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REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

EAST INDIA (TRANSPORT OF TROOPS);

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

APPENDIX, AND INDEX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
1 *July* 1858.

Jovis, 4° die Februarii, 1858.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire concerning the measures resorted to, or which were available, and as to the Lines of Communication adopted for reinforcing our Army during the pending Revolt in India; and to report thereon to this House, with a view to ascertaining the arrangements which should be made towards meeting any future important emergencies involving the security of our Eastern Dominions.

Lunæ, 8° die Februarii, 1858.

Committee nominated, as follows:—

Sir De Lacy Evans.	Sir Charles Napier.
Viscount Goderich.	Mr. Osborne.
Lord Stanley.	Captain Vivian.
Sir John Pakington.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. Horsman.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir Ed. Colebrooke.	Mr. Crawford.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Seymour.
Mr. Adderley.	

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Cammittee.

Ordered, THAT the Returns (presented 5th February) relative to Transport and Conveyance of Troops be referred to the Committee.

Martis, 23° die Martii, 1858.

Ordered, THAT Mr. Sclater-Booth, Lord John Hay, and Mr. Adderley, be added to the Committee.

Jovis, 1° die Julii, 1858.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to report their Opinion, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire concerning the measures resorted to, or which were available, and as to the Lines of Communication adopted for reinforcing our Army during the pending Revolt in India, and to report thereon to The House, with a view to ascertaining the arrangements which should be made towards meeting any future important emergencies involving the security of our Eastern Dominions;——HAVE considered the Matters to them referred, and have come to the following RESOLUTIONS, which, together with the Evidence taken before them, they have agreed to report to The House:—

1. THAT the Inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the Overland Route to India; the second, to the employment of Steamers, as compared with Sailing Vessels, for the Transport of Troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the Mutiny of the Military resources of this country and of the Colonies.

2. That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the Overland Route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation.

3. That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet.

4. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route.

5. That although the Overland Route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.

6. That if Steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by Sailing Vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of Steam transport was

attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of Steam Vessels than were actually employed.

7. That Steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.

8. That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.

9. That the Committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country, and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the Army in India during the past year.

1 *July* 1858.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Jovis, 11° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Byng.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Adderley.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Sir Charles Napier.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Horsman.	

Sir DE LACY EVANS was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, at Twelve.

Martis, 16° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Bernal Osborne.	Lord Stanley.
Mr. Byng.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Crawford.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Willoughby.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Adderley.

The Committee proceeded to the consideration of their course of proceeding.

Motion made and question proposed (Sir *J. Pakington*), "That the inquiries of this Committee ought to commence from the day on which it was determined by Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Directors, on account of the mutiny in India, that it was necessary to send reinforcements to our army in that country":—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), to leave out all the words after the word, "That," in order to add these words: "The inquiries of this Committee should commence from the date when the Government and Board of Directors received the first despatches communicating the meeting at Barrackpore and elsewhere, in February":—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 8.
Sir Charles Napier.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Sir John Pakington.	Mr. Willoughby.
Lord Stanley.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Lord Goderich.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Crawford.
	Mr. Seymour.
	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Adderley.

Words added. Main question as amended put and agreed to.

The Committee called and examined Mr. *Philip Melvill*, and Mr. *Mason*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 19° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Horsman.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Osborne.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Seymour.	Sir C. Napier.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Lord Stanley.

The Committee examined Captain *Shepherd*.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, at Twelve.

Martis, 23° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Byng.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Seymour.	Captain Vivian.
Lord Stanley.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir Charles Napier.	Mr. Crawford.
Sir James Elphinstone.	

The Committee examined Mr. *Lumsden*, Captain *Harris*, and Mr. *Mason*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 26° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Byng.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Adderley.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Seymour.	Mr. Willoughby.
Captain Vivian.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Osborne.
Lord Goderich.	

The Committee examined Mr. *Mangles*, a Member of the House, Mr. *Mead*, and Admiral Sir *H. Leake*.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, 16th March, at Twelve.

Martis, 16° *die Martii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Byng.	Sir C. Napier.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Crawford.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Mr. Horsman.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Danby Seymour.

The Committee examined Admiral *Milne* and Captain *Hoseason*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 19° *die Martii*, 1858.

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Lord Goderich.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. Crawford.	

The Committee examined the Right hon. *Vernon Smith*, Sir *Allan Macnab*, and Sir *Henry Storks*.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, at 12.

Martis, 23° *die Martii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord Goderich.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Sir C. Napier.	Sir Edward Colebrooke.
Mr. Horsman.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Crawford.	Captain Vivian.

The Committee examined the Right hon. *H. Labouchere*, a Member of the House, and Sir *Frederick Currie*.

The following question being put to the witness (Mr. *Seymour*): "What does the oath of secresy relate to?"—An objection was taken to the question (*The Chairman*).—Question put, "That that question be put." Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 3.
Mr. Crawford.	Lord Goderich.
Mr. Seymour.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Byng.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	

The examination of the witness was resumed.

The Committee examined Sir *George Clerk*.

[Adjourned to Friday, at Twelve.

Veneris, 26° *die Martii*, 1858.

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Horsman.	Sir James Elphinstone
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Byng.	Lord John Hay.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Sir Charles Napier
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Osborne
Captain Vivian.	

The Committee examined Captain *Engledue*, superintendent of the Peninsula and Oriental Company, at Southampton, Mr. *Allan*, Mr. *Hertslet*, and Mr. *Beatson*, staff surgeon.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, 13th April, at 12.

Martis, 13° *die Aprilis*, 1858.

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir Charles Napier.	Lord John Hay.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Captain Vivian.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned.

Martis, 8° *die Junii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord Goderich.	Captain Vivian.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Sir Charles Napier.	Mr. Bernal Osborne.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Lord John Hay.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.	Sir James Elphinstone.

A draft report proposed by the Chairman, was read 1° as follows:

"The Minutes of the Evidence and the Documentary Statements annexed to this Report are for the most part from highly reliable sources, individual and official. The greater number of Witnesses were specially conversant and of much experience in connexion with the topics on which they were examined; and their testimony is the more valuable, having been obviously given with no other motive than that of furthering the public interests. The results of this investigation will therefore, it is hoped, be found to contain information well calculated to lead henceforth, on the questions referred to, to correct conclusions both as to the past and future.

"With this preliminary observation, your Committee will now endeavour to point out as briefly as possible—

"1st. What measures appear to have been resorted to, in order rapidly to reinforce our army in India.

"2d. What might in some specified instances have been preferably adopted, with a view to accelerate the transmission of these reinforcements.

I.

"PRECEDING INCIDENTS.

1943. "On the 9th of April was received the first telegram of symptoms of disaffection in the sepoy ranks; of incendiary fires at different points, attributed to sepoys; and of a mutinous spirit in several native regiments stationed near Calcutta.

"In the copies of despatches transmitted to this Committee, and particularly that of the 11th of February from General Hearsey (considered one of the most competent officers and best acquainted with the natives of any in India), there were already strong expressions of anticipated danger, such as, 'We have at Barrackpore been dwelling upon a mine ready for 'explosion.'—'Well might Sir C. Metcalfe say, that he expected to awake some fine morn-'ing and find India had been lost to the English Crown.'

"From that period commenced a considerable anxiety in the public mind concerning Indian affairs. On the 19th of May a former Governor-General, inquired in the House of Lords whether reinforcements were being sent to India. The Minister for War replied in the affirmative, but added, 'that the intelligence recently received from India 'had not been such as to create any apprehension in the minds of Her Majesty's Ministers 'for the safety of our Indian dominions.' In the House of Commons also (June 11), Ministers declared that the public need be 'in no alarm as to the recent unfortunate 'occurrences, as the late disaffection among the troops in India had been put an end to.'

"It

" It appears from the evidence of Colonel Sir H. Storks, of the War Department, that 'so soon as the first inkling of the mutiny in India took place,' the intelligence regarding which arrived on the 9th of April 1857, the Secretary of State for War addressed the President of the Board of Control (April 14), recommending a permanent increase of two regiments of infantry to the establishment of the Queen's troops in India,—in consideration of the 'recent occurrences in India,'—of the 'vast territories' of late years annexed to the possessions of the East India Company; and to supply the place of the troops detached for the 'War in Persia.' Certainly, for the augmented requirements thus shadowed forth, two regiments must seem but a scanty provision. 1943. But it would appear that this communication of April 14 was not transmitted to the Court of Directors, by whom its receipt is denied.

" It appears in the same evidence, that the Court of Directors of the East India Company applied, in the latter part of April, for four regiments to replace the four regiments diverted from their Indian destination to China. The reason given for this requisition being—'the uncertainty of the duration of the operations in China.' On the 2d of May, the Secretary of State for War requested His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief to make arrangements for sending four regiments without delay to India, in conformity with the requisition of the Court of Directors. On the 21st of May, the Under Secretary of State for War, Sir Benjamin Hawes, addressed the Board of Control, to the effect, 'That, in the opinion of the War Department, the reinforcements to India ought not to 'be despatched later than the 20th June.' But Mr. Melville, the Secretary to the Military Department of the East India Company, states in effect, that till the accounts of the outbreak at Meerut, no anxiety as to the insufficiency of British troops prevailed 'on the 'part of the Governor-general,' nor 'in the Court of Directors.' That the communication made by Lord Canning was so 'satisfactory that no serious anxiety was entertained.' The director, Captain Shepherd, corroborates Mr. Melville. Some official statements in Parliament were of a similar import. May 2 and 4. 269. 36. 183. 185. 187. 336.

"II.

" Revolt at Meerut, Seizure of Delhi by the Mutineers, 10th and 11th of May.

" On the night of the 26th or morning of the 27th of June, telegram of these events reached London. This telegram arrived at noon, on the 26th of June, at Trieste, bringing intelligence from Alexandria of June 21; from Bombay, May 27; Calcutta, May 18; Madras, May 25. Its transit was therefore about 20 hours from Trieste; six days from Alexandria; from Bombay to London 31 days; from Calcutta to London 40 days. 2175.

" Including 4,000 European troops then detached to Persia, the British portion of our Eastern army was then between 8,000 and 9,000 below its establishment. We had been rapidly annexing kingdoms to our already vast territory, while diminishing in an inverse ratio the means of securing the results of that ambitious policy. 1804.

" Various indications of the extension of hostility to our rule were now but too quickly perceivable. Over a line of 1,500 miles, from Calcutta to Peshawar, our utterly unprepared and isolated detachments, being in a few days outnumbered everywhere by unexpected foes, were placed in unparalleled difficulties.

" The political and material advantages accruing to the rebels by their seizure of Delhi were of the utmost magnitude. It was so appreciated throughout Asia and Europe. Every day, every hour of their retention of that fortress imperiled our dominion. The urgency of remedying this state of affairs was surely impossible to exaggerate. Such also, to the fullest extent, were the opinions of the Governor-general, as expressed in several of his telegraphic orders.

" For this purpose, then, to collect and despatch reinforcements by the speediest means, and by every practicable exertion, to the scene of action, became the most pressing duty of Government. They could only be collected from the forces in the United Kingdom, from those in the colonies, and, especially in the first instance, from the stations nearest India,—Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Cape. Accordingly, application to the Governors of these nearest colonies was immediately resolved on by the supreme authorities of the different Presidencies.

" Sir H. Lawrence, from Lucknow, on the 16th of May, telegraphed to the Governor-General, 'All is quiet here, but affairs are critical: get every European you can from 'China, Ceylon, and elsewhere; also all the Goorkas from the hills: time is everything.'

" Sir John Lawrence telegraphed for the Governor-General, June 3:—'All is safe as 'yet in the Punjaub; but the aspect of affairs most threatening. The whole native army 'are ready to break out; and unless a blow be soon struck, the Irregulars as a body will 'soon follow their example. Send for our troops from Persia; intercept the force now on 'its way to China, and bring it to Calcutta. Every European soldier will be required to 'save the country, if the whole of the native troops turn against us. This is the opinion of 'all the leading men here. Every precaution which foresight can dictate is being taken, to 'hold our own independently of the natives.'

" On the 17th May Lord Elphinstone telegraphed for authority, from the Governor-General, to despatch a fast steamer to Suez, to convey to the Home Government, as early as possible, the disastrous news from Delhi. This suggestion, the Governor-General did not deem it necessary to accede to.—Mr. Melville, the Military Secretary of the East India Company, estimates the time thus lost in transmitting the intelligence at about 10 days, 'not more.' Papers laid before Parliament. 1269. 48. 49. 50.

1943. "Lord Elgin immediately assented to the desire of Lord Canning to postpone the Chinese operations, and to re-divert to Calcutta the four regiments on their way to Canton, which had been originally destined for India—two for reliefs, the other two to replace the regiments withdrawn from the Indian establishment during the Russian war. Lord Elgin also repaired himself to Calcutta, affording at the same time the opportune co-operation of the 'Shannon' and 'Sans Pareil' ships of war; the Government transports, 'Himalaya,' 'Assistance,' 'Assurance,' 'Simoom'; of a body of marines, and of the naval brigade of artillery, which has since so often performed, under Sir William Peel, such signal services.

"This reinforcement was highly opportune and important. Before its arrival at Calcutta that capital was not in security.

III.

"Ceylon and the Mauritius.

2141. 2142. 2145. 4th June. "The requisitions for assistance addressed to the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius were responded to in a manner entitling these authorities to the 'highest tribute of praise.' It was most 'meritorious.' Scarcely half a dozen hours had elapsed after his receipt of this requisition, when Sir Henry Ward had despatched from Ceylon to India nearly all the force within the colony, retaining less than 300 British bayonets to maintain order in a population of one million seven hundred thousand.

"The praiseworthy promptitude of Governor Sir James Higginson was similarly displayed, by likewise almost denuding the Mauritius of its garrison. Never since its conquest, in 1810, was it left with so small a military defence.

"The Government at home, seeing that from Ceylon there had been sent to India almost all its European troops, deemed it right to afford some substitute, by directing one regiment to be sent to that station; but Sir H. Ward, preferring to incur risk within his own com-
4142. mand, despatched that regiment also, without delay, to Calcutta, and this at a time 'when 'there were not wanting rumours of the disposition on the part of the (Ceylon) population 'to disturbance and insurrection.'

"While touching, however, on the above incident in regard to the Mauritius, we are unwilling to leave without record in this report the offer of support, in case it should be required,—from the French Governor of the neighbouring island, extracts from which, and from the suitable reply of General Hay, are subjoined:

"The Governor of the Island of Bourbon (Réunion), to the Governor of the Mauritius, 14 September 1857.

"'I know equally well that the troops at Mauritius have been, for the most part, sent to Bengal. 'You have more than 132,000 Indians in the island which you govern; these men, constantly in com-'munication with Mussulmen of the revolted countries, have received letters inviting them, it is 'reported, to rise. It is to be feared that insurrectionary movements will disturb the sister island. 'The Government of the Emperor has sent me a garrison destined to replace the one which is to return 'to France after its term of colonial service is completed. This places, at the present moment, rather a 'large number of troops at my disposal. I am about to propose to you, that should you perceive any 'symptom of revolt, if the Indian population of your island should be considered, or should become 'excited by their co-religionists of the Peninsula, and should raise the standard, I would propose to you, 'I say, to place under your command a part of the garrison of Réunion. You have only to make a 'signal, and the French troops shall be under your orders.'

"Reply of Major-General *Hay*, administering the Government of Mauritius, to the Governor of Réunion.

"'I beg to assure you that I feel the deepest gratitude for the noble offer of assistance you have made 'me, should the disastrous rebellion of the natives in India extend to the coolies in this island, and 'should I find myself placed in such a position as to require aid, I shall not hesitate to apply to you in 'the same frank and fraternal spirit which has dictated your generous offer.

"'You will be pleased to hear that I have carefully watched the current of events and feelings here, 'and that I entertain no apprehension of a rising. I have, however, taken every precaution, and am 'prepared for whatever may occur.'

"IV.

"The Cape of Good Hope.

"According to the last Colonial Statistical Tables presented to Parliament (for 1855), we find that the male white population of British South Africa, including Natal, numbered (British and Dutch) but 60,336; with a coloured population (Fingos and Hottentots), but little more numerous. The adults, therefore, of European origin may perhaps be estimated at one-fourth, or about 15,000.

2570. Papers presented to Parliament, Despatch of Troops to India, March 1858. "From a return adduced in his evidence by Mr. Labouchere, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, the troops in South Africa, on the 31st of July last, amounted, in 'rank 'and file,' to 10,666. It was a seasoned force. Assuming this return to be correct, we must add to it, for the non-rank and file, the most expensive as well as important element of efficiency, about 1,250.

"For colonial corps in the last official 'Tables' above quoted from, there are considerable items of charge for Kaffir and frontier police, mounted police, Fingo levies, &c., numbers not given. On the 7th of August, Governor Grey states his having augmented by 200 the Border Mounted Police, which he alludes to as a very efficient corps. He also states his intention of completing to its full establishment the Cape Mounted Rifles, viz. 1,084.

"The

" The garrison of this dependency was therefore of the following strength :—

" Artillery, engineers, 13 regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, rank, and file (by order of the Minister for War. ' War Department, ' November 12, 1856,' the German Legionaries were directed ' to be told off' into ' three regiments ' of about 800 men each) - -	10,666
" Non-rank and file (officers, serjeants, general staff departments, &c.) -	1,250
" Colonial mounted and infantry police, border police corps, &c., for which charges are referred to of 74,000 *l.* per annum (£. 60,000 being mentioned as the Colonial charge; £. 14,000 from Imperial funds) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,300
" TOTAL of all Ranks - - -	13,216

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RETURN OF TROOPS IN SOUTH AFRICA. 31st July 1857.

	Rank and File.
Artillery -	421
Engineers -	245
2d Foot -	746
6th ,, -	717
12th ,, -	409
13th ,, -	768
45th ,, -	850
60th ,, -	717
73d ,, -	745
80th ,, -	779
85th ,, -	769
89th ,, -	707
Cape Mounted Rifles -	793
Three regiments of German Legion -	2,000
	10,666

(signed) *R. Bates.*
Major, Military Secretary.

Officers, serjeants, staff, &c. - -	1,250
Colonial Corps	1,300
TOTAL -	13,216

To which it appears should be added, a considerable force of volunteers, as thus alluded to in a despatch of November 26, 1857 (Appendix No. .)

" ' When I assumed the Government there were no volunteer corps in existence. Since ' my arrival here 19 such corps have been raised, all armed, clothed (and mounted in the ' case of the cavalry) at their own cost. These are now, generally, in a state of high ' efficiency.'

" No such inconsiderable community, in point of numbers, was probably ever before provided with so large an army,—not only free of cost to themselves, but with this extra important advantage, that the provisioning and requirements of the troops afforded the best possible market for the produce of various descriptions at the disposal of the colonists.

" There is also an ' irregular mounted military force,' referred to in the same despatch, as ' under the command of the general,' of from 500 to 600 men, but not very distinctly particularised. Likewise a mounted ' police,' (he says) ' paid out of a small reserved sche- ' dule of 14,000*l.* per annum,' granted from Imperial funds, ' for frontier purposes.'

" Independent, however, of these circumstances, the comparative proximity of this station to India (being nearer to Calcutta than England by 7,200 miles), led justly to anticipation that powerful reinforcements would have been promptly transmitted from thence to the East. It will be seen in how far this was realised.

State of the Kaffir tribes.

" The actual state of ' starvation,' and consequent prostration, into which the Kaffir tribes have fallen commenced in 1856, and is distinctly attributable to the ravages of the ' *lung*' disease among their cattle. This disease also carried off many thousands of the cattle within our own provinces. The results, from this and other causes, lead to the inference, that REGULAR TROOPS were not then really required to be retained at the Cape to keep those tribes in check. The following extracts from despatches of the Governor appear to us to bear out this inference :—

" To the Secretary of State, 14 July 1856.

14 July 1856.

" ' IN British Kaffraria everything was quiet and prosperous; the natives, who, poor ' people, had suffered severely from the lung sickness among their cattle, were employed in ' large numbers in opening up the country by roads, and upon other public works, and ex- ' pressed themselves most grateful for the employment that was afforded to them.'

" To the Secretary of State, 27 August 1857.

27 August 1857.

" ' IF we are obliged to put forth our strength in India, I shall continue to augment the ' BORDER MOUNTED POLICE FORCE, and to get it into the highest state of efficiency; and ' if we are compelled to enter into any active operations against the native tribes, such ope- ' rations shall be principally carried on by rapid movements of the CAPE CORPS and the ' MOUNTED BORDER POLICE.'

" To the Secretary of State, 2 November 1857.

2 November 1857.

" ' THE Kaffir nation has been effectually crushed.'

" The Government of the Cape to the Governor-General of India, 25 August 1857.

25 August 1857.

" SUGGESTS a proposition to receive in South Africa 10,000 sepoys, with their wives and families, at the expense of the Indian treasury,—and observes—

" ' It may not, however, be superfluous to state, that the colony is making rapid strides in ' material progress and social improvement; that the continuance of peace on the frontier, ' and the PROSPECT OF A COMPLETE EXEMPTION FOR THE FUTURE FROM KAFFIR WARS ' AND ALARMS, are working important changes throughout the colony, which may be traced ' in the enclosed, &c.'—The Governor-general transmitted this despatch to the Home Government.

"REQUISITIONS FOR REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE CAPE.

"THE late Secretary of State for the Colonies directed the Governor of the Cape (June 29) to despatch a regiment of infantry to Calcutta 'as speedily as possible.' A regiment was also directed (July 14) to be sent 'forthwith' to Ceylon. Again, on the 26th of August, the Governor was instructed to send six regiments to India 'with as little delay as prac-'ticable.' The admiral on the station was at the same time directed to provide for this purpose maritime means of transport.

"On the 27th of November, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies again addressed the Governor as follows:—

"'You are fully apprised of the desire of Her Majesty's Government that you should 'avail yourself of the circumstance of so large a number of troops being assembled in the 'British province of South Africa, to render the utmost assistance in your power to the 'Indian administration, and I trust that you will have been able to despatch considerable 'additional succours to that country, where seasoned troops will be especially valuable.—I 'should hope, from the accounts which I have lately received from you, that the present 'condition of the British provinces in South Africa, as well as of the native tribes in their 'vicinity, will have rendered such measures quite compatible with the due security of the 'colonists.'

"EXTRACT of a Despatch from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P., late Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Governor of the Cape, dated February 5, 1858.

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858, p. 28.

"'ALTHOUGH you have not fully complied with the instructions which I gave you in my 'despatch of the 26th August last, in which I expressed the expectation of Her Majesty's 'Government that you would be able to spare six regiments for service in India (including 'the one sent to Ceylon), retaining four in South Africa, besides the Cape Mounted Rifles 'and the German military settlers now under arms, and leaving you to determine, in con-'junction with the Commander of the Forces, what particular regiments should be selected 'for that service.'

"'I understand from your several despatches that the total amount of succours which 'you have sent to India and Ceylon from the force stationed at the Cape, have been 'four regiments and a detachment of artillery, viz.:—95th Regiment, 800, which was sent 'to relieve the 89th; 13th Regiment, 500; 80th Regiment, 500 (sent to Ceylon); 6th 'Regiment, 760.'

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858, p. 42.

"If this official statement of the Secretary of State be correct (and there is no reason to doubt it), no accounts had reached the Colonial Office up to February 5, 1858, that any greater reinforcements had been sent from the Cape to India than four regiments of infantry, numbering 2,560. Nine regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, besides artillery and engineers, having been therefore still retained by the Cape authorities.

"On the 29th of June (and 8th of July) Lord Elphinstone and the Council of Bombay addressed to the Governor of the Cape a most impressive representation of the alarming position of affairs in our eastern dominions,—soliciting 'four regiments of infantry and 'three companies of artillery to be sent to Bombay and Calcutta,' or, 'at the very least,' one regiment. This despatch reached the Cape on the 6th of August; and a reply was written to the Bombay Government, to the effect that one regiment, from the garrison of the Cape, the 95th (so soon as it should arrive from England) and one company of artillery, would be sent to that Presidency.

Page 20.

"There was at the same time a contingent promise, mentioned to the Secretary of State, as follows:

"'I have, however, written to Sir James Jackson (the Commander of the Forces) request-'ing him to make every exertion to spare another regiment from this command; if we can 'with any safety accomplish this, such regiment shall immediately be sent on to Calcutta.' It was alleged that Sir J. Jackson was indisposed to send any troops from his command. No troops went, however, from thence till the 30th of August. On that day 400 or 500 men of the 13th regiment were embarked for India; in the following month, the 95th regiment was embarked.

Sir G. Grey. (No. 131.)

Pages 20, 23.

"The 89th, destined for New Zealand, the 23d and 93d, destined for China, and a relieved company of artillery destined for England, were diverted from these destinations to India by order of Sir G. Grey. But none of those corps belonged to the garrison of the Cape.

Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858, p. 17.

"The Governor of the Cape (November 5) informs the Secretary of State, that on 'mature consideration,' as the instructions of the 26th of August (directing *six* regiments to be sent forward to India) did not '*specially repeal*' those of the 1st of August (directing only one regiment to be sent forward), he deems it for the 'public service' to continue to act on the more limited instruction of the 1st of August, 'for,' he adds, 'it does not do 'lightly to depart from a plan of operations once entered on.'—'It appears to me' (he goes on to say), 'to whom was entrusted THE FINEST VETERAN FORCE WHICH BELONGED TO 'ENGLAND,

'ENGLAND, that it was safer for these, and other reasons, not too largely to exceed the 'demands for troops made upon me.'—'The Indian Government' (he further remarks), 'may have thought that disasters would result if too large masses of troops were suddenly 'poured into an unhealthy country.'—'It was most probable that no barrack accommoda-'tion existed for them.'

"But it was obvious that the reinforcements requested, were for the *field*, not for *barracks*.

"Although, as has been mentioned, the Kaffirs were officially represented (November 2d and 5th) as 'effectually crushed,' 'completely broken,' 'the prospect of complete ex-'emption from future wars' with them announced;—'the blessings of a lasting peace and 'a prosperity surpassing any expectations,' predicted;—the Governor, notwithstanding, addresses the Secretary of State (November 11), as follows:— Papers presented to Parliament, March 1858.

"'You informed me in your despatch of the 26th of August last, that two young regi-'ments were coming out to relieve two veteran regiments in this colony. I think, until 'this relief is accomplished, no more troops can go on from hence to India; nor, indeed, 'are they at this moment required there.'

"And yet at that date, the 'finest veteran force which belonged to England,' had only afforded a reinforcement to India of two regiments and some artillery. In the return before quoted, the rank and file of artillery at the Cape (31 July 1857), were 421. In the statement of General Peel, in the House of Commons (25 March), the artillery, rank and file, at the Cape, at the date of the last returns (1 December 1857), were 353.—Difference 68. While at the same time, the Governor-General had not yet a sufficient number of soldiers at his disposal, to rescue the beleagured women, children, and sick, from Lucknow!

"And nearly at the same period, the condition of the survivors of the starving and helpless tribes, to guard against whom so many troops were still withheld from India, was described, as follows, by the Governor, in his despatch (Appendix, No.).

"'The Kaffir population has dispersed, upwards of thirty thousand have become hired 'servants in the colony, some thousands have fled to Fakus' country, and beyond it, some 'thousands to Moshesh's country, some thousands, I fear, have perished, and some thou-'sands have been supported by charitable aid afforded them.'—'It will be found that 'sixty-eight thousand and thirty-four souls, that is, two-thirds of the population, have dis-'appeared from British Kaffraria alone in the first seven months of this year.' Appendix, No.

"It was under those circumstances that 'Her Majesty's (late) Government thought it 'right to point out,' 'discrepancies' and 'conflicting statements' in the representations from the Cape relative to the Kaffirs, and as to the reasons assigned for placing the German Legionary settlers on 'full pay and field allowances,' 'although there was no 'enemy in the field, nor any present apprehension of such an enemy:' (and though there were then in the colony) 'no less than ten British regiments, besides the Cape Mounted 'Rifles.' Appendix, Nos.

"General Sir George Napier, who was Governor of the Cape for six years, and maintained peace throughout that period, states in his evidence (1851),—'The Committee must 'be aware that there are a great many people in the colony, who make a great deal of 'money by wars, whose constant cry was 'HAVE MORE TROOPS.' Committee of Inquiry, 1851.

"Sir George Clerk, who was recently Special Commissioner on the Kaffir frontier, was offered the appointment of Governor, and who may fairly therefore be regarded as well and intimately acquainted with this topic,—states in his evidence that the Dutch settlers are quite capable of restraining Kaffir trespassing and cattle-lifting propensities, without the aid of any British regular troops or of regular military operations. The Kaffirs, he adds, are not a people likely to invade our territory, unless their pasture-lands are attempted to be taken from them. The many thousands of them who have lately passed in a starving state, seeking for labour within our territory, can be restrained (he is of opinion) from any disorderly conduct by the local police. 2237. 2243. 2250.

"But this witness goes on to state, that the prosperity of this colony depends on the expenditure from the military chest; that the greater the amount of this expenditure, the more it contributes to the profit and good humour of the colonists; that a Governor would thus find things made much easier to him in every way, by retaining 'a large army expend-'ing there money brought from England.' 2226. 2229. 2237. 2241.

"The expenditure from the Imperial Treasury for the forces above enumerated, has been at the rate of 600,000*l.* per annum. The Home Government have, however, to defray large additional sums beyond the above 600,000*l.* for maintaining the forces referred to; for instance, share of recruiting expenses, of transport of reliefs and drafts, for clothing, arms, and military stores, share of pension, invalid and non-effective charges. Such an extent of disbursement must of course be well calculated to gratify and enhance the 'ma-'terial prosperity' of its recipients, whose scanty numbers (and consequently greater advantage) have been already given from official returns.

"And in these facts may no doubt be traced an explanation of the apparent remarkable tardiness, in parting with troops from this colony, to succour on the present occasion our Eastern, as previously (it is said) our Crimean Army.

"But the description in Sir G. Grey's despatch, already quoted, of the ruin of the Kaffir tribes, is fully corroborated by the last intelligence from that colony, published in the 'Cape Town Mail' of March 22d, of which the following is an extract:—

"'The Royal Mail Steamer "Bosphorus" leaves for England this afternoon.

"'The breaking up of the late formidable Caffre nation seems to be almost completed. 'Kreili, the paramount chief, being called to account for his conduct, has fled beyond the 'the Bashee River, leaving depopulated all the country between that river and the Kei. 'Four of the other principal chiefs sentenced, after formal trial, to imprisonment for various 'crimes—Macomo, Seyolo, Vandana, and Quesha—are at present confined on Robben 'Island, at the entrance of Table Bay, and another, the much-trusted Pato, in the Cape 'Town prison. Dilima, son of the last-mentioned chief, has also been apprehended and 'convicted of "horse-stealing."

"'The last year's revenue had been 65,000*l.* in excess of the expenditure.'

"Finally, taking all the circumstances to which our attention has been directed, into consideration,—the local interests of border farmers or graziers in Africa, on the one hand, —and on the other, the requirements of a great war still raging in the most important dependency of the empire,—your Committee are of opinion, that of the 13,000 efficient troops of all ranks at the Cape, besides numerous volunteer corps, 9,000 or 10,000 men might, and ought to have been spared for reinforcing the army in India. This assumes that a portion of the most favoured of all military corps (the German Legionaries) would have been willing to participate in field duty. Even if the larger number (10,000) were despatched, there might have still remained a German regiment of 800, Cape Mounted Rifles 1,084, foot and mounted police 1,300, total 3,184, besides the organized volunteers; altogether an ample force for the totally improbable eventuality of any operations against the wretched remains of the Kaffir people. And if the Home Government and the Government of India had been without delay informed by the authorities of the Cape, that such an amount of succour would be available, we may safely assume that means would have been procured to place, before the end of the last year, this powerful aid at the disposal of our commanders on the Ganges.

"Of our small and widely dispersed army, it should be borne in mind, that, independent of India, about fifty regiments are usually stationed in distant colonies or garrisons, for the most part, thousands of miles asunder. This includes about 9,000 men of colonial corps. It is important then that prompt and unqualified action in regard to inter-co-operation by the civil and military chiefs of these various detached forces should be peremptorily enjoined by the supreme Government, for all occurrences of any serious or unforeseen national exigency.

"But the principle, even without any instruction from Government, which should guide our remote authorities on such critical occasions, has been so well and patriotically laid down in a passage of Governor Sir Henry Ward's despatch to Viscount Canning, of the 1st of June 1857, that we trust it may be of utility to quote it in this place.

"'I mention this (he says) to show that not a moment has been lost here in complying 'with your Lordship's wishes at so critical a moment. But in justice to the Major-general '(Lockyer), as well as to myself, I must add, that nothing but the strongest sense of duty 'could have induced us to hazard the step which we have taken. *We feel that it is in 'India at the present moment that the battle of British supremacy must be fought; that it is 'upon India that the prestige of England depends; and that all minor considerations must be 'lost sight of, to sustain the national honour.* Although, therefore, I see clearly that by 'reducing the English element in the small military force maintained here too low, we lose 'our best security for the good behaviour of the rest, and that with large capitals invested, 'and small groups of planters scattered over separate districts, we might be reduced by 'any sudden combination against us to the state of the European communities in the valley 'of the Ganges, whose perils your Lordship so feelingly describes, I prefer this responsi-'bility to that of withholding the aid which your Lordship asks, and which circumstances 'so imperiously require.'

"Such also was the conduct of the civil and military chiefs of the Mauritius;—so likewise, in a brilliant degree, at a previous period, was that of the civil and military chiefs of Malta (Sir W. Reid and General Sir James Ferguson), who, on hearing of the dangerously reduced numbers of our army in the Crimea towards the close of 1854, immediately despatched thither, without waiting for orders from any quarter, every British soldier on the island,—trusting to the inhabitants for its defence."

"V.

"CANADA.

"ON the arrival of the eventful accounts from the East, there were in Canada and the adjoining provinces, no very considerable body of troops. But not only was the immediate withdrawal of the chief portion of them, cordially concurred in by the authorities and population of that colony,—but the spontaneous offers to raise Canadian regiments in aid of the parent State, made during the Crimean war, were now again transmitted, in a similar spirit of patriotism.

"Canada

"Canada is increasing in population and resources, very much more rapidly than the United States, or any other portion of that continent. This and the other less considerable provinces of British North America, now contain a population of 3,000,000,—which was about that of the United States, when they successfully contended with and threw off the yoke of England. This noble dependency, is evidently destined to become at no distant period a powerful State. 2051. 2054. 2055.

"Through its centre flows into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the greatest estuary in the world. On the shores of the chain of lakes or inland seas, of which this estuary is the only outlet, is now or ere long will be, an extraordinary amount of agricultural produce for exportation. On its northern bank is the fortress of Quebec, whose port is already so considerable an entrepôt, and in which there have been of late as many at a time, as 1,300 vessels.—Such are the maritime prospects and resources of these shores, of above a thousand miles extent. 20.

"We have had the evidence on this topic of Sir Allan MacNab. This gentleman originally served as a British officer in the war with the United States, of 1812, 1813, and 1814. Since then, he has filled several of the highest official appointments in that country, including those of President of the Chamber of Deputies, and President of the Executive Council, or chief Minister.

"He states that a very remarkable feeling of loyalty and attachment to the mother country exists in Upper Canada;—that it was settled by the United Empire Loyalists, a description of people who, rather than forfeit their allegiance, left their property in the United States and accepted grants of land from the Crown;—also by half-pay officers and soldiers who had served during the old revolutionary war. In fact (he says), all the leading families of Upper Canada are men of that description now; and in Lower Canada no men could have behaved better than the Frenchmen did, during the last American war. 2048.

"He is of opinion that the French part of the population, are similarly attached with the British of Upper Canada, to the alliance with England; that they are a 'very well inclined, 'very loyal, and very excellent people.' 2057.

"'They (French and English) want,' he says, 'what they are fairly entitled to, 'namely, to have the British army opened to them as it is opened here. I do not see any 'difference in a man born in Canada and a man born in England.'

"They were desirous, he states, as does also the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, of raising Canadian troops to aid us, during the Crimean war; as recently for the war in India. He thinks that if this force had been officered by Canadians, the commanders and staff to have been taken from the British army,—that in such case, the Canadians would have felt that it was the opening of a new profession to the young gentlemen of that country; and—'THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MIXING THEM UP WITH THE BRITISH 'ARMY IN THE GENERAL DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE.' 2055.

"A corps is now, it appears, at length to be embodied in Canada,—but not quite, we regret to perceive, in conformity with the opinion of this witness,—as a large proportion of the officers are to be British. Appendix, No.

"We have had and are but too likely to continue to have, abundant reason to regret, that our former policy towards the United States has, it may be feared, engendered in that now powerful federation, feelings towards the parent State, rather of rivalry or alienation than attachment. We should sedulously avoid a similar error in respect to the remaining portion of that great continent, which still willingly acknowledges our sovereignty. The people of the home territory of this empire, can scarcely be deemed adequate to the varied and immense responsibilities they are so wont to undertake. Not only the present but future contingencies of war are within the scope of the inquiry of this Committee. Emergencies may yet arise to task us beyond our unaided means. In such an event, to be enabled to count on the cordial and powerful co-operation, of a numerous and gallant kindred race, at no great distance from our shores, would certainly be a resource greatly desirable. With this view then, to increase the ties of mutual sympathy between us and such truly loyal fellow-subjects, will, in the opinion of your Committee, be a sound policy; and to this end no course seems more likely to contribute, than that of identifying them with our army and with our military enterprises.

"VI.

"THE QUESTION OF STEAM OR SAILING VESSELS, FOR TRANSPORT OF TROOPS INDIA.

"OUR last war with a revolted colony, that of the United States, was eminently unsuccessful. One of the causes assigned for the failures in that contest, was that the colonists were near to, or in the midst of their own resources, however insufficient these resources sometimes might be;—while England had to convey her troops, stores and reinforcements, over a sea line of 3,000 miles. But the advantages of a short line of communication between a base of operations or source of supply and an army in the field, need no demonstration.

"We have still a native army in India, of perhaps one hundred and fifty thousand men. The European army (of Her Majesty and the East India Company) at present actually in India, may number probably eighty thousand men.

"The distance over sea by which the latter part of this great army has to be conveyed and has to carry on its communications, reliefs, and successive drafts from Britain to the mouths of the Indus and Ganges, to Calcutta, Madras, Kurrachee and Bombay,—may, in round numbers, be reckoned (according to past arrangements), as about fourteen thousand miles.

"The maintenance of war under such unparalleled circumstances, from so vast a distance, and on such a scale of magnitude, is without example in history; must aggravate the arduousness of the national efforts to an extreme extent, and possibly, for a considerable period. To alleviate the difficulties, dangers, and sacrifices thus entailed, demand the adoption for their remedy, of every expedient that can be devised.

"Hitherto, on all occasions, it has been the practice to effect the reliefs of regiments in India, by this long sea voyage, in sailing vessels. This habitude may, perhaps, partly account for the announcement of opinions on the part of the authorities of the Admiralty and of other departments, at the commencement of the late events, that sailing vessels would be still preferable to steamers for the conveyance of the troops.

"Up to the 10th of July that opinion continued to be acted on. To that date, of 31 vessels taken up, nearly the whole were sailers; but it has been alleged, and perhaps correctly, that the prevailing winds in July and August, warranted for these months, the opinion in favour of sailing ships.

"In the interval from the 10th of July to the 1st of December, of the 59 ships taken up for troops (several of a good, some of the best class), 29 were screw steamers. This at all events afforded tests, though not accurate ones, of the relative qualities of steamers and sailing vessels in accomplishing the transit. No sufficient experience, it is stated, had been yet had, of the employment on long voyages of screw steamers. Doubts were entertained as to the means of replenishing coal on the voyage. But slight provision at depôts, appears to have been previously made, either by Government or for the mercantile marine. Of the four regiments despatched about the middle of July, two were embarked on steamers, two on clippers, or fast sailing vessels.

"According to the Return furnished by the Marine Department of the East India Company, giving names of transports and length of passages to the four principal ports of India, the following will be the average results, as between steamers and sailing ships:— Appendix, No.

"FROM ENGLAND TO CALCUTTA:

"From 6th August to 21st October 1857: average of nine steamers, omitting fractions	82 days.
"Average of 22 sailing ships: 10th June 1857 to 27th August 1858	116 days.
"In favour of steamers: difference	34 days.

"TO MADRAS:

"Average of 2 steamers	90 days.
" 2 sailing ships	131 days.
"Difference in favour of steamers	41 days.

"TO BOMBAY:

"Average of 5 steamers	76 days.
" 9 sailing ships	118 days.
"Difference in favour of steamers	42 days.

"TO KURRACHEE:

"Average of 3 steamers	91 days.
" 10 ships	128 days.
"Difference in favour of steamers	37 days.

"Average of the whole of the 19 passages by steamers to the four ports of India	83 days.
"Average of passages of 43 sailing ships	120 days.
"Difference between averages of steam and sailing vessels	37 days.

"The

"The expense charged for steamers in most of these cases may perhaps have been treble that for sailing ships. This great enhancement of charge however for steamers, gradually diminished after the first unusual pressure of demand. But in so vital an emergency expense was expressly admitted to be unimportant as an element of calculation.

"As to the exact value of these averages, it is for nautical men to form a judgment. But though they may be wanting in some of the particulars requisite for complete comparison, still it must be admitted that the above averages do afford element for an approximative estimate of the relative motive powers of wind and steam, in relation to the class of transports at present available in the merchant marine market.

"Looking again to this official return, dated 27 February 1858, we have to notice the following amongst the results of the long sea route on the present occasion:—

"To CALCUTTA, were conveyed by steamers	6,798	men.
" " " sailing ships	9,489	"
"TOTAL to Calcutta	16,287	"
"To MADRAS, by steamers	2,089	"
" " sailing ships	985	"
"TOTAL to Madras	3,074	"
"To BOMBAY, by steamers	3,906	"
" " sailing ships	3,439	"
"TOTAL to Bombay	7,345	"
"To KURRACHEE, by steamers	1,351	"
" " sailing ships	2,321	"
"TOTAL to Kurrachee	4,272	"

"By steamers 1,951 men,—by sailing ships 4,029,—were sent to CEYLON (Total 5,980); but as this was a destination merely of rendezvous, expressly to 'await orders as to 'port of destination,' to refer to the transport of this portion of the troops might lead to inaccuracy.

"It appears, then, from the above, without referring to Ceylon, that 27 steamers carried to the four ports of disembarkation in India, 14,144 men; averaging therefore 548 men in each ship. That in 55 sailing ships were conveyed 16,234 men; averaging 289 men in each. Now by the same official statement of averages, it appears that the 14,144 men conveyed on steamers, arrived at their destinations on an average of 37 days sooner than the 16,234 men embarked on sailing ships. We have no sufficient evidence to enable us to state, that any considerably greater number of steam transports could or could not have been procured at that time in the market. But we may at least observe, that in so far as that could have been done, a portion of the latter number would have arrived at their destinations by some weeks earlier than they actually did. But we draw this inference distinctly, with a view to the future, rather than to the past.

VII.

"THE 'OVERLAND ROUTE.'

"The transport of troops by this route, we believe, to be a branch of our inquiry of great importance. A controversy in regard to it, between the Board of Control and the East India Directors, appears to have commenced coevally with our first information of the Indian revolt.

"The expediency of dispatching by this line some portion of the reinforcements, was repeatedly proposed by members of the House of Commons so far back as during the last year's Parliamentary Session. Her Majesty's Government then dissented, however, from these propositions.

"Subsequently to those discussions, political obstacles to the passage of our soldiers through Egypt, have been occasionally alluded to by members of the Government. But the slightest inkling as to the weight or character of these political considerations, has not been communicated to your Committee. And though alleged to have been entertained by the Cabinet in July, as they were waived in September, and since then continuously to the present time, we are totally unable to attribute any importance, if even a reality, to these assigned considerations. Moreover, it seems to have been forgotten, that if there were any validity in this political obstacle, it ought similarly have operated to prevent what has been going on for years in the knowledge of all Europe, namely, the constant passage and repassage through Egypt of all ranks of our military officers, from commanders-in-chief down to the humblest subaltern.

"Mr. Vernon Smith, the late President of the Board of Control, states that, 'on looking 'back, the only things he regretted are, that the forces that were under engagement to go 'out in slow sailing vessels were not taken out of those vessels, and put in other ships, and 'that more screw steamers were not sent at an earlier period;' that he considered the dangers of the Red Sea in the hot season immense; that there was the possibility of the demoralisation of the troops; that, in short, there was no manner of preparation there for the passage
1895. overland; and that he had a gentleman in his office, Sir G. Clerk, with whom he was constantly in communication, who was decidedly of the same opinion as himself with respect to this route, and as to the insalubrious climate of the Red Sea in summer. Dr. Beatson, he
1896. added, was also prepared to give valuable evidence on the latter point. Colonel Sir H. Storks, Secretary for Military Correspondence at the War Department, was likewise suggested as a witness on the part of the Board of Control.

1915. "1. Sir H. Storks generally coincided in the opinions of Mr. Vernon Smith. He had
1916. twice passed through Egypt. He 'went down the Red Sea in May, and returned in the
1921. 'month of October 1851.' On going down the Red Sea no death took place during his voyage; but on returning in October, two deaths occurred, a naval surgeon, and an officer
1922. of the East Indian Civil Service. He attributes these deaths to sleeping on deck; almost all the passengers except himself slept on deck. His own health was 'not at all' injured. He had merely passed through Egypt. But he entertained a 'strong opinion about the 'insalubrity of the passage through Egypt for troops during the summer months;' believed that troops landed in India after this passage, would not be in so good a condition as after
1926. the voyage round the Cape. He adds, however, in the latter part of his evidence, that with respect to the troops subsequently sent through Egypt, everything 'has gone on very
2002. 'well.' The railway is in the 'most efficient state.' Excepting in the hot months, 'there
2019. 'would be no difficulty in sending any number of troops across the Isthmus of Suez, with 'proper arrangements.'

2257. "2. Sir G. Clerk states that he has been over the Red Sea passage three times, but not during the worst part of the year (July and August). Could not say the climate of the Red Sea was unhealthy when he was there, but it is impossible for a crowd to be comfortably stowed away. Believed that ladies and children pass by that route, but they have accommodation. The companies that work the line there, have everything admirably conducted, and they would have done it as well as any other company in the world, perhaps better. The ships are good, the service well looked after on shore and afloat,—but they
2258. cannot do impossibilities. He deems it the 'very worst route that could be thought of for
2265. 'troops;' a 'precarious,' 'false and baseless system of transit, where the troops have to
2285. 'scramble on jackasses across the desert, and you cannot rely upon anything even so 'organised as that for a continuance.' In regard to the climate, his objections, he said, principally applied to the months of 'July and August.' Under the circumstances that
2268. did occur, however, he was of opinion that this transit might have been practicable, provided provisions, means of transport, and accommodation had been prepared, and 'provided 'Egypt belonged to us.' At Suez 'you require rations for the men to eat and ships to 'float them, and good drinking water is brought from far off.' 'You may evaporate altogether
2277. 'in a healthy climate; that is the condition of Suez.' At the same time, he had not heard a word against the conduct of the troops now going by this line, for whom 'there have been 'admirable arrangements made.'

"This witness is well known to be a high authority on questions of Indian as well as Kaffir policy, but we confess that some of his opinions on this local and partly maritime topic, appear to us totally unsupported by facts. Already, though at a later period than necessary, above 5,000 British troops have arrived in India in excellent health, by this 'precarious, false, and baseless' transit.

2854. "3. Dr. Beatson, whose sanatory objections to the Red Sea passage were so much relied
2855. on, had 'passed down' that sea 'only once,' in the month of August 1851; found no difficulty in passing through Egypt; the heat in the Red Sea was the most intense he ever
2861. experienced; but there was no sickness, no malady, no deaths, in the Red Sea; but on the
2863. passage from Aden to Galle an engineman died. There was 'very great discomfort from 'intense heat;' but on the whole, so far as he himself was concerned, he 'preferred very much
2866. 'this mode of transit to India to four months' voyage round the Cape.' He had been in the
2867. last Burma war. Of the force with which he served (1,050 men), 43 died of cholera, after
2868. the capture of Rangoon. To a crowded deck passage from Madras, and to hardships and
2869. privations during the attack on Rangoon, he attributes the loss of these 43 men. 'All
2881. 'fresh arrivals (in India) are very subject to outbreaks of cholera.' With regard to the
2891. transit by the Red Sea, Dr. Beatson 'would not hesitate to adopt it in a great emergency;
2911. 'did not think the risk so great, provided suitable arrangements existed for embarking the
2901. 'men; but would not recommend it in ordinary circumstances.'
2902.

"Various corroborative statements will be found in our proceedings, to the effect,—that
2255. so soon as the events of Meerut and Delhi became known,—the Directors of the East India Company submitted earnest representations to Government, and continued to do so, with a view to despatching a portion of the reinforcements by Egypt. Almost the whole of them had directed their exclusive attention, from earliest life, to Indian affairs. They were necessarily, for many years, in constant communication with their civil and military officers, constantly going to and returning from the East in all seasons, by the short overland route. But their representations remained without result for nearly three months. On the 19th

September

September permission was given for detachments to be passed over Egypt. The first detachment of 200 men embarked at Malta on the 1st of October, and arrived at Aden in 12 days.

" Above four months elapsed before 281 men of the first regiment (the 69th foot) were sent by this line; they embarked at Plymouth on the 11th of November, and arrived at Madras in 34 days, being less than half the time of the swiftest passage round the Cape. The 94th regiment embarked from Plymouth on the 8th December, and arrived at Kurrachee in 37 days. The 863 officers and men of this corps were conveyed from Plymouth to Alexandria on the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ship 'Albeona;' from Suez to Kurrachee on the steamer 'Oriental.' The 71st foot, 861 officers and men, proceeded from Malta on Her Majesty's ships 'Vulture' and 'Princess Royal,'—arrived at Bombay, 1st wing in 18 days,—2d wing in 16 days. Appendix, No.

" It appears that the Governor-General in Council assumed that the Home Government would have despatched troops by the way of Egypt. The following is a passage from the Governor-General in Council's letter to the Home Government, dated 7th of August 1857: Appendix, No.
'We are also in communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company for the conveyance from Suez of the troops that may possibly have been despatched to India by that route. Soon after, the intelligence of the mutinies reached England. It is understood that the ordinary mail steamers of this company can bring 400 men from Suez each trip, and more if there are few passengers. Instructions have accordingly been given for preparing the 'Bentinck,' the steamer which conveys the present mail, for the reception on board of that vessel of as many men as she can convey in addition to the ordinary passengers.' 1820.

" In France likewise it seemed to have been assumed, as a matter of course, that the acceleration of our reinforcements must at that moment have been a paramount object of British policy. Not doubting then of the overland route being adopted, the Emperor Napoleon spontaneously, and in the most generous manner, promptly tendered permission for the passage over France by British troops, to enable their being embarked, if deemed desirable, at Marseilles for Egypt. This was appropriately acknowledged in the House of Commons during the last year's Session, by the then Premier.—The same anticipation, doubtless, actuated the Sultan's Government, by whom a firman was immediately offered and transmitted for our troops to pass over the Egyptian territory. Every one, we believe, who had the slightest knowledge of the local Government of the latter territory, was fully aware of the special willingness of his Highness the Viceroy or Pacha, to render every possible assistance towards the progress of our forces. 2850.

" This was amply proved; when at length, the superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, in Egypt, Mr. Holton, was authorised to make application on the subject. Extracts of the reply, transmitted to us from the East India House, are as follows: Appendix, No

" 'The answer of the Viceroy respecting the passage of the troops, ex 'Ripon,' through Egypt, was received last evening. His Highness states that it will be a satisfaction to him to give facility to the passage of not only 200 men, as in the present instance, but to that of 20,000, if necessary, and not '*en bourgeois*,' but in uniform, and with their arms, if required.'

" 'No physical difficulty exists,' the superintendent adds, 'in the passage of troops through this country; 10,000 men (by rail and marching) might easily be transported (from Alexandria) to Suez in 60 hours.' 'A thousand men can easily be transported across the Isthmus in 30 hours; baggage and stores in 48 hours.' 'Artillery could also be transported; Appendix, No
but until after the completion of the railway (next April) it would have to be limited to very light field pieces.' 'The Viceroy is very desirous to convey through his country as many soldiers as possible; and so great a disposition does he display to facilitate their movements, that he adds, 'I will consider them not as transit passengers, but as my own, and will carry them by my own private engines, carriages, and trucks.'

" It is certainly worthy of remark that, in support of the course they pursued, the late Government only had to adduce the before-named two or three official witnesses, who coincided, it is true, with their chiefs, but whose actual information on the matter was obviously deficient.—Neither of them having been ever, as they admit, in Egypt or on the Red Sea, during the summer months.

" On the other hand, in the annexed Minutes of Evidence, and in the Appendix, are contained numerous and concurrent testimonies in favour of the adoption of this line of transit. Several of them from persons of most extensive local and practical experience, and therefore of great and unquestionable authority on the subject.

" 1. Captain Harris states—that he has been 40 years at sea; originally commanded the 'Lowther Castle,' East India Company's ship; subsequently commanded during 11 years Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers; navigated in those steamers between Calcutta and Suez during nine years; passed up and down the Red Sea 68 times, at all seasons of the year; is at present nautical assessor to the Board of Trade; is of opinion that no serious maritime dangers are incurred in the Red Sea, certainly not for steamers; to tow the ordinary Arab vessels of the country would be dangerous; no danger whatever in towing English vessels up the Red Sea, but doubts that steamers could tow sailing 840. 882.

clipper-vessels against the monsoon from Bombay to Aden. In the monsoon at sea, the rain is merely in occasional squalls; on the whole, it is fine weather in that season from
898. Socotra to Bombay; it is when the south-west monsoon reaches the western ghauts of India
996. that it precipitates itself in heavy rains. Passengers coming from India are usually in impaired health, therefore occasional deaths take place; passengers leaving England,
860. arriving in this very hot weather, usually make no difference in their diet or mode of living,
861. and on the voyage to India consequently deaths sometimes occur, as everywhere else, from imprudence; but with troops, he apprehended that the commanding officer or their
1040. doctor would take care that proper attention was paid to their diet. To persons in ordinary health, no impediment whatever from heat or personal suffering to undertaking that voyage.
1041. In the hot season of the year in the Red Sea, might have had occasional sickness on board
1042. his ship, but never any violent diseases, such as fever or cholera; his passengers suffered considerable inconvenience from heat, but no cases of sickness in consequence of it, that he
1042. remembered; considers Suez a sanatorium, one of the finest climates in the world; does not see how troops could be demoralized there; in the summer extremely warm, but still healthy; sees no difficulty as to water. At Aden, the water of the Peninsula, though not good, is used without injury to health by the garrison and inhabitants; does not think that even in the monsoon, troops would experience more than ordinary occasional sickness in passing down the Red Sea; an entire regiment, the 94th, was landed at Kurrachee without a case of sickness; other detachments landed in India without a single case of sickness; as a maritime station, states that Aden is one of the finest harbours in the world; at Aden it rarely happens that you have any gales of wind at all,—never amounting to a gale; counts the voyage during the south-west monsoon (June, July, and August), from Malta to Bombay as 20 days,—from the Mauritius to Bombay as 30 days,—from the Cape to Bombay 35 to 40 days. Thinks we have had a proof that clippers proceeding round the Cape cannot arrive in India, even with the inducement of a high premium, so quickly as screw steamers.

Four days from Malta to Alexandria, thence three days to Suez, five days from Suez to Aden, thence to Bombay, eight days.

" 'Under all circumstances, and in all seasons, considers that the best way of carrying 'troops to India, is for the Government to organise a line of sea transport down the Red 'Sea; this might be organised by the Government, but it could also be as efficiently carried 'out by private enterprise.'

" The extraordinary experience of this witness, as a navigator of eastern seas, has induced us to extend this summary of his important evidence.

" 2. Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, of Her Majesty's Navy, was Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy for the last five to six years—directed the embarkation of the army for the Persian Gulf. During the six months ending 17th September, when he left Bombay, there were 140 vessels lying in Bombay Harbour, and only one steamer—had a great many steamers under his command, but they were dispersed over the Indian Ocean. About 110 of these were very fine ships, splendid and fast sailing ships belonging to this country. When the 10th Hussars went to the Crimea, they did not lose a man on the voyage to Suez, and but 12 horses out of 1,400. Some men who had had chest complaints were all recovered when they arrived at Cairo. This regiment and the 12th Lancers were embarked for Egypt under his direction—four steamers and six sailing ships conveyed them,—there were 1,600 men and 1,400 horses. The hay and water required nearly as much tonnage as ten times as many men. Had the Government judged fit to send screw line-of-battle ships to Calcutta and Bombay with troops, it would have had an extraordinary and electric effect on the whole population of the country. The moral effect would have been enormous. The steam companies have large depôts of provisions at Suez; is favourable to employing line-of-battle ships for troops, if lower-deck guns taken out; does not see why troops being on board should upset the crew of a well-disciplined man-of-war. Received permission from the Court of Directors to build a 60-gun frigate (68-pounders), to be so constructed as to be capable of being converted into a line-of-battle ship, or a transport, a screw vessel on the plan of the 'Shannon.' Was aware that there is a difference of opinion as to the expediency of carrying troops on board ships of war. Does not think there would be any injury to the health of troops in the passage through Egypt or by the Red Sea,—nor the slightest difficulty on the score of health, want of provisions, or water,—but you must take care of your commissariat beforehand. Went with his family to India by the Red Sea—for three days it was intolerably hot, but nothing to interfere with health,—'we were as 'healthy as usual, and we ate and drank as much as usual.'

" 3. Mr. Engledue, formerly a lieutenant in the English navy, has been employed for the Peninsular and Oriental Company, since 1840, in the transmission of mails and passengers through Egypt,—was the first superintendent sent out to arrange the coaling stations to India; has been 18 years officially concerned in this transit,—is now superintendent for that company, at Southampton; at different times has been in Egypt, in India, to Calcutta, down the Red Sea; across the Indian Ocean; and has made several trips at all seasons of the year; considers Suez, in the month of July, though hot, one of the purest atmospheres you can breathe; landed there himself, when nearly dying from dysentery,—remained there 12 days, but had recovered some days before the end of that period. The European
2412. troops at Aden have been healthy; considers that it is as hot in Malta as in the Red Sea;
2413. believes Cairo to be particularly healthy; thinks that on an emergency there are no serious
2414. difficulties to be apprehended for troops in the Red Sea; believes that a body of troops
2415. conveyed by one of the Peninsular Company's ships would be much more comfortable than
2416. under

under canvas in the field, in the hot season of the year. A vessel (he says) going nine or ten knots an hour always creates a draught, and with double awnings, and sails over the usual awnings, and wetting them, you might make matters very comfortable; found it equally warm in India as in the Red Sea, in June, July, and August; only showers of rain occasionally in the Red Sea; in the Indian Ocean, rain comes in the monsoon only in squalls, and not continuously, as in India; rarely in the monsoon any severe weather in the Red Sea; between Aden and India there are sometimes heavy seas; but nothing like the Atlantic Seas.

" The first detachment of the 57th regiment proceeded from Malta to Aden in plain clothes, as ordered from home. The Pacha said 'he did not wish anything of the kind, 'that they might march through with their arms. He turned into ridicule the idea of our 'sending them in plain clothes.' The arms, accoutrements, and kits of the men were packed in arm-chests adapted to the purpose, but not exceeding 200 lbs. the case. The whole journey (of this detachment), deducting stoppage and certain accidental detentions, was completed from Alexandria to Suez in 17 hours. 'The arrangements made for giving '(the troops) two meals *en route* were excellent.' 'The men were provided with one day's 'cooked provisions in the haversacks, in case of need.' 'The railway is capable of carrying 'any number of men, the viceroy frequently being accompanied in his excursions through 'the country by 5,000 troops at a time.' 2419.

" 'I have never known but one feeling, either with the old pacha, Mehemet Ali, or the 'present one' (says this witness),—'and that is to give every facility in sending things 'through Egypt, troops and baggage, and everything else.'—Even when our fleets were bombarding Acre, then garrisoned by Egyptian troops, Mehemet Ali declared his determination not to interrupt in any way our passage over his territory. 2417. 2525.

" The fact fortunately is, that the continuous use of this line by England contributes in a very important degree to the revenues of the Viceroy, and to the pecuniary advantage of his people.

" 4. Admiral Alexander Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, thinks it is always objectionable to send troops in line-of-battle ships to any great distance, particularly across the tropics; it is all very well in the Mediterranean. Our ships of war (16 line of battle, besides frigates and smaller vessels), brought home 21,404 men from the Crimea. Some of these large ships brought home as many as 1,700 men, with a full crew. The lower deck guns were not taken out. There are merchant ships lying at the Cape generally. There were four ships of great power at the Cape—the 'Penelope,' the 'Megæra,' the 'Castor,' the 'Boscawen;' a line-of-battle ship, ready if required. The Transport Department under the Admiralty is reduced since the war. There were nine of Her Majesty's ships set apart since the peace for transport services;—the 'Himalaya,' the 'Urgent,' the 'Perseverance,' the 'Assurance,' the 'Assistance,' the 'Simoom,' the 'Vulcan,' the 'Megæra,' and the 'Transit.' The 'Transit' was lost, and there are now only eight.—When the troops were brought home from the Crimea, they must have been 'exceedingly crowded' in the ships of war. 'It is lucky that there was no sickness.' 'We all know' (Admiral Milne says), 'that it is a great inconvenience to have ships lumbered with troops, and the discipline and 'drill and everything is interfered with; it is always to be avoided if it can be.' 1651. 1664. 1723. 1724. 1728.

" 5. Mr. Lumsden, senior member of the Council at Bombay, left Bombay the 15th August 1857, for England, over land. Has been seven times up and down the Red Sea; so far from the health of his fellow passengers having been affected, it was quite the reverse; they were all very well. The heat of the voyage in the Red Sea continues for two or three days. There are reefs in the Red Sea,—but it has been very well surveyed by the officers of the Indian Navy. Does not of late years recollect a case of the loss of a ship. Does not think the monsoon is felt at all in the Red Sea. There would be no difficulty on the score of health, in sending by it at any time of the year a considerable number of troops by way of Egypt, with proper precautions, not over-crowded, and with good awnings.—After the news from Delhi, they all at Bombay had the impression that it would end in a serious general revolt. Was very anxious to obtain troops from Malta, where he heard there were 10 regiments. The water at Suez is brackish; Nile water is sent from Cairo. Had for several months an unusual number of clippers, very fine vessels, at Bombay; 500, 1,000, or 2,000 men might remain at Cairo without inconvenience. Lord Elphinstone showed from the first the greatest energy and activity, and sent and received telegrams himself without waiting to consult his Council. 701. 702. 732.

" 6. Mr. Mead states that he was ten years in India. Has been six times up and down the Red Sea. On the last occasion the ship was full of women and children; no death or sickness occurred. Does not recollect on any occasion any death or sickness in the Red Sea. Recollects at the commencement of this revolt, before he left Calcutta, a proclamation published by Nena Sahib, stating as an encouragement to the revolters, that the Viceroy of Egypt and the Sultan had totally cut off the means England had possessed of sending reinforcements through Egypt.

" 7. The Chairman of the Court of Directors, Mr. Mangles, states that Colonel Fraser, who was employed during the Crimean War to superintend the transport across Egypt of the 10th and 12th regiments of Cavalry, from India, wrote to the War Department, in August last, very strongly in favour of the overland route. Recollected that Lord Elphinstone in his private letters expressed several times his regret that the overland route had not 1260. 1261. 1262. 1263. 1355.

not been adopted. He had written on the part of the Court, very early in the day, to the President of the India Board, to ask whether the Admiralty would give some line-of-battle ships to take out troops; and the answer was, that Sir Charles Wood had no ships for us.

1303. Says 'We were not (in the first instance) so satisfied as we are now, as to the great superiority of screw steamers (over sailing vessels).' Was of opinion that to have sent out troops to India in the very hot season would have cost life; but that as it was a grave emergency, that risk might well have been run, as the rapid appearance of reinforcements in India would have been of such eminent service.

"8. Captain Hoseason, a commander in the Royal Navy, has served nine years in the Mediterranean; considers Egypt very healthy; that there is an error in regard to the word 'monsoon;' it is only a wind blowing periodically in a certain direction; it is just as healthy as any other wind. The south-west monsoon (he says) is not an infectious wind; it is a retarding wind for vessels coming from India to Suez, but it is wholesome, in fact, it purifies all India when it comes. Has been many times in Alexandria; no inconvenience to lay in the harbour of Alexandria; has been two months at a time there; the harbour is of great capacity, the facility of going in and coming out of it, for steamers, is proved by the wonderful regularity of the mail steamers going to and coming from India.

"9. Captain Shepherd, a Director of the East India Company, and member of the Committee where all matters connected with shipping and transport of troops to India are

380. managed, has no hesitation in saying, that from the first he was very anxious that troops should be sent overland; that they fixed the period for the ships to be ready, but the troops were not ready under three weeks; had heard the other day that the 94th Regiment, after all their misfortunes in the Bay of Biscay, had arrived at Kurrachee, by Egypt, in 37 days from London. Had his wishes been acted on, troops would have arrived at Bombay 22 days sooner; at Kurrachee, the difference would have been greater. Were the affair to occur again, he would certainly, for the long sea voyage, have recommended screw steamers, in preference to clippers or sailing vessels. A proposal was made, on the 22d of August, to the East India Company, by Messrs. Croskey & Co., on behalf of the European and American Steam Company, for the conveyance of troops overland, to the effect that there should be a fortnightly despatch from this country, and that 1,000 men should be sent by each conveyance. The reply was, that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of sending any considerable number of troops through Egypt.

"10. Mr. Allen, managing director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company,—states that the Company has latterly charged 40*l.* per man to Calcutta, all expenses of every description included therein. The Pacha of Egypt charges the company 5*l.* per soldier and 10*l.* per officer, for the use of his railway across Egypt, and for the use of his carriages. The Pacha's ordinary charge for passengers is 10*l.* There are particular charges for different kinds of mercantile commodities. Gold and silver and jewellery form a very large portion of them. The duties levied by the Pacha on silver and gold is 7*s.* 6*d.* per cent. During the last year there were forwarded by the company through Egypt at least a million and a half sterling of silver per month.—(The duty payable therefore, last year, to the Pacha

2652. on silver alone, must have been about 76,000*l.* The additional transit charge would pro-
2653. bably have carried this payment on silver to above 100,000*l.*)—Ladies and children pass at
2663. all seasons of the year. The Peninsular Company receive from the Government for assist-
2664. ing to forward the mails over 200,000*l.* a year. The company have 45 steam ships, ranging
2665. from 2,600 tons to 700. About two-thirds of these ships are in the Eastern Seas, one-third
2681. on this side of Egypt. The 10th Dragoons, in 1854, were a little troublesome at Cairo, but
2706. nothing of that sort has occurred since. The water at Aden is a little brackish, but the
2713. troops drink it, and are very healthy. If the authorities had called on the company in the
2744. month of July last to send troops for them overland, the company could have done it then
2757. just the same as it has been done since; he anticipated no difficulties whatever. The
2759. Pacha attributes great importance to the overland transit; is very desirous of facilitating
2794. it; does not believe the Pacha consulted the Sultan about it.
2804.
2808.

Appendix, No. "11. Dr. Fraser, surgeon 10th Hussars, states from Suez, 3d January 1858, 'The temporary hospital I have opened here succeeds satisfactorily.'

"'At present, however, everything is going on well, especially that which I regard as the most important item; fresh water is delivered with regularity, and in sufficient quantity. I have therefore no fear but that those under my charge will be comfortably provided for, as in almost every other respect we are independent, having such an ample supply of preserved provisions of every kind, to have recourse to if need be. The house, of course, has been thoroughly cleaned, fumigated, and white-washed, and though of humble appearance, the men are as well provided for in essentials, that is, so far as their comfort and well-being in every respect are concerned, as if the structure were of greater pretensions. It is well ventilated, and in an airy situation.' (December 16, 1857.)

"Early in this inquiry, a letter was addressed to our Chairman, which was laid by him before the Committee. It was transmitted through a Member of the Committee, Mr. Bernal Osborne. It appears to your Committee so specially relevant, and so unimpeachable a testimony on the point at issue, that we deem it right to submit it, verbatim, in our Report, as follows:

"Sir, Oaklands, Clonmel, 3 March 1858.

Appendix, No. "I HAVE seen in the papers that you are Chairman of a Committee of the House of Commons, to inquire, amongst other matters, as to the practicability of conveying troops to India in the summer, through

through Egypt and the Red Sea. It appears to me that the question was solved when a large force under Sir David Baird proceeded from India in the year 1801, and landed at Kosseir in May and June; crossed in nine days the desert to Kherie, on the Nile; proceeded down that river, garrisoned Alexandria; and in the following year, 1802, several regiments returned to India by Suez and the Red Sea, in the month of June. That force, amounting to 5,000 men, consisted of a troop of horse artillery, six guns, some field batteries, a troop of dragoons, and several regiments of infantry. They had with them guns and small arms, ammunition, camp equipage, baggage, and 120 chests of treasure. The troops generally were very healthy. The march across the Suez Desert from the Lake of Pilgrims, near Grand Cairo, to Suez, was performed in four days with the greatest ease; marching by night and encamping during the day. In June the ships proceeded to India, the wind at that season blowing down the Red Sea. They made a very quick passage.

"There are probably several officers in England, who, like myself, served the whole campaign under Sir David Baird; but I am very willing to give any information on the subject, if the Committee should wish me to do so.

"I have marched through the whole of Oude in June and July, and I found the heat much more oppressive than I did in the Suez Desert.

"I have, &c.
(signed) "*P. Phipps*,
"Colonel, E.I.C.

"Lieut.-General
"Sir De Lacy Evans, G.C.B., M.P.

"Most truly does Colonel Phipps observe, that the question was in fact solved by the historical facts which he so graphically relates. And this was when there were no Steam Navigation Company's agents to aid our arrangements, and when no railway existed.

"Coming down now to the actual present time, annexed are a series of official letters on the subject, addressed through the Military Secretary to His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief. They are from Colonel Pocklington, Deputy Quartermaster-general, appointed in October last to direct and superintend the transit of the troops. This correspondence, continued to the latest date, has been transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State for War. It is most explicit and satisfactory. Colonel Pocklington informs His Royal Highness that 'No difficulty whatever exists in the transit, small bodies of troops being treated in every respect as ordinary overland passengers. The transit administration evince every disposition to favour our troops, and to attend to their individual comfort, and the security of the stores.' In the course of the evidence, it was requested that a comprehensive Report might be obtained from Colonel Pocklington for the information of the Committee. Within the interval of about a month it was transmitted to us. Not having been in Egypt during the summer months, he abstains from giving any decisive opinion as to whether the transit during that period 'would or would not prove 'detrimental to the health and stamina of the men.' But he says, that during his 'six 'months' experience (autumn, winter, and early spring) of the overland route, I am not 'prepared to mention a single disadvantage this line possesses as a medium of transport for 'troops to reinforce Her Majesty's army in India.'

Appendix, No

Overland route.

"As the authority of this Report is beyond question, as the facts appear to be most carefully stated, and having been expressly prepared by direction of the War Department for this Committee,—we herewith submit it:

"Sir, Alexandria, 7 April 1858.

"In obedience to the instructions of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, contained in your letter of the 22d *ultimo*, with *enclosure* from the War Office, dated 20th March 1858, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the report called for respecting the advantages or disadvantages of the overland route for the transport of troops to India.

"I have, &c.
(signed) "*L. H. F. Pocklington*,
"Col. Dep. Quartermaster-gen.

"Major-General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B.,
"&c. &c. &c.
"Military Secretary, Horse Guards, London.

"Report on the Overland Route to India as a Means of Transport for Her Majesty's Troops.

"The advantages of the overland route are very considerable, and the trajet most simple.

Advantages.

"A thousand men per week can be conveyed across the isthmus by the Transit Administration of Egypt, without interference with the ordinary passenger traffic.

"Between 300 and 400 men can move at a time, and perform the distance from ship to ship in 26 hours.

"The transit by rail is completed to within almost 20 miles of Suez.

"This last portion of the journey is performed by the soldiers on donkies in about six hours.

"The same activity does not exist as heretofore in the completion of the line of rail to Suez, but it is expected to be finished throughout before the end of the current year.

"There can be no doubt as to the experiment having succeeded, and the chief cause of good order and success arises from the practice of conveying the troops continuously from ship to ship on either side of the isthmus, never allowing them to land for detention in the country.

Number of troops crossed overland from 5 October 1857 to 7 April 1858:—Officers, 214; Men, 5,303.

"Troops, if practicable, should not arrive at Alexandria till corresponding tonnage is available in the Suez Roads to receive them. Moreover, it is highly important that all troops, moving by passenger ships down the Red Sea, should receive 'between deck' accommodation accessible at all times, for, at the minimum, one-half of the number of men embarked, the same as in transports specially chartered for the conveyance of soldiers. The absence of this has created very natural dissatisfaction, and been a subject of complaint by the troops. No article of baggage accompanying the troops is allowed to exceed 250 lbs. in weight; two such are a camel's load. An occasional package of three-and-a-half to four tons can, on an emergency, be conveyed across the Desert at the present moment.

General Arrangements, &c.

"Two meals during the transit are furnished to the soldiers at the cost of the steam-ship company conveying the troops.

"One day's cooked provisions are taken in their haversacks in case of accidents in the Desert.

" For passage across the Isthmus, including disembarkation at Alexandria, and re-shipment at Suez (performed by lighters and steam-tugs), but exclusive of refreshments, the Transit Administration of Egypt charge 5 *l.* for each officer, first-class carriage, and 224 lbs. of baggage allowed to each; 3 *l.* for each soldier, second-class carriage, and 112 lbs. of baggage to each.

" First-class carriages hold 24 persons; second-class carriages hold 30 persons. Line of rail single.

" A thousand camels could, at 10 days' notice, be procured for Desert transport.

" A thousand donkies at Cairo by 48 hours' previous warning.

Disadvantages.

" During six months' experience (autumn, winter, and early spring) of the overland route, I am not prepared to mention a single disadvantage this line possesses, as a medium of transport for troops to re-inforce Her Majesty's army in India.

" The limited amount of material that just at present can be conveyed, seems the only military difficulty, but on completion of the railway to Suez this will no longer exist.

Concluding remarks.

" The expediency of forwarding troops overland to India in the summer, exposed to the Desert's sun, with the great heat of the Red Sea following, is a matter for consideration, and how far the injurious effects likely to arise from the said exposure, would or would not prove detrimental to the health and stamina of the men.

" The last detachment of young soldiers (260 men of various corps) that crossed the Desert on the 27th ultimo, seemed, on arrival at Suez, to feel the effects of their six hours' exposure to the sun.

" To perform the trajet on donkey-back during dark nights would be most tedious, liable to accidents, and unadvisable.

" The advantages of the overland route have been greatly enhanced by the facilities afforded our troops by his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, followed by the ready and most obliging co-operation of the director and executive officers of the transit administration, whose prompt attention has been invariably given to any suggestion it was thought requisite to offer for the convenience or comfort of Her Majesty's troops.

" (signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington.*

" Alexandria, 7 April 1858. " Colonel and Deputy Quartermaster-general.

" It is well known that on the very day of the arrival at Constantinople of the news of the revolt, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government to know if he should apply to the Turkish Government to allow our troops to pass through Egypt on their way to India. On the 2d of July Her Majesty's Government replied by telegraph, that it was not their intention to send troops by that route. On the 2d of October Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was directed to ask the formal permission of the Porte and the Pacha of Egypt to pass over the Isthmus, which was immediately complied with by both. Three months, therefore, had already elapsed before detachments were sent by this line, and nearly four months elapsed before we availed ourselves of it for a regiment of infantry.

Overland route.

" In the summer of 1854, the 10th and 12th Regiments of Dragoons (1,400 horses, 1,600 men), arrived in Egypt from India, and were forwarded thence to the Crimea. These corps, though their transfer took place during the hot months or monsoon alleged to be so insalubrious, and though they had to remain some short time in Egypt, are known to have been remarkably healthy and efficient, and to have continued so, throughout their Crimean service. This transit, and all the arrangements for it, were superintended by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, of the Bombay Army, who was selected for that duty by the then Governor General, the Marquis of Dalhousie. It appears that while thus employed, anticipating the possibility of additional troops being required from India 'during the sultry months of 'June, July, and August,' Colonel Fraser proposed a plan to the Governor-general for effecting that object. Lord Dalhousie not only approved of it, but directed it to be strictly adhered to in the event of any further transit.

" The internal means of transport after disembarkation of troops also requires notice. Much difficulty and delay are represented to have occurred in forwarding the troops to Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Lucknow. It is said to have taken a month to push forward 3,000 men by detachments to Allahabad. The reinforcements, therefore, have usually joined the army by driblets. Six little steamers are mentioned as having been got ready to assist these movements, but of so small locomotive power as to be unable to tow against the stream. There are in India some thousand miles of river navigation, the Indus, the Ganges, and some of their principal tributaries, being of course the most important. Such as these are doubtless the best natural highways of all countries. The great towns, many of which are strategic posts, are almost invarably on the banks of rivers. To navigate the majority of them effectively, steamers, we are told, ought not to draw more than two feet of water. It is to be hoped that such vessels have been provided, or are in course of construction, as undoubtedly by this means our military operations would be powerfully facilitated.

Screw Steamers on the Long Sea voyage.

" Opinions having been very generally expressed and entertained as has been observed, in the House of Commons, to the effect that screw steamers were not employed in a sufficient proportion for the conveyance of reinforcements to India by the long-sea voyage; that the overland route was not adopted for a portion of these reinforcements at as early a period in the crisis as its advantages and facilities justified; and generally, that the national forces were not expedited to the scene of action with as much promptitude as the painful and momentous character of the revolt demanded.

" On reverting to the statements and calculations brought forward in a preceding page (xvi), it will be seen that, had the 16,000 men embarked upon 55 sailing ships been conveyed on steamers, they would have arrived and become available for operations, on an average, 37 days sooner, or at all events considerably sooner, than they actually reached their destinations.

" During from three to nearly four months elapsed as we have remarked, before Her Majesty's Government directed arrangements or preparations to be made for transporting, by Egypt, a portion of the reinforcements so imminently needed by our army in the East. Reiterated objections were made, that tedious and difficult negotiations were involved; Overland rou
that great injury to the military stores and efficiency of the troops must arise from their disembarkation at Alexandria and re-embarkation at Suez; that the passage of the desert presented serious obstacles; and that the extreme insalubrity of the transit rendered its adoption altogether inadmissible.—The evidence annexed to this report induces your Committee to feel convinced, that these objections were either great exaggerations or totally and completely unfounded.

" Several thousands of our troops, we must repeat, have now reached India by this line, with extraordinary advantage as to economy of time, and with perfect preservation of health. —The first regiment that was despatched by this line, passed from Plymouth to Bombay in 37 days. Of the first regiment sent from Malta, the first wing arrived at Bombay in 16 days, the second wing in 18 days. An overwhelming mass of evidence, from numerous reliable witnesses, has been laid before your Committee, attesting the peculiar facilities, especially in periods of emergency, connected with this mode of communication with our great Indian possessions. With only two exceptions, these sources of information were as available to the Government as to your Committee. Many of these witnesses were in official situations, and personally known to members of the Government. We have no evidence to show that Her Majesty's ministers sought for reliable information from any one who might be supposed specially acquainted with the subject.—It is obvious, that had orders been given to make preparations for this passage on the 1st of July instead of the 1st of October or 1st of November, an earlier arrival in India of some thousand troops must have been effected, than actually took place.

" Under what circumstances our ships of war should or should not be required to submit to the inconvenience or disagreeableness of assisting to transport in times of war Her Majesty's military forces, is one of the topics connected with this inquiry, remaining for observation. Under no Government appears some distinct regulation on this point, from high authority more requisite than under ours,—since joint naval and military operations, great or small, on some portion of the globe, seem with us to be almost continuous. The greater the reason, therefore, for the most unreserved mutual co-operation of both branches of our armed forces. On the score of economy, too, a word may be said on this head. About nine millions sterling was the charge for hired transports in the Crimean war. Very large also will be the charge under the same head for reinforcements to India. The latter, indeed, will not figure just now in Parliamentary estimates, but we cannot be certain that English tax-payers may not yet be compelled to contribute in some manner towards them. The greater part by far of these transport charges are inevitable. But in some instances it may surely be hoped that a diminution of them might be effeet d. Doubtless a naval battle can probably be better fought when the combatant ships have but their fighting crews on board. On the other hand, however, the result of a battle on shore may be hazarded, or the fruits of victory imperfectly gained, partly in consequence of the means of transport in war ships having been unnecessarily restricted.

" We have been led to these remarks in some degree, because of the strong disinclination to admitting troops on board war ships, evinced in his evidence by one of the most justly influential of our official naval administrators,—and because we cannot gather from that 1746.
evidence, that the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Navy,—the greatest navy in the world,—have deemed it their duty to render any very adequate support or co-operation to the policy of our authorities in the east, or to the more rapid augmentation of our forces there, naval or military, during the present lamentable crisis in that quarter.

" The evidence, however, of Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, an officer of superior practical experience, is of a directly contrary tenor on this question. He is favourable to employing line-of-battle ships for troops if lower-deck guns be taken out—does not see why troops being on board should upset the crew of a well-disciplined man-of-war.

" On the Future Transport of Reinforcements.

" Hitherto, the reliefs and drafts of British troops for India have been numerically of comparative small amount. Henceforth, we fear, for a considerable period, it must be far different. During the course of the present, the second year of the Indian revolt, augmentations or drafts, to supply losses in the field, and yet more in hospital; the wear and tear from sword and sickness, and the requirements generally of present Indian policy, ought not to be estimated at less than 20,000 men. Anticipating good results from the operations now in course of execution, still the next year will probably demand from us, as many as from 10,000 to 12,000, and perhaps for one or two further yers, as many as from 8,000 to 10,000. Nothing, as is well known, more frequently proves fallacious than political prophecy. Who will pretend to predicate what contingencies may or may not arise during the next two

or three years in Europe or Asia. Still we are bound to make provision, as far as our lights enable us, for apparent probabilities.

"During the discussions on this subject, there has been no one statement more completely erroneous, than that troops proceeding by the long sea voyage are likely to reach India more ready for immediate efficient action than those arriving there by the shorter overland line. The longer troops are on board ship, inevitably without adequate exercise, the more inefficient they will inevitably be, for immediate exertion, after disembarking. And this will be the more certain in warm climates. There are members of your Committee who have seen, even after a six weeks' voyage, hundreds of soldiers fall out on the line of movement, and prove incapable of a five miles' march,—many even fall dead, from exertion being required, without a due period of preparatory exercise.

"Now, the time occupied by troops from England to India is, by the one line, from 33 to 40 days. From Malta to India, from 16 to 18 or 20 days. Compare these periods with the 83 by steamers, or the 120 days by sailing ships, on the long sea route, and the difference will be admitted to be great.

"Again, let us take into calculation that, during the longer route, we shall have, under present circumstances, from 15,000 to 20,000 troops, in effect, *hors de combat*, and beyond power of counter orders,—for a period, annually, of from three to four months. This is a serious consideration. While, as to the shorter line, it will be but for the brief period of some 14 days, during the transit from Suez to India, that the troops will be beyond reach of recall, for any unexpected European contigency.

"For these reasons, your Committee would therefore earnestly recommend that all regiments for reliefs or augmentation of our eastern army, be henceforth sent overland, from England, Gibraltar, or Malta. From the two latter undoubtedly in preference, because of their greater proximity to India, and because those stations are known to be particularly well adapted for acclimatising troops for eastern service. With respect to detachments of recruits, when not pressingly required, and when yet of insufficient age and strength for immediate service, it may perhaps be found preferable that they should proceed by the long sea voyage.

"Three or four extra regiments being successively kept up in Gibraltar and Malta, the most acclimatised corps of these garrisons might, with facility, be pushed on to their Indian destinations, as required. On this side the Isthmus, maritime means are of course always available for constantly maintaining the forces at Malta up to their proposed or necessary strength. Ships of war might (without any transport cost) convey the troops thence, as they now do, to Alexandria.

"Two first-class steamers, independent of the four monthly mail vessels, plying between Suez and Aden, would probably be amply efficient for the transit from Suez;—one of these steamers to proceed onward to India, when requisite. It is also to be borne in mind, in regard to the passage between Aden and India, that clipper sailing vessels are deemed as well adapted as steamers, for rapidly performing that voyage during some periods of the year.—To provide against accidental delays (if it be not already done), a commodious ship should obviously be permanently anchored off Suez,—for reception of troops when necessary, fully provided with awnings, water, and commissariat stores. For the completion and continuance of these arrangements, in the most safe and satisfactory manner, Her Majesty's Government have the advantage of the services or advice of Colonels Fraser and Pocklington, both of whom officers of great intelligence, practically conversant with the subject, and one of whom, Colonel Pocklington, being now and for above six months back, actually employed in performance of the duties connected with this passage.

Appendix, No.

Recapitulation.

"We shall briefly recapitulate then the following particulars, as bearing on the recommendation which your committee have deemed it their duty thus to submit. For three days, during the months of June, July, and August, the temperature in passing down the Red Sea is stated to be intensely warm, but not unhealthy; while on the other hand, on the long sea voyage, ships have to encounter a similar temperature twice under the line, during which they are not unfrequently becalmed.—But even this extreme heat is solely referrible to summer months, and need not be incurred except in urgent emergency. The length of voyage round the Cape, we must again bear in mind, is, to our principal ports of Indian debarkation, from 13,000 to 14,000 miles. From Malta to Bombay or Kurrachee, the distance being reduced to 4,000 miles; to Calcutta about 5,700. In respect to the power of promptly throwing in military succours for all Eastern contingencies, the Malta and Egypt line secures, therefore, an advantage, in point of distance, of from 8,500 to 10,000 miles. It has been very idle to talk of the influence of other powers, on this matter, over the Pacha of Egypt. That Pacha is an acknowledged hereditary viceroy, scarcely more than nominally recognising the suzerainty of the Porte. The Viceroy reaps a revenue, direct or indirect, from English mercantile and passenger traffic, of perhaps above 200,000 *l*, per annum; a profit greatly to be increased by the continuance of what is now proposed. and herein is a sure guarantee for the enduring goodwill towards England of the ruler of

Egypt.

Egypt. As to the security of this communication, it rests, of course, on the same basis as does the possession of all our colonies and dependencies—the superiority of England at sea. And at present it may also be observed, as seriously obstructive to rivals; that in Gibraltar and Malta, Aden and Perim,—we in fact hold the keys of the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

" A considerable time has now intervened since your Committee have been charged with the duty of this inquiry, and yet its interest and importance have scarcely, perhaps not at all, diminished. Great achievements have been accomplished, signally to the advancement of the national fame,—but an extensive hostility to our rule, it cannot be denied, has been evoked,—which throws a gloom of uncertainty over the duration and termination of the conflict. Four months of heroic constancy were inevitably required for the siege and victorious assault of Delhi. No more brilliant fête of arms ennobles British annals; but not one soldier, despatched as reinforcement from England, shared in it. It is true it did not put an end, as was hoped, to the stupendous insurrection; but had it not succeeded, British dominion in the East may have become, it must be feared, beyond restoration. The part borne however, in connexion with this achievement as well as others which followed, by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub,—in respect to creating and forwarding reinforcements to every point endangered,—can surely never be thought of, without the highest feeling of admiration.

" No diligence or exertion in England could by possibility have saved from the perfidy of the enemy, the gallant and lamented General and those who fell victims with him at Cawnpore —Perhaps the same may almost be said, as to the position of the heroic Lawrence at Lucknow, in whose fall his country have had such irreparable cause of sorrow. These and other grievous losses, however, will, perhaps, be eventually considered as contributed to in no small degree by a previous policy of territorial acquisition, followed so untowardly, with a diminution by many thousand bayonets, of the British forces at the disposal of the succeeding Government of India.

" But the early operations of Havelock and Outram, and of our present skilful Commander-in-Chief Sir Colin Campbell, have undoubtedly been retarded and enfeebled, by the insufficient energy and exertion of those in England, who were mainly responsible for a more rapid transmission of additional forces in furtherance of the operations of those able chiefs.

" Doubtless hitherto, in all ordinary circumstances, it devolved to the gentlemen charged with the administration of the East India Company's affairs, to appreciate the military requirements of India, and to take charge of the forwarding the same to their destinations. And it is but just to state, that in the more than usual responsibilities thus in this instance imposed upon them, they exerted themselves in a manner very highly to their credit.—But this was truly a case of peril and magnitude beyond all precedent, beyond the sphere of routine, and should have called into action the most prominent efforts and deepest consideration of the highest functionaries of the State. The two Government departments immediately connected however with the development of military force, are, of course, that of War and the Admiralty. The Naval Department, it appears, declared an inability to afford any assistance; and what is more alarming as to the distribution of our great maritime resources, it was alleged that we had not a first class line-of-battle ship manned or ready for sea, in the British Channel. That distribution no doubt, however, depends for the greater part on the Cabinet rather than on the First Naval Lord.—Of the Secretary of State for War, whose duties would seem above all others to have been concerned, no proof, we regret to say, has been adduced, to enable us to offer, on this occasion, any expression of our acknowledgment of commensurate or energetic interposition by that department, in the matters under consideration.

" We have given details of the evidence which might not perhaps, at first sight, have seemed requisite. But there appeared no other adequate method of rebutting, conclusively, inaccurate statements emanating from the highest official authority.

" Your Committee have given the utmost attention to the investigation referred to their consideration. They hope the results may be of some public utility. And they close their remarks with the consolatory reflection, that, if many deplorable bereavements have occurred in this fierce and unforeseen contest,—it will at all events as to the British soldiers and civilians engaged in it, be ever borne in memory, that none of any nation in the world have ever sustained with more firmness, self-devotion, and patriotism, the interests and renown of their country."

[Adjourned to Friday 18th, at Twelve o'clock.

Veneris, 18° *die Junii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord John Hay.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Mr. Crawford.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Byng.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir James Elphinstone.	

The following Resolutions, proposed by Lord *Goderich* were read:—

"1. That the inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the overland route to India; the second, to the employment of steamers, as compared with sailing vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the colonies.

"2. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route to India at the earliest period at which it could have been used with a certainty that the troops sent across Egypt would on their arrival at Suez have found transport ready to convey them down the Red Sea; but that that certainty could not have been obtained before the end of August or beginning of September; that the troops could then only have been despatched in small numbers, and would have arrived at Calcutta about a fortnight sooner than the first reinforcements sent round the Cape.

"3. That although the overland route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be adopted as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.

"4. That if steamers had been used in greater numbers the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed.

"5. That steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.

"6. That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.

"7. That the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

"8. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that credit is due to those who have been charged with the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year."

Motion made and question proposed, "That the Committee do now proceed to take into consideration the Draft Report proposed by the Chairman."—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), to leave out all the words after the word "That," in order to add these words, "before proceeding to consider any Draft Report, it is desirable to ascertain and determine by Resolution the opinion of the Committee upon the principal points involved in the matters referred to the Committee." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.	Noes, 7.
Sir C. Napier.	Lord John Hay.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Horsman.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Willoughby.	Lord Goderich.
	Mr. Crawford.

Words

Words added. Question as amended put and agreed to.

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the Resolutions proposed by Lord Goderich be now taken into consideration." Put and agreed to.

Motion made and question proposed, "That the inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches: the first, relating to the overland route to India; the second, to the employment of steamers, as compared with sailing vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the colonies." Question put and agreed to.

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route to India at the earliest period at which it could have been used with a certainty that the troops sent across Egypt would on their arrival at Suez have found transport ready to convey them down the Red Sea; but that that certainty could not have been obtained before the end of August or beginning of September; that the troops could then only have been despatched in small numbers, and would have arrived at Calcutta about a fortnight sooner than the first reinforcements sent round the Cape."

Motion by leave withdrawn.

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That although the overland route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be adopted as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India."—Amendment proposed (Sir *C. Napier*), To leave out all the words after the word "emergency," in order to add these words: "the Government are the best judges whether on common occasions it should be adopted." Question put, "That the words as far as the word 'adopted' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 10.	Noes, 3.
Lord John Hay.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Sir C. Napier.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Sir J. Elphinstone.
Capain Vivian.	
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	
Mr. Horsman.	
Mr. Byng.	
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	
Mr. Willoughby.	

Further amendment proposed (Captain *Vivian*), To leave out the word "adopted," in order to insert the words "relied upon." Question put, "That the word proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 2.	Noes, 11.
Lord John Hay.	Mr. D. Seymour.
Lord Goderich.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
	Mr. Osborne.
	Captain Vivian.
	Sir C. Napier.
	Sir J. Elphinstone.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Mr. Horsman.
	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
	Mr. Willoughby.

Words "relied upon" inserted.

Another amendment proposed (Mr. *Willoughby*), To leave out all the words after the word "as," in order, to add these words, "the sole and exclusive route under ordinary circumstances for the transmission of troops to India." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." The Committee divided:

Ayes, 9.	Noes, 4.
Lord John Hay.	Sir J. Elphinstone.
Mr. D. Seymour.	Mr. Byng.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Willoughby.
Captain Vivian.	
Lord Goderich.	
Sir C. Napier.	
Mr. Crawford.	
Mr. Horsman.	

Original question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That although the Overland Route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India."

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That Steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport."

Question put, and agreed to.

[Adjourned to Monday, at Twelve.

Lunæ, 21° *die Junii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Lord John Hay.	Sir J. Elphinstone.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Crawford.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Byng.
Sir E Colebrooke.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	

Motion made and question proposed (Mr. *Horsman*), "That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation."—Amendment proposed (Lord *Goderich*), After the word "political" to insert the words "and other." Question, "That those words be there inserted," put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 5.
Lord John Hay.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Willoughby.	Sir J. Elphinstone.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr D. Seymour.	Mr. Byng.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the Overland Route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation."

Motion made, and question proposed (Mr. *Horsman*), "That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the early part of September, when the more serious character of the war led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet."—Amendment proposed (Mr. *D. Seymour*), after the word "war," to insert the words "and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta." Question, "That those words be there inserted," put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 4.
Lord John Hay.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. D. Seymour.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Captain Vivian.	
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	
Mr. Osborne.	

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved,

Resolved, "That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet."

Motion made, and question proposed (Mr. *Horsman*), "That the sudden and unexpected transmission of reinforcements by the overland route, when it was first suggested by the Directors, would necessarily have been attended with some risk and inconvenience. But it does not appear that any greater danger was to be apprehended from the attempt, if confined to small bodies of troops, than in so grave an emergency might have been fairly encountered and overcome, if no political considerations had stood in the way."—Amendment proposed (Lord *Goderich*), to leave out all the words after the word, "That," in order to add these words, "it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route, at the earliest possible period at which it could have been used with a certainty that the troops sent across Egypt would, on their arrival at Suez, have found transport ready to convey them down the Red Sea; but that that certainty could not have been obtained before the end of August or beginning of September; that the troops could then only have been despatched in small number, and would have arrived at Calcutta about a fortnight sooner than the first reinforcements sent round the Cape." Question put, "That the words to the word, 'Directors,' inclusive, stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.	Noes, 7.
Sir C. Napier.	Lord John Hay.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Crawford.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Horsman.	Mr. D. Seymour.
Mr. Byng.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Lord Goderich.
	Mr. Osborne.

Question, "That the remaining words stand part of the question," put and negatived. Question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the proposed words be there added." Amendment proposed (Sir *C. Napier*), That instead thereof, these words be there added: "The unexpected transmission of reinforcements by the overland route, when first suggested by the Directors, would have been attended with no considerable risk or inconvenience, as mail steamers had been in the habit, for several years, of traversing the Red Sea, and are capable of transporting between 300 and 400 troops, besides passengers, and 1,000 without passengers, in perfect safety, in 40 days less than steamers and in 80 days shorter than sailing vessels round the Cape of Good Hope." Question put (Lord *Goderich*), "That the words 'it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route,' be there added." Committee divided:

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 4.
Lord John Hay.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Byng.
Mr. D. Seymour.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Captain Vivian.	
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	
Mr. Osborne.	

Question again proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the remaining words from the word 'route' to the end of the question be there added."—Amendment proposed (Sir *E. Colebrooke*), to leave out all the words after the word "period" in order to add these words, "And apart from such considerations it is to be much regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route."—Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out as far as the words 'Red Sea,' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 6.	Noes, 7.
Lord John Hay.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Willoughby.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. D. Seymour.	Sir James Elphinstone.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Crawford.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Sclater-Booth.

Question, "That the remaining words stand part of the question," put, and negatived.

Question proposed (Sir *E. Colebrooke*), That those words be added after the word "period." Amendment proposed (Lord *Goderich*), to leave out the word "much." Question put, "That the word 'much' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 5.
Mr. Willoughby.	Lord J. Hay.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Seymour.
Sir C. Napier.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Crawford.	Lord Goderich.
Mr. Horsman.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Byng.	
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	

Amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*) to leave out all the words after the word "date." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 5.
Lord John Hay.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Willoughby.	Sir C. Napier.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Mr. Byng.
Captain Vivian.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Osborne.	

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route."

Veneris, 25° *die Junii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Sir DE LACY EVANS, in the Chair.

Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Byng.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Horsman.
Captain Vivian.	Lord John Hay.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Osborne.

Motion made, and question proposed (Sir *James Elphinstone*), "That the attention of the Government should be directed to increasing the facilities and diminishing the cost of this mode of transmitting troops to India, so as to render it available for that purpose as far as circumstances may permit, even in ordinary times." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 8.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir J. Elphinstone.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Horsman.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Lord Goderich.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Lord John Hay.
	Mr. D. Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (Sir *J. Elphinstone*), "That it would be highly impolitic to discontinue the advantage afforded by the overland route in transmitting troops to India." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 8.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir J. Elphinstone.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Horsman.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Lord Goderich.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Lord John Hay.
	Mr. D. Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (Sir *J. Elphinstone*), "That this route should be employed for the transport of regiments at such periods of the year as a full consideration of the circumstances may justify; but that drafts of recruits continue to be sent round the Cape of Good Hope as hitherto." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 5.	Noes, 8.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir J. Elphinstone.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Horsman.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Lord Goderich.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Lord J. Hay.
	Mr. D. Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed."—Amendment proposed (Sir *E. Colebrooke*), To leave out all the words after the word "That," in order to add these words, "a comparison of the length of the passages performed by steam and sailing vessels despatched with troops during the months of July and December inclusive, has established the superiority of the former for the rapid transmission of troops, and removed some doubts which had previously been entertained by several naval authorities on this subject; but looking to the uncertainty which existed as to the supply of coal on this route, the home Government was justified in not resorting to this mode of transport in a greater degree than it was actually employed." Question put, "That the word 'if' stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 8.	Noes, 4.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Willoughby.
Captain Vivian.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Byng.	Sir C. Napier.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Crawford.	
Lord John Hay.	
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	
Mr. Danby Seymour.	

Amendment proposed (*Captain Vivian*), To leave out the words from "but" to "whilst," inclusive. Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:—

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 3.
Mr. Willoughby.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Osborne.	Sir C. Napier.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Mr. Crawford.	
Mr. Byng.	
Lord John Hay.	
Mr. Danby Seymour.	

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved, "That if steamers had been used in greater numbers, the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed."

Motion made, and Question proposed (*Sir C. Napier*), "That the Committee desire to express their opinion that great credit is due to the East India Company for the promptness

ness with which they faced the difficulties in which they were suddenly placed, as well as for the systematic and business-like manner in which they carried out the operations which devolved upon them; but the Committee feel bound to state, that it was proved satisfactorily that the passage round the Cape by steamers has had an advantage over sailing vessels of upwards of a month; and that, although frequently warned in the House of Commons by naval authorities, Her Majesty's Government do not appear to have made sufficient inquiry on the subject, nor did they advise the Board of Control or the East India Directors to give the preference to steamers; on the contrary, they recommended sailing vessels to be employed." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 2.	Noes, 11.
Sir C. Napier.	Mr. Willoughby.
Sir J. Elphinstone.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
	Mr. Osborne.
	Captain Vivian.
	Lord Goderich.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Horsman.
	Lord John Hay.
	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
	Mr. Danby Seymour.

Motion made, and Question proposed (*Lord Goderich*), "That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape without loss of time forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course." Amendment proposed (Captain *Vivian*), To leave out all the words after the words "to India." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided.

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 2.
Mr. Willoughby.	Captain Vivian.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Osborne.	
Lord Goderich.	
Mr. Crawford.	
Lord John Hay.	
Mr. Byng.	

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved, "That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape without loss of time forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course."

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies."—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), after the word "That" to insert the words "the Committee observe with satisfaction that."—Question, "That those words be there inserted," put and agreed to.

Further amendment made, by omission of the words, "That the Committee"—Amendment proposed (Captain *Vivian*), to leave out all the words after the words "mother country." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 7.	Noes, 4.
Mr. Willoughby.	Mr. Osborne.
Sir E. Colebrooke.	Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Sclater-Booth.
Mr. Horsman.	
Lord John Hay.	
Mr. Danby Seymour.	

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That the Committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies."

Motion

Motion made and question proposed (Lord *Goderich*), "That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that credit is due to those who have been charged with the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year."—Amendment proposed (Mr. *Osborne*), After the word "sent" to insert these words, "and having special reference to the recognition by the Government of India of the promptitude and efficiency with which the Home Government supported the Government of India with troops and all military appliances."—Question put, "That those words be there inserted."

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 7.
Mr. Willoughby.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Osborne.	Captain Vivian.
Lord Goderich.	Mr. Crawford.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Horsman.
	Lord John Hay.
	Mr. Sclater-Booth.

Amendment made (Mr. *Crawford*), By inserting after the words "opinion that," the word "great." Another amendment proposed (Mr. *Crawford*), To leave out the words "those who have been charged with," in order to insert the words "the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged." Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the question." Committee divided:

Ayes, 4.	Noes, 8.
Mr. Osborne.	Mr. Willoughby.
Lord Goderich.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Lord John Hay.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Danby Seymour.	Sir C. Napier.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Mr. Byng.
	Mr. Horsman.
	Mr. Sclater-Booth.

Question, "That those words be there inserted," put and agreed to

Question, as amended, put and agreed to.

Resolved, "That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year."

Motion made and question proposed (Mr. *Byng*), "That the frequent reference made to 'political objections' against the earlier adoption of the overland route for the transmission of troops to India has seriously embarrassed the proceedings of this Committee, inasmuch as they felt themselves necessarily debarred from inquiring whether those objections were or were not sufficiently valid; and they are in consequence precluded from expressing any definite opinion upon a very important branch of this inquiry." Question put. Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.	Noes, 9.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Horsman.	Sir E. Colebrooke.
Mr. Sclater-Booth.	Mr. Osborne.
	Captain Vivian.
	Lord Goderich.
	Sir C. Napier.
	Mr. Crawford.
	Lord John Hay.
	Mr. Danby Seymour.

Question, "That the following Resolutions, together with the Minutes of Evidence, be the Report of the Committee to The House," put and agreed to.

"1. That the inquiry which this Committee has been appointed to conduct may be divided into three branches; the first, relating to the Overland Route to India; the second, to the employment of Steamers, as compared with Sailing Vessels, for the transport of troops round the Cape of Good Hope; and the third, to the use made during the Mutiny of the military resources of this country and of the Colonies.

"2. That the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation.

"3. That the Committee cannot judge of the validity of those political objections, as they felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them; but that they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, when the more serious character of the war and the lateness

of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, led to a formal requisition from the Court of Directors, and to a compliance with it on the part of the Cabinet.

"4. That it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. That the transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and that the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape, as to give any great advantage in favour of this route.

"5. That although the Overland Route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India.

"6. That if Steamers had been used in greater numbers the reinforcements would have reached India more quickly than they did by sailing vessels; but that no evidence has been laid before the Committee to show that, at the time the emergency arose, a greater amount of steam transport was attainable, whilst it has been shown that grave doubts existed whether the supply of coal on the route would have been sufficient for a larger number of steam vessels than were actually employed.

"7. That Steamers should for the future be always made use of, as far as possible, in urgent cases; but that, for the transmission of the ordinary reliefs, the Committee would not recommend the adoption of so costly a mode of transport.

"8. That the Governors of Ceylon and the Mauritius gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserve great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which they acted; that the Governor of the Cape without loss of time forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course.

"9. That the Committee observe with satisfaction that the people of Canada displayed great readiness to afford assistance to the mother country; and that the Committee are of opinion that it is highly desirable to give every encouragement to such demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the colonies.

"10. That on the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the Army in India during the past year."

Ordered, To Report.

EXPENSES OF WITNESSES.

NAME of WITNESS.	PROFESSION or CONDITION.	From whence Summoned.	Number of Days Absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and Back.	Allowance during absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses Allowed to Witness.
				£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Mr. Lumsden -	Gentleman - -	- - -	6	3 10 -	6 6 -	9 16 -
Mr. Mead - -	- Ditto - -	Manchester -	11	4 - -	11 11 -	15 11 -
Captain Engledue, -	- Ditto - -	Southampton -	1	1 15 -	1 1 -	2 16 -
Dr. Beatson - -	Staff Surgeon - -	Isle of Man -	8	6 6 -	16 16 -	23 2 -
					£.	41 5 -

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Martis, 16° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Osborne.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Sir John Pakington.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Lord Stanley.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Captain Vivian.
Viscount Goderich.	Mr. Willoughby.

SIR DE LACY EVANS, IN THE CHAIR.

Philip Melvill, Esquire, called in; and Examined.

P. Melvill, Esq.

16 February 1858.

1. *Chairman.*] WHAT office do you fill?—The office of Secretary in the Military Department of the East India Company.

2. What number of European regiments were, in the month of February 1857, deficient in the establishment of the East India Company; Queen's regiments?—In the month of February last the ordinary establishment of the Queen's regiments in India was deficient by two regiments of infantry.

3. With regard to the numerical deficiencies of the whole of the regiments, are you aware what amount were wanted in drafts?—The aggregate number at that time of the 22 regiments was 20,855 men present in India, and the establishment of each of those regiments was 1,037.

4. What would be the sum total of the deficiency?—About 1,950 on the establishments of those regiments; to that deficiency you must add the aggregate of two entire regiments, amounting to 2,074.

5. That would make a total of 3,500?—Rather more than 4,000.

6. Mr. *Osborne.*] Of effectives?—Yes.

7. Sir *J. Pakington.*] That applies only to the infantry?—It does; of the cavalry, there were four regiments then in India of the fixed establishment; the aggregate was 2,570, which I should say was about 250 below the establishment, not more.

8. *Chairman.*] May we assume that the whole deficiency of the establishment of the Queen's troops was then 3,900 under the proper number?—The aggregate was 4,274.

9. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Did a larger deficiency ever occur at any other time?—I should say not; certainly not; the ordinary establishment has not been lessened by any circumstance, except by the Crimean war.

10. *Chairman.*] Can you inform the Committee what deficiencies existed at the same period in the Company's European forces?—The Company's European forces at the same time amounted in the aggregate to 14,881. There was then a deficiency of about 350 in the infantry in Bengal; at the other Presidencies the establishment was complete.

11. Was that including the artillery and infantry?—The artillery and infantry, and veterans.

12. You would state that 350 was the deficiency?—About 350 in Bengal.

13. Then, in fact, there were 5,000 Europeans deficient at that time in the regular establishment?—Rather less; about 4,624.

14. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] What was the reason of that deficiency in the Company's troops?—At that time of the year the recruits had not arrived, and the ordinary deaths, invalidings and retirements occasioned that deficiency.

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15. Mr. *Osborne.*] That deficiency in the Company's troops was not exceptional; it is so every year is it not?—Yes, every year.

16. *Chairman.*] At the beginning of the year generally there is a deficiency?—About the middle of the year, before the arrival of the drafts of the season, there are ordinarily deficiencies in the establishment.

17. Lord *Stanley.*] You stated that the whole deficiency of European troops was about 5,000 below the average?—Below the establishment; not below the average.

18. What per-centage is that of the whole strength of the establishment?—At that time if the two regiments had been present, the establishment would have been about 42,500. The per-centage of deficiency is therefore about 10 per cent.

19. *Chairman.*] The establishment was at least 45,000 was it not?—Yes, including officers.

20. Captain *Vivian.*] How was it that there were two regiments deficient?—They were withdrawn during the Crimean war, and they had not been replaced.

21. *Chairman.*] Were they infantry?—Yes.

22. The cavalry had been replaced had they not?—Yes.

23. Mr. *Crawford.*] Are the regiments in Persia included?—Yes.

24. How many regiments were sent to Persia from India?—Three regiments of Queen's troops and one of the Company's, viz., three infantry and one cavalry; artillery also were sent.

25. At what dates did those regiments return to India?—They returned to India in the month of May 1857.

26. Captain *Vivian.*] Were any requisitions made to the Government to replace those two regiments?—A very earnest remonstrance was made by Lord Dalhousie against their being withdrawn, and in reply to that the Government stated that they should be replaced as soon as possible.

27. When was that remonstrance made?—In the year 1854.

28. And the troops were not replaced till 1857?—No.

29. From time to time were remonstrances made to the Government?—No further remonstrances were made.

30. Viscount *Goderich.*] Was not there a request for more troops made by the Government of India, in February 1857?—During the progress of the war in Persia, the Governor-general made a representation that if that war continued very large reinforcements would be required; but, when that representation arrived in England, it was known that a treaty of peace had been concluded, and was therefore not acted upon.

31. *Chairman.*] What was the date when the accounts first reached the India House of those mutinous evidences and those acts of incendiarism which took place at Barrackpore, and, I believe, at Dumdum, and in the neighbourhood of the capital?—In the month of March; the report of the dissatisfaction at Barrackpore, on account of the greased cartridges, arrived in that month.

32. You do not recollect the date?—The date of the despatch of the Government was the 7th February; and the despatch was received on the 20th March. The occurrence took place in January.

33. Mr. *Osborne.*] The 23d of January?—Yes.

34. *Chairman.*] Would you have the kindness to state the date when you received those communications of the serious state of affairs, particularly represented in different dispatches by General Hearsey?—No further despatches on the subject were received until the 25th May; these announced the mutiny and disbandment of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry, and the trial and execution of a Sepoy in the 34th Native Infantry, for shooting at Lieut. Baugh. Despatches were received on the 5th June, reporting misconduct on the part of 14 men of the 63d Native Infantry, in refusing to take the usual furloughs; and the trial of two Sepoys in the 2d Native Infantry for mutiny. The next mail was received on the 12th June, and brought no despatches on the subject.

35. With regard to the Punjaub, when did you first receive at the India House information of any new or serious state of feeling on the part of the Sepoy army, or in the North-western Provinces?—The most important intelligence was that which arrived by telegram on the 29th of June, namely, the outbreak at Meerut, and the seizure of Delhi; antecedent to that, no advices had arrived which occasioned great uneasiness.

36. Did the Court of Directors consider that state of things at Barrackpore, of which you received the account early in March, and did they make any representations in consequence to the Board of Control as a matter seriously requiring some measures to be adopted?—No, they did not, and for this reason; Lord Canning informed the home authorities that the matter had been fully explained to the men at Barrackpore and at Dum Dum; and that they appeared perfectly satisfied that there existed no intention of interfering with their caste.

37. Will you have the kindness to supply the date of that statement of Lord Canning's into your evidence when you revise it?—Yes; the 7th February 1857.

38. If that be the case, I suppose Lord Canning's representations guided the Court of Directors with regard to the gravity of events at successive periods?—Undoubtedly.

39. You received on the 29th of June an account of the events at Meerut and Delhi?—Yes.

40. Can you tell the Committee at what date intelligence of these events reached Lord Elphinstone at Bombay; it was by telegraph was it not?—Yes.

41. It was on the same day almost?—Lord Elphinstone first received the intelligence on the morning of the 15th May, by telegram from Agra, dated the preceding day.

42. He would have received it on the evening of the 10th of May, would he not?—Had it been dispatched on that day; but this was the case.

43. On what day would the Governor-general have received it?—The first telegram announcing the intelligence of which we have any record is dated at Agra, the 12th May; this was addressed to the Government of India.

44. You received the Governor-General's communication on the 29th of June?—We received the telegraphic communication on the 29th of June,

45. When did you receive the dispatches; was it two days afterwards?—Not till several days afterwards, viz., on the 6th July.

46. Was there any separate communication made by Lord Elphinstone to the Court of Directors, in consequence of his having ascertained this state of things?—Not any that I am aware of; the communication that we looked for was from Lord Canning.

47. I suppose in a matter of gravity you are not guided entirely by routine?—Unquestionably not. Any communication from Lord Elphinstone would receive immediate attention.

48. Did you know of his having telegraphed to Calcutta on the 11th or 12th of May, suggesting that he should send the first steamer after the packet, to communicate the news to the English Government?—Yes, I understood that that was the case; but the date was the 17th May.

49. What might have been the answer to that telegraph?—That Lord Canning did not desire to send to England by an earlier opportunity than the mail which would leave Calcutta on the 18th May.

50. If Lord Canning had assented to that, at what period earlier than the 29th of June would the English Government and the Court of Directors have received this communication?—About 10 days sooner.

51. What step was taken by the Court of Directors on receiving that communication on the 29th of June?—They immediately held a special meeting, and requested Her Majesty's Government to place at their disposal four regiments of infantry for immediate dispatch to India; this, I should state, was in addition to four regiments of infantry, two of dragoons, and 2,665 recruits, which were already under orders for India, the arrangements for whose transport were in rapid progress.

52. Those four regiments of infantry and two of dragoons included, did they not, the two that were deficient?—The four regiments of infantry which were under orders prior to the 29th June, included two that were deficient.

53. Therefore there were two additional regiments of infantry and two of dragoons independently of those four?—Yes.

54. What was the communication of the Board of Control on that request being made?—They instantly acquiesced in it.

55. In point of fact it was considered by the Court of Directors then and the Board of Control that two additional cavalry regiments and six additional infantry regiments would be sufficient to meet this contingency?—Yes.

56. What steps were taken to transmit them immediately to India?—The

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arrangements for the engagement of transports were all made in the Marine Department, and I am not therefore prepared to give information upon that subject.

57. Are you prepared to say whether the Court of Directors and the Board of Control deemed it a matter of so much urgency that the most rapid mode of transmitting them should be instantly adopted?—It was believed that, at that season of the year, the best mode of sending those troops would be in sailing vessels, but it was determined to employ steamers for the conveyance of a portion of them; accordingly, as I understand, six screw steamers and seven sailing vessels were engaged for the conveyance of the four regiments sent on special requisition.

58. Did any question arise then as to making use of the overland route?—That was a question, I believe, considered in the Cabinet; I cannot give information on that.

59. Did any communication take place from the Directors to the Board of Control?—No official communication took place at that time; that is, no communication in writing.

60. Might there have been a demi-official communication?—I am not prepared to answer that question.

61. Would such a communication have passed through your hands?—It would not.

62. It would have passed through the chairman, would it not?—Yes; directly to the president of the India Board.

63. Therefore, you have no knowledge of what question may have arisen, except that you know that it was resolved by both departments of the Governments of India that sailing vessels at that season of the year were the best?—I am not aware that any such resolution was come to; I know that they resolved to employ sailing vessels, and also, I have already stated, some screw steamers.

64. Are there any despatches confirmatory, or giving more information on these particular points, that you would place on the table of the Committee?—I am prepared to place on the table of the Committee all the correspondence that took place on the subject, in addition to that which has been already laid before the House; but I am not aware that that correspondence will throw any light upon these questions.

65. You are not aware whether any difference of opinion existed between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control as to the question of steam and sailing vessels?—I am not aware that there has been any question of difference between the Board and the Court as to steam or sailing vessels; I believe they have been in perfect harmony all through.

66. With regard to the overland route, you apprehend that the Committee may obtain evidence through some other source, not through you?—It does not belong to my department to speak on that subject.

67. Lord *Stanley*] Are the Committee to understand, that, since the year 1854, there had been a continual deficiency in the number of the European troops in India?—Certainly.

68. A promise was given in 1854 that that deficiency should cease as soon as the emergency which had caused it came to an end?—Yes.

69. But that promise was not fulfilled?—It was fulfilled, I imagine, as soon as the emergency which had caused it came to an end.

70. Do you not believe that the emergency came to an end at the beginning of 1857?—No. When the troops returned from the Crimea, the season for sending to India was past, and it was very desirable that they should not be replaced in India till the favourable season began.

71. The return of the troops from the Crimea was in the spring of 1856, but no steps were taken in the winter of 1856 to send European troops in sufficient number to replace the deficiency which had existed since 1854?—No; the troops from the Crimea did not, I believe, return so soon.

72. On the outbreak of the 12th of May, I understood you to say that 10 days were lost by the refusal of Lord Canning to despatch a steamer immediately with the news?—I think it likely that that may have been the time; but I cannot speak exactly.

73. Upon the receipt of the news the Directors decided to send four additional regiments

regiments besides those which they had been preparing to send in the natural course of events?—Yes.

74. Was there any requisition made to Her Majesty's Government as to sending out those regiments with the utmost possible dispatch?—The requisition to Her Majesty's Goverment was to place them at the disposal of the Court of Directors for dispatch to India; and it rested with the Court of Directors to make arrangements for sending them.

75. The manner of sending them resting entirely with the Court of Directors?—Yes, subject to the approval of the Board of Commissioners.

76. You state that it was understood at that time; that is, I presume, understood by the Directors, that sailing vessels would be most convenient. Can you state the ground on which that purpose existed?—At that time I was present when discussions took place, though I did not belong to the department, and it was believed at that time that there were not depôts of coal at St. Vincent, at the Cape, or at the Mauritius, adequate to take on the steamers, and that probably steamers would be as long on the voyage as sailing vessels, while sailing vessels going at that season of the year would arrive in the Bay of Bengal when the south-east monsoon was blowing.

77. The season being favourable for sailing vessels, and there being a doubt whether the steamers could be supplied with coal, it was thought that no time would be gained by sending steamers?—That was the impression, I believe, at that time, although it was thought desirable to try the experiment of sending a portion of the troops in steamers.

78. As to the overland route, the Committee are to understand that no official communication took place respecting it to your knowledge?—No communication on that subject took place to my knowledge in the months of June or July, or till the end of August.

79. Sir *John Pakington*.] You state that when the intelligence arrived on the 29th of June you applied to Her Majesty's Government for four regiments, and at that time there were four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry under orders for India?—Yes.

80. At what time was it decided to send those four infantry and two cavalry regiments?—It was decided early in the month of May.

81. On what ground, and for what reason was it decided to send out these four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry?—Two of them were to replace the two withdrawn during the Crimean war, and two of them were to go out as reliefs for two which had exhausted their time of service in India.

82. Two of the infantry regiments?—Yes. The two regiments of dragoons were to relieve two that had also exhausted their tour of service.

83. Are the Committee to understand you to state that the whole of that force of four infantry and two cavalry regiments were sent either to supply the existing deficiency of regiments, or to give the ordinary relief?—Distinctly.

84. No part of that force was intended to augment the army in India?—Not at all.

85. When did the Court of Directors take it into consideration, whether it might or might not be advisable to augment the army in India on account of the events connected with the mutiny?—On the 29th of June; that was the first day when it was thought necessary to send additional reinforcements.

86. The 29th of June was the first period at which it appeared necessary to the Court of Directors to increase the Indian army beyond its ordinary force?—Distinctly.

87. Then I presume that no measures had been taken to send out those six regiments, four of infantry and two of cavalry, with more than the usual rapidity?—No.

88. By what means were those regiments to be sent?—That I submit may be explained to the Committee by the officer of the Marine Department, who is in attendance.

89. At what time was it fixed for those regiments to go?—Those of them that were destined for Bengal, were to embark between the 1st and 25th July.

90. Are you aware whether it was, or was not, held out in the House of Lords on the part of the Court of Directors, that reinforcements would be sent to India about the middle or latter end of June?—It may have been stated, and the date named in June was the 20th, at which they should embark if possible.

91. What forces were to embark on that day?—Such of the forces then under orders as were destined for Bengal.

92. The 20th of June was the time fixed for their departure, was it not?—It was not found practicable to send them so soon.

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93. They did not go then; when did they go?—They commenced to embark ten days later, I believe.

94. Can you state the precise date when they were sent off?—I have ascertained that the first embarkation was on the 1st July, and the last on the 25th July.

95. Can you give the date at which the four regiments subsequently ordered were sent off?—The embarkations commenced on the 28th July.

96. Do you state that up to the 29th of June, or at that time, no communication with Her Majesty's Government did take place on the part of the Court of Directors, with regard to the overland route, or that none took place with yourself personally?—None took place, so far as I am informed, in the months of June and July.

97. There may have been such a communication, may there not, by other members of the East India Company?—Very possibly.

98. You have mentioned your willingness to present to this Committee all the correspondence in the case; what was that correspondence?—The correspondence that passed between the Court and the Board in the Military Department, and the correspondence between the Court of Directors and the Government of India.

99. What was the subject of the correspondence?—The requisitions made and the extent to which they were made, and the arrangements for sending the troops out.

100. Do you mean requisitions for troops?—Yes.

101. From the East India Company to the Crown?—Yes.

102. Have you got that correspondence with you?—Yes.

103. Does it bear upon the subject matter of this inquiry?—To the extent I have mentioned.

Vide Appendix.

104. Is it very extensive?—The correspondence is in addition and in continuation of that which has been laid before the House of Commons.—(*The correspondence was delivered in.*)

105. Sir *Charles Napier.*] It appears that between the 8th of May and the 10th of June, 24 transports were taken up to embark between 5,000 and 6,000 troops; were all those troops the reliefs?—They were regiments, and the reliefs which I have mentioned, in reply to a former question.

106. Then the vessels sailed from the 11th of June to the 26th of July; there were no additional troops, though the reliefs went on to the 26th of July?—The dates of embarkation will be stated to the Committee by an officer in the Marine Department.

107. Was it the habit in general to send the reliefs out to India in sailing vessels?—Always.

108. I see that there is one steamer taken up in those vessels which I have mentioned?—I will explain the reason. That steamer was bought by the East India Company for the conveyance of troops between Madras and the Straits, and having that vessel to send to India empty, we took advantage of her, and sent a body of 300 recruits in her; it was quite an exception; it was the "Prince Arthur."

109. Have you a Marine Department attached to the India House?—Yes, we have.

110. Were their opinions asked relative to the propriety of sending out troops by steam or by sailing vessels?—I must refer the Committee to the officer in that department.

111. Can you tell the Committee the first day after the 29th of June, when the first reinforcement sailed?—That information also I must refer the Committee to Mr. Mason for.

112. Do you know when the troops embarked?—They embarked between the 28th July and 14th August.

113. That comes within your department, does it not?—My department has to do with providing the troops, not with sending them out; the Marine Department arranges the whole of that.

114. Who takes up the transports; does the Marine Department?—Yes.

115. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] When was the military establishment to which you have alluded fixed?—It has been understood since the Punjaub War, that 24 was the established number of regiments of infantry of Her Majesty's army for India, and in speaking of the deficiency of two, I refer to that standard.

116. At

116. At what date was that?—In the year 1849.

117. *Chairman.*] Was that the termination of the Affghan war?—The Punjaub war.

118. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] You stated in answer to a question by the honourable Chairman, that Lord Dalhousie had made an earnest remonstrance against the troops being withdrawn from India; can you give me the date of that remonstrance?—It was dated 13th September 1854.

119. Did any obstacle exist in sending troops direct from the Crimea through Egypt to India, to reinforce the army there?—That is a Cabinet question with which I am not acquainted.

120. Did not it come under your notice in any way?—No.

121. A regiment of dragoons went from India to the Crimea and arrived in perfect safety?—Two regiments of dragoons, the 12th Lancers and the 10th Hussars.

122. Did they go back in the same way?—They returned to England.

123. And they are quartered in England now, are they not?—The 12th is gone to India.

124. When did the first troops, specially sent out in consequence of the mutiny, sail from England?—Between the 28th July and 14th August.

125. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You stated, did you not, that the Company's European troops were deficient; at the period that you alluded to were the drafts requisite to supply that deficiency actually embarked, or about when did they embark?—They were embarked early in June.

126. You stated, did you not, that Lord Elphinstone's telegraph to Lord Canning proposed to send news by a special steamer, and his proposal not being acceded to made a difference of 10 days in the receipt of the news in England; how do you calculate that period?—The question was asked me very suddenly, and I, trusting to memory, stated that I supposed it would be about 10 days; but I cannot specify the data upon which that was founded.

127. That would depend upon the date at which the last steamer departed from Bombay, and the day on which the next steamer would leave?—Undoubtedly.

128. That can be ascertained, can it not?—Undoubtedly.

129. Can you assign any reason why sailing vessels are employed in preference to steamers in the conveyance of ordinary reliefs and drafts to supply casualties?—The great difference of expense is the reason.

130. Have the Government of India expressed any opinion on the measures taken for sending out reinforcements to India?—Yes; in the despatch that we received from the Government of India, dated on the 11th of December last, they state as follows: "We desire to assure your honourable Court that the promptitude and efficacy with which the Home Government has supported the Government of India with troops and all military appliances, has satisfied us that this point (sending out drafts to supply vacancies) has not been overlooked."

131. Mr. *Osborne.*] Has that despatch been printed?—It has not.

132. Who is that from?—From the Governor-general in Council; it came by the mail before the last.

133. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] When the reliefs were sent out in June was any order sent to retain in India the troops that should have returned in the course of the season?—When the requisition for additional regiments was made, and the result communicated to the Government of India, they were then told that they had the power of retaining the relieved regiments, if they required them.

134. They were told that by the Government at home?—Yes; that they might retain the regiments to be relieved, if they required them.

135. That took place, did it not, at the end of June, when application was made for additional forces?—Yes.

13 . Can you state the amount of drafts, both in the Company's and the Queen's service, that were in the course of embarkation when the news of the mutiny arrived?—They amounted in the aggregate to 2,665 men.

137. Are they sent out to India generally from year to year, at that particular time of the year?—They are, in order that they may arrive at the healthy season.

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138. They were not delayed in this year later than the usual time of embarkation?—On the contrary, they were sent rather earlier.

139. Mr. *Adderley.*] What was the statement of Lord Canning which induced the Court of Directors in March, on the first intelligence of the outbreak in Bengal, to make no communication with the Board of Control as to the measures to be taken in consequence?—The statement made by the Governor-general was to the effect that the explanations which he had given to the troops had been satisfactory, and that he believed that the feeling had passed over. That document has been laid before Parliament amongst the Mutiny Papers.

140. Mr. *Byng.*] The 29th of June was the first date, was it not, when the East India Company thought that urgent measures were required?—It was.

141. Mr. *Osborne.*] You stated, did you not, that the East India Company were always in the habit of forwarding their reliefs by sailing vessels?—Always.

142. It does not come within your department to state the reason why?—I have just stated that the main reason is the expense; the difference, speaking in round numbers, between 50*l.* a man and 10*l.*

143. *Chairman.*] Is the difference so great as that?—I am informed that 49*l.* is the highest sum that has been paid in steamers, and 7*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* the lowest in sailing vessels.

144. Mr. *Osborne.*] Will you explain, then, the reason why the "Prince Arthur" was employed?—I have already explained it, namely, that she was our own ship. The East India Company had purchased her for the purpose of transporting troops rapidly between Madras and Rangoon, and other places on that coast. She was going out empty, when it was proposed that, under the pressure of events, she should be made use of to convey the drafts, and an arrangement was then made by the owners to take out the troops at the victualling charge of 15*l.* or 16*l.* a head.

145. You state that this was a question of emergency; are you aware whether any remonstrance proceeded from your department at that particular time, requiring the employment of steam vessels in preference to sailing vessels?—Not that I am aware of.

147. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Although the troops were withdrawn from the Crimea in the summer of 1856, it would have been unwise to send them to India in the winter of 1856?—Undoubtedly, as they would have arrived at the unhealthy season.

146. What is the latest time of the year at which they could have been sent out?—The latest time of the year for sending to Bengal is August, about the end of August.

148. *Chairman.*] That is under ordinary circumstance?—Yes.

149. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You were asked, were you not, about the grounds for preferring sailing vessels?—Yes.

150. All that you can tell the Committee upon that subject is from hearsay, as it is not in your department?—Quite so.

151. Lord *Stanley.*] You state, do you not, that the latest time at which, under ordinary circumstances, it is convenient to send troops to Bengal, is the end of August?—Yes.

152. Will you be good enough to state on what calculation of the length of the voyage that statement is founded?—Four months.

153. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You stated, that Lord Elphinstone offered to send a steamer to Aden to catch the previous mail with the news; the expense of sending a steamer is very considerable, is it not?—The steamer being one of the Indian navy, the coals would be the only expense.

154. Probably it would be 400*l.* or 500*l.*?—Possibly.

155. Mr. *Crawford.*] With regard to the ordinary course of proceeding at the India House when a despatch is received from India, in what department does it first go?—That depends upon the department to which it belongs. The despatch announcing the outbreak at Meerut was in the Military Department, and it would come into my hands.

156. What is the next step taken?—To lay it before the chairman, in order that he may communicate with the committee to which it belongs.

157. Is it then considered by the committee?—Yes.

158. It subsequently comes before the court?—Yes.

159. Then if the result of this reference to the court is a requisition to Her Majesty's

Majesty's Government for troops; that requisition is made to the Indian Board? —Yes.

160. Upon the answer being received, it comes back to your department in the India House?—Yes.

161. What steps do you then take, having received that authority from the Board of Control?—The chairman then moves the Military and Political Committee, to request the Committee of Home and Finance to make arrangements for engaging the necessary transports.

162. Then, so far as your department is concerned, you have nothing more to do with the transmission of troops to India?—Nothing more.

163. Any further information that the Committee may want they must obtain from the Marine Department of the India House?—Clearly.

164. Can you state how many requisitions were made by the Court of Directors to the Commissioners of the Board of Control for troops to be sent out to India?—There were six requisitions.

165. Can you give the dates of the requisitions?—Yes: the first requisition was made, as I have already stated, on the 29th of June, and that was for four regiments of infantry; the second requisition was made on the 14th of July, and that was for six regiments of infantry and eight companies of artillery; the third requisition was made on the 3d of August, and that was for two dragoon regiments, four regiments of infantry, and six companies of artillery; the fourth requisition was made on the 2d of September; it included four regiments of infantry, three regiments of dragoons, four companies of Royal Engineers, five companies of Royal Artillery, three field batteries, and one troop of horse artillery. The fifth requisition was made on the 21st of October for two infantry regiments, and the last was made on the 22d of December, also for two infntryy regiments.

166. Can you state whether those requisitions were made at the request of the Government of India, or upon that of the Court of Directors?—The two first were made before any requisition had been received from the Government of India, and on the receipt of the telegraphic account of the mutinies; they were entirely spontaneous. The third was made in consequence of the receipt of a requisition from the Government of India, and so with the fourth and the fifth; but the last was made without any additional requisition.

167. Can you state to the Committee whether there was any delay intervening between the period of the receipt of the requisitions from India, or of intelligence, that led the East India Company to make those requisitions of their own accord, and the requisitions being made to the Indian Board?—I should say none that could possibly be avoided. The first requisition on the 29th of June, was made on the day of the receipt of the telegraphic intelligence, and the requisition of the 14th of July, two days after the receipt of the next telegram. The requisition on the 3d of August was made a few days after receipt of the requisition of the Government of India. I should say that there was no delay at all.

168. Was there any delay on the part of the India Board in acceding to, or responding to, those requisitions?—None whatever.

169. There was no delay on the part of the East India Company in taking the necessary steps through the Marine Department?—Unquestionably none. The most prompt and energetic measures were taken.

170. Has there been any remonstrance from the Government of India with respect to the sending of troops to India?—Not any. On the contrary, I have just read a remark made by the Government of India, expressive of their thanks for the promptitude evinced by the Home Authorities.

171. You stated, in answer to a question put to you just now, that two regiments of Hussars were sent from India to the Crimea. At what period of the year did they leave Bombay?—In January and February 1855.
it was in the autumn of the year.

172. Captain *Vivian.*] You have stated that our European force in February 1857, in India, was about 40,000?—Between 38,000 and 39,000, viz.:—

Queen's Infantry - - - - - -	20,855
„ Dragoons - - - - - -	2,570
Company's Artillery and Infantry - -	14,881
TOTAL - - -	38,306

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173. And they were 5,000 short of their usual complement?—Between 4,000 and 5,000.

174. But then that force was not available for the suppression of any mutiny at that time in the Indian territory, as a part was employed in Persia?—Yes.

175. What was the amount of it?—The European force in Persia amounted to about 4,000 men, including the artillery.

176. What did the force consist of?—Of three regiments of infantry, one of dragoons, and a large force of artillery.

177. Then that reduced your force in India at that time to a little more than 35,000?—About 34,000.

178. Of that force, how much was in the province of Bengal?—Nearly 21,000.

179. You state that the first requisition was made on the 29th of June; that was on the receipt of the intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut?—Yes.

180. About when was the news of the outbreak at Barrackpore received?—The account of the dissatisfaction amongst the troops at Barrackpore arrived on the 20th March.

181. There was a very anxious feeling in India then prevailing, and in the whole of those provinces, was there not?—Not so early in the year; so far as I am informed, the anxious feeling was first evinced in May.

182. Between March and June were there many communications from India expressive of that anxiety?—Several communications, which have been laid before Parliament, but not indicating any necessity for reinforcements.

183. But indicating great anxiety on the part of the population, if not on the part of the Governor-general?—Not anxiety on the part of the Governor-general.

184. But on the part of other persons at Calcutta?—The first intimation of this feeling was received by the mail which arrived on the 6th July, being the Address of the Calcutta Trades' Association, dated 20th May 1857, as laid by the Parliament in July.

185. Did not anxiety prevail in the Court of Directors?—I think not until early in the month of June.

186. Did you not feel anxious on account of the reduction in the number of troops?—No.

187. You thought nothing of the mutiny?—At first, the communication made by Lord Canning was so satisfactory, that no serious anxiety was entertained.

188. Did you think nothing at all of the mutiny before the arrival of the account of the Meerut affair on the 29th of June?—Before the arrival of that account there were rumours of a mutiny at Meerut, which made me very anxious.

189. Did you make any communication to or suggest to the Company of Directors a requisition for more troops to be sent to India before the 29th of June?—I did not.

190. Did you not feel great anxiety on account of the reduction of the troops?—No.

191. Did any communication pass between you and the Directors of the Company?—Not any upon that subject.

192. And, in short, you thought nothing of the mutiny till the 29th of June?—I cannot say that I thought nothing of it; it was a matter of the deepest interest, and the accounts were looked for with great anxiety.

193. I mean that you could have thought nothing of it, when, notwithstanding the number of troops ordinarily kept in India was so much below the general proportion, you were not at all anxious on that account?—I was not, until the rumour arrived of the mutiny at Meerut.

194. Was any of that force which was employed in the Persian war withdrawn from the province of Bengal?—It was not.

195. You cannot tell the Committee the amount of those troops that were in the province at that time?—It amounted to about 21,000.

196. Viscount *Goderich*.] You stated, did you not, that the first requisition from the East India Company for troops, in consequence of the mutiny, was made on the 29th of June?—It was.

197. Are you aware that a letter was forwarded from the Board of Control to the Secretary of the East India Company, on the 22d of May, enclosing a letter, dated

dated the 21st of May, from Sir Benjamin Hawes, the Under-secretary for War, in which there is this passage: "His Lordship" (that is, Lord Panmure) "approves of the arrangements therein submitted, except in so far as regards the departure of the regiments, which he is of opinion ought not, under the present circumstances of India, to be postponed to the period fixed in Sir J. Melvill's letter"?—Yes. *P. Melvill, Esq.* 16 February 1858.

198. And I believe that the reply was, that the Court of Directors were unable to hasten the departure of those reinforcements?—Yes.

199. Why did they find themselves unable to hasten the departure of those reinforcements?—They had previously made contracts with the owners of ships to sail on a certain day, and they were unable to alter those terms.

200. Would it have been impossible, if they had made other contracts, to send them at an earlier period?—If they had cancelled the existing contracts, and entered into new ones, they might have done so; the time was very short, but it might have been done.

201. Can you state what would have been the loss in making such an arrangement?—No, I am not able; but the Marine Department can give the Committee all the figures.

202. Are the Committee to understand you to say, that you cannot give any evidence as to any correspondence that may have passed between the East India Company and the Board of Control, on the subject of the overland route?—Except that correspondence officially between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, commencing with the letter of the 31st August. The question put to me before had reference to earlier periods.

203. Are you aware that a letter upon that subject was addressed by the Court of Directors to the Board of Control on the 31st of August?—Yes, I am.

204. Lord *Stanley*.] Reverting to a question which I put to you; you state that under ordinary circumstances the latest time for troops to leave England is the end of August; that is calculated on the duration of the voyage being four months?—Yes.

205. That is to say, it is not considered advisable that the troops should arrive in Bengal later than the end of December?—Yes.

206. Is it considered then that the months of January and February are much more unhealthy for newly arrived troops?—They are not considered more unhealthy, but it is considered desirable that the troops should arrive in India before the closing of the fair season, in order that they may have time to settle themselves in quarters before the hot weather begins.

207. It is desirable, if possible, that they should have the whole of the healthy season before them, in which to become partially acclimated?—Quite so.

208. But it is not supposed that any serious injury to health would arise from their landing in Bengal in January or February?—Certainly not; but it is very important that European troops should have time time after they land to proceed to their stations, so as to be settled in quarters before the hot weather begins. These stations in Bengal are, for the most part, at great distances from Calcutta.

209. So that upon any necessity arising, even though that emergency were not very pressing, there would be no difficulty in sending troops as late as the 1st of October?—Certainly not.

210. There are no valid sanatory reasons against the despatch of troops by the ordinary means of sailing ships during the whole of the months of September and October?—No, if on arrival they are placed in quarters at the place of debarkation.

211. You stated, did you not, that no part of the Persian force was withdrawn from Bengal?—No part of it.

212. Where was it withdrawn from?—It was withdrawn almost entirely from Bombay; a wing of the dragoon regiment was withdrawn from Bangalore to assist Bombay, but the whole of the force, excluding that wing, was withdrawn from Bombay.

213. Was it not a fact that in the various districts where the mutiny has since broken out the garrisons were materially weakened by the forces being drawn off for the Persian expedition?—Unquestionably not.

214. Mr. *Crawford*.] Is it not the fact that the voyage to India greatly increases in length as you get on from the months of June, July, and August into September?

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September?—Of course, if you arrive in the Bay of Bengal after the monsoon has changed, the voyage is prolonged.

215. So that there is another reason why you should not ship troops from this country to India after August; that is to say, because the voyage becomes much longer and the period of arrival in India is delayed considerably?—I believe that is the case.

216. Sir *Charles Napier*.] Can you tell the Committee when you began making arrangements to send troops through Egypt to India?—The exact date I am not prepared to state; it will be stated to the Committee by the Marine Department.

217. When did you begin to make arrangements to send troops overland by Egypt to India?—I believe it was in the month of September.

218. Have you gone on sending them through that channel constantly since?—Not altogether, but partially since.

219. How many do you send in each vessel?—For that I must refer the Committee to the Marine Department.

220. This paper which I have in my hand is dated the 16th of February, and we have no return of the sailing vessels and some of the steamers, and as to almost all the sailing vessels that sailed in July and August, we have no return of the dates of their arrival in India; you naturally must have now the date of the arrival of the troops in each vessel, and you must have the date of the arrival of each vessel?—Undoubtedly; that defect arises, I imagine, from the date of the order.

221. It was dated the 18th of December last?—That return has been made, I presume, up to the 18th of December, the date of your order.

222. It is dated the 5th of February, and you could ascertain the arrival of the vessels that sailed from England in July and August?—All I can state is that the return does not come from my department.

223. Sir *Edward Colebrooke*.] You have been asked whether you made any suggestion as to the increase of force; are you in the practice of making suggestions as to the amount of force maintained in India?—My duties are those of a secretary, purely ministerial; but if, at any time, suggestions occur to me of measures which may appear to be calculated to advance the public interests, I communicate them to the chairman and deputy-chairman for their consideration.

224. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] It appears that the troops from the Crimea did not arrive in England till August and September 1856; would there have been any difficulty in directing those troops upon India instead of upon England?—Those troops, I presume, had suffered greatly during the war, and required to be recruited, and to be in many respects re-equipped. To have sent them direct from the Crimea to India would have been to send them in a very incomplete state.

225. Do you know that they were in that disorganised state from your own knowledge?—I did not use the word disorganised; but my impression unquestionably is, that they were not prepared to go to India immediately on leaving the Crimea.

226. Are you not aware that many of those corps were in a more efficient state at the period to which I allude, than they were ever before?—I have no doubt that those that remained of the original force were so; but their numbers had been greatly reduced.

227. Had they not been recruited up to their full strength?—There is no doubt that a number of recruits were sent, but they were very young.

228. As a matter of fact could they have been sent without a very serious loss to India to reinforce the army in India, at that time in a confessedly deficient state?—They might have been; but I presume that you would refer for information on that subject to the Commander-in-chief.

229. With regard to the "Prince Arthur;" it appears that the "Prince Arthur" is a steamer?—Yes.

230. And she stands here at 16 *l.* per man; is that because she was owned by the Company, and that the 16 *l.* merely denotes the victualling?—Distinctly, as I understood it.

231. Strictly the victualling?—Nothing else.

232. In that case, I see that ships were taken up as low at that time as 11 *l.* 11 *s.*; was their scale of provisions and cubic space the same as in the "Prince Arthur"?—The scale of provisions was the same.

233. And

233. And was the cubical space for each man the same?—The cubical space no doubt was the same.

234. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You have stated that of the 40,000 European troops in India, a portion was detached to the war in Persia. Will you state to the Committee when they returned to India, and whether they were available for the military operations that ensued?—They returned to India in the month of May, and two of the European regiments were instantly sent round to Calcutta.

235. They, in fact, formed a part of General Havelock's force?—They did.

236. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] With reference to the question that was asked you about sending the troops straight from the Crimea, may there not have been other reasons for not sending troops in the autumn of 1856, with which you are not acquainted?—Undoubtedly.

237. You stated that the contracts might have been cancelled, and troops sent out before the arrival of the news of the revolt at Meerut?—Possibly.

238. Would not the cancelling of the contracts have been an extreme measure, justified only by news more serious than had been received at that time?—Most certainly.

239. You did not consider, and persons generally at the India House did not consider, the mutiny to have assumed very serious proportions before the 29th of June?—Certainly not.

240. You have stated that the difference in the rate of conveying troops in sailing-vessels or steamers was the difference between 10 *l.* and 50 *l.* a man; was the victualling included in that?—In both.

241. Mr. *Crawford.*] I see that the rates at which those sailing-ships were taken up which conveyed those six regiments to India ranged from about 11 *l.* 10 *s.* to 13 *l.*, exclusive of the "Prince Arthur," and I see that the steam ships subsequently taken up obtained as much as 49*l.* per man; then the additional sum that the East India Company would have had to pay would have been something like 36*l.* a man?—Yes.

242. The "Prince Arthur" was sent out by the East India Company as their property, and at their expense?—As I understand, she was bought under the condition that the owner should place her at Madras on a certain date.

243. She was to be delivered at Madras?—Yes.

244. She was, therefore navigated at the expense of the owner?—Yes.

245. In that sum of 16 *l.* must therefore be included the cost of the fuel of the ship?—No doubt, all the expenses connected with the troops on board.

246. I conceive that as there is a considerable difference between the expense of sending a steamer that consumes coals and an ordinary sailing-vessel, there is a justification for the additional sum of 16 *l.* being paid?—I do not know whether she was steamed out or not.

247. Sir *J. Pakington.*] You have stated in a former answer that the expense per man of sending troops to India by sailing-ships is 10*l.*, and by steamer 50 *l.* It appears that the "Prince Arthur," or that a steamer took them out for 16 *l.*, and your explanation hitherto has been that the reason is, that she belonged to the Company. Will you state to the Committee how you arrived, in that case, at the difference between 16 *l.* by the "Prince Arthur" and 50 *l.* by the other steam-ship?—The "Prince Arthur" was, as I have explained, purchased by the Company for delivery at Madras. She was therefore going out at the expense of the builders, who could therefore afford to take troops at a far less cost than the owners of steamers sent out for the purpose.

248. The exact calculation is not within your knowledge?—No.

249. Viscount *Goderich.*] You do not say that the cost per man in sending out troops by steamer has been always 50 *l.*?—Not quite so much; 49 *l.*, 48 *l.*, and 47 *l.*

250. Captain *Vivian.*] Two regiments were brought from India, the 12th Lancers, and the 10th Hussars; do you know at what period they were withdrawn from the Indian force?—In January and February 1855.

251. We were then two cavalry regiments lower than our ordinary strength in India?—Yes.

252. When were they returned to India?—In August 1856.

253. They came overland, did they not?—Yes, to the Crimea.

254. The expenses were borne by the English Government?—Yes.

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255. Were the expenses of returning them also borne by the English Government?—I am not aware that that question has been settled.

256. Is it a moot point?—I am not aware that it is, but I certainly thought that the expense of the return voyage of the 12th Lancers, which was brought from India, and returned to India, should have been paid by the British Government.

257. The 12th came overland. When were they returned to India?—In August 1856.

258. In the year 1856?—Yes.

259. After the requisition for troops was made?—No, long before that.

260. They came from the Crimea to England, did they not?—Yes.

261. Having sold their injured horses in the Crimea?—Yes.

262. And they were sent back to you, were they not, without horses?—Yes.

263. They landed in India without any horses?—Yes.

264. And they had to re-model their regiment?—Yes.

265. Mr. *Osborne*.] You are not aware whether there might not have been reasons for selling their horses in the Crimea?—I think there were very good reasons; the expense of bringing them home would have been greater than the value of them.

266. *Chairman*.] When you state that six battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry were to be sent out, I understood that this was an addition altogether of six battalions and two of cavalry; but I find, from a subsequent part of your evidence, that I was mistaken in that inference, namely, that in reality four of those battalions were meant either as relieving battalions, or as replacing those two battalions; and that, in point of fact, there were only four additional battalions and two regiments of cavalry?—In order that this matter may be clearly understood, I will, with the Committee's permission, append a statement of the whole of the troops sent out last year; premising that, as the Government of India were authorised to retain the time-expired regiments, viz., two of dragoons and two of infantry, the whole force sent, was an actual addition to the means of the Government. It is as follows:—

STATEMENT.

	Regiments of Dragoons.	Regiments of Infantry.	Troops of Horse Artillery.	Companies of Foot Artillery.	Field Batteries.	Companies of Engineers.	Drafts.
Under orders in May and June 1857.	2	4*	-	-	-	-	2,095
1st requisition on 29th June -	-	4	—	—	—	—	—
2d „ 14th July -	-	6	2	6	—	—	—
3d „ 3d Aug. -	2	4	1	-	4	—	—
4th „ 2d Sept. -	3	4	1	5	3	4	—
5th „ 21st Oct. -	-	2	—	—	—	—	—
6th „ 22d Dec. -	-	2	—	—	—	—	—
Drafts in addition to those under orders in May and June.	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,250
Drafts for the East India Company's Forces, embarked up to Dec. 1857.	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,700
	7	26	4	11	7	4	

Aggregate number included in the above return - - - 40,740

* Two of these were in restoration of the two withdrawn for the Crimea.

267. We understand, that in point of fact, when those disturbances broke out, the European troops, both the Queen's and the Company's, were 5,000 deficient of their establishment, but it appears that in reality there was a deficiency of

of 9,000 European troops in the available force that was at the disposal of the Supreme Government in India, including the 4,000 in Persia?—The deficiency in the establishment was 4,624; the troops employed in Persia amounted to 4,123; together, 8,747.

268. The Committee are to understand, from some of your replies, that in your department, and also among the Court of Directors generally, there was no alarm whatever felt until the 29th June?—I will not say that there was no alarm. There was certainly anxiety from the early part of June, on account of the ominous rumours which had reached England of the mutiny at Meerut.

269. It appears that until the 29th of June, at all events, no strong impression existed at the India House of the necessity of important reinforcements, and yet how is that to be reconciled with the letter of the Under Secretary of War, dated 40 days previously. On the 21st of May, the War Minister writes to the Secretary of the India Board, to say that he is of opinion that the 20th of June is too late a date for those reinforcements to be sent, therefore we must conclude that the War Department here were, 40 days previous to the 29th of June, of opinion that it was urgent to send reinforcements to India?—The words of Sir Benjamin Hawes are, "His Lordship considers that they ought not to be despatched later than the 20th June." There was no doubt anxiety on all parts, that the troops then under orders for India should proceed as early as possible; and they were sent off as soon as was then practicable.

270. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Were the two regiments which came from India to the Crimea mounted on Arabs?—They were all entire horses. I believe they were Arabs.

271. They are very valuable horses, are they not?—They are esteemed the best that you can procure in India.

272. What might have been the value of the troop horses of those two regiments?—Each troop horse might have been put at 50*l.*

273. Does not the loss of so many seasoned troop horses, through selling them in the Crimea for nothing, affect the present supply of cavalry horses in India to a serious extent?—No doubt; 1,500 horses is a large number.

274. Mr. *Osborne.*] Were not those horses so seasoned that half of them were dead and unfit for use?—I have not heard that.

275. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] The Honourable Chairman asked you whether there was not a deficiency of 9,000 men on the Indian establishment; would it not rather be 8,000 than 9,000, as the establishment is always low at that season of the year by 1,000 men?—During the short part of the period under review, whilst forces were in the Persian Gulf, the number wanting to complete in India, and the number so absent, was about 8,747; but the Persian force returned to India in May.

John Charles Mason, Esquire; called in, and Examined.

276. *Chairman.*] YOU are in the Marine Department at the East India House?—I am assistant to the Secretary of the East India Company in the Marine Department.

277. When was the first communication made to you from the higher authorities under whom you act, as to the necessity of employing a more than usual amount of maritime transport for reinforcing the army in India?—Immediately after the receipt of the news on the 29th of June last.

278. There was no intimation before that of anything more than usual being required?—None.

279. Was it decided at once that sailing ships were preferable to steamers, or the contrary?—The question was one of very considerable doubt as to whether steamers or sailing vessels would be the best; the question was doubtful, both out of doors and in the East India House. In the East India House, they had had no experience whatever with regard to the employment of screw steam vessels. They knew from inquiries that had been made, when the employment of screw steam vessels was first suggested, that there was great uncertainty as to any coal being obtainable at the different stations where it would be necessary for vessels to call for the purpose of taking in fuel, if it was expected of them to make

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make a tolerably quick passage; and therefore, it was decided that of the four regiments that were to be sent out upon that requisition, two of the regiments, or their equivalent in numbers of men, should go by steam vessels, and two of them by sailing vessels, clippers, if they could be obtained.

280. At what date was it decided that two of the regiments were to go in screw steamers?—I think on the 1st of July; immediately, I may state, after the troops had been conceded by Her Majesty's Government upon the requisition of the Court of Directors.

281. One-half by steam and one-half by sailing-vessels?—Exactly.

282. That was on the 1st of July?—Yes.

283. Mr. *Osborne.*] You said "clippers"?—Yes, they are supposed to be fast-sailing vessels; in fact, it may be called, if I may use the expression, a sort of slang term for a fast-sailing vessel.

284. *Chairman.*] With regard to the steamers; what inquiry was made in order to ascertain whether there was or not likely to be a deficiency of coals at the different intermediate stations?—An inquiry was made of the different steam companies that had contracts as to the quantity of coal that might be available at St. Vincent, and an inquiry was likewise made of the Admiralty as to the possibility of any assistance being given from the Queen's depôts at the different stations, such as the Cape of Good Hope, Ascension, and other places; and the quantity of coal that was supposed to be available was anything rather than large, because Her Majesty's Government then had a great many vessels that were likely to be calling for coal; and the answer we got, although with every disposition to assist the East India Company to the utmost extent, was, that the stores, such as they had, were not large, although they were taking measures for replenishing them very largely, but they could not promise any very large quantity.

285. Was the supposed deficiency so great that they could not promise for more than two steamers on the 1st of July?—I think it will be found that we took five or six, and that was the consequence of our inquiry; we inquired before we engaged any steam vessels.

286. Within what dates were those five or six steamers taken up?—They were taken up between the 7th and the 14th of July.

287. Did the Admiralty make any statement to you of the actual amount of coals at each of those stations?—They did; but it was necessary to consider it as rather a promise of assistance than actual assistance at that moment, because they were so uncertain as to how much might have been taken from time to time by vessels that had been calling there.

288. Queen's vessels?—Yes; we asked at the same time as to the probability of coal being in private hands at the Cape of Good Hope, and we were not at all satisfied that there was much in private hands, and we furthermore knew from all experience, that when the Government or the Government servants came into the market the probability would be, that the price of coal in private hands would be very much enhanced.

289. But I suppose that, for the emergency which arose, the enhancement of the price would hardly have decided your resolution upon the subject?—No, it would not; but our object was to make a quicker passage by a steam vessel than by a good sailing vessel, and we were most anxious to know whether it was at all likely that there would be coal there when they went for it, otherwise they would have been taken out of their course and would have lost a great deal of time; as it was, with the information before the Court, they engaged a certain number of steam vessels, and they obtained a promise from the Royal Mail Company to assist those transports, in case of necessity, with a certain amount of coals, at a favoured price, so as to protect them in a certain degree against any monopoly, and at the same time the Admiralty gave us the same permission at the same price, so far as the Government stores would permit.

290. Those five or six were the large steamers which you took up during the first week in July?—They were small steamers.

291. What might the class of clippers have been that you took up at that time, in the beginning of July?—Ranging from 800 tons upwards.

292. That is rather small, is it not?—For a sailing vessel we consider it large, that is, for a handy ship.

293. A ship

293. A ship of about 800 tons would take about 300 men?—Four hundred men, probably.

294. Are the Committee to understand, that, on the average, on this voyage, you allowed, in the sailing vessels, about two tons per man?—That may be taken as the general average, although we have found, in the progress of the arrangements that have been made this season, that, from the larger amount of baggage being taken with the troops, such as tentage and so forth, there is a much greater demand upon the tonnage of a ship; so that we cannot put as many men on board ship as we could under the old rule, assuming two tons per man.

295. With regard to steamers, what is the average; is that two tons likewise?—Nothing like it; there is so much encroachment upon the space by the engine-room.

296. Would it be one-and-a-half?—About that, probably, in general terms.

297. At what date did you commence to hire larger steamers?—I think it was after the second requirement for troops. I perceive that the 29th of June was the first, then the 14th July, then the 3d August. It was upon the 14th July when we began to take rather larger steam vessels. I think the "Golden Fleece" was a vessel of 2,700 tons.

298. In the beginning of August you went still beyond that, and rather endeavoured to take up a larger class of ships?—Yes; the object then was this: we had been in the habit of sending, for general convenience, not more than 400 men in any ship, until this case of emergency arose; and then it was thought it would be very much better that the troops should be landed in India in a fit state for co-operation, and, instead of dividing a regiment in half-a-dozen ships, as under the old practice, that if we got larger vessels to take nearly a regiment in one, they would be advantageous. There are disadvantages with it, no doubt; for all the risk is in one.

299. Then, with regard to the troops on the 29th June, was it four regiments of infantry, and two of cavalry, that were pointed out as being required?—When we had that special requirement for the four regiments, we had, as it were, on hand, and in course of detail for embarkation, four regiments of infantry, with a large number of detachments, or drafts, as they are called, for Her Majesty's regiments already in India, and a considerable number of the East India Company's recruits for their own European regiments; making altogether between 7,000 or 8,000 men, for whose transport we had made contracts for 25 or 26 ships. Those regiments were the 2d Dragoon Guards, the 3d Dragoon Guards, the 7th Foot, the 88th Foot, and the third battalion of the Rifle Brigade.

300. This was anterior to the 29th?—Yes; but they were in course of embarkation. Then, when the 2d Division of the four regiments after the 1st July came for their transport, the East India Company engaged seven steamers, the "Caledonia," the "Robert Lowe," the "Carthage," the "United Kingdom," the "John Bell," and the "Thebes."

301. After these requisitions, was there any delay on the part of the War Department in furnishing the troops which the Government had agreed to give?—We ascertained that they would be ready as soon as the ships could be got ready for them, and, upon pressing the inquiry, we found that that would be three weeks.

302. Could not those ships be obtained in the large maritime market of this country without a delay of three weeks?—I understood the question to apply to troops being ready. We heard that the troops would be ready as soon as the ships could be got ready for them, or say in three weeks from the time they were put at our disposal.

303. Am I to understand that the ships were not likely to be got in readiness without a delay of three weeks?—Certainly not; I should think not; we have never found it practicable in much less than three weeks; from a fortnight to three weeks.

304. Did you find any difficulty in going into the market and procuring the class of ships that you required?—We immediately posted advertisements inviting tenders from the owners of screw steam ships, and of sailing vessels of a certain size, stating to the public the number of men we had for transport, and stating the terms and conditions, and the victualling, and everything of that kind, so as to enable the owners of ships to see exactly the bargain that was necessary to be made, and the tenders were to be delivered in. The advertisement was

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dated on the 3d July, and the tenders were delivered in on the 7th July, and they were under consideration between the Court of Directors and the India Board till the 12th, and were eventually decided upon on the 14th July, that certain ships should be engaged, subject of course to survey.

305. Was there any point raised with regard to those ships as between steam and sailing ships by either of the departments, as to the propriety of considering the question of economy or not?—The question of expense was entirely waived, it being considered both by the Court and the Board of Commissioners, who entirely concurred that expedition was the main object. The practice had always been before to advertise for ships, to receive the tenders, to examine the tenders through, and to select for employment those ships that came within the scope of the terms and conditions, and which were the cheapest in price. The presumption always is that they were to be surveyed, and that they were to be one ship as good as another; but on this occasion that mode was waived by the consent of the co-ordinate authorities, meaning the Court of Directors and the Board of Commissioners; and instead of taking nearly the lowest, unless it proved to be in the opinion of the Court the best, to take ships which they thought would be most likely to perform the service best, without reference to price.

306. Did any question arise in your department, or when, if any question did arise, was it, as to the propriety of making use for a part of the reinforcements of the overland route?—That matter did not come before my department; it was entirely a Cabinet question. I think I am right in stating that the Prime Minister in his place in Parliament explained the reasons why it was not thought expedient to a certain extent to make use of the overland route, but departmentally I had nothing to say on the subject; the transport of troops does not come in any way under my cognizance, until the route in fact is prescribed by which they are to go.

307. Viscount *Goderich.*] I think you stated that you took up two clippers, and two steamers, to sail on the 2d July?—I have been misunderstood if that be so.

308. Did you intend to say that you sent on the 2d July, two clippers and two steamers with troops, or did you mean that of the first batch of troops sent upon requisition, one half was to go in two clippers, and the other half in two steamers?—I meant to say, and I think I did say, that of those four regiments it was determined that two of the regiments should be sent by screw steam vessels, and the other two by sailing vessels.

309. I see that a steamer in the list before me is said to have been taken up on the 10th June; what induced you to take up a steamer at that date?—I apprehend that your Lordship is referring to the "Prince Arthur."

310. No, the "Caledonia"?—That ought to be the 10th July; that is a typographical error.

311. *Chairman.*] Is that incorrect?—It is evidently a typographical error; it was the 10th July; it was one of the batch of vessels taken up for the purpose of sending out those very regiments to which I have already made allusion.

312. Viscount *Goderich.*] That was one of the five or six steamers taken up between the 7th and 14th July?—Yes.

313. *Chairman.*] Is this a return made from the India House?—Yes, but not printed by the India House; printed by this House.

314. Viscount *Goderich.*] You are aware that it was suggested to the East India Company, on the 22d of May, from the War Department, that it was very desirable that the troops then proposed to be sent out, should be sent out at an earlier date than that suggested by the Company?—Yes.

315. Will you state what were the difficulties in the way of complying with that suggestion?—Contracts had been entered into, for, I think, 26 sailing ships, and the details of the embarkation were arranged according to the date that had been given in that contract, namely, on or before the 25th of July, and therefore those contracts having commenced it would not have been practicable to break those contracts without paying the contracting parties, the owners, the full contract price, which would have involved a sum of something like 70,000 *l.*

316. Do you say that the contracts were actually entered into on the 22d of May?—They were.

317. How long previously to that date were the contracts entered into?—Many of the ships had been taken up in the earlier part of May; some so early as the 8th of May, and the 29th; on the 29th a large proportion of them.

318. I find it stated in Sir James Melvill's reply, dated the 26th of May 1857, "That advertisements were issued last Wednesday for tenders for the requisite tonnage to convey to India one regiment of dragoons, three regiments of infantry, and recruits for Her Majesty's regiments, the said tenders to be delivered this day, or on Wednesday the 3d proximo, and to provide for the embarkation of the troops between the 1st and 25th of July." Will you have the goodness to explain how that is consistent with what you have just stated as to the contracts having been entered into before the 22d of May?—With regard to the date of the letter which you first quoted, the 22d of May, the matter did not come in any way before me in the Marine Department until the urgent requirement, dated the 29th of June, and then at that time, the 29th of June, all the contracts had been entered into, and the dates that were given by those contracts, was the 25th of July, and we made our arrangements for the other four regiments to embark by the 25th of July likewise.

319. Then are the Committee to understand that Sir James Melvill declined to comply with the suggestion of the Minister of War, that the despatch of those reinforcements should be accelerated without any communication with you, being the head of the Marine Department of the East India Company, as to whether it could be done or not. His letter is dated the 26th of May?—True, but I am only a departmental officer, and Sir James Melvill, who is the secretary, is the organ of the Court of Directors, in whose name he speaks.

320. Still we have reason to believe that Sir James Melvill considers that you are better acquainted with the details of the Marine Department, and the contracts for vessels, than he is?—Of the actual transport.

321. And of the nature of the contracts entered into?—The principle upon which the transport is arranged is with higher powers than with me, the Court of Directors, whose organ the secretary is.

322. Captain *Vivian*.] I understood you to say, that the reinforcements which were going out to India without any relation to the mutiny, consisted of four regiments of infantry, and two regiments of cavalry?—Yes.

323. You made arrangements to send them out, and you had to send them out together with the recruits, to the amount of 7,000 men?—Yes.

324. I think you stated, that the reason why Sir James Melvill declined to comply with the requisition made by the Board of Control to send the extra troops out earlier was, because those contracts were entered into in the early part of May?—Not for extra troops, but contracts for the reliefs.

325. The contracts for the reliefs were entered into in the early part of May?—In the course of May, the greater part of them were.

326. That being the case, what is the meaning of this letter of Sir James Melvill, directed to the Secretary of the East India Board, saying, "I have received their commands to acquaint you that advertisements were issued last Wednesday for tenders for the requisite tonnage to convey to India a regiment of Dragoons, three regiments of infantry, and recruits for Her Majesty's regiments, the said tenders to be delivered this day, or on Wednesday, the 3d proximo;" how could that be so if, as you say, the contracts were made in the the early part of May?—I cannot reconcile that with the statement of every individual ship of the 26, but there are some that are evidently in that category.

327. Here are three regiments of infantry, one regiment of dragoons, and all the recruits for Her Majesty's regiments?—I find in this letter, signed by Sir James Melvill, that "advertisements were issued last Wednesday for tenders for the requisite tonnage to convey to India one regiment of dragoons, three regiments of infantry, and recruits for Her Majesty's regiments, the said tenders to be delivered this day, or on Wednesday the 3d proximo, and to provide for the embarkation of the troops between the 1st and 25th of July. The desire now expressed by the Secretary of State for War that the troops should be dispatched by the 20th June, I am directed to state cannot possibly be acted upon, as the time required to enable shipowners to make their tenders to allow of the requisite survey of the ships, and for the due examination of the provisions for the voyage; and, in the case of the regiments to embark from Portsmouth, to

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allow time for the ships to get round to that port, preclude an earlier embarkation than that which the Court have specified. Her Majesty's Government may rest assured that no available delay will be allowed in the dispatch of these troops." Those are the reasons which the Court of Directors give why they could not do it?—I may state upon that, that as a question of time, supposing these contracts had been cancelled, the very reasons which are stated in the last paragraph of that letter, would apply very forcibly to the taking up of other vessels to supply their place, inasmuch as when we had put our advertisements into the papers for the next four regiments, we fixed the same date for the embarkation of those four regiments as had been fixed for those preceding ones, because we were quite sure that, with the survey and everything necessary, you could not get vessels ready at an earlier period.

328. Captain *Vivian.*] You stated, and made a great point of it, that the great reason why you could not comply with the requisition of the Board of Control was, that your contracts were entered into, and it would involve a sum of something like 70,000*l.* to sacrifice them. This is simply a requisition for tenders. Does the fact of a tender being sent in constitute a contract?—Not exactly; but if a tender is advertised for, and received, and entertained, and a letter has been sent to the parties stating that, subject to a survey, the Court will engage that vessel, it is then considered as an engagement.

329. That does not bind you to complete the contract?—Out of doors, I think, they would look very suspiciously upon a transaction of that kind.

330. At this date, on the 26th of May, tenders were not sent in; they were to be sent in either on that Wednesday or on the 3d of June?—The meaning of that letter is evidently this, that, bearing in mind all the detail that was necessary, no time would be saved.

331. But the effect of it is this, that on the 26th of May there was not only no contract made for those ships, but that the tenders were only proposed to be sent in on the following day, or none until the 3d of June?—Yes.

332. The contract to start those troops, was to be completed between the 1st and the 25th of July. Had they all left by the 25th of July?—By the 26th.

Veneris, 19° *die Februarii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.	Sir Charles Napier.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Crawford.	Sir John Pakington.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Lord Stanley.
Viscount Goderich.	Captain Vivian.
Mr. Horsman.	Mr. Willoughby.

SIR DE LACY EVANS, IN THE CHAIR.

Captain *John Shepherd*, called in; and Examined.

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333. *Chairman.*] IN what department, more especially, do you, as one of the Members of the Court of Directors act?—I am a Member of the Finance and Home Committee, where all matters connected with shipping are managed, particularly with reference to the transport of troops to India, and matters connected with the Home Establishment.

334. At what time did the Court of Directors first call upon the department in which you especially act, to adopt prompt measures for transmitting reinforcements to India?—The first occasion that our attention was specially called to it was on the arrival of the telegram, giving accounts of the calamitous occurrences at Meerut. A special court was summoned and the whole matter taken into consideration, and it was decided that there should be a requisition for four additional regiments. That was the first occasion when special measures were taken.

335. That was on the 29th of June, was it not?—Yes.

336. There appeared to have been very serious disturbances or movements in Bengal amongst the sepoy regiments near Calcutta some months before. Did or did not those create any anxiety on the part of the Directors or the Board of Control, to your knowledge, or was not there some anxiety felt, seeing that the army was very much below the established amount?—No doubt accounts did reach us of the disaffected feeling at Barrackpore, but we received a letter at the same time that those accounts were transmitted from Lord Canning, in which his Lordship said that the circumstance of the greased cartridges had been explained to the troops, and that all uneasy feelings were removed. I confess myself that I was under no apprehension. I had great confidence, as many others had, in the fidelity of the sepoys; and until the accounts from Meerut, even my apprehension was not excited.

337. You do not recollect at this moment whether any intermediate incidents occurred of a similar nature in any parts of the districts within reach of the metropolis, of Calcutta, between that period and the 10th of May?—I am not aware of any.

338. On the 29th of June, you were called upon to make arrangements promptly to dispatch troops?—Yes; it was decided that we should make a requisition to the War Office for additional regiments. There had been a considerable number of drafts to make up the Queen's regiments, which had been under orders to embark previously; and in addition to those about to embark, and those that had sailed, we made a requisition for four Queen's regiments of infantry.

339. What steps did you take to obtain transports for those troops?—We took into consideration the various arguments with reference to the eligibility of screw-steamers and fast sailing vessels. It is proper that I should endeavour to recount fully the various arguments for and against both classes of vessels. In the first place, the season was the most favourable time for sailing vessels, and we were uncertain as to the supply of coals for steamers at the intermediate stations between this country and India. We made the necessary inquiry, and

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we found that the only quantity that we could make sure of (in fact we did not hear of any other) was 400 tons which the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company had at St. Vincent's, and we immediately requested the company to sell them to us, fixing their own price. They agreed to do so, and we purchased those coals at 42*s.* a ton; we made our minds up that the steam-vessels that we chartered should have orders to take care and fill up their coals at that station, and to use their utmost exertion for making a speedy voyage. With a view of stimulating them also, we proposed to them that they should have a premium of so much per day if their voyage was less than 70 days. They were to have 60 *l.* for every day less than 70 days of passage, and they were to be mulcted 30 *l.* for every day beyond that. That was from a desire to give them every inducement, not only to make the best of their way, but not to pass a coaling station.

340. Those regulations were for clippers?—No, for steamers; I will explain that we had had this experience as to the clippers: we knew that several of them had made the voyage to Australia in 63, 64, and 68 days; the experience that we had had as to the "screws," was not favourable; there were three or four ships that belonged to Mr. Lindsay's fleet, and the average of their voyages was 104 days. We had no other experience, at that time, as to their success in long voyages; and therefore, after due consideration, we thought that it would be prudent, seeing that the season of the year was so favourable, to send one-half of the troops in screw steamers, and one-half in what are called clipper sailing vessels. It was in communication with the Chairman and the President of the Board of Control after the Court of Directors had approved of it, that this course was agreed to, and it was determined that in taking up clippers and steamers we were not to regard expense; we were to endeavour to select those vessels that were safe and most likely to make the quickest passage, which we certainly took every means of effecting. Having been an old sailor, the Finance Committee on those occasions generally used to request me to take the chair of the committee; and with all the assistance which I received and the inquiries which I was able to make from my knowledge of ships, I think we made a most excellent selection, and I am happy to say that the return which I hold in my hand as to the voyages made by those vessels will prove to the Committee that not only were we successful but fortunate in our selection. I may mention the fact that in taking up the vessels we had chartered the sailing ships to touch at Ceylon; it was thought very proper that we should make that a sort of rendezvous, in order that we might receive instructions from the Governor-General in Council as to where the troops would be most wanted; and also we had this advantage, that it enabled the Government to send down steam vessels to be ready to take portions of the troops to any part of the coast, or to tow the sailing vessels. The result of several passages amongst those vessels was that the average rate of passage to Ceylon of the steamers was 83 days, and the average rate of passage to Point de Galle of the sailing-ships was 93½ days, making a difference of only 10 days in favour of the screw vessels.

341. It does not appear that the whole of the arrivals of those ships are mentioned in the printed list; do you now speak of the arrivals?—Of the first division of the troops sent out after the urgent news came.

342. On how many ships, "steamers and sailing vessels," is that average struck?—There were at the Point de Galle nine sailing ships and four steamers; I will give the Committee also the average as to Madras and Calcutta afterwards.

343. Will you give the Committee the names of those four steamers?—The "Caledonia" was the first; she made her voyage in 74 days; the "Robert Lowe" made her voyage in 87 days.

344. Sir *Charles Napier.*] She was dismasted, and she put into the Cape, did she not?—I never heard that.

345. *Chairman.*] What was the first date of the despatch and departure of ships on which the Committee are now taking evidence?—The date of the sailing of the "Caledonia" was the 26th of July from her last port.

346. Will you now give the Committee the names of those four steamers and nine sailing vessels?—I will give the Committee the sailing ships now; the "William Hammond" sailing ship; her passage was 98 days.

347. Sir *Charles Napier.*] It is in the return by the India Board 89 days?—My return is 98; I hope it may be 89.

348. Viscount *Goderich.*] Is that to Calcutta?—No, to Ceylon; perhaps the figures

figures may be transposed; my return gives 98; the next was the "Merchantman," to Ceylon; she took 108 days to Point de Galle; the next was the "Whirlwind," 91 days; the "Walmer Castle," 92; the "Louisiana," 95; the "Sussex," 83.

349. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Was she a sailing vessel?—Yes.

350. The return from the India Board is 103 days?—I am not responsible for that return.

351. Will you look at that return (*the same being handed to the Witness*) and say whether it comes from the India Board or from the East India Company?—There is no doubt that this is from the India House, as it is signed by the Secretary. I would suggest that a correct return of dates would be most satisfactory, but that appears to be a mistake in the print. This return I have had from the Marine Department of the India House. I would suggest that if there is any doubt about it an inquiry should be made. I have great confidence in my return. The next is the "Liverpool," 107 days; the next is the Tyburnia," 87 days; the next is the quickest, namely, the "Ballarat," which vessel made the fastest voyage of all the sailing vessels. She was 81 days.

352. What was the date of the "Ballarat's" sailing?—It was the 15th of August.

353. *Chairman.*] That is a month subsequently to the other ships?—There may have been some peculiar circumstances to cause delay. We could not always get them ready at the time. We allowed them only 10 days to equip. No one could have any idea of the difficulty. Sometimes a ship is taken into dock and she cannot get out again on account of the tides taking off. There are various incidents that may have caused this. The "Ballarat," was 81 days performing the voyage.

354. Sir *Charles Napier.*] On what day did she sail?—On the 10th of August, and arrived on the 4th of November. I wish to call to the notice of the Committee, that this vessel made a quicker passage than the following steamers. She beat the "Scotland," the "John Bell," and the "Robert Lowe."

355. Viscount *Goderich.*] How long was the "John Bell"?—Eighty-five days.

356. How long was the "Scotland?—Ninety-three days. I made a mistake. The "Scotland" arrived at Calcutta, and therefore she ought not to be counted as one of them. I confine myself to Ceylon. The "Scotland's" voyage of 93 days was to Calcutta.

357. *Chairman.*] It appears by this return that most of those are of very small horse power, and the one you have just now mentioned, the "Robert Lowe," is only 100-horse power?—The actual power of the "Robert Lowe," is 300 horses, and she is 1,250 tons. They bracket 100 nominal and 300 actual horse power.

358. There are some ships of 400-horse power, others with 300, another 400, and another 700?—They have got into such a mode of quoting horse power that no one can understand it, according to the pressure to which they work their engines.

359. You have drawn the average with regard to those three or four steamers?—Four steamers.

360. The nine steamers, when compared with the sailing ships, were quicker by 10 days to Point de Galle?—Yes. Still I wish this to be borne in mind, that some sailing ships, the "Sussex," for instance, and the "Ballarat," made quicker voyages than some of the steamers; and, knowing that we are blamed by some parties for not having sent all the first division of the troops in steamers, I am anxious to give the Committee full information as to the grounds on which we acted, and I think that the result justifies the course we pursued.

361. Soon after that period to which you now advert, you took up almost exclusively large steamers, did you not?—Yes. As the season of the year advanced, of course the time was not so favourable for sailing vessels, particularly after we got towards the end of August; then it became very important to prefer screws, and to look to the very best mode of conveying the troops by the shortest route.

362. What are the months of the year in which you consider that steamers are altogether superior to sailers, and in what months are sailing vessels preferable

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ferable?—Up to the 10th or 15th of August you may very safely calculate upon good passages by sailing vessels.

363. From what period; to the 15th of August?—From the month of March.

364. And in all the intermediate period between August and March again, you consider that steamers are preferable?—Yes; the result has proved that the screw steamers at that period of the year have the advantage of sailing vessels; we had not that experience at the time that we took them up; the experience that we had of screws on long voyages was rather unfavourable, whereas the experience that we had of the clippers, the new ships with very fine forms and great length in proportion to their beam, was very favourable.

365. You were also influenced by doubts as to fuel being found?—Yes, that was a most important thing; I am of opinion that screws, if they have not relays of fuel, are not so certain in their passages as well managed fast sailing vessels.

366. If they have not fuel?—If they cannot be certain of finding fuel at the intermediate stations.

367. You only alluded to fuel at St. Vincent's; did you make any inquiry whether there was any fuel at the Cape?—Yes; we wrote to the Lords of the Admiralty and had information from them as to the quantity, which was about 2,000 tons; but in their letter they stated that it was impossible for them to say what demands might have been made upon the store in the meantime before our vessels got there; therefore we had no certainty as to the quantity at the Cape.

368. Were the 400 tons which you ascertained were probably at St. Vincent, coals belonging to private owners?—They belonged to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company; they were kind enough to make them over to us at the price I mentioned.

369. Did you hear it stated that one of the coal merchants, hearing that there was a probability of a want of fuel at those stations, hurried out a quantity of coals to any of those stations?—I never heard of their being sent to St. Vincent; in the course of our taking up those vessels I saw several shipowners and brokers, and suggested to them the advantage they might derive by sending out coals to St. Vincent and other places; and the owners of the "City of Manchester" took up a vessel for the purpose, and sent out coals to St. Vincent, and the consequence was when she arrived there she had that cargo and made a very excellent passage.

370. What was the amount of that cargo?—I cannot state the quantity of coals; probably it was 500 or 600 tons.

371. Do you know of any depôts of coals at Ascension?—I believe Her Majesty's Government have had some there, but there was none that I was aware of; we were informed of none at the time.

372. Have you struck any average as to the time occupied by either sailers or steamers in going on to Calcutta from Point de Galle?—Yes, which is not so favourable as to Ceylon; the average passage of sailing ships to Madras from England was 95½ days, and the average of four steamers to Madras was 83½ days, giving the steamers the advantage of 12 days. The average of three sailing ships to Calcutta was 97 days; and taking the average of eight steamers, the difference is 19 days in favour of steamers to that port.

373. Did all those ships, of which there were about a dozen of both classes, go on to either Madras or Calcutta, without transferring their troops at other places?—I cannot give the Committee that detailed information; they all touched at Ceylon; some were sent on I know.—(Mr. *Mason.*) Only the first batch stopped at Ceylon; we have no advice as to whither they were sent on.

374. If there is a despatch from the Governor-General, dated the 7th of July, stating that they had expected 4,000 tons of coals from England in the following month, those must have been despatched, must they not, about the time when those vessels departed or before they departed from England?—There had been a very great demand upon our stores of coals in consequence of the Persian war, and we were very anxious to fill up the quantity at the various stations, and not only did we send coals out ourselves, but we made inquiry and bought all the cargoes that we could lay our hands upon that we understood had sailed, particularly five or six cargoes which were despatched for Point de Galle. There are coal mines at Burdwan, but every possible exertion was made to send out coals; we knew well the importance of it.

375. The

375. The exact process, as soon as the two Boards had decided upon those regiments being sent out on the 29th of June, was to advertise for tenders, was it not?—Yes, we advertised for tenders; but at the same time we adopted quite a different mode of chartering them. The ordinary course is to take the lowest tender, provided the ships are found eligible after survey, and upon this occasion, in consequence of the emergency, it was agreed between the Board and the Court, through the Chairs, that we should disregard expense, and that the utmost exertion should be made to select the safest and fastest vessels. That became rather an invidious duty; but we did it with regard only to the public interests, and I think with regard to the first batch, particularly of sailing vessels, no fault can be found.

376. With regard to that despatch, which has been alluded to not only by you, but by the other witnesses, from the Governor-General, stating that there was no ground of apprehension, and that the affair of the cartridges had been settled; I do not think that that despatch appears in any of the documents that have been laid before Parliament?—Yes, I think it is laid before Parliament.

377. During those occurrences at the India House, did the practicability of expediting the troops by the overland passage occur, or was it brought under consideration?—Yes, certainly. I think the Committee have before them a letter from the Chairman of the Court, addressed to the President. I may mention that towards the end of August, when the season became unfavourable for sailing vessels, we renewed our application by letter; previously we had a discussion of it in Court, and it was decided that the Chairman should be requested to communicate to the Government, through the President of the Board of Control, the anxiety of the Court that the overland route should be availed of. That was at the first meeting we had on the 29th June, or the following day.

378. The idea of the overland route did not at all occur before that date?—No; this was on the emergency when we were discussing the best mode of transport.

379. Then a verbal communication was made by the Chairman?—There was a very long discussion about it. I will state, if the Committee desire to have my personal opinion of the grounds on which they acted; you have, however, the fact before you.

380. The Committee would desire to know your personal opinion upon the subject?—Then I have no hesitation in saying that I was very anxious from the beginning to avail ourselves of the overland route.

381. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] What do you mean by the beginning?—The 29th of June; at the first meeting of the Court upon the subject, after the 29th of June.

382. *Chairman.*] It was decided by the Court that it would be desirable at once to avail themselves of that route if the Board of Control consented to do so?—The question was very carefully discussed, and the decision was, that the Chairs should be requested to communicate with the President of the Board of Control, and to express to him the desire of the Court to avail themselves of the overland route.

383. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Was that in writing?—No, it was not in writing. I will explain the reasons why I was very anxious that it should be in writing; but many of my colleagues stated that this was a matter which specially came within the province of Her Majesty's Government, as it involved political considerations, and it was thought it might possibly be considered as embarrassing if we were to make an official written application, and the consequence was that it was done through the medium of the Chairs. On the next court day the Chairman communicated to us ——

384. What was the date of the next court day?—I cannot remember; it was within the week.

385. You had many court days at that time, had you not?—Almost every other day. The Chairman informed us that he had communicated the wishes of the Court to the President, but that the political objections were considered such as that it was not desirable to avail of the overland route.

386. It was a verbal answer from the Board of Control?—It was brought by the Chairman to the Court on the following court day.

387. *Chairman.*] Was the answer, that political reasons rendered it inexpedient to adopt that course?—Yes.

388. Probably this took place on the 1st, or 2d, or the 3d of July?—Yes, I think in the first week of July. I recollect perfectly well that a communication was made, at the first Court, to the Chair, to make that communication,

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and the answer was, at the following Court, that political reasons were such that Her Majesty's Government thought it inexpedient.

389. Was that proposition at any time subsequently repeated?—Yes; when we got to the end of the month of August, seeing that the season of the year was such, that sailing ships would meet with the north-east monsoon in the Bay of Bengal, I thought it so important that I pressed the re-consideration of it, and that a letter should be written; and the Court decided that a written application should be made then.

390. What was the date of that communication?—I think the 31st of August.

391. Was that second application assented to?—I think it was. The letter from the President of the Board was to this effect: "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, stating the strong opinion of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, after perusing the despatches from India by the mail which arrived on Saturday, that considering the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, it is in the highest degree desirable that such additional reinforcements as may now be available for despatch in India, should be sent through Egypt as soon as steamers can be provided for that purpose by the Government of India to convey the troops from Suez to Bombay, for operations in Central India, and to Kurrachee, for service in the Punjaub." Mr. Smith goes on to say, "I request that I may be informed, first, what is the date at which you calculate that a regiment now ordered for embarkation might reach Calcutta, Bombay, or Kurrachee in a sailing vessel, or in a steam vessel, according to the average duration of such voyages at this time of the year; and, secondly, what is the date at which you calculate that a regiment would reach Bombay or Kurrachee, if instructions were sent to the Government of India by the mail of the 10th instant, as proposed by you, showing the data on which your calculation is founded. I should be glad to see the comparison for which I have asked; but in examining it we must not forget that a considerable allowance must be made for delay in the negotiations which would be necessary on the plan of sending through Egypt, and for disappointments likely to arise from the more complicated character of the arrangement, even if political reasons, of which Her Majesty's Government alone can be judges, should not prevent the undertaking. I presume you feel satisfied that the store of coal in the Red Sea will be sufficient; and I should be glad to be apprised of your latest information as to the supply of coal on the ordinary route." I think I ought, though it may appear very egotistical, to mention to the Committee that I was very anxious that instructions should be sent out to India by the first mail after the 29th of June ordering steamers round to Suez. I pressed my opinion upon the Chairs and upon the Secretary, and the reply that was given was, that it was no use; the political objection was such that the overland route could not be taken.

392. Was that a verbal reply?—Yes, but I asked Sir James Melvill a few days ago (I did not wish to be examined on this point, but if examined on it, I wished for no reservations) if he remembered that, and he stated that he remembered it perfectly, and that he also spoke to the Chairman on the subject.

393. At what date was it that you made that strenuous suggestion of sending out orders to send ships to Suez?—Before the 10th of July; the mail-day being the 10th; it was two or three days before that date.

394. You had no apprehension that difficulties would arise after your suggestion had been acceded to on the score of coals at Suez and Aden?—No, we always have a supply of coals at Suez and at Aden.

395. What may be the regulated quantity of coals that you have at Aden. (Mr. *Mason.*)—About 10,000 tons.

396. What quantity at Suez?—Four thousand.

397. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Does that belong to the Directors?—Yes.

398. *Chairman.*] Have the steam companies any coals of their own at their stations?—The Peninsular and Oriental Company have large stores.

399. Then these are extra coals beyond what the Peninsular and Oriental Company had?—Yes.

400. The Directors have 4,000 tons at Suez and 10,000 at Aden, exclusive of what the steam companies had?—Yes.

401. What quantity have the steam companies at the two stations?—I do not know.

402. The

402. The Committee may assume that you had some knowledge of what the available maritime transport was then at Bombay; had you no grounds to apprehend that there would be a difficulty in finding vessels to send for the troops?—No; I thought that at Bombay there would be vessels there available. I cannot be certain, but I know that they have vessels of large power. I think I ought to state fairly the objections that some individuals raised to it; I do not wish to give an *ex parte* statement. The idea was that the passage by the Red Sea at that season of the year (the weather was very hot) would be unfavourable for the health of the troops. There was also this to be said, that under the most favourable circumstances, supposing a vessel had been sent to Suez, the troops would not have arrived at Bombay before the middle or last week of September. Now, we did hope that by the passage round the Cape they would arrive early in October, so that the possible gain was not great; still, in the opinion of many of us, we thought it very desirable to take the chance of it.

403. For some of the troops?—Yes; I may mention that I thought that the fortnightly Peninsular and Oriental vessels ought to have been availed of. There was an objection made upon that score, that it was very likely to disorganise the regiments, sending out only 150 or 200 men; my view was, that a perpetual stream of 150 or 200 men arriving every fortnight, the moral effect would have been very useful in India.

404. Continuously disembarking at some part or other?—Yes. Latterly we have been availing ourselves of that system; since the month of September we have been sending troops by fortnightly vessels very successfully.

405. Sir *Charles Napier.*] By the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels?—Yes. I heard this morning that the 94th had arrived (after their misfortunes in the Bay of Biscay and putting back) in 37 days from Plymouth, by the route through Egypt, at Kurrachee.

406. How many were in each vessel?—I do not know the exact number; I thought, as they could take 150 passengers at this season of the year, when ladies are not likely to be going, they might put themselves a little out of the way, and take at least 200 troops in addition.

407. *Chairman.*] They are large ships, are they not?—They are very large ships.

408. Were those passengers civilians?—Yes, partly; all civilians were ordered out, and all military men also. I ought to mention, that I thought there would be very few ladies going out, and that the civilians and the military officers might not mind much being crowded in a case of emergency.

409. Do you recollect the date at which Her Majesty's Government abandoned their political objections to the overland route?—It was, I think, in September, after another letter was written pressing it.

410. They yielded at last?—Yes.

411. Can you give the Committee the date of the first arrival of British troops from the Persian Gulf at Bombay and the last arrival of them?—I have not those dates in my memory.

412. Do you happen to recollect about the month when the vessels came down with return British troops from the Persian Gulf?—I do not remember.

413. Will you have the goodness to send in a statement of that kind to the Committee?—Yes.

414. Sir *John Pakington.*] Are the Committee to understand that you having received at the India House the first intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut on the 29th of June, the first despatch of reinforcements took place on the 26th of July?—I may mention that we fixed the period for the ships to be ready in 10 days, that the troops were not ready under three weeks.

415. As a matter of fact, the first despatch of troops took place on the 26th of July?—The 23d of July seems to have been the first, the 24th, and the 26th, and so on.

416. Will you state to the Committee whether, considering the extreme emergency of which you had heard, it was not possible to send troops at an earlier date after the 29th of June than the 23d of July?—I do not think it was, for the reason that the troops were not ready. Instead of allowing the ordinary time, three or four weeks, for the ships to be got ready, we only allowed 10 days, and we found it very difficult to get them ready even several days beyond that; but when we found that the troops would not be ready under 21 days, of course the delay could not be said to rest with the ships.

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417. In point of fact, the ships were ready before the troops were ready?—I think so; I cannot say positively in all cases; but we required them to be ready in 10 days.

418. In the statements which you have made to-day with regard to the time occupied by the voyages, you have in almost every instance named a shorter period, and in some cases a very considerably shorter period, than is stated in this printed paper furnished from the India House. How do you account for those discrepancies?—I am bound to say that it is the first time I have heard of them; the return I have was given to me from the Marine Department, and I believe it to be accurate.

419. This printed paper, I presume, is an official document, and therefore ought to be relied upon?—I can only suggest that we should have an inquiry made to see whether that paper is correct. I think the calculation of the number of days will be found erroneous.

420. Will you undertake to clear that difficulty up, so that the Committee may know whether we are to rely upon the printed paper or upon your verbal evidence?—Yes, certainly.

421. You have used the expression in your evidence, that you thought, after the end of August, it had become very important to obtain the best vessels; would you be good enough to explain that answer?—I meant steam vessels; it was more important to have them after August than previously.

422. When you used that expression, you referred rather to an increased number of steamers, than to having larger or more commodious vessels?—Yes, principally; speed was our great object.

423. What is your opinion, in the event of your advice having been adopted, and orders having been sent out by the mail of the 10th of July to send steamers to Suez for the conveyance of troops overland, as to the earliest period at which troops could have been landed in India?—I think about the middle or end of September; it would depend very much on the time lost at Bombay in fitting a vessel, and upon the length of the passage to Suez. My view was that it would arrive at Bombay the last week in September, or probably about the 20th or 22d of September.

424. Is it still your opinion, that if orders had been sent on by the mail of the 10th of July to send steamers to Suez, that the troops could have been landed in India before the end of September?—I think so.

425. What was the date of the first reinforcements arriving in India?—I think in the first or second week of October, at Calcutta.

426. You have stated, in your opinion, that troops sent overland would have been available by the 22d of September; will you state to the Committee at what period the troops that were sent as it was were available in any part of India?—The "Alnwick Castle" arrived at Madras on the 29th of October; the "Thebes" arrived at Calcutta on the 14th of October; the "Carthage" arrived at Madras on the 19th of October; the "Sydney" arrived at Calcutta on the 23d of October; the "Golden Fleece" arrived at Calcutta on the 15th of October.

427. Did not your answer to my question, with respect to the arrival of the troops on the 22d of September, refer to Bombay?—

428. Had not that reference to Bombay?—Yes, to Bombay.

429. What difference, do you think, it would have made as to Calcutta, supposing the troops had been sent overland to Calcutta under the arrangements that you suggested?—The voyage to Calcutta would be an increase of 10 or 11 days.

430. Can you state what, in your opinion, would have been the practical difference, as regards the first troops that were sent, between the two routes, in the time of their arrival, so as to have been available at Calcutta?—I should think about a fortnight. But I should like rather to make a careful examination, and I will furnish the Committee with the grounds on which I formed my opinion.

431. Can you state to the Committee what would have been the difference in the time of the arrival of troops, so as to have been available, either at Bombay or at Kurrachee, in the event of your advice having been acted upon?—I should think 20 or 22 days and more at Kurrachee, particularly if all had been as successful as the last.

432. There would be a difference of 22 days at Bombay, and a still larger difference at Kurrachee?—Yes, I think so.

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433. You are personally conversant, are you not, with the navigation to India?—Yes; I commanded a ship for some years.

434. The Committee have heard a great deal about the impracticability of sending troops overland to India, on account of the heat of the Red Sea; will you state whether you yourself have ever gone to India by the Red Sea?—No, I have not.

435. Is it or not the fact that the mail steamers are constantly running to India, down the Red Sea, at all seasons of the year?—Yes, it is so.

436. Is it not the fact, that not only do the crews navigate those ships, but passengers of all descriptions, including ladies, are constantly travelling by those steamers?—It is true. I may mention, as to ladies, that they generally choose the season of the year when it is not the hottest.

437. Although, no doubt, the Red Sea is very hot at that season of the year, in your opinion, would that heat be a sufficient reason why, under the great emergency, the troops should not have run the risk?—I thought that they should, but of course it is a matter of opinion. I have heard many people complain very much that the heat of the Red Sea is intolerable, but I observed an officer, when I came into the room this morning, who commanded one of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ships for many years; he has made 70 voyages, and I recommend the Committee to examine him.

438. Have you made, yourself, a voyage round the Cape to India?—Very often.

439. Have you ever been becalmed in the tropics?—Yes.

440. You found it rather warm, did you not?—Yes.

441. Do you suppose that the heat, in passing rapidly down the Red Sea in a steamer, is worse than the heat when passing across the equator?—I am bound to say, from the description I have heard of it from some passengers, that it would appear to be so. Whether it is from the vessels being crowded or from the heat, it is more intolerable than the ordinary voyage round by the Cape.

442. That is very hot, is it not?—It is warm; but we have awnings and means of ventilation.

443. You spoke of the possibility, in your opinion, of sending by those ordinary mail steamers 150 or 200 soldiers by each packet. Do not you think that a larger number could have been sent by those steamers?—On the first application we found that they would not undertake to carry more than 200; they had not got the largest ships; it would depend very much upon the size of the ship and the number of passengers they had to carry.

444. Would they have undertaken to convey the average number of 200, do you know?—I can give the Committee the number of men that they have taken since they commenced the operation. The "Ripon" took 200; that was the 30th of September, destined to Aden; the "Sultan" took 235 men and 13 officers, and she sailed on the 2nd of October.

445. Mr. *Willoughby.*] That was for relief of the garrison at Aden?—Yes.

446. Sir *J. Pakington.*] What was the average number?—I should think about 230.

447. Had the Court of Directors any communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Company at the earlier period of which you spoke, when you wished to avail yourselves of the overland route, to know how many they could convey in each of their regular packets?—Not until the end of August, when the President of the Board of Control agreed that we should avail ourselves of the route.

448. Did they then make you any specified offer as to the average number that they would take?—I forget; I think it is on record; something about 200.

449. Sir *Charles Napier.*] It appears by this printed paper that there was a considerable number of vessels taken up before the 29th of June;—That was with reference to the reliefs, before we heard of the outbreak at Meerut.

450. Amongst those there was only one steamer?—Yes, one purchased by the East India Company; and they availed themselves of her as she was going out to put on board as many troops as she would carry.

451. Did it not occur to the Directors, or to you, that after the bad news arrived it would have been better to have quashed altogether the contracts with those vessels and to hire steamers?—That did not escape our notice; but we had to bear in mind this; that if we cancelled the whole of those contracts and

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looked for steamers, we were only taking from the list of vessels that we wanted for the other four regiments; several vessels had gone and others were embarking the troops; we did not consider the expense upon the occasion, but the expense would have been the full amount of what we chartered those vessels for. I do not say that that ought to have stood in the way, but remembering that the men were ready to embark, and that the emergency, though it grew so serious, was not viewed so seriously on the 29th of June; I am bound to say we hoped at that time we might not have required a great many more.

452. You did not think the news from India such as to induce you to break the contracts and take steamers?—No; if we had broken those contracts and taken steamers, we should have been actually taking from the next batch of troops the vessels that we were engaging.

453. Surely there were plenty of steamers in the market, were there not?—There were a good many steamers, and latterly larger vessels came in to offer. I do not say but what we might possibly have accomplished the object; but that was one of the grounds which influenced us.

454. Perhaps you thought that the time lost in getting steamers ready and quashing the contracts might have had something to do with it?—That was an additional reason.

455. You state that you did not expect to find coal sufficient at St. Vincent's, Ascension, or the Cape?—Yes.

456. That was one reason why you did not take up steamers; was that the only reason?—That and the great hopes that we entertained that the clipper vessels would make good voyages.

457. Was there any other reason that you did not hire steamers subsequently for the other regiments?—No. I may mention, to show that we used every exertion to expedite the departure of vessels, that we sent a circular to all the owners, pressing them to expedite the period, offering them, I think, 25 *l.* a day for every day that they would anticipate the period of departure. Those were the ships taken up for the reliefs; and told them that we would defray the expense of towing them out of the Channel. In fact, every encouragement was given that we could think of; by cancelling the contracts we should have had the whole of the shipowners upon our backs.

458. Are you aware that a good many steamers have left this country, and gone to India, without stopping on the road to coal at all?—I can easily understand, if there is no great emergency, that a man may keep his coals in reserve, and if his ship is a good sailer under canvas he need not burn any coals.

459. I have a return here of eight steamers that sailed from this country, and went to India, one in 88 days, another in 64, another in 79, another in 88, another in 80, another in 76, another in 79, and another 87; they took in their coal in England, and only used coals when there were light winds or in calms?—I am not aware of these vessels' proceedings; the only experience that we had was of the ships that I have mentioned.

460. Did you consult the Admiralty about the propriety or impropriety of sending troops out by steam, because it has been stated that they were of opinion that sailing vessels were preferable to steam?—We did not consult the Admiralty, because we saw by the proceedings in the House of Commons that Sir Charles Wood was of the same opinion as ourselves.

461. That sailing vessels were better than steam?—Not better. I do not think I ever observed that Sir Charles Wood went so far as to say that sailing vessels would be better; but that there were sufficient grounds for sending a portion of the troops in fast sailing vessels; the chances might turn out that they were equally expeditious as the screws. I have given the Committee three instances, the "Ballarat," the "Sussex," and the "Tyburnia," which went as fast and faster than some of the steamers.

462. You have been round the Cape very often, have you not?—Yes.

463. Have you been becalmed a great deal on the line?—Occasionally.

464. On the average, how many days have you ever been becalmed in going out to India?—I do not think more than 10 days.

465. You had light winds besides that, had you not?—There is generally a certain period of baffling winds till you get into the trade winds.

466. Supposing a steamer had sailed from England and a sailing vessel at the same time, as you say you have been becalmed 10 days with light winds going into

into the trades, do not you think that the steamer using her steam in calms and in light winds when the sailing vessel was lying idle, would get on faster to India than the sailing vessel?—Yes, at those peculiar periods she would in calms have the advantage over a sailing vessel; but there are disadvantages in steamers also, when they fall short of fuel they are obliged to go into port; when they draw near the final consumption of their coals they may have to bear up for some distant port, and there are contingencies which, in my opinion, do not give so great a preference to screws on a long voyage as the honourable Member seems to imagine; for instance, the delay in coaling; and if a captain gets into calms and burns a great quantity of coals, he may have to run back hundreds of miles for a port for coals. Capt. *J. Shepherd.* 19 Feb. 1858.

467. That would not happen if steamers carry sufficient coals to take her out to India?—Of course that depends upon the period, and how long the calms continue.

468. You are always becalmed, are you not, in getting into the trades?—There is no doubt that you are liable to be becalmed; but I have frequently run out of one trade wind into the other.

469. Did it ever occur to you that if you had started the troops in a steam-vessel full of coals, and if another steamer took her in tow and towed her into the trades, that you could have expedited very much the voyage to India, although the expense might have been very great?—I was surprised when I heard that that was the honourable Member's opinion. In the first place, as we had so little coal at Saint Vincent, the opinion I had upon that point was, that if we had had time to send out relays of coals in large quantities, such a thing was practicable; but with the certainty of knowing that there was very little coal in that immediate locality, I thought that if we had steamers there to tow the vessels across the line, we should run the risk of robbing the vessels carrying the troops, who might touch there, of the coals that they required.

470. You do not seem to understand my question; I did not intend that those vessels should coal anywhere at all, but be filled in England with coal, and that another steamer from England should tow her as far as the coals would last, to Madras or Cape St. Vincent, cast her adrift there, and then let her continue the voyage by means of her sails and coals?—I do not think that there would have been much advantage in that; you cannot tow at a very great rate a large vessel deeply laden with coals and troops; you could not tow her through the water more than five or six knots, and the towing steamer would have no coals to bring her home.

471. It appears that the East India Directors wrote to the India Board, stating the necessity of sending reinforcements out to India, and that they should be sent overland "as soon as the steamers should be provided for that purpose by the Government of India, to convey the troops from Suez to Bombay for operations in Central India, and to Kurrachee." That letter was dated on the 2d of September, and it appears that on the 4th of September you received a direct refusal from the India Board?—I do not think that it was a direct refusal, if I remember rightly; it asked a number of questions.

472. I will read their reply: "The advantage in point of time in favour of the new route, even if no part of the arrangement disappointed your expectations, would be little more than a fortnight. This being the case, Her Majesty's Government are decidedly of opinion that it would not be advisable to incur all the embarrassment and inconvenience which must arise from adopting the unusual line of conveyance, as well as to involve themselves in the necessary negotiations for the purpose, especially now that troops will, for the next three months, be continually arriving in India. I have therefore to request that you will take immediate measures for obtaining freight to India *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope, for all the troops, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, about to be despatched thither. If possible, they should all be embarked in screw steamers. With respect to the supply of coal, I would suggest that particular inquiries should be made at the Admiralty." This you took as a direct refusal; they told you to send the troops round by the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes.

473. There is another letter in this printed paper from the Directors of he East India Company to the India Board, dated the 14th July, in these terms: "With reference to the serious intelligence which the last mail has brought from India, and more especially to the increased number of sepoys of the Bengal army who had mutinied or deserted, and to the necessity of further strengthening the hands of the Governor-General in Council, to enable him to

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deal confidently and vigorously with every disaffected or suspected corps, after armed resistance shall have been put down, we have the honour, at the request of the Court of Directors, to intimate to you their opinion, that an additional force of six regiments of infantry should be immediately despatched to India by the most speedy means of conveyance which may be found to be available for that purpose." What answer did you get to that requisition for six regiments? —I do not remember the terms of the answer; it was of course complying with our request and informing us that the Horse Guards were prepared to comply with our requisition.

474. In a subsequent letter the President of the Board of Control directs the East India Company to send them out by steamers; did you comply with that order?—That is the letter of the 4th of September, and I think we complied with that as far as I can remember, or else we had good reasons for not doing so; I think it was the occasion on which the three large vessels belonging to the Black Ball line, "The Champion of the Seas," and the "James Baines," and another, were taken up.

475. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] What was the name of the third one?—"The Lightning;" we expected great things from them, seeing that they had made such splendid passages before, and our experience remained the same as to what the screws could do; we thought ourselves justified in taking them up; I do not say that money had any weight with us, but there was about 25 *l.* per man difference in the rate.

476. Sir *Charles Napier.*] You stated that the troops which you sent to India arrived by the overland route in 37 days?—I heard that this morning; this is an extraordinary instance. I beg to call the attention of the Committee to this, that it was after preconcerted plans; that the Peninsular and Oriental Company had a vessel waiting at Suez for the express purpose. The 94th Regiment arrived, and found a powerful steamer ready, and away they went to Kurrachee at once. It is a proof of what can be done, but not a proof of what could have been done without previous arrangements.

477. The Peninsular and Oriental Company's plans had been arranged, and they were making their regular voyages once a fortnight, were they not?—Yes; but this was a special arrangement for the occasion; they could not have gone to Kurrachee ordinarily; the advantage here was that the steamer took in her troops, and went direct from Suez to Kurrachee.

478. Could not she have gone to Calcutta and Bombay in the same way?—Yes, but she was an extra steamer taken for the purpose. There is now one to Bombay and one to Calcutta every fortnight, but this was an extra one, which carried the 94th to Kurrachee.

479. Was that vessel more powerful than the steam company's other vessels? —She was one of their best, I believe; the "Oriental."

480. If one could go to Kurrachee, another could go to Calcutta and Bombay in the same number of days, more or less. The opinion of the Board of Control in saying that there was only a saving of 10 days by the overland route cannot be correct?—I am not prepared to say the exact number of days that may be saved.

481. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Up to the 29th of June the vessels that appear in this Return were just the ordinary reliefs going out to India?—Yes.

482. Consequently we may exclude them from our consideration altogether? —Yes.

483. How many sailing vessels did you take up for the special purpose of the expedition applicable to the mutiny?—Eleven for the first division, and five for the second division.

484. The first division all made good passages?—Yes; they almost all show two figures only in the number of days, and they were all selected with reference to their sailing qualities.

485. In fact they were wonderfully good passages for that time of the year? —I do not call them wonderfully good passages; I think they did well; passages are not always owing to the swiftness of the vessel; a mistake in the navigation, such as standing on a wrong tack in a long passage, may lengthen it a good many days.

486. The President of the Board of Control stated, in the House of Commons, that he had laid the reins on the neck of the Directors, and applied the spur; how long did that last?—The figure of speech is not applicable as regards the spur.

spur. We did not require any spurring; but we had a *carte blanche* at first. I believe the facts of the case are these: of course every shipowner was anxious to have his ship taken up; and I think one or two gentlemen whose ships were not taken went to the President of the Board of Control, and complained that their ships were not selected; and the President, threatened with questions in the House, and other things, called upon us to give the grounds upon which we had taken some and rejected others. Those grounds were very difficult to give, because we had got them in confidence from several parties. I, knowing a good deal about ships, and knowing who the parties were who could give me the best information, and knowing that the previous length of the voyages of the ships could be discovered by a little painstaking and trouble, I went through all that process, and made my recommendations accordingly; therefore we were not able to give the detailed grounds to the President of the Board of Control, particularly as to the causes of rejection.

487. Did these references involve delay?—I do not think they did, because I am bound to say that I took the matter a little into my own hands, and we went on as before. At the same time I had an interview with the President of the Board of Control at his house, and explained to him how difficult it was to please everybody, and that we must proceed upon public grounds, without reference to the feelings of parties.

488. Who manages the maritime affairs of the Board of Control?—They have no special officer for that purpose.

489. Is such a reference as that referred to any nautical man or professional man?—I may mention that the control of the India Board on those questions has been generally more of a financial than a nautical description. Their object is to keep the purse strings tight, and to see that we do not waste the public money. Mr. Leach, the assistant secretary of the Board, generally looks after that department; and I think, on nautical points, they have generally had confidence in the management of the marine department, under the Court of Directors, at the India House.

490. Do you think that the rate at which you took up ships was exorbitant under the circumstances?—I was disappointed when we were called upon for 49 *l.* per man. I thought we should have had to pay about 30 *l.*; but shipowners, like others, desire to have as high a freight as they can, and such was the emergency, that we were obliged to pay the rates demanded.

491. Supposing the Government had brought forward four or five sail of screw line-of-battle ships, would that movement have reduced the pretensions of the shipowners?—I am bound to say that I do not think that line-of-battle ships would have taken the troops out either so comfortably or so speedily as the large steamers that were taken up. I do not think that they are built for the purpose. I think that they could not carry a sufficient quantity of coals, and I do not believe that they are built for speed or the accommodation of troops. Upon that point I quite concurred with what Sir Charles Wood said, though I should have been glad to see two or three of them, if only for the moral effect they would have produced at the Presidencies. As to the mere conveyance of the troops, he was quite right in not granting line-of-battle ships. I think that the vessels that we took up conveyed them quite as quickly as any screw line-of-battle ships would have done.

492. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Would it have been as cheap?—That would depend upon what the Admiralty would have charged India for the service.

493. Sir *John Pakington.*] Would they have taken as many at a time?—I do not think that they could have taken more than the "Lady Jocelyn" or the "Golden Fleece" took.

494. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Are you aware that a line-of-battle ship brought 1,000 men from the Crimea to England, and some of them more?—The "Golden Fleece" took out 901; the "James Baines," 996; and the "Champion of the Seas," 997.

495. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Are you not aware that the "Princess Royal," and various other ships, brought home 1,200 men from the Crimea, with the whole of the crew?—That was a short voyage. It is very different, I think, in bringing home on a short voyage a crowded ship, to carrying the same number on a lengthened voyage in a tropical climate.

496. But sending them out with their lower-deck guns out and half a crew, those 90-gun ships, such as the "Conqueror," would surely carry out a very

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large number?—I do not think they would have carried a sufficient quantity of coals to have impelled them at the same rate as vessels built for the purpose.

497. You are aware, are you not, that they lift their screws?—Yes, and so did those vessels selected by the East India Company.

498. You did not approve of that plan?—I wished to have had two or three of them, but more for the sake of the moral effect that their appearance would have had in India, than with a view that they would carry troops out faster.

499. Would not a movement of that description have had a very important effect upon the freight market?—If it had been done on a large scale, it might have had that effect.

500. Were there any proposals made to the Admiralty to that effect?—A proposal was made to the President of the Board of Control, at the same time that we talked of the overland route, whether we could have two or three line-of-battle ships; but it was not so much with a view to speed of transport. It was on the first court day after the arrival of the bad news.

501. What answer did you receive to that proposal?—It was a verbal answer from the President, that they had no steamers available that they could give us.

502. Sir *John Pakington.*] No man-of-war?—Yes.

503. Mr. *Osborne.*] Who made that answer?—The President of the Board of Control. I ought to mention that the Court was not unanimous with reference to the advantage of what I thought would be the moral effect. Two or three of them said that it might be thought that the ships were sent there to take people away; there was a difference of opinion.

504. Do not you think that 2,000 blue-jackets would have had a good appearance in Fort William?—Yes; they could have done no harm.

505. You received no assistance whatever from the Government?—We got no line-of-battle ships, but we got coals, and subsequently some screw steamers were sent out.

506. Would it not have been possible for the "Conqueror," instead of coming home, just to have left her lower-deck guns at Gibraltar, and gone straight out to India with that regiment, instead of bringing it home?—Of course it might have been possible, provided they had a sufficient quantity of fuel, and a certainty of getting it at the intermediate stations; but I do not exactly know what quantities those ships carry; the consumption of fuel is very great, and they do not carry a large quantity. I do not think that they carry a 30 days' supply, as some of the large screw steamers do.

507. Would you not have thought it natural for the Government here to have assisted you in getting those troops out, as it had assisted the Turks?—I considered that the emergency was as great in India as in the Crimea.

508. In that alarming emergency, you were left to your own unassisted efforts to forward troops to India?—I do not think it is exactly right to suggest any particular sentiments as my answer; I am bound to say, that I should have been very glad if Her Majesty's Government had taken the same view as we did originally, and had allowed us to avail ourselves more promptly of the overland route; I should have been glad also if we had had two or three line-of-battle ships; but both were questions, particularly that one as to the overland route, for Her Majesty's Government to be the sole judges of as to the political objections, with regard to the effect that it might have had on the Sultan and other crowned heads on the Continent; it was not for us to be judges on that point, and, as I said before, I thought the matter of the line-of-battle ships less important, as I did not expect that they would have carried out the troops quicker, or so quick as the vessels that we took up.

509. Your position gives you opportunities, does it not, of knowing what is going on in the political world in India?—I certainly have an opportunity of reading all the letters that are written at the India House in the public department, not in the secret committee, and of knowing what is passing.

510. Is it not the custom for natives in Asia, who are on terms of amity and agreement with each other, to permit the passage of troops through their territory for purposes such as warfare beyond, or for any other purposes?—The power of the Company hitherto in India has been such that we have very seldom asked permission. In the Affghanistan war we marched our troops through Scinde; there was no power to prevent us, and there was no difficulty as to our doing as we chose.

511. When you made a requisition to the Government to send troops over the

the Isthmus of Suez, you never suspected that political reasons would be urged against you?—I do not say that; I apprehended that that might be the case; but the view I took was that the emergency was so great, and seeing that we had brought two regiments from India to the Crimea, that we might apply to have them sent from England to India by the same route. I thought it more a question of humanity than war, and that it would prevent those wretched and unhappy sepoys from destroying themselves as well as their officers.

512. In fact, you considered it an ordinary case of transit?—No, not an ordinary case of transit. As regards the political objections, the Foreign Office will explain them to the Committee much better than I can.

513. Did the Peninsular and Oriental Company offer to put on a weekly service at a very early period?—No. The fact was, I was very anxious as to the transport of troops when the season grew late, and there was a communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Company. An application was made in concert with myself.

514. Then a weekly service has been put on?—It has been going on since, but the Peninsular and Oriental Company did not volunteer in the first place.

515. Do you know whether there were vessels kept at Bombay in anticipation of the troops coming from Suez?—I never heard of it.

516. You do not know that two or three steam frigates were kept at Bombay, ready coaled, in anticipation of the troops coming out to Suez?—I never heard of it, and I think if it had been the case I should have heard; it is obvious that if there had been any anticipation of that kind, Suez would have been the place to send them, but no vessel was sent to Suez for the purpose.

517. Are there steamers on the Indus?—Small vessels.

518. Were they available for carrying troops up if they had gone to Kurrachee?—Small bodies of troops, and they tow flats, which carry a considerable number of men.

519. Do you know that the "James Baines" and "The Champion of the Seas" were towed round from Liverpool to Portsmouth?—I think I heard that one of them was; it might have been with a view to the utmost expedition; we were very anxious to get them round quickly.

520. They brought two very powerful tugs round with them; would it not have been a good thing if tugs had been employed to tow them as far as they could off the land, in the then state of the weather, variable winds and light airs?—There is no question that it would have been an advantage, provided the circumstances were such as the Honourable Member has described. I do not remember the state of the wind or weather at that time.

521. You do not know whether there were any tugs available at Portsmouth for that purpose?—No; I merely say that, in my opinion, every possible exertion was made to get those ships away as quickly as possible.

522. You are satisfied that every exertion was made at the India House that could possibly be made?—Fully satisfied; I am bound to say that I feel under great obligations to the Marine Department of the India House for the exertions which they have made; I believe that there is not on record an instance of so many troops being sent out with such despatch, such regularity, and such success. We have not heard of any casualties yet; the "Sarah Sands" was burnt, but no lives were lost. I am proud to say that those who were subordinate to me in that department, particularly Mr. Mason and his assistants, deserve the highest credit.

523. No consideration induced you to refuse the best ships that were in the market?—Certainly not.

524. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Will you furnish a return, showing the ships taken up in the ordinary manner before the 29th of June, and afterwards as each division of the troops was despatched according to the news received from India?—I will.

525. You have stated that you were of opinion that the troops might at an earlier period have been sent by fortnightly steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company; could the authorities have availed themselves of that resource without previous arrangements for provisioning the troops, seeing also that at the time referred to they must have been crowded with passengers owing to the Court's orders for all civil and military servants to return to India?—There is no doubt that it would have required considerable energy and exertion to have accomplished it, and that the ships would have been to a certain degree crowded;

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crowded; but the view I took of it was this, that a little crowding, particularly on the part of gentlemen, might have been put up with, seeing that the object was so important; I should have had no objection to have prevented gentlemen taking their wives with them, and to have let the gentlemen double up in their cabins in order to make room for the soldiers.

526. Is it likely that the ships of the Peninsular and Oriental Company employed on the packet service would, without warning, be provided with a sufficient quantity of provisions for the troops?—I think, with reference to the short time occupied on the voyage, that they might have taken provisions with them. We were informed in September that they had sufficient provisions, and the means of getting provisions in Egypt; the Peninsular and Oriental Company will be able to speak for themselves on that point.

527. Is it not the fact that few persons, except perhaps a nautical man, would select the month of June, July, or August to proceed to or from India if they had an alternative, seeing that they would not only encounter great heat but very boisterous weather?—There can be no question that the passage in the cool season is much more agreeable than the other.

528. Is it not the fact that during the monsoon steam vessels from Bombay to Suez are obliged to go out of the direct course, and that instances have been not unfrequent of steamers being unable to make the passage in consequence of the extreme violence of the monsoon, and they have been obliged from this cause to return to the port of departure?—There have been instances in which they have been obliged to put back before there were vessels of sufficient power and machinery so perfect as it now is.

529. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] You alluded to applications that were made to the India Board before those written ones as to the expediency of adopting the route by way of Egypt; I find that after the first written communication made from the India House it was replied to, and the President of the Board of Control commented on an expression in the letter implying that you had made previous communications on the subject; and he concludes by "totally disclaiming the construction put by the Board as to the expression of any opinion on their part," and the Board of Directors in reply, say, "We had, in point of fact, stated to you the opinion and desire of the Court as distinctly as if it had been formally expressed." And some correspondence continued as to the understanding of those communications. Can you state, of your own knowledge, that the Directors empowered the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to make such inquiries?—There can be no doubt whatever that they not only empowered them, but desired it to be done; and we were informed of the result. I regret much that it was not done upon paper.

530. You mentioned that you had reports as to the rapidity with which that despatch was effected; have you had any accounts as to the general health of the troops?—No, I have not heard specially with regard to the health of the troops. Only this morning I heard of the very excellent passage that the 94th have made to Kurrachee; I have not heard the details.

531. You stated that some objections had been made as to the despatch of the troops in small bodies; is it not the case, that upon the breaking out of the mutiny the troops were sent up the country in very small bodies, under the emergency that took place?—That is very true; but what I alluded to was, that the emergency being not considered so great at first, we understood that the Commander-in-Chief had great objections to dividing his regiments into small divisions on the ground of discipline. It was apt to disorganise them. I believe that is quite true, and in that point of view it is objectionable.

532. *Chairman.*] You refer to the Commander-in-Chief in England?—Yes. His object was to have them sent out in complete regiments if possible.

533. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] How did that come to your knowledge?—I mentioned that the case was discussed in our Court, and of course there were various opinions given by various Directors. The objections were stated as well as the advantages, and one of the objections was the military one of sending men in small parties as being injurious to discipline, and in fact I think that we have on record somewhere a letter from the Horse Guards desiring us, if possible, to send the regiments complete in one vessel. There is no doubt an advantage in it, but still I think it may be carried too far. I should in fact prefer having two ships with 500 each on board to having one with 1,000, and the two to keep company; 500 troops are enough in one ship.

534. Can you state how many troops were sent monthly overland from the time that you commenced to use that route?—We sent on the 30th of September 200 men to Aden, on the 2d of October 235 with 13 officers, on the 12th of October 221 men with 12 officers, on the 14th of October 244 men with 12 officers; they went overland, but the Peninsular and Oriental Company took up an extra ship, to take them to Alexandria, called the "Dutchman." Then the next division was 281 men and 14 officers, who were taken to Alexandria by the "Tamar," and the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company despatched them from Suez by one of the Peninsular and Oriental Company vessels, because the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's ship had not arrived at Suez.

535. Mr. *Adderley.*] Did the President of the India Board assign to the East India Company any reason for his change of opinion on the 14th of September as to the overland route?—I do not recollect any special reason; I think that we convinced him, particularly by the tender of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, of the practicability of the measure; the political questions I imagine must have vanished, or they were no longer considered serious obstacles.

536. You think that the President of the India Board yielded to the arguments of the East India Company?—I presume that the Foreign Secretary and Lord Palmerston must have been of opinion that the political questions were no longer so important.

537. *Chairman.*] You know nothing of that?—No; I imagine that their political objections having been strong in the earlier part, they became weak latterly.

538. Mr. *Adderley.*] During the whole of those proceedings is that the only point upon which the India Board and the East India Company have had any difference of opinion?—I think it is; that and the difference as to the "*carte blanche.*"

539. From that date has there been any occasion on which the President of the India Board has urged the East India Company to make arrangements for more troops than they were asking for?—I do not remember any occasion.

540. Not through the whole of the proceedings?—I have no recollection of any.

541. That is the only occasion on which any difference between the two bodies led to delay in sending out troops?—I do not think there was any other; at this moment no other occurs to me.

542. From what source do the Company supply their stores of coal at Aden?—We buy them here and send them out.

543. Is that also the case at Suez?—Yes.

544. And at Point-de-Galle the same?—Yes. We bought half a dozen cargoes on their way out.

545. Would there be any quarter from which they could, in a case of emergency, more readily supply their extra stores?—I scarcely think at present that they could. There are coals at Calcutta, brought from Burdwan, but inferior for steaming purposes to ours, and they are more expensive, I believe, than coals sent from this country.

546. Mr. *Horsman.*] You stated that there were differences of opinion; you gave your own, but said that you did not wish to make an *ex parte* statement, both as to the overland route and as to using the fortnightly mail?—Yes.

547. Were those differences of opinion in the Court of Directors?—Yes; with reference to using the fortnightly mail. At the same time the decision that we came to was, that the first object was, to ascertain whether there were any political objections, and we felt great delicacy in writing a letter upon a subject of which it might be said justly we had no real special knowledge. The Court's decision was, that the best course would be, that the Chairs should consult the President of the India Board, and ascertain whether there were political objections to the course spoken of, which was, first, the use of the fortnightly mails, and, secondly, having vessels sent to Suez; but the political objections being such, there was an end to it.

548. Did you make a direct representation to the Board of Control that the Court of Directors would recommend the overland route?—It was done verbally through the chairman; I argued that a fortnightly communication would be available, and that I did not regard putting the passengers to inconvenience; others

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others thought that the ships would be crowded with civilians and military officers going out, and that putting 200 troops on board would be an intolerable evil. Others stated military objections as to sending small detachments separated from their commanding officers; but the ultimate result that was come to was, that we should first, before we dealt with the details, see whether there were any political objections to availing ourselves of the route.

549. Mr. *Osborne.*] Are the Committee to understand you to say that you are clearly of opinion now that the despatching of troops by screw vessels would have been preferable to sending them in fast sailing ships?—Judging of the result, I am bound to say, that if I had to do the thing again in an emergency, I should not have the same confidence in sailing vessels as I had. I was in hopes to find, being an old sailor, that some of those very fast vessels would have made as good voyages as the screws. Three of them only have done so; but whether it is from erroneous navigation, or from the quality of the vessels, or from circumstances over which they had no control, I cannot tell. But I would suggest to the Committee, that if they desire to have detailed information to guide them in future, the logs of the various ships that have made good passages might be obtained, and also those of the longest voyages compared with each other.

550. Would not a clipper, leaving England between the 5th of February and the 1st of July, make as fast a passage as a screw?—Not if the screw has a certainty of coals at St. Vincent, at Ascension, at the Cape, and the Mauritius, if found necessary.

551. What, in your opinion, is the best description of screw steamer to send troops in?—I should say, that, as far as I can judge, such a vessel as the "Golden Fleece." She made the best passage; or in vessels of 1,500 to 1,600 tons, carrying 500 troops each.

552. The shortest passage?—Yes. I understood that she carried 200 tons more of coals than any other.

553. Do you remember her horse power?—I can give it to the Committee; she was of 300-horse power, and 2,768 tons.

554. Is it not the case that a vessel of 300-horse power, and say 1,500 tons, is the best ship for carrying troops?—I should prefer myself, with reference to other matters than mere speed, that when a regiment is sent out, they should be sent in two vessels, to keep company with each other; and such sized vessels as described would be suitable for the purpose.

555. Is it not the case that the greater the horse power you have, the less accommodation there is for the troops?—No doubt, if it is not what is called nominal power, working at high pressure, to have regular engines and cylinders to the full extent, must take up space.

556. What would you say is the best season for troops to arrive in India?—There is no doubt (and that has a bearing upon a question put before) that there is nothing more detrimental to troops arriving in India than to arrive at the unhealthy season; and I think that from and after October is the proper time. I remember, when I commanded a Company's ship, arriving in Bengal in the month of July; we did not lose a man on the way out, and there were five or six births on board. But after the troops landed and went to Fort William, in less than a week we heard of eight or ten deaths, and before I left for China 10 per cent. were dead in consequence of the heat and the exposure of the men to the sun, and the facility they had for getting new arrack, and other pernicious spirits.

557. With reference to the question which was put to you by the Honourable Member for Southwark, was it ever proposed to you when those sailing vessels went out that they should have screw ships to wait on them to tow them?—Yes, that was proposed as to crossing the Line.

558. Was it formally pressed upon the Company?—I do not remember it. I observed it first in the speech of Sir Charles Napier.

559. Was such a proposition ever formally entertained before the Board of Directors?—I do not think it was.

560. You would have smiled at it, would you not?—At the first view of it I did smile. I was surprised at it.

561. The expense would be very much increased, would it not?—Yes, I do not think much of towing under such circumstances.

562. Have you ever heard of vessels being employed as tugs under such circumstances?

cumstances?—I believe they were used very much in the Mediterranean in the Crimean war, but I never heard of their going round the Cape.

563. With reference to the two ships, the "James Baines," and the "Champion of the Seas," to which your attention has been drawn, being cleared from Portsmouth, is it not the fact that they were merely cleared off the land by tugs?—Yes.

564. And they gained two days, did they not?—It is probable, I think.

565. Of course that was done at the expense of Messrs. Baines?—Yes.

566. With regard to line-of-battle ships, did you ever make any formal application to the Government for line-of-battle ships?—No, not by letter; it was done at the same time as the overland route was suggested.

567. You made no application to the Admiralty whatever?—Not by letter; we made an application to the President of the Board of Control through the Chairs, and I am bound to say that we had a note from the President of the Board of Control, stating at first, that Sir C. Wood had no vessels of the kind to spare.

568. You were not so strongly disposed to make use of line-of-battle ships, that you made any express application?—No; and I did not feel any very great disappointment at it.

569. Of course you are aware that there might be political reasons for not sending line-of-battle ships away from the Channel?—I did hear that there were political reasons.

570. With reference to the overland route, you stated, that on the 29th of June you were strongly of opinion that it would be expedient to send steamers to Suez?—Yes, to write off by the mail to Bombay, requesting them to send steamers to Suez.

571. Did you confine yourselves to a mere verbal communication to the India Board; was there any consideration of the matter?—No letter was written; the rock that we split upon was our always thinking those political objections of such a delicate nature that we ought not to write official letters on the subject.

572. Did the Court of Directors share in your opinions?—Yes, most undoubtedly, as to availing of the overland route. I mentioned to the Committee that we were not unanimous as to the fortnightly communications, and sending out small parties.

573. Are those opinions entered upon the minutes of the East India Company's proceedings?—I believe that minutes are never made excepting in the case of written documents; but one letter which has been quoted, of September, distinctly alludes to the fact.

574. Is it usual in the transaction of business between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, to carry on such an important matter by conversations?—I must remind the Committee again that it was entirely owing to the desire of the Court not to meddle with a question involving policy in Europe, which was thought to be beyond our province. I ought to say that I pressed as much as I could the propriety of a letter being written, but seeing the feeling of my colleagues, I agreed in the propriety of not (as it was spoken of at the time) embarrassing Her Majesty's Ministers with a written official application.

575. You are aware that there is a letter, dated the 26th of September 1857, from Mr. Vernon Smith to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Board, in which he is clearly at issue with you and the Board in general as to the result of a conversation?—Yes. I regret it very much, but I can only say that I cannot be responsible for any one but myself; but what made me believe that the matter must have been rather a default of memory on the part of the President of the Board of Control, was the fact of the Chairman having come down and given us a reply to our request that he would communicate with the President.

576. Will you be kind enough to read that passage in the letter of the 26th of September (*handing the same to the Witness*)?—This is a letter from Mr. Vernon Smith, addressed to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors, in which he says, "I must distinctly deny that you ever stated it to me to be the opinion and desire of the Court that you should urge upon Her Majesty's Government to take the route by Egypt, or that I apprised you that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to adopt the course recommended. I discussed that question in all its bearings, as has been hitherto usual between yourselves and me, previously to any decision either of the Court or the Cabinet.

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You say that my reply was communicated to the Court, but no record of that reply is placed upon your minutes; and by adopting the course proposed by you, the opinion of the President would be expressed in such words as you may think it right to use, and not in those which to him might seem best adapted to convey his meaning. I must therefore request that whenever the Court make you the channel of imparting to me their views with the intention of bringing them before me as a matter of official record, to which public reference may thereafter be made, you will have the goodness to set forth those views formally in writing." Allow me to say that the Committee are well aware that our Chairman, Mr. Mangles, is just as strong in his assertion; it is a warning to all official men to take care not to be content with verbal communications on important subjects. It is an unhappy misunderstanding, which no one regrets more than I do myself. I beg to state, however, that the ordinary inference to be drawn is, that after we desired the Chairman to make this application, he did it; for on our next Court day he gave us the result of it. I cannot know with what force, or energy, or gravity he made his application. If he did not do it in the form that was necessary, I only regret it; but it would appear very strange that he should have come and told us that he had done what we asked him to do, and that the result was, that the political objections were represented to be such as we could not get over, if such conference had not taken place.

577. You are decidedly at issue with the Board of Control on this point?—Yes.

578. Are you aware whether, on the 29th of June, when you recommended that communications should be made for sending sailing vessels to the Isthmus of Suez, there was any sort of steam power there for the transport of troops?—Of course we could not calculate upon there being any spare vessel at Suez; our object was, by writing by the 10th of July mail, to ensure one being sent from Bombay. The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company might not have known whether they had any vessel; but, as the political objections intervened, we did not go into the matter by making any inquiry.

579. Were any representations made to you, not from the Government, but on the part of military men, as to the unhealthiness of the season at that time for sending troops by the Red Sea?—I do not recollect any official intimation being given; but very likely they were made, because it was generally understood that the Red Sea was unhealthy at that season of the year.

580. More so than if a ship was becalmed on the Line?—If the descriptions which I have had from passengers are correct, they certainly represent the heat as being more intolerable than when becalmed on the Line.

581. You never knew of a ship being becalmed on the Line, or any fever breaking out, or any serious thing happening to the health of the troops?—No.

582. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You say that you proposed, on the first day after the 29th of June, the overland route for the troops; did you do so in a full Court of the Directors?—Yes.

583. Did you propose it formally?—I made no motion; but I pressed it as much as I could; we all agreed, that instead of writing an official letter it should be done through the Chairs, as I have described.

584. Were you unanimous upon that point?—The decision come to was *nem. con.*

585. That is to say, it was a mere conversation; nothing was proposed; nothing was before the Court at the time?—It was distinctly so far a proposition, that, instead of a letter, which I pressed, it was decided that the Chairs were to be the medium of communication.

586. In the regular way of business you generally end with a resolution; in this case you did not—Yes.

587. No written minute?—No written resolution.

588. You thought this a very important subject at that time?—Yes.

589. Did you bring it on again between that court day and the time when you proposed writing a letter; the letter was written at the end of August?—I think at every court day I dwelt upon the importance of it; I believe my colleagues will bear me out in that.

590. You felt the importance increasing?—Very much.

591. And yet you made no regular motion in the Court of Directors during the two months?—Not till the end of August, when the matter became more pressing, and then I pressed that a letter should be written, which was done.

592–3. During that month you made no regular motion?—I did not, certainly, because I thought the political objections were better estimated by Her Majesty's Government than I could possibly estimate them; I could only express my regret and disappointment.

594. That was the only reason, was it, the political considerations, why you did not make the motion?—Yes. The view taken was, that pressing a matter which involved a political question, which could only be judged of by Her Majesty's Ministers, would look very like stepping out of our province, and embarrassing Her Majesty's Government; that was the ground.

595. You had discussed this question previously in the committee, had you not, of which you are chairman?—I am not always chairman; only in my turn. What I stated was, that when we were taking up ships, my colleagues often put me into the chair with regard to questions of a practical nature, but we did not discuss the overland route. My committee is not a political committee; it is a finance, home, and naval committee.

596. Upon your committee you did not discuss this question at all?—No.

597. You stated that there were objections by individuals who spoke as individual directors upon this subject?—Yes. I allude particularly to the plan of sending small detachments by fortnightly steamers; there were differences of opinion upon that point.

598. Was there any difference of opinion about writing to the Governor of Bombay to have a steamer sent to Suez?—I do not remember that there was any.

599. Did you ever propose it formally?—The sole object of my suggestion was, that we should write to the Government of Bombay to send steamers to Suez to be ready to carry troops to India.

600. You have the power, have you not, of initiating all letters to India?—Yes.

601. You never proposed formally to write to the Government of Bombay to send steamers to Suez?—There would have been no use in that if we could not have availed of the overland route.

602. You never did propose to the Government of Bombay to do so?—No, for the reason just stated.

603. You say that there were individual objections to the overland route at the time; whose were they?—I cannot remember.

604. Were they objections of members of the Court of Directors?—Certainly not.

605. On the question of the danger of passing troops through the Red Sea at that time, you said that it was but fair to state that there were opinions of individuals against it?—There were allusions to the heat of the Red Sea, and the danger of the troops suffering from that cause.

606. You have never been through the Red Sea?—No.

607. Are you aware in the month of September what the temperature of the Red Sea is?—Very hot.

608. Are you aware that it is as high as 96 degrees in a bucket of water taken out of the sea?—I do not think it is so hot as that.

609. Are you aware that passengers have constantly died when passing through the Red Sea in the summer?—No; but will the Committee allow me to state that, as compared with sailing vessels, there is one great advantage in the current of air which is produced by a steam-vessel passing through the water at the rate of nine or ten knots an hour; there is always a current of air, and the advantage of awnings and ventilation modifies very much the temperature.

610. Did you take any medical evidence upon the expediency of sending troops during the summer through the Red Sea?—No.

611. In any case, supposing your suggestions had been followed, the troops would have arrived at Bombay at the end of September?—Yes, about the middle or end of September.

612. They were not particularly wanted at Bombay; Calcutta was the point?—It was uncertain, from the first news that we had, where they might be wanted, but Calcutta was the main point.

613. I think you stated that it would take about 14 days longer to get to Calcutta than to Bombay?—Ten or eleven days.

614. That would bring it to about the second week in October?—No; I said about

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about the 22d or 23d of September; add 10 or 11 days to that, and it would bring it to the beginning of October.

615. The date at which steamers sent round by the Cape began to arrive was about the second week in October?—Yes.

616. About a fortnight's difference?—Yes.

617. The civilians and military officers were ordered out about that time; in September?—Yes.

618. It was very important at that time to have them out in India, was it not?—Military officers were ordered out as a matter of duty, but there was a difference of opinion as to sending the civilians out; it was well known that at the West-end the opinion was strong on that point, and it was agreed that every man should go, as he might be of use.

619. It was proper, was it not, that the officers and civilians should be at their posts in the time of danger?—I thought so.

620. The presence of an officer would be of more importance than the presence of a private in India?—It depends upon the circumstances; no doubt the officers ought to be there.

621. His influence would be greater than that of a civilian's?—That depends upon the circumstances, and where their services were available. I think it was very proper that the civilians were sent out too; there have been instances in which their influence and exertions have been most advantageous.

622. If the steamers were filled with officers, both civil and military, they would be at any rate as important as the private soldiers?—Yes; but I wanted to fill the cabins with the civil and military officers, and to have all the other possible accommodation for the troops. I would have doubled up the passengers in order to make room for them.

623. Are you sure that there were not more officers went than filled merely the cabins?—I am not certain of that.

624. Are you not aware that generally there are as many on board as can possibly lie, not only in the cabins, but that they find accommodation on the deck too?—I have no doubt that that occasionally occurs; when men are very anxious to go, they will rough it rather than be left behind.

625. Are you not aware that such is generally the case?—No.

626. When did the British troops return from Persia to Bombay?—I cannot answer that question from memory.

627. You did not know that at this time the troops had returned to Bombay?—No; I do not think we could have heard of it then.

628. A large number of transports from Bombay were employed in conveying troops to and from the Persian Gulf?—Yes, there were.

629. You stated that at the end of August you thought the best vessels would be required for the conveyance of troops?—Yes; I meant to say, of course, that risks should not then be run with reference to the chance of sailing vessels being equal to steamers; we preferred steamers as the season advanced.

630. From the beginning you had a *carte blanche* to take up any ships that you thought most suited for the purpose?—Yes.

631. There was no limit with regard to expense?—No.

632. That was in communication between the Chairs and the President of the Board of Control?—Yes, in the same way as the other important question.

633. But you only know what the Chairman told you in the Court of what passed between the Chairman and the President?—Yes, upon that particular point; with reference to the *carte blanche*, I must say that it was in some measure contracted or withdrawn afterwards.

634. In what way?—We were called upon to give details, and it was impossible to do so, and in consequence of that I changed my plan in our committee, and requested that the names of the vessels selected should be all sent up to the Board of Control to be approved before they were taken up; finding after getting the *carte blanche* that the confidence was not so full as we anticipated, we finally accepted the vessels after their names had been sent up, and had received the approbation of the President.

635. *Chairman.*] Was there, or not, a communication from the Board of Control, desiring that specific or categorical reasons should be given for incurring the additional expense for the steamers?—Yes.

636. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Where is that to be found?—You shall have the letter, if it is not already before the Committee.

637. *Chairman.*] Was there, or not, any alteration in this letter subsequently —I think

—I think two or three letters passed, and I must say that we were rather mortified that those explanations should be required; I myself particularly felt great difficulty in giving the required information, having obtained it in confidence from disinterested shipowners and from parties who keep journals of the performances of various ships: I felt it was impossible to give such confidential communications as had enabled me to select the best ships; but after the second or third letter (controversial letters I call them) we gave the President of the Board of Control an answer at last to satisfy him, stating in general terms that such a ship was taken up because she was A 1, and a noted fast ship. It took a long time before we could succeed in satisfying him.

638. *Chairman.*] In fact the *carte blanche* was recalled?—Almost tantamount to that.

639. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Were you ever written to from the Board of Control not to take up steamers on account of the expense?—No.

640. What was the object of the letter from the Board of Control requiring you to report the reasons why you chose the various vessels?—I cannot tell what the object was; I have mentioned what I thought was the cause: I had understood that some gentlemen who had been disappointed in having their ships taken up, had complained to the President, and I understood that notice was to be given of a question to be asked in the House of Commons, and therefore the President wanted to have information to enable him to answer those questions.

641. Will you be good enough to read Sir George Clerk's letter to you on that point?—"The Commissioners for the Affairs of India have considered your letter of the 8th instant, proposing to engage four screw steamers and five clipper sailing vessels for the conveyance of five of Her Majesty's regiments to India, and as a matter of urgency, they will not delay their approval of the engagement of the vessels proposed; but the Board request to be informed, for the purpose of their being put on record, of the reasons which have led to the rejection of many of the tenders of lower amount and of the acceptance of the highest tender in certain cases."

642. Is that the one to which you alluded as giving offence at the India House?—I myself must say that I thought the *carte blanche* was such that there was perfect confidence placed, and when that letter was brought to me, I felt it as showing a want of confidence in the course that we pursued, and I distinctly said, that as for giving the detailed grounds for taking up higher vessels instead of the lower, the thing was impossible. I will explain to the Committee how the necessary information was obtained. There are offices in the city, and places where records of the length of the voyages of every ship that sails from London or from Liverpool are kept; there are other people, again, who have detailed information with regard to the qualities of the ships, and anxious as I was to recommend the best ships, I availed myself of all that description of information, and the consequence was the selection of those fast ships. In one particular case, a man said, "Before I can give you any information I must understand distinctly that it is in the strictest confidence." Of course I could not give the Board such information as that; and the Committee will remember that we stated these difficulties to the Board of Control, and at last we made a sort of compromise by giving the result in general terms.

643. The usual course when you invite tenders is to take the lowest, without there is some special reason against it?—Yes; but the President of the Board of Control told us, through the Chair, to disregard expense, and take the best and fastest vessels.

644. Was there any letter sent from the East India House stating the reasons that you have just detailed to the Committee?—A letter has been written giving in general terms (not in detail) the reasons which induced the selection of those vessels.

645. When the Court of Directors refused to give that information to the Board of Control, did not the India Board further explain the reasons for asking for that information of it in their letter of the 25th of August, and will you read it?—"The Board do not doubt that the Court have acted to the best of their judgment in the selection they have made, but the Board are responsible to Parliament and to the country for measures which they sanction, chiefly, in confidence in that judgment, having no marine department with surveyors of their own. They therefore think it right to have reasons on their records for the selection of particular vessels by different rules from those usually followed,

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especially as the expenditure on their hire is very considerable. They therefore request to be furnished with copies of the reports of the Court's surveying officers or others, explaining, in the ordinary form, the grounds on which the selection or rejection of the vessels referred to in your letter of the 30th ultimo and the 13th instant has been founded." That was the compromise that was made.

646. That was the answer to the letter?—I forget whether it was the first answer or not. I rather think there was another letter, but I cannot be positive; that passed before this came; this was the compromise made.

647. What compromise is there there?—You required all the reasons why we selected the various vessels and rejected others; and here you say, "Copies of the reports of the Court's surveying officers or others, explaining, in the ordinary form, the grounds on which the selection or rejection of the vessels referred to in your letter of the 30th ultimo and the 13th instant has been founded."

648. Why should you not call that an explanation, instead of a compromise?—I consider that when the *carte blanche* was given, it ought to have been given in generous confidence, and that no letter implying suspicion ought to have been sent.

649. Why do you call it a suspicious letter?—If a man, confiding in you, tells you to do your best, and then demands explanations implying that you have not done your best, I cannot help thinking that that shows want of confidence.

650. But the Board of Control is responsible for all the money you spend?—If that was the preponderating feeling, then they ought not to have given us a *carte blanche* originally.

651. May not the Board of Control ask for an explanation of the way in which you have exercised that confidence?—Yes; but what I mean is this, that when we were told, as Mr. Vernon Smith said, that he "had laid the reins on our neck," you ought not to have pulled us up on our haunches in the way you did.

652. *Chairman.*] It appears that this letter is not the most suspicious or offensive letter that was written?—I only remember that at the time I felt mortified; and I am afraid that, recalling it to my memory, I have allowed my feelings to get the better of me on the present occasion.

653. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] By the expression which you have used, "pulling you up on your haunches," you mean making you account for the way in which you had spent the public money?—I mean this, that if the President of the Board gave us a *carte blanche*, it must have been upon the grounds of having full confidence that we would not abuse the power; but the second and subsequent letters, calling for the reasons, showed that some cause or other had induced the President to modify that opinion.

654. Lord *Stanley.*] If I understand you rightly, your meaning is this, that, considering the very large discretion which had been reposed in you, you thought that there was some unnecessary jealousy shown in the way you were questioned as to the use you had made of that discretion?—Yes.

655. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Will you read the explanation of the President in his letter, dated the 8th of September (page 84)?—"Now I need not assure you that in all my communications with you I have entertained the most complete confidence in the desire of the Court of Directors, and of the committee of their body, to whom such charge is entrusted, to accomplish the object of securing the best and fastest vessels for the conveyance of troops. I have therefore abstained from insisting upon any reports previous to the acceptance of tenders, which might have delayed arrangements of great emergency; but I think it absolutely necessary for the vindication of the Court's conduct, for the justification of the Board's vigilance, and for the satisfaction of the public, that some record should remain of the reasons which have guided the committee in their preference of particular vessels, where in their selection they have deviated from the usual practice of accepting the lowest tender."

656. That was calculated, was it not, to remove any impression that discourtesy was intended to the Court of Directors?—I think that was the intention no doubt, and I believe it had in a measure that effect; I am sorry that the subject has been revived; the matter is all gone by now.

657. Mr. *Osborne.*] Was the public business impeded by this difference of opinion between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control?—I do not think

think it was much, because we were always so anxious on the subject of the transport of the troops that we would not allow it to do so. The only difference that we made was, that we always sent an express west to get the President's approval before we accepted a vessel.

658. You had no confidence in one another?—I will not say that; I think it was an error in judgment on the part of the President. I think, as I said before, that some man had gone and complained to him of his ship not being taken up, and the last man who had his ear left an impression.

659. Therefore you had no confidence in one another?—It was not the fault of the East India Company. It may be an exposition of the evils of double government, but that the evil did not originate with us is quite evident.

660. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Do you not think it is the duty of the Board of Control to know how the public money has been spent?—Undoubtedly.

661. With regard to the line-of-battle ships, and as to the reasons for not employing them, it has been stated that probably the men might have been moved to India cheaper in them?—I said that it depended upon the charge made by the Admiralty upon the Indian revenues.

662. If it had been cheaper, cheapness would not have been the only point to look to in using the ships of the Mediterranean fleet?—No.

663. With respect to the line-of-battle ships Sir James Elphinstone asked you whether you received no assistance from the Government whatever. You were divided upon that point, were you not, at the India House?—I mentioned that I never viewed that particular point as of much importance, particularly with reference to the speedy transport of the troops. My idea was, that if a line-of-battle ship could have arrived in the Hooghly, and also at Madras and Bombay, the moral effect would have been good, and that nothing ought to have been left undone that could be done that would have a good effect in India.

664. There was no formal application by the East India Company for any portion of the Mediterranean fleet to convey troops to India?—No.

665. Had you at any time any dearth of ships to convey troops?—Latterly we found that we could not always get the description of steamers that we desired; eligible steamers became scarce.

666. In the earlier part of the time you always found plenty of ships?—Yes, generally.

667. Your opinions as to the eligibility of sailing vessels were shared generally by naval men?—I think that most naval men that I had an opportunity of speaking to shared them certainly.

668. They thought that clippers were as likely to arrive as soon as the screw vessels?—Yes, particularly with regard to the uncertainty of steamers finding coals at the intermediate stations.

669. Mr. *Crawford.*] Have you a very complete marine department in the East India House?—We have a very efficient head, and one or two efficient assistants.

670. It has been your practice, has it not, for many years past to take up ships for the conveyance of troops and stores to India?—Yes.

671. Therefore the business of taking up ships is not in any marine department?—No; and it has been estimated so, I believe, by shipowners both of the city of London and at Liverpool.*

672. Have you received any complaints from India as to the ships you have sent out?—On the contrary, I understand there have been letters from Lord Canning stating how much pleased he was with the manner in which the troops had been sent out.

673. Have you had any casualties except in the "Austria"?—I do not call that a casualty; she twice met with very bad weather in the Bay of Biscay, and she put back safely to port. She had been surveyed, and was considered a very good vessel; but in consequence of the delays that charter has been cancelled. As I have told the Committee, the 94th Regiment, which was embarked

* There is either a mistake in the Question No. 671, or it was entirely misunderstood by me. I thought the question put was with reference to my opinion as to the general efficiency of the management of shipping business at the India House, and I answered that its efficiency was admitted by shipowners of London and Liverpool.—*J.S.*

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embarked in the "Austria," has been sent overland; the "Sarah Sands" was brought on to the Mauritius; and as yet we have heard of no casualty, not even the death of a soldier.

674. You have heard no reports from the Government of India, or from any of the Presidencies, as to the satisfaction, or otherwise, of the officers in command of the troops?—Not any special detailed reports; but we have heard of many instances in which officers have expressed their great satisfaction at the comfort they enjoyed, and the manner in which they had been treated on board the several vessels.

675. Can you, as having to a certain extent superintended these operations, look back with satisfaction at the part you have taken?—Yes; I think there is every reason to be very much gratified with the result, and the manner in which the duty has been performed. I do not take so much merit to myself as to the gentlemen who have acted under me.

676. Point de Galle is not, at any season of the year, in the direct course of a ship bound from this country to Bombay or Calcutta?—It is very little out of the way for ships bound to Calcutta; you may, perhaps, run down your latitude in the longitude of Calcutta; but if you draw a line touching at Point de Galle, I do not think it would make 100 miles difference, and the great advantage that we had in view was with regard to the troops in the event of their being required on any part of the coast; and in the event of sailing vessels requiring to be towed, they would have that advantage, in consequence of the orders sent to India with that object.

677. In point of fact, a comparison between a ship that has made a direct passage from this country to Calcutta, and one calling at Point de Galle, is not just?—I think it is; so far as the distance to Point de Galle. I have stated before, that if a vessel, at the season of the year when the monsoon is just about finished, get into light baffling winds, a screw vessel with coals will have a great advantage.

678. Take two ships which are perfectly equal and similar in their conditions leaving England together, bound to Calcutta, one making the direct passage, and the other calling at Galle, you cannot make a fair comparison between the two?—There would no doubt be some delay in touching at Galle.

679. In this book of correspondence there is a proposal made to the East India Company by Messrs. Croskey & Co., on behalf of the European and American Steam Shipping Company, for the employment of certain steam vessels belonging to that company in the conveyance of troops overland; and I see also that the proposal was to the effect that there should be a fortnightly despatch from this country, and that 1,000 men should be sent by each conveyance. I see that this proposal was made on the 22d of August, and was further referred to on the 7th of September by Messrs. Croskey & Co. in a second letter, and on the 11th of September there is a note from Sir James Melvill, sending a draft proposal, and at the close of that letter there is this paragraph: "In reply, I am desired to inform you that, as it is not at present the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send any considerable body of troops through Egypt, the Court are unable to avail themselves of your offer, which might otherwise have been accepted with advantage to the public service." Is the Committee to understand that, at the date of that letter, Her Majesty's Government had still not expressed to the Court of Directors any intention of sending any considerable number of troops through Egypt?—I cannot give you a positive answer, but it strikes me that the idea was then more experimental with regard to the overland route, and they were not prepared at that time to go into the large proposal of Messrs. Croskey. The same proposal has been lately renewed, and we found a difficulty on the subject, for this reason, that though it may be very well in an emergency of this kind to adopt the very expensive mode of sending troops overland in large steamers, costing 40 *l.* or 50 *l.* a man, yet, upon ordinary occasions, and we hope the time is not distant when there will be no necessity for continuing such a mode of conveyance, I have no hesitation in saying that the ordinary route round the Cape, for recruits and young men, is the more advantageous, looking at the state in which they will be landed, if they are sent at the proper season of the year.

680. Did Messrs. Croskey make a second proposal for the conveyance of troops overland, or round the Cape?—I believe round the Cape.

681. Can you lay that letter before the Committee?—Yes; and the answer.

682. The

682. The Committee are to understand that the Court did not avail themselves of this first offer, because it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send any considerable body of troops through Egypt, though the Court were of opinion that it might be accepted with advantage to the public service?—I presume that that must have been the case, otherwise it would not have been written.

683. Captain *Vivian.*] The Secretary of the Military Department of the East India Company, states that the European army in India at the outbreak of the mutiny, was 1,000 short of the Company's established force?—I think he was not certain as to the number.

684. He stated to the Committee that there were 1,000 short, and that the cause of that was that the drafts had not gone out for the year?—I must state to the Committee that this morning I was making inquiries with reference to that subject, and he informed me that in his revised evidence he would correct that error. There were a very few short of the Company's army, about 4,000 or 5,000 short of the Queen's troops, but that is not the fault of the Company. Reports are sent home to the Horse Guards, and as they apply for transport to send out the complement to make up their regiments, they are provided. I do not think that we are responsible for any deficiency that may be found at the end of the year. I am told that there is an error in the statement of the deficiency of the Company's army.

685. Viscount *Goderich.*] You stated, did you not, in answer to a question put to you by Admiral Napier, that if you had made an alteration in the arrangements which you had proposed for sending out reinforcements to India before the 29th of June, and had sent them out in steamers, or had made other arrangements to hasten their departure, you would have been obliged to break the contract into which you had entered?—I think that that was a fair consideration which had weight with us in deciding to allow the troops to proceed, as they were all about embarking; amongst other reasons that was a make-weight.

686. You are probably aware that upon the 22d of May a letter was transmitted from the India Board to the Secretary of the East India Company, enclosing one from the Under Secretary for War, dated the 21st of May, stating Lord Panmure's opinion that it was important that the departure of certain reinforcements should be hastened?—Yes, I have alluded, in my former evidence, to the importance that we attached to having the troops arrive at the best season; and when we represented that matter to the President of the Board of Control and to the War Department, I believe they did not press with such anxiety the transport of the troops. I think if the Committee will look at the correspondence, they will find that at last Lord Panmure said, "Pray let us have them despatched as soon after the 20th of June as possible." It is impossible to overestimate the danger of landing troops too early in the season in India.

687. The point that I wish particularly to inquire into is in reference to the contracts. I wish to know whether, if you had complied with the suggestions of Lord Panmure at that time, it would have been necessary to break any of the contracts into which you had previously entered. It is stated in a letter from Sir James Melvill, dated the 26th of May, that the tenders for ships to take out the troops in question were to be sent in to the India House either upon that very day or upon the following Wednesday, consequently, according to that letter, you had entered into no contracts to send out the troops when you received that communication from the War Department; is that so?—I must call to your Lordship's notice that we were not aware that there was any emergency. There was no doubt the opinion of Lord Panmure was, that the troops ought to be sent out as speedily as possible, but his Lordship was not aware, as we were, of the importance of not having the troops landed at an unhealthy season, and we represented that to him; but when we found, on the 29th June, that the emergency was great, we then, as I have stated already, called upon the owners of those ships to make the utmost exertion in getting the ships off expeditiously, and we offered them 25 *l.* a day for each day that they should anticipate the period.

688. Will you state to the Committee whether, upon the 26th of May, you had entered into binding contracts for the dispatch of those troops or not?—I have no doubt that if the records are sent to the Committee, we shall show that it had been the practice generally, under ordinary circumstances to give the

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shipowners full time to prepare the ships; and that plan has this advantage, that the longer period you give, the better the chance of getting moderate terms. That is the reason why that long period is given, from the 1st to the 25th of July, although the 25th of May was the date of that letter. It was a longer period than usual, but that is the object of it. If we had foreseen (which I am sorry we did not) what took place afterwards in India, we should have insisted upon having those ships prepared at a much earlier date.

689. It was stated by Mr. Mason, that if you had acted upon the suggestion of Lord Panmure, you would have lost something like 70,000 *l.*, in consequence of having to pay for breaches of contract; will you state whether at the time of the transmission of those reinforcements you had entered into any contracts at all?—Not at this date, I presume; but after the ships had been tendered and the owners written to, and the ships accepted, although the contracts had not been signed, sealed, and delivered, questions might arise, and in a similar case it was decided against us in a court of law.

690. The mere sending in of a tender which has never been acknowledged cannot constitute any kind of contract, either honourable or legal?—Certainly not.

691. Mr. Mason in his evidence made this statement: "It would not have been practicable to break those contracts without paying the contracting parties, the owners, the full contract price, which would have involved a sum of something like 70,000 *l.*;" can you explain that?—I am afraid that I cannot give the Committee detailed information upon that point.

692. You observe in that letter from Sir Benjamin Hawes it is stated that Lord Panmure thinks it important that the despatch of those troops should be hastened in consequence of the state of things in India?—His Lordship may have had information that I had not; but, as I stated before, I had no apprehension till we heard again from India; Lord Canning's letter completely satisfied me that the matter was likely to be satisfactorily settled with regard to the greased cartridges, and I should not have thought it necessary to adopt any extreme measures, such as cancelling the contracts for the vessels at that period. Even when the news came on the 29th of June, the Committee are aware that the emergency was not thought so pressing as it turned out to be by the next mail. When the next mail came we saw it developing itself in all its magnitude, and took measures accordingly.

693. It appears from this paper, that on the 26th September it was suggested by the Director-general of the Army Medical Department, that a certain number of medical officers should be sent out to India as soon as possible, for the service of the Queen's troops there, and it appears from a subsequent draft letter, dated September, that the East India Company considered that there was no means of sending out those officers before the month of December; can you explain to the Committee how that delay arose?—I cannot; I apprehend it must have been either with reference to the generally full complement of medical officers available; at all our stations we had a full complement of surgeons.

694. Was it a question of transport or of passage?—My memory does not serve me for that particular point; but I will make inquiry about it.

695. It appears by this correspondence, page 135, No. 112, that Sir Henry Storks addressed a letter to the Secretary of the India Board on the 19th of October 1857, stating that "a detachment of the Royal Artillery, consisting of 11 officers and 296 non-commissioned officers and gunners, has been ready to embark, and waiting transport for India since the 12th of September last." Then it appears that in consequence of that letter Mr. Leach wrote to the Secretary of the East India Company upon that subject (page 143) stating, "The Board cannot but remark on this delay. The owners pledged themselves to be ready for the service required on the 16th of last September. A whole month is thus lost at a moment of the greatest importance, and under circumstances of almost unexampled exigence. It is true that the owners are liable to a fine for this delay, which the Board trust will be rigidly enforced; but the facts of this case convince the Board that the amount of this penalty is disproportionately low, and insufficient to check the reckless tender for services which the actual resources of the owners do not supply." It is certainly very important that you should give any explanation that you are able upon that point?—I cannot give the Committee a particular answer, but I may mention circumstances that are apt to occur frequently; ships are tendered and represented

sented to be eligible ships, and when our surveyors go down they are found to be ineligible, and are rejected. It happened the other day that a party tendered a ship, and when we sent our surveyor down he found that she was not off the stocks, and not expected to be launched for a week. Unfortunately we have no power of preventing such things. I imagine when we can give the Committee the particulars connected with this case it will be found that there were some such circumstances as I have described, or such as we had no control over. However, the Committee shall have all the explanation that we can furnish. Capt. *J. Shepherd.* 19 Feb. 1858.

Martis, 23° die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.	Sir Charles Napier.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Mr. Crawford.	Lord Stanley.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Captain Vivian.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Willoughby.

SIR DE LACY EVANS, IN THE CHAIR.

James Grant Lumsden, Esq., called in; and Examined.

696. *Chairman.*] WHAT appointment did you fill in India before you left it?—That of the Senior Member of Council at Bombay.

697. At what date did you leave Bombay in the past year?—On the 15th of August.

698. You left India, I believe, in consequence of severe illness?—I did.

699. You came, in your way to England, by the overland route?—I did.

700. Notwithstanding your extreme ill health, you were not intimidated by the reported unhealthiness of that route?—I never have considered that route to be necessarily unhealthy.

701. How many times have you passed up and down the Red Sea?—I have been four times up the Red Sea, to and from Bombay, and three times down.

702. Do you recollect any great calamities that occurred during those seven voyages to the health of your fellow-passengers?—Certainly not; quite the reverse.

703. There is a part of the passage of the Red Sea which is represented to be extremely hot and insalubrious; what part might that be?—I should say south of Judda, and until you arrive at Mocha; you are more subject to calms within that space of the Red Sea, and there the heat is very great indeed.

704. For how many days of the voyage does that considerable heat generally prevail?—From two to three, I should think, of extreme heat.

705. During the other three or four days, as it may be, of the passage, what is the temperature of the climate generally?—As you leave Suez, in going to India, you generally have a northerly wind down the Red Sea. I have always found it very pleasant for the first day or two; after that the heat gradually increases, until you get to Mocha, which is not far from the Straits of Babelmandel, and there you commonly meet a southerly wind, which lowers the temperature very much. From the straits to Aden, the climate is not very oppressive to any one who has lived long in India, as I have.

706. Have you, in the course of the several passages you have made across Egypt, and especially across the desert, experienced any serious difficulties, either as to the means of transport, or as to the effect upon your health?—No. As far as the transport of passengers is concerned, that was provided for before

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I visited Egypt. I met with no difficulties whatever. I have always understood that the desert especially was extremely healthy for the greater portion of the year.

707. What is the character of the climate in Cairo?—Unless in the case of an epidemic it is, I believe, a very healthy place; I know that visitors during a certain period of the year, when the heat is rather inconvenient at Alexandria, resort to Cairo for a change; I understood so from residents. I have been at Cairo on several occasions for short periods; I have always understood that the climate was a very good one on the average during the year.

708. Are you aware that some families, or individuals from this country who are in a bad state of health, go to Cairo for the benefit of their health?—I have understood so, of late years.

709. Are there ample means of procuring provisions in and around Cairo, if required, for troops passing through?—I should say so; the resources of Cairo are very great indeed, sufficient I should imagine to maintain a large body of troops without inconvenience.

710. In case of 500, 1,000, or 2,000 men arriving, and having to wait a few days at Cairo, do you suppose that any very great injury or inconvenience might arise either from not procuring provisions, or to their health? I think not; arrangements ought to be made before their arrival with regard to provisions and accommodation, such as were made when the 10th Hussars and the 12th Lancers were sent to the Crimea overland, they were a day or two at Cairo, I think.

711. Would it require any considerable time to make those arrangements, so as to accommodate troops there for a temporary period?—I think not; Cairo is a very large city, the bazaars are overflowing, and the Pacha has troops quartered in the neighbourhood.

712. Do you consider that there is ordinarily an abundance of vans, or omnibuses, camels, and horses, to be had for facilitating the passage of baggage and the passengers, and the troops that may be passing?—The number of vans is limited, but I should say that any number of camels could be procured with a few days' notice.

713. And horses?—Yes; they use other means of transit; donkeys were formerly used for the carriage of passengers, before the vans were established.

714. I believe that the donkeys of Egypt are much stronger animals than those of this country?—Yes; I should say that they are of a different breed.

715. Your own health never suffered in the Red Sea?—Never; I was always better for the voyage from Bombay to Suez.

716. Was the ship you came in a large ship?—I came up in the "Pekin;" she is about 1,200 tons, I think.

717. Do you happen to recollect whether there is in the Red Sea a considerable number, or the contrary, of mercantile craft that might be made use of, in case of emergency, to put small detachments of troops on board, to be towed by steamers?—Yes; every time I have been at Suez, I have seen some 20 or 30 small coasters; some of them are probably from 30 or 40 to 150 tons.

718. At Suez?—Yes, and in the neighbouring ports in the Red Sea; there are also some coasting craft, but probably they would not be available without some delay.

719. Do you happen to recollect that you have heard of any great perils in the navigation of the Red Sea?—I believe there is no other peril than that occasioned by the reefs; but the Red Sea has been very well surveyed by the officers of the Indian navy. Of late years we seldom hear of a steamer going ashore; formerly it was more common; in other respects, the weather is generally fine.

720. You seldom or ever hear of shipwrecks there?—No; I cannot say that I recollect a case of the total loss of a ship within the Red Sea.

721. Are tempests or hurricanes usual in the Red Sea?—No; it occasionally blows very hard, but not for a long period; sometimes it blows quite a gale of wind, and a short, unpleasant sea gets up for a time, but nothing that is dangerous to a well found ship, though it would obstruct the towing of vessels. I have been in so heavy a sea. near to the entrance of the Sea of Suez, that if a vessel had been attached to our steamer, we must, I think, have cast her off, for a time. It blows very hard occasionally in the Sea of Suez, with northerly winds.

722. During the monsoon?—The monsoon is not felt at all there.

723. It is not felt in the Red Sea?—I do not think it is at all. The prevailing winds, for the greater portion of the year, are the northerly winds, which blow down the Red Sea to a certain distance from Suez, and at the entrance to the Red Sea by Babelmandeb; during the same period the winds are generally from the south.

724. Am I right in supposing that you have, as an amusement, directed your attention to nautical and maritime affairs during your life?—I was very fond of boating, as an amateur.

725. You met with no sort of impediment or injury in passing through Egypt on this occasion, or on any other?—Never.

726. As you are not connected with maritime affairs, you are not specifically acquainted with the quantity of shipping that might have been disposable at Bombay at about the periods of July, August, and September; but, as being next in point of position to the Governor there, you would probably have a general idea as to whether there was not at those periods a good deal of maritime transport disposable at Bombay?—Yes; we had a considerable number of shipping in the harbour for several months previous to the mutiny, at the commencement of it, and for some time afterwards; a rather unusual number of shipping, in fact, many of them clipper vessels. I think no difficulty would have been found in procuring transports for a large number of troops.

727. Lord *Stanley*.] Are you aware what amount of provision could be made for a large number of troops, if any delay occurred, at Suez?—But little provision could be made for a large number of troops; you might possibly employ the coasting craft, if you had a steamer to tow then, and so convey a few hundred men to Aden. At Aden there are generally four or five vessels lying there, traders, and these could possibly be taken up for the conveyance of troops.

728. You speak of the possibility of employing small coasting vessels, but the passages made by them are very slow and uncertain, are they not?—It would not do to send troops by them from Suez to Aden, unless they were taken in tow. If they were taken in tow they might accommodate a certain number, 30 or 40, or 50 men, without danger, if proper precautions were employed to protect the men from the heat.

729. If the suggestion which has been thrown out had been acted upon, and if sailing vessels had been sent in large numbers from Bombay up the Red Sea, probably their time of arrival would have been uncertain at Suez?—Sailing vessels almost always make a very long passage indeed up the Red Sea. The sea is very narrow, and the channel is still more confined by reefs; coral reefs extend from the shore on either side to a considerable distance. In the upper part of the sea, a ship would probably have to beat up dead against the wind.

730. There would be great delay in such passages, and great uncertainty in the time of the vessels arriving, and consequently considerable delay in taking up the troops in Egypt, waiting for their passage?—Certainly, if the ships sent from Aden were not towed by steamers.

731. You have spoken of the climate of the Red Sea in summer. I understood you to say that there was nothing dangerous to health in the summer heat on the Red Sea?—If you expose yourself to it, I should say the heat is dangerous, but I think the best reply to that question is, that vessels, very often crowded, have for years past been going up and down the Red Sea at all seasons. I have gone down the sea in two of the hottest months, and I never knew of any case of serious illness on board. I have heard of two or three cases where women had exposed themselves to the sun and had suffered from *coup-de-soleil*, and had lost their lives in consequence. I consider the Red Sea passage as generally healthy, when passengers are not exposed to the action of the sun.

732. Your evidence comes to this, that there would be no difficulty, on the score of health, in sending, at any time of the year, a considerable number of troops by way of Egypt and the Red Sea?—Certainly not, with proper precautions; they should not be overcrowded; good awnings should be provided, and they should be as well protected from the heat as possible in all respects.

733. With regard to the means of providing accommodation for such troops at Suez, or the means of sending them down the Red Sea, you are probably not able to give any information?—My impression is, that no accommodation would be found at Suez for troops; I am pretty positive that this is the case.

 734. *Chairman*.]

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734. *Chairman.*] In the Red Sea?—At Suez.

735. Sir *Charles Napier.*] I think you stated that vessels could have been found at Suez in the event of the steamers not being able to carry the troops?—Very few; not very many; probably from 20 to 30 coasting craft.

736. Were they covered over?—They are decked; the troops must be on deck.

737. Would you recommend troops to be sent by that means?—I do not say that; but you generally find people prefer being on deck, under good awnings; even ladies remain constantly on deck, and at night ladies occasionally sleep on deck.

738. What number of men could those vessels carry?—I am not competent to answer that question; but they are coasters.

739. Could they carry 50 men?—Some of them could carry 50, and some a great many more; I should say that they are from 30 to 150 tons.

740. Fifty men would not crowd one?—I dare say 50 would not crowd most of them; speaking of the vessels that I have seen at Suez.

741. Were there any steamers lying at Bombay at the time you said there were a number of vessels there?—Yes; but I cannot state their names. I was ill at the time, and I seldom left the house, except of an afternoon for a sail.

742. Were they Government vessels?—Some of them were Government vessels, and some belonged to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, also some belonged to the Bombay Steam Navigation Company.

743. Could they have been made use of?—Yes; they had vessels which could have been made use of.

744. Was there plenty of coals?—Yes, there were coals; when we require coals, we have always found the Peninsular and Oriental Company most willing to lend us coal to any amount in their power.

745. Had a telegraphic message been sent from this country to Bombay, stating that several hundred men would go to Suez by each of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam boats, could you have immediately taken up vessels to have met them at Suez?—Yes, steam vessels; I think we could have managed it; but I cannot speak positively, we employed spare steamers to go to the Mauritius, and by that course we obtained a regiment from the Mauritius, I think by the 10th or the 12th of August.

746. The news of the rebellion arrived on the 29th of June; suppose the Government had telegraphed to Bombay directly to send steamers to Suez, could that have been done?—Yes, but how many I cannot pretend to say; we were using the steamers between the Persian Gulf and Bombay at that time; on the 9th of May we recalled, on our own responsibility, the 64th and 78th regiments, in fact, all the European troops, from Mohamrah; we sent a steamer expressly to do that; but I have no doubt that we could have sent steamers to bring down from Suez a moderate number of troops had we been required to do so.

747. It appears that the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers could not accommodate more than 200 or 250 men, and to run once a fortnight; could you have found steamers at Bombay in sufficient number to have sent one once a fortnight, and capable of embarking 200 men?—I think we could; I cannot say precisely how many steamers would have been available.

748. Are the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers that come from Bombay to Suez to receive the mails large enough to embark 200 men at a time?—Some of them, I should say, are quite so: including the Calcutta boats?

749. Yes?—Some of them are 2,000 tons and upwards; the general tonnage of the Bombay mail boats is about 1,200 tons down to 1,000 tons.

750. There would have been no difficulty in forwarding the troops on that came from England by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company's boats to Alexandria in the Bombay steamers that came to Suez?—A small number might certainly have been sent in the mail steamers from Suez.

751. About 200?—We must make allowance for the passengers; and I am not aware of the space allowed for each soldier.

752. Who can give the Committee any information relative to the capacity of the Bombay steamers?—I should say, as far as the Company's steamers are concerned, you would get it at the India House.

753. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] How many steam frigates were there in the harbour at the time when you first heard of the disturbance?—I cannot pretend to say from memory.

754. They had all returned from the Persian Gulf, had they not?—No; we had some steamers in the Persian Gulf. The "Assaye" was employed, I think, shortly afterwards in conveying a portion of the 64th or 78th to Calcutta.

755. How far does the railway extend from Bombay?—To a distance of 92 miles from Bombay to Kaprotee.

756. Is it on the top of the Ghâut?—No; when I left India the rail extended to the bottom of the Ghâut.

757. How far is that from Candalla?—About three or four miles.

758. How long would it take the troops to get on the table land from Bombay, going by railway?—They would get on the table land in the course of four or five hours from Bombay.

759. There they would be in a good climate, would they not?—A delightful climate during the rainy season.

760. It is a very fine climate during the rains, is it not?—Yes.

761. Then could they not have been marched from there into the Saugor and Nerbudda country much sooner than by being marched from Calcutta?—I cannot say so positively.

762. To Mhow?—To Mhow I should say decidedly.

763. There would have been no greater difficulty in their marching from Poonah to Malwa than there would be in the troops gaining it from the Calcutta side?—I know nothing about the Calcutta side. The rivers are a difficulty during the rainy season on the Bombay side; but our troops did actually march to Mhow, and they have since gone on to Indore, and further.

764. Have you been on the plains of India in hot weather?—The principal portion of my service was passed in Guzerat.

765. Have you lived in tents there?—Yes, at times.

766. Would you compare the heat in the Red Sea to the heat at Guzerat?—Certainly not; it is a totally distinct character of heat.

767. The heat in Guzerat was much more oppressive, was it not?—No; the heat of the Red Sea would be a very serious obstacle to the transport of troops, unless protected by awnings, when I consider there would be little danger from it. The heat on the plains of India is generally felt as a fiery hot wind, which is very disagreeable, but it does not prevent men going out hunting and shooting. It is not very trying to the health; but I fancy liver complaints are not unfrequently the consequence of imprudent exposure. At the time you seldom suffer.

768. In point of actual temperature, would the troops in the Red Sea have been exposed to a greater degree of hardship during those three days, they would have taken to pass through the sun and the heat, than they would have been exposed to had they been marching for a considerable time on the plains of India in the summer time?—I do not think they would have suffered materially in their health had due precautions been adopted.

769. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You stated, did you not, that from 500 to 2,000 troops might remain at Cairo without inconvenience?—Yes, I think so.

770. How would they fare at Suez if they were so detained?—There is no accommodation whatever at Suez; they have to send provisions from Cairo for the overland passengers; there is no water near, and what water there is is brackish, and altogether unhealthy.

771. The craft at Suez are from 50 to 150 tons; supposing them to be towed by steamers, have such vessels accommodation sufficiently suitable for European troops?—I would never advise troops being sent by them except in a great emergency. If the men had been sent on deck and not over-crowded, and had been otherwise well-cared for, and the vessels had been taken in tow, the latter might have conveyed a certain number of men to Aden, without difficulty or injury to their health. At least such is my opinion.

772. Did it occur to the Bombay Government to suggest at an early stage of the mutiny, either to the Government of India, or to the Home Authorities, that troops should be despatched by the overland route?—Yes, it occurred to me to suggest this counsel on the day after I heard of the mutiny, but the subject was very well considered, and it was thought on the whole, by the majority, that it was better to send for troops to the Mauritius and the Cape.

773. Were the Government of India consulted on the subject?—I am not aware what Lord Elphinstone may have done on that point. I rather think that he did telegraph to Lord Canning, but I would rather not speak positively.

774. When you received the news of the mutiny, was the idea entertained of

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sending a special steamer to Suez, to expedite the intelligence to England?—Yes, I myself suggested that course on the same day that I heard of the mutiny.

775. With what result?—I understood from Lord Elphinstone that he had telegraphed to Lord Canning about sending a steamer, who had declined to do so, expecting better news to arrive, I imagine, and preferring to send home the news by the regular steamer.

776. You stated that the Bombay Steam Navigation Company had steamers in Bombay, which might have been made available; how many vessels had they that would make the passage from Bombay to Aden, in the monsoon?—They had two very fine vessels which could have made the passage during the monsoon.

777. At the time the mutiny broke out the troops employed in the expedition to Persia were being withdrawn; were not some of the best steamers belonging to the Government and the Peninsular and Oriental Company so employed —They were.

778. Were not some of the steamers sent out to Mauritius and the Cape for troops?—Yes; we sent the "Pottinger," belonging to the Steam Navigation Company, and afterwards I believe the "Assaye" was sent down belonging to the Government, that, I think, was after I left Bombay.

779. *Chairman.*] The "Assaye" was sent to the Cape, was she?—I think so after I left India.

780. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Was that after the 15th of August?—Yes.

781. You have contrasted the heat in the Red Sea with the heat of Guzerat; is not the heat in the latter place mitigated by artificial means?—Yes, it is; generally by people living in tents.

782. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You spoke of craft in the Red Sea; you do not know personally anything about the amount of native craft in the Red Sea?—I do not; I have merely seen boats lying in the harbour.

783. In like manner, in your evidence upon the climate of the Red Sea, you would hardly speak about the casualties to be expected among a large body of men going down in the hottest time of the year?—I do not presume to do more than offer an opinion upon the subject.

784. It would rather be the business of the medical profession to speak upon that, would it not?—I should fancy that naval officers are about as good judges as anybody; we had a surveying establishment formerly in the Red Sea for a long time; the Persian Gulf is just as hot or hotter.

785. It is about the same, is it not?—I have heard that the heat in the Persian Gulf is more distressing than in the Red Sea.

786. If sailing craft had been towed down the Red Sea with troops they would have gone much slower, would they not?—Only for a short period; I stated that I had been three times down the Red Sea, twice during the months of August and October, and we had always a strong fresh northerly wind, which would not have required towing at all until we got into calm.

787. That is to say, 150 miles from Suez you generally have a north wind?—I cannot say how far; it varies at different times; it blows pretty freshly.

788. For the other 400 miles there would have been a considerable delay in towing large vessels?—A certain delay from the time the vessels got into the calms, which would increase as they approached the Straits of Babelmandeb. During the extreme heat the towing would not have been much impeded, because generally the sea is perfectly calm.

789. You could not have obtained sailing vessels in time to send from Bombay to Suez, to carry troops in the emergency?—My impression is, that a sailing vessel would not get up the Red Sea unaided, in a couple of months, or more.

790. In fact the difference in the price of coal at Suez and Aden shows that, does it not?—I cannot say; I never inquired into the difference of price in coals.

791. The price of coals in Suez is sometimes 7 *l.* a ton, is it not?—I think generally it is supplied in this way; contracts are made by the India House or by the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and the coal is delivered there. When we wanted coal, we always found the Peninsular and Oriental Company most ready to give it to us at the price which it cost them.

792. The Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers generally endeavour, do they not, to take their supply at Aden to last them up and down the Red Sea?—Generally, as far as practicable; I have no doubt that the cost of coal at Suez is much greater than at Aden.

793. At

793. At Suez all the water that they have is the water that they get from Cairo?—Yes.

794. Are there any provisions to be obtained?—None whatever; no resources whatever.

795. Are you aware that there was considerable difficulty in keeping the two regiments that were sent overland for a short time at Cairo?—I am not aware of it; I heard that they had gone across remarkably well.

796. You are not aware that there were great complaints at Cairo during the stay of the men there?—I heard nothing about it.

797. Captain *Vivian.*] You stated, did you not, that the heat of the Persian Gulf was quite as oppressive, if not more so, than that of the Red Sea?—That is my impression. I cannot speak from personal knowledge; I have heard it stated by many of my friends, naval men, that the heat of the Gulf is greater, if anything, than that of the Red Sea.

798. Were not some of the European troops employed in the Persian war crossing the Persian Gulf at the hottest period of the year?—It ought to have been much hotter there than it was; we had a most unusual season. The 78th and the 64th came down from the Persian Gulf, about the 21st of May, and a troop of Horse Artillery. The 14th Dragoons had arrived before. I think about the 2d of May, but I speak from memory,

799. That was at a very hot period, was it not?—Very hot; but it is hotter far in September, and I believe in June and July.

800. Did those troops suffer from the heat at all?—Not at all.

801. Then there is no reason to suppose that troops going down the Red Sea would have suffered much more than those in May going down the Persian Gulf?—My own belief is, that had proper arrangements been made the health of the troops would not have suffered at all going down the Red, either from Suez to Aden or from Aden to Bombay.

802. As to your own experience, you think that it ought not to have been any obstacle to the troops on such an emergency, going that way?—I ought to say that I cannot state how many troops could have been sent that way. The heat of the Red Sea should not have been an obstacle had we possessed the means of transport.

803. You think that the heat should not have been an obstacle?—No, I think not.

804. Were you at Bombay at the outbreak of the rebellion?—Yes.

805. Do you think that the moral effect would have been great of a body of 4,000 men landing in India at that time?—I fancy so, but I do not think that we were under serious apprehensions for the Bombay Presidency. Not at least until some time later.

806. Did you concur in the general expectation which there was on the part of persons capable of forming an opinion, that the Government would have sent an advanced guard by the overland route through Egypt?—I saw very few people, and had no means of knowing what the public opinion was; I know that it was thought by the Government that it would probably be better to employ the resources that we had in obtaining troops from the Cape and Mauritius, and we did get them about the 10th or 12th of August from Mauritius.

807. What was the opinion of the Council; was there any reference as to the troops coming from England?—I do not think that it was very much discussed in Council; I discussed it with Lord Elphinstone; I should rather say that the result showed what the prevailing opinion was; we sent for troops to the Mauritius, but made no arrangements for their coming overland.

808. But then was not that, perhaps, because you inferred that the Government at home would send you reliefs without your applying for them, as a matter of course?—No; I think, if I may state what I understood from confidential conversations, it was supposed that the troops would not be sent by the way of the Red Sea from home, and that was why we made no arrangements for bringing them on from Suez, as we might have done.

809. You do not know whether any communication took place between Lord Elphinstone and Lord Canning?—I am not certain; I was unwell, I recommended that a telegraphic message should be sent about the conveyance of troops by the Red Sea route, but that was with reference to the proceedings of the Bombay Government.

810. You did not know that Lord Canning had made arrangements for the troops being sent overland?—No.

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811. You did not know that such a communication was made by Lord Canning to Lord Elphinstone?—No; I was certainly not aware that any such communication had been made.

812. Lord Elphinstone did not know that Lord Canning had made arrangements with the Peninsular and Oriental Company to carry some troops?—I do not think he did; I must explain that I was very much confined to the house, and had been so for some time before.

813. In short, you knew very little of what was going on?—I used to call upon Lord Elphinstone when I thought there was a necessity for my seeing him.

814. Did you recommend a telegraphic message to be sent for troops?—Yes; I think I did this on the day after I heard of the mutiny.

815. Your opinion was strongly in favour of sending home for troops?—It always has been in favour of this course, but it would be presumptuous for me to speak decidedly; I thought we should sooner have got a body of troops from Malta or from England by the Red Sea than round the Cape.

816. You urged upon the Council the importance of sending over the troops by that route?—I urged it upon the Governor.

817. Sir *Charles Napier.*] You have stated, have you not, that the water was brought from Cairo to Suez?—Yes; to the best of my knowledge.

818. Do you know that the steam vessels distil all their own water?—Some of them do; not all.

819. Do the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels distil their own water?—Some of them do; I think the "Hindostan" always does.

820. Are you aware that there are tanks in the Desert that are constantly filled with water by camels?—Yes; they are not very large; I have seen them; they are iron tanks.

821. If more camels were employed, they could keep them full?—Yes; but they would supply only water for a limited number of men; they are small in capacity; but a string of camels could be employed to feed them constantly.

822. There is no difficulty in that, is there?—No; there are plenty of camels to be obtained.

823. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] As the railway is now opened to within 25 miles of Suez, there could be no necessity for any other conveyance of water than by that railway to keep the tanks full in any quantity?—The railway was some distance from the stations where the tanks were to be found at the time I speak of. When I came home in August the railway had not been made as far as within 25 miles of Suez. The rail had been carried a little beyond number eight, the centre station in the desert.

824. Supposing the troops were sent across by the railway, could not water have been carried with them on the railway, to supply their wants until they got on board the ships at Suez?—As far as the railway extended, undoubtedly this could have been done.

825. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that the heat would be nothing across the Red Sea, and that there could not be any difficulty in the troops passing down the Red Sea with proper precautions; if there were not proper precautions, what would the result be in that case?—Then it would be doubtless dangerous. I have always seen proper precautions taken.

826. It would be very difficult in an emergency to prepare vessels for a considerable body of troops, would it not?—Yes, but I think that difficulties might have been surmounted; I think, as respects the heat of the Red Sea, that the great thing was to have good thick double awnings, and the men would have been better on deck than below.

827. The vessels that carried the troops from the Persian Gulf were properly prepared, were they not?—Yes, they were transports.

828. You think that the opinion of the council was against sending to Suez for troops?—Yes, that was shown by the result; I must say, that I hardly know what the opinion of the council was; Lord Elphinstone, I think, from the first showed the greatest energy and activity. Telegrams were coming in constantly, which required immediate replies, and he answered them himself; the council did not probably know much of what was going on till they saw the book of the telegrams the next day; it was not a time for the despatch of business in the usual way, by sending boxes of correspondence over the Island and minuting on everything that was done, but as to the opinions of all my colleagues, I am not certain about them. I know only what Lord Elphinstone's opinion was.

829. He

829. He decided to send to Mauritius and to the Cape in preference to Malta?—Yes, and very possibly he was right.

830. Did you think that the arrival of 5,000 men would have had a great effect in Bombay?—At the time that the reinforcements arrived from Mauritius, the populace were said to be in a rather excited state, and the arrival of the regiment was very opportune. I believe at that time we had sent away all the troops in garrison at Bombay, except about 170 or 180 men; I mean all the European troops. We had not, I think, had more than the number I have named for a fortnight previously.

831. After those troops arrived, you had no further anxiety in Bombay?—No; I do not think that the Government had ever any anxiety until, perhaps, latterly; the outbreak at Colapoor happened just before I left India.

832. You got the troops by the Cape quicker than you would have got them from Malta?—From the Mauritius.

833. Captain *Vivian.*] Your opinion was decidedly in favour of sending for them from Malta?—Yes; I understood that there were ten regiments at that time in Malta, and I fancy that had we turned all our energies towards bringing the troops overland from Malta, we might have got large reinforcements sooner by that route than by any other to Bombay and to Kurrachee.

834. Your experience convinces you that it might have been done very easily, and that there were no material obstacles, as to the heat, or the climate, or the means of conveyance?—I think if you could have found the means of transport from Malta to Alexandria, the railway would have carried the troops on as far as it went; there was every disposition on the part of the authorities in Egypt to forward troops so sent. I have friends with whom I have corresponded in Egypt, and I have been in Egypt at different times.

835. There was no reason because Lord Elphinstone sent for the regiments from Mauritius, why you should not have also had some regiments from Malta?—When two of the large steamers at our disposal, the "Pottinger" and the "Madras," had been sent away to the Mauritius, we had not the same means of providing for the transport of troops from Suez.

836. You stated, did you not, that you had the means?—We had few available steamers, and they would not have brought down a large force. Had we sent to Suez for troops, we must have made arrangements for towing ships up the Red Sea from Aden, and have sent an agent overland to arrange for the arrival of the troops, and for passing them through Egypt.

837. You could, in short, have made arrangements?—I cannot say for what number of troops we could have provided at this time. I was under the impression that, by making Aden the rendezvous of the sailing ships, and employing all the available steamers in towing vessels up and down the Red Sea, we could have brought down a greater body of troops than we could procure from the Cape or Mauritius.

838. In short, notwithstanding you had sent some steamers to Mauritius for troops, you might still have provided other steamers to meet a certain number of troops if they had been sent through Egypt?—We had only a limited number of steamers at that time; every day was of consequence, and there would have been a delay in providing other steamers.

839. *Chairman.*] You speak altogether without any positive certainty, do you not, with regard to the quantity of maritime transport that you had?—Yes, that is the case.

840. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] When you speak of larger bodies of troops arriving at Bombay, you did not want a large body of troops there?—We certainly wanted troops there. On the outbreak at Indore we had to form a moveable column to send there.

841. You sent troops round from Bombay to Calcutta?—Yes, we did.

842. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] You never would consider cost as an element in a matter of such emergency?—Not if India was in peril, certainly.

843. You considered India to be imperilled at this time, did you not?—I thought that the mutiny at Meerut was very likely (that was my impression) to end in a general revolt. That was the opinion which we all had after the news of what had occurred in Delhi.

844. The Company's coals in the Red Sea would have made no difference in your decision, provided you had got the troops more rapidly by that means than by any other?—Certainly not.

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845. *Chairman.*] As you passed Aden, did you happen to observe whether there were many vessels lying in the Bay of Aden?—There was one coal ship and a hulk at Suez.

846. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Did you expect to obtain reinforcements of troops from Malta without previous communication with England?—No, it was not Lord Elphinstone's opinion that we should; I thought it possible that, on an emergency, and one of a very pressing nature, they might be obtained; I am ignorant as to what would have been the result of an application.

Captain *Henry Harris*, called in; and Examined.

Capt. H. Harris.

847. *Chairman.*] THE Committee have been given to understand that you have navigated the Red Sea very many times; what number of times have you been up and down the Red Sea?—Nearly 70 times; exactly 68, I believe.

848. At all seasons of the year?—Yes.

849. You have had ample opportunity, have you not, of judging as to whether there are really serious maritime dangers to be incurred in that sea?—I have.

850. Do you consider that they are not really of a serious character?—Certainly not for steam vessels.

851. Does the sea run occasionally there so high as to preclude the use of towing-vessels?—I should give it as my opinion that it would be highly dangerous to attempt it in the ordinary vessels of the country.

852. You mean the coasting vessels?—Yes, the Arab vessels.

853. Not English vessels?—Certainly not any danger whatever.

854. Do you recollect as to the deaths that occurred during those 68 voyages; were they very numerous?—No; the numbers are much exaggerated; occasionally deaths have occurred in the Red Sea as well as in the Indian Ocean; but to say that they died through the heat would be absurd.

855. Do you know that, in general, passengers coming from India leave in a very bad state of health?—A great many do, and some die during the voyage; but that is in all parts of the passage, the whole length of it.

856. But for persons in ordinary health, you apprehend that there is no possible prohibition or impediment to undertaking that voyage?—None whatever.

857. What is the capacity of the Bay of Aden; how many vessels might lie with safety at anchor there?—I should say from 40 to 50 vessels.

858. Safely at anchor?—Safely at anchor; but some arrangement would be necessary; it is very contracted; I speak of the inner anchorage, not the outward one.

859. Is the outer anchorage more extensive?—It would contain the navy of the world.

860. Is there a tolerable security against heavy winds in the outer anchorage?—At Aden it rarely happens that you have any gales of wind at all; in fact never amounting to a gale; you have a strong monsoon, but never a gale.

861. Then Aden must be a remarkably good maritime station?—I should say that it is one of the finest harbours in the world.

862. If a regiment or two were to be brought down from Suez, would there be any great inconvenience caused by their waiting at Aden for some days for the means of being transported on to Bombay?—That I think would depend in some measure upon the class of vessels that they were brought down in; I mean for the supply of water.

863. Do they send across or to either coast for water?—They get water occasionally from the interior in the upper part of the bay, the name of which I forget now; but it is attended with danger.

864. During the past year are you at all aware whether we were in an amicable state of relations with the tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden?—I cannot say.

865. You have never experienced any difficulty in obtaining provisions at Aden?—Never any whatever; there are sheep in abundance.

866. In this voyage you do not disembark generally in Egypt at all?—I have frequently been across Egypt to Cairo, and so forth, but my time was very limited at Suez; from four to ten days at the outside.

867. You do not therefore know during the past year what maritime transport there was at Bombay?—I can give no opinion on that.

868. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Did you ever command one of the Peninsular and Oriental

Oriental Company's steamers between Bombay and Suez?—Not between Bombay and Suez.

869. Did you ever command a steamer between Bombay and Suez?—No.

870. Between what places?—Between Calcutta and Suez, for nine years.

871. How many troops do you think you could have carried in those steamers with safety, on an emergency?—Upon an emergency, with our ordinary number of passengers, I should say we could have carried in those steamers from 200 to 250, without difficulty.

872. In each vessel?—Yes.

873. Had the Government thought proper to send troops from Malta or the Ionian Islands, and to send about 1,000 marines, who would have embarked from the fleet at the same time, would there have been sufficient tonnage to carry them out to India?—In detachment.

874. Would that have been once a week, or once a month?—Twice a month, providing notice had been given.

875. Supposing a telegraphic message had been sent out to India to say that about 250 troops would leave Malta and the Ionian Islands, and the marines out of the fleet, would you have been able to have arranged so as to have embarked 250 in each of the steamers?—Yes, in detachments, no doubt.

876. Was there any other means of getting other steamers in India to take more?—That I can hardly say; I know that there were certain steamers available, which were sent, as I heard, down to the Cape and to Mauritius; there were large steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's, I believe, at Bombay.

877. There are many steamers in India, are there not, at the different ports?—Not a great many. The Peninsular and Oriental Company have the principal number; they have a large fleet out there.

878. And they have spare steamers, have they not?—Some few. I think most of them are employed.

879. You do not think that they could have gone on embarking in detachments, in the first instance, 250 men in each steamer?—In the first instance, and till notice had been sent on to India.

880. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] You have been many years at sea, have you not?—Forty years.

881. You commanded an East Indiaman?—Yes.

882. The "Lowther Castle"?—Yes.

883. Afterwards you were appointed captain of one of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers?—Yes.

884. How many years have you commanded her?—Nine years in the Red Sea, altogether. I think I have been eleven years actually in command.

885. You have been up and down the Red Sea, have you not, at all seasons of the year?—Yes.

886. What time did you usually lie at Suez, from the time that you discharged your upward cargo until the outward-bound was ready?—From four to perhaps nine days; during the time that I have been there I have been as long as nine days, but the usual time was about four.

887. What number did your crew consist of?—One hundred and twenty-two men; about that.

888. Have you ever had any sickness on board in the hot season of the year?—Never; there might be occasional sickness, but not any violent diseases, such as fever or cholera.

889. Your crew were, on the average, healthy?—Yes, on the average.

890. Did your passengers ever suffer severely?—Very trifling; they suffered considerable inconvenience from the heat, but there were no cases of sickness in consequence of it, that I remember.

891. Deaths have occurred in the course of those voyages, as they do everywhere?—Yes, occasionally.

892. In most cases, probably, the death has been attributable to the imprudence of the person?—Too frequently, I am afraid; the fact is, that passengers leaving England, when they arrive in this very hot weather, make no difference in their diet or mode of living, and they suffer very much; but with troops, I apprehend that the commanding officer or their doctor would take care that proper attention was paid to their diet.

 893. What

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893. What is the length of the Red Sea, from Babelmandeb to Suez?—1,200 miles.

894. What winds prevail in the month of July?—In the months of June, July, and August, a northerly wind is the strongest; that is the prevailing wind for nine months in the year; that wind prevails in the Red Sea, in the higher portion of the sea.

895. How far down does the northerly wind extend?—At certain seasons it extends down to Djedah, and at other seasons not quite so far.

896. From Djedah it is generally calm?—Yes.

897. Will you describe the action of the south-western monsoon?—The monsoon is supposed to commence somewhere about the equator, and it generally commences in the month of May or June. It blows strong across the Indian Ocean home to the ghauts, but owing to the conformation of the land and blowing over Africa, it is diverted up the Red Sea, and there becomes a south-south-easterly monsoon; that is the true south-west monsoon; it is there south-south-east.

898. The main portion of the south-western monsoon blows across the Arabian Sea until it precipitates itself in heavy rain upon the western ghauts of India; it is not continuous rain across the sea; it is merely passing squalls?—Merely occasional squalls; upon the whole, it is extremely fine and pleasant weather.

899. So that vessels leaving the Red Sea in the south-west monsoon immediately emerge into fine weather till they get to Bombay?—After passing Socotra.

900. Your ships are well provided with awnings, are they not?—They are abundantly.

901. Are they double awnings?—Yes.

902. You occasionally use steam pumps, do you not, to wet those awnings?—Yes; occasionally I have tried it, but it did not succeed.

903. A ship steaming head to wind 11 or 12 knots, as a matter of necessity makes a current of air, which moderates the heat under any circumstances?—A considerable current. Then again, in the arrangement of the awnings we leave a space between them, so that there may be a current of air through.

904. In a heavy rain you slope your awnings, do you not?—Always in the south-western monsoon.

905. That forms a sufficient shelter on deck, under any circumstances, does it not?—It forms a very good shelter; I will not say that it would be a sufficient shelter, but it is a very good shelter.

906. Better shelter than General Havelock had in his tents in the rains?—Yes.

907. One is a good substantial shelter, and the tent is not?—No; a certain amount of water must come in when the awnings are sloped; it would fall between the awning and the bulwark.

908. But the centre of the ship would be dry?—Yes.

909. You stated that you could carry 250 troops, with a full allowance of passengers, on board?—I think so; on an emergency it might be done.

910. You are now supposing that those passengers enjoyed the usual luxury of their cabins, and that their arrangements would not be disturbed?—Not at all.

911. Supposing you knocked down a few bulkheads, you could of course take in a great many more?—Of course, and the proof is that it has been done over and over again since the emergency did occur; 2,700 and odd troops have been sent that way now, and 150 officers.

912. Excluding ladies on an emergency; supposing a certain number of bulkheads had been knocked down and the officers doubled up, how many troops could you have carried in a ship like the "Bentinck" or the "Hindostan"?—I should not have hesitated to have taken 500 men at once.

913. Without any preamble?—Without any demur. I am only presuming that it was an emergency.

914. Do you distil water in those ships for your use?—All our ships, without exception, are fitted with condensers.

915. Do you know whether the Company's steamers are all fitted with condensers?—I do not think they are; I have understood that they are not.

916. In your opinion they ought to be, ought they not?—Yes.

917. If 500 men had been sent over the desert in the manner I have mentioned,

mentioned, the officers to be doubled up and the men taken on board, you would see no difficulty in respect to water?—None whatever.

918. Have you a large depôt of provisions at Suez?—Yes; in my time there was a considerable depôt, and I have heard that it has been greatly increased.

919. The railway would have brought over provisions amply sufficient for such a detachment of troops?—There is no difficulty; in Egypt provisions are abundant.

920. When you speak of provisions, do you allude to salt provisions?—Yes, salt provisions; we have a depôt for them at Suez, in case of necessity, and always have had one; but no doubt they could have been obtained from Malta or Cairo; in fact, I believe they have been since.

921. Sir *Charles Napier.*] And can you obtain live stock in any quantity?—In abundance.

922. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] With regard to coals, you have a depôt of coals at Suez?—We have.

923. How many tons have you?—In my time there were 2,000; I speak of when I left the line; there were then 2,000 tons always on stock.

924. How many tons were on stock at Aden?—The minimum, at Aden, was 16,000, now it is 25,000.

925. So that there would have been no difficulty whatever in respect of coals?—None whatever.

926. Supposing the Bombay Government had sent steamers across from Bombay, each steamer towing a clipper ship, which the Committee understand was in the harbour, would there have been any difficulty with regard to coals either at Aden or at Suez?—None, with regard to coals; no doubt arrangements would have been made with the Peninsular and Oriental Company to supply them in an emergency.

927. Could a steamer have towed a clipper up against the monsoon?—I am rather sceptical about that; I should rather doubt it.

928. A clipper would have made very nearly as good a passage as a steamer?—I think not.

929. There would have been no great difference in the arrival at Aden?—Both of them must have made a very considerable circuit.

930. They must have gone down as far as six or eight degrees north, must they not?—Further than that; a sailing ship would have gone to the equator, in all probability.

931. What time would that have taken?—I should say it would have taken six weeks, or perhaps more, for a sailing vessel, not for a steamer, of course.

932. How long does a steamer take to get to Aden in the monsoon?—I think it is about 16 or 17 days from Bombay.

933. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] When you state that it would take six weeks or two months, you do not say from what point to what point?—From Bombay to Aden, I should say six weeks; it would take a sailing vessel during the strength of the south-west monsoon.

934. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] When the monsoon slackens, a steamer could tow a clipper across without difficulty?—During the north-east monsoon there is no difficulty whatever.

935. At what period do you fix for the commencement of the south-west and north-east monsoon?—The south-west monsoon commences in Bombay harbour in the first week in June usually; the strength of it may be said to abate about the end of September or October.

936. Then from June to October you would not recommend steamers going from Bombay, or towing vessels at that season of the year?—Steamers might have gone, for they are in the habit of going during the monsoon; but towing vessels is another affair.

937. They could not have towed vessels, but they could have gone themselves?—Yes.

938. You are in the habit of transporting the whole cargo of your ship in a very few days across the Isthmus of Suez, are you not?—In my time it took about four days to get our cargoes across.

939. How much cargo might you have had?—I suppose from 8,000 to 9,000 packages.

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940. That took you four days?—About four days transporting them from ship to ship.

941. By the old mode of transport?—Yes, by camels.

942. Sir *Charles Napier.*] What was the tonnage of those packages?—Perhaps if I say 200 or 250 tons, it would be about that.

943. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] When the railway is completed to Suez, of course that difficulty will be very much obviated?—Entirely.

944. Then there will be no difficulty in transporting troops across the Desert at any season of the year?—I cannot see any difficulty; not the slightest, any more than there is in the transport of passengers.

945. The ship being ready at Suez?—Yes.

946. And even if delayed a few days there, your experience of the climate does not lead you to think that they would suffer materially in health by the detention?—So far from that, I think Suez is a sanatorium; the finest climate in the world.

947. You would not think that they would become demoralised by being at Suez?—I do not well see how they could be demoralised there.

948. Does that answer apply to all seasons of the year?—Perhaps I must make a reservation, that in summer it is very warm, but still the climate is fine and healthy. I look upon it as being an exceedingly fine climate, and I have been there at all seasons of the year.

949. Your crew never suffered from lying at Suez in summer time?—Never.

950. With regard to the navigation of the Red Sea, your departure from Suez depends very much upon your being able to pass the Straits of Jubal at daylight?—If the mails were to arrive on board at 10 o'clock in the morning, and we were ready to start, we should delay till the evening, so as to pass through the Straits of Jubal at daylight.

951. So that waiting 10 hours for a detachment of troops would not necessarily be a delay to the ship?—Possibly it might; but I do not think it would cause any delay.

952. With a view to making the Isthmus of Suez, and the Red Sea, at certain seasons of the year the means of sending troops to India from this country, would it not be necessary to light certain points on the Red Sea?—It would be very desirable to do that; it would facilitate the navigation of it considerably.

953. Are you not detained for several hours by not being able to fall in with those places at daylight?—We so time our departure from Suez, as to pass the Straits of Jubal at daylight, and at the other extremity of the sea we so time our departure from Aden to get through the Straits of Babel Mandeb by daylight.

954. Where ought those lights to be placed?—In coming down the sea, we require a light upon the high island of Shadwan to light us through the Straits of Jubal.

955. Would you require a light upon the Dædalus?—I do not think it is necessary; that may be avoided by keeping the high land of Egypt in sight.

956. Where else?—On the island of Perim.

957. You wrote a letter on the subject of the lights in the Red Sea, did you not?—I did.

958. Will you put it in as evidence?—Yes; this is a copy of the letter which I wrote (*producing the same*).

959. *Chairman.*] To whom did you write that letter?—It was addressed to the Secretary of the Peninsular and Oriental Company in reply to a letter from Lord Clarendon, requesting that the most experienced officers of that company would give him information with regard to the necessity of lighting the Red Sea.

960. Was any reply from Lord Clarendon obtained?—I never heard of any.

961. Are you disposed to put that letter in as evidence?—If it is desired by the Committee, I am.

962. What is the date of it?—The 9th of July 1857.

[*The following Letter was handed in:*]

Sir, 15 Gloucester-Terrace, Hyde Park, 9 July 1857.

With reference to the letter from the Foreign Office which you have done me the honour to enclose for my remarks, I entirely concur in the utility of erecting lighthouses upon the points designated therein, viz., Suez, Shadwan, the Dædalus shoal, and Perim Island.

A system

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A system of lights, such as the Government propose, would greatly facilitate the navigation of the Red Sea, and save many hours in the transit of the Indian mails.

In the passage from Aden to Suez, the land about the entrance to the Red Sea is, at night, very difficult to make out. Cape Babelmandeb and the False Cape so nearly resemble each other, forming what is termed the False Strait, that most navigators hesitate to enter the Red Sea after nightfall; thus many hours are lost.

Perim Island.—A good light upon Perim would designate the entrance to the Red Sea.

A light placed upon the high bluff north eastern point of the island would indicate the position of the small and most frequented Strait of Babelmandeb, and prove a useful guide both up and down the sea.

The large Strait of Babelmandeb, though wider, is rarely used by ships, for reasons which would occupy much space to detail; suffice it to say, that the route is more circuitous, and the western shore of Perim so low and difficult to discern at night, that a ship might get into danger on the Abyssinian coast, ere she could regain the fair track up the sea.

From Babelmandeb to the Island of Jibbel Teer, the numerous islands passed being lofty and steep too, may be considered a sufficient guide.

With a good departure from Jibbel Teer, no danger need be apprehended in this part of the Red Sea.

The Dædalus Shoal.—This small and dangerous shoal is nearly in the middle of the Red Sea. During certain seasons of the year, when the southerly winds prevail, it is entirely submerged. At other seasons, when the strong northerly winds blow, and the Red Sea falls below its usual level, the reef is covered with fine sand, and in calm weather very difficult to make out.

A light upon this reef would enable a ship to make a somewhat more direct course up or down the sea, and might also enable her to shape a course to avoid the low and dangerous islands called the Brothers, to the northward and westward of the Dædalus.

My own opinion is, that this shoal, as well as the Brothers, may be easily avoided, by keeping the land of Upper Egypt on board; and I also consider that of the four lights suggested (apart from engineering difficulties), this one is of the least importance.

No soundings exist in this part of the Red Sea, and the same observation applies to the entire fair track from Babelmandeb to Shadwan, with one or two trifling exceptions.

Shadwan.—The most dangerous and most contracted part of the Red Sea is the Straits of Jubal, or entrance to the Gulf of Suez.

These straits can only be attempted on a fine and clear night, when the island of Shadwan is distinctly visible, and the island of Jubal also seen.

In these straits a fixed light, of the first order, is indispensable. Hours might be saved by its adoption.

A light of the above description placed upon the bold south-eastern point of Shadwan, would form a "leading mark" by night both ways.

The same point now forms the leading mark during the day, but is too undefined at night to rely upon with safety when in the most dangerous part of the channel.

Shadwan, like most of the islands in the Red Sea, is of volcanic origin, uninhabited, and entirely destitute of fresh water or vegetation.

After losing sight of Shadwan and Jubal, the coast on either side of the Gulf of Suez, with ordinary care, is a sufficient guide till approaching the harbour of Suez.

Suez Harbour.—A fixed light upon the low point of land, Ras Ul Murkub, would indicate the position of the harbour, but not prove a sufficient guide for entering.

The entrance of the harbour is very contracted between the shoal spots of Ras Ul Markub and the spit of Adagha, and is even more contracted between the former cape and the dangerous harbour shoal.

In my opinion, therefore, a powerful floating light would be preferable to a lighthouse.

This might be moored at the entrance of the harbour, upon the same spot as the small floating light of the Peninsular and Oriental Company now occupies; indicating, at the same time, the entrance, the fairway, and the safe track to the anchorage.

These remarks are the result of an experience gained in about 70 passages up and down the Red Sea in command of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ships, and I trust may prove of use to the object contemplated. Any further or more detailed information I shall be at all times happy to supply.

I remain, &c.
(signed) *Hy. Harris.*

C. W. Howell, Esq.
&c. &c.

963. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Would not a shipwreck in the Red Sea be more disastrous than anywhere else?—I should say that it would be; the chances are that it would be extremely disastrous, inasmuch as there is neither water nor shelter

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shelter to be obtained on the coast, and there are nomadic tribes in all parts of it.

964. And there would be no wind to carry you away from the point where you might be shipwrecked?—The wind blows up or down the sea.

965. It would be very disastrous for a ship to be cast away with troops on board in the Red Sea?—Possibly.

966. Consequently, in the event of the Red Sea being brought into general use, lighting it is a matter of very great importance?—I should say so.

967. Has a lighthouse been constructed in this country for the port of Suez?—Yes.

968. What description of light is it?—A first class light, constructed by the order of the Pacha of Egypt for the port of Suez.

969. Has it been sent out?—Yes.

970. It is not of a nature, I believe, calculated to be useful at Suez?—I should say, decidedly not.

971. A light-vessel would be much more useful, would it not?—Yes.

972. Would it not be of essential service if it were now represented to the Pacha that the lighthouse, instead of being erected at Suez, where a light-vessel is the natural and proper thing, should be taken down and erected upon the island of Shadwan, which is now a danger of very great magnitude?—Yes, of the greatest importance; it is needless where they contemplate placing it.

973. A reference from the Foreign Office would in all probability lead to that light being placed in a situation where it would be useful to navigation?—I presume so.

974. *Chairman.*] From what quarter in this country might an application of that nature be made to the Foreign Office, in order to induce the Pacha to attend to it; do you mean those large steam companies who are interested in the matter?—No doubt the Peninsular and Oriental Company and the East India Company are the most interested in it.

975. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] You always bring a sufficiency of provisions and water from Calcutta to take you back again, do you not?—We carry a sufficiency of provisions and water; our orders are to have invariably a month's supply over and above the requirements of a very large number of passengers and crew.

976. You consider that condensers on board ships carrying troops in the Red Sea are indispensable?—Most unquestionably.

977. You are of opinion that sailing ships in the Red Sea are out of the question?—Quite so.

978. Have you ever commanded a steam troop ship?—Yes.

979. What ship?—Her Majesty's ship "Perseverance."

980. How long did you command her?—About seven or eight months.

981. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Is that the vessel that upset?—Yes.

982. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] She upset in dock, did she not?—Yes.

983. That was nothing against her, was it?—Nothing; she was over-masted.

984. Did you consider the "Perseverance" properly masted when you commanded her?—Yes, she was masted as a 28-gun frigate.

985. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Then there was a reduction from a line-of-battle ship down to a 28-gun ship?—Yes.

986. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Is that class of ship calculated for the navigation of the Red Sea?—I should say that she was peculiarly well fitted for it.

987. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Were you employed by the Government in the command of the "Perseverance"?—I commanded her by orders from the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

988. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] How many voyages did you make in her?—I went first to the Crimea, subsequently to Gibraltar, and then I went to the Baltic with a flag of truce, and lastly to Ireland.

989. Was she not a man-of-war?—No.

990. What number of men did you carry?—The crew was 150.

991. How many soldiers did you carry?—We took out to the Crimea, I think, if my recollection is right, about 750 artillerymen, and I think 24 officers.

992. Did any sickness occur among your troops?—With the exception of one case of small-pox we landed at Gibraltar; and not a case of sickness occurred.

993. If she had been at Suez she would have performed the passage down the Red Sea very well?—She was remarkably well adapted for it.

994. She

994. She was the description of ship that should have been made use of, was she not?—Most undoubtedly.

995. Supposing, in an emergency, the troops were to be directed from Malta, from the Cape of Good Hope, and from Mauritius to Bombay, which of the three, supposing them all to start from those three points at the same time, would be the soonest in Bombay, supposing the south-west monsoon to be blowing from the latter part of July to the middle of October?—I should say from the Cape of Good Hope to Bombay would be five weeks, and I should say from the Mauritius would be somewhere under a month, and from Malta to Bombay, by Alexandria, 20 days during the south-west monsoon.

996. *Chairman.*] It is about 20 days from Malta, 30 days from Mauritius to Bombay, and 35 days from the Cape?—Yes, assuming that a ship gets a good start from the Cape of Good Hope; she might encounter a gale from the eastward, which would of course retard her passage; I suppose a fair wind on each occasion, and from 35 to 40 days from the Cape of Good Hope, I should say, would be the average voyage.

997. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Is it not the fact, that during the monsoon steam vessels from Bombay to Suez are obliged, generally speaking, to go out of the direct course, and that instances have not been unfrequent of steamers being unable to make the passage in consequence of the extreme violence of the monsoon, and that they have been obliged to return to the point of departure?—That has been the case with the East India Company's steamers occasionally.

998. Have no such instances occurred in regard to vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—I do not think there is one on record.

999. There has been no such instance from Calcutta?—I should say certainly not.

1000. You state that from 200 to 250 might be conveyed in the vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Company from Suez to India; could that be done without previous arrangement as to provisioning the troops?—As a proof of that, it has been done very recently, without the people of India knowing that any troops were coming.

1001. The same answer, perhaps, applies to the cases in which you would take 500 men, excluding passengers, and doubling up the officers?—Yes; we have no difficulty in getting supplies.

1002. You have stated that abundance of provisions are obtainable at Aden; are you not aware that the garrison of Aden is sometimes straitened for provisions?—They have abundance of sheep always; I never had any difficulty in getting them.

1003. I am alluding to a considerable number of men; namely, the garrison at Aden?—My answer applied to the fact of our being victualled at Suez under ordinary circumstances; and even under extraordinary circumstances we would take sufficient supplies, knowing that they could not be obtained at Aden to carry us on to India.

1004. You said, did you not, that provisions were abundant at Aden?—We have never found any difficulty in obtaining sheep at Aden.

1005. But for a considerable body of troops the case might be different?—Possibly; that I am not prepared to say; I know that we get large flocks of sheep there.

1006. The news of the mutiny in India reached England on the 29th of June. Supposing that orders had been sent to Bombay by the return mail to send steamers belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, if they were there available, to Suez, to convey troops to India, about what date do you suppose they would have reached Suez, making of course due allowance for provisioning and other necessary arrangements for the due accommodation of the troops?—I do not think they could have got up before the end of September; making a rough guess, I should say it would be about the end of September.

1007. Mr. *Horsman.*] Do you found that answer upon the knowledge of the fact that the orders sent out from England on the 10th of July would reach Bombay on the 4th of August?—No, I did not understand that the orders of the 10th of July would reach Bombay on the 4th of August. I said just now that I did not know exactly at what period the steamer would arrive at Bombay.

1008. *Chairman.*] If orders had been immediately sent on the 29th of June,

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those orders would have reached Bombay, would they not, in time for vessels to be at Suez on the 30th of September?—At the end of September.

1009. Mr. *Horsman.*] Supposing that the orders sent out from England arrived at Bombay on the 4th of August, how long would it take you to get the vessels ready and send them to Suez?—We will suppose that we give them a week, to the middle of August, to get ready, then they would then take at least a month to get up to Suez during the strength of the south-west monsoon in the month of August.

1010. *Chairman.*] You mean the middle of September?—Yes; I have never made the passage myself; I speak more from memory than anything else; I should have thought that it would have been late in September; I allow one week for them to get ready, and they would then have been up about the middle of September, supposing they started in the middle of August. I take it that it requires a month to go up to Suez during the strength of the south-west monsoons.

1011. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Do you know what spare steamers your company had in India?—I do not know of my own knowledge; I have heard what they had.

1012. I do not think you had above one extra steamer on the other side, on the Bombay and Calcutta line?—At Bombay I think there were three steamers available, namely, two sent down to the Cape of Good Hope, and another one sent, I think, to the Persian Gulf.

1013. *Chairman.*] Was there one available, besides two sent to the Cape?—Three altogether available at Bombay; but I cannot speak for certain, for I do not know when they were sent down to Bombay, the "Pottinger," the "Chusan," and the "Precursor."

1014. It is worse going down the Red Sea, is it not, than coming back, in the heat of the summer?—The heat is greater going down; you feel it much more going down.

1015. Did you ever know of any deaths among the passengers from heat?—I never heard of such a thing.

1016. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] In a question that was put to you by Sir James Elphinstone, he supposed you to go 11 knots an hour; that is beyond your usual pace, is it not?—Our average pace is 10 knots an hour; undoubtedly in the Red Sea we do not keep up our average speed, owing to the density of the water; the specific gravity of the water is almost a fourth more than in the Indian Ocean; and we lose our speed owing to the heat of the water.

1017. What is the heat of the surface water in the Red Sea?—It is usually three degrees higher than the heat of the atmosphere.

1018. What is the heat of the atmosphere?—I have known the extreme heat of the atmosphere, only on one occasion, to be 100.

1019. And the water was 103?—Yes; I would say that on that occasion I did not try an experiment; but I have frequently found it higher than the atmosphere.

1020. Last August and September your vessels were full, were they not?—I am not prepared to say.

1021. You stated, did you not, that you have generally more passengers than you have berths; are there many first-class passengers that lie on deck?—Occasionally they do.

1022. Going down the Red Sea nobody can sleep below, can they?—For many years I was there, and I very rarely remarked people sleeping upon deck; some few from choice would sleep there, but as a general rule they did not.

1023. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Is there a heavy dew in the Red Sea at night?—In the southern parts of the Red Sea the dews are very heavy.

1024. Does that do any harm to the health of the people?—I should think it would be very prejudicial, but I never knew of any instance of sickness occurring in consequence.

1025. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that you could take 500 men at a time in a large vessel?—Five hundred troops.

1026. Would you have all your first-class berths full besides?—I think that the question applied to the doubling up of a certain number of our usual number of passengers, and the cabins being pulled down.

1027. How

1027. How long would it take you to prepare a vessel under those circumstances at Suez?—Knocking the cabins down would not take above two or three hours.

1028. But how long would it take you to embark 500 troops, without information that they were coming on board?—I should say that on an emergency it might be done in 48 hours, or less.

1029. Could you have carried them from Suez to Calcutta?—No doubt about it.

1030. Could you have carried 500?—Yes.

1031. When you arrived at Suez on this emergency, could you have provisioned 500 men to go from Suez to Calcutta at once?—I think there is very little doubt of it; I know that our stores at Suez are so abundant. We have a very large stock of salt provisions in store in case of any emergency. That was so in my time, and I think it is so now.

1032. All the 500 men would be on deck, would they not?—A portion of them, and a certain portion of them below. I should say two-thirds might be accommodated below, and one-third on deck.

1033. In September, to which our inquiry particularly refers, it would be the height of the monsoon, would it not?—It would be in the Indian Ocean.

1034. That monsoon is accompanied with a great deal of rain, is it not?—Not in the open ocean; occasionally you have a squall, but not much rain in the open ocean.

1035. You have a fall of as much as 500 inches on the Malabar coast in the year, have you not?—A great quantity, I believe.

1036. Do you not think it would have been prejudicial to the health of the troops at that time being on deck during heavy rain for weeks together?—I think the Honourable Member misunderstood me. In the open sea very little rain falls during the south-west monsoon. It is not till the clouds impinge upon the ghauts that the rain falls, but there are occasional showers.

1037. Do you consider that the awnings would protect the troops during heavy rain?—Not during very heavy rain; but I think in such an emergency as is contemplated, the troops might be carried during the south-west monsoon without much inconvenience across the Indian Ocean.

1038. You were asked with regard to lighting the Red Sea, and with reference to that you have sent in a report, have you not, of your experience as to the places where the lights are wanted?—Yes.

1039. You are aware that it has occupied the attention of your Company and the East India Company?—I only know that it has occupied the attention of our Company.

1040. With reference to the distances; from Malta to Bombay, you stated that it would take 20 days, did you not?—About 20 days.

1041. How many days would you allow from Malta to Alexandria?—Four days.

1042. How many across to Suez?—Three.

1043. For troops?—Yes; five days to Aden, and eight days to Bombay.

1044. That is supposing there was no delay at all?—No delay at all.

1045. *Chairman.*] Are you of opinion that, on the score of injury to the health of the soldiers, the passage down the Red Sea during this monsoon would have been a decided impediment or not?—I am decidedly of opinion that they might have been taken without any more than the ordinary occasional sickness; and the proof is, that they have been taken, and landed in India, without a man being ill.

1046. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Not the numbers that you stated on board each vessel?—In one instance we have landed an entire regiment at Kurrachee, the 94th, without a case of sickness.

1047. Was that in a special steamer or not?—In a special steamer. In other instances, 200 or 250 have been carried, and have been landed in India without a single case of sickness.

1048. Mr. *Crawford.*] You have frequently been between Suez and Cairo, have you not?—Yes, frequently.

1049. Would there have been any practical difficulty in marching the men across from Cairo to Suez, or in taking them in the vans of the Transit Company?—I think that at that season of the year, considering the heat of the summer, it would

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would have been hazardous to have marched them; they might have been conveyed in vans. If they were exposed to the sun in the desert during that season it would have been very prejudicial to their health.

1050. Do you think there would have been sufficient vans to have carried any large number of men across?—It would have taken some time to have done it. I do not know the precise number of vans that they have; there are a considerable number.

1051. Do you consider that it would have been practicable to have sent 500 men across the desert from Cairo to Suez?—On a great emergency it might have been done.

1052. Sir *Charles Napier.*] When you commanded the "Perseverance" you stated, did you not, that she was not a man-of-war?—No.

1053. What was she?—A Government troop ship.

1054. She belonged to the Government?—Yes; and I held a sort of commission from the Admiralty, acknowledging that she was the property of the Crown, and employed by the Lords of the Admiralty.

1055. Were you under martial law?—No.

1056. Did you hire your own men?—We did; we were not under the merchant seamen's law.

1057. Where did you go with her?—We fitted her out at Sheerness, and we always came back to Portsmouth.

1058. Between England and where did you go with her?—Between England and the Crimea; first to the Crimea.

1059. Have you ever gone round the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes, in former days.

1060. Have you done so frequently?—Yes.

1061. You have had great experience of steam vessels, have you not?—About 14 years' experience.

1062. In the command of a steam vessel?—Yes.

1063. Supposing a steamer had been filled, say at Portsmouth, with the proper number of troops, and with the proper quantity of coals, and another steamer had been employed to take her in tow, could that steamer tow her to Madeira without any difficulty, if she had coals sufficient put on board, in the month of June or July?—I think it would have been very hazardous in crossing the Bay of Biscay.

1064. Are you aware that the "Scourge" steamer towed a three-decker with Queen Adelaide on board all the way to Madeira, and all the way back again?—No.

1065. You have seen a large steamer tow a large vessel, have you not?—Frequently.

1066. It appears that the East India Company sent a steamer to tow a vessel round from Liverpool to Portsmouth. If they could tow one from Liverpool to Portsmouth, which is much more difficult navigation than from England to Madeira, in fine weather would there be any difficulty attending it?—The Honourable Member has asked me if one steamer was towing another, but I want to know what description of steamer is referred to. Supposing she was a paddle-wheel steamer and towed by another paddle-wheel steamer, it would be an exceedingly difficult operation to do so.

1067. You are aware that the steamers that embarked the troops were all screws, and they had also the means of lifting the screw up; would there be any difficulty whatever in that case in towing?—With due deference, I should say that there are very few merchant steamers that can lift their crews; I may say that there are not more than three or four in the whole service.

1068. Can they disconnect the screw?—Yes.

1069. Then they can disconnect the paddle wheels at the same time, can they not, and let steamers tow them?—It is possible.

1070. Is there any difficulty in it?—There would be no difficulty in unkeying them; the great difficulty would be in keying them up again at sea.

1071. What is the difficulty; it is done every day?—A merchant steamer's paddle wheels are different from a man-of-war's; in a man-of-war's paddle wheels you have a racket by which you can lock your wheel to get your keys in again;

again; but in the case of a heavy merchant steamer, if she is lurching, it is very difficult to key her up at sea.

1072. It can be done, can it not?—It could be done, but it is attended with great difficulty. The great danger would have been in parting the tow-rope in the Bay of Biscay. If the tow-rope broke, it would be in consequence of bad weather, and there would be a difficulty in getting hold of her again.

1073 Supposing that did happen, then the ship could go on without a steamer at all, could she not?—She might have gone on.

1074. Supposing the weather to be fine in the month of July, and supposing a steamer going out in that way, full of coals, arriving at the beginning of the trades, would she not get out to India faster than one that used coals from the time of starting from England?—Under those conditions, if it was possible to tow her, it might be so, but I think the difficulty would be in towing a very deep ship.

1075. I have given you an instance of a three decker being towed?—Of the two, I should prefer to tow a three decker to a steamer.

1076. *Chairman.*] What situation do you now hold?—I am Nautical Assessor of the Board of Trade.

1077. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Your knowledge of the route to India, and in short, your general character induced those parties who assembled in congress at Paris to take into consideration the Suez Canal, to make you a member of that congress?—Yes; I was a member of the International Commission.

1078. And you are now Assessor to the Board of Trade?—Yes.

1079. Supposing the reliefs which we require to send to India in future amount to 20,000 annually, and that the matter were placed entirely in your hands, and that all the routes and all the means were placed in your power, will you give the Committee your views as to how those men would be most advantageously conveyed to India, having due regard to the Red Sea route, and steam and sails as applied to the various seasons of the year in which the passage could be made; and also your views with reference to the expense?—It is a very stupendous question; but according to my opinion, if I may venture to give one, a proper line of transport would be necessary to be organized in the Red Sea between India and the Red Sea, and that could only be done by the Government.

1080. What is your opinion with regard to the use of screw steamers across the line?—I think that the route to India, and the expense at the same time would be less; the time would be less, and the expense would be less by sending the troops overland by a thoroughly organized system of transport.

1081. My question applied to three different modes available, namely, the Red Sea, screws and sails?—Yes.

1082. Which would you prefer?—The overland, decidedly, provided no political question lies in the way; and supposing that to be smoothed away, I believe that on the score of expense and time, the most preferable route would be the Red Sea by a properly organized line of transport.

1083. At all seasons of the year?—Yes.

1084. What are the advantages and disadvantages of a line of screw steamers by the route by which they used to go to India, crossing the line about 20° west without touching anywhere?—Having made the passage round the Cape of Good Hope in a very powerful steamer myself, I can give something like an opinion, and I believe it is on record; that I made the longest steam passage yet made, from Buonavista to the Cape of Good Hope, and that took me 21 days against the south east trade wind; consequently I think the difficulty would be in the supply of coals; and for want of coals they would not get on so rapidly as by the line I have suggested by the Red Sea.

1085. In that case you ran from Buonavista straight to the Cape?—On that occasion I did.

1086. Supposing you had crossed the line in 22°, and made a sailing voyage, making Trinidad, and followed the track of the Indiamen, only using your screw (supposing it could be disconnected) when it was necessary, would not that be a very expeditious and efficient mode of sending troops to India by a regularly organized line of transports?—My own private opinion is, that the utility of screw steam vessels *viâ* the Cape has been very much overrated, and for this reason,

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which a sailor will understand, that as you get light, you have a difficulty in carrying sail in a screw steamer when the coals are used.

1087. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Are you not aware that there is a means of obviating that difficulty by filling up your coal tanks, that is, that when they are out you take in water to keep the ship in her proper place?—I have done that, but it is not a most desirable mode.

1088. Why is it not?—It is extremely inconvenient; water is a shifting ballast unless the tank is perfectly full. Then of course in an ordinary iron screw steamer (and my remarks are principally confined to those) the carrying of water is a very inconvenient sort of thing, but it is possible to be done.

1089. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] With regard to sailing vessels, would it be advisable to employ first class clippers to send the troops to India?—I think we have had proof that they cannot arrive in India, even with the inducement of a high premium, so quickly as the screw steamers.

1090. Under all circumstances, and at all seasons, you consider that the best way of carrying troops to India is for the Government to organize a line of steam transport down the Red Sea?—That is my opinion.

1091. Mr. *Willoughby.*] With regard to the letter now shown you (*handing the same to the Witness*) from the Secretary of the India Board to the Secretary of the East India Company, dated the 9th of July 1857, what difference would that make in your reply to the question as to the time of arrival of a steamer from Bombay?—About a week, I should think.

1092. *Chairman.*] Then it would be a week earlier, would it not?—Yes.

1093. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] In forming your opinion of the relative advantages of the overland route, and that round the Cape, did you take fully into consideration the expense of the transport of the troops?—I did; I see by certain calculations that have been made that the expense by the overland route seems to have been less than by the screw steamers round the Cape.

1094. Not with regard to a comparison between a sailing vessel round the Cape and the overland route?—Judging from the troops that have been sent that way.

1095. It has been stated that the ordinary expense of sailing vessels round the Cape is about 10*l.* per man, as against 40*l.* by the steamers; does that agree with your experience?—No, it does not.

1096. You think that the ordinary expense of sending them by sailing vessels round the Cape would be higher than that?—I think so; I do not know it of my own knowledge.

1097. Do you think that the expense of sending troops overland could be brought below 40*l.* per man, supposing proper arrangements were made for the purpose?—I think there is no doubt about it.

1098. Forty-nine pounds is about the expense which it has cost in the recent transmission?—I believe it is somewhere thereabout. The last troops have been conveyed at 40*l.* a man.

1099. Mr. *Crawford.*] You stated, in answer to a question just now, that you thought that the best mode of sending troops to India would be by a steam transport service, organized by the Government, down the Red Sea?—Yes.

1100. Do you think that the Government alone could organize such a service?—No; the Honourable Member may possibly have misunderstood me; I meant, organized by the Government, either of their own ships or employing an organized transport service, taking ships up for the purpose.

1101. The question was put to you rather in the form of a leading question, I thought, and your answer committed you to the opinion that you thought the Government alone could have organized it?—I ought to have corrected myself.

1102. You are of opinion, are you not, that such a service could be as efficiently carried out by private enterprise as by the Government?—Decidedly I am under Government supervision.

1103. *Chairman.*] You have given the preference in case of going round the Cape, to steam decidedly over sailing ships, and you spoke of the arrival of those respective descriptions of vessels in India; have you struck any averages, or made any general calculations of the arrivals of those two classes of ships in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras?—I have merely seen them; I have not made any

any calculations myself. The average certainly seems to be in favour of steam vessels. Capt. *H. Harris.*

1104. Would you be so kind as to make out a regular calculation, and to furnish it to the Committee?—If I can obtain the materials I will. 23 February 1858.

1105. Mr. *Willoughby.*] In giving the preference to steamers by the Cape of Good Hope, of course you take into consideration the question of expense; the expense per man by steamer would be more by that route than by a sailing vessel?—Possibly it might. We are speaking more with reference to future operations.

1106. But in an ordinary case, the expense would be taken into consideration, would it not?—Yes.

John Charles Mason, Esq., called in; and further Examined.

1107. Captain *Vivian.*] ON the last occasion we were clearing up an apparent discrepancy about the date of the tenders. You will probably give the Committee some more information upon the subject?—Yes; it arises upon my answer to question 315, by Lord Goderich: "Will you state what were the difficulties in the way of complying with that suggestion;" and I have to state that I have found, upon looking into documents to refresh my memory, and at the same time referring to the whole of the correspondence (in the Military Department), of which the two letters of the 22d and 26th of May formed a part, that there were reasons rather than "difficulties" in the way of complying with the suggestion. It was not merely a question of time, it having been stated in that correspondence that the troops, being reliefs and detachments that would go under ordinary circumstances, should go at such a period from this country as would insure their arrival in India at the time the best suited to the health of the men in the different climates to which they were to be sent. At the same time there was a financial question involved in it, by some contracts entered into, and by engagements afoot, with regard to a considerable portion. The embarkation was to take place between the 1st and the 25th of July, which had been stated in a letter of the 26th of May, from Sir James Melvill; but in a subsequent letter it was stated by the Board of Commissioners that Lord Panmure trusted the troops would be sent away as early after the 20th of June as practicable, and the Court bent their attention to compliance with that part of the request so far as they could. The date pressing so strongly on my mind was the 29th of June, after arrangements had been made for the reliefs, and when we were about to make provision for the extra regiments that were called for upon the emergency. *J. C. Mason*; Esq. 23 February 1858.

1108. You were in error about the contracts, were you not?—Yes; I found on consulting our records that I was not correct in my reply.

1109. That upset the question about the loss of 70,000 *l.*?—I have put down on paper the real operation of the thing, if the Committee will permit me to read it. I hold in my hand a memorandum of the ships under engagements for the reliefs and the recruits at the time that the news arrived on the 29th of June, the receipt of that news having induced the first requisition for four extra regiments. Then I find that under the advertisement of the 17th of April the Court had two ships, the "Nile" and the "Amazon," and under the advertisement of the 20th of May 1857 they had 20 ships, the contracts for six of which were completed on the 26th of May, the same day as Sir Melvill's letter, and for the other 14 on the 3d of June. Then, under an advertisement of the 10th of June they had three other ships, the arrangements and contracts for which were concluded on the 17th of June and the 24th of June; that makes up the number of 25 ships; and if from those 25 ships, the five ships in which we put the East India Company's recruits are deducted, it would leave the expense of the 20 ships for the reliefs of the Queen's troops and the detachments, 63,369 *l.* in round numbers.

1110. But a good many of those were not completed on the 26th of May?—Not by deeds under hand and seal.

1111. You might have broken with some of those; I do not say that it would have been politic, but you might have done so?—I think we might perhaps have

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entered into a compromise; I doubt very much whether we could, according to our practice have broken off without payment.

1112. *Chairman.*] Probably for about 20,000 *l.* a compromise might have been effected?—Yes, perhaps; but there is one point clear, the case was not viewed by the Court of Directors in a financial spirit. The question never arose with them as to breaking through those contracts. It was obvious, even if it were done, we should not gain anything in point of time, as we should have to go into the market again to get other ships, whether steamers or not, and we must have lost a great deal of time in necessary forms. With regard to the arrangements for the four extra regiments, we put in our advertisements the same days of embarkation for them as for those that were reliefs, and we got them all away on or before the 26th of July at the latest.

1113. Mr. *Crawford.*] Do you not think that the effect of such a course as has been suggested on the part of the East India Company would have been to cause great consternation and future mistrust, on the part of shipowners in London, in their dealings with the Company?—I have not only no doubt about it, but I am quite satisfied that it would have generated great distrust in our future engagements of freight.

1114. *Chairman.*] If fair and equitable sums were accepted by those parties, how could that consternation arise?—A sum would not have been offered to them, without some complaint being made. If at the India House we considered that, because a contract was not actually under seal, we were not bound, we were scarcely likely to have volunteered to pay them anything.

1115. It was not a question of expense?—Not at all, as already stated.

1116. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Was not the breaking of the contracts strongly urged upon the Court by the President, and after consultation with him, was it not thought better not to do so?—I am not aware of that; I do not think any such thing is upon record. I do know this, that it was strongly recommended and urged upon the Court, "to get the troops away as quickly as they could possibly be sent." I am not at all aware of anything appearing upon record that they were either to break the contracts, or to pay.

1117. You would probably not be acquainted with it if it had taken place?—I should certainly know it if it had taken place.

1118. But you merely carry out the orders of the Board of Directors?—If such a case had occurred, it would have become my duty to have managed the compromise

1119. You might not have been consulted upon the matter at all?—I should certainly have been ordered to do it, if compromise had been contemplated by the Court.

1120. *Chairman.*] It could hardly have been carried out without your instrumentality, from your official position?—I will not say that it was impossible to be done without my instrumentality, but it would have been an extrordinary proceeding, as it is in my department to settle all shipping questions.

1121. Sir *Charles Napier.*] It would not have been usual to have done so?—No.

1122. Did you ever hear of an instance of its being done?—No.

1123. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You are not acquainted with all that passes between the President of the Board of Control, and the Chairman and the Deputy-chairman of the East India Company?—I am not. The honourable Member must know from his own position that these communications are of course confidential.

1124. Mr. *Adderley.*] In your answer to question 317, you stated that some of those contracts were made as early as the 8th of May; do you adhere to that statement?—I have mentioned, in the explanation I have just now given, two ships, the "Nile," and "Amazon" into which we put the East India Company's recruits.

1125. Mr. *Byng.*] Those were for the usual drafts, not the additional reinforcements?—The whole of the troops we are now speaking about were the ordinary reliefs and detachments for filling up the regiments already in India, which would have gone out to India at the time I named whether there had been any emergency or not, and therefore distinct from the extra service.

1126. Captain *Vivian.*] In the first place, by taking up ships for the conveyance of those extra troops, you did not take up any steamers, as you were not certain about

about the provision of coal?—Yes, we did take steamers, I think six, two of which were small-powered vessels,

1127. You did not take up more, as you were afraid as to the supply of coals?—Yes.

1128. On the 14th of July you began to take up larger steamers?—Yes.

1129. Had there been, between the 29th of June and the 14th of July, any encouraging accounts as to the amount of coal that you could obtain?—Yes; we made an application to the Admiralty again, and we were assured by them that they had entered into contracts, and had made arrangements to a very considerable extent for replenishing the royal stores at different places; that they had sent to the Cape a quantity of coals, and that they were shipping coal to be delivered, to the extent of above 4,000 tons more. We heard, likewise, that a considerable amount of coal had been sent to the Cape de Verdes, and that the Admiralty had likewise sent coals to Ascension (speaking from recollection as well as I can) to the extent of 4,000 or 5,000 tons, which the Admiralty expected to have there when any future steamers arrived out. This assured us.

1130. You were not at that date quite satisfied that screws had a great advantage over sailing vessels?—No, and it is a question now as to their relative passages in both monsoons.

1131. Do you think, after the experience as to all those vessels, of the way in which the screws had beaten the clippers, there is any question about it?—It may be very well to take it as an average, that the screws have beaten the clippers, but there are individual instances where the clippers have beaten the screws. The average is the other way, certainly; about 10 days between the best vessels to Point de Galle.

1132. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Have you calculated the number of days difference between the sailing vessels and the steam vessels?—Not since I was last here.

1133. When you speak of 10 days, you do not mean what has actually been done?—Indeed I do, to a certain extent; I find, however, that the average voyages of the troop ships and steamers engaged since the 1st of July 1857, as far as we know of their arrival in India (made up to the 13th of February 1858), are in favour of the steamers:

1134. *Chairman.*] It includes, I suppose, all that you knew of at that time?—Yes; all the vessels that we knew had arrived at the different ports. The average of three ships to Calcutta was 97 $\frac{1}{3}$ days, and the average of eight steamers to Calcutta was 78 $\frac{5}{8}$ days, showing a difference of 19 days; the average of two ships to Madras was 95$\frac{1}{2}$ days, and the average of four steamers to Madras was 83$\frac{3}{4}$ days, showing a difference of 12 days; the average of seven ships to Bombay was 115$\frac{4}{7}$ days, and the average of five steamers to to Bombay was 75$\frac{2}{5}$th days, showing a difference of 40 days; the average of nine ships to Point de Galle was 93$\frac{5}{9}$ days, and the average of four steamers to Point de Galle was 83 days, showing a difference of 10 days. Passage of one ship to Kurrachee was 120 days, and the average of two steamers to Kurrachee was 94 days, showing a difference of 26 days. This may be enlarged at the Committee's pleasure; these averages must necessarily, as the service for which the ships have been engaged is still going on, be subject to difference every day till all have arrived. I know that there are several ships which have arrived at different places since I was here last, and probably, if my attendance be again required, my averages will be altered again.

1135. *Chairman.*] Have you any knowledge of the quantity of maritime transport at Bombay in the months of August and September?—The East India Company have a Steam Navy of considerable extent, but at that particular time their naval vessels were on political service in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

1136. With regard to establishing telegraphs on from Suez to India, were there not propositions made to the Government to enter into arrangements with some commercial party or parties to continue the telegraph on from Malta to Suez and Bombay?—I am aware of the circumstances of that question, but it is not in my department, and I would rather not trust myself with an answer which might be recorded, and which might mislead the Committee.

1137. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] When the Government became fairly alarmed and were determined to send out troops to India as fast as they could, you took up the very finest ships you could lay your hands upon, did you not?—We

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made a selection of the best that were offered to us under our advertisements and conditions.

1138. And you took them up, irrespective of the expense?—Quite so.

1139. The price of coals in the Red Sea or anywhere else, did not enter into your calculations?—Not at all; it was part of the conditions that the owners were to find all coal and fuel, as part of the freight allowance.

1140. Expense was no object; your object was to carry the troops to India in the most speedy way that you could, regardless of expense?—Exactly so. If it had so happened in the course of our selection that two or three ships appeared to us to be equally advantageous for the public service, we should certainly have given the preference to the cheaper of those two or three.

1141. Suppose the Government had brought forward three or four line of battle-ships, and had taken the lower deck guns out, and left half the crews at home, and had intimated that they were ready to take out a portion of the expedition, would not that have moderated the pretensions of the shipowners?—Yes, I think so.

1142. That would have brought things to a more reasonable level, would it not?—No doubt about it, having the effect of competition.

1143. No official proposition of that sort was made?—No; none is upon record.

1144. Suppose you had to send out an expedition of 20,000 men to India and you had three months open to you, and suppose that all preparations were made for sending them out in steam transports, such as the "Golden Fleece," or the "Emeu," or in clippers like the "James Baines," and the "Champion of the Seas," which route would you prefer?—Certainly across Egypt, under an emergency.

1145. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Which would be the next best mode?—I would employ screw steamers, taking care to fill the depôts on my way with plenty of coal.

1146. It is in evidence that, in the event of your breaking a contract, you would have been forced to have paid the full amount for which the vessels were chartered; are you of that opinion?—I am; but I wish to guard myself in this respect; I should feel, morally speaking, that we ought to pay it; but I should certainly endeavour to get off upon easier terms.

1147. And to make a compromise?—Certainly.

1148. Mr. *Adderley.*] During all these proceedings, has your opinion altered much with regard to the superiority of steamers for sending out troops to India?—No, it has not.

1149. Have you still some doubts in your mind as to which are the best?—I never thought that the comparatively small difference in the time that the vessels would take (supposing all went fair and straightforward) was worth the difference of expense, which was more than doubled by the steamers.

1150. If you had a similar question now before you as you had in the month of May last, with regard to sending out troops on an emergency to India, you would still prefer sailing vessels to steamers?—I could hardly say that; I should have great hesitation, under the circumstances of so great an emergency, to go so far in the very teeth of public opinion as to recommend sailing vessels. Not being a seaman, I could scarcely trust myself to advise their adoption; but, under ordinary circumstances, I should select the best clipper vessels in preference to steamers.

1151. Sir *Charles Napier.*] But not under an emergency?—No.

1152. Mr. *Adderley.*] It would appear by the much greater use of steamers in later months that the East India Company have very much altered their opinion as to the superiority of steam over sailing vessels?—Certainly; but there may be other considerations in that. The season was becoming unfavourable to sailing vessels. A strong public feeling existed, and there certainly were better steam vessels in the market; likewise, the urgency of the service increased.

1153. About what time did the urgency of the service so much increase as to make steam vessels appear superior to sailing vessels?—Just about, I think, the end of August or the beginning of September, when the question of the overland

land route was pressed on again, and it had been, as the Committee know, talked of much in high quarters; and towards September, when an offer was made to us for the overland route.

1154. Was it the increased urgency of the occasion, or the increased pressure of public opinion, that induced you to change your opinion, and also the East India Company?—I can hardly answer that question for the East India Company. For myself, it was my duty to get all the steamers that I could, and to despatch them with the troops as quickly as I could.

1155. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Was not the decision of the Court of Directors in regard to sailing vessels, in the first instance, founded partly upon the opinion entertained that sailing vessels at that time made quicker passages than they would at a later period of the year?—Certainly.

1156. Mr. *Adderley.*] Are the Committee to understand, although you say you cannot answer for the opinion of the East India Company, that your own opinion has not changed throughout the whole of these proceedings?—Yes.

1157. So that, according to your own view, the extra use of the steam vessels in the later months of the year was a waste of money, for you would still have preferred sailing vessels to steam in the month of September?—I scarcely see the value of my individual opinion when I have a positive order to abide by.

1158. You have expressed your own opinion strongly as to its being very doubtful whether steamers were preferable to sailing vessels; I ask you whether that opinion has been maintained throughout, and if not, at what period in these proceedings did your opinion change?—When we were assured that all the assistances that were required for steam vessels were provided, that assurance would have a natural effect in increasing the confidence of a person in that particular mode of transport.

1159. Did your confidence increase in that mode of transport?—Certainly, when I found we had got all matters in our favour.

1160. What matters?—The provision of coal, and, as was generally believed, a faster description of vessel than was offered to us at first.

1161. Do you mean that if you had been quite sure of your depôts of coal being well supplied, you would at first have preferred steamers to sailing vessels?—I believe that I have said all along, in the first instance we had no experience on which to found a preference. I had no personal experience in my official capacity, and the East India Company had no sufficient experience of screw steam vessels; nothing on which to form a judgment so particularly in their favour over sailing vessels.

1162. Has their experience during these months altered their opinion?—Certainly it has. We have had an opportunity of seeing the way in which vessels have made their voyages; we have seen within how few days some of them got to St. Vincent, and to other places, where (we saw by the papers) they were recorded as having touched, outward bound, for coal or fuel.

1163. With your present experience, if the same evils recurred, should you have the same doubts as to the superiority of steam vessels over sailing vessels?—I think I have never said anything to the contrary (for an emergency) of employing steamers.

1164. You consider that it was the gradual alteration, from the influence of experience, in the opinion of the East India Company which led to a greater use of steam vessels towards the close of the period?—I think so, for an emergent service, especially as the season then became unfavourable to sailing vessels.

1165. Mr. *Crawford.*] Is it not the fact that steam vessels may be used to much greater advantage, as compared with sailing vessels, in the month of September, rather than in the months of June and July?—I believe that that is the case; but not being a nautical man, I cannot give my opinion with anything like a feeling of authority.

1166. What is the reason why the voyage should be better performed by a steamer sailing in the month of September than by sailing vessels sailing in the same month?—I believe that the difference would arise from the winds and the weather that they would meet in the Bay of Bengal.

1167. A proposal was made on the 22d of August to the East India Company by Messrs. Croskey & Co. for the employment of the steam vessels of the European and American Company in the Red Sea; did that come down to you in your department?—It did.

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1168. Was the proposal examined in the Marine Department of the East India Company?—It was.

1169. Was any opinion expressed by the officers of your department upon that proposal, to the Court?—None, on its practicability. The decision upon the application of Messrs. Croskey & Co. for the employment of their vessels turned upon the transport of troops through Egypt in large bodies, and the answer that was given to Messrs. Croskey & Company's proposal applied to that point entirely.

1170. From the experience you have had in that department, you are not yourself aware of any circumstances which would have rendered that proposal, irrespective of political considerations, one that ought not to have been entertained by the East India Company?—It strikes me that at that time there were two very important objections—three, I might say. One was, that it was proposed to be performed by their fleet of eight, four vessels on this side, and the other four on the other side of the Isthmus, to run between Suez and India, and Messrs. Croskey & Company had not got their eight vessels free for a considerable time (some of them being under contract to us at the time). Another point was, that it occurred to me as being a very expensive arrangement, because the charges were a great deal, as I thought, enhanced; and it was very objectionable as being a time bargain, by which I mean so much money a ton per month from the time of the engagement to the time of the discharge in England, which is a premium upon slowness.

1171. Did he not propose to carry the men out at so much a head?—No, his proposal was not to that effect. He accompanied a modified proposal with a calculation, by which he made it appear that, supposing this and that to be done, such and such would be the result; so much a head. He worked out his own calculation to bring the proposal within our general way of doing business.

1172. *Chairman.*] You stated that three points were deficient; you have mentioned two; was there any other?—The other point was embraced in my answer about the time bargain.

1173. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Did it not occur to you that it would have been as well, in a moment of emergency, to have obtained information from the Peninsular and Oriental, and other companies which were in the habit of sending steamers round the Cape of Good Hope to India, with regard to the comparative passages made by steamers and sailing vessels?—We had been looking very much to the working of the postal contract with the Cape of Good Hope, in which all the screw vessels, which were all alleged to be good vessels, were very seriously out of time. The steam companies' vessels were only sent round the Cape to take up their stations abroad, coal depôts and everything being prearranged.

1174. Did you obtain any returns of the actual time they took?—We did not get anything that we could call a "Return;" it was a matter of public notoriety.

1175. Did you make any application to the Admiralty to ascertain the number of days the Admiralty's steamers took to go to the Cape?—No.

1176. Were no questions asked of the Lords of the Admiralty, either publicly or privately?—I believe privately, but not publicly; and I believe the First Lord is reported to have expressed his opinion upon the point in his place in Parliament.

1177. *Chairman.*] There must have been some special cause assigned for the failure of those steamers in going to the Cape and back; what might that have been?—It seemed to be attributed to some mismanagement, rather than fault in the vessels.

1178. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Mr. Lindsay, I believe, was the contractor?—Yes.

1179. *Chairman.*] If there had not been some special mismanagement, there seems reason to infer that those steamers would have made far better passages?—With regard to that, I have just noted down a memorandum of what I have heard, namely, the Cape mail contract by screw steamers allowed 38 days for the passage; the penalties were very heavy for delay, commencing at 50 *l.* per diem, and increasing in amount progressively; the actual performance was very unsatisfactory;

unsatisfactory; every passage was considerably over time, the average passage being 50 days; that is 12 days over time.

1180. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Whose vessels were those?—Mr. Lindsay's, I believe.

1181. Was that the average performance of all his vessels?—They were contract vessels, but the contract was given up, I have heard, and the penalties are a question even now.

1182. Do you happen to know the names of the vessels. Was the "Robert Lowe" one?—I do not see that name. The "Harbinger" was one, and the "Clarendon." The "James Hartley," the "England," and the "Tynemouth," are in my memorandum.

1183. It appears that the "Robert Lowe" only took 89 days to go to Calcutta, and she stopped 14 days at the Cape of Good Hope to get a new foremast?—We have no record or means of knowing how long she may have stopped; I heard she stopped. With regard to the "Robert Lowe," I have learned that she took 87 days to get to Ceylon.

1184. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Do you attach any importance at all to the average passages of the ships that have gone out to India on this occasion, as a matter to be relied upon at any future time?—It is all that we should have to refer to, as a question of experience, in judging of the probability of future performances of the same ships.

1185. As the result of such an expedition as this was, ships of all sorts, and captains in command of them totally inexperienced in the passage going out, with ships that always made long passages, do you think that these averages are of any value whatever, further than as applying to the then state of circumstances, and not to the general question?—It is a very important integer in our consideration, in the event of the re-employment of any ship, or supposing that we had to make a re-selection of ships. If we were going to select perhaps two or three ships out of ten or twelve, we should naturally inquire, or endeavour to inform ourselves, as to what had been the average speed of such and such a particular vessel, and we should engage her, in all probability, in preference to another as to which we were not so well satisfied; but I think that a great deal more is due to the management of the captain than to either the lines of the vessel, or anything else, in getting his ship quickly to her port of destination.

1186. Did the Admiralty place at your disposal any information which they had relating to the Transport Board to guide you in taking up the ships?—I have not seen anything of the kind; I have only seen printed returns of the different vessels (principally steamers) engaged in transport service.

1187. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] They may have given that information to Captain Shepherd or to other directors without your knowing it?—Certainly.

1188. Mr. *Crawford.*] Do you not think that you know just as much about it at the India House as they do at the Admiralty?—I should be very sorry to say anything that would appear like drawing a comparison between the East India House and the Admiralty.

1189. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Do you not think that the expedition which you sent out to India was, as compared with the expedition to the Crimea, better planned and better carried out in every respect?—I can scarcely consider that a fair question to me, who carried out the details of the expedition; but public opinion is very strongly in favour of what we have done.

1190. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Will you have the kindness to furnish to the Committee a statement exhibiting the number of troops embarked for India, giving the dates of their departure, and also the number which, by the last accounts, have arrived in safety?—I will.

Veneris, 26° die Februarii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Adderley.	Mr. Horsman.
Mr. Byng.	Sir Charles Napier.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Mr. Osborne.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Captain Vivian.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Willoughby.
Viscount Goderich.	

SIR DE LACY EVANS, G.C.B., IN THE CHAIR.

Ross Donnelly Mangles, Esquire, called in; and Examined.

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1191. *Chairman.*] YOU are Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company?—I am.

1192. I believe the first accounts that reached the court of any serious appearances of disloyalty in the Bengal army were about the beginning of May; the occurrences which took place in the latter part of January, or the beginning of February, appeared to have been of a very grave character?—I do not like to rely upon memory; I suppose you have the despatches before you.

1193. First, as to the state of affairs in the garrison of Barrackpore in January and February, there were accounts received in this country that at least four battalions of native troops were in a state of conspiracy, that 300 men met at night, somewhat in disguise, for the purpose of concocting an attack upon the Presidency, and that those four regiments meditated an attack upon Calcutta, and the seizure by surprise of Fort William; that occurred, I believe, either in the very last days of January, or the beginning of February?—I have heard all those circumstances stated since; I do not think there is any proof as to the existence of a conspiracy to attack Calcutta.

1194. It is stated in the despatches of General Hearsey to the Governor-general, that an individual sepoy stated that there was a meeting upon a plain of sepoys in disguise, with their faces muffled up, so that he did not know who they were; was any part of the force under General Hearsey disarmed during that month, or in the two subsequent months?—It was at a considerably later period when he reported that he could not answer for their fidelity any longer, and then they were disarmed, but it was at a considerably later period; I do not carry the date in my head.

1195. You perhaps recollect that a late Governor-general, in the House of Lords, on the 19th of May, inquired with some anxiety what reinforcements were being about to be sent out on the 19th of May, that the President of the Board of Control declared that he saw no reason to apprehend any danger to the security of our Eastern Empire, and that a certain number, from 4,000 to 8,000 men, were about to be sent out?—I remember (not as to date) that Lord Ellenborough on several occasions has spoken in that tone, and I believe that the President of the Board of Control also spoke in the House of Commons to the effect stated.

1196. The telegram that arrived regarding the events at Meerut and at Delhi reached you I suppose on the night of the 27th of June?—The night of the 27th of June, I believe it was.

1197. Did the Court of Directors take steps for the purpose of acting upon that information on the 28th?—I think that I summoned a Court on the 28th, and it met on the 29th.

1198. Was there anything in the shape of political alarm felt by the Court of Directors in regard to the nature of this intelligence?—We felt it to be a very serious matter; a very alarming matter, no doubt; though neither we, nor any one at that time, had any adequate notion of the extent to which the mutiny would go, still we felt it to be a matter of great importance, and of great peril.

1199. What

1199. What was the amount of the force which you deemed adequate, and for which you applied to the Government, to meet this momentous state of things?—I think, if I remember rightly, that we applied at that time for four regiments of infantry, and two regiments of cavalry.

1200. I presume that they were entirely independent of the reinforcement of the 8,000 men, which were required to fill up the deficiencies of the establishment?—We applied for these six regiments in addition to the troops previously under dispatch to India.

1201. Did you take any measures upon that occasion, not only to accelerate the despatch of those six regiments of infantry and cavalry, but to accelerate the 8,000 men to reinforce the establishment, making in all nearly 13,000 men?—The troops for which transport was provided were upon the point of embarking, and I think some of them must have embarked; we took no measures with regard to the past, but we took the best measures that we could prospectively, and we endeavoured to engage the best vessels, both steam and sailing vessels, that we could for the transport of the additional force.

1202. It appears from some of the previous evidence that two questions arose very soon afterwards, and the first was as to the preference to be given to steam vessels or to sailing vessels going round the Cape, and secondly, with regard to the overland route?—Yes; almost immediately.

1203. Did you resolve, after a full consideration of the subject, that the troops should be sent round by the Cape, and that sailing vessels of a good class would be preferable?—No; I think the Committee will find that from the beginning we engaged some of each sort. We were not at that time so satisfied as I am now as to the great superiority of the screw steamers; the screw steamers which had made voyages to and from India previously, in the postal or other service, had not made such rapid voyages as they have since in the transport of troops, and there was not that manifest superiority in them over sailing vessels which has now become apparent. We felt also that there was a great question with regard to the supply of coals at the different stations, and that it would be vain to send out more steamers than there was coal upon the route to supply. We also believed that many of those steamers were inferior as sailing vessels to vessels which were only sailing vessels, and there always being some hazard that steamers might break down with their machinery, we thought it hazardous to trust the whole of the troops to steamers, which might, either from the failure of coal or the breaking down of the machinery, be thrown out, and be longer upon their voyage than good sailing vessels. But very early in the day I came to an arrangement with the President of the Board of Control, that we were to choose the best vessels that were offered to us, without any reference to price, whether sailing vessels or screw steamers, and we acted from the time that we received the news of the outbreak at Meerut upon that principle throughout, engaging, without reference to price, those which we believed to be the best vessels, whether screw steamers or sailing vessels, to carry out the service.

1204. And the policy of that, irrespective of price, was acceeded to by the Board of Control?—It was in the first instance. They afterwards desired explanations why we had chosen this vessel or that vessel, and why we had disregarded the price. At first it was an entire and thorough understanding, between the President of the Board of Control and myself, that I was to take up the best vessels for the service, without any regard to the relative price.

1205. At that time you rather thought it was better to send part of the troops in good steamers and part in good sailing ships round the Cape?—Yes, it was early in the day.

1206. Perhaps about the 1st of July?—Yes; we began immediately to take measures after receiving the news of the outbreak at Meerut. I cannot remember the particular days, but I think our first Court, after receiving the news of the outbreak at Meerut, was on the 29th of June, and we had Courts or committees for the purpose of taking up vessels almost every other day after that.

1207. Mr. *Adderley*.] For how long?—For a long time, till we had got rid of those troops

1208. For a fortnight?—For a considerable time.

1209. You do not mean through the whole month of July?—No; but I do not remember the precise dates on which the several Courts and committees were held.

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1210. *Chairman.*] This was a matter of very great consequence, was it not?—I think so, and I wish it to be recorded, that the President of the Board of Control did not interfere with the taking up of the ships in such a manner as to prevent the best ships being taken up; he merely required, after they had been taken up, and after he had sanctioned their several engagements, that we should enter into a special explanation of why we had chosen the dearer ships rather than the cheaper (which I thought was unnecessary, and objected to); but he did not interfere to prevent their being taken up, nor did anything that he did in that respect interfere with the dispatch of the service.

1211. The Committee have reason to infer that about the time you are now alluding to, namely, the very early days of July, suggestions were made by Captain Shepherd, and by Mr. Mason also, which were adopted by you and the Court of Directors, that it would be expedient as soon as possible to take advantage of the overland route?—Yes.

1212. Upon that did the Court decide that a communication should be made by the chairs to the Board of Control, with the view of obtaining the concurrence of the Board to that arrangement?—Yes, there was a considerable discussion in the Court and at the Board with regard to the superiority of the overland route, and the propriety at any rate of taking advantage of that route to some extent. I do not believe that it was ever contemplated to send the whole body of the troops by that route, but that some of the troops should be sent by that route; and I was instructed by the Court to mention the matter, and to express the opinion of the Court to the President of the Board of Control; it was not upon one occasion only that I received such instructions, but the matter was frequently referred to and urged upon me as chairman by my colleagues, and urged by me as chairman upon the President of the Board of Control.

1213. In former evidence it was stated, that on three successive occasions you made that representation by the instruction of the Court of Directors to the Board of Control verbally?—Whether it was made three, four, or five times, I cannot say; but I think it was much more likely to be the larger than the smaller number; indeed, I have a strong recollection that on many occasions, both at the Board of Control, and when I met the President in the House of Commons, I urged upon him the opinion of the Court of Directors in regard to the overland route.

1214. What might have been the cause of the Court wishing this communication to be made to the Board of Control verbally, rather than officially?—From the first, I understood from the President of the Board of Control that there were political reasons, of a European character, which interfered with the feasibility of sending the troops by the overland route, and that it was of no use to press the matter upon Her Majesty's Government, for that their minds were quite made up against taking that route; and what I represented to the Court of Directors from the beginning to the end was this, that I was always stopped at once by the President of the Board of Control saying, that there was no use in urging it, and that it would serve no purpose to press the opinion of the Court in that respect, as the Government were decidedly of opinion that that route could not, with reference to European considerations, be adopted. But I beg to state, that all I have to say on that subject is to be found in that last letter, which I may call the winding-up letter, dated the 1st of October (No. 101), signed by me and Sir Frederick Currie, to the President of the Board of Control, in which we distinctly state, as plainly as language can state, what had passed according to our recollection between him and us upon the subject; and if I were to give any amount of evidence before this Committee, I could not state the case in plainer or stronger language than it is stated there.

1215. I perceive, in a letter from the President of the Board of Control to the Chairman of the East India House, dated the 4th of September, the following sentence: "Thus the advantage, in point of time, in favour of the new route, even if no part of the arrangement disappointed your expectations, would be little more than a fortnight." Do you consider that at that juncture, considering the extreme difficulties in which our troops were placed in India, that a fortnight sooner or later was a matter of little importance in the arrival of the reinforcements?—I think we stated in our letter that the troops sent by the overland route would reach Bombay in the last week in November; they would have reached Kurachee a few days sooner. I think it would have been of great importance if the troops had been sent at that moment overland.

1216. By

1216. By the gain of one fortnight?—I think the gain of a fortnight at that period, would have been a great advantage.

1217. Would the gain have been only a fortnight, do you suppose?—We made our calculations in the preceding letter, to which that which you have quoted is an answer; and I have every reason to believe that that calculation was a correct one. It would have been something more than a fortnight, I think.

1218. Are you aware that the 94th Regiment arrived from Portsmouth at Kurachee within a period of 37 days?—But then a steamer was ready in the Red Sea to carry them on. In this case, if the Committee will look to the letter to which that letter of the President of the Board of Control is an answer, they will find that we went into the whole calculation; the time that would be occupied in writing to Bombay for steamers, the coaling and preparing at Bombay, and in coming to the Red Sea, and there preparing and coaling to take the troops on; whereas in this case, (I think it was the "Oriental" which carried on that regiment), the vessel was already in the Red Sea, and by previous arrangements ready to carry the troops on without any delay. There is no question, of course, that when once you have made your arrangements, the troops could be sent to India within a fraction of the time, as rapidly as ordinary passengers go by the mail steamers; but the great point was, how long it would take us to prepare the Government of Bombay to send out those vessels; that is to say, to get them ready and dispatch them to the Red Sea. That was much more the point than the mere question of time in which the passage would be actually made, after the arrangements had been completed.

1219. May the Committee not conclude that this delay, which you anticipated would take place in preparing the Government of Bombay, and which would reduce the arrival of the troops to a little more than a fortnight earlier, would necessarily only affect the first detachments?—No doubt.

1220. And not the second or the third?—No; but, on the other hand, the second trip would not have been so important as the first, because our reinforcements were pouring into India at that time round the Cape. I mean by the time that the second trip would have taken place; and therefore the second trip would not have been of that importance which the first would have been.

1221. I am afraid by the accounts that our reinforcements have not sufficiently poured in even to this day, and therefore I think that you are rather assuming a more complete result from the reinforcemenes pouring in than the actual results prove?—There is a very large body of troops now in India.

1222. You are aware that we had a large force at the time to which we are now alluding at Malta; an extra garrison by one or two battalions at the Ionian Islands; and also one extra battalion at Gibraltar?—I did not know that.

1223. You did not know the number of troops at Malta?—No; but this I know, that a regiment has recently been sent from Gibraltar, and another regiment from Malta to Bombay. That is the last reinforcement that has been sent.

1224. I suppose you are familiar with the distances; supposing that we had a large force at Malta at that time, am I right in supposing that the distance from Malta to Bombay and Kurachee is respectively about 3,600 and 3,700 miles only?—I am not familiar with nautical distances; but the fact is, at that time, whether the troops had been sent from England or from Malta, what would have regulated necessarily the arrival of the troops in India, was the period indispensably necessary to enable the Government of Bombay to send a steamer to Suez.

1225. Is the distance from Malta to Bombay or Kurachee about 4,000 miles?—I cannot say.

1226. Can you say whether the distance by an ordinary clipper is 14,000 miles?—I think that is generally assumed as the distance to India.

1227. Then the one route was 10,000 miles shorter than the other?—Yes.

1228. Did you receive at the Court of Directors any communications which led you to suppose that the Viceroy of Egypt was unfavourable to allowing the use of his territory for the transport of our troops?—At that time, at the beginning of the discussion with regard to the overland route, I think that we had no information as to the feelings of the Viceroy, but at a subsequent period we certainly heard that he was not unfavourable to it, and that he would be quite willing not only to permit, but to facilitate it.

1229. What did you find to be the feeling and disposition of the Viceroy with regard to the troops?—The information was not official; I think some of the

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agents of the Peninsular and Oriental Company wrote to represent the feelings of the Viceroy on the subject, and those letters were communicated, if I recollect rightly, privately to me, and other communications were made to me from parties who professed to know the feelings of the Viceroy.

1230. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] At what time was that?—I cannot remember as to the dates, but I recollect that a gentleman called Green Bey, who is an agent, as I understand, of the Viceroy for the transport service across Egypt, called upon me at the India House, and represented that the Viceroy was quite willing to give every assistance in his power, but I think that that was at a considerably later date.

1231. *Chairman.*] Had you any reason to conclude, or was it reported officially, or demi-officially, to the Court of Directors, or did you hear whether our ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, at Constantinople, applied, immediately on hearing of the occurrences at Delhi and at Merut, to the Sultan for permission to use the overland route?—I am under a difficulty upon that point. I do not remember whether I heard that or anything on the subject in the Secret Department, which I am bound by oath not to divulge.

1232. Viscount *Goderich.*] Can you tell the Committee when you were first instructed by the Court of Directors to communicate with the President of the Board of Control upon the subject of sending the troops overland?—I think at the first or the second Court after we received the news of the outbreak at Merut; that is my impression.

1233. I understood you to state that your opinion upon the subject is distinctly conveyed in the letter of the 1st of October?—Yes.

1234. As to what passed between you and the President of the Board of Control?—Yes; that letter was written after the President had stated in the letter, to which that was an answer, of the 26th of September, his own impressions as to the nature of our conferences upon the subject of the overland route, and therefore it became essential for the vindication of my own reputation and that of the Deputy-chairman, for I beg the Committee to observe that it is not my memory only, but the memory of the Deputy-chairman also, who signed the letter, who speaks for himself as well as I speak for myself; it became necessary, I say, to justify myself to my colleagues as soon as the President of the Board of Control had denied that that was the impression he had received from our conversations. It became necessary that we should state distinctly what our impressions were, and therefore I tried to express them in as few words and in as plain language as I could command, and that is the result of our recollection of what had passed.

1235. To the best of your recollection, you stated to Mr. Vernon Smith, early in July, that you were instructed by the Court of Directors to draw his attention to their opinion that it was very important that the troops should be sent by the overland route?—Yes; I stated to him that it was the opinion of the Court of Directors, and urged it upon him.

1236. And that you were directed by them to tell him so?—Yes; I have no doubt that I did tell him so.

1237. You understood him to say, in reply, that it was the opinion of the Government that, for political reasons, that route ought not to be adopted?—I understood him to say that, not on one occasion only, but on many occasions. Whenever the subject was adverted to, the discussion was stopped by the President stating that it was of no use pressing the matter, for the Government had made up their minds.

1238. In the letter to which your letter of the 1st of October is an answer, I observe that the President of the Board of Control takes exception to your speaking privately to him in the name of the Court of Directors, because he states that he has often found, in his intercourse with the Chairs, that they had been entirely mistaken in what they believed to be the decision of the majority of the directors. Are you quite certain that on that occasion you were not mistaken in regard to the wishes of the Court of Directors?—I apprehend that the President of the Board of Control, in that remark, does not refer to me personally. I am quite sure that I was not mistaken with regard to the opinion of the Court of Directors.

1239. Can you tell the Committee when, in your opinion, the troops would have arrived in India by the overland route, supposing the President of the Board of Control had acceded to your proposition in the beginning of July?—

The

The Committee may arrive at that result, and I would rather that they would arrive at it in this way, by taking the letter in which we make a calculation of the time, and if they will apply that to the date mentioned in the question, they will see when they would have arrived. We made them arrive at that period in the last week in November by the overland route, and if they alter the date of departure, and allow the same period of time, they will see when they would have arrived according to our calculation, if despatched at an earlier date.

1240. How soon do you suppose it was possible that the troops could have proceeded by the overland route from this country, after your first communication with Mr. Vernon Smith on this subject?—That is a question that the War Office could answer better than I can; we had no power; we had merely to provide the means of transport, the War Office get ready the troops.

1241. I suppose I may conclude from that answer, that as it is stated in this letter, that if orders were sent out to Bombay by the mail of the 10th of September, the troops might have arrived at Bombay in the last week of November, if such orders had been sent out by the mail of the 10th of July, the troops might have arrived there at the end of September?—Yes; they would have arrived at the end of September.

1242. If they arrived at Bombay at the end of September, at what period would they have arrived at Calcutta?—That would have taken a few days longer; from a week to 10 days longer, I suppose.

1243. Mr. *Horsman.*] It has been stated that almost immediately on your hearing of these disturbances in India, at the first meeting of the Court of Directors the propriety of a representation to the Government that it would be proper to dispatch the troops overland was discussed?—Yes, I think so. I said the first or the second meeting; I think it was immediately afterwards, but I do not remember the day.

1244. You received instructions, then, to make that communication to the President of the Board of Control?—Yes.

1245. There was no record of those instructions?—No.

1246. It has been stated that the reason why those instructions were not conveyed in writing, there being no record of them, was, that it was a matter that might be considered as embarrassing to the Government if an official application were made, and it was decided that it should be done privately, and through the Chairs?—Yes, according to the best of my recollection, it was so.

1247. Was this mode of making communications through the Chairs, without any official record, a very usual mode of transacting business between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control?—Very usual.

1248. I observe that in the letter of the President to you, of the 18th of September, he says, "These interviews are eminently useful between the Chairman and Deputy-chairman, who originate, and the President of the Board, who finally sanctions all public acts of the Indian Administration. They are intended to avoid constant collision between the Court and the Board by previous arrangement, and to smooth the passage of measures through the Court"?—Just so.

1249. Therefore what you did on that occasion was consistent with the usual practice, and was not adopted by you on that occasion for the first time?—Certainly not.

1250. Subsequently that route was adopted by the Government?—Yes.

1251. Previous to its adoption you say that you think that you heard through some of the agents of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Packet Company that the views of the Viceroy of Egypt had been ascertained, and that he was favourable to that route being taken?—Yes; I think I had by that time seen Green Bey.

1252. *Chairman.*] Is he an Englishman?—Yes; Green is his name, and Bey is his Egyptian title.

1253. Mr. *Horsman.*] Was it in consequence of your learning that that you renewed your application to the Government to adopt that route?—Yes, I think it was, and we then, I think, urged upon the Government that at any rate small detachments of troops might be sent by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels on each trip. The first batch that was sent, I think, was a body of 200 men from Malta, to reinforce the garrison at Aden.

1254. The application that you made at that time was an official one, in writing?—Yes.

1255. Had that been preceded by any private communication between the Chairs and the President?—I dare say that it had, most likely, but we were

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constantly discussing the matter off and on, I urging the opinion of the Court, and the President of the Board stating that the Government were not disposed to allow that route to be taken.

1255.* At the time that that official communication was made to the President of the Board of Control, was the Court unanimous?—Yes, I think they were.

1256. Originally there was some difference of opinion, was there not?—No; I can hardly say that: there might have been some difference, but no difference of opinion that led to any division.

1257. The instructions that were given to you at the outset to communicate with the President of the Board of Control when those verbal communications took place, were given by the Court of Directors without any division?—Yes, with the general acquiescence of the Court.

1258. Throughout, and to the end, they were of the same mind generally?—Yes, I should say so.

1259. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you know that Lieutenant-colonel Fraser, who was employed to transport those two cavalry regiments during the Crimean war?—I have seen him, I think.

1260. Did you see the letter that he wrote to Mr. Peel in August, suggesting the overland route?—I think I did.

1261. He was very strongly in favour of it, was he not?—I believe he was.

1262. Was there any communication from Lord Elphinstone, or from Lord Canning, early in the revolt, suggesting the overland route?—No; I do not remember it. I recollect that Lord Elphinstone has several times expressed his regret that the overland route had not been adopted, but I do not recollect it early in the day, certainly not officially; I am speaking now of his private letters.

1263. *Chairman.*] But he did, in his private letters, express his regret several times?—Yes.

1264. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you know whether there was not a suggestion from Lord Elphinstone to Lord Canning, begging that a steamer might be sent after the mail, which had started, to catch her at Aden, in order to bring earlier news of the Merut revolt?—I think there was.

1265. All that time Lord Elphinstone did not send home, suggesting the overland route, did he?—I think not; I do not wish to speak with certainty.

1266. I see that Lord Canning wrote to you on the 7th of August?—Yes; but that letter would have arrived in England after we had begun to take that route, I think.

1267. *Chairman.*] About that period, what was the time of letters arriving from Calcutta; was it 28 days?—About that.

1268. Captain *Vivian.*] When did the "Bentinck" arrive at Suez; about the 21st of August?—About that time; a little later I think.—Mr. *Mason.*] About the 28th.

1269. Captain *Vivian.*] It was evident from that letter; do you not think that Lord Canning expected that the overland route would have been adopted, and that the "Bentinck" might meet the troops when she arrived at Suez?—Yes, he probably was under that impression; I wish to point out to the Committee that expression in Mr. Vernon Smith's letter of the 2d of September 1857, at the end of the penultimate paragraph: "even if political reasons, of which Her Majesty's Government alone can be judges, should not prevent the undertaking." That expression in his letter strongly corroborates, in my opinion, what I have already said with regard to the real obstacle to the using of that route of communication.

1270. Captain *Vivian.*] In short, it was entirely owing to the President of the Board of Control having told you, or implied that there was a political difficulty, which prevented you from pressing more urgently on the Government at first, the overland route?—Yes.

1271. Mr. *Crawford.*] Would the recommendation which the Court of Directors instructed the Chairs to make to the President of the Board of Control, on the 29th of June, that the troops should be sent overland, have been officially made, but for fear of embarrassing the Government?—Yes, I think so.

1272. And it would have been the unanimous wish of the Court?—No division having taken place, it is difficult to say whether it would have been the unanimous wish, but it would have been the general wish of the Court, certainly.

1273. It

1273. It is understood that the Government gave the Court of Directors a *carte blanche* to take up ships; but it appears by the documents before the Committee that the assent of the Board of Control was required to each contract which you made with shipowners?—Yes.

1274. Then what is the meaning of a *carte blanche*, if you were not to have absolute authority in taking up the ships?—What I understood when the *carte blanche* was given was, that the matter was left to us, and that assent would be given as a matter of course; as I understood the *carte blanche*, it certainly was intended that we were to act as sole masters of the occasion, and that the President of the Board of Control would sanction whatever we did in that spirit.

1275. Then it must have been a matter of some surprise to the court to find afterwards that the exercise of their powers, under the *carte blanche*, was a matter of question, and was inquired into?—Yes; no doubt a matter of great surprise to me, and of some vexation.

1276. The Government claimed credit for having given you a *carte blanche*, but they did not practically allow you the exercise of it?—No; but as stated in my previous answer, I am bound to do this justice to Mr. Vernon Smith, that he did not interfere so as to prevent the business going forward; he merely required an explanation afterwards; he gave his sanction, but he required us, which I thought was vexatious and not in the spirit of our understanding, to give an explanation as to why we had taken this ship, and not that.

1277. Had you any evidence on the 29th of June as to the amount of steam shipping available at the port of Bombay to be sent to Suez?—No, I think not; we probably might have made a very good guess as to what ships were there. Some of them, I apprehend, had then been sent round to Calcutta, with troops from the Persian Gulf.

1278. And also to Mauritius and the Cape?—Yes; I do not recollect the precise date of their despatch to Mauritius and to the Cape, but we could have made a pretty good guess as to what ships were there.

1279. You cannot say when the mail arrived at Bombay, on the 4th or 5th of August, which would have been the mail by which any message directing ships to be sent to Suez would have been forwarded, that there would have been then any ships available to have gone to Suez?—I think there would have been some.

1280. Private steamers, or Company's steamers?—Both.

1281. Sir *Charles Napier*.] It appears that the Directors of the Company wrote a letter, dated the 14th of July, to the Board of Control, in which they say, "that an additional force of six regiments of infantry should be immediately dispatched to India by the most speedy means of conveyance which may be found to be available for that purpose." I see no reply to this letter?—Whether there is a reply among those papers I know not, but I know that the six regiments were sent.

1282. Were they sent in the speediest manner?—I think they were sent almost entirely round the Cape by steamers.

1283. What was the date of the departure of the first screw vessel that sailed with troops to India; I do not speak of those that took out reinforcements?—The "Caledonia," on the 26th of July, appears to have been the first that sailed.

1284. In the letter dated the 31st of August the Directors state that it is most desirable that reinforcements should be sent out by Egypt; and then Mr. Vernon Smith informs you, under date of the 2d of September, that it is difficult to make this arrangement, that you had better go on and send them round by the Cape of Good Hope?—No; I think on the 2d of September he desires us to make a calculation.

1285. I see that it was on the 4th of September that he tells you directly that you must "take immediate measures for obtaining freight to India," and to dispatch it thither. What reply did you give to that; did you urge him again upon the subject?—I do not remember, but you will find the reply if there was a reply.

1286. I see a reply here signed by Mr. Howell, dated the 8th of September, in which he states, "The means of transit through Egypt are sufficient, they considered, to admit of the men being conveyed from Alexandria to Suez in the same time as the other passengers"?—Yes.

1287. You stated that you were not aware that steam vessels were preferable to sailing vessels, in the first instance?—I do not think that I stated exactly

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that. I stated that it was then not so manifest as it is now that steamers were so superior to sailing vessels; that some of the screw vessels, the very vessels which we afterwards engaged, had made by no means rapid passages, not such rapid passages as have been made of late by screw vessels to and from India; and therefore there was not at that time that strong inducement to prefer screw vessels to clippers of established character which there is now; indeed, I may say that one or two of those vessels, the "James Baines" and the "Champion of the Seas," have actually made, to the best of my knowledge and belief, quicker passages to and from Australia than any screw vessel has ever made.

1288. What steps did you take to inform yourself of that?—We knew what the time occupied by some of those screw vessels had been in their voyages to India and back.

1289. Did you ever see that paper (*a paper being handed to the Witness*)?—No, I never saw it before; but some of these passages I see were by no means peculiarly rapid ones; there are instances of 88 days, 88 days, and 87 days, in three cases.

1290. Mr. *Osborne.*] With reference to that last question, the general impression at the India House, previously to the recent occurrences, was in favour, was it not, of dispatching the troops, both with respect to expense and expedition, by fast sailing vessels in preference to steam?—No, I do not wish that to be implied; I think not; I think the general impression was, in favour of the steamers, but that there were many things to be considered; for instance, there was the quantity of coal available at the different stations, and there was the hazard of the steamers breaking down, and the probability that the steamer after she had broken down would be inferior to an ordinary sailing vessel.

1291. But both Captain Shepherd and Mr. Mason have stated that that was the impression among them till these recent occurrences?—My own notion and impression was, that we ought to try both; to get the fastest sailing clippers that we could, and the best steamers that we could, and to try them both, but to rely exclusively upon neither; that was the feeling on my mind.

1292. You had no decided feeling of preference to the one over the other?—Yes. If steamers could command coal to a certainty, and if we could have been sure that the machinery would not break down, probably they would have beaten any but the very fastest clippers; but as I have already mentioned to the Committee, the extraordinary passages which some of those vessels had made to Australia, made me believe, though the result has turned out otherwise, they would probably beat the steamers to and from India.

1293. You are alluding, are you not, to Mr. Lindsay's contract ships?—Yes; I speak of those that had made indifferent voyages at a previous date.

1294. Was the advisability of sending out troops by line-of-battle ships ever made the subject of discussion by the Directors?—Yes.

1295. Did you ever make any formal application for line-of-battle ships?—No; but I wrote to the President privately.

1296. That letter does not appear here?—No; none of our private letters appear here.

1297. *Chairman.*] When was that?—It was very early in the day.

1298. Mr. *Osborne.*] What was his answer?—Sir Charles Wood says that he has no ships for you, or something to that effect.

1299. In consequence of this private communication all further application for line-of-battle ships dropped?—Yes.

1300. There was no formal application on the part of the India House to the Admiralty?—No.

1301. You had no communication with the Admiralty on that subject whatever?—No.

1302. *Chairman.*] Are you authorised to make applications formally to the Admiralty?—No; we have no power of corresponding except through the Board of Control.

1303. Mr. *Osborne.*] But in a matter of that emergency you would, I presume, put aside the usual routine?—No, I do not know that we should, because it would only have caused the delay of a day or two; I wrote to the President of the Board of Control to ask whether we could have any line-of-battle ships; several of my colleagues thought that they would not merely take out large bodies of men very speedily, but that the arrival in Calcutta of vessels of that size would have a good effect.

1304. Mr. *Osborne.*] Meaning a moral effect?—I am not sure that I wrote to that effect to the President, though that was the opinion in the Court; but what I am sure of is, that I did write to ask whether we could have any line-of-battle ships to take troops out, and the answer was, that Sir Charles Wood had no ships for us.

1305. You did not think the matter of such great importance as to make an official communication to the President?—No.

1306. It was merely a private note, of which you kept no copy?—Yes.

1307. With reference to this unfortunate difference of opinion between Mr. Vernon Smith and the chairman of the East India Company, can you tell me whether at these interviews Mr. Vernon Smith was alone?—Yes, always.

1308. You and Sir Frederick Currie waited upon him, but he was quite alone?—Yes.

1309. Has that always been the custom in transacting business with him?—Invariably.

1310. *Chairman.*] A question has been put to you as to this being a private letter, and whether you deemed it of importance or not; is it not the fact, that you communicated by private letter a matter of great importance?—Certainly; I did not consider it of no importance because it was in a private letter, nor could it, in fact, be properly called; it was a private letter, a demi-official letter.

1311. Mr. *Osborne.*] Are the Committee to understand that you thought it of very great importance to have line-of-battle ships?—Some of the members of the Board thought it more important than I did personally, for they had a strong feeling, as I have stated, that it was not merely that the troops might be sent out very expeditiously in line-of-battle ships, but that the arrival of such vessels in Calcutta and in Bombay would have had a strong effect upon the minds of the natives. I believed then, and I believe still, that any screw transports, or any of the first-rate clippers would have got out probably as soon.

1312. Therefore you did not think it of that importance?—Personally I did not think it of that importance.

1313. Were you not commissioned by the Court to urge it?—No, I think not; to ask it.

1314. Then the Court did not think it of great importance?—It is difficult to say, after this lapse of time, what degree of importance they attributed to it; they thought it of importance enough to ask it.

1315. Are no minutes kept of those matters?—Not of every word that passes.

1316. Not upon a great question of that sort?—I do not know that it was considered a very great question.

1317. You do not remember?—I remember the circumstance perfectly, and the whole that passed perfectly well, but I am not competent to say of how much importance the matter appeared in the minds of my colleagues.

1318. *Chairman.*] When the answer was given to you that Sir Charles Wood had no ships to give you, was that considered as putting the matter out of the question?—Yes, and I communicated that to my colleagues; I specially remember communicating it to Captain Shepherd, and there the matter stopped.

1319. Mr. *Osborne.*] Are you quite clear that the answer was that Sir Charles Wood had no ships, or that the ships were not manned?—I am quite sure that the passage was in a single line of a letter, and that it was as nearly as possibly what I have stated. I looked for the note yesterday, but could not find it, but the expression used was, that Sir Charles Wood has no ships for you, or has no ships to give, or words to that effect, as brief as that.

1320. You made no further representations?—No.

1321. In the case of the route to Suez you continued to make representations?—Yes, I did.

1322. Therefore you thought it of much more importance than the line-of-battle ships?—Much more so.

1323. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] With reference to this subject, I asked a question of Captain Shepherd with regard to the line-of-battle ships: "Were there any proposals made from the Admiralty to that effect," namely, giving you line-of-battle ships, and his answer was, "A proposal was made to the President of the Board of Control, at the same time that we talked of the overland route, whether we could have two or three line-of-battle ships; but it was not so much with a view to speed of transport. It was on the first Court day after

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after the arrival of the bad news." Is that consistent with your recollection?—It was about that time.

1324. Then, in answer to the question, "What answer did you receive to that proposal," he says, "It was a verbal answer from the President that they had no steamers available that they could give us?"—Yes, that was the answer, but it was not a verbal one. It was written in the terms that I have stated.

1325. There were two regiments sent to the Crimea, were there not, from India, overland?—Yes.

1326. Did you not suppose that you had a right, in point of fact, to have those regiments returned by the same way they went?—They had gone to England from the Crimea long before the emergency took place in India. At the time they left the Crimea there was no apprehension of any outbreak in India.

1327. Having assisted the Turkish Government in that way, at that time, did it not give you a good claim to have your troops sent out overland?—No doubt it would; but that is a matter quite out of the province of the East India Company; we could have nothing to do with any negociations with the Porte, or with any claim that we might have had upon the Sublime Porte; that was a consideration for Her Majesty's Government.

1328. With regard to merchant screw vessels, you are aware that most of the merchant screw vessels do not lift their screws, so that they are very unmanageable in the event of their breaking down?—I believed this. I did not know as to particulars, but I believed that if those steamers had broken down, they would have been in their broken down state inferior to good sailing vessels.

1329. Is it customary at the Board of Control, in taking up ships, to take the highest tender, almost irrespective of the quality of the ship as a sailer?—No; in ordinary times we look more to economy than we should do under such an emergency. The rule that we laid down for ourselves (and what I understood the President to agree to) was, that we should not look at all to the question of economy, but simply to take the best vessels. No doubt in ordinary times we should have looked much more to economy, but we should not have allowed our regard for economy to lead us to engage a bad vessel.

1330. Then the matter being placed in the hands of Captain Shepherd and Mr. Mason, I suppose you were rather surprised at having received a letter from the Board of Control, calling upon you to account for the reasons which had induced them to reject some of those ships?—I beg to state that I did not so far abandon my functions as to put the matter entirely into the hands of Captain Shepherd and Mr. Mason; both of them gave me most efficient help; but I did the best that I could do, as I was bound to do, to endeavour to find out and to select the best vessels.

1331. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Captain Shepherd stated in his evidence that the *carte blanche* had been withdrawn; do you agree as to taking up the ships?—It was not formally withdrawn, but I certainly felt very much aggrieved by what was done.

1332. Question 638 is, "In fact, the *carte blanche* was recalled," and the answer is, "Almost equal to that"?—It was not formally recalled, but I certainly felt very much aggrieved, after what I believed to be the understanding between the President and myself, that he should have required me to give any explanation as to why I chose one vessel rather than another, because I thought that confidence was reposed in me and in the Court of Directors that we should choose the best vessels, and that there the matter was to end.

1333. There would be no want of confidence shown in the Chancellor of the Exchequer in asking him to put certain items of expenditure before the public, and explaining how the money had been spent?—But the President of the Board had all the items, all the names of the ships, and the times at which they had been taken up; what he called upon us to do was to state why we preferred ship A, which was offered to us at 40*l.* a man, to ship B, that was offered at 35*l.* a man, and after the *carte blanche* had been given to us, I certainly felt aggrieved at being called upon to explain.

1334. He explained that he wished for information, that there might be some reasons placed on the records of the office?—Yes.

1335. Explaining that it was not from any doubt that the Court had done the best they could, but simply that there might be some reasons on record for departing from the usual custom?—Something to that effect.

1336. It

1336. It is usual, is it not, when you send up any proposals for expenditure, to explain it in a letter?—It is the ordinary custom, but it was not an ordinary case.

1337. What the President of the Board of Control said was, we will not discuss the question of expenditure so as to cause any delay, but he never said that afterwards he would not wish you to send him some account?—No; I wish to do the President the amplest justice, and to say that he never interfered in such a way as to prevent the public service from going on. The explanations which he required were subsequently to his having given his sanction. But he wrote a letter, which I took back in my hand to the President; it was written in what I thought, under the circumstances, unfair terms; the expression was that the President would not refuse to sanction such and such ships being taken up, and I took that letter back to the President, and I said, "These are not the terms in which you should have written to me after you had given me a *carte blanche*; it implies that if it were not for considerations of the public service, you would refuse."

1338. You thought it showed suspicion?—Yes.

1339. A subsequent letter showed that no suspicion was intended?—A subsequent letter explained it; but that did not remove, I am bound to say, the disagreeable impression from my mind that the *carte blanche*, after having been granted, had been grudgingly granted.

1340. At any rate, the letter appeared intended to produce that effect upon your mind?—I suppose it did.

1341. In your discussions in the Court of Directors about the Suez route, you had no written report at all, had you, nor any motion before them?—No.

1342. Therefore you were not aware what Directors were for it, and what Directors were against it?—I am not aware that any Directors were against it.

1343. Did you distinctly state to the President of the Board of Control when you conferred with him, that it was the opinion of the Court of Directors that the Suez route should be adopted?—Yes.

1344. You rather hesitated on that point before?—I am not aware that I did. What I have said, and what I repeat is, that I cannot state my impression of the circumstance plainer or shorter than they are stated in the last letter on the subject, signed by me and Sir F. Currie.

1345. The President of the Board of Control is always alone when you go to consult him?—Yes.

1346. You are always accompanied by the Deputy-chairman, are you not?—Yes.

1347. Are you aware that several of the Presidents of the Board of Control have represented the inconvenience in matters of this sort, of there being two gentlemen from the Court of Directors, the President being alone?—I never heard of that.

1348. Did you ever hear that a proposal was made that one of the secretaries should be present, or some other person with the President?—Never.

1349. Have there not been occasions when the Chairman and the Deputy-chairman have conferred with the President, and subsequently, on submitting their views to the Court, they have found that the Court disagreed with the Chairman and Deputy-chairman?—I have no doubt that there have been such cases.

1350. In every year does not one or two cases of that sort occur?—I dare say they do, but not frequently. When the Chairman and Deputy-chairman are discreet people, they are ordinarily acquainted with the opinions of their colleagues.

1351. Has it not happened since you have been Chairman or Deputy-chairman?—It has not happened since I was Chairman, I think.

1352. Have not drafts been returned to us at the Board of Control after being agreed to between the President and the Chairs, which have been refused by the Court?—It may be so.

1353. Therefore, without you distinctly say that you represent the unanimous opinion of the Court, the President would not be certain that the point was pressed by the Court?—There might have been some difficulty in the President's mind on that ground, if the matter had not been stated and urged upon him more than once.

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1354. If you thought the matter of very great importance, and urged it several times, you did not put this in writing as a formal motion for a whole month afterwards?—The reason why that was not done has been stated.

1355. You said that Lord Elphinstone expressed his regret that the Suez route had not been adopted?—Yes, I have seen expressions of regret in private letters.

1356. To you?—Yes.

1357. You could not state at all the grounds of his opinion, or at what time he expressed that opinion?—No; but I think it was some time early in the day, comparatively early, not at the outset.

1358. Suppose troops had been sent out on the 10th July, what number of men do you calculate could have arrived by the end of September at Bombay?—That must entirely depend upon the number of steam vessels that the Government of Bombay could have forwarded to the Red Sea.

1359. In the beginning of July you must have had some calculation as to what the amount of troops would be that you could land?—The Court thought that if one or two regiments, or even a smaller number, one regiment, could be sent, that the effect of their arriving so rapidly, and by that route, would have made a considerable impression upon the minds of the natives.

1360. In the letter which you wrote to the President of the Board of Control, you only proposed to send troops to Bombay, I think; did you ever contemplate sending them to Calcutta?—It would have depended entirely upon whether we had thought that the authorities in Calcutta could have sent steamers to meet us, I do not think they could, and therefore I presume that we did contemplate Bombay and Kurrachee in the first instance.

1361. As it turned out, the troops were not wanted at Bombay and Kurrachee. I mean that there was no detriment to the public service in consequence of their not being there at the end of September?—It has so happened, no doubt; but Bombay has been in a very touch-and-go state upon several occasions, and Lord Elphinstone sent off most energetically to Mauritius, and got half a regiment from that colony, and again to the Cape; and I remember that half a regiment from Mauritius arrived at a moment of great emergency, and great peril.

1362. *Chairman.*] I believe that that regiment prevented the insurrection which took place at Kolapoor from spreading?—I believe it did; it arrived most opportunely.

1363. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] What was the date of the Kolapoor mutiny?—

1364. You did not contemplate at that time sending troops to Calcutta?—I think not.

1365. There could have been only one trip, could there, to Calcutta—suppose that on the 10th of July the steamers could only have made one trip before the arrival of the great mass of the reinforcements round the Cape?—I suppose not.

1366. Therefore it would have depended upon the number that could have been shipped at once from Suez; supposing transports to have been sent from Bombay in consequence of orders from the Government of England, they might have sent those troops to Calcutta?—True.

1367. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You have stated, that by the directions of the Court, you communicated verbally to the President of the Board of Control their opinion, that the troops should be sent overland, and having done so, did you communicate the President's reply to the Court?—Yes, I did.

1368. To the effect which you have before stated?—Yes.

1369. In making the suggestion, did not the Court make a reservation of the political question involved in the arrangement?—Yes, they certainly did.

1370. They considered their duty performed in making the suggestion for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, who alone could be aware whether any political obstacles existed?—Certainly.

1371. You stated, that the Pacha of Egypt was favourable to the transit of troops overland. His Highness's consent was not, it may be presumed, the only difficulty?—I understood that the consent of his suzerain was also necessary.

1372. An allusion has been made to the differences which sometimes have arisen between the Chairs and the President of the Board of Control, arising out of

of the questions, and agreed to between them, the Court afterwards dissenting; may not those frequently arise from the system of previous communications, at which stage of the proceedings the Court is not consulted?—No doubt; it is the same thing.

1373. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] When the contracts were taken up for troops, the War Office wished them to be sent out very quickly. In May, did not the President of the Board of Control propose to you either to break those contracts, or to get rid of them at any expense, in order to send the troops out quickly?—I have no recollection of it; I should say certainly not.

1374. Mr. *Byng.*] Do you remember when Her Majesty's Government first changed their opinion with regard to the transmission of troops by the overland route?—It was late; the Committee will find a letter among the papers, stating that they proposed to send them.

1375. By a letter written in August?—No; it was our letter. There is a letter in which the Government say, that they propose to send 200 men to reinforce the garrison at Aden. That was the first letter, I think.

1376. Have you any doubt if, when you first suggested the practicability of the overland route, the Board of Control had acceded to it, there would have been any difficulty in transmitting troops?—No, I think not; but I am bound to say that I think, although that point was not raised at the time by the Board of Control, that if troops had been sent at that very hot season through Egypt, there would have been very considerable suffering on the part of the troops, and some considerable loss of life.

1377. Then it would have been dangerous to send them?—It would have cost life; but it would have caused their rapid appearance in India, and they would have been of such eminent service that I think the risk might well have been run; I think there would have been that risk.

1378. You think that the risk might have been incurred, considering that it was a grave emergency?—Yes.

1379. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] Have you formed any opinion with regard to the future reliefs of the army, as to which route would be preferable, the overland route or by screw steamers, or sailing transports, taking into consideration the question of expense?—I think that in all ordinary times there is no question whatever that they should go out in sailing transports. When our European force in India is quite sufficient, and when there is no apprehension of danger, certainly they should go out in sailing vessels; I believe that the men acquire a great deal, if they are under good officers, of discipline and drill on board a vessel, and I do not see that there is any object in sending out raw recruits in that haste, except under circumstances of such emergency that every white face is an object.

1380. Have you seen the report of Colonel Fraser on the subject, in which he gives an estimate of the expense of transport round the Cape as 22 *l.* per man, and he estimates the cost round the Cape as higher than that of the overland route; do you think that correct?—Certainly not; it is very much lower. I think we pay upon the average about 15 *l.* a man round the Cape, from 12 *l.* to 15 *l.*; we pay 40 *l.* for the overland passage now.

1381. He estimates it at 22 *l.* a man round the Cape, and 17 *l.* per man by Suez?—He very nearly doubles the expense round the Cape, and about halves the expense through Egypt.

1382. In a case of emergency, which route should you prefer?—I should prefer the overland route. Supposing you had made arrangements by which you had sufficient tonnage at Suez to carry them on with rapidity, and certainly it would be very undesirable that the troops should be detained in Egypt for want of means to carry them on; suppose that you had the means, by an organised system, of carrying them on from Suez, there is no question that, in an emergency, the overland route is very much the better.

1383. Sir *Charles Napier.*] When Sir Charles Wood communicated to you that he had no ships to give you, are you aware that he had just paid off the Channel squadron?—It was not Sir Charles Wood, but Mr. Vernon Smith, who told me what Sir Charles Wood had said. I do not know anything about the Channel squadron.

1384. If the Channel squadron had not been paid off, could the reliefs for the

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the four regiments have been embarked immediately?—I do not know what relation there is between that and paying off the Channel squadron.

1385. They would have been ready, and had the vessels been ready, could the reliefs have been embarked immediately?—I suppose they could; very shortly, at any rate.

1386. And much more quickly than they were embarked?—No, I think not; we got the screw steamer very quickly.

1387. If the Channel squadron had been ready, could not the Government have immediately sent out the reliefs?—We did take up vessels for them; we could have thrown up those contracts, and have put them on board at once.

Henry Mead, Esq., called in; and Examined.

H. Mead, Esq.

1388. *Chairman.*] HOW many years have you been in India?—Ten years.

1389. Have you been in different parts of India?—I have been in Madras, in the North Western Provinces, in Bengal, and at Pegu.

1390. At what date did you leave Calcutta on your way to this country overland?—On the last occasion, on the 10th of August.

1391. How many times have you passed up and down the Red Sea?—I have made six passages through the Red Sea.

1392. Have you any means of stating with confidence what the amount of steam transport might have been at Calcutta at the time you left, or immediately before, or between that period and the arrival of the news from Delhi and Merut?—In May there were two steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the "Oriental" and the "Bentinck." The "Oriental" had been employed as a troop ship conveying troops from Madras to Burmah; she had brought up the 84th from Burmah; she had been fitted as a troop-ship, and was waiting orders from the Government to serve as a troop-ship again. The "Bentinck" was a spare steamer on the mail route.

1393. Had those two ships been dispatched at an early period after the unfortunate events at Delhi and Merut, what number of troops could they have brought from Suez?—The "Oriental" brought from Rangoon 820 of the 84th Regiment, besides officers and followers; in all about 1,000 souls belonging to the 84th. She brought 820 rank and file from Rangoon, a distance of 1,000 miles.

1394. But she was quite ready to be dispatched, was she not?—Quite ready; 24 hours would have enabled her to complete her coaling, and be ready for sea.

1395. And the other ship which you have mentioned?—Two days, I think, would have been ample.

1396. What was the tonnage of each of those ships?—The "Oriental" was 2,000 tons, and the "Bentinck" above 2,000.

1397. Are you aware whether there was, or was not, any strong feeling entertained by the public generally in Calcutta, as to whether the Government of India would at that time dispatch those two ships, or any other ships, for troops to Suez, or not?—I think the feeling was universal; I had an opportunity of conversing with all classes of persons, civil and military officers, as well as merchants, and I never heard the expression of a doubt as to the propriety of sending steamers to Suez.

1398. Have you any means of knowing whether the matter was suggested to the Government, or whether the Government had really entered into the consideration of the question?—I believe that the Government never officially considered the question; I believe that the emergency was not thought of sufficient gravity to warrant the expense of sending steamers to Suez, before communicating with England.

1399. And that was the general impression?—That I believe was the case; the Peninsular and Oriental Company's officers expected daily communications from the Government at Calcutta for the employment of those steamers, and great disappointment was felt in May and in June.

1400. At what time did you learn in Calcutta of the perilous situation of affairs, as it was considered by Sir Henry Lawrence in Oude?—The first information was communicated to the public in Calcutta on the 15th of May. The blue books will show that it had been telegraphed to the Government on the

the 11th, from Agra, from Mr. Colvin. The tidings of the capture of Delhi, and the massacre of the Europeans there was communicated on the 12th, we heard it in Calcutta on the 15th, and rumours of it in the bazaars on the 12th and 13th.

1401. You mean to say that the Government had the news on the 12th?—Yes; the news of the capture of Delhi on the 12th, by telegraph.

1402. Are you aware of any communication being received immediately after, from Sir Henry Lawrence, at Lucknow, indicating his opinion as to the perilous state of affairs?—I can only speak from the authority of the blue books, and those show that from the 12th to the 16th, numerous messages were received from Sir Henry Lawrence.

1403. Was the tenor of those communications publicly known, or publicly spoken of?—Yes; it was generally known that Sir Henry Lawrence was urging upon the Government the propriety of getting troops from all quarters.

1404. That was as early as perhaps the 17th or the 18th of May?—Yes.

1405. You left on the 13th?—I left Calcutta on the 10th of August.

1406. Then you came direct to Suez?—Yes.

1407. You have passed six times up and down the Red Sea; do you remember any serious consequences happening to the health of your fellow passengers during those various transits?—No; I have passed through it in January, in May, in July, in September, and in October, and on the last occasion the ship was full of women and children, and we had no death or sickness during the whole transit among those women and children going down the Red Sea. I do not recollect upon any occasion on which I have made the overland journey that any death has occurred in the Red Sea.

1408. You are pretty well acquainted, from having been at different times in Egypt, with the facilities of passing detachments of troops through Egypt; do you know of any great impediments or danger to be apprehended to the health of the troops?—None whatever; 300 persons are frequently moved at a time in the vans of the Transit administration; for example, passengers by the outward and homeward mails frequently cross each other in the Desert, and we always make the distance between Suez and Cairo, 80 miles, in about 14 hours, including stoppages, and about from 10 to 11 hours actually in the vans.

1409. That was even before the railway penetrated the Desert?—Yes; 300 men could have been moved forward with all their baggage certainly in two days and a half, with the ordinary means at the disposal of the Transit Company.

1410. Without any preparatory arrangement?—Yes.

1411. Do you know how many wells there are upon that route?—I do not think that any use is made of the wells in passing, but there is an abundance of water always provided; a great number of camels are employed by the Transit administration in supplying the stations; there is one at every five miles.

1412. The line by which the camels and the vans proceed, I believe, is some four or five miles distant from the railway line?—Yes, they are from two days to 56 hours, making the passage between one steamer and the other; and during that time of course the baggage and the passengers, and the cargo of the ships are transferred by means of the camels; the camels do the distance in 14 hours, and I think the camels occupy about 24 hours from Suez to Cairo, where the railway takes them up.

1413. The whole passage through Egypt occupies about 56 hours?—Yes.

1414. That is the ordinary time?—Yes, which is taken in transporting the passengers and the cargo of an overland steamer.

1415. Since the railway has penetrated some 40 miles into the Desert, that rather diminishes the time, does it not?—Yes, certainly; from Alexandria to Cairo the trains travel slowly; on the last occasion we left at eleven o'clock in the morning and got in at nine in the evening; 11 hours doing the distance by railway; and if that were magnified into 24 hours, 12 ought to be quite sufficient to perform the remainder of the journey; 36 hours would suffice now, I should think.

1416. Have you any acquaintances among the Egyptian authorities?—Yes; I have frequently conversed with persons in the service of the Transit administration.

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1417. Had you any means of ascertaining that the general feeling amongst the authorities and the Viceroy was in favour of that passage being made use of by England?—Yes; it was expected in Egypt at the time that it would be largely made use of, and no objections were ever urged against it; I have heard that the Pacha might, at the outset, possibly have objected to the transport of troops, but that was got rid of by the suggestion that the troops should come over in blouses, with their arms packed, and sent through in the ordinary way, as a portion of the cargo.

1417*. If there had been any obstacle on the score of an armed force passing through the country, it was quite avoidable by those means?—Yes, by dressing the troops in plain clothes.

1418. Have you any idea what the financial advantages to Egypt are from this constant traffic of British passengers and goods through Egypt?—The Pacha charges 10 *l.* per head for travellers from Alexandria to Suez, and I have heard that the revenue derived by the Pacha is about 30,000 *l.* a year, but I do not know that.

1419. Upon passengers?—No, upon the route altogether; about 30,000 *l.* a year profit. I have been informed that the net revenue is that.

1420. But supposing that bodies of troops had been sent on this occasion, I suppose his gains would have been still more?—Still more; but it is optional with the traveller to avail himself of the railway, and the vans of the transit administration, or to go by camels or donkeys as he pleases, when he pays according to a certain tariff for the use of the stopping places in the desert; you can go across the desert independently of the Pacha.

1421. Are you of opinion, that, independently of the actual net revenue received by the Viceroy in consequence of our making use of this transit, that there is also a very considerable expenditure amongst the inhabitants of the country?—Very great indeed.

1422. Have you observed any improvement in consequence of this amongst the inhabitants along the line?—Perhaps it would be hard to say that the fellahs derive any advantage, but of course the class of persons who usually profit by travellers must of course derive great benefit from the large sums which are spent. Each person pays 10 *s.* a day at the hotels, independently of wines or beer consumed, and there is a large sum spent in the bazaars by the Europeans travelling there.

1423. Do you recollect, at the commencement of this revolt, to have read, or to have heard discussed, the substance of a proclamation published by Nena Sahib, in which proclamation he stated, as an encouragement to the revolters, that the Viceroy of Egypt and the Grand Sultan had totally cut off the means which England possessed of sending reinforcements through Egypt?—Yes; we heard of that, and we knew that that was designed to get rid of the universal impression in the minds of the natives that the troops would be poured in very rapidly in great numbers by the overland route; that was the universal native impression.

1424. Is it your impression that that proclamation probably had some effect upon the minds of those who were disposed to revolt?—I cannot say, but I know that the feeling that the troops would be poured in by the overland route was general among the natives.

1425. Have you any idea whether the people of India, particularly of late years, have had a strong impression of the very superior power of Russia?—They have got a very strong impression of the great force of Russia. I believe that that notion was very perseveringly disseminated during the Russian War, and there was a great deal of writing and talking in India about making use of the sepoy army to supplement our deficient forces in Europe, for it was supposed that we were so short-handed for troops that the Indian army would be called on to supply drafts of irregular cavalry especially, and artillery from Bengal.

1426. Have you any idea whether the capture of that entire army corps which garrisoned Kars, and which was represented by Russia as an Anglo-Turkish corps, had any material effect in augmenting the opinion in the native mind of the power of Russia?—I can hardly say; but the most exaggerated statements of the power of Russia are continually poured in from the tribes of the north-west, and I believe the course of English policy for the last few years has rather tended to deepen that impression than otherwise, as we have made preparations against Russian invasion, and have generally allowed that to be understood.

1427. Mr.

1427. Mr. *Willoughby*.] You have stated that when the mutiny broke out, the "Oriental" steamer and the "Bentinck" steamer were at Calcutta; that the former might have been despatched within 24 hours, and the "Bentinck" in 48 hours; could the requisite supply of provisions for troops have been embarked within those short periods?—Yes; the Peninsular and Oriental Company keep a very large stock of provisions at Garden Reach, and those vessels merely needed to fill up their supplies.

1428. Then that is included in the 24 hours and the 48 hours?—Decidedly.

1429. Can you state at what period 300 passengers could have been conveyed by the transit administration across to Suez?—Yes; I recollect in 1852, that we brought home a very large number of passengers, and we met a large number of passengers in the Desert.

1430. Three hundred?—Taking both classes, I think 300 would have been about the number.

1431. On those occasions are not the passengers conveyed by relays?—They are always conveyed by relays of 36, in batches, as they are termed; they start two hours after each other.

1432. You have suggested that troops might have been sent by the overland route dressed in blouses. Could 150 or 200 men pass through Egypt without their real character being detected by the authorities in Egypt?—I do not think the question could have arisen if they had been passed through as second class passengers; it is hardly possible to suppose that the political bearing of the subject could have been brought in question.

1433. You do not think it would have been noticed?—I think not; it was the general impression in India, and it was the impression in Calcutta, that such might have been done, and so avoid any complication as to the passage of armed men, but not to do it secretly.

1434. Mr. *Byng*.] Do you say that there was a prevailing idea among Englishmen in Calcutta and among the natives, that the overland route would be adopted for sending reinforcements?—I certainly never heard a doubt expressed as to the propriety of such a course.

1435. When did you leave Calcutta?—On the 10th of August.

1436. Had the subject then been discussed?—Yes, very fully among the officers of the Company's service, both civil and military, and at every port on our way home; when we found any troops ready who were waiting to be carried forward, there was a bitter feeling created.

1437. There was a general expectation, both in the minds of the natives and of Englishmen, that the overland route would be adopted?—Certainly.

1438. Mr. *Danby Seymour*.] Are you aware that there were considerable complaints at Cairo by the Pacha when the two regiments of cavalry were there, and difficulties with the inhabitants?—I am not aware of it, but I think there would very likely be complaints if troops are not under a strong hand.

1439. You are not aware whether any communication passed upon the subject with our Government?—No.

1440. What would have been the gain, do you think, first of all, in time, if the overland route had been adopted?—If the Government had adopted the course which, I believe, was suggested by a high authority, of sending an agent home at once with the news of the mutiny, which agent should be charged to make all necessary arrangements, I think you might have landed a considerable body of troops in Calcutta before the close of July.

1441. Supposing transports had been sent from Calcutta?—No; there are always three steamers fortnightly; six steamers a month could have been available from the mail service.

1442. Each way?—Six steamers each way; one of the Australian each fortnight, an Australian steamer, and a steamer from Bombay, and a steamer from Calcutta; three steamers a fortnight.

1443. By your calculation, what number of troops would have been poured into Calcutta before the arrival of those which came round the Cape; what would have been the gain in troops?—If the Government had availed themselves of the ordinary mail steamers, without any preparation whatever, they might have certainly landed 900 men in Calcutta in July; 150 per steamer could have been carried without difficulty in July, if the Government had, on the breaking out of the mutiny, despatched an agent to the Government at home, charged with the duty of making arrangements on route.

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1444. Captain *Vivian.*] Do you date from the outbreak at Meerut?—From the period when Lord Elphinstone telegraphed to Lord Canning that he could send an officer by the first steamer to overtake the mail which had left Bombay on the 11th May.

1445. Mr. *Crawford.*] What was the date of that?—The mail left on the 11th of May.

1446. On what date did Lord Elphinstone send that message?—On the 13th or 14th of May.

1447. You think that if Lord Canning had telegraphed back to Lord Elphinstone to send a steamer, and if that message had been acted upon by the authorities in this country, that 900 men might have been landed in India by the time that the troops arrived in considerable numbers round the Cape?—They might have been landed in July if the Government had sent down the "Oriental" to Suez; and if transports, which could very easily have got down to Suez during all May and June, had been sent, some thousands of troops could have been poured in in the month of July.

1448. Captain *Vivian.*] Were there transports there?—There were 18 vessels arrived at Bombay carrying troops from the Persian Gulf during the month of May.

1449. Mr. *Crawford.*] How many of those were steamers?—Four.

1450. Then there were 14 vessels which were not steamers?—Yes.

1451. How long do you suppose it would take a vessel to proceed from Bombay even as far as Aden in the month of May?—In May and June, before the force of the monsoon is felt, which begins in June, about the middle of June; they could have got down to Suez with the greatest ease before the end of June.

1452. You say that a sailing vessel despatched from Bombay, say on the 15th of May, might be expected to reach Suez on the 30th of June?—Yes, certainly; and I have for that the authority of all the officers of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Packet Company, who constantly discussed the subject.

1453. You have been connected with the Press in India?—Yes.

1454. With which newspapers?—The "Madras Athenæum," the "Delhi Gazette," and the "Friend of India."

1455. Do you speak of Lord Canning's not having accepted the proposition of Lord Elphinstone rather in a sense of imputing blame to him?—I think it was unfortunate that he did not accept Lord Elphinstone's offer to avail himself of the mail of the 11th of May to overtake the steamer at Suez.

1456. Those vessels would have been, according to your calculation, at Suez by the end of June?—Yes.

1457. The intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut arrived here on the night of the 27th of June?—Yes.

1458. The supplemental steamer which Lord Elphinstone would have despatched, under the circumstances you have described, might have arrived here a few days afterwards?—No; it would have caught the mail that left Bombay on the 11th of May; that arrived here on the 12th of June, I think.

1459. Why?—Because Lord Elphinstone proposed to despatch a fast steamer to overtake the mail which left there four days before.

1460. That might have been very well, if the fast steamer that left was quicker than the other; but it might have been probable that it would not overtake it?—He believed that she could.

1461. Under any circumstances, the intelligence could not have got here quicker than the 27th of June?—Lord Canning, in reply to the despatch, said, "I do not want to send to England till the mail of the 17th of May."

1462. The regular mail left Bombay on the 11th of May, and the intelligence was received here by telegraph on the 27th of June; so that the intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut could not have reached this country sooner than it did?—Unless the first steamer could have overtaken the steamer of the 11th of May.

1463. Still the news would not have been here before the 11th of June?—Yes, a fortnight before. No intelligence was sent by the mail of the 11th of May; it was a proposal to save a fortnight.

1464. Then do you suppose that the Government, being in possession of the intelligence in this country on the 27th of June, they could have got ready to send through Egypt 900 men, and land them in India at the end of July?—I think there would be no difficulty in sending them, if the intelligence had arrived here

here a fortnight earlier than as it really did, on the 12th of June; I think that no difficulty would have been experienced in landing troops even in Calcutta by the end of July.

1465. What time do you allow for a sailing vessel to go from Suez to Calcutta?—A steamer would have taken the transports in tow to the head of the Gulf at Aden, and then the monsoon would have been in their favour, and they would have got to Bombay in seven days from the head of the Straits at Aden; from seven to nine days is the calculation from Aden to Bombay. I said that 900 men could have been landed in Calcutta by the use of the ordinary mail steamers, the six steamers which leave Suez monthly.

1466. Mr. *Danby Seymour*.] You mentioned two cases, that the mail steamers might have been used, and that the ships which brought troops from the Persian Gulf might have been sent?—Yes, two steamers capable of holding 1,000 men, 500 men in each, might have been despatched, namely, the "Oriental" and the "Bentinck."

1467. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] How do you make out six steamers sailing monthly from Suez to India?—There are two sail for Ceylon, on the Australian line, two from Bombay, and two from Calcutta.

1468. Are you not aware that the Australian line has only lately been put on?—It was put on early last year; it was on during the time of the mutiny.

1469. Are you able to state that from your own knowledge?—I state it as a fact; I saw the steamer lying there in August, and I know that they had been put on early in the year; I think last February.

1470. Are you aware that the first of those ships went out in July, the "Simla," and that the line was not fairly in operation till several months afterwards?—If you refer to the figures, you will find that the line was in operation early in last year.

1471. Do you state of your own knowledge that the Australian line was in operation at that time?—Certainly, in June of last year.

1472. Do you recollect the names of the ships that went out?—The ships on that side were, the "Columbia," and I forget the other names, but a steamer was lying there in August, and another steamer I know of, that was coming down to take the service for the next fortnight. The captains of the steamers expected on the other side, that the steamers which had brought their despatches to Alexandria would be employed in bringing the troops from Marseilles.

1473. Are you not aware that the "Australia" broke down, and did not come to time, and that the "Emu" got ashore in the Red Sea, and in consequence of that there was no Australian service at all until September or October?—I believe that was a subsequent disaster; I believe in June, July, and August, no accidents happened to that line.

1474. Mr. *Osborne*.] I think you stated that you were connected with the press in India?—Yes.

1475. If I recollect rightly, you were the editor of the "Friend of India"?—Yes.

1476. Were you proprietor too?—No.

1477. You received a very handsome salary, did you not?—Yes.

1478. As editor of the "Friend of India"?—Yes.

1479. You were in the habit of writing articles in the "Friend of India"?—Yes.

1480. Was not the "Friend of India" suspended?—No.

1481. A warning was given to the press by Lord Canning?—Yes.

1482. Was the "Friend of India" never suspended while you were there?—Never.

1483. Of course you took a strong view of the Order issued by the Governor-general in Council for the supension of the press?—Yes, I did.

1484. You did not leave the editorship of the "Friend of India" in consequence of that Order?—No; I was not in anywise interfered with by the Government or the proprietors of the paper. I had only taken it for four months; I had renounced journalism for two or three years, and I took it to enable the proprietor to pay a visit to England.

1485. Are you aware of a petition having been got up in Calcutta?—Yes.

1486. The first petition was in the month of July, I think?—Yes.

1487. You came home in August?—Yes, on the 10th.

1488. Did you bring that petition home with you?—Yes; I resigned the

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editorship of the "Friend of India" on the 2d of July, feeling that I could not, consistently with my own views of things, continue to edit it; and fearful that the Government would visit such articles as I might write in future with the suspension of the paper, rather than damage the paper, I replaced it in the hands of the proprietor.

1489. You brought home the petition in August from Calcutta?—Yes.

1490. Are the Committee to understand that you act as agent for the petitioners?—I merely acted as agent for the purpose of getting the petition presented to Parliament, and obtaining as much acceptation for it as possible. I am not the agent of the people of Calcutta, that is to say, my functions have ceased. I have had the petition presented, and have done what I covenanted to do.

1491. Have you acted as an unpaid agent?—No; I received 700*l.* from the people of Calcutta to defray my expenses for coming home, and remaining in England sufficiently long to get the petition before the public.

1492. You now receive nothing?—I have no salary.

1493. You merely received that 700*l.* for that particular purpose?—Yes.

1494. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You stated that six steamers proceeded monthly from Suez; from what date has that been so?—I do not know from what date the Australian steamers commenced. There have always been four of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company's vessels; one each fortnight from Bombay, and one each fortnight from Calcutta.

1495. That is a recent arrangement?—No, always two per month; two monthly from Calcutta, and also two per month from Bombay, making four steamers a month.

1496. But a steamer from Bombay could proceed as far as Aden?—They have for many months past gone down to Suez.

1497. You have stated, that by means of sailing transports reaching Suez at the end of June, troops might have been conveyed to Calcutta, 900 in number, by the end of July; at what date would those transports have left Bombay?—The 900 troops of which I spoke, might have been conveyed by the ordinary mail steamers without any transports from Bombay.

1498. You alluded to transports leaving Bombay and arriving at Suez?—Yes.

1499. At what time?—I presumed that those transports which had been fitted up for troops in the Persian Gulf might have left Bombay by the 20th of May.

1500. They could have got to Suez by the end of June, you think?—Yes, in a case of great emergency. I think they might have been ordered to wait at Aden, and have been towed down the Red Sea by the mail steamers.

1501. *Chairman.*] But all your evidence regarding Bombay and the Persian Gulf the Committee may assume to be conjectural?—It is from the study of public documents.

1502. Mr. *Willoughby.*] How could a transport be employed in the Persian Gulf, and be got ready to proceed to Suez?—Nearly the whole of the 14 transports that left the Persian Gulf with the troops composing the Persian expedition, returned to Bombay before the 20th of May; 14 sailing vessels and four steamers reached Bombay during the month of May from the Persian Gulf, with troops on board.

1503. Your proposition would have been to divert them from Bombay to Suez?—Yes.

1504. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Were those four steamers at Bombay when the rebellion broke out in India?—I do not know; but they all reached Bombay before, I think, the 26th of May.

1505. When did the mutiny break out?—On the 10th of May; it was known at Bombay on the 12th.

1506. I think you said that there were plenty of steamers at Bombay?—Yes, vessels of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company, and one or two spare vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Packet Company, and a war steamer.

1507. Which could have sailed for Suez immediately?—With a very short preparation; two or three days would have been quite sufficient.

1508. I think you stated that from Aden steamers could have taken merchant vessels in tow with troops on board, and have towed them to Calcutta and Bombay?—No; I spoke of their being cast off at the head of the Straits of Babelmandeb, and making their way under sail, and they would have got to Bombay quicker than a steamer could have towed them.

1509. How long would sailing vessels be going from Aden to Bombay?—From seven to nine days, with the monsoon in their favour.

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Admiral Sir *Henry Leeke*, called in; and Examined.

1510. *Chairman.*] YOU have been Commander-in-chief of the Indian navy?—Yes.

Admiral Sir *H. Leeke.*

1511. For how many years?—Five years and eight months.

1512. You had almost altogether the direction of the embarkation of the troops for the Persian Gulf?—I had.

1513. And you also directed the re-embarkation of the troops from the Persian Gulf, did you not?—No; I left after the landing of the troops, and the bombardment of Bushire, by order of the Governor-general.

1514. And you came back to Bombay?—Yes.

1515. But you remained in command there, did you not?—Yes, I remained as Commander-in-chief for eight or ten months after that.

1516. On what date did you arrive at Bombay on returning from the Persian Gulf?—On the 29th of December 1856.

1517. Then you must have been in the Persian Gulf when the re-embarkation took place?—I commanded the Persian Gulf expedition from its starting from Bombay to the arrival of the despatches at Bombay. I sent down a frigate with the despatches after the action, and I sailed four days afterwards, and arrived at Bombay on the 29th of December.

1518. Then for a period considerably before the revolt you had your flag flying at Bombay?—Yes: the first I heard of it was from Lord Elphinstone, I think about the 10th of May: I have no memorandum here, but about that time he spoke to me on the subject of vessels being ready for any emergency to send for troops, or any cause for which they might be required.

1519. You had been directed, had you not, many days before the news of the events at Meerut and Delhi to send orders for the return of the squadron and the troops from the Persian Gulf?—Yes.

1520. Do you remember the date?—No, I do not, but it was about that time; I had been in communication with Lord Elphinstone two or three times; he wished to get them down; but the Commander-in-chief, Sir J. Outram, thought it necessary to keep the vessels there in readiness to send the troops down again, not having heard of the revolt in India.

1521. Who commanded the troops at that time?—Sir James Outram.

1522. In what month did he come down?—I think he came in advance of the troops, but I think he arrived in Bombay the end of July.

1523. Not before?—I think not.

1524. Do you recollect when the first ships of the returning fleet from the Persian Gulf began to arrive at Bombay?—I think the first ships arrived with the 64th on the morning of about the 17th, or from the 17th to the 20th of May. Lord Elphinstone sent for me the day before, and he said, "We must get the troops off to Calcutta as fast as possible; what will you do?" I said, "The only vessel I have here is the 'Assaye'; I have another steamer, but I should be almost fearful of her meeting the monsoon." The "Assaye" is a large steam-frigate of 1,800 tons, and I said, "If the troops come in the morning, I will undertake to get them away in the afternoon." I had a vessel coaled and provisioned, and they fortunately arrived at ten o'clock in the morning, from the 17th to the 20th of May, and in the afternoon, at four o'clock, she steamed out with the transport in tow, and took the 64th to Calcutta.

1525. Was that the only regiment?—The 78th came down in the afternoon, and we hired a steamer (I forget her name), the "Princess Charlotte," or some such name, a large screw-steamer, and she steamed out with another vessel, sailing, on the Monday morning, at nine o'clock, and arrived at Calcutta about the 28th.

1526. Did you transfer the troops from the other ships?—Yes, to those vessels.

1527. What became of the ship in which they had come from the Persian Gulf?—She remained there, and went back again with stores and provisions.

1528. Was she a steamer?—No, a sailing vessel.

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1529. Then some artillery came down?—Yes, afterwards, and they went on, I think, to Poonah; they landed at Owlwa, and I think they went on to Poonah, and from that to Ahmednuggur.

1530. While you were in the Persian Gulf, was it in the hot season?—It was exceedingly hot in the day, but at night it was so cold that I recollect going on shore to General Stalker, after the troops were encamped, and he said, "My fellows are going about blowing their fingers."

1531. When did you leave Bombay eventually?—On the 17th of September of last year.

1532. Between the period when you received the news of the events at Meerut and Delhi and the 17th of September (that is a period of four months), do you recollect during the greater part of that period whether there was any considerable number of shipping lying there?—Yes, there were 140 merchant vessels, of all descriptions, there.

1533. Were some of them steamers?—No; as I mentioned before, the "Assaye" had been sent off, and we had then the "Ajdaha," a paddle-wheel steamer, about 1,400 tons; she was a fine vessel, but I did not think her safe to meet the monsoon; she was an old vessel, and had been repaired, but I did not think she would have been safe to send with troops. I mentioned this to Lord Elphinstone. If it had been a case of emergency, there would have been no reason why she should not have gone up to Suez. This was in May, before the monsoon came on; it came on about the 12th of June; the "Ajdaha" would have been up before that; she would have been able to come down with troops; there is no doubt of it.

1534. Had you some steamers at your command also?—Yes, a great many.

1535. At that time?—We had a great many dispersed over the Indian Ocean, and in the Persian Gulf, and some in China.

1536. Were there any at Bombay?—Only the one that I spoke of, the "Ajdaha."

1537. Was there any other steamer at Bombay at that time?—No other.

1538. But if it had been the decision of the Government to send in the latter part of May to Suez, there would have been no objection to her being sent thither?—No; I should not have had the slightest objection to her going on.

1539. If it had been decided that ships should be sent to Suez from Calcutta as well as from Bombay, you had the command at Bombay, had you not?—Yes; I had the command over the Indian Ocean.

1540. Would there have been the means to send vessels of a competent description?—Not belonging to the Indian navy; the "Auckland" and the "Zenobia" were the only ships, and they were both employed in China, assisting the fleet of the Royal navy there.

1541. Would there have been any great difficulty in the early period, that is to say, in the latter portion of May, in sending some of the better class of merchant sailing ships?—Not at all; it would have been done with a great deal of ease; time was the only reason for not sending, not the expense.

1542. What would have been the time taken up if they had been sent on the 25th of May?—I think if we had started a fast-sailing merchantman on the 25th of May she would not have reached Aden under from 35 to 40 days, it so much depends upon how far south she goes, and where she catches the wind. She would have gone down with baffling winds to the southward to catch the monsoon, and then her passage would be a safe one between the Island of Socotora and Cape Guardafoi; after that she would meet baffling winds again. Some vessels make a lucky hit, and get into Aden probably on the fifth day from Cape Guardafoi; after getting to Aden, she has to encounter the Red Sea. If she gets the southerly wind she will run up to a small island called the Brothers, and be sure to get the northerly wind in some part, and then southerly, one for her, and one against her. If she met the northerly wind in the Gulf of Suez it might take her 10 days or a fortnight; it is impossible to say; these things are all lucky hits.

1543. If she did arrive, or ships of that class, would it require two months?—Under two months she would do it; that is a long time.

1544. Should you say six weeks?—Yes; she would not do it under six weeks; the average would be fully that.

1545. If

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1545. If she got from Bombay to Suez (speaking of sailing ships) in six weeks, would she at that season of the year have been able to bring her troops in a competent manner to Bombay?—She would have the same difficulties to encounter in her return from Suez to Aden. There is no monsoon in the Red Sea, and you have the same winds, and in the same kind of way the northerly wind blowing up or down, and she would have to work her passage from Suez unless she was towed.

1546. What might be the average of her passage down to the Straits of Babelmandel?—If she got a good northerly wind she might do it very well in eight or nine days. I have known merchant ships, those that went with the 10th Hussars and the 12th Lancers, I think make the passage up in 12 days, and I think they were about 15 days coming down to Aden, but they were always assisted part of the way by our men-of-war steamers that were then in the Red Sea, and they were assisted by the Peninsular and Oriental Company likewise.

1547. Supposing there had been no steamers to assist those sailing ships, they would at least have required 10 days to get down to Aden?—I think so.

1548. It would have been about the beginning of August?—Then you would have been in the middle of the monsoon; then her passage is almost sure; she would make the passage then in about nine days to Bombay from Aden.

1549. How many days would she take to Kurrachee?—To Kurrachee would be, I dare say, 12 or 13 days; probably it would be about three days more; it is about 600 miles to the northward of Bombay, in a direct line, and they would have a fair wind.

1550. Is it not almost the same distance?—No, it is further; it might take a day more probably; a day or two probably from Aden.

1551. Mr. *Crawford.*] And it is not so safe either?—I would rather run for Bombay of the two. There is no difficulty with seamen in making Kurrachee.

1552. In point of fact, how many merchantmen were there?—I was out one evening sailing, in the month of June, just at the commencement of the monsoon, and I counted 140 merchant vessels of different sorts; there were about, I think, 30 native merchant ships belonging to native owners, and about 110 very fine merchant ships belonging to this country, splendid ships, from 700 to 1,500 tons; one ship, the "Persia," was 2,000 tons.

1553. Were they clippers?—Yes, many of them; they were splendid and very fast-sailing ships.

1554. Were there ten or a dozen of those?—Yes, more than that, and a great many Americans and French, and all offered for the service, the Americans too in a very handsome way.

1555. Were any of those steamers (American and French)?—Not any.

1556. If those very superior clippers had been despatched about the 20th or 25th of May, they would have got to Suez in about 42 days?—About that.

1557. And they would have got back in 20 days?—About that.

1558. Leaving some space for getting the troops on board, say 54 days?—Rather more than that, I think: 40 to Aden, 10 up the Red Sea, making 50, and say two or three days to embark, 53; they might be eight, nine, or ten days down; giving an average of nine, that would make 62, and eight more would be 70 days. I do not think they would do it under that time.

1559. Assuming that they started on the 25th of May, that would bring it to what date of what month?—That would be about the middle of August.

1560. Then it appears that there might have been a fleet of a dozen of those clippers performing that voyage?—You might have had 140 ships if it had been necessary.

1561. On a great emergency?—Yes.

1562. *Chairman.*] Seeing that we had a large force at Malta at that time, suppose that the Governor of Malta had undertaken the responsibility, which he did in the Crimean war, of sending every soldier he had upon the island out of it without authority from home, what time would have elapsed before the troops would have arrived at Cairo?—I think they would have been about four days from Malta, or five days.

1563. Had Lord Lyons taken upon himself the responsibility of sending the troops by his squadron, or the marines of his squadron, would not that have facilitated the reinforcements very much?—No question about it; the arrival of either soldiers or sailors would have been a great thing in Bombay.

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1564. He had about 1,000 marines, had he not?—I do not know the force of the squadron.

1565. Sir *Charles Napier.*] He had four sail of the line?—Then he would have about 500 marines. He would have had 190 on board his own ship, the "Royal Albert." He might have had 600 altogether in four sail of the line.

1566. *Chairman.*] Had you any conference with Lord Elphinstone upon the subject of making use of the overland route?—Yes; I had frequent conversations with him; I do not know that they were official conversations. Lord Elphinstone was kind enough to send for me frequently; we always talked these things over, and he consulted me as to the feasibility of bringing troops across.

1567. Did he entertain any decided opinion upon the subject himself?—I do not know; I do not know that I recollect enough to say.

1568. Do you know whether he was understood to have telegraphed to Calcutta upon the subject?—I have heard so, but I do not know of my own knowledge; he never mentioned it within my recollection.

1569. Are you aware of there being any particular injury to health to be apprehended from navigating the Red Sea?—I should think not. When the 10th Hussars went up, the men that went up sick with chest complaints were all recovered by the time they arrived at Cairo. Whether that was to be attributed to the Red Sea or to the air after landing at Suez, or not, I do not know, but they did not lose a man. They lost, I believe, altogether about 12 horses, out of 1,400.

1570. Were the horses generally in fair condition when they were disembarked?—When they landed at Suez, I believe they were in as good condition as when they went away; I heard the officers say so. I had a letter from one officer, Captain Bowles, 10th Hussars, who was killed in the Crimea, and he said that their horses were just as fit for service the day they landed as the day of embarkment from Bombay.

1571. When they were disembarked at Suez, did you understand that they had any very great hardship to endure in marching to Cairo, and during their stay in Egypt?—Certainly not.

1572. Are there any peculiar dangers connected with a ship lying for a week or 10 days before Alexandria or in Aboukir Bay?—I do not know enough of the anchorage there to say, except that vessels would be tolerably safe at Alexandria.

1573. With regard to Egypt, you see no difficulties in passing troops through it, either on the score of health, or want of provisions, or water?—No, not the slightest; but you must take care of your commissariat beforehand. There is no difficulty. At Aden provisions are exceedingly scarce, with the exception of Aden sheep; I believe they are to be procured at times in abundance, and at other times not; but in the Peninsular and Oriental Company, or our own ships, when they ran as packets (and we had a very powerful packet service), the officers always laid in a good stock of provisions, and everything of that sort, at Bombay, because they knew they could not get a great quantity at Aden or Suez, and they were obliged to husband as much as they could.

1574. Are you aware that the steam companies have large depôts of provisions at Suez?—I have heard that they have.

1575. Do you know what quantity of coals are there; I suppose for the Indian navy there are some coal depôts?—We have a small depôt of coals at Suez. At Aden we had from 8,000 to 10,000 tons belonging to the East India Company; but there was always plenty of coal till latterly, when we were obliged to borrow from the Peninsular and Oriental Company, who very readily supplied us with coal; but at the time I speak of it ran short, because we had to send an immense quantity to the Persian Gulf. We sent as much as 20,000 or 23,000 tons of coal to the Persian Gulf, and we robbed Aden to send it on to the Gulf, and to Muscat, and other places.

1576. During the period that we have been alluding to, were there any ships belonging to either of the steam companies lying at Bombay?—No; the whole of the spare vessels belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company were employed in our service for towing the vessels up and down the Persian Gulf; we had a very large force even then in the Persian Gulf; and we were obliged constantly to send on provisions, stores, and so on, to the Gulf. We had no vessel of our own, and I was in communication with Mr. Ritchie, the agent for

for the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels, and I used to say, "Give me only one ship, and you will assist us very much," (I say this to show that we had no vessels), and he said, "I should be glad to do so, but we must carry on the mail service; if the Government will bear us clear, and take the responsibility, then you shall have a ship;" but we did not get one; there were no shipsto spare.

1577. Do you know what spare ships those companies had at Calcutta during that time?—No.

1578. Was the transport of those two cavalry regiments to Suez, in 1854, that you mentioned, entirely done under your direction?—Entirely.

1579. Under your personal inspection?—Yes.

1580. How many steamers and how many sailing ships were employed in the transport of those two regiments?—Seven ships took the 10th Hussars to Suez, and six ships, I think, took the 12th Lancers from Mangalore to Aden and Suez.

1581. What class were the steamers and sailers?—The "Assaye" was one of 1,800 tons; the "Punjaub" was a ship of the same class; she had just comé off the stocks, and she was fitted as a sailing vessel; I forget at this moment the names of the merchant ships; the "Ferooz," 1,600 tons, was another man-of-war steamer.

1582. There were three steamers, and perhaps six sailers?—Two working steamers ready to assist in towing; but one was built for a steamer, but I made her into a sailing vessel, as she could carry more troops; with the engines out she carried 230 horses, if I recollect rightly.

1583. That expedition was accomplished by two steamers and seven sailing ships?—The transport of the whole of the two regiments that you alluded to was accomplished by three steamers and ten sailing ships, as far as I can recollect.

1584. What is the additional accommodation, as compared with men, that is required for horses' forage and water?—It is something very considerable; the quantity of hay to be carried is extraordinary; the ship is filled all round.

1585. One thousand four hundred horses would have required nearly as many tons as would have been required for ten times as many men, would they not?—About that.

1586. So that in reality that squadron of three steamers and ten sailers were capable of transporting 10,000 infantry?—I do not think so many as that; you could not put 10 where you could put one horse; that requires a little calculation.

1587. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Many of the men would be on deck?—They must necessarily be on deck; a few would be below with their horses.

1588. *Chairman.*] It would be an advantage to this Committee if you would make a calculation of that at your leisure?—I will do so. A ship of 1,000 tons will carry 100 horses, and without the horses, she would carry 600 troops.

1589. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Could you have procured steamers at Bombay, Madras, or Point de Galle, to send to Suez after the mutiny broke out?—Certainly not; at Bombay we had nothing.

1590. If you had had authority, would you run the risk of sending the clippers you spoke of to Suez for troops?—Yes, undoubtedly.

1591. Had the Government judged it proper to send screw line-of-battle ships to Bombay and Calcutta with troops on board, what do you think would have been the moral effect?—Extraordinary; if six sail of the line had arrived at Calcutta, and four or five at Bombay, I think the effect would have been something extraordinary; it would have been electrifying to the whole population of the country.

1592. Have you ever commanded a steamer?—Not in the Royal Navy; I have commanded steamers in the Indian navy.

1593. A screw?—No, a paddle-wheel.

1594. Did you go to India by the Red Sea?—Yes.

1595. Did your family go also?—Yes.

1596. Did they suffer any inconvenience from the heat?—For three days it was very hot; it was certainly very hot indeed.

1597. But nothing to interfere with health?—Not at all; we were just as healthy as usual, and we ate and drank as much as usual. We lost one lady, who was ill before she embarked.

1598. Mr. *Crawford.*] If you had received instructions at Bombay, on the arrival of the mail from England of the 10th of July, to send, about the first week

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week in August, steam vessels to Suez to receive troops, should you have had it in your power to send them from the resources of the Indian navy?—No; I do not think that is a question that I can answer, for I was at Poonah then; I had given up the command on the 7th of July. I know that a steamer (I think it was the "Pottinger") came back from the Mauritius with troops, and I think a steamer arrived, a short time after that, from the Cape, with troops on board.

1599. When were you relieved?—On the 7th of July.

1600. Practically, if this Government had sent out instructions by the mail of the 10th of July from this country to provide tonnage for the reception of troops, on board at Suez, to be conveyed to India, those troops could hardly have reached India before the troops which left this country and went round the Cape, in the month of July?—I do not think they would; I think it would have been about the same time.

1601. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] What time did those two regiments leave Bombay when they went to the Crimea?—I forget the month.

1602. Do you remember when they arrived in the Crimea?—No, I do not.

1603. Supposing two sail of the line had appeared at Bombay, and two at Madras, and two at Calcutta, they would have enabled the governors of those places to have dispensed with the garrisons entirely, would they not?—Decidedly.

1604. You could have thrown shells right over Bombay, could you not, in case of a disturbance?—Yes; and they would have landed their men to man the batteries.

1605. In short, the moral effect would have been enormous?—Enormous; even with the merchant vessels that were there we could have landed, upon the average, 10 men from each ship, and supposing there were 100 English merchant ships there, and 10 men from each, there would have been 1,000 men directly. I spoke to Lord Elphinstone about it, and he said, "Well, they are a very good reserve; I think we had better keep them where they are at present." And he desired me to get up my dockyard brigade. I had a very large factory, and a great many fine fellows in the factory as engineers, Europeans; I think we had enough to man six or eight field pieces, and they would have been very formidable fellows if they had been called out.

1606. It was in reference to that mode of defence that Lord Elphinstone was able to pass on so many troops from Bombay?—Yes.

1607. Was not the same resource at the disposal of the Government at Calcutta and Madras?—I do not know.

1608. Mr. *Osborne.*] You spoke of the moral effect that would have been produced at Bombay and Calcutta, supposing it had been possible to send troops in line-of-battle ships; are you, as a naval officer, favourable to making line-of-battle ships transports?—It is rather a strange question; I always go upon the service that I am ordered upon.

1609. As the commander of the Indian navy, supposing the Indian navy had line-of-battle ships, would you adopt that mode of conveying troops?—Yes, I certainly should have done so.

1610. Would you have taken out the lower deck guns?—Yes, because I have advocated that business with the Court of Directors, and requested that I might be allowed to build a 100-gun ship to carry a hundred 68-pounders; I could have turned her into a transport, into a line-of-battle, or a harbour guardship; and the Court of Directors, thinking I was rather going too far in my ideas, told me I might build a 60-gun frigate, and I have so constructed her that she would be either a three-decker, or her ports might be so fitted, that she would become a two-decker or a frigate.

1611. She is built for transport as well?—For everything; she is to be a screw vessel, on the plan of the "Shannon."

1612. An hermaphrodite?—Yes; she can be everything.

1613. You are aware that we have no such ships in our service?—Not on that precise plan, certainly not.

1614. You are distinctly of opinion that troops may be as expeditiously and as well conveyed in line-of-battle ships, supposing them to be ready, as by transports built for the purpose?—I do not see why they should not; if I commanded a 90-gun ship I would as soon have troops on board as not.

1615. With reference to the crew, it might for a time upset the crew of a well-disciplined man-of-war?—I do not see any reason why it should.

1616. It might for a time upset the crew, and disturb their discipline?—I do not

not see why the discipline of a well regulated man-of-war should be affected; they could reef topsails and shift their top-gallant masts, and exercise their guns in the same way, with the exception that they would not have so much room.

1617. You are aware that there is a difference of opinion in the navy upon that point?—Yes; I never met two captains that ever agreed.

1618. Mr. *Willoughby.*] When the two cavalry regiments were sent from Bombay to Egypt, were not two officers of experience, one in the Commissariat Department and the other in the Quartermaster-general's Department, sent on before to make the necessary arrangements?—Yes.

1619. Are you aware whether any shipping is obtainable at Suez for the conveyance of troops?—No; I know that at times there are three or four coal ships there.

1620. I mean native craft?—There are native craft, but I would not trust troops in them; I should set my face against putting troops on board such things; I do not think they are fit for the purpose. There are some grabs of about 200 tons that might bring down 40 or 50 men if towed down; but I should not like to run the risk.

1621. You stated, did you not, that you had no steamers or other tonnage at your disposal to send to Suez?—No, except the "Ajdaha."

1622. Which you did not consider safe to face the monsoon?—No.

1623. Is it not the fact that that vessel, after having proceeded 300 miles from Aden, with troops, put back, having sprung a leak?—I have heard so by letter; I know that it is the case. We had made her very strong, and my report to the Government was, that I could at an expense of 7,000 *l.* make the "Ajdaha" a strong vessel for the transport service, but not to go from the home station.

1624. You stated, did you not, that sailing vessels from Bombay could go to Suez during the monsoon, leaving Bombay about the 25th of May; is that a common occurrence?—Certainly not.

1625. It is a very difficult passage to make, is it not?—Yes.

1626. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] The "Ajdaha" has broken down since, has she not?—So I am told.

1627. That is not the first time she has broken down?—No, the second or third time

1628. Four years ago it was a very great break down, was it not?—Yes, and she was put to rights at a very considerable expense, and made a very strong ship.

1629. If a sailing clipper had been sent from Bombay in the end of May she would have arrived about the middle of August, would she not?—Yes, about that time.

1630. That was about the time that you received the troops from Mauritius?—We received them several weeks before that; the troops from Mauritius arrived in the early part of the monsoon.

1631. Did you receive any from the Cape?—Not in my time; they arrived just as I sailed for England.

1632. After the arrival of the troops from Mauritius you had no apprehension at Bombay?—I do not think I am prepared to say that; I do not know that I had any, but I think there was a great panic up to the arrival of the 33d. I think it was a wing of that regiment that allayed for a time the mutiny of Sholapore. They went down the coast, and were landed at Goa; then came on the same kind of panic, and the ladies flocked on board the merchant ships at night.

1633. They were fortunate in not having any serious want of troops?—They had the seamen at hand.

1634. In counting your 70 days, you counted the same time up the Red Sea as the former craft had towed, did you not?—I do not quite recollect the number of days it took to tow them up. Our vessels at that time, with a fair wind, returned and caught the others, and towed them up.

1635. You are aware, are you not, that a vessel takes sometimes six weeks to go from Aden to Suez?—I am told so; I do not know it.

1636. You have heard so?—Yes.

1637. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Supposing that the "Conqueror," a 90-gun ship with two decks, had had her lower deck guns taken out at Gibraltar and 1,200 men put on board, and her crew reduced to 400 men, could she not have

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carried those troops out to India and made the passage comfortably?—I should think not so many as 1,200.

1638. How many men could she carry?—I should think not more than from 700 to 800 with safety; it is a long passage; she has a screw, I believe.

1639. The "James Baines" and the "Champion of the Seas" carried 997 to India, and 991, I think?—About 800, I imagine.

1640. She could have carried them out perfectly easily?—I imagine so; I do not see why not; I do not know how many they generally place on board those ships.

1641. Is it not the fact that a line-of-battle ship lightened sails very well with her lower masts and jury and topmasts?—Yes, I believe they generally sail as well as the others; I commanded a frigate once with jury masts, and I think she sailed as fast as with her own masts.

Martis, 16° *die Martii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Byng.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Captain Vivian.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Willoughby.
Viscount Goderich.	

SIR DE LACY EVANS, IN THE CHAIR.

Rear-Admiral *Alexander Milne*, called in; and Examined.

Rear-Admiral *Alexander Milne.*

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1642. *Chairman.*] WHAT appointment do you fill at present?—I am one of the Members of the Board of Admiralty.

1643. You have been some years in that capacity, have you not?—Yes.

1644. A general opinion has prevailed that the Admiralty might possibly with advantage have afforded the assistance of two or three large screw men-of-war, by taking out their guns, and thereby facilitating the means of sending troops more rapidly to India; are you of opinion that that might have been done?—I think not. I may mention that early in July the subject was discussed with Sir Charles Wood, and the expediency of affording all the assistance that the Admiralty could to the East India Company, the only ships of the line then in commission were the screw line-of-battle ships employed in the Channel for the defence of the ports of England. Those vessels, I think, amounted to eight or nine.

1645. Sir *Charles Napier.*] The block ships?—Yes; but not one of them was a fit vessel for the conveyance of troops to any distance. They might be very well for a short voyage, but to send them to India was quite out of the question. They were vessels of the old description of line-of-battle ships with machinery put into them, and their amount of stowage was incompetent; they would only stow from 42 to 50 days' provisions, and they were considered unfit vessels to send on so long a voyage.

1646. With regard to any larger or a higher class of ships, were there none available?—With regard to ships of other classes, there were none in England in commission. The Lisbon squadron, comprising eight sail of the line, had been paid off about a month or six weeks before, in consequence of the number of men being 8,000 over what was allowed by Parliament; and the reason that the reduction could not be made without paying off that squadron was, that the reductio ncould now be made from the men on foreign stations, although there was an excess of the usual number of men in China. We had then no less than 9,000 men in the China seas, and if we had commissioned those ships as they were paid off we had no men to put into them. On the 1st of July, at the time

time that the pressure came upon the East India Company, the vote for men was 1,700 seamen over the vote of Parliament, and if we had commissioned any of those ships, they could not have been got ready under five or six weeks at the very soonest. Then came another question, whether it was expedient to send away line-of-battle ships from England, when as many ships as were required, screw steamers and clippers, could be obtained in the ports of England.

1647. Some competent witnesses have stated to the Committee, that the desire to have two or three ships of war in the two or three great ports of India was not with reference to accelerating the transmission of troops, so much as with a view to the moral effect that the appearance of those powerful ships of war might have upon the population, and that is one of the reasons why that was dwelt upon rather strongly?—So far as relates to the squadron then on its way to China, carrying out upwards of 5,000 men, it was diverted from its destination and sent to Calcutta; the "Shannon" frigate, the "Sanspareil" line-of-battle ship, and the "Himalaya," the "Assistance," the "Assurance," the "Simoom," the "Megæra," the "Penelope," all those vessels arrived at Calcutta between the month of July and the month of October; therefore their arrival must have had the moral effect that has been alluded to.

1648. Those ships that went to Calcutta were second-class ships, were they not?—The "Shannon," was a new 50-gun frigate; the "Sanspareil" was a line-of-battle ship; she arrived on the 25th of September.

1649. Is she a 74?—A screw 70-gun ship; the "Sanspareil" was a sailing ship with 400-horse power engines put into her.

1650. Sir *Charles Napier.*] She was never reckoned a good ship, was she?—Not a fast ship; more an auxiliary power than a full-powered ship.

1651. *Chairman.*] With regard to the future, the Committee are desirous of knowing whether permanently there are or are not insuperable objections to the employment of those great line-of-battle ships in a case of emergency, and at a time when those particular impediments to which you have now alluded might not be said to exist?—I consider it is always objectionable to make line-of-battle ships into troop ships, and to send them to any great distance. It is very well for the Mediterranean, as in bringing home the army from the Crimea; they then rendered very great assistance by bringing home 21,000 men, but at the same time the ships were very unnecessarily crowded. We would not attempt to put into ships to send to any distant port the number of men that came from the Crimea, particularly in ships going across the tropics; and I think it is always inexpedient to employ ships of war for that purpose, except for a short distance, when other vessels can be obtained.

1652. The question was with regard to a case of emergency?—No doubt in an emergency that might be done, but not to cross the equator.

1653. Is your objection on the score of discipline, or what?—I think you would disorganise the whole of your fleet, and if you have 20,000 men to send, you must send at least 20 sail of the line, and that must reduce your actual efficient fleet for the naval purposes.

1654. The general opinion was that there were a great number of ships of a high class disposable by the Admiralty, though there was a deficiency of men?—There were a number of sailing line-of-battle ships ready in the ports to be commissioned at a moment's notice; but of the new screw line-of-battle ships there were not sufficient to admit of their being sent from the ports of England.

1655. What might be the number of those large screw ships of war?—We have altogether about 38 sail of large ships; good, serviceable line-of-battle ships.

1656. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Have you 30 sail of screw vessels?—I think, altogether, about 38.

1657. Including the block ships?—Yes.

1658. Had the Lisbon fleet not been paid off, how long would it have taken you to send them to sea?—From about a week to a fortnight they would have required caulking, and defects in the machinery to be made good.

1659. I am talking of ships that came home from the Mediterranean, bringing troops; were they all unfit for service?—I think that was the year before; it was in 1856.

1660. With regard to those ships that were paid off, you would not have paid them off if it had not been for the reduction of the ships?—No. We had a vote

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for 76,000 men during the war. When the peace came that vote came down to 56,000, and in the following year, 1857-58, to 48,000.

1661. Do you remember when the Spaniards marched an army into Portugal, that the ships were sent out in 48 hours to Lisbon?—Perfectly.

1662. If from these large ships, having a crew of 1,100 men, in a case of emergency you had taken out one watch, and the marines, and put troops on board, was there anything to hinder those ships from sailing immediately?—No; that is, if any such large ships were in commission there would be no difficulty whatever for so short a distance, but I think it would be very inexpedient, and very unwise to send them to India.

1663. How many troops could each of those ships embark?—The Horse Guards do not allow any troops to embark, when there is not room to hang up a hammock.

1664. How many did they bring from the Crimea?—I think the "Queen" brought 1,700, with a full crew.

1665. Could not the "Duke of Wellington" have carried out to India, with half a crew, 1,000 men?—I think there would have been unnecessary crowding.

1666. I am talking of an emergency. Do you mean to say that if you had paid off one-half of the ship's company, one watch, that those large ships could not have carried out 1,000 men with the greatest ease?—It is a matter of space.

1667. If one-half of the ship's company had been paid off in one of those large ships, would you have scrupled to send out 1,000 men in her?—I would not certainly have scrupled.

1668. When was the fleet paid off?—The Lisbon squadron between March and May 1857.

1669. In the event of the fleet not having been paid off, if the House of Commons had not reduced the number, you could have sent out between 8,000 and 10,000 men immediately?—I do not think that the Admiralty would have sent one of those ships from England.

1670. Could they have done it?—No doubt about it, but I should say that I do not think there was anything to be gained by it; not one of those ships would have taken the men out in the same time that you could have sent them out by screws, steamers, or clippers.

1671. But the screws were not sent, and if the sailing line-of-battle ships, having their auxiliary screws on board, had started with the wind, following exactly the same course that merchant ships would, using their screws in calms and light winds, would not the troops have been carried faster than in sailing ships?—I do not think they would; not than clipper ships; speaking from my experience of screw vessels, the large new frigates that have gone out; for instance, take the "Chesapeake;" she was 53 days going to the Cape.

1672. Was there anything the matter with her machinery?—Nothing whatever; the "Shannon" was 52 days. I have a return here which gives the length of the different passages to the Cape. I have taken an interest in this question about the passages, and the average length of the passages of screw vessels to the Cape is within a fraction of 50 days.

1673. *Chairman.*] How many voyages of screw ships is that return calculated upon?—I have a great number here; about 25 or 30 ships.

1674. Were they all screws?—Yes.

1675. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Did those screws steam direct out to the Cape?—No, they could not stow coal for that distance; the generality of them coaled at St. Vincent.

1676. Then they did not take the natural course?—Yes, nearly so; a sailing vessel generally passes in sight, or not far to the westward, of St. Vincent.

1677. What has been the quickest sailing of a man-of-war?—I believe 39 days by "Himalaya." I could give in a Return, and it is a very curious one, even with regard to the ships going to India; last summer, for instance, the "Australian" was 38 days; the "John Bell," 54; the "Lady Jocelyn," 44, and the "Robert Lowe," 56 days, going to the Cape.

1678. But she was dismasted, was she not?—Not dismasted, but her mast was injured; the "Ireland" was 51 days; the "Great Britain" was 39 days; the "Calcutta" was 40 days; the "Southampton" was 42 days; the "Thebes," 42 days; the "Carthage," 46 days; the "Vulcan," in 1851, was 56; and again, she was

was 58 days, and a third time 71 days; the "Mauritius" was 55 days; the "Cleopatra," with troops to China, was 49 days; the "Imperatrice" was 38½ days; the "Adelaide" was 49; the "Himalaya" was 39 days; the "Simoom" was 57 days; the "Sanspareil" was 60 days; the "Transit," 42 days; the "Adventure," 58 days; the "Assistance," 64 days; "the Shannon," 52 days; the "Chespeake," 53, and the "Cordelia" 54 days, all screw ships, which would give under 50 days as the average of 30 passages; the "Sidon" was 65 days.

1679. Did they follow out the usual course, and only use the screws in calms and light winds?—Yes; they are obliged to do so; they cannot attempt to face the south-east trades; they steamed as far as their coals would carry them.

1680. Then, in point of fact, if that squadron had not been paid off, they could have sailed with 8,000 or 10,000 men on board in 48 hours?—I would give them a little more than that.

1681. How much more?—Five days for coaling, provisioning, and fitting.

1682. You have stated that you had no ships in commission; but if you had had those ships in commission you would have taken a month to fit them out; do you mean to say that you could have fitted out eight sail of the line, and manned them in a month?—No; I say if we had had the men.

1683. How long, according to the way in which you have been manning ships, would it require to have fitted them out and manned them?—A great deal depends upon the time of the year.

1684. In the most favourable time of the year how long would it take?—Several months.

1685. Can you state how many months; one, two, three, or four?—When you come to fit out eight or ten sail of the line it would take three months at least to fit them out and man them, unless men were ready for them.

1686. Would it take any longer if they were fitted out as men of war, and not as troop ships?—Certainly.

1687. How long would it have taken them?—That depends upon how you can raise the men.

1688. How long have you taken to man one ship since you have been at the Admiralty?—If you have the men in a home port they are completed at once.

1689. How long have you taken to man one ship since you have been at the Admiralty; I mean the shortest time?—I will take the ships that were commissioned, when the First Lord of the Admiralty came down to the House and asked for a vote of 2,000 men in July, namely, the "Chesapeake" and four others, specially commissioned for India. Those ships were commissioned about the 20th July, and sailed from England the end of September.

1690. You are aware that a steamer was sent to Liverpool, and that she towed round a vessel to Portsmouth to receive troops?—Yes.

1691. If a steam merchant vessel had been full of coals, and the troops were put on board at Portsmouth, and a large tug steamer had towed her to the trades, say as far as Madeira, do not you think that that would have expedited the voyage?—No, I doubt it very much. I doubt whether any vessel can make certain of towing another, in anything but next to a calm or very little wind.

1692. Do you remember the "Scourge" towing the "Howe" all the way to Madeira, and bringing her back?—I heard you say so, but I very much doubt the fact. On the passage to Madeira of 12 days 15 hours, the "Howe" was towed one day, two hours; that is from the logs of the ships. On the passage home, out of nine days six hours, she was towed three days six hours.

1693. At what time of the year was that?—In April 1848, coming to England; the passage out was in the month of October 1847.

1694. You stated that you would not send the ships referred to with troops across the equator; why was that?—I think it is inexpedient to send ships of the line to any distant station, and away from England.

1695. Is there any reason why they should not go across the equator?—None whatever, if they can be spared.

1696. *Chairman.*] With regard to the inexpediency, do you mean on political grounds?—Yes.

1697. There was no absolute impracticability?—None; I think, perhaps, as the Committee is discussing this question of the troops, that I may explain the different systems of sending out troops.

1698. What are the different modes of sending out troops to India?—First by employing

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employing a Government troop ship, which you can send where you like Secondly, by hiring transports by the month, and these are vessels taken into Government service so long as they are required. Third. By hired troop ships employed to perform a specific service. Fourth. By a troop freight ship for the conveyance of troops from England to a station abroad. Thus, in sending troops to Calcutta, and when there are no troops to return to England, it is better to charter a ship for the voyage to Calcutta, and then to pay the ship off there.

1699. Sir *Charles Napier.*] In an emergency you would not consider the question of expense at all?—Certainly not.

1700. Mr. *Willoughby.*] On or about what date was the squadron under Commodore Watson ordered to the East Indies?—I think between the 17th and 20th of July.

1701. Were there no suitable vessels in commission for this important duty which might have been sent out at a short notice?—None. The intention of the Admiralty was to form a separate and distinct squadron on the coast of India.

1702. Mr. *Crawford.*] You are acquainted, are you not, with the "Golden Fleece?"—Yes.

1703. You have seen her?—I have.

1704. I see that you have marked upon the chart here the track of her voyage?—I put it there, for I think this vessel and the Sydney's, they are two most extraordinary passages.

1705. It seems to have been the fastest?—Yes; and it was owing to one circumstance that, independent of the usual supply of coal, a large extra quantity was taken in her hold and between decks, and she was actually able to steam the whole distance to Calcutta, except 18 days; therefore, there is no doubt, in a great emergency, vessels like the "Golden Fleece" are exceedingly well adapted for the speedy conveyance of troops. I believe she is one of the best ships that was ever built, and did great credit to the company that built her. She has a lifting screw, and is well rigged as to canvas; but, instead of confining the coal to the coal bunkers alone, she had 120 tons of coal in the hold, and on her arrival at St. Vincent she not only replenished the whole of it, but she also took 100 tons of coal on deck. Therefore the "Golden Fleece" is, I think, an exceptional case as to the passage made, as she steamed the whole way to Calcutta, except 18 days.

1706. Can you state how many days she was under sail, how many days she was under steam, and how many days she stopped to coal on the voyage?—The "Golden Fleece" was six days and four hours under steam alone; she was 40 days and eight hours under steam and sail, and 17 days nine hours under sail only, and she was three days and a half detained to coal.

1707. *Chairman.*] Steam and sail combined?—Yes.

1708. In very light winds?—Yes.

1709. Mr. *Crawford.*] You are aware, are you not, of the manner in which the troops were carried?—I am not.

1710. Do you think that if you had had screw line-of-battle ships, or other suitable ships, available for the purpose, that the service would have been more efficiently performed by such ships of the Royal Navy than by the "Golden Fleece" and other first class merchant steamers?—No.

1711. With regard to the comfort of the men, was not the advantage on the side of the merchant steamers?—No; I think that the comfort on board would be equal, but not superior to, that of any man-of-war.

1712. *Chairman.*] In making use of men-of-war in this manner, are their lower guns taken out?—Yes.

1713. What was done with regard to those ships that brought the troops home from the Crimea?—They took nothing out; they were exceedingly crowded; it is lucky that there was no sickness, but it was a great emergency.

1714. How many line-of-battle ships were employed in that way?—Sixteen line-of-battle ships, besides frigates and smaller vessels.

1715. How many men did they bring home?—21,402 men.

1716. And what quantity of cannon?—I have no return of the guns and stores brought home.

1717. They were brought in the same vessels, were they not?—Not many they came home principally in sailing transports.

1718. Mr. *Crawford.*] Is there a transport service connected with the Admiralty?—There is a Transport Department under the comptroller of the Victualling and Transport Services; that was always the arrangement during peace; but during the war, or after the first 15 months of it, when I had the chief responsibility, a Transport Board was formed to carry on the business during the war; but when the peace came the Transport Department was reduced to what it was before.

1719. Are there any of Her Majesty's ships particularly set aside for transport service?—Yes, nine; the "Himalaya," the "Urgent," the "Perseverance," the "Assurance," the "Assistance," the "Simoom," the "Vulcan," the "Megæra," and the "Transit." The "Transit" was lost in the Straits of Banca, and there are now eight.

1720. As a general principle do you think that the transport of troops to such a distance as India could be, in fact, carried on better, by taking up such ships as are offered in the open market; or by having a transport service connected with the Admiralty?—I think it is always requisite to have a certain number of transports under the Admiralty; but I think as a general question, we should go to the private trade on any great emergency. It depends on the service to be performed; for if you have to send a regiment to a place, and nothing to bring home, it is better to employ the merchant ship.

1721. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Do you think it injures line-of-battle ships to employ them as transports?—Not the ships themselves.

1722. Viscount *Goderich.*] Did you not employ the Queen's ships to take the troops from the Cape?—Immediately the news came home from India, instructions were sent out by the Admiralty to the officer in command there, Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Grey, to place any ships at the Cape at the disposal of the Governor; and in consequence of that, the "Penelope" and the "Megæra" proceeded to Calcutta, and the "Boscawen" was ready to go, if she was wanted.

1723. *Chairman.*] Were those frigates?—The "Penelope" is a steam frigate. The "Megæra" is a troop ship; there was another frigate, the "Castor," and the "Boscawen," a line-of-battle ship, ready if required; the "Boscawen" was the flag ship.

1724. There were four ships of great power?—The "Penelope" and "Megæra" were steam-vessels; the other sailing.

1725. Viscount *Goderich.*] Can you give the Committee any information as to the voyages which those vessels made?—No, I cannot now, but I could furnish it.

1726. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] There was one vessel, was there not, employed to carry horses?—Several ships were taken up at the Cape, and are still continued to be taken up to carry horses to Calcutta.

1727. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Was not the "Himalaya" one?—Yes, the "Himalaya" after landing troops at Calcutta went to the Cape for horses.

1728. *Chairman.*] Are there merchant ships lying at the Cape generally?—Yes; there was no difficulty in getting ships there. The question of employing sailing vessels *versus* steamers, had been considered by Sir Charles Wood and myself. The feeling that I had was, that if those vessels had to coal at more than two places, then a clipper ship would probably have the advantage during the south-west monsoon, and I wrote to Lloyd's, and requested the secretary to be kind enough to furnish me with a return of the number of days that clipper sailing vessels took from England to Calcutta, and he reported between 90 and 100, and a large mercantile house in Glasgow wrote to Sir Charles Wood, showing the average of sailing vessels from Glasgow to Calcutta direct, and the general average was 94½ days; therefore, the making of speedy passages depends upon the question whether those ships are to coal at a number of ports or not, the same as Mr. Lindsay's packets, and they were upon the average 104 to Calcutta.

1729. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] Did that average extend over the whole year?—I think so. The Admiralty considered a difficulty would arise upon the question of coals; and when the East India Company applied to the Admiralty, we sent them a return of all we had in store, and we found that if any number of

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screw steamers were to be sent from England with troops, it was quite obvious that they would fail for want of coal at the Cape of Good Hope. We always keep up a supply for about a year's expenditure; but in consequence of the large fleet that went out to China, gunboats and others, our expenditure in the first seven months of the year 1857 averaged 9,000 tons, whereas our yearly expenditure from 1854 to 1857 did not exceed 2,500; and though we had sent out large supplies to meet the gunboats going to China, yet there was not sufficient to meet any demand made by vessels conveying troops to India. In the beginning of August, the "Assistance," going to China, was detained three days for want of coal. Luckily a collier came in, and she went on; it was considered more safe to send some sailing ships during the south-west monsoon, and by the time of the change of the monsoon there would be a store of coal at the Cape of Good Hope, for any vessels requiring a supply during the north-east monsoon.

1730. Captain *Vivian.*] The question is, whether, for the future, there should not be a large provision of coal at all the stations?—We always keep up the supply for one year, and the moment that we see any emergency arising, then we immediately send supplies out as fast as we can to meet the emergency.

1731. What do you mean by a year's supply; for how many ships?—For the whole of the ships on the station, and those passing from China. We have a monthly return sent home, and when we see that any extraordinary supply has been made, we send out more.

1732. Might you not have three times the quantity ready?—It would perish; it deteriorates very much; but if any service is required to be performed, the requisite supply of coal would be kept up.

1733. Mr. *Crawford.*] Was any application made by any department of Her Majesty's Government to the Admiralty to know whether there were any men-of-war available for the conveyance of troops to India in the beginning of July?—I am not aware of any, unless made personally to the First Lord of the Admiralty.

1734. *Chairman.*] It has been stated in evidence before this Committee that a request was made by the President of the Board of Control, at the instance of the Chairs of the Directors of the East India Company, and that the reply was that the Admiralty had no ships?—I think it probable that it was a communication to the First Lord personally in the Cabinet; I am not aware of any public letter.

1735. Mr. *Crawford.*] Do you attribute the rapid passage of the "Golden Fleece" to the fact of her not calling at the Cape?—Certainly, having taken on board extra supplies of coal at St. Vincent's.

1736. She made her passage by taking a due south course from St. Vincent?—Yes, going right straight to Calcutta.

1737. She went from St. Vincent to Ceylon without calling anywhere?—Yes.

1738. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Were the steamers that went to the Cape in the number of days which you have mentioned, all men-of-war steamers?—Not all, there were some taken up as transports carrying troops to China last year; the "Mauritius" was one.

1739. Have you taken the average of the number of days to the Cape?—Under 50 days.

1740. There were six steamers that went to Ceylon, and their average was only 76½ days; those must have been very inferior vessels that took so long to go to the Cape?—No, they were very good vessels; the average was under 50 days.

1741. What was the average afterwards to Ceylon?—They did not go on.

1742. How has the "Renown" been manned since she has been put in commission?—I cannot tell off-hand.

1743. When was she commissioned?—About three months ago.

1744. She was commissioned on the 22d of November, and this is the 16th of March. Does the "Marlborough" man?—Slowly, but not likely to be manned for some time.

1745. *Chairman.*] Have you heard that in transferring the French army from Bulgaria to the Crimea, the French line-of-battle ships carried very large bodies of troops?—Yes, because they have, I believe, no transports.

1746. Did you understand that there was any very great inconvenience resulting

resulting from that?—We all know that it is a great inconvenience to have ships lumbered with troops, and the discipline and drill and everything is interfered with; it is always to be avoided, if possible.

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1747. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Did not our ships also carry in the Black Sea a considerable number of troops on the expedition to Kinburn?—I do not think very many. There were about 5,000 men in five sail of the line and two frigates; you had always ready transport for the movement of 10,000 at Balaclava.

1748. You are not aware that they were more than three weeks on board our ships of war at that time?—No.

1749. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You mentioned that the "Perseverance" was one of transport ships attached to the navy?—Yes, she was a vessel that was purchased from Messrs. Mare.

1750. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Was that the one that turned over?—Yes.

1751. Mr. *Willoughby.*] The Committee have heard that she was overmasted?—She was masted exactly in accordance with the drawings sent by the builder; but the builder himself made a mistake; he sent the "Urgent's" masts instead of the "Perseverance's," and her masts were afterwards reduced; she never was masted larger than a 30-gun ship, although I believe it was otherwise stated in the evidence. Here are the dimensions, which I beg to hand in (*the same was delivered in*).

Vide Appendix.

1752. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Are you aware that the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels that went round the Cape never coaled at all at the Cape of Good Hope?—They coaled at St. Vincent, where they took in coal in their holds, in order to make the long passage. I believe the average of their passages was 83 days.

1753. The return that I obtained was from the director, Mr. Wilcox, and he stated that they never stopped at all?—I think it was 82 days.

Captain *John Cochrane Hoseason,* called in; and Examined.

Captain *J. C. Hoseason.*

1754. *Chairman.*] YOU are in the British Navy, are you not?—Yes, I am a Commander.

1755. Have you sailed in the Red Sea?—I have not been in the Red Sea.

1756. Have you been much in the Mediterranean?—I have been nine years in the Mediterranean.

1757. What is the description of the ports on the north coast of Egypt; there are two or three; there is a port at Aboukir, and a port at Alexandria, are there not?—I have been through all the ports in the Mediterranean.

1758. What is the description of those ports; are they safe, generally speaking?—Alexandria occasionally is difficult to approach; but since steamers have been more in use they generally can succeed in getting in at any time; in fact, we see that in the wonderful regularity with which the steamers go to and from India.

1759. Is there a great capacity for ships in that harbour?—Great capacity. I have been many times in Alexandria.

1760. What may be the diameter of the entrance?—The entrance of some of the channels is narrow to go in; but as the pilotage is well known, the difficulty of entering the harbour is nothing, I should say, in fact, to a steamer; the communication is carried on like at Point de Galle, and that communication is infinitely more difficult than any place in the port of Alexandria.

1761. In the case of ships of war, either steam ships or sailing ships, if they arrived with troops, for instance, on the coast of Egypt, with a view to disembark them at Alexandria, if circumstances required them to wait for a few days, there would probably be no inconvenience?—None that I know of. I have been up to Cairo in Egypt, and I saw no inconvenience anywhere in those days.

1762. Have you been in a ship waiting at Alexandria?—Yes; I have been lying two months at a time at Alexandria.

1763. What is the description of the Bay or Port of Aboukir?—I have not been in the Bay of Aboukir, but I should say over the whole of the Mediterranean there is no space where a steamer might not lie. I do not see the object of the question exactly.

1764. The object is this: in case of sending troops, when matters were not in complete readiness to send them across Egypt, they might have to wait on the coast?—I have heard that question debated a good deal, and the only thing

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that occurs to me is this, the climate cannot affect them; the only possible objection to using a route not organised, is the detention of your troops for any lengthened period where there is not accommodation for a large number. The climate is good, and there is nothing injurious in it. If 20,000 men, for example, had been sent to Egypt, there is nothing against those 20,000 men being there, but that they would have to wait till means arrived at Suez to take them on. I should think that Egypt is very healthy. There is an error with regard to the monsoon in the word; it is only a wind blowing periodically in a certain direction, and it is just as healthy as any other wind. The south-west monsoon is not an infectious wind: it is a retarding wind for vessels coming from India to Suez, but it is wholesome; in fact, it purifies all India when it comes.

1765. With regard to the employment of ships of war for the conveyance of troops, as you are a naval officer, are you of opinion that it would be highly inconvenient; and if so, on what grounds?—I consider that that is a question of opinion; it is a question of opinion which will mainly rest with the Cabinet.

1766. In a case of emergency do you think that there would be any difficulty?—If I were to employ them in the Mediterranean, then I should be perhaps favourable to the employment of line of battle ships; but there are practical objections when you have to send them to distant stations. But the whole question of the capacity of a large line of battle ship or a screw must be gone into, and this Committee will form no conclusions without they know what clear space there is in a line of battle ship at their disposal. Screws have revolutionised our position in one respect with rapid communication, but they have made line of battle ships incapable of keeping at sea for lengthened periods, like they did in former wars; for example, a line of battle ship could keep at sea with 1,000 men for 9, 10 or 12 months, but a line of battle ship cannot keep at sea for that time now, for a screw engine occupies so large a space that the provisions only last for three instead of 9, 10 or 12 months; therefore the capacity of the ship, abstractedly, may be as great on her decks, but her capacity for provisions and stores is altogether taken away from her, when the engine-room, the shaft, and the boilers are taken into account.

1767. Supposing there was a first-rate sailing ship and a first-rate steamer of the same tonnage or nearly so, have you ever made a calculation as to the proportionate diminution of capacity for stores or troops in a steamer of that description relatively to a sailer of the same tonnage?—Sailing vessels and screw ships have so materially altered of late years, especially since the repeal of the Navigation Laws has brought competition with America, that there is no analogy, or no comparison can be made. I have previously listened to Admiral Milne's evidence, and I think that the dates of the times when the ships were built should be compared. With regard to two steamers, for example: between one steamer of 600-horse power and another steamer there is as much difference as between a donkey and a racehorse; there is no comparison to be made between two vessels, without you know the different proportions of the ships; the vessel of 2,500 tons that has a 60-horse engine is not the same vessel that is of 2,600 tons and has got a 300-horse engine; therefore, we must know the size of the ship, the momentum of the ship, the capacity of the engine in her, and also her capacity for coal. I have heard the evidence which has been given by Admiral Milne; he talked of Mr. Lindsay's ships, but Mr. Lindsay's ships all differ from each other; that is to say, the ratio of horse power to the tonnage materially differs, and one vessel may be hardly removed from a sailing vessel, or hardly able to do more than steam three or four knots in a calm, and the other vessel may make the very same velocity for tonnage, the conditions being the same; we must know the horse-power. Mr. Lindsay's vessels materially differ.

1768. Sir *Charles Napier*.] Are you aware that much stowage has been gained in screws by distilling water?—There is no question that it is a most important gain.

1769. Then there would be much more room for provisions?—There is no question that it would be so.

1770. Would you have any hesitation whatever in taking the "Duke of Wellington," starting with half her crew, that is 500 men and 1,000 troops, to India?—

India?—Am I to understand that that question applies to the mere capacity of the ship to do it?

1771. Suppose you commanded the "Duke of Wellington," fully manned with 1,100 men, and an order from the Admiralty was issued to take the guns out of the lower deck, and out of her main deck, to discharge all her marines, and keep 500 seamen on board, would you have any hesitation in taking 1,000 men in her to India?—Not the least.

1772. Supposing, in the case of an emergency, when the news arrived, the Admiralty had sent off a telegraphic despatch to do this, how long would it take, if the "Duke of Wellington" had been at Spithead, to get to sea?—You might have been at sea in 48 hours, and you might have been at Calcutta within 80 days, without a doubt; there is no question of it.

1773. If you had commanded that ship with the troops on board, you would not have thought of steaming with her straight to the Cape of Good Hope?—Certainly not.

1774. You would have taken the passage that the sailors do, and used your screw only when becalmed, and in light winds?—If I had had the power I should have requested a vessel of the same tonnage or momentum to tow me towards the equator; I should then leave at that period of the year, July, August, September, which tells us are the very months in the year to send sailing vessels from England.

1775. If you were the captain of that ship, and such an order came down to you, and you exercised your own discretion, you would go straight out with the trade wind, the same as a sailing vessel does, and you would use your steam only in calms and light winds?—Yes.

1776. The "Duke of Wellington" would make the passage just as well, would he not, as any other ship?—Not quite so well as any other ship, because other ships have more capacity for fuel, to combine steaming with sailing.

1777. Your lower deck guns and main deck guns would be out, and all the shot room given, so that you could stow more coals in the "Duke of Wellington"?—You cannot alter the "Duke of Wellington's" bow; many of those steamers will go much faster; their lines are bluffer below the water.

1778. In point of fact, you see no objection to sending the "Duke of Wellington" out with 1,000 men to India?—I see no objection whatever.

1779. You would anticipate making a good voyage?—You would have a fair voyage.

1780. There would be plenty of room, and plenty of air, for the people, would there not?—Yes.

1781. There would be more air than in merchant vessels, and more room to move about?—With the guns out, I should say so, decidedly.

1782. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] If you had had your choice, what would you have done?—If you say, "They are all ready, which will you choose?" then the case is materially altered.

1783. Then which would you choose?—Then I should make my selection from the transport service; from the whole marine of Great Britain.

1784. You think that transports would be better for the conveyance of troops to India than line-of-battle ships?—Yes. The question then turns upon what steamers you allow me; whether you allow me to avail myself of the whole knowledge which I possess of the whole mercantile marine of the country, and make my own selection; I should then select from such vessels as the Cunard line, and the best of the Royal West India Mail line of vessels, which I know have for the last five years averaged about 12 nautical miles an hour. I know and possess many of the performances of those ships for the last five years; I know that that velocity is obtainable; and I know that it has been obtainable in the turbulent ocean, the North Atlantic. It is a mean deduced from going against the westerly winds, and in their favour. I have then a fact, and if I can only select a ground of equidistance, in which the road is easier, plainer, and smoother, I have the minimum speed obtainable; therefore I should select, say, the "Arabia." Having the power of the contracts entirely at my command, by telegraph I should order the "Arabia" to be ready, and I should, taking up the list, order another to be ready, and order them to come hereafter, and be at the port in 24 hours, supposing the existence

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of coal; to reckon on the stations for my coal, as without that a steamer is the worst ship; but if the coal is there she is the best; I should be secure that she would perform 12 nautical miles an hour to India; I have only to get the positive abstract distances of the different stages, and I have the fact to an hour; the question in fact then turns upon the coal consumed.

1785. Without coaling on the road?—There is the coaling at the different stages, Sierra Leone, and the Cape; not in Table Bay, with the Admiralty accommodation, which is the worst that I ever saw in my life; it took me three weeks to get on board very fractional portions of coal. I have found the coaling vary; sometimes at the rate of 15 tons only obtained in 24 hours, and 350 tons, which was obtained at the distance of two miles from the shore.

1786. *Chairman.*] Was that in Table Bay?—No; one was in Simon's Bay. When a south-westerly gale sets in, it is impossible nearly to coal alongside. Table Bay is an open roadstead, but a very rapid place for coaling; I took on board there 40 tons in one hour, in the "Inflexible;" I put into the Cape, and was ordered round by the senior officer to go to Simon's Bay; I went round there to coal, and I took 40 tons an hour on board, which is at that rate 960 tons in 24 hours, so that with relays, any steamer may coal at the rate of 960 tons a day, with proper working arrangements on shore. Captain Cooper Kay, now in China, stated that he had taken 45 tons an hour, and I know that other officers have taken at the rate of 50; but in computations of this sort it is safest to take a minimum average, and you may count on 40 tons an hour, so that all the detentions from coaling may be brought to that point.

1787. Sir *Charles Napier.*] It must be very fine weather in Table Bay to do that?—If the Committee were to move for the returns of the 10 steamers of the General Screw Company that went out to Calcutta, and were employed for two years, they would get the mean average performances of those boats, and the time that they were detained to coal at the Cape; the Committee will get the returns monthly, as they were packets, and at all seasons of the year; they will get all those steamers' performances for two years every month.

1788. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] They failed notoriously in performing their contract, did they not?—They failed in performing their contract, as I predicted. When I came home I stated that, if they had 50,000,000 *l.* of capital to work on; it was a bankrupt company that they had started; I went on board the "Queen of the South" with Captain Edmonds, and I said, "What a pity it is to think that all this capital is lost by the attempt to go round the Cape under any Government contract; it will be ruin to the company that undertakes it."

1789. *Chairman.*] Why so?—I will explain. I was asked to meet a company of merchants, of which Mr. Robert Napier, the great engineer, was one, and Mr. Lindsay another, on my return to England; they submitted to me the Admiralty plan to go out to India, and I begged them to have nothing to do with the contract, because it was perfectly at variance with the winds, and the course that the ships were to take was all in the teeth of south-east trade, and as a consequence I said they would fail in delivering their mails at St. Helena altogether; and the Post-office, the very next voyage they took, when the news came home, would have to advertise that the letters that were to go to St. Helena should go to the Cape, and then take St. Helena as they came home.

1790. If they had taken another route you think that the contract would have answered?—Yes; but the whole class of steamers must be changed.

1791. What route should they have taken?—The inshore route.

1792. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] This Screw Steam Navigation Company which you are acquainted with was intended, was it not, to go to India by the straight route, running from the Cape de Verde Islands to the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes.

1793. As soon as they cross the line, do they not fall in with the south-east trades, which there assumes the character of an inshore wind, and do they not have the greatest difficulty in getting to the Cape?—Yes.

1794. It was there that the great consumption of coals took place, was it not?—Yes.

1795. Following the usual tracks of ships going to India, crossing the line in 22° west, and going to Trinidad to the southward, according to the usual tracks, would not those ships have been able to make their passage to India without that great expenditure of coal, and wear and tear?—No, I do not think they would; and the reason that I give is this: there is an error prevalent, that a steamer

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under steam and sail keeps the same course that she does under sail alone; that is to say, that if a steamer finds the wind, on crossing the equator, southerly, where it must hang to the southward, she will lie up within six points of the wind, but directly you try to accelerate her velocity, and make her go, not at three knots an hour, but to go eight, then you do not steer the same course; you cannot possibly lie within six points of the wind then; you may be going off west, and then you never would go to your destination. A steamer moved by steam and sail does not lie so near to the wind, and then the question is, what course you gain.

1796. Sir *Charles Napier.*] That is in fine weather?—Yes, whenever the velocity of a ship under sail is small through the water, when you seek even by auxiliary power to increase that velocity, say from three to eight miles an hour, the ship does not lie on the course she did before; I found that out in going through the "Trades" myself. I saw the sailing vessels lying up at six points, two points to windward of me, and I was astonished to find that I could not lie so close to them; but on stopping the engine, to repair a defect, she lay up just in the wake of the other ships, and the very moment that I put two boilers pressure on her she fell off those two points, and absolutely lay two points further to the westward than she did before.

1797. If those clippers brace their yards much sharper, they go much nearer the wind than six points now-a-day?—The argument holds good, whatsoever the points are; if you say that one ship braces up sharper, I take it to be the result of going faster through the water by what the steam makes, and the ship falls off.

1798. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You stated that you could have got the "Duke of Wellington" ready in 48 hours, taking out the guns and shot, and could have embarked 1,000 men in that time; is not that a very short period?—I assume, as Sir Charles Napier assumed, that the ship was ready for sea; I assume that the soldiers are all ready for embarkation; I assume all that, as it was put to me; it has been assumed that if the Cape is 7,000 miles from England, and if a certain average speed be obtained, then the sequence is that the same average speed will be obtained on the other side; that is a great fallacy. At different periods of the monsoons it takes 40 days to go from the Cape to Calcutta, and 80 days to go from Calcutta to the Cape; by the simple change of the monsoon the lengths of time are reversed, so that the very opposition of the wind would make an average of 40 days.

Veneris, 19° *die Martii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Byng.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Osborne.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Captain Vivian.
Viscount Goderich.	Mr. Willoughby.
Mr. Horsman.	

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR DE LACY EVANS, K. C. B., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable *Robert Vernon Smith*, a Member of the House; Examined.

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1799. SOME statements have been made by some of the witnesses which have led the Committee to think it desirable to understand how far you may or may not concur with them; perhaps you may recollect that several very serious symptoms of disaffection in the sepoy army manifested themselves early in January, February, or March?—Yes.

1800. About what time might those accounts have reached you?—The Committee are perhaps aware that the President of the Board of Control has no official

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official correspondence with the Governor-General; in a private letter from Lord Canning, dated the 22d of February, it was stated that there were such symptoms of disaffection as the Honourable Chairman has mentioned, but it did not state it as a matter of very serious importance. That letter arrived, I think, about the beginning of April.

1801. In the official documents which have been laid before the Committee, it appears that there were also a great many incendiary fires; were those alluded to by the Governor-General?—In that letter they were, but none previously.

1802. On the 9th or 19th of May, in the House of Lords, a late Governor-General of India, Lord Ellenborough, appears to have conceived already some alarm, and to have inquired what reinforcements were being sent to India; a reply was made by Lord Panmure, but as you were probably much more conversant with the whole state of things than they were, will you state whether you had at that time any reason to apprehend that it was necessary to take precautionary measures?—My attention had been awakened to the circumstance that such aid would be required, but I do not think that it had been excited by any communication from the Government of India.

1803. Are the Committee right in supposing that the telegraphic despatches that arrive at the India House are immediately forwarded to the Board of Control?—Yes, the same day, or the day after, if important.

1804. It was on the evening of the 27th of June that the telegraph arrived with regard to the rising at Meerut; was it transmitted on that day or the next to the Board of Control?—I have no doubt that it was.

1805. It appears that the directors did not assemble to consider those despatches until the 29th, and perhaps they did not make any communication to the Board of Control even on that day; can you remember when they made a communication to the Board of Control in consequence of that telegraph with regard to sending additional troops?—I have not refreshed my memory as to dates; but I think it was on the 29th of June that I stated in the House of Commons what had passed, therefore it was probable that before that the telegraphic despatch had been communicated to me.

1806. It has appeared from some of the witnesses, that at the India House even those events at Meerut and Delhi did not create great alarm or great apprehension of very momentous results; was that the case at the Board of Control?—No, I cannot say to that extent that it did not create very great alarm and apprehension; it certainly did not create the expectation of what has happened since, nor do I think it did in the mind of any man. I have been reproached for having treated it too lightly in the House of Commons; but at the same time, though I said I hoped it would end well, I also stated that we were prepared for the worst, and that I conceive was the attitude which any Minister was bound to take.

1807. An expression was made use of by you, that it was necessary to put the spur into the Court of Directors; on the other hand, the witnesses from the Court of Directors would rather lead the Committee to suppose that they had been putting the spur into the Board of Control. Did you find any remissness on the part of the Court of Directors in the exertions which they made on this subject?—It is very difficult to defend a metaphor; perhaps it is rather a young thing to use one; but if I did use it, I think I stated that I should deal with them as I believe the gallant General or any other person would deal with a generous horse if he found himself in difficulties; he would lay the reins on his neck, while he kept the spur ready to put into him in case he failed. If the gallant General asks me whether I ever found it necessary to spur the Court of Directors, I may fairly say that in some instances I did not think they acted quick enough; I was always ready to press them to act quicker. They may, of course, reproach me with similar remissness, and if they can prove it I must submit to the reproach.

1808. Do you recollect at what date the communication was made that a portion of the troops should be conveyed by the overland route?—The first official request made to me was on the last day of August, the first written request, as will appear by the papers before the Committee.

1809. It has been stated in evidence that the directors caused their Chairs to make repeated verbal communications on that subject to you previously?—That I think

think is all stated, as well as I can state it, on the papers before the Committee. If the Committee wish me to resume that question, it is of course a very disagreeable thing to be personally opposed to gentlemen whom I so much respect as the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors; but I am completely at issue with them as to the manner in which they made that request. I should perhaps inform the Committee that the usual habit of communication between the President of the Board of Control and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors is first by a private interview, which takes place for the purpose, as I conceive, of smoothing the passage of measures through the Court of Directors; but I never should consider anything stated at those private interviews so solemnly put before me as to communicate it to the Cabinet of which I was a member as the opinion of the Court, without a special direction from the Court of Directors. The Chairman I believe has stated that he had frequent discussions with me upon the subject of the overland route; there is no doubt that that is true; we discussed that and every other means of conveying troops, but I conceive it to be also plain that if the Court of Directors really thought it was of vital importance to the preservation of our empire in India that the overland route should be taken, it was their solemn duty not to trust to oral communications, but to put on paper and convey to the Cabinet that such was their wish and such their belief. They never did so; there is no record whatever of it; nothing appears on their minutes of its having been done; and if it was done otherwise, which is contrary to my recollection, I can only say that it seems to me that, so far from exonerating them, it would be rather casting an imputation upon them, that they did not take more formal means to make that wish known.

1810. You mentioned a date in August at which the first official communication on this subject was made by the Chairs of the East India Company; what was that date?—The 31st of August.

1811. Was any communication made by you to the Cabinet on that subject until you received that communication of the 31st of August?—I do not know that I am at liberty to say what passes in the Cabinet; everything that could be discussed was discussed in the Cabinet, and every means of conveyance of troops to India.

1812. It appears that what deterred the Court from writing in the first instance formally, was some intimation that had been made from the Board of Control that there were political reasons which precluded the use of that passage; is that correct?—Among other reasons, no doubt there were political reasons; but when they state that, in consequence of their belief that there were political reasons against it, they declined to embarrass Her Majesty's Government by further representations, I conceive as they had no scruple in embarrassing Her Majesty's Government, if they thought so, on the 31st of August, they need not have had any scruple in doing it on the 30th or 31st of July.

1813. Statements had been made at an early period that the Viceroy of Egypt had expressed an entire willingness to admit of the passage of troops through Egypt; at what time might such a communication have reached the Board of Control?—Not previously to that.

1814. There have also been in the public prints statements made to the effect that our Ambassador at Constantinople, on receiving a communication of the state of affairs at Meerut and Delhi, lost no time (I believe that statement was made on the 30th of June) in soliciting the Sultan's Government to grant his authority for the use of the overland route; did any such circumstance reach the Board of Control?—That representation, if it was so, would have been made to the Foreign Office, and not to the Board of Control.

1815. Did it not reach the Board of Control?—I think not.

1816. The 31st of August was the date of the first official communication; how soon after that did the Government comply with the request that was made?—I believe very shortly after that communications were entered into with the Peninsular and Oriental Company for sending small detachments of troops overland; but when the Honourable Chairman puts that question, as if the compliance with that request was an alteration of opinion from the first refusal of it, I may remind him that the seasons were altered, and communications had been made with the Indian Government, which made us believe that they were more likely to have the means of transporting troops from Suez to Bombay.

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1817. Had there been any communications that came, not officially direct to the Board of Control, but through the Court of Directors, from the Governor-General of India, or from the Governor of Bombay, to the Government in this country, suggesting the expediency of making a greater use of the overland route?—No, I believe not.

1818. One way or the other?—No; I have been told in private letters by Lord Canning since, that we were quite right in not having used the overland route, and if we had, the troops would have been clubbed at Suez for want of accommodation; that their steam resources were very scanty, as I knew, and that the ships were not good; even the last ship sent out, the "Dalhousie," had been obliged to put into dock, out of which it would not come at a cost of less than 2,500 *l.* And if they had sent ships to Suez they would not have had them available in general for traffic between the Indian ports, or for the transport of troops from the Cape and the Mauritius.

1819. Do you know the number of troops which have now passed over that route?—I cannot answer offhand, not having an opportunity of referring to documents, but I think Sir George Clerk or Sir Henry Storks will inform the Committee.

1820. Viscount *Goderich.*] You stated that you believed that no suggestions had been made by the Governor-General on the subject of sending troops overland. Has your attention been directed to a letter from the Governor-General of India in Council, dated the 7th of August 1857, which is to be found among the Indian mutiny papers, in which I find this passage: "We are also in communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company for the conveyance from Suez of the troops that may possibly have been despatched to India by that route soon after the intelligence of the mutinies reached England. It is understood that the ordinary mail-steamers of this company can bring 400 men from Suez each trip, and more if there are few passengers. Instructions have accordingly been given for preparing the 'Bentinck,' the steamer which conveys the present mail, for the reception on board of that vessel of as many men as she can convey in addition to the ordinary passengers"?—Yes.

1821. Does that make any difference in your answer to that question?—No. I am obliged to the noble Lord for putting it, because I understood the gallant General's question to refer to a time previous to the official application of the Court of Directors. At the time that letter was received we were actually in communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company about sending the troops.

1822. *Chairman.*] Was that the first communication from India in point of date referring to that route?—I believe so.

1823. Have you any objection to state to the Committee whether you understood from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors, in the course of those interviews which they had with you previously to the 31st of August, that they were expressing the opinion of the Court of Directors, and whether those opinions were in favour of sending troops by the overland route?—I should certainly say that they were not in a formal manner stating the opinion of the Court of Directors. It was not then stated that those things had passed in the Court, or that they had been discussed among their colleagues. At this distance of time I cannot say accurately, but I have no doubt that it is correct, as they assert that they did say something about it, but they never put it before me in such a formal shape that I should have considered it necessary to have stated it to my colleagues in the Cabinet as the united opinion of the Court of Directors, nor do I think that I could have done so. It has been frequently the case, in my experience, that the opinion of the Court of Directors, when taken by a division, or by a formal record to be placed on their minutes, was very different from what I had heard it stated by the Chairs.

1824. Then those interviews did not leave the impression upon your mind that it was decided by the opinion of the Court of Directors that the overland route ought to be adopted?—Certainly not. My opinion is fairly this, with regard to the Court of Directors, however they might have discussed this question, as we might have discussed it in the Cabinet, or as any Honourable Member might have discussed it in private, that until the plot thickened, and the danger became greater, and the public took up the question, they did not put

put it in any official shape, and that the first official shape in which they put it, as I think is made clear by the letter itself, was on the 31st of August. If the Committee look at that letter, they will see that it begins by stating that in consequence of the news received by the mail which arrived on Saturday last they made this application. I think there were two letters between us before they intimated, as they did in the third, that it had always been their opinion. When they said that, I took notice of it; I saw there was a contradiction of opinion between us that would lead to public discussion.

1825. You stated, did you not, that there were some political reasons which led you to think it not desirable in July or August to send troops overland to India; had that ceased to be operative when you did adopt the overland route?—It had diminished, and with that diminution also had occurred, as I pointed out, a difference of reason. The Committee will perhaps remember, with regard to a charge, which had not the slightest foundation in truth, not even an excuse for the charge made against me by Lord Derby for my negligence on this subject, Mr. Wilcox, the chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, wrote a letter, which was read by the Duke of Argyle, stating that they never would have thought of proposing the overland route earlier than that time; and if the Peninsular and Oriental Company who were to have the charge of it would not have proposed it, I think it is clear that the Court of Directors would hardly have thought of advancing it.

1826. You are aware, are you not, that the Peninsular and Oriental Company did send out directions by the mail of the 10th September, by which time the East India Company proposed in their first official letter to send out similar orders and directions for all vessels to be prepared to take troops by the overland route, if required?—Yes.

1827. Therefore at that time it had struck the Peninsular and Oriental Company that it was possible that troops might be so sent, though it was not your opinion?—Yes; it was on the 10th of September, and it was very shortly after that that we did send troops. The whole question turned upon the want of preparation. There is no doubt that if by preparation everything had been anticipated we might have ventured upon that route, but we could not when nothing was anticipated, and when we thought that there would be the greatest embarrassment, and risk to the health of the troops; they feared the greatest danger from delay, and also that the troops would be landed in such a state as I am sure the gallant General would never wish to see.

1828. You consider that you did avail yourself of that route at the earliest period at which proper arrangements could be made?—I believe we did to that extent, and to those numbers.

1829. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Did you apply to the Admiralty to send troops out to India by ships of war?—I mentioned to Sir Charles Wood that it was the request of the Chairman and Court of Directors that they should be so sent.

1830. What was his reply?—I think Sir Charles Wood's reply was, that he had none to send, or could not spare them.

1831. *Chairman.*] What was the date of that communication?—I think it was shortly after we heard of the outbreak.

1832. It was correct, was it, that the Board of Admiralty had no ships to give?—I suppose so, from Sir Charles Wood saying so.

1833. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Did the Court of Directors press you to send troops out to India by steam round the Cape of Good Hope?—No, I think I rather pressed them to send them out.

1834. Did you consult the Admiralty as to whether it was better to send troops to India by steam or by sailing vessels?—Yes, I took the opinion of the Admiralty.

1835. What was that opinion?—The opinion of the Admiralty I would rather that the Committee would get from Captain Milne; but as far as I recollect, it was that they had taken the average of passages, and that they found that sailing vessels were nearly equal in speed to screw steamers; and I think that Sir Charles Wood stated that in the House of Commons.

1836. You stated in the House of Commons that there was no Marine Board at the Board of Control?—Yes.

1837. There is a Marine Board attached to the Court of Directors, is there not?—Yes.

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1838. Did you consult them as to the propriety of sending troops out by steamers?—I had their opinion, certainly.

1839. Do you remember what it was?—Their opinion was expressed through Captain Shepherd, who manages most of those things at the India House.

1840. Did you take any other steps to inform yourself from the Peninsular and Oriental Company as to what was the average number of days' passage by their vessels to India round the Cape?—I had a general report from the India House and from the Admiralty, but I had no private communication with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, if the question means that. I should state that the information is all derivative at the Board of Control; it comes through the Court of Directors to me; there is no Marine Board, and no naval person whatever to consult at the Board of Control, and therefore the gallant Admiral may imagine that I was to a certain extent in a helpless situation. I could only apply to the Admiralty, or implicitly believe everything said to me at the India House. That is what has given rise to the evidence of Captain Shepherd, which through the kindness of the Chairman I have been permitted to read. Captain Shepherd had always been the person who had conducted the whole of the Marine Department at the India House, and in ordinary times the only duty of the Board of Control was financial, to see that they did not take up the most expensive vessels when they could get cheaper accommodation. When this mutiny broke out, of course I naturally felt most anxious about it, and an expression has been used, either by Captain Shepherd or Mr. Mangles, that I gave the Court of Directors a *carte blanche*. There is the same difficulty in the use of that expression as the gallant General has pointed out in the use of my metaphor. What I said I think was this: my duty is in general to look to economy, but for the present, economy must be put out of the question; we must have the best of everything. But I never intended entirely to leave to them the whole transaction without knowing how it was transacted myself. I had to appear in the House of Commons, and from the gallant Admiral, or any other active Member of the House, I should have been subject to attack if anything went wrong, therefore it was my bounden duty at least to obtain information as to what ground for their proceedings the Court of Directors had in everything they did; I never impeded them in anything; I caused them not a moment's delay; and all that I insisted upon was, that after having done anything a record of the way in which it was done should be put into my hands, in order that I, who had to bear the burden of defence, might have the means of defending myself.

1841. You were perfectly satisfied with the explanation that the Admiralty gave you as to the propriety of sending troops out by steam or sailing vessels?—Yes, as well as I could be; at the same time, I may say that the facts seemed to me extraordinary, and therefore, as will be seen in my correspondence, whenever there was a doubt, I always urged upon them to take screw steamers; that will appear in the correspondence.

1842. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] What induced you to suppose that there would be such serious difficulty in the passage of troops through Egypt: you stated, did you not, that they would be demoralised by passing through Egypt?—No, I did not state that; but it was stated to me, among other causes, and what had happened in the passage of the 10th and another regiment was pointed out as what might probably occur again.

1843. Did it not occur to the Government that if these disorders did take place on that occasion, it would not be very easy to keep the troops on board ship at Alexandria?—No doubt if there had been preparation for all those things, it would have been different; but there was none.

1844. Even under the altered circumstance of the railway being opened to within 25 miles of Suez, do not you think that that altered the state of matters materially?—Yes, to a certain extent, but it did not completely annihilate the danger.

1845. Would you not have supposed that it entirely annihilated the danger, from the fact that the troops might have been disembarked at Alexandria, and been conveyed to Suez, and would not have been encamped at Cairo, where those disorders took place?—From the best information I could get, I did not consider so at the time.

1846. Were there any conferences with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, when

when the mutiny first broke out, as to the possibility of transmitting troops by that route?—Not on the part of the Government, that I remember.

1847. You understood, did you not, from Mr. Wilcox, that there was a difficulty in the transmission of troops across the Isthmus?—Mr. Wilcox, in his letter, says, "I have only to add, if it were true that the Peninsular and Oriental Company made an offer in July and August last (monsoon months often prevailing into September), the Government would have been perfectly justified in rejecting the scheme for the conveyance of troops by the mail steamers during that period."

1848. It never came under your notice that there was a difference of opinion in that Board, and that Mr. Wilcox stood by himself?—No.

1849. Do you remember any representation being made to you as to the taking up of ships, and complaints on the part of shipowners of their ships being rejected?—Yes, frequently, of course.

1850. And I suppose on other occasions as at that time?—Yes, always, of course, the rejected shipowners complained. I think if the Committee refer to Captain Shepherd's statements it will appear as if those complaints had influenced me to revoke what he calls a *carte blanche*. He is incorrect; they had no influence with me; on the contrary, I received many communications direct, which I attended to, and many anonymous and indirect communications, which I put in the fire, complaining and stating all sorts of things that I did not believe; but what influenced me was what I have stated, that I wished to have a record of what had passed in order to justify myself, and that I saw in the ships taken up what appeared to me a capricious selection; that ships with large tonnage and the power of carrying troops which appeared to be equal to those taken up had been offered at a less price and were rejected. I had no doubt that Captain Shepherd, in whom I had perfect confidence, had done the best he could for the public service, but he told me that his means of acting were by conversation, and learning from persons whom he knew well, the character of those ships, and of course such a mode of communication, it is obvious, is liable to suspicion; unless, as was the case with Captain Shepherd, the character of the agent is above suspicion; but as I had nothing to do with it, and I was to be the suspected person, I was bound to arm myself with a panoply, if I could get it, to defend myself from an attack which I was to meet alone.

1851. Did this practically interfere with the business of taking up ships?—Not in the least; not for one moment. I will venture to say that neither Captain Shepherd nor Mr. Mangles will say that one moment's delay was occasioned by any act of mine. I think that any public man would agree, and that the Committee whom I am addressing will think that I was justified in requiring something to defend myself against a thing for which I was nominally responsible, but not morally so. The whole question appears to me to have been, on Captain Shepherd's part, a question of the natural jealousy of a man who had been intrusted with absolute power, finding that, in difficult circumstances—not that I suspected him—I wished to have some grounds and reasons for his actions.

1852. Do you think that it would have been possible to have performed that service in a more efficient manner than it was performed, and that you could by any other means than by that oral communication to which you have referred, in the same space of time, have collected the same number of efficient ships, and have transmitted those troops in a more efficient manner to India?—No, I dare say not. I believe that oral communication, if you can trust the person who communicates with you, is by far the easiest and best mode of transacting all business, but I may say it is a manner which is most difficult to defend before the public.

1853. Then the usual way of merely communicating with the shipowners in writing, which is the habit of the Admiralty, might, in your opinion, if it was carried on by trustworthy persons, be improved upon?—It might be improved upon in that respect, but I should be sorry to see it carried on by oral communication, for I think it would tend to throw a deal of obloquy upon public departments, though oral communication, if the persons can be trusted, is the simplest; if they cannot be trusted, it is the largest and widest door that you can open to jobbing.

1854. Do you not think that a man like Admiral Milne or Captain Shepherd might be trusted to make a contract in the usual way?—No doubt. If you ask

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me as to individual character, I am bound to say of those gentlemen that they are quite to be trusted; but we do not make laws for people who are to be trusted, but for those who are not to be trusted.

1855. It appears that the Court received a verbal reply to their message, and with respect to the conversation that took place, the Chairman states that he reported the conversation to the Court, and the Court generally bear him out in the statement that he made?—Of that I know nothing; it does not appear on their records; all the knowledge that I have of what passes in the Court of Directors is by minutes of what passed. Their speeches are not recorded, and their votes are taken by ballot; therefore I only know by what is sent up to me in the way of minutes what has passed there.

1856. Were any representations made to the Government at home from the Government in India that the services of two or three line-of-battle ships would be of great value in a moral point of view, enabling them to protect Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras?—Not to me.

1857. Were the seamen in those ports ever taken into account as a means of defence, as there are probably from 2,000 to 3,000 men in the ships off the towns?—Yes, I believe they were.

1858. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You stated, did you not, that on some occasions you found the Court of Directors remiss; did that observation refer to the subject under inquiry before this Committee?—I stated very generally when the Chairman put the question, I thought occasionally I might quicken them, and I believe I wrote notes to that effect; but I had nothing, generally speaking, to complain of in the conduct of the Court of Directors; I think that, on the whole, the thing was as well managed as could be. If I am asked whether it could not have been managed quicker by a united body than by a double Government, that of course is a question for Parliament to decide.

1859. You have stated, have you not, that the Chairs were in the habit of waiting on the President of the Board of Control for the purpose of facilitating the transaction of public business. Is it not a fact that the Court, through the Chairs, occasionally intimate their opinion verbally to the President, with the view of previously ascertaining whether, if the subject is submitted officially, it will be sanctioned, the object being to obviate unnecessary discussion and possible collision?—The manner, as the Honourable Member knows very well, is this, the Chairmen wait upon the President of the Board of Control, and, to a certain extent, sound him as to his opinion, and whether, if the thing is submitted to him, it will pass through, in his judgment, as it is proposed by the Court, or not, but they also discuss with him as to whether the thing can be passed through the Court or not; in short, the whole of those interviews are necessarily, to a certain extent, confidential, because if they were not the President of the Board of Control would be completely overweighted, for they are always two to one.

1860. Though the consideration of the measure of sending troops overland might be suggested by the Court of Directors, it was one which would entirely depend upon the decision of Her Majesty's Government?—That also enters into a grave question; of course Her Majesty's Government would be bound, if they thought it advisable, to enforce it upon the Court of Directors; but it is very doubtful whether the Government can enforce upon an unwilling Court an additional expense.

1861. The object of my question was this, to show that the Court, on its own authority, has no power to order a measure of that kind?—No; but that being the case, as I have just stated, I think the Court were supereminently bound to make the proposal, if they considered it advisable, as it must emanate from them.

1862. Mr. *Byng.*] Did you say, that until the 31st of August there was no official communication made to you from the Court of Directors as to the overland route?—None.

1863. That was the date of the first official communication?—Yes.

1864. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] If there had been steamers at Suez, and you had had information of it, you would have sent troops to meet them from this side?—Probably, if there had been that preparation; but, as I said before, preparation was the thing that was wanted.

1865. On the 29th of June you did not consider the emergency sufficiently great to take the steps of sending troops across the Isthmus?—At no time should

should we have considered the emergency sufficiently great to justify us in that risk unless we had made preparation.

1866. You could not have been aware at that time that a few hundred men would be of such great importance?—Nothing was said about it in the letter requesting additional troops.

1867. It was not at that time the general opinion in this country?—No; everybody, whether informed or not informed, underrated the danger, as it afterwards turned out.

1868. Had you received information that there had been considerable difficulties when the troops passed through Egypt before in going to the Crimea?—Yes.

1869. There were representations, were there not, from the Turkish Government on that subject?—I believe so.

1870. *Chairman.*] Were those representations sent to the Board of Control, or in what department of the Government are they to be found?—In the Foreign Office. They were known to me as a member of the Cabinet.

1871. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] They were sent from Constantinople, were they not?—I think so.

1872. You of course supposed, and you had good grounds for believing, that both the East India House and the Admiralty had obtained information from the Peninsular and Oriental Company, as well as from all other sources available?—I conclude that we had, certainly.

1873. It would have been an irregular proceeding to have inquired of private companies?—Quite so. The communication came through the Court of Directors.

1874. As you are responsible for the expenditure of the East India Company, had you not a right to expect that all inquiries which on that subject you had the power to make should be answered without hesitation?—Undoubtedly.

1875. You were rather surprised to find that such was not the case?—Yes. I do not understand that species of jealousy; I think a man had better say why he has done a thing, if he has done it, honestly.

1876. Mr. *Crawford.*] Were the Peninsular and Oriental Company at all instrumental in getting over any political difficulties in passing troops over the Isthmus?—They flattered themselves that they were; but I do not think they were.

1877. With all your experience since, do you think that the service could have been more efficiently performed, taking it as a whole from beginning to end?—I am perfectly willing to state my opinion. On looking back the only two things I regret are that the forces that were under engagement to go out in slow sailing vessels were not taken out of those vessels and put in other ships, and that more screw steamers were not sent at an earlier period.

1878. Captain *Vivian.*] You do not regret that an advance guard of 4,000 or 5,000 were not sent out first overland?—No; because I think that they would have met with such difficulties and such probable failure of health, that they would not have been worth much when they arrived; that is my opinion from what I have heard from people of experience. Although it was our duty to put an end as soon as possible to the mutiny, it was just as much our duty to send the men out in as good health as possible, at the best season of the year. I think that they were better when they arrived in India for the long sea voyage.

1879. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] There has never been an idea of sending so large a force as 4,000 or 5,000 men?—No, only what the steamers would accommodate; there were no means of doing it.

1880. Mr. *Crawford.*] Did you refer just now to a suggestion made on the part of the Government to the Directors of the Company, that they should cancel the contracts that were made for sending out the troops in sailing vessels at the latter end of May and the beginning of June, and substitute steam vessels instead?—Yes; that again was oral communication. I asked them if they thought it advisable, and they gave me an answer which at the time satisfied me; they said there would be the difficulty of disembarkation, and interference with the screw steamers which they were about to take up for the other troops.

1881. You stated just now that you thought that a sufficient number of screw steamers had not been sent out?—I stated just now that I should have wished that more screw steamers had been sent than sailing vessels, for this plain

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reason, that now the event has proved that the screw steamers made the quickest passages.

1882. Had you no knowledge of the fact whether all the screws that were available were tendered and taken up or not?—Yes, I had to a certain extent. I know that at one time, when advertisements were issued, no more screws were offered; and therefore it is fair to assume that almost all had been taken up. I do not say that in the way of reproach, but only in answer to the question put to me; but I should say, if I were asked the question *ex post facto*, that they must have been the best.

1883. Have you received any expression of opinion from the authorities in India as to the manner in which the troops are sent out, as to their comfort, and the efficiency of the service as performed by the sailing and screw vessels?—Most satisfactory.

1884. In no case have you received anything like a condemnation of their treatment on board the vessels?—Not at all; quite the contrary.

1885. *Chairman.*] Does that answer apply to the troops on board sailing as well as on board steam vessels?—Entirely so; the whole body has arrived, and it is certainly a very singular thing that there should have been such a total absence of illness and deaths on board those vessels.

1886. Mr. *Horsman.*] With reference to those interviews with the Chairs, are the Committee to understand that those interviews are not official, but are merely preliminary, the Chairs waiting upon you rather with the view of sounding the feeling of the Government with the view of advising the Court?—Just so; there is no record kept of them.

1887. If they find that the disposition of the President is to agree with them, then probably that induces them to address an official communication?—Yes; but even then the Right Honourable Member must understand that they have to pass that official communication through the Court, who may disapprove of the very suggestions that the Chairs have made.

1888. But I understand this, that until your interview with the Chairs is followed up by some official communication from the Court, you do not attach importance to those interviews, but consider them merely preliminary and unofficial?—No farther than this, that if the Chairs and I have agreed upon a certain course, I should be surprised to find it not followed up by some communication.

1889. But an official character is given to those interviews by the communication that is afterwards made to you?—Entirely; the Chairs are, to a certain extent, speaking the opinion of the Court, but they do not represent the Court; the Court frequently differ from them, and therefore it is a mere preliminary discussion.

1890. *Chairman.*] To a certain degree the Peninsular and Oriental and other Companies, or the ships that they provide for the carriage of the mails, are under the orders of the Government, are they not?—Very partially, I think. They are bound by their contract to certain engagements, but I do not know beyond that they can be said to be under orders. I imagine that they would not be under the orders of the Government as to passengers.

1891. Then is the authority of the Government entirely restricted to their transmitting the mails?—Yes.

1892. Then all the rest depends upon their own calculations of profit or loss or good pleasure or patriotism?—Yes.

1893. Mr. *Osborne.*] Their contract only extends to carrying letters?—I believe to nothing else.

1894. Viscount *Goderich.*] Would you have the goodness to tell the Committee the precise reasons of a non-political character, which induced you to think that it would not be desirable to adopt the overland route previously to the month of September?—Putting aside political reasons, I should say that there was a total want of preparation for the conveyance of troops by the overland route, that we knew that the steam navy of India was deficient, as has since been proved by the breaking down of the "Ajdaha" at the time when the "Alma" was unable to meet its engagement at Suez, and thereby affording a practical instance of the difficulty and embarrassment that might take place by the overland route. In addition to that, the season was very disadvantageous; I had been assured, although I know that it has been stated otherwise; but I was assured at that time, and since, by persons whom I considered perfectly competent to judge,

judge, that the danger of putting troops on deck at that hot season in the Red Sea was immense, and they would probably have arrived in India in a state totally unfit for service. In addition to that, supposing a difficulty to arise at Suez itself from the possibility of the demoralization of the troops by their stay there; we had not even ready a hulk or any ship at Alexandria to hold them until the time for their disembarkation; in short, there was no manner of preparation there for the passage overland. Then we thought that our duty was to get the troops to India in as good health and vigour as possible, and considering how well the long sea voyages were performed, and taking into consideration the time also which would elapse in making those necessary preparations, we resolved at first to send the bulk of the men by the long sea voyage, and looking back at that with the utmost anxiety, and the feelings that must naturally arise, having to deal with such a difficult transaction as that was, I cannot regret it for one moment.

1895. You did make inquiries as to the climate of the Red Sea in summer?—Yes, no doubt; I had a gentleman in my office perfectly competent to give an opinion upon that; I refer to Sir George Clerk, who was decidedly of the same opinion, and with whom I was in constant communication upon the subject.

1896. Did you make any such inquiries from medical men?—Yes, there are medical men in this country; some have left it, but others are here; Dr. Beatson is prepared to give very valuable evidence to the Committee upon that point, if they wish to examine him.

1897. Captain *Vivian.*] You stated that one of the few things that you looked back to with regret, in the arrangements that you made at the beginning, was the fact, that some of the troops sent out in the earlier part of the time, were not sent by screw vessels. At the time when the news first arrived, the East India Company were then entering into contracts for a great number of ships to carry out the ordinary reliefs to India; those contracts were not completed, but they were completed after the news arrived, and the troops went out eventually by those ships. Do you think that the East India Company ought to have broken off those contracts which were not completed, and to have taken up another class of ships?—If it is stated from evidence upon which the honourable Member relies that the contracts were not completed, I bow to that, but my impression was, that they were completed; I remember that the Chairman told me that they must pay forfeit if they did so.

1898. Viscount *Goderich.*] What period are you speaking of?—At the end of June.

1899. Do you happen to recollect that on the 21st of May Sir Benjamin Hawes urged upon the India Board that they should press the Court of Directors to hasten the despatch of certain reinforcements which were then going out?—Yes, to hasten the despatch of them; that is to say, to get them on board, but not to alter the contract, that I remember.

1900. Sir *Charles Napier.*] You have heard of no sickness among the troops that have been sent since by the overland route?—I think that among those that went by the "Nubia," there have been three or four deaths.

1901. Not among the others?—No; it was at a different season of the year.

1902. Do you not regret that you did not send more out that way as no sickness occurred by the overland route?—No. The gallant officer is confusing the dates. What was told me was, that at that season of the year it was unwholesome, but not when they went later.

1903. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] If Lord Lyons had been ordered to send troops to Alexandria to go on by the monthly mail steamers, and to provide for their transit, could they not have lived on board the ships at Alexandria till they were forwarded across the Isthmus; supposing them to be sent down in a couple of line-of-battle ships, in the "Conqueror" or the "Princess Royal"?—I suppose they might.

1904. You have stated in answer to a question from Mr. Danby Seymour, that you were prepared to send troops as soon as you found accommodation on the other side?—Yes.

1905. Then what became of the political question; that must have been disposed of?—I have already stated that the political difficulty had diminished as the time advanced.

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1906. And it diminished rapidly?—Yes.

1907. Are you aware that the deaths on board the "Nubia" were just worn-out men who died in the course of nature, and not at all attributable to the climate of the Red Sea?—I do not know that; they were deaths from cholera, I believe.

1908. It is in evidence from a gentleman who has made 68 voyages up and down the Red Sea, and has lain a considerable time at Suez at all seasons, summer as well as winter, that Suez is the sanitarium of the world, and he stated that he never had any sickness in his ship's company at all; have you any evidence at all that could possibly rebut that?—I wish that he had come to me earlier; my information was quite to the contrary.

1909. What was the hesitation that you alluded to with respect to the communications in furnishing you with information by the East India Company?—It is upon record in the papers presented to the Committee; they state that the business was done by oral communication, and so on, and that they had a difficulty in telling me. I think they stated fairly, that their real reason was a sort of jealousy of interference.

1910. Admitting that you are perfectly justified in requiring records of those transactions, having given the Court of Directors a *carte blanche*, might it not have been that those difficulties arose from the manner in which the communication was made to them?—The manner was the usual manner, through the Board official organ.

1911. Mr. *Willoughby*.] You stated, did you not, that you did not think that the Court would have been deterred from communicating more formally to you their opinion as to resorting to the overland route on account of embarrassing Her Majesty's Government, because that plea would have been equally good in August, when they did make it; may they not have been deterred in the interviews that they had previously with you in the verbal discussion of the subject, by learning that there were political objections?—No; I think if they felt strongly that the interests of India were at stake, they ought not to have been deterred by anything that I said, or anybody said, from enforcing it by every possible and even forcible means that they could, upon the Government. I think the Chairman stated, that I had always stopped him by saying that there were political objections. I only deny that that was the course I pursued. I was always ready to entertain any proposition as long as I was President.

1912. But they may have been influenced by that consideration, that they did not wish to embarrass Her Majesty's Government by making proposals which involved political considerations of some consequence?—I should not have been influenced myself by any consideration but that of the public service, nor prevented from urging the thing.

1913. Viscount *Goderich*.] Did you give the Chairs to understand that the political objections were of such a character as to be an absolute bar to the consideration of the subject?—I believe not. I did not intend it.

Colonel Sir *Henry Storks*, K. C. B., called in; and Examined.

Col. Sir *H. Storks*, K. C. B.

1914. *Chairman*.] WHAT office do you hold in the War Department?—I am Secretary for Military Correspondence at the War Office.

1915. Have you served in Egypt, or passed through it?—I have passed through Egypt twice.

1916. At what periods of the year?—I went down the Red Sea in May, and I returned in the month of October.

1917. Did you know of any remarkable injurious effect on the health of your fellow passengers going or coming?—In the month of October 1851, when I came up the Red Sea, we had two deaths.

1918. Was that on board one of the large steamers?—Yes, the "Oriental."

1919. Are you aware what number of persons, crew and passengers, were in that ship?—No, I am not.

1920. Was it one of the ships of 2,000 tons burthen?—Yes; the "Oriental" was the name of it.

1921. Were there any deaths the second time that you passed?—The first time there were no deaths; it was on the return, coming up the Red Sea, in October, that they occurred.

1922. Were those invalids when they left India?—I think not; they appeared in perfect health. The death of one was attributable very much to his sleeping on deck.

1923. Were they officers or men?—They were officers. One was a surgeon in the navy, and the other was an officer in the civil service in India. The latter caught a very bad fever, and we left him behind, in Alexandria, and he died in the hospital.

1924. In both cases, did you remain any time in Egypt?—No, I merely passed through.

1925. Did you find any particular difficulty, or injury to your own health?—No, not at all.

1926. Is there any particular point that the late President of the Board of Control desired that you should give evidence upon?—I have a very strong opinion myself about the insalubrity of the passage through Egypt for troops, during the summer months. Dr. Beatson, a first-class staff surgeon, and a man of great experience in India, having been many years there, gave me his opinion, which he put in writing for me, and which I can read, or put in, as the Committee wish; he is at the Isle of Man now, on half pay, but he will come if the Committee wish to see him.

1927. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] How long was he in Egypt?—I do not know.

1928. *Chairman.*] The object of this Committee is to inquire into what measures might have been adopted for reinforcing the army in India, and, amongst those, I stated more than once, in the House of Commons, that I understood that offers of service, upon the present emergency, were made by Canada; I also stated, and it was the opinion of other Members, that, although the transmission of troops from the Cape was as rapid as it might have been, as to the raising troops in Canada, I believe we have heard that the Government have at last assented to the raising of one or two regiments?—There is to be a regiment raised in Canada; I believe it is being raised at this moment; it is to be of the strength of a regiment of the line, 1,000 men, and to be called the One Hundreth, or the Prince of Wales's Ro yal Canadian Regiment.

1929. Can you tell the Committee what the conditions of the enlistment are?—The regiment is to be enlisted and enrolled like any other regiment of the line.

1930. Was there to be any particular inducement, as I believe has been the case with regard to pensioners after serving in the regular army of this country, that any land would be given to them?—No, there are no conditions of that sort. Certain proportions of the commissions in the regiment are to be given to Canadian gentlemen, one majority, a certain number of companies, a certain number of lieutenancies, and a certain number of ensigncies, on condition that they bring a quota of men in proportion to the grade that they receive.

1931. What number of captains?—I think half.

1932. And how many lieutenants?—Eight.

1933. Was there to be no other dissimilarity than that from that of a regiment of the line?—Certainly not.

1934. For general service?—Yes.

1935. How many field officers were there to be in this regiment?—The same as a regiment of the line; a lieutenant-colonel and two majors.

1936. Was there not an offer before this, seven or eight months ago, to raise two battalions in North America?—Several offers were made of various sorts. When Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General, was in England, he saw the Government about those offers. There was a proposal at one time to raise a black regiment in Canada from the negroes.

1937. Has that been entertained?—It is under consideration now. It was not accepted before, as it was not thought desirable to do so. There was a question of sending black troops to India, but the Government considered it would not be desirable to send black troops to India so long as we had available white troops.

1938. Was there not a distinct offer more than once made of raising two battalions in North America a considerable time back?—There were offers made to raise two battalions in North America, and so there were in this

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country; volunteer battalions; but the Government were determined to have nothing to do with volunteer battalions, and decided that any force that might be raised should be raised as a part of the army, and as regiments of the line.

1939. What state were we in with regard to the number of troops that the East India Company had a right to expect to be furnished by the Government at the outbreak of the revolt?—At the beginning of last year we owed the Company two regiments; they were two regiments short of their establishment. It was proposed to send two regiments, and also two regiments to relieve the 10th and 29th, whose period of service in India had expired. The regiments detailed for this service were the four regiments that were sent to China.

1940. They had been previously detailed for the service?—Yes. When their services were no longer wanted in China they were to go to India, two to remain to fill up to the 24 regiments, and the other two to relieve the 10th and 29th.

1941. At what time did those four regiments embark that went to China?—Embarkation commenced the first week in April.

1942. At what time would they have been embarked for India if the Chinese affair had not taken place?—They would have been embarked then; they were originally intended for India, and being ready to go to India their course was diverted, and they went to China.

1943. They were diverted from India first to China, and then diverted from China to India?—Exactly. The first news that came by telegraph from India arrived here on the 11th of April. It was stated in that telegram that a portion of the 19th Infantry had mutinied at Moorshedabad. I may state that the practice is for the Court of Directors to make a requisition on Her Majesty's Government for troops, and although Her Majesty's Government may decide to send forces if they think it necessary to send them, still a requisition must come from the Court of Directors. The news having arrived by telegraph on the 11th, the Secretary of State for War addressed a letter to the President of the Board of Control on the 14th of April, which I will read to the Committee. "Sir, The attention of Her Majesty's Government has been drawn, by recent occurrences in the East, to the expediency of increasing the force of Her Majesty's troops now stationed in the possessions of the East India Company. Although of late years vast territories have been annexed to that Government, no provision has been made for any additional supply of Queen's troops to protect them; and it has become necessary upon the occurrence of an emergency, such as the war in Persia, to denude important positions in order to provide the force required to meet it. Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government deem it expedient that two regiments of infantry should be added to the permanent establishment of Queen's troops now in India; this, however, cannot be done except on the application of the Court of Directors; and I have to request that you will make a communication to that body to this effect, and urge them to comply with the opinion which I have above expressed." That letter was sent to the Board of Control, and we got an answer from the Board of Control on the 29th April, transmitting, in a covering letter, an answer from the Court of Directors; that answer is dated the 29th of April: "Sir, Referring to the correspondence which has passed on the subject of the regiments of infantry to be sent to India this year, the Court of Directors request us to state, that as the 82d and 90th regiments, which it was proposed to send to India in the present season, to replace the two regiments which were withdrawn during the late war, have been despatched to China, it will be desirable that two other regiments should be embarked for India in their stead. One of those regiments is due to Bengal, the other to Madras. The number of Her Majesty's regiments of European infantry on the establishment of India will then be restored to 24, the number which has been maintained there, except for a brief interval, since the year 1842. The Court are also desirous that if the course of events in China shall not permit the regiments destined to relieve the 10th and 29th regiments, proceeding to India for that purpose, authority may be given to the Governor-general in Council to detain those regiments in India until relieved." On the receipt of that letter, a communication was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 2d of May, by the Secretary of State for War,

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War, conveying the orders of Her Majesty's Government in these terms: "Sir, I have the honour to acquaint your Royal Highness, that owing to the uncertainty of the duration of the operations in China, Her Majesty's Government has resolved on sending out at once the four regiments destined for India, independently of those composing the expedition to China. I have therefore to request that your Royal Highness will take Her Majesty's pleasure as to the regiments to be selected for the service, which will of course have to be increased to the Indian establishment. It is desirable that application should be made to the East India Company to provide the necessary tonnage without delay, so that the regiments may be embarked not later than the second week in June." At the same time, a letter was addressed to the Board of Control by the Secretary of State for War, dated the 4th of May: "Sir, I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 30th ultimo, with its enclosure, from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company, relating to the replacement of certain of Her Majesty's regiments in India, and I have to acquaint you, in reply, that in consideration of the uncertainty which attends the duration of the hostilities in China, Her Majesty's Government have deemed it expedient to despatch four regiments to India without delay; I have accordingly requested his Royal Highness, the General Commanding-in-Chief to take Her Majesty's pleasure as to the regiments to be selected for this service." This is merely an official answer after the requisition from the East India Company had come. I mention these facts, to show that so soon as the first inkling of the mutiny in India took place, Her Majesty's Government, through the Secretary of State for War, made a communication desiring that four regiments at once might go to India.

1944. Viscount *Goderich.*] That was done before any requisition for fresh troops was made to you on the part of the Court of Directors?—Yes, the Court of Directors having been previously informed that the four regiments that were gone to China would go, when their services were no longer required in China, to India, two to remain, and two to relieve the 10th and 29th.

1945. *Chairman.*] Was that strong manifestation of anxiety on the part of the War Department, with respect to the force in India, the result of the intelligence that was brought of the events that took place in January and February in India?—Yes, certainly; it arrived on the 9th of April, and our letter was written immediately after.

1946. Were there not very considerable detachments to be sent, to fill up the various regiments?—Yes, there were the drafts going out when the news came of the decided outbreak in India.

1947. You took no steps about the drafts at this period?—They went out in their usual course. It must be understood by the Committee, that the moment the regiments embark from this country, they cease to belong to the British establishment, and they are to all intents and purposes belonging to the Company. We prepare the drafts and give information when they are ready.

1948. The last communication from the War Department to the Board of Control was about the 29th of April, was it not?—The 4th of May.

1949. It states that the Government are desirous that those troops should be despatched without delay?—Yes; they were placed under orders. I have here the Quartermaster-general's return, showing when those regiments were placed under orders; for instance, the third battalion of the Rifle Brigade on the 4th of May 1857.

1950. Where were they stationed for the purpose of embarkation?—They were embarked at Portsmouth; that is one; then the 88th was another.

1951. Viscount *Goderich.*] When was the 88th placed under orders?—On the 4th of May, and embarked at Portsmouth on the 4th of July. The Rifle Brigade was put under orders on the 4th of May too, and they embarked in detachments.

1952. *Chairman.*] Having taken those steps, the War Department presumed then that the Board of Control and the Court of Directors would proceed to carry them out?—Yes; the Quartermaster-general, when Her Majesty's pleasure is taken, and when the regiments have been selected, communicates directly with the East India Company and the Marine Department, and the ships are taken up, and properly inspected and examined, and the men

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embarked as soon as the ships are ready. The intelligence of the serious nature of the mutiny was received on the 28th of June; on the 29th of June Lord Panmure, in anticipation of a requisition on the subject from the Court of Directors, which did not arrive till the following day, ordered four regiments of infantry to be despatched forthwith to India; that was four more.

1953. Were those regiments placed under orders forthwith?—Yes; the 19th, the first battalion of the 1st Foot, the 38th, and the 79th Regiments. With regard to this I have a printed return, which I beg leave to hand in to the Committee (*the same was handed in*). The troops were successively put under orders, according to the dates shown in that paper.

Vide Appendix.

1954. One statement was made by one of the witnesses from the Court of Directors, that certain corps that were directed to embark were not ready?—I think that the Quartermaster-general of the army would be the fit person to give any explanation to the Committee on that subject; I am sure that he is quite prepared to do so. The four regiments, the 19th, the 1st, the 38th, and the 79th, that were ordered on the 29th of June, were reported on the 20th of July as ready to embark; but I would explain, that the delay was caused by those regiments having to receive volunteers from other regiments At the end of the war, and the beginning of the year 1857, the army was very much reduced in numbers, and we had to recruit those regiments by volunteers from other regiments; and volunteering, and taking the men over, is not done in a day; there were necessarily a few days' delay; but I have the authority of the Quartermaster-general to state, that he is quite prepared to appear before the Committee, and to show that there was really no delay as to the troops.

1955. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Are you aware that a letter was received from the War Office, stating that when those four regiments were requested, it would take three weeks before they were ready?—Yes; I think there was a letter with reference to those four regiments. I mentioned that to show the difficulties with which we had to contend. Owing to the reduced establishment of regiments, a number of volunteers was necessary, and it took about 20 days to prepare those regiments, and to make them efficient. They were embarked from Dublin.

1956. *Chairman.*] Do you happen to have a memorandum of the force that was in the Mediterranean at the end of the month of June, and of the force at the Cape of Good Hope?—No. I can put in a statement which I have here: "A Return of all the Reductions and Alterations made in the Military Force in the Colonies in consequence of the demand for Troops for service in the East," which gives it according to the different stations.

1957. The Committee would wish to know the exact number of regiments at that time disposable in the Mediterranean and at the Cape of Good Hope?—I can state to the Committee what steps we have taken about those colonies. On the 26th of August the Governor of the Cape was instructed, if possible, to send six regiments to India, and he has actually despatched four; and the report says, though it has not been officially confirmed, that he has despatched two more, and that would make the six.

1958. Are you able to state what the force now at the Cape is?—The force at the Cape consists of six battalions of the line and the Cape Mounted Rifles.

1959. Does that assume that the six battalions we have alluded to have gone on?—Yes.

1960. Are there now six battalions and the Cape Rifles?—Yes; one is a very weak battalion, and it is ordered home without relief. That is the reserve battalion of the 12th; it is to form the 2d battalion of the regiment, and get an increased establishment. Since the commencement of the outbreak we brought to England from the Mediterranean four regiments, the 30th, the 47th, the 55th, and 68th. Two companies of the 57th have gone to garrison Aden, and two regiments, the 71st and the 92d, have been despatched to India by the overland route, and they have been relieved by the 25th, at Gibraltar, and one of the newly raised battalions at Malta.

1961. Was it from Malta or Gibraltar that those two regiments were sent?—One from Malta and the other from Gibraltar; the 71st was from Malta, and the 92d from Gibraltar.

1962. Did they go by ships of war?—The 71st from Malta was sent by Lord Lyons in the "Conqueror" to Alexandria, with a steamer in attendance on her; the line-of-battle ship could not get into Alexandria, and she was obliged to lie outside.

1963. Was she a sailing ship?—I think she is a screw. The troops were put to great inconvenience by being obliged to remain on board this small steamer at Alexandria till the steamer was reported ready to receive them at Suez.

1964. Viscount *Goderich*.] What was the date of that?—In January this year. The 92d regiment was sent from Gibraltar; they were taken in the "Vulcan," which was sent from this country to embark them. She is a steam transport.

1965. *Chairman*.] Did she meet with any difficulty at Alexandria?—They remained on board her for several days, as the ships were not ready at Suez.

1966. Did you hear what was the difficulty that prevented the "Conqueror" from getting in; was it the entrance?—Bad weather, and the want of depth of water. In fact the captain did not like to risk the ship by going in at that season of the year; it is a very difficult place to get into with a large ship of that sort.

1967. Can you give the Committee any information with regard to the German Legion at the Cape?—All the papers have been presented to Parliament, and the terms of the agreement on which they went there are shown.

1968. Are you aware whether any reinforcements have been sent to this legion since they went out?—None.

1969. Are you aware that they were placed on full pay last year?—Yes, I am.

1970. Immediately after they arrived?—Yes.

1971. How long did they continue on full pay?—They have continued on full pay all this year; there is no vote to be taken for their full pay in this year's Estimates.

1972. They are still on full pay, are they not?—They will be on full pay till the 31st of March.

1973. Is there anything decided on the subject of their remaining on full pay or not?—It is decided that they are not to remain on full pay, unless under the terms agreed upon, which have been laid before Parliament. If called out for the defence of the colony, the Governor has the power of putting them on Imperial full pay; if in aid of the civil power, for the maintenance of peace within the colony, they will be chargeable to the colonial funds. They have been on Imperial full pay, because the Governor called them out, and stated in his general order that it was for the defence of the colony.

1974. What number of local troops are under pay there now; are there not some burgher troops?—No. There was a small levy raised by the Governor, I believe, for the purpose of patrolling a certain part of the frontier, but the Secretary of State for War communicated with the Colonial Office, and desired that they should be permitted to enlist in the Cape Corps, and they will be struck off pay.

1975. What number of horses may have been furnished, if any, by the Cape Mounted Rifles for India?—I think Sir George Grey wrote that he had dismounted half the regiment, and without loss of time proceeded to remount them.

1976. Have you a memorandum that will show, up to the present date, how many horses have been dispatched from the Cape from all sources?—No; but I can furnish it to the Committee.

1977. Those German troops were sent out originally under the denomination of settlers, were they not?—Yes.

1978. And certain allowances of money; I believe, in the last year, there was an estimate for 90,000*l*. for locating them; building huts?—It was proposed to establish military villages all along the frontier, on the Croat principle, to provide a defence against the inroads of hostile savages.

1979. What progress has been made in that?—They have all been located.

1980. Have money allowances been made to them, or have the huts been built for them?—They have given them certain advances of money to build their

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own houses. There is a Blue Book before Parliament in which all the locations are put down on a map.

1981. And they are distributed along the frontier?—Yes.

1982. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] The troops were for some time in Alexandria, were they not, on board the "Conqueror"?—No, they were transferred to a steamer.

1983. Were they landed in that way?—They remained for some time, to their great discomfort, on board the steamer.

1984. What was the reason of that?—Because the ship was not ready at Suez to take them on.

1985. Why did the "Conqueror" not go into Alexandria Harbour?—The captain did not think it prudent to go in.

1986. Sir Charles Napier went in with seven sail of the line after the affair at Acre, though they were all sailing ships; could not the "Conqueror" have laid in Aboukir Bay? - I am not sailor enough to answer that question.

1987. You have heard, have you not, that line-of-battle ships have gone into Alexandria Harbour?—Yes, they have ships of their own lying there.

1988. Would there have been any difficulty in getting the use of the barracks at Alexandria?—I cannot, of course go into the political question; it is a question not within my competency.

1988.* I am talking as to whether it would be right or prudent to let the men remain there?—I think, speaking as a soldier, that there are very grave objections to landing troops there, and putting them into barracks.

1989. Admitting that at the ordinary seasons of the year, have you ever heard that there was any difficulty in a line-of-battle ship getting into the harbour where the troops could remain on board?—I am not sailor enough to give an opinion.

1990. Do you know whether the cholera that took place among the 51st regiment was at Rangoon, or did it take place in the Bay of Bengal?—It took place in Rangoon.

1991. Do you know how long they had been at Rangoon before that took place?—I will read an extract from a memorandum on this subject by Dr. Beatson: "Having been embarked for 12 days with the head quarters and right wing of the 51st light infantry, of which I was the surgeon, on board the "Feroze," one of the finest steam frigates in the Indian navy, on passage from Madras to Rangoon, on the breaking out of the last Burmese war, I speak from some experience; and I believe that the exposure of those 12 days and nights in the Bay of Bengal, a far less trying climate than the Red Sea during the summer months, impaired the health of the men, and predisposed them to a violent outburst of cholera which attacked the regiment on our landing in Burmah."

1992. What was the date of the time when he was at sea?—I do not know.

1993. Viscount *Goderich.*] You stated, did you not, that your own opinion was unfavourable to the use of the overland route during the summer months?—Yes.

1994. Can you state whether the first suggestion for making use of that route, which appears from these papers to have been made on the 17th of September, came from the War Department, or whether this letter of that date, signed by you, was in consequence of any communication from the Board of Control?—It is in a letter from me to the Board of Control.

1995. With reference to sending detachments to Aden?—I communicated to the Board of Control, I think, the decision of the Government.

1996. Those were the first troops that were sent by the overland route?—I think they were; the Aden detachment.

1997. Do you consider that, at that date, the objections in point of climate to the overland route had ceased to be of importance?—I would much rather not have sent them till two months later. I went up the Red Sea in October, and then it was fearfully hot, and the dews at night were very heavy; I do not think so much of the sun as the dew at night; I believe men catch fever from being in the sun all day, and lying under an awning at night with a heavy dew.

1998. I find that on the 24th of August you transmitted to the India Board certain letters from Colonel Fraser?—Yes.

1999. Did

1999. Did you transmit them in consequence of any request from the India Board?—No; Lord Panmure considered the letter a very good one, and from Colonel Fraser's experience, he having been an officer of the East India Company's service, who discharged the duty of Quartermaster-general, when the 10th and 12th passed through Egypt, he thought that his opinion was deserving of consideration; the letter was transmitted to be laid before the Court of Directors.

2000. I find the first letter, addressed erroneously, I suppose, to Mr. Frederick Peel, is dated the 18th of July; can you state why it was not transmitted to the India Board at that earlier period?—It was not considered to be of so much importance as the second; we sent both together.

2001. About the 24th of August, Lord Panmure began to think that it was important to consider the overland route?—I think he was always of opinion that it was a very desirable one, if we could get over the political difficulties, the heat of the climate, and the want of preparation at the time; for the great difficulty was not having any preparation on the other side. I have heard it stated here that Suez is a most healthy and charming place; for my part, I cannot conceive a more deplorable place to send troops to; there is not a drop of water in the place. We have had a small hospital established there for sick soldiers, and we have sent out a distilling apparatus to distil water.

2002. I believe that those troops which have now been sent by the overland route have found it a convenient mode of transport, under the present arrangements?—Very; we have heard no complaints; the men have behaved themselves very well, and the arrangements have been successful.

2003. Do you think it would be a route available for the future as a mode of sending troops to India?—Certainly, if we have an efficient service on both sides, and the men do not remain in Egypt.

2004. Suppose the railway to be opened the whole way?—Yes, except in the summer.

2005. In the favourable season you could resort to that way of sending them?—Yes, always having ships properly fitted to receive the men on the other side.

2006. Captain *Vivian.*] In an emergency in the summer months, would you not send troops in that way?—Yes, in an emergency; but I think that the great point is, when troops are going into the field, that they should arrive on the ground in good health and in an efficient state. I think all our experience of the Crimea, and of the stay that the army made in Bulgaria, showed that. Sir De Lacy Evans knows that the health of the army suffered very much in Bulgaria, and it is very important to land troops in the very best health.

2007. If you had been sure of steamers to take the troops on, you would not have hesitated so to send the troops out in the beginning, though it was an unhealthy period?—I should not hesitate to do anything in an emergency.

2008. Evidence has been given to this Committee, that the ordinary passengers prefer sleeping on deck under canvas?—Yes; in the steamer that I was on board of in October, I think almost all the passengers except myself slept on deck.

2009. So that you do not apprehend any mischief from the heat, if the troops cannot be lodged below?—Yes, I do; I think that they would get fever. A passenger on board one of those steamers has many more comforts and more luxuries than a private soldier, sleeping in his clothes on deck, can have.

2010. I suppose the great luxury in the passage down the Red Sea is a draught of air?—Yes, a draught of air and punkahs, iced water, and comforts that you could not give to a private soldier.

2011. Captain Harris, who has been 68 times up and down the Red Sea, said that his experience went to prove that there was nothing unwholesome in the heat?—I differ with him there; I have had some experience with troops, and I should hesitate very much sending them by that route, if I could send them any other way. I know Captain Harris, and have very great respect for his opinion.

2012. Mr. *Crawford.*] You think that the exposure lays the seeds of disease?—Yes;

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—Yes; I think that the men would get fever, and get generally out of health; and when they landed, they would not be in the condition that they were in after the voyage round the Cape.

2013. Viscount *Goderich.*] Have you formed any opinion as to how much time would have been gained, if the troops had been sent by the overland route, at the earliest possible period, supposing immediate orders to have been sent to India, on the receipt of the news of the Meerut revolt, to send vessels to Suez?—I cannot answer that question off hand.

2014. Mr. *Osborne.*] Can you state the number of troops that were sent?—I can give it from this return.

2015. With your experience as a military man, are you aware of such a number of troops ever having been sent before?—No. I think the greatest feat of modern times is the dispatch of this force to India, looking at the reductions that had taken place at the end of Crimean war, and our totally unprepared state. We were quite unprepared for any outbreak of this sort. I think that the dispatch of such a force as this is really a most wonderful effort, and no other country in the world could have done it.

2016. Both with regard to speed and efficiency?—Yes; we have sent 38,799 men from this country.

2017. *Chairman.*] Does that include the four China regiments?—No, that does not include the four China regiments; but they are all given in the return I have handed in. When one looks at the number that we reduced at the end of the war, the urgency of the occasion, and the force sent out in so short a time, I really do think it is a very great feat.

2018. To what date is that return made up?—Up to the 18th of February.

2019. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Would there be any difficulty in sending any number of troops across the Isthmus of Suez, with proper arrangements?—I think none. The stream might be continuous if we had steamers at both ends. From the reports of the Quartermaster-general, on the spot, he says that the railway is in the most efficient state, and that troops could be sent in any number.

2020. Have you two staff officers in Egypt?—Three; a lieutenant-colonel and two captains; one is at Alexandria, and the other goes from Cairo to Suez when troops are passing, and Colonel Pocklington has the general direction of the whole.

2021. You have a large hospital there, have you not?—No. not a large one; we have a hospital established at Suez.

2022. Do you know how many beds it contains?—I cannot say off-hand.

2023. There would not be the slightest difficulty, if it were thought desirable, in sending the Indian drafts every year that way, would there?—I think not, except that I am of opinion it would be very unadvisable to send them in the summer months, on account of the climate.

2024. Otherwise there are every means for their easy transit through Egypt?—Yes. They embark at Alexandria, and go straight on to Cairo and Suez. The company have made most admirable arrangements.

2025. For eight months in the year there would be no more serious difficulty than sending them 200 miles in this country?—No, I think not. It would cost a great deal more.

2026. *Chairman.*] The officers there report most favourably of the means of transit?—Yes, certainly, they speak in very high terms of all the arrangements made by the company and their officers in Egypt, both for feeding the men and for facilitating the speedy transport of them from one steamer to another.

2027. The Peninsular and Oriental Company conduct the whole?—Yes. The officers speak in high terms of all their arrangements in Egypt.

2028. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Have you any report from the Quartermaster-general's department in Egypt on the general question of the transit of troops across the Isthmus, showing the periods of the year that it can be more advantageously carried out; in short, general recommendations for such a system?—We have all the reports that he has sent home, showing how he has succeeded, and his own impressions on the subject. I do not think that he goes into the question as to the particular seasons of the year.

2029. *Chairman.*]

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2029. *Chairman.*] He was placed there probably in October?—Before the first detachment went.

2030. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Would it be possible, in the course of six weeks, to get a report from the Quartermaster-general's department there on this subject?—Certainly; we can call upon him to make a full report, if the Committee would like to have it.

2031. *Chairman.*] Can you state what time that report would take?—I should think about a month.

2032. Then will you have the goodness to call upon Colonel Pocklington for a comprehensive report?—Yes.

2033. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You have stated that it is your opinion that, as a general rule, during eight months in the year, the most desirable route would be the overland route; in expressing that opinion, do you take into consideration the political question whether we have a right to demand the passage for troops at all times proceeding to India, or the inconvenience that might arise from its being interrupted?—I must guard myself against giving any opinion upon the political part of it; I am merely speaking of the transport of troops; I think that is another question. There would be some professional disadvantage in it, such as the troops not being able to take their heavy baggage.

2034. Allusion has been made to the plan of the troops, when they arrive at Alexandria, being disembarked and put into barracks; are you aware whether any unoccupied barracks are there?—I think that the Egyptian Government would give us barracks if we asked for them.

2035. Mr. *Byng.*] When was the hospital established at Suez?—As soon as it was decided to send the troops overland; in September.

Sir *Allan Mac Nab*, called in; and Examined.

Sir *A. Mac Nab.*

2036. *Chairman.*] I BELIEVE that you served in the old war of 1814, in the British army?—Yes, during the years 1813, 1814, and 1815, until the restoration of peace.

2037. You have subsequently been in high official stations; Prime Minister of Canada and President of the Chamber of Deputies, have you not?—Yes, I have held official appointments; I was Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, and President of the Executive Council.

2038. The Committee have heard from various sources that a disposition on the part of the population and the leading gentry in Canada has existed for a considerable time back to participate in the military services of the British army?—I think there was a very strong feeling evinced during the Russian war, at the time the provincial Parliament voted 20,000 *l.* towards the Patriotic Fund, and there was a great desire on the part of Canada to participate in the military services of the British army, and several offers were made to raise regiments to assist in the Crimea.

2039. What prevented that being carried into effect?—That I cannot answer.

2040. With regard to more recent events, were not offers made to assist with reference to the Indian revolt, some six or eight months ago, by raising troops in Canada?—I have heard such is the case, but I have no personal knowledge of the fact.

2041. When did you understand that there were propositions made?—It was during the war with Russia that there was a general feeling in the country, and a desire that a Canadian regiment should be organised and sent over, as one of the line to join the British army in the Crimea.

2042. Were there any particular conditions which you considered would have facilitated the embodiment of such a regiment?—Yes; I think, considering the conduct of the loyal militia of that country upon all occasions, especially during the late American war, when we had not 1,000 troops in the western portion of the province above Montreal, in raising a regiment there, the appointments should be given to young gentlemen, properly qualified, in Upper and Lower Canada, of English and French origin, who, in recruiting for their commissions, would raise a regiment in a very short time.

2043. It has been stated in evidence by Sir Henry Storks, that there is now a regiment to be called the 100th, to be raised in Canada, and that the officers are to be composed of British and Canadians, and that the Canadian portion is

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to consist of about half the captains, half the lieutenants, and one major; do you conceive that that is a proportion that would meet the expectations of the people?—My opinion is, if the staff of the regiment were taken from the British army, and as I have just stated, young gentlemen of the country were allowed to recruit for their commissions, you would much more easily attain the object you have in view.

2044. Do you mean the colonel commanding, the adjutant, the paymaster, and so forth?—Yes.

2045. Leaving the local gentlemen to furnish the whole of the rest?—Yes; I think it could be done at once.

2046. Do you think that under the present proposition we have heard of, it is likely to succeed very soon?—I am not aware of the particulars of the orders for raising the regiment, except what I have heard to-day.

2047. The Committee have been given to understand that there are no particular inducements offered beyond what is offered here, and that the regiment is to be on precisely the same footing as the other regiments of the line, only that a certain portion of the officers shall be selected from the gentlemen of that country?—I am of opinion that, were the plan I have mentioned adopted, it would be an inducement for greater exertion, and afford greater facilities for raising the regiment.

2048. I believe you have reason to know, that owing to the origin of the population there, particularly of Upper Canada, there is a very remarkable feeling of loyalty and attachment to the mother country among them?—Yes, I am convinced of it. Upper Canada was settled by the United Empire loyalists, a description of people who, rather than forfeit their allegiance, left their property in the United States and accepted grants of land from the Crown in Upper Canada; also by half-pay officers and soldiers who had served during the revolutionary war; and as to Lower Canada no people could have behaved better than the French Canadians during the last American war.

2049. Is the population of the North American States, the two Canadas being by far the most important, now somewhat near 3,000,000?—In British North America there are quite 3,000.000, but not in Canada alone.

2050. Are there 2,000,000 in Canada?—I cannot exactly say; but I should think about 1,800,000.

2051. Is the augmentation of the population and resources of the country going on very rapidly?—Yes; in Upper Canada more than in any other portion of British America.

2052. Are there any great maritime and commercial resources connected with that settlement, particularly at Quebec and other seaports?—Quebec is one of the most important seaports. There have been as many as 1,000 to 1,300 vessels in port at a time.

2053. There has been some increase, has there not, of our commercial intercourse through the lakes, which promises to be very great for the future, particularly with a town belonging to the United States at the head of the lakes?—Chicago; that is in the United States.

2054. Does that lead to anticipations of great importance?—Yes, very great indeed.

2055. As the population is so important and somewhat of a military disposition, do you suppose that there is really a want of an opening for young gentlemen, both French and English, into the military profession?—I do think so; and if the regiment were officered by Canadians they would feel that this was the opening of a new profession to them, and would feel a pride in joining with the rest of the British army in defence of the empire; and I think it desirable that such should be the case.

2056. Are the advantages in the way of schools in that country sufficient to give the necessary amount of instruction to young gentlemen?—Yes; there are excellent schools in the country, and it has been seen by competent judges that the best school system we have is in Canada. We have common schools in all parts of the country, model schools in each section of the provinces, and colleges and universities. A reference to the journals of Parliament will show exactly the amounts, paid for them, and how they are supported.

2057. Do you think that the French proportion of the population is similarly attached to the alliance with England?—Yes, I do; I thought very differently

differently at one time, but I have quite changed my opinion. Since the union of the provinces, I have been more thrown in contact with them, and have had a better opportunity of judging, and I believe them to be well disposed towards England, and a most loyal and most excellent people. Sir *A. Mac Nab.* 19 March 1858.

2058. Captain *Vivian.*] Were you in Canada in 1836, during the rebellion there?—Yes.

2059 Do you recollect a regiment that was raised at Lord Gosford's instigation in Lower Canada at that time?—I have heard such was the case, but being in Upper Canada at that time I did not see the regiment.

2060. But there was a regiment raised very rapidly, and a very fine regiment they were; were they not?—I believe so.

2061. Lord Gosford was the Governor-general?—Yes.

2062. Do you think that in any great emergency to the mother country, the loyalty and desire to serve England is so great on the part of the Canadians, that they would willingly raise a regiment of 1,000 or 2,000 in two months?—The loyalty of the Canadians, and their desire to serve the mother country, has been manifested on all occasions; but I should not like to say that a regiment could be raised in two months; but much depends upon the manner of doing it; and I think the country would take a great interest in its organization if the plan suggested were adopted.

2063. The Russian war was a special case; it was popular in Canada; it would depend upon the popularity of the war, would it not?—I think on all occasions their readiness has been very much the same.

2064. They raised 20,000*l.* at that time, did they not?—Yes, and a great deal more than that; I think there was not a town that did not contribute something; in my opinion that was the time to have raised a regiment.

2065. Did the same feeling prevail on the occasion of the Indian mutiny?—Yes, I think it did; the feeling would be at all times the same if the Imperial Government required their services upon equal terms with the line.

2066. You do not think that it is so much an enthusiasm in favour of England as a desire to have a Canadian regiment?—The loyalty and patriotism of the people of that portion of the empire has been manifested upon more occasions than one. The remaining portion of the question I have already answered.

2067. If the regiment was called the One-hundreth, and not the Royal Canadian Regiment, they perhaps would not be so ready?—Perhaps not.

2068. Or if that regiment was officered by English officers?—I do not think they would.

2069. *Chairman.*] The young men want a new incentive to exertion?—They wish for what they are fairly entitled to, namely, the British army opened to them as it is here; and I cannot see that any distinction should be made between a man born here and one born in Canada.

2070. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Is the black or coloured population of Canada numerous?—I am not aware of the exact number, but they are numerous in Canada.

2071. How do they, generally speaking, support themselves?—They are industrious; they find plenty of employment; many of them are good mechanics; many of them have farms, and they follow various callings in different parts of the province.

2072. Would it be feasible to raise a corps from among them for service in India or elsewhere?—Yes, I think it would. They are a loyal class of people; and when their services were required during the late insurrection, many of them came forward and enrolled themselves in companies.

2073. And you think there would be no difficulty in inducing them to enlist?—I do not think there would; and the companies that were organised during the insurrection behaved themselves well.

2074. Can you say on what terms they would be disposed to enlist; could they be obtained on more favourable terms with regard to pay and privileges than the European soldier?—I cannot say upon what terms they would be induced to enlist, but certainly not on terms less favourable than those of the British Army.

2075. You would be adverse to officers being sent from this country; you think that the others would be more likely to succeed?—I am not adverse to

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officers being sent from this country, but I think the coloured people would be more readily induced to leave Canada if it were to go with some one they knew and had confidence in.

2076. Viscount *Goderich.*] But the regiment that you alluded to previously was not a regiment of negroes?—No.

2077. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Supposing that persons of influence in Canada were to endeavour to raise a regiment of coloured people, you think that there would be no difficulty in their doing so?—They might experience some difficulty; but a regiment could, I think, be raised.

2078. They would be required to be officered by persons in whom they had confidence?—Yes.

2079. Do you think that they would have any difficulty in inducing their females to go to India with the prospect of eventually being settled on land there?—No; I think those who had families, that they most probably would accompany them.

2080. We know that the African is the most robust and best colonist for India; but what I wish to arrive at is, whether you think there would be any possibility of raising a corps of negroes in Canada who would be accompanied by a sufficient number of females to form the nucleus of a colony in Bengal, or any part of India, where advantages might be offered to them?—I think it would very much depend upon the terms and conditions, and the manner in which it was carried out; the people, I think, would willingly go if they could better their condition, not unless; and there are a great many coloured people in the country, strong, healthy, powerful men.

2081. You think it is a rational idea that may be entertained without any danger?—Yes.

2082. *Chairman.*] Can you form any conjecture as to the number of that class of people that are now in Canada?—No; I cannot tell you the exact number, but it could be easily ascertained. There are a great many in all parts of the province; and in the western section there is a settlement where the inhabitants are almost entirely coloured people.

2083. Is it of any considerable population?—Yes; there are a great many of them.

2084. They all speak English, do they not?—Yes; it is the only language they speak.

2085. Have you any memorandum about the number or supposed number of those coloured people?—No, but I think I may safely say there are 20,000.

2086. Are they industrious?—Yes, and they are doing well in all parts of the province.

Martis, 23° *die Martii*, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Byng.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Sir C. Napier.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Danby Seymour.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Captain Vivian.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Willoughby.
Viscount Goderich.	

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR DE LACY EVANS, IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable *Henry Labouchere*, a Member of the House, Examined.

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2087. *Chairman.*] DO you happen to recollect, without referring to specific dates, whether offers were made from Canada with regard to this Indian revolt, either immediately after, or even preceding it, to raise troops, in order to assist the Imperial Government?—Yes, I remember generally, on both those occasions, first of all during the Crimean war, that offers were made by several public-spirited gentlemen in Canada to raise volunteer forces for the service of the country; that took place before I was at the Colonial Office. Still, I am well aware of the circumstances under which those offers were made, and similar offers were repeated lately, while I was at the Colonial Office, at the time of the Indian war.

2088. The details concerning those offers, either as to entertaining or declining them, went chiefly through the War Department?—No; I must say that the principles upon which those offers were dealt with were matters for the consideration of the Government generally, but especially of the Colonial Department. Those offers were declined in both cases. They were declined, in the first instance, partly I think upon general considerations, but also because we found that those offers having been referred by the Governor-General of Canada to his responsible advisers, I mean to his council, the advice of that council was distinctly, that in the then circumstances of Canada, at a time when that province was making great exertions to strengthen, and making more efficient its militia force, it was not advisable that the mother country should accept those offers: the council stating, at the same time, that they did not mean to express any opinion that was contrary to the use of the Queen's prerogative of recruiting for the regular army in Canada, in the same way as she may recruit in any part of her dominions. What we did object to was, the acceptance on the part of the Government of these offers of volunteer corps.

2089. Did that refer chiefly to the offer of men during the Crimean war, or on both occasions?—In answer to the question I will state that, quite lately, when I was at the Colonial Office, some such offers were repeated. At that time it was in the contemplation of the Government to raise a regular regiment of the line in Canada, and the answer that I gave on the part of the Government was, after thanking the gentlemen who came forward in this public-spirited way, that it was the opinion of the Government that any military succour to be derived from Canada would be better derived in the ordinary form of recruiting for the regular service rather than accepting those volunteer offers.

2090. That was officially communicated to the Government of Canada?—No doubt.

2091. Those regiments were proposed to be volunteer regiments, but the Government in Canada made no objection to raising regular regiments?—They made no objection to raising regular regiments or to recruit for the service of

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the Queen there; that, they said, was a matter for consideration by the Imperia Government. I think it has already been stated to the Committee that quite recently arrangements have been made which I trust will lead to the raising of a Canadian regiment in Canada for the military service of the empire generally.

2092. At one period it was in contemplation, was it not, to raise a regiment with two battalions, and one of those battalions to be levied or to come from some other provinces besides Canada, such as New Brunswick?—Yes; I know that various schemes have been in contemplation. It has been in contemplation, and I should be very glad to see it carried out, to have at least two regiments raised in British North America; one for Canada, and another for the Lower Provinces; but these matters are, of course, rather for the War Department than for the Colonial Department. I only considered these questions with reference to general policy, rather than with reference to military details.

2093. Do you happen to recollect what was the ground of the distinction drawn by the Canadian Government between volunteer regiments and regiments of the line; they had no objection to the latter being levied, but the Government at home did not approve of volunteer regiments?—I suppose they considered those volunteer regiments as giving greater stimulus to the youth of the country leaving Canada at that particular time.

2094. Did you refer chiefly to the period of the Crimean war, or the recent one?—I should say more especially to the Crimean war. At that time the militia undoubtedly was by no means in the state in which it is now. I believe great exertions have been made, particularly by Colonel de Rottenburgh at the head of militia, a most meritorious public servant, and I believe those exertions have been very successful.

2095. Numerically they are nearly 200,000 men?—It may be so.

2096. Allusion has been made by Sir Allan M'Nab to the proposition of raising a black regiment or a coloured one in Canada?—I hope the Committee will excuse me if I do not go much into that; the subject was under consideration by the late Government, but no finally decisive step had been taken upon it, and I do not think that I ought to state anything with regard to an incomplete transaction.

2097. Do you happen to know, as you have left office so recently, what the state of that accepted proposition for raising one regiment is in at present?—I believe in a very forward state.

2098. At that time there were how many British regiments in Canada at the breaking out of the revolt?—I am afraid of trusting my memory with figures.

2099. Can you inform the Committee what amount of force of every description there was at the Cape in the month of August when the authorities at the Cape first received intelligence of the revolt in India?—Perhaps the Committee will allow me to premise that there is already on the table of the House of Commons a correspondence upon the subject of the dispatch of troops to India from the colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and Mauritius, which was presented by command of Her Majesty in December 1857. Since that I had prepared, just before I left office, further papers on the same subject, which I left at the Colonial Office in a printed form ready to be presented to Parliament, which printed papers will give the House, and consequently this Committee; fuller information upon all those subjects up to a recent date. I have communicated with Lord Stanley on this subject, and he says that it is his intention forthwith to lay those papers upon the table of the House of Commons, and he has also authorised me to use the information contained in those papers in any answers that I may give to the Committee. I state this to justify my quoting from papers not yet on the table of the House of Commons. Those papers contain an account sent by Sir George Grey of the amount of force which must have been at the Cape at the time to which the gallant Chairman has referred. There is a return of the troops at the Cape of Good Hope and Natal on the 31st August 1852 and the 31st of July 1857; he has sent me two statements.

2100. Will you give the Committee the sum total of the force in August?—I find that on the 31st of July 1857 there were altogether at the Cape in rank and file, including the German Legion, which amounted to 2,000 men, and the Cape Mounted Rifles, amounting to 793 men, a total of 10,666 men.

2101. The

2101. The Mounted Rifles are given at nearly 1,000 men in each Army Estimate?—I am quoting from a return signed by Major Bates, the Military Secretary, and sent to this country by Sir George Grey.

2102. Does that include artillery?—Yes, it includes artillery and engineers; 421 Royal Artillery, 245 Engineers.

2103. Is there any return as to any local force or burgher force at that time?—No; no otherwise than as the Cape Mounted Rifles and the German Legion may be called a local force.

2104. Is the actual strength of the German Legion mentioned?—It is put down as 2.000.

2105. In the Estimates of the two successive years they are put down as 2,300; is the force that you speak of for duty or not?—I can only give you the return, as I have it here.

2106. There is a great deal said in those despatches with regard to diverting regiments that were either ordered to New Zealand or China; what actual regiment or force of infantry or artillery was deducted upon that occasion, and sent to India?—I will state that presently. The Committee is probably aware, from the papers already before it, that on the 26th of August I wrote a despatch to Sir George Grey, expressing a hope, on the part of the Government, that he would have been able to spare six regiments, which would leave him four, besides embodied troops of the German legion and mounted rifles; I go on to state, "In case, however, you should not have already sent six regiments to India (including the one which has gone to Ceylon), I have to instruct you to do so with as little delay as may be practicable, unless indeed the circumstances of the colony should have so materially altered since the date of your last despatches as to render this step manifestly dangerous to its security."

2107. That despatch was dated the 26th of August?—Yes.

2108. What was done before that in the month of August?—On the 8th of January I received an answer to this despatch from Sir George Grey, dated November 5th, 1857; in that despatch he recapitulates all that he had done up to that time, and states his reasons for not fully complying with the instructions that I had given him with regard to those regiments.

2109. What did he do on receiving the request of Lord Elphinstone about the 26th of August?—I think he sent two infantry regiments to Bombay.

2110. Will you see whether the 89th regiment is in that return?—Yes; I have a return here of the regiments at the Cape on the 31st of July, with their numerical force: Royal Artillery, rank and file, 421; Engineers, 245; 2d Foot, 746; 6th Foot, 717; 12th Foot, 409; 13th Foot, 768; 45th Foot, 850; 60th Foot, 717; 73d Foot, 745; 80th Foot, 779; 85th Foot, 769; 89th Foot, 707; Cape Mounted Rifles, 793; German Legion, 2,000; total 10,666.

2111. Does it mention that they are of all ranks?—Rank and file. I will give you now a return of the troops under orders for China, but diverted to India by Sir George Grey on his own responsibility. The 23d regiment was composed of 21 officers and 387 men, and the 93d of 18 officers and 318 men; the 93d, again, that had come by the Mauritius, 34 officers and 700 men; the 93d and 23d, 19 officers and 338 men, making altogether 1,743 men and 92 officers, that had been thus diverted as they were going by the Cape, on the responsibility of the Governor, and sent to India. There is a note to this return to say that the "82d and 90th regiments had passed the Cape previous to the intelligence of the outbreak in India having been received."

2112. If I understand rightly, not one of those 1,700 men belonged to the command at the Cape of Good Hope?—Not at all. Those were only on their way to China, and at the Cape they were diverted by Sir George Grey on his own responsibility to India, in consequence of the intelligence that had been received from that country.

2113. Orders were sent, I believe, by the Governor-General to stop them, even if they had not been diverted by Sir George Grey?—I imagine Sir George Grey anticipated those orders in doing this.

2114. Viscount *Goderich*.] Those troops are not included in the 10,000?—Certainly not. I will now state what I understood to have been the number of troops of his own force which Sir George Grey sent to India in consequence of the events that had taken place there. I stated to the Committee that I sent to him, on the part of the Government, on the 26th of August, directions

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expressing the hope that he would be able to spare six regiments for service in India, leaving to him at the Cape and to the Commander-in-Chief the discretion of selecting what regiments should stay, and what should go; and I received, on the 7th of January of this year, a despatch from Sir George Grey, stating what he had actually done, and his reasons for not having fully complied with the instructions which I gave him in that respect. I must add, that I hope the Committee will have the goodness carefully to consider Sir George Grey's reasons as stated by himself, because it will be much more satisfactory to me, and much more just to Sir George Grey, than merely taking my account of those opinions. Sir George Grey gives various reasons for not having fully complied with those instructions; he observes that the state of the country was still such as to inspire a good deal of apprehension in his mind; he observes that by sending horses in great numbers to India, and by dismounting the Cape Rifles, in order to be able to send seasoned horses to India, he had greatly crippled the efficiency of that corps; he states, "What I had actually done under these circumstances, indeed before I had received any instructions from you, was to divert all the China force which passed here from its original destination, and to direct it on to Calcutta; to order the four regiments named in the margin to proceed, two to Bombay, one to Calcutta, one to Ceylon." That regiment that was sent to Calcutta, was, from the despatch which I have received, and which is in those papers from Sir Henry Ward, sent by him, very much to his credit, in my opinion, to India; he thinking that the tranquillity of Ceylon was such, that he was not justified in retaining that regiment there, under the present circumstances of India. He goes on to say, "And I sent also detachments of artillery to Calcutta, which at the rate of the strength of our regiments here, must be rated at nearly half a regiment; I sent up this detachment of artillery fully horsed; I took the whole of the specie in the colonial chest, 60,000 *l.*, sent that on to Calcutta, and made such arrangements for purchasing horses, as enabled me to procure the required number in a few days." The number of horses was, I think, 1,000, that he had been directed to procure, and from the information since received from Sir George Grey, I believe he will have sent no less than 2,500 horses to India, a most valuable supply to that country, and one which I believe has been highly appreciated; many of those horses, having been trained, being doubly valuable on that account. Sir George Grey also remarks that the regiments he had sent were some of the strongest and choicest regiments he had at the Cape, and that it would have been easy for him to comply more nearly with the letter of my instructions, if he had not thought it necessary to observe their spirit, by sending a greater number of regiments, but by sending weaker regiments than those he had actually transmitted to India; and he goes on to state general considerations as to the condition of the colony, which rendered it, in his opinion, inexpedient at that moment further to weaken the defences of the colony. Sir George Grey, in his despatches, also adds the assurance that he will continue to watch the progress of things in India, and that he will take every opportunity he can, consistently with the security of the colony that he administers, of sending further assistance to India.

2115. Have you had any account of the sum total of the cost, or the average prices given for those 2,500 horses?—No; those details will be better obtained from the War Department; but I have seen a letter from the authorities in India expressing very strongly their sense of the assistance Sir George Grey rendered in sending horses to India; and one letter, particularly, said that they were really more wanted than men at that particular moment.

2116. With regard to the German legion, it was stated in the House of Commons, I believe by yourself, and here by Sir Henry Storks, that that legion was put upon full pay immediately on its arrival, or continued on full pay. It was on full pay, perhaps, when it left this country?—I forget how that was; I know it was put on full pay almost immediately after its arrival.

2117. How long has it to be on full pay?—That of course must depend upon circumstances.

2118. It was stated by Sir Henry Storks that it is to be on full pay, at the expense of the Imperial Government, from its first arrival at the Cape till the 21st of this March?—I dare say that is quite correct. The arrangement made was,

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was, that if that force was called out for Imperial purposes, they should be paid as soldiers in the ordinary mode; but if called out for police purposes for the colony, they were to be paid for by the colony itself. I had some correspondence with Sir G. Grey upon that subject, and I collected from his despatches that he considered the reasons that had induced him to call out the German Legion to be of a mixed character; partly, it is true, for what may be termed internal purposes, namely, for the security and good conduct and discipline of the men, but partly also for Imperial purposes. Under those circumstances he thought himself warranted in placing the expense to the charge of the mother country.

2119. As it does not appear that there was any war at that time, how could it have been for Imperial purposes?—I can assure the gallant General that there was very great apprehension of a war. I know, both from Sir George Grey and other persons connected with the Cape whom I have seen, that there probably never was a greater period of alarm, and a more generally spread alarm, than there was until quite recently in the colony of the Cape, owing to the very extraordinary state of things that existed there. It was believed that there was a very general combination of the native chiefs to have a general rising of the native tribes in that country, who were under the influence of a self-styled prophet, who had acquired a most extraordinary influence over the minds of the natives, and who it was supposed was used as an instrument by those chiefs. There was a great apprehension of a very wide-spread rising in that country.

2120. Viscount *Goderich.*] At what period?—Till quite lately.

2121. *Chairman.*] Can you recollect the time at which the greater portion of the Caffre population were reduced to a state almost of starvation, when some 20,000 or 30,000, in consequence, came in, and were employed in various ways in our settlements?—No doubt; that was just the time I have referred to. One of the modes which this prophet had made use of was, to induce those poor people to destroy their own crops and cattle; and he produced a state of things that was most dangerous to the whole country. The bubble burst at last; and owing, I believe, very much to the energetic and prudent conduct of Sir George Grey violence was not resorted to. Those poor people were starving, and they flocked in much larger numbers than the gallant General has stated into the colony; and they are now employed there; but they are there in such large numbers that they are, to a certain degree, a source of danger to the colony, and they require vigilant attention.

2122. What might have been the number?—Not far short of 80,000.

2123. In the colony, and in a state of starvation?—They have crossed the frontier to seek for labour.

2124. Is there any proof that there was the slightest manifestation of hostility on the part of those starving people?—No, I do not think that is so; but it is quite clear that the presence of an immense number of persons like them is and must be a source of danger. This is a sentence in the despatch in which the numbers are mentioned. Sir George Grey proceeds to say, "A misconception appears to have arisen from the use of the term regiments; if, for instance, I were to send to India the 12th Regiment, which is one of the regiments I am said to retain here, probably not more than 350 men would embark. The total force in the command at the present moment is but 6,265 rank and file, including Natal."

2125. What is the date of that?—The 2d of November. "Out of that force, the 60th Regiment, about 760 strong, are under orders for embarkation, and every effort shall be made to send, if possible, still larger reinforcements to India. I shall not attempt, by sending weak regiments (to enable myself to say that I have sent so many regiments), but the force sent shall be efficient and useful, and not a man that can be spared shall be retained in this country. But I beg that Her Majesty's Government will remember that, to send this efficient force, we have crippled the artillery here by sending every horse from our field batteries; that we have temporarily almost destroyed the Cape Corps, by taking 200 of the best horses from that force, and this has been done with 70,000 barbarians within our colonial borders, exclusive of those in Kaffraria and the neighbouring states. The object I have had in view throughout, was to furnish to India efficient aid, corresponding to the crisis in the affairs of that empire, not to make an idle boast of having sent so many regiments."

2126. You are aware that as this return is made out of rank and file, that

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every one of those regiments is about 100 men stronger than as stated in that report?—I only state the facts as they have been stated to me. Perhaps the Committee will allow me to add, that in considering the necessity of keeping a sufficient force at the Cape, the state of Natal must by no means be left out of view. There is a very small force at Natal now, but, as the Committee is probably aware, the native tribes in that neighbourhood, the Zoolus, are very numerous and warlike, and as it may be necessary at any time to send a regiment from the Cape to Natal, it would be in the highest degree inexpedient and imprudent to leave the military defences of the Cape in such a state that there would not be at any time a spare regiment from the Cape for Natal.

2127. *Chairman.*] There should be, then, always an extra regiment at the Cape beyond its real wants, for the possible contingencies of being required at Natal?—I think, taking South Africa as a whole, it is necessary always to keep in view the possibility of the troops being required at Natal at any moment.

2128. Does the return you have quoted state what number of troops are now at Natal?—I do not think it does, but I know there is but a small force there, 200 or 300 men.

2129. The German Legion was originally intended to become settlers; have they began to cultivate the land?—Yes; they are now, I believe, in process of settling. I saw their commanding officer, Baron Stutterheim, the other day, and he gave a satisfactory account of the way in which it was going on.

2130. Some statements appeared in the newspapers here, and at the Cape likewise, that a reinforcement of marriageable ladies for that Legion from Germany was sent for by the authority of the Government at the Cape: has any circumstance of that sort come to the knowledge of the Colonial Department?—Yes, no doubt. It appeared that the few women that accompanied those men were at first a very great difficulty in the way of maintaining discipline, and Sir George Grey was very anxious to supply that want. He proposed to the Government here that we should undertake to send out German emigrants, women and families, for that purpose, and we declined to undertake that task at all; we thought it would be very expensive and troublesome; in short, that they had no right to come to this country for money to carry them there. However, he undertook it with colonial funds, which there was no objection to his doing, and I believe there has been some plan devised to communicate with Germany and to induce German emigrants to go out and become wives to those settlers.

2131. Have any persons from Germany passed to the Cape under that arrangement?—I am not aware that any have actually passed. I know that measures have been taken, and I think, through a very respectable mercantile house in Hamburg, to obtain them. All that the Government have done is this: the Emigration Commissioners having a certain sum at their disposal belonging to the colony, they have endeavoured to expend that partly in inducing Irish girls of good character to go out to the Cape to supply that want.

2132. Irish as well as German females?—Yes.

2133. You are aware that there is a large sum, 40,000 *l.*, at present per annum, voted by Parliament, for the purposes of the education and civilisation of the Caffres?—Yes.

2134. It appears from some printed accounts that I have seen, that reports were prevalent at the Cape that a portion of that 40,000 *l.* was made use of for the purpose of bringing over those marriageable ladies from Germany?—No, I believe that can be said in no other sense than in this, that that 40,000 *l.* went in aid of the colonial revenue, and in that way facilitated the operation; I do not believe in any other sense that can be said.

2135. Mr. *Horsman.*] Having regard to the means at the disposal of Sir George Grey for sending out reinforcements of troops to India, have you reason to be satisfied that he did what he could to assist the Government?—I must begin by saying that I entertained a very high opinion of the ability, energy, and public spirit of Sir George Grey, and that being the case, I considered it my duty to place a very large degree of confidence in him, who was (being on the spot) most able to judge of the circumstances with regard to the amount of the force which he thought it necessary to keep at the Cape. Perhaps, in answer to the question the honourable gentleman has put to me, I cannot do better than

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than read, if the Committee will allow me, an extract from a despatch which I wrote to Sir George Grey when I received from him the account that he had not fully carried my instructions into effect. "Sir, I have received your despatches of the numbers and dates noted in the margin on the subject of the succours which you have been able to afford to the Indian Government. I am glad to find that they have been very considerable, both in men and horses, although you have not fully complied with the instructions which I gave you in my despatch of the 26th August last, in which I expressed the expectation of Her Majesty's Government that you would be able to spare six regiments for service in India (including the one sent to Ceylon), retaining four in South Africa, besides the Cape Mounted Rifles, and the German military settlers now under arms, and leaving you to determine, in conjunction with the Commander of the Forces, what particular regiments should be selected for that service. I understand, from your several despatches, that the total amount of succours which you have sent to India and Ceylon from the force stationed at the Cape have been four regiments and a detachment of artillery, viz., 95th Regiment, 800, which was sent to relieve the 89th; 13th Regiment, 500; 80th Regiment, 500 (sent to Ceylon); 6th Regiment, 760. In your despatch of 2d November, No. 158, the 60th Regiment is stated to be under orders for embarkation, but it appears by your subsequent despatch, No. 161, of the 5th November, and by the latest military returns sent home from the Cape, that it was the 6th and not the 60th Regiment which was under orders. This is probably attributable to a clerical error. You also supplied the Indian Government with a detachment of artillery, with a sum of 60,000 *l.* in specie out of the colonial treasury, with upwards of 1,000 horses, besides 100 Cape draught mules, and 2,000 barrels of flour, independently of the supplies of biscuit and other provisions, which on your application were forwarded to India by Rear-Admiral Sir F. Grey. I am not insensible to the weight of the reasons which you allege for not having fully carried into effect the instructions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the number of regiments which you were to send from the Cape, and I am unwilling to urge you to weaken the military defences of the colony beyond what in your deliberate judgment you may consider indispensable to its security. You will however bear in mind, that any troops that you can spare will assuredly be readily provided for and usefully employed in India, and Her Majesty's Government rely with confidence on your assurance that you will afford to the utmost extent of your power such assistance to the Government of India as circumstances will admit of. Your greater proximity to that country may give you opportunities of doing so without the delay which would be occasioned by reference to England; and Her Majesty's Government think it best not to fetter your discretion and that of the Commander of the Forces by more definite instructions in this respect. You will not be required to send on a regiment to New Zealand from the Cape in place of the 89th, which was to have gone there; and it is not the intention at present of Her Majesty's Government to send any fresh regiments to the Cape, for reasons which have induced the military authorities to prefer sending those regiments to the Mediterranean, to supply the place of seasoned troops that have been sent from there on to India. With reference to your suggestion that a regiment of militia should be sent to the Cape, I would remark that this cannot be done consistently with the laws of this country. I observe with great satisfaction the exertions that have been made by yourself and the local authorities to co-operate to an increased extent with Her Majesty's troops in the defence of the colony. I am fully aware of the reasons which would render it improper to weaken the force now stationed at Natal." I would observe with regard to the latter part of this despatch, that Sir George Grey had suggested, that if there could be sent from this country newly raised regiments, or militia regiments, they would be very serviceable at the Cape, and it would enable him to send on seasoned troops to India. Now, first of all, with regard to the militia; the Committee are aware, doubtless, that it is not in the power of the Government legally to send a militia regiment to the Cape; but with regard to sending newly raised regiments to the Cape, and thus relieving seasoned troops, who might be sent on to India, at first the Government were disposed to entertain that idea; but, on further consideration, it was the opinion of the military authorities that it was not advisable, in the case of a newly raised regiment, to scatter it in detachments in the way it

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would be from the nature of the service in British Caffraria; and it was thought, therefore, advisable to send those newly raised regiments to the Mediterranean, where they could be kept together in garrison as regiments, and thus to send on those regiments from the Mediterranean to India, instead of doing what Sir George Grey suggested, namely, to send those newly raised regiments to the Cape to relieve others to go to India.

2136. Mr. *Horsman.*] On a review both of your instructions, and Sir George Grey's conduct on receiving them, there does not appear to be on your mind an impression that there was any omission on his part to give that assistance which, either by zeal or by judgment, he might have given to the Government?—No; upon the whole, with the opinion I entertain of the public spirit and high qualities that have always been evinced by Sir George Grey as the Governor of that colony, there does not remain on my mind any impression that he has not done his duty to the country. I think there has been a great deal of misapprehension with regard to his conduct in this respect on previous occasions, which may have induced Members of this Committee rather to prejudge him in a question of this kind. In the course of the Session of last summer it was stated in the House of Commons that Sir George Grey had accumulated, when he was Governor of New Zealand, round him no less than six regiments, and this was stated as a reason for being suspicious of his conduct when he was Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. Sir George Grey upon seeing this statement, wrote to me a despatch, which I laid on the table of the House of Commons, explaining the real facts of the case. No doubt, nominally there were six regiments, but they were represented, I believe, in one case by a single man, and in another place by a dozen men, and it turned out, when you sifted this assertion, that in point of fact there were not two regiments at that moment in New Zealand; I think the numbers were under 1,200 men. I mention this, because I am speaking for an absent man, with whom I have no personal acquaintance, and yet for whom, as a public servant, I entertain the highest respect, I think that the country ought to be very grateful to him, and I trust that the Committee will excuse me for trying to remove misapprehension with regard to his public conduct.

2137. Viscount *Goderich.*] You are aware that it has been stated by those inclined to criticise the conduct of Sir George Grey, that at the time those reinforcements were asked for the Cape was in a state of unusual tranquillity, and that in consequence of the famine among the Caffres, they were less likely than usual to revolt; I think the Committee may gather from your evidence that that is not your opinion?—There is no doubt there was a lull; the Caffres were broken for a time; and I confess, merely judging from this country, as is evident from my own despatch, that I was in hopes that Sir George Grey might have been able at once to have spared more men than he sent; but at the same time, I must repeat that I do not think myself authorised to set any opinion that I may have formed of that kind against the deliberate opinion of a man like Sir George Grey, in whose general judgment I repose so much confidence. With regard to the Cape, the Cape has been for some years a source of very great expenditure to this country, and I am very far from saying that that military expenditure ought not to be very closely watched; I think it ought to be. But on the other hand, I hope that this country will not commit the mistake of reducing to too low a point the military defences of South Africa. I think that we got into the last Caffre war very much from having committed that mistake, and that it is true policy and economy to keep our force in South Africa on a respectable and efficient footing; of course this is all a question of degree; I am very far from saying that all practicable economy ought not to be practised there.

2138. As a matter of fact, is it not true that Sir George Grey has maintained tranquillity at the Cape more sucessfully than was previously the case?—The four years during which Sir George Grey has been Governor of the Cape have been years of unexampled prosperity to that colony; under very difficult circumstances the peace of the country has been completely preserved, and the consequent prosperity of the colony has been very great. If any Honourable Member will take the trouble to look to those statistics which indicate the prosperity of that colony, particularly the increased export of its staple of wool, he will be struck with the remarkable increase of that colony, and I believe that we have only adequately

adequately to protect that colony for a few years, and to allow its natural strength and resources to develope themselves, ultimately to get rid of the difficulty and burden which have weighed so greatly on this country hitherto.

2139. Sir *Charles Napier.*] How were the four regiments sent to India?—The means of transport were provided by the Admiral on the station, but that part of the subject did not come particularly under my cognizance; I believe any information upon that subject will be better got from the Transport department, and Board of Admiralty.

2140. Did you apply to the Admiralty to send out vessels then?—Yes; in giving my instructions to send those regiments, I find this paragraph: "The Admiral at the Cape station has received directions respecting the means of transport for these troops," of course those directions were not given by me, but by the Board of Admiralty.

2141. *Chairman.*] What number of troops did the Governor of the Mauritius retain in the Mauritius, and what number did the Governor of Ceylon retain for the security of their possessions?—I see that Governor Higginson, in answer to Lord Elphinstone's application for troops, dated July the 22d, states that he sends "five companies, consisting of 500 rank and file, of the 33d Regiment of Foot, being all the troops that the "Pottinger" can accommodate." From the Mauritius I am speaking of. In writing to me at the same date, the Governor goes on to say, "this colony has never since the capture been left with so small a garrison, but I entertain no apprehensions whatever for the maintenance of public order and tranquillity." I do not now exactly recollect what the number of those troops was, but I have no doubt that this sentence in the despatch gives a general representation of the state of things there. I wish to add, that I think the Governor deserves great credit for the manner in which he complied with this requisition.

2142. What did the Governor of Ceylon retain?—The Governor of Ceylon, Sir Henry Ward, sent almost all the European troops that were at his disposal at that time in Ceylon; and I think his conduct entitled him to the highest praise; he did this in the middle of a large native population at a time when there were not wanting rumours of the disposition on the part of that population to disturbance and insurrection. I will also add, from the representations that were at that time made to the Government from SirHenry Ward, that we thought it wrong to leave him for any length of time in so denuded a state, and we consequently directed the Governor of the Cape to send one regiment to Ceylon, but, as I think I have already stated to the Committee, I find from a despatch recently received on the 18th of January 1858, from Sir Henry Ward, that he, conceiving that the presence of that regiment was not absolutely necessary for the security of Ceylon, thought it his duty to send it on to India, and he is not afraid of keeping Ceylon in the state in which it is now, with very few European troops in it.

2143. As Ceylon contains a very large population, which was in rebellion a very few years back, does not the conduct of Sir Henry Ward contrast very markedly with that of Sir George Grey?—I think the circumstances are so completely dissimilar that it would be most unfair to institute the smallest comparison.

2144. In what degree are the circumstances different?—They are of a totally different character. The population of Ceylon is large, yet they are very hostile to one another; they are of different religions and classes, and the people in that colony keep one another very much in check; the whole question must be judged of on totally different grounds in that colony.

2145. Had the Colonial Department any occasion to stimulate either of these Governors to send reinforcements to India?—Certainly not; on the contrary, Sir Henry Ward has done more than I should have considered it consistent with my duty to ask him to do; he has judged the question for himself, and acted accordingly; but in saying that for Sir Henry Ward, and in paying that tribute to him, I do not think it ought to be taken as any disparagement of Sir George Grey, who, under circumstances totally dissimilar, has pursued a different course.

2146. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] The population of Ceylon is not very large; what does it amount to?—It is more than a million.

2147. It is a small island?—It has a large population; about 1,300,000.

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2148. A very large proportion of that is the population of Southern India, is it not; the Tamuls?—Yes.

2149. The Tamuls and the Cingalese are, I believe, not on very good terms together?—No, fortunately for us, there is a good deal of difference between them; there is no amalgamation, but great dislike, between the Mahomedans and Cingalese, for instance.

2150. Most of the Cingalese have property of their own to lose?—Very much so; and the Government of Ceylon has been such of late years that it is more easy to support law and order in that colony than it was some time ago.

2151. In case of any difficulty, Sir Henry Ward was much nearer to reinforcements than Sir George Grey?—Yes.

2152. He was within a very short distance from the opposite coast of Bombay?—No doubt.

2153. And he might have got assistance from Madras also?—No.

2154. But his situation would enable him to spare more troops?—No doubt those circumstances should be taken into consideration.

2155. Do you not think that the arrival of 70,000 or 80,000 half-famished barbarians would be calculated to cause great anxiety to the Government of the Cape?—Certainly; and no doubt it is a circumstance that requires vigilance. I may say here that the colonists themselves have behaved very well on this occasion; they have increased their mounted police force to a considerable extent. I think they now devote 60,000 *l.* a year to that purpose; and the burghers and citizens of Cape Town also undertook to mount guard themselves, and to do garrison duty to enable the Government to send troops to India. I may also add that at the time when it was very important to get horses rapidly, the leading colonists came forward to offer their own carriage horses, Sir George Grey and other officials setting the example; and in every way they have showed a disposition to assist the Government in this emergency.

2156. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Will you have the kindness to state up to what date a letter had been received from the Cape which is included in the correspondence referred to in your evidence about to be submitted to Parliament?—I see that the date of the last despatch included in the papers referred to is on the 28th of December 1857.

2157. It stated in papers recently received from Bombay that two more regiments were expected from the Cape, say about the middle of February; do you know whether those regiments are included in your statement of the reinforcements sent from the Cape?—I have stated the reinforcements up to the last accounts that we have received; but you will observe that Sir George Grey intimates his intention of watching events, and hopes he will be able to spare more troops for India.

2158. He may have sent two more regiments?—I think it very possible.

2159. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Do you think that any troops could be raised from the Caffres?—I would rather not offer an opinion upon that point; I am hardly competent to do so. They are brave men, and fight very well against us.

2160. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Was there not an extraordinary *émeute* among the Caffres much about the same time as when the mutiny broke out in India?—Yes. There was a most extraordinary state of things, in consequence of the prevalence of a delusion which a self-styled prophet had given rise to, that if they would destroy their cattle, and cease from tilling the ground on a certain day, a fresh breed of cattle would spring from the earth, and the ground would be endued with some extraordinary and miraculous power of fertility. A very great number of these poor people acted upon this advice, and the consequence was the greatest misery and a state of starvation; many have actually died of starvation among them.

2161. The mutiny at Ceylon, in Lord Torrington's time, was a very trifling affair, was it not?—I would rather not answer any question that I was not officially connected with. I think he took very energetic means to suppress it, and if he had not taken those means I believe it might have been a very serious affair.

2162. You consider that Sir Henry Ward's conduct has been most spirited and proper in the late emergency?—I think so; indeed his conduct has been highly meritorious.

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2163. Do you think, on reviewing the whole circumstances of the case, that Sir George Grey sent as many troops as he could, under the circumstances of that colony, to India at the commencement of the outbreak?—The only answer I can give to that question is that Sir George Grey has done nothing in that respect to shake the confidence I have always had in his judgment and zeal for the public service.

2164. You think that he did all that he could do?—I believe he did.

2165. Sir *Charles Napier.*] You were quite satisfied with Sir George Grey?—Yes, I was satisfied with Sir George Grey.

2166. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Does that remark also apply to the Governor of the Mauritius?—Yes.

2167. *Chairman.*] With regard to sending more troops to India, the possible danger of the colony, if there were not sufficient troops there, has been frequently dwelt upon in some degree by Sir George Grey and by yourself; do you conceive that there was any sort of analogy between the possibility of danger to the security of Caffreland and the tremendous perils that impended over our great Indian Empire at that time?—Of course it was the duty of Sir George Grey to bear in mind both those considerations; it was his immediate duty to provide effectually for the security of the colony and also to consider the requirements of the public service in India, to give due weight to each of those considerations.

2168. Do you think that he gave a fair relative weight to the immense importance of the revolt in India, and to the possibility of a disturbance among the Caffres?—I have already stated to the Committee that I have great confidence in him, and I have no doubt that he did give due weight to both considerations.

2169. Viscount *Goderich.*] Would it not have added greatly to our difficulties if there had been a Caffre war as well as an Indian mutiny?—No doubt.

2170. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that the force at the disposal of Sir George Grey during these four years of peace has been greater numerically than we ever had in that colony during the war?—That is not the case; and if that is the impression of the gallant officer, I am glad to set him right. I have already stated the number of rank and file at the Cape and Natal on the 31st of July 1857, at the same time, Sir George Grey sent me a return of the number of the troops at the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, on the 31st of August 1852, the period when the Caffre war was drawing to a close. I have already stated that the numbers on the 31st of July 1857 were 10,666, and I find that the number of the rank and file that were in the colony on the 31st of August 1852, were 13,122.

2171. Composed of what? how many regiments?—I will read them: "The 12th Lancers, 392 rank and file; Royal Artillery, 273; Royal Engineers, 242; 2d Foot, 544; 6th Foot, 606; 12th Foot, 585; 43d Foot, 587; 45th Foot, 951; 60th Foot, 583; 73d Foot, 525; 74th Foot, 577; 91st Foot, 597; Rifle Brigade, 615; Cape Mounted Rifles, 777; Levies, 5,172; Detachment, 2d and 45th Foot, 96." In sending me this return, Sir George Grey observes, "you will see that my predecessor had under his command a force of upwards of 13,000, rank and file, paid by the Home Government, which was, comparatively speaking, strong in cavalry, and was of a most efficient description, whilst the force in this command on the 31st of July 1857, (including the German Legion, the officers and men of which were quite new to the country) but slightly exceeded 10,400 rank and file, and was exceedingly deficient in cavalry.

2172. *Chairman.*] That return does not include any burghers?—No; the returns in both instances are returns of the rank and file forces paid by this country, but I will observe that the return in 1852 includes 5,172 men under the head of levies.

Sir *Frederick Currie*, called in; and Examined.

Sir *F. Currie.*

2173. *Chairman.*] IT appears that several interviews took place between yourself, Mr. Mangles, and Mr. Vernon Smith, on the subject of sending a portion of the troops by the overland route to India?—Yes, that was the case.

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2174. Those interviews began, I believe, in the very earliest part of July?—Before that. Perhaps it would be as well if I were to state the circumstances of our interviews from the commencement of the more serious part of the outbreak. On Saturday the 27th of June, we received the first intelligence of the Meerut outbreak. I am not certain when; after that, our first meeting with Mr. Vernon Smith took place. I think we went to him on Monday, but I am not sure. We had a special court on the Monday, the telegram having arrived on the Saturday.

2175. About what time?—In the morning about 10 o'clock; I sent an express to the Chairman, who was engaged at the other end of the town, and all the members of the Court assembled in my room on Saturday the 27th, and it was determined to have a special court on Monday. By that time we hoped we should have the letters, that the mail would be come in, and that we should ascertain what the real circumstances were. The telegram was bare and confused, as they generally were at that time. From that period until, I will say, the 31st of August, which was when the first letter was written on this subject, we had every week official interviews with the President, and at all those interviews the dispatch of troops, the most speedy means of getting them, and the number of the reinforcements that were to be sent were discussed, and at all those meetings, or nearly all, I think, the Chairman told the President that there was a strong feeling in the Court of Directors that, if practicable, the overland route should be made use of for the conveyance of a portion of the reinforcements. I say strong feeling in the Court of Directors, because it would not be right for me to say a decision or a distinct opinion of the Court of Directors, because no regular discussion upon the subject had taken place; no division had taken place, and no minute had been recorded; there was no record of their opinion collectively, but certainly at each of our interviews a discussion took place as to the mode in which the reinforcements were to be sent, and the opinion of the Members of the Court of Directors as to the expediency of making use of the overland route was stated. The first written intimation of the feeling of the Court of Directors was on the 31st of August; but previously to that, some time early in August, I think, I cannot charge my memory with the exact date, at the Court of Directors, a discussion had taken place as to the expediency and the propriety, or perhaps necessity, of urging more distinctly upon Her Majesty's Government the propriety of using the overland route. If I mention more particularly to the Committee how this took place, perhaps it will tend to elucidate a matter upon which there seems to be some little discrepancy between the Chairman's recollection, and the recollection of the President of the Board of Control, as I understand from what has been said. At that Court of Directors one of the members stated his desire and intention of putting on the records a resolution that the Court should formally and in writing make a requisition upon the Government to make use, if possible, of the overland route. It was then stated by the Chairman that, in our discussions with the President, we had already made known to him that there was a feeling in the Court that this would be expedient, but that we had been told by the President that there were political considerations which rendered it inexpedient, and that there were other difficulties and inconveniences upon which it was suggested by another influential member of the Court of Directors that, as the Chairman had given to them this information, that the President was aware of the feeling in the Court, and that he had stated that there were political objections felt in the Cabinet to the consideration of the subject, it would not be right for the Court of Directors to press this matter upon Her Majesty's Government in a more formal way, inasmuch as we were all acting in concert, with the desire to get out the reinforcements in the speediest possible way, and not in any antagonistic way, the Court being on one side and Her Majesty's Government on the other; and therefore that it would be hardly right to put on record this, and to make a written communication on the subject to the President, as it might tend to embarrass Her Majesty's Government, the President having told us that there was embarrassment and inconvenience upon the matter, upon which that member consented, I cannot say to withdraw his motion, for I find it was never recorded upon the minutes, but to forego his intention of making the motion upon the express understanding that, at our next meeting, the Chairman would again press upon the President that this was the feeling of the Court of Directors.

2176. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Can you state when that was?—I cannot say exactly when it was, but it was previously to the 31st of August; about a fortnight, I think. Upon this understanding, the motion was not put, and the understanding with the Court was, that the Chairman should, at his next meeting with the President of the Board of Control, state that there was a feeling still in the Court, or rather it was the feeling of the Court, that, if practicable, the overland route should be made use of, and at the next meeting with the President, the Chairman, to the best of my recollection, did make this statement. He did not certainly state, as I have stated here, what took place in the Court of Directors, but he stated that there was a desire on the part of the Court of Directors that the overland route should be made available; when the discussion took place pretty much as usual the objections, inconveniences, and impossibilities, and other matters, being discussed. On the 31st of August the Court of Directors determined to make a distinct written requisition, and it was in consequence of the more serious intelligence having been received in the meantime, and from their not being satisfied with the reply which the Chairman made as to the result of the communication which had been made in accordance with the further determination of the Court.

2177. Viscount *Goderich.*] Was that the last determination of the Court, taken as soon as the Chairman had reported the result of his interview with the Board of Control?—No, not consequent upon that, but consequent rather upon the intelligence of a more serious kind received from India in the meantime.

2178. Is it within your recollection, that at any of the interviews which you had with the President of the Board of Control, early in July, or about that time, the Chairman or yourself expressed to him that it was not the formal opinion, but the general wish of the members of the Court of Directors, that the troops should be sent overland?—I do not think that we could have said that it was the formal opinion, or that it was the general opinion of the Court of Directors, previously to the court-day which I have been describing; because many of the members of the Court urged it, while others were of a different opinion, and there was no opinion of the Court, collectively, taken; but it was said to the President, that there was a feeling in the Court that it would be desirable to make use of it if possible, and that some of the Members of the Court thought so.

2179. Then, at that period, at the end of June or the beginning of July, it was not the unanimous opinion of the Court that that course ought to be taken?—No, I think not; certainly not. It had not been put in a way to elicit the opinion of the majority, either as to one course or as to the other.

2180. Did you understand, during any of those earlier conversations upon this subject with Mr. Vernon Smith, that the political objections to sending the troops by the overland route were of such a character as to be an absolute bar to the further consideration of the subject by the Court of Directors?—We considered that we were precluded from pressing the subject, by the communications that were made to us by the President, and we considered that if there were political objections, those were not for us to consider; and, besides the political objections, others were mentioned in discussion by the President; the difficulties of the transport, and the absence of all preparation on the other side of the isthmus, and the unseasonableness of the time of year, all those things were mentioned. But what particularly prevented our saying anything further was, that there were political objections which involved negotiations that were inconvenient.

2181. Are the Committee to understand that it does not consist with your recollection, that the decision was come to in the Court of Directors early in July, that the Chairs should be requested to communicate with the President of the Board of Control, and to express to him the desire of the Court to avail themselves of the overland route?—No, not until some time, I think, in the beginning of August.

2182. That would be about some three or four weeks before the official letter was written to the Board of Control?—Perhaps two or three weeks.

2183. *Chairman.*] When it was submitted for decision to the Court of Directors, what might have been the division on the subject?—I do not think there was any division upon the subject when it was formally submitted to the

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Court of Directors, and when, on the 31st of August, it was determined to write a letter.

2184. Then it was unanimous?—Yes; that is, there was nobody on the opposite side.

2185. Mr. *Crawford.*] Was the President informed by the Chairman, to your knowledge, that it had been the intention of any Member of the Court to draw the attention of the Court formally to the question of sending troops overland?—No; to the best of my recollection no intimation of that sort was made by the Chairman.

2186. Can you state how the political difficulties were got over with regard to sending the troops overland?—No.

2187. The East India Company were not at all instrumental in it, were they?—No, they were not; nor were they informed of the political difficulties.

2188. It is the practice of the Chairs to wait at certain periods upon the President of the Board of Control, in Cannon Row, for the dispatch of business?—Always once a week.

2189. On what day is it?—Thursday. Our court days are generally on Wednesday, and we generally communicate personally with the President on the following day.

2190. During the months of July and August did you restrict your visits to once a week?—I think we were frequently with the President. I think there were some special meetings; I cannot positively say.

2191. Probably on those occasions the forwarding of troops was the principal subject you had to discuss?—The numbers of the reinforcements, or something connected with them, was doubtless the subject of any extraordinary meeting that we may have had with the President. I do not remember that there was any meeting. One reason why it was not necessary at that time that we should have an extraordinary meeting with the President was that the Chairman was in the habit of seeing the President of the Board of Control every evening at the House of Commons, and pretty much the same communications took place between them there that took place in Cannon Row.

2192. Do you suppose that in the weekly interviews that took place between the Chairs and the President from the beginning of July to the end of August, there was any occasion on which you did not converse about forwarding troops to India?—I think there could hardly have been any in which it was not mentioned.

2193. And in which allusion was not made to sending troops out overland as round the Cape?—I cannot say on every occasion, but we took up pretty nearly 100 transports, regarding which we had to communicate with the President of the Board of Control, and the different objections were urged before him regarding different ships, and there was a great deal of discussion on this subject. I cannot say that on every occasion the overland route was mentioned; but usually it was. The object that we all had was to get out the largest number of reinforcements by the quickest route and the best mode of getting them out, and the different routes were the constant subject of discussion.

2194. Were those interviews of a confidential nature?—I can hardly say whether they are considered to be of a confidential nature; they are of an official character, certainly.

2195. Should you consider yourself at liberty to communicate to the Court anything that passed at such an interview, if the President had not requested you not to mention it?—If he had not requested that it was not to be communicated certainly I should communicate it; and consider ourselves at liberty, and almost bound to communicate generally to the Court of Directors, what had passed between us and the President of the Board of Control.

2196. Then, in point of fact, they were official visits?—Yes. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman, as representatives of the Court of Directors, see the President of the Board of Control once a week.

2197. Is it the practice of the Court, at the following weekly meeting, when reference is made to those interviews, to receive a statement which is recorded of what passed between yourselves and the President?—It is not the practice of the Court to make any record on that subject.

2198. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] When you say that you discussed the question of sending troops overland, what do you mean by the term sending troops overland?

land? Do you allude to sending a certain number of men by mail steamers; or do you allude to sending men through Egypt, in anticipation of transports having been sent from India?—It was very general up to the 31st of August, when the thing began to take the shape of sending men out, but it was not, I believe, till nearly the middle of September that any troops did go; but before that, any discussions that we had were quite of a general character, that if it were practicable to send troops, and arrangements could be made, the Court of Directors would be very glad to see that route made available.

2199. Do you think that the President, when you were discussing those subjects, thought that you acquiesced in his objections as to sending the troops overland?—I cannot tell.

2200. Did you state when you left him that you were still unconvinced by him?—Certainly not; I may say for myself personally, that I did acquiesce in the objections that were made, and I did not hear any objection made to them. We stated generally what our opinion was, and we received his objections; we did not controvert the matter, nor discuss very much upon the subject.

2201. You stated, I think, that you considered that those weekly interviews with the President were not of a confidential character?—I said that I could hardly see how you could consider them of a confidential character. They were official visits. I should say that we are also members of the Secret Committee, and at times secret matters were discussed, and those were certainly of a confidential character; but generally those relating to the public matters of the Court of Directors were not, and therefore it is difficult to say whether they were confidential or not, because to a certain extent they were, and to a certain extent they were public.

2202. The Chairman and Deputy-Chairman, and the senior member of the Court of Directors, form the Secret Committee?—Practically, the Secret Committee is the President of the Board of Control.

2203. You are bound, are you not, by an oath of secrecy?—Yes, we are.

2204. Then in making public anything that passed between you, you must exercise a discretion?—We could make public nothing which was communicated to us in the Secret Department.

2205. Would you not consider that those interviews were very much like a meeting of the Cabinet?—Excepting that we represented a corporate body, and had to communicate to that body the results of our communications; as we represented the Court of Directors with the President, and apart from the Court of Directors we had no authority, excepting in the Secret Department, when we could confer with him on secret matters independently of the Court of Directors, who are no part of the Secret Committee.

2206. Will you state the subjects to which the oath of secrecy relates?—To despatches in the Secret Department to and from India, to the best of my recollection; but the oath is in the charter by the Act of 3 & 4 Will. 4, and also in the last charter the oath is recited; and it is that each member of the Secret Committee makes oath that he will not, without permission of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, divulge the contents or the purport of any despatch in the Secret Department to or from India.

2207. And of course the subjects to which those despatches relate?—Of course.

2208. Viscount *Goderich.*] Do you think that the subject of the transport of troops to India had any connexion with the questions that you are obliged not to divulge by your oath of secrecy?—Certainly not.

2209. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Of course the communications from the Court of Directors generally to the President of the Board of Control, which were made through the Chairs, could not be in the Secret Department?—Certainly not; the Court of Directors generally are not in the Secret Committee.

2210. Is it not the practice for the Court of Directors frequently to communicate, through their Chairs, with the President, with the view of ascertaining verbally, whether if they officially submit a measure, the proposition will meet with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, the object being to avoid unnecessary correspondence, and possible collision of opinion?—Certainly, occasionally that is done. There is that which is called the "previous communication," which is a communication between the Chairs and the President of the Board of Control, on purpose to avoid discussions and correspondence,

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respondence, and to ascertain what are the views of the President of the Board upon a particular subject before it is brought before him officially; that is what is commonly called the "previous communication," of which there is a great deal.

2211. Was not the reason why the Court, as a body, did not express their opinion that the overland route should be resorted to earlier than it was, that there might be political objections in the way of it?—I think all that the Chairman, upon the occasion we are referring to, was requested to do, was to make known to the President the wish of the Court of Directors that, if there were no practical objections, that route should be made use of.

2212. But during the discussions in the Court of Directors, was not the circumstance of the political objections alluded to, as rendering it, in the opinion of the Court of Directors, desirable not to make an application in the first instance in a more formal manner?—On that particular occasion that I have referred to, when the member whom I have mentioned, Captain Shepherd, consented to forego making his motion, upon the understanding that it should be intimated to the Board that such was the wish of the Court.

2213. The Chairs communicated the reply of the President to the Court, that there were objections to the overland route being then resorted to? —Yes.

2214. At Question 1943, it appears in evidence, that a letter dated the 14th April 1857, was addressed by the Secretary of State for War to the President of the Board of Control; can you state of your own knowledge whether a copy of that letter was communicated by the President to the Court of Directors (*the Evidence was handed to the Witness*)?—I do not think that I have ever seen this letter till I see it now in print, and if it had been communicated to the Court of Directors, I think I must have remembered it.

2215. *Chairman.*] It would certainly have come before you, if it had been communicated to the Court of Directors?—Yes; I cannot positively say that it never was communicated, for I have had so many papers to read; but I can say very, if not quite, positively, that this letter was not communicated.

2216. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Will you ascertain beyond a doubt, and inform this Committee, whether this letter was or was not received by the Court?—Certainly.

2217. Viscount *Goderich.*] You will observe, that in an answer to the same question to Sir Henry Storks, to which the Honourable Member for Leominster has alluded, there is set out a letter from the Court of Directors to the Board of Control, dated the 29th of April?—Yes.

2218. Could you lay before this Committee the letter from the Board of Control to which that letter from the Court is a reply?—I observe that this does not purport to be a reply to any particular letter, but it commences, "Sir,—Referring to the correspondence which has passed on the subject of the regiments of infantry to be sent to India this year." I do not see that it refers to any particular letter, but to the whole course of correspondence; and that whole course of correspondence can be of course laid before this Committee, if it is desired. I think if the letter from Sir H. Storks had ever been communicated, I must have recollected it. It contains such striking remarks, that they could hardly escape my memory.

2219. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] You have stated that when the President of the Board of Control expressed his objections you acquiesced in them: are the Committee to understand that you acquiesced in the political objections which he set forth, but that generally you had a strong opinion in the beginning of the absolute importance of immediately adopting that line of communication? —The President did not mention to us what was the exact nature of the political objections, but he stated that there were political objections, as is stated in the letter to the Court. There is an allusion to the embarrassments and inconvenience in consequence of negotiations, but the nature of those embarrassments was never communicated to us by the President; he stated the existence of them, and he also referred to the want of preparation on the other side of the Isthmus, to the state of the climate, and to the difficulties generally. When I stated that I acquiesced personally in the objections that he raised, and that they did appear to my mind to be sufficient for the occasion, it was not on account of my considering that it was not necessary and most desirable to get out reinforcements by the most speedy means, for that opinion I have always

always entertained more strongly perhaps than some of my colleagues; I have always felt the great importance of the present crisis, but I did see the difficulties which were then set forth in the month of August to the overland route, and as political objections were stated, I considered that that was a sufficient answer to the question that had urged us at that time.

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Sir *George Clerk*, K. C. B., called in; and Examined.

2220. *Chairman.*] YOU were Lieutenant-General, were you not, of the Cape during the late war there?—No: I was Special Commissioner on the Kaffir frontier.

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2221. That was during the period of the last war?—At the termination of it.

2222. Therefore you had ample opportunities of judging as to the formidable character of the Kaffir people?—In some degree.

2223. I believe you were previously Governor of Bombay?—Yes.

2224. I think I have seen in some official documents a statement of yours, as well as of Sir George Cathcart, with whom you acted, as to the amount of the forces that would in future be required for the protection of the colony against any outbreak of the Kaffirs?—Yes.

2225. What might that number of troops have been?—Sir George Cathcart's estimate was 4,000 men. I formed my own view of the subject when I was likely to become responsible for the security of the colony. I was asked to remain as Governor, and I acceded, unless another could be found; had I not come away, I proposed to act upon it, for 4,000 I think ample. It is a matter determined entirely by what may be the Imperial view of the question. The colonial view is of course different.

2226. But on colonial grounds you conceived that 4,000 men would have been sufficient?—If the Governor of the colony, I would say, if adverting only to its wants, that the more troops you sent me the better, in order to keep the colonists in good humour. But on Imperial considerations, a very moderate force should suffice, and would suffice, providing the colonists assisted to protect themselves. They are not likely to do so, if you give them a large force, such as there is now. I believe in the colony there were between 3,000 and 4,000 men before the last war. Then you sent out two or three regiments during the war, and they got together levies of Hottentots, Kaffirs, and Fingoes.

2227. Those levies were Hottentots, Kaffirs, and Fingoes?—Yes.

2228. Do you conceive that they are to be reckoned upon at all in point of effectiveness in contact with English troops?—No. Sir Stephen Lakeman's levy of 100 men was the only one composed entirely of Europeans.

2229. Were there many Dutch amongst them?—No; they leave their protection to you as long as you choose to pay for it.

2230. Viscount *Goderich.*] There were no Dutch amongst the levies?—The Dutch are always willing to go out in camps of their own, and to hold the Kaffirs in check, but the tone here is generally to restrain them, and not to allow them to take into their own hands the coercion of the Kaffirs.

2231. Would they have been called levies if they had gone out?—They prefer their own name; there were some out during the war on the north-east frontier, and they are always ready enough to go out.

2232. The levies mean, in fact, those Fingoes and Kaffirs?—Yes, raised during the war to assist, and hold posts; there were 27 posts in Kaffraria held by Her Majesty's troops during that war, and some posts and lines of communication were held by the levies.

2233. *Chairman.*] I think that Sir George Cathcart, as well as you, was of opinion that now the Cape had attained a constitution, after some three or four years, they should be charged with the principal portion of the expense of defending their own frontier?—That was the engagement of the colonists when they sent their delegates before a Committee of the House of Commons; they proposed that if you gave them a constitution, they would take upon themselves the protection of their colony. You gave them a constitution, and you are benevolent enough to protect the colony too; they like very well to have a constitution, but they have not yet performed their part of the bargain. Lately, I think,

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I think, Sir George Grey is working with them quite in the right direction, in making them assign a portion of their revenues for frontier police. The amount I do not know, but something has been done; of course that may be carried further; there might be a proportionate reduction of the troops, if it is not the Imperial Government's object to retain them there; if it is, there is no objection on the score of climate to so employing a large number. But on the other hand, it is not requisite for Imperial purposes to have many of the Royal troops there; a moderate number I should say would amply suffice. I have always thought that Sir George Cathcart's estimate was a very fair one. Assign 4,000 for a limited period, and let the Dutchmen know that upon the expiration of that time they will have to look after themselves, and then, if the troops are required for home or other purposes, you could gradually withdraw the whole, except one local corps. If I had taken the Government at that time, my intention was to give them three years' notice (as recommended in one of my despatches) that at the end of three years they must be prepared for the withdrawal of all the troops, if wanted for other purposes in Europe or elsewhere.

2234. But more than three years have elapsed, and there is still a larger force than ever?—Yes.

2235. That tends to keep the colonists in good humour?—Naturally; for the prosperity of the Cape colony depends first of all on your military chest. If there is no military chest, there is little prosperity in that colony, till you get to the productive part of it at Natal; elsewhere there is no fertility and no labour. The pay of the Queen's forces, therefore, is of the greatest assistance to the colonial trade and revenue.

2236. The real resources of that colony, barring Natal, are to be traced to the military expenditure?—Yes; they rise and fall with that entirely. Bring home the military chest, and they all come down with a run.

2237. With regard to the formadibility of the Kaffirs, are they a body of people likely to invade the colony on military grounds without fair subjects of retaliation, or are they capable of forcing themselves into the colony?—Yes; if the frontier is not guarded they will enter the colony; they have two inducements; one is cattle-lifting; and the other retaliation if trespassed upon. If you trespass on their lands, the Kaffirs will return and resent it, but not otherwise; he may thieve, and take cattle away, but the Dutch know how to control that. If they are left to themselves, they have always managed the Kaffirs very well.

2238. If that be the case, if we had abstained from making war upon them, passing with our troops into their territory, we need not have had any serious apprehension of war with them?—No; but you have been attracted onwards towards the eastward by the fertility of their pastures. They possessed the fine pastures of South Africa, and you have advanced gradually till you came in contact with them, and they had to retire; they are a manly, brave, and fine race, and they will not give up their pastures without resistance.

2239. As you have occupied so important a position there, it is possible that you may have heard of what has been going on there; have you heard the statement that I have alluded to in the public prints, of moneys having been sent by the present Governor of the Cape for making certain additions to the German legion from Germany?—No, I have not traced the German legion there; I recollect their going out; I supposed the idea was, that they might do well to colonize. I never thought they would; because I supposed the German considered that he was to have a small but fertile piece of land to maintain himself and family; but nothing but a very large tract of land will support a family; it takes five or six acres to carry one sheep.

2240. Are you aware whether any progress at all, in the way of colonization, has been made?—Not at all; I believe they are in camp on the frontier, as it were in the field; that is merely what I have heard. I have not heard much regarding them.

2241. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] You stated, did you not, that the good humour of the colony depended a good deal upon the weight of the military chest?—Of course; and their prosperity, in a great degree, depends upon that. As the Governor of a colony you would find things made much easier in every way if you had a large army expending their money brought from England.

2242. Does not that induce the colonists to make aggressions on the Kaffirs that there may be an apparent necessity for a large body of troops there?—It did

did formerly, but I think it must depend on the Governor very much. Sir George Grey watches that very closely, and he admits of nothing of the kind.

2243. When that irritation on the frontier is once produced there is a visible necessity for troops?—Yes, unless you leave it to the Dutchmen to protect themselves; they could do that without British forces.

2244. That has not been the case hitherto?—No, because it was considered, or was alleged, that they punished the Kaffirs too severely.

2245. What is your opinion as to the danger of those half-starved Kaffirs coming in large numbers into the colony?—I think very little of the starved Kaffir; it is only to get money to buy some cattle and go back again to his wilds that he enters the colony.

2246. Would not there be danger, if a large number were employed in labour, of their uniting together to rob and murder?—You will not get them to be steady at labour in the colony; a Kaffir will not work except when he is starved; he will then, to get money to buy cattle.

2247. I understand that a good many of those Kaffirs did labour when they came in?—Yes, because they are starving, and they want to get cattle.

2248. If there was so large a number as 70,000, ought they not to be watched?—Certainly. I heard that there were 30,000, and not 70,000.

2249. If there were 30,000 it would require precautions to be taken?—Yes, it would require the police to be vigilant.

2250. Would it require any troops in the district where they were?—No; a local police would be sufficient.

2251. You do not think that the immigration of the Kaffirs would have been any reason for not sending troops on to India?—Not to beyond a certain amount; beyond four regiments, I should say, and the Cape corps making five; that is a very good force to protect the colony and its frontiers, making the colonists assist as I believe they do now.

2252. Are you aware of the effect of the preaching of this prophet; have you heard whether it did produce a great impression?—Yes, no doubt it did on the Kaffirs. They often have a prophet, and are under some delusion of the kind. There was one 8 or 10 years ago, and there was another just before I went out; he was killed; this one made them kill their cattle.

2253. If there was one having particularly great influence over his people, that would be a reason for greater attention on the part of the Governor, would it not?—Yes, certainly.

2254. Viscount *Goderich*.] You are now Secretary to the India Board, are you not?—Yes.

2255. Mr. Vernon Smith, in his evidence, told the Committee that you could give them some information with regard to the Red Sea in summer, and also that you would be able to communicate to them your opinion as to the propriety of the course that was pursued with regard to sending troops overland; will you state your views on those points?—When the outbreak was reported in England, there was, after a short time, some anxiety on the part of the Court of Directors to adopt the overland route; but the President of the Board of Control, and I think the War Office also, seemed to have a more correct notion of the haphazard sort of route that that is, which would then have left so much to chance; and I suppose that everybody else would have thought so, who had any regard for the efficiency and health of the troops. It was a question of sending reinforcements to India to retrieve our position there, and great anxiety was felt. The Court of Directors, I believe, consulted the President of the Board of Control about it, and it was urged in the public papers. No doubt the Court of Directors may have felt that pressure; but that was to be traced to the anxiety of parents about their sons (I am one of them) fighting their best in India to get the Government out of the very dangerous scrape in which they had deliberately involved themselves; but so far as the merits of the route went, I do not suppose that it was really imagined by anybody who knew it that it could be a preferable route.

2256. It is your opinion, then, that it would not have been desirable to send out troops by thatr oute sooner than they were sent?—Decidedly not; nor then either in my opinion, but certainly not during the bad season.

2257. How often have you been in the Red Sea?—Three times.

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2258. During what season of the year?—Never during the worst; but at the times that I have been I should say that it was the very worst route that could be thought of for the troops.

2259. In your opinion, the climate was unhealthy when you were there?—I cannot say unhealthy, but it is impossible for a crowd to be comfortably stowed away; accommodation and ventilation are there at all seasons indispensable. It was generally stated that it was perfectly easy for ladies and children to pass by that route, and they do, I believe, at all seasons; but it was a mistake, I think, to suppose that therefore it was a desirable route for troops. It is a very different thing. Families cross, having months before secured accommodation. The companies that work the line there have everything admirably conducted, and they would have done it as well as any other company in the world; perhaps better. The ships are good, on shore and afloat, the service is well looked after; but they cannot do impossibilities. To get men from here to Suez is plain enough; but there you require rations for the men to eat, and ships to float them. Good drinking water is brought from far off.

2260. You think that any detention at Suez would have been extremely injurious?—I should say that it was one of the worst depôts for troops. I have letters from the medical department at Suez, showing that it has become, in fact, a depôt already. I do not believe that anybody who proposed sending the troops had the slightest idea that there would be a requisition for a hospital there; but it has been found to be unavoidable.

2261. It has been stated to the Committee that the climate of Suez is remarkably healthy, and it has been described as the sanatorium of the world; does your opinion agree with that?—You may evaporate altogether in a healthy climate; that is the condition of Suez. There may be no epidemics; still you cannot exist there under certain circumstances; troops, I should say, could not. They might struggle through the heat, but they could not have struggled both through that and the monsoon, exposed to the heavy rains, at the time when it was proposed to send them.

2262. Can you say how many troops have up to this time been sent by that route?—I cannot tell without referring. That information could be supplied. The Court of Directors worked hard to get ships. I have a list of 24 transports despatched during July round the Cape.

2263. Can you tell the Committee, whether the experiment of sending troops by the overland route has or has not been successful, so far as it has now gone?—Two companies of a regiment of the line were sent to Aden to relieve the garrison there; that was done very well and it was very proper so to do it, but that is a question of the Red Sea only. The 92d regiment, on the other hand, reached Alexandria in Her Majesty's transport "Urgent," on the 30th ult., and they embarked at Suez by the "Oriental," on the 17th instant; that is in the height of the fine season; there was great delay, that is the only instance I know of; I believe some of them went on without any delay.

2264. Mr. *Crawford.*] Is not the question of the establishment of a hospital at Suez, likely to suggest future questions for discussion with the Turkish Government?—Not only as to the hospitals; but it is not our territory to begin with, and that of itself makes it a bad route for Her Majesty's troops; every request that you make of course must teach the authorities there to look upon you as very troublesome neighbours. It is very different, of course, with private companies; it is most profitable for them, and I dare say some money goes into the pockets of the people about the Pasha, his ministers; but that is altogether distinct from public considerations. There are enormous interests at stake in Egypt. There are three States at least which are concerned in it, and without the permission of all those three, you cannot stir. We do not possess one foot of ground between Malta in the Mediterranean and Aden at the end of the Red Rea, so that all the rest is by the sufferance of the Pasha of Egypt, and the Sultan of Constantinople, and a more powerful neighbour still across the Channel; rely upon it you never stir a foot in Egypt without the permission of the French Government.

2265. Mr. *Willoughby.*] The circumstances which you have just now alluded to, are in your opinion adverse to the overland route being considered as the established route for the conveyance of troops to India?—Certainly; inasmuch as you ought not to trust the security of your boasted Indian empire to the precarious,

precarious, false, and baseless system of the transit by the route of Egypt, where the British troops have to scramble on jackasses across the desert; and you cannot rely upon anything even so organised as that for a continuance.

2266. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] There were complaints, were there not, from the Turkish Government, or the Pasha of Egypt, with regard to the conduct of the troops at Cairo?—I have not heard anything with regard to the conduct of the troops now going, but the arrangement made by the Pasha, when our dragoons crossed to the Crimea, was to pacify his subjects by proclaiming that we were advancing to support them against Russia.

2267. Captain *Vivian.*] You have given a very decided opinion upon the subject of sending troops by the Isthmus of Suez, and you seemed to base your opinion principally upon the political objections which there might be, and which may arise at any moment. Do you consider that in an emergency, such as that which occurred at the commencement of the Indian revolt, with the full and free permission of the Pasha of Egypt, supposing that there were ships to receive the troops on the other side, there would have been still reasonable objections to sending a small force in the first place across the Isthmus of Suez to arrive in India earlier than they would have done by going by the Cape?—None whatever, if you had the proper accommodation and supplies ready, and so to avoid delay and discomfort in a degree to send the men into hospital.

2268. That is to say, that supposing there were steamers, or other ships, to take a body of 1,000 or 2,000 men from Suez to India, you think that there would have been no objection on account of the climate to sending those men across the desert?—That is supposing the accommodation is sufficient; but my idea of the sufficiency of accommodation is, perhaps, something that would generally be considered excessive, because of the intensity of the heat and the storms they have to endure in crossing the Arabian Sea in the monsoon. I suppose we never have had transports at sea in such a condition as they ought to be to land the men in healthy condition.

2269. Have you ever been in the Persian Gulf?—Yes.

2270. Do you consider that the climate of the Red Sea is worse than that?—No, much the same, I think.

2271. You are aware that an expedition went to Persia lately?—Yes.

2272. They came down the Persian Gulf, did they not, about the end of May or the beginning of June?—Yes.

2273. And part of that expedition was composed of European troops; do you know anything relating to the health of the troops?—I never heard anything against it. I have heard that they had an abundance of transport, and I have always assumed that they were healthy; I have never heard to the contrary.

2274. Do you consider that it is not a climate which would affect the troops if they were properly protected?—If they were not exposed, and had space and ventilation.

2275. In short, your objection to the overland route as a means of conveying troops in the first instance, arises from the fact of there being no means of sending them on?—That objection applies principally.

2276. And it is not an objection to the climate?—No; I do not say that I consider it preferable to the Cape route; but I do not think that there would have been any objection at that time, supposing they had been provided for with provisions and accommodation, each man having the same allowance and description of both that a private passenger secures.

2277. I think your observations rather go to object to the route across the Desert as a general means of communicating between this country and India, than as a means of communicating under special circumstances?—Under the special circumstances that did arise I think it was impracticable, but, generally speaking, I think it might be arranged so as to be practicable, always provided that Egypt belonged to us. There is a minor matter affecting the transport of troops overland, and if the Committee wish to hear medical opinions, I will hand them in. There is also the explanation of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, showing that they did all that they possibly could. There is a complaint on the part of the medical men that the soldiers had no room to lie down, and they point out that it is very necessary that they should lie down; when on board a ship a landsman is sometimes glad to lie down; but it seems there has been no provision made for the sick soldiers to lie down. The Peninsular and Oriental

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Company have asserted that if they had been apprised in time they could have managed it, but as it was, they could give them nothing but deck passages. Dr. Fraser, who is at Suez, begs that accommodation may be provided on board the ships; a sick bay; but the Peninsular and Oriental Company say, "We only engage to give them a deck passage." That is a most material point. When it was talked of sending out troops overland, the Peninsular and Oriental Company proposed to do all they could do, and they could do no more. I dare say they would have assisted with awnings on deck, but that covering could not be set in the monsoon.

2278. Mr. *Willoughby.*] At what date was that?—In July; there was then, I believe, some anxiety on the part of the directors to get the men out overland. Then there were no rations provided, so far as I know, and no ships in the Red Sea, where there never are any craft whatever, unless they are provided for a specific purpose.

2279. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] Could you have put the troops in native craft?—No.

2280. Would it have been possible to send sailing ships from Bombay to Suez?—I believe that at Lloyd's, and everywhere else, it is considered the worst passage in the world beating up the Red Sea from the Straits of Babel Mandel; it is a narrow sea, with coral rocks; the colliers with coal for Suez never go if they can avoid it; the Peninsular and Oriental Company endeavour generally to have their depôt at Aden; I have known them buy coals in the Mediterranean, and transport them on camels' backs across to the depôt at Suez, a camel carrying only 5 cwt.

2281. You were governor of the North West Provinces as well, were you not?—Yes. I will, with the permission of the Committee, read an account which I have received from a passenger who went in one of those very ships in which it was proposed to send the troops, dated Melbourne, the 13th of September, sent to the Reverend Mr. Eliott: "We joined the 'Simla,' 26th July, and for want of a stiff wind, were long in that hot, nay burning climate of the Red Sea. If we were overpowered with the heat, you may imagine what the engineers and stokers were. Actually pools of water were standing at their feet from the heat of their bodies, and consequently four of them struck, and refused to work." "As for what we did on the voyage, what with sickness and then with debility, both of mind and body, caused by the heat, I, for one, did almost nothing." From another passenger by the same vessel there is this account: "My last letter was posted from Aden, after the wearisome toils of the Red Sea. Our next adventure was by no means a pleasant one. Eighty miles off Aden, in the dead of the night, we ran on a reef, and stuck there for more than three hours, although we had more than six fathoms under the stern. The storms succeeding the fearful heat would have killed some of us, had we not had a change of weather. I could not possibly encounter the same again. In a state of repose the perspiration fell from our bodies as dripping wet." I will now read the opinion of one of the most competent officers in the service; I refer to Captain Balfour, of the Indian Navy; he called upon me the other day about the Danube and Rhine navigation, and he observed to me, "How fortunate it was that troops were not sent across by the Red Sea during the monsoon;" to which I replied that it was "a most injudicious and thoughtless project." Captain Balfour then said, "What did they expect?" and I answered, "No one who knows the passage, and had the slightest regard for the health and discipline of the troops expected advantages from it at the bad season; but of course it held out the prospect of enormous profit to private companies in substituting the helter-skelter Egyptian route for the usual sea transport service, and it was natural therefore that it should have some zealous advocates. Others having no pecuniary interests, had heard or read puffs in the newspapers that it was a short cut to India, and quite safe for ladies and children; so they at once concluded, in their fears for friends and families in India, that the route furnished just the same means and comforts, or remedies for discomforts, for any amount of troops." Upon which Captain Balfour said, "I understand it was intended they should have a deck passage; indeed that was all they could have had. Why, to say nothing of the rough seas at that season, the rains would have been fatal to a good many of them." Captain Balfour was accompanied by Captain Rennie, of the Indian navy, and Captain Balfour concluded in this way: "We estimate they would have lost 15 per cent." I

look

look upon him as one of the best judges of that route; and I replied to him "Yes, when it comes to the usual force of the storm of the south-west monsoon, hatches down and dead-lights in, for five or six or more days together, with the deluge of tropical rains, the troops must have been forced below where there was no space, and the suffocation would have been intolerable." It has never been ascertained what was intended to be done with the men during the heavy rains of the monsoon; they could not remain on deck; there was not space for the smallest number below.

2282. *Chairman.*] The Committee have understood, from evidence given by some gentlemen who have been frequently on the voyage, that when going down at that period called the monsoon, there is a favourable wind all the way to Bombay, and that the passage would occupy not more than 14 days or 16 days?—Not so much by three days, and that would suffice to kill a man; 10 days I reckon the passage; I mean from Aden; they do not encounter anything so bad in the Red Sea; it is when they get out on the open sea; to stay on deck is out of the question, at most times, during day or night.

2283. Mr. *Danby Seymour.*] The Committee were told that there was no rain during the monsoon?—Then what becomes of India? All the fertility of India depends upon the rain that falls at that particular period.

2284. Sir *Edward Colebroke.*] Do you consider that the resolution which was adopted in September, to send troops by the overland route, was perfectly proper?—Supposing they did not get to the Red Sea till October, and were off from Aden at the end of October, then they had nothing but the severe dews and heat to contend with, and that is bad for the health in crowds on deck.

2285. But the objections which you have stated, principally apply to the month of July and August, do they not?—Yes principally, so far as the climate is concerned.

2286. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You have stated, that the Court of Directors exhibited an early desire to resort to the overland route, and that the Chairs communicated with the President of the Board of Control at an early period; was not one of their objects by thus early agitating the subject, this, that the necessary preparations might be made for the comfort, accommodation and convenience of the troops?—I was not aware of all that passed, but I was sensible that the Court overlooked much of what was indispensable as to accommodation; for instance, I know as a fact that the accommodation proposed was a deck passage.

2287. I was alluding to the idea of communicating with India for the purpose of having steamers sent?—That I consider also was quite impossible; you yourself know how short-handed you are with regard to steamers in India. Who had them to send? I looked at that, and I saw no possibility of any number being relied on. You have 5,000 miles of coast to provide for in India and to the eastward. Look at the constant calls on the Bombay Government for steamers; and if in times of peace you are short-handed, what can you be in time of war? I should imagine that there never could have been one seaworthy ship to spare.

2288. *Chairman.*] Could you give the Committee the prices paid for transports?—The highest for screw steamers was 49 *l.*; the lowest, 19 *l.*; for the highest clipper, 26 *l.*; the lowest, 11 *l.* 7 *s.* with stores; and 11 *l.* 11 *s.* without. Those were all round the Cape.

Veneris, 26° die Martii, 1858.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. G. S. Booth.	Lord John Hay.
Mr. Byng.	Mr. Horsman.
Sir Edward Colebrooke.	Sir Charles Napier.
Mr. Crawford.	Mr. Osborne.
Sir James Elphinstone.	Captain Vivian.
Sir De Lacy Evans.	Mr. Willoughby.

SIR DE LACY EVANS, IN THE CHAIR.

John Ralph Engledue, Esq., called in; and Examined.

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2289. *Chairman.*] YOUR situation at present is that of Superintendent to the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Southampton?—Yes.

2290. At what date did you first begin to be concerned in the transmission of mails and passengers through Egypt by the overland route to India?—As far back as 1840.

2291. Have you been consecutively employed, having originated I believe the transit over Egypt, for 18 years past in the superintendence of it?—I was the first superintendent sent out to arrange the coaling stations.

2292. Have you continued to be employed in Egypt, in India, or in this country, on the same business?—I have for the last 18 years.

2293. Have you been at different times in Egypt and to Calcutta down the Red Sea, and across the Indian Ocean?—I have made several trips at all seasons of the year.

2294. It appears that the "Conqueror" a line-of-battle ship, carried troops to Alexandria a short time ago, and that the captain of the "Conqueror" declined entering the harbour of Alexandria?—Yes.

2295. You know the harbour of Alexandria well?—Yes, I do.

2296. Do you suppose that there was any danger to a ship of that size going in?—Yes, I do.

2297. In that case, I suppose all large ships of great tonnage and draft of water like the "Conqueror," would find it inconvenient to go in?—Decidedly; the Pasha had heavy ships of the line there, and he took out all the lower-deck guns to make them as light as possible to get them over the bar, or out through the passage; but that would not interfere with the taking of troops there, as they might have been taken in, in small steamers out of the "Conqueror."

2298. The tides there are, I believe, slight?—Not of any consequence.

2299. What is the usual draft of water over the bar?—I think not more than about 24 feet; then there is frequently a send; a swell.

2300. In point of fact, you would not consider it safe for a ship drawing more than 20 feet water to go in?—I should think decidedly not, unless the day was very smooth indeed.

2301. What do you say as to frigates?—Drawing 18, 19, or 20 feet of water they might go in perfectly well.

2302. The ordinary mail packets are of 2,000 tons, are they not?—Yes, and some of them more.

2303. What is the usual draft of water?—Going to Alexandria about 18 or 19 feet.

2304. When they are carrying troops and merchandise, or otherwise?—Yes.

2305. The

2305. The harbour is always open to them?—Yes.

2306. In the event of heavy weather outside, supposing that a line-of-battle ship went with troops, could she find shelter in Aboukir Bay?—Perfectly well.

2307. That is sheltered from most winds, is it not?—Yes, from the prevailing heavy winds, from the north-west.

2308. Plenty of water, and good anchorage?—Yes.

2309. How long would it take for a steamer to go to Alexandria?—A few hours only.

2310. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] Did not Sir Charles Napier go into the harbour with seven sail of the line after the siege of Acre?—I am not aware of that; I met him at Alexandria after Acre; he was then in a small vessel; a steamer.

2311. He went in with the "Powerful," did he not?—Yes. They might go in on a very smooth day.

2312. But not if there was any sea?—No.

2313. *Chairman.*] Had he any ships there so large as the "Conqueror"?—Yes.

2314. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] The Egyptians had a three-decker there and several 80-gun ships in the harbour, had they not?—Yes, but they always took out the lower-deck guns, and middle-deck guns, and did not fill the water till they got out.

2315. *Chairman.*] That causes great delay, does it not?—Yes.

2316. Do they put the guns in afterwards, when they place them in the harbour?—Yes, for the purpose of exercise and appearance.

2317. Lord *John Hay.*] Do you think you would find a pilot of Alexandria that would take a line-of-battle ship in of the size of the "Conqueror"?—Yes; there are only two or three pilots there; they are Government men belonging to the Pacha; they are thoroughly conversant with the Channel; they would not take them in if blowing hard or with a heavy sea on.

2318. Did you ever ask them the question?—Not as to a line-of-battle ship. A chart of the Alexandria Harbour would give you the depth more accurately than I can give it; a survey has been taken.

2319. When was that survey taken?—I believe very recently, I think within the last three or four years; now the Channel is buoyed out, and you can take a ship in yourself.

2320. *Chairman.*] Those pilots are very good, are they not?—Yes they are, of the kind.

2321. But they become comparatively needless now the buoys are put down?—Yes.

2322. Every captain can take his own ship in?—Yes.

2323. What is the case with regard to the roadstead of Suez?—The roadstead of Suez is perfectly safe; there is very seldom a strong wind up there. I do not know that it has ever been known to blow a gale of wind there; never beyond a double-reefed topsail breeze.

2324. There is good anchorage?—Very good.

2325. There is an article to-day in "The Times" denouncing, in the most vehement language the conduct of the authorities at home in establishing the small hospital at Suez, which they say is one of the worst places in the world?—I can only say, from my own experience, that in the year 1841, I had a very severe attack of dysentery coming down the Red Sea, and I was nearly dying, and I had not been on shore at Suez for 12 hours before I recovered. I remained there for 12 days, and this was in the month of July in the hot season: it is the most pure atmosphere you can breathe; it is warm.

2326. Have you been often there?—Yes, frequently.

2327. With regard to the water at Suez what do you say?—There is a difficulty there; the water is not very good from Moses' Well, but now the railway is established, you can get any quantity of water from the Nile.

2328. Even for a body of troops?—Yes: there would be no difficulty.

2329. Supposing 1,000 men were there?—Then there would be no difficulty in getting any quantity of water.

2330. The Nile water is good?—Very good; it is the most pure we can have.

2331. Are there any reservoirs on the way and at Suez?—At the different stations there are tanks.

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2332. Are those supplied by water brought from the Nile?—Yes.

2333. And then on to Suez?—Yes; also the water for the use principally of the inhabitants of Suez is that from a well about three or four miles out of Suez; it is a little brackish.

2334. Is it dangerous to the health?—No; the inhabitants there drink it commonly, and I have drank it. Persons accustomed to sweet water would detect that there is a little brackish taste in it; but the Nile water is perfectly pure; the most pure water you can drink.

2335. What is the population of Suez now?—I cannot say; not more, I think, than perhaps 5,000. I speak now only from guess; it has increased since I was there.

2336. Are they an extremely poor class?—There is a great variety. The Arabs drink that water with perfect gusto; the well water just outside Suez. Suez, as you may say, is supplied from a well immediately outside.

2337. Is that a copious well?—Yes, there is any quantity. I never heard of it being dry at all.

2338. What are the dimensions of those reservoirs?—Some of them are tanks underground, holding perhaps 20 or 30 tuns; some are iron above ground, holding about 8 or 10 tuns.

2339. And they preserve the water well?—Perfectly; I have drank it frequently in crossing Egypt.

2340. Can you inform the Committee of the probable number of days, or hours even, that it would have required, and did require, in the month of July last, before the recent improvements in the telegraph, to receive a communication from Malta, in London, and the same back?—I should think, in round numbers, about 70 or 73 hours. It depends upon the weather a good deal; but at that time the telegraph was not completed to Malta.

2341–43. Can you give the Committee some idea if in the early days of July the Government had deemed it right to communicate with Lord Elphinstone, and through him by telegraph to Calcutta, what number of days it would have taken to have apprised the Governor of Bombay, and the Governor-General, of the desire on the part of this Government to use the overland route?—About 23 days from London to the Governor-General of Calcutta, presuming the telegraph was complete between Bombay and Calcutta (which it was), and a Bombay steamer was at Suez on the 7th of July; then from that date, supposing she sailed on that day, the Governor-General could have had a communication in 15 days from that date.

2344. Lord *John Hay.*] Do you mean by steamer?—Yes, from Suez. The Governor-General ought to have received the intelligence on the 23d of July.

2345. *Chairman.*] Having sent from this country on the 1st or 2d of July?—Yes.

2346. Was there any opportunity on the 1st or 2d of July to send from Suez?—Yes; they sent a sort of special steamer, I imagine, for that purpose; there must have been one, I imagine, going to meet that vessel.

2347. Would it not have been shorter to have telegraphed to Marseilles, and have ordered a steamer to be taken up to go to Malta?—Decidedly, there are lots at Marseilles.

2348. Supposing that had been done, when would that communication have reached Suez?—It might have been done in five days with a fast vessel.

2349. Then there were two days extra from the 7th?—Yes.

2350. Mr. *Crawford.*] Supposing that on Monday the 29th of June you had occasion to communicate upon matters of great emergency with Bombay, how soon do you suppose you could so have communicated?—I would have telegraphed to Marseilles; in the event of there being no steamer about to start for Alexandria direct, I would have chartered one, and sent one in five days from that time; a few hours takes us from here to Marseilles.

2351. How soon do you think you could have conveyed that communication to Bombay, and will you give to this Committee *seriatim* the way in which you would have done it?—Starting from Marseilles. I would give her five days to Alexandria from Marseilles, a full allowance for a fast vessel, and it might have been telegraphed in a couple of hours from Alexandria to Suez; then give her six days down the Red Sea, and give her a day, which is the extreme time, for coaling at Aden, and seven days going between Aden and Bombay.

2352. Does not that imply a steamer being in readiness at Suez?—Yes; I know there was a steamer in readiness there.

2353. *Chairman.*] Do you state that you knew there was that steamer on the 7th available at Suez?—Yes, we knew there was a steamer there; I do not know her name; I am not certain whether it was a mail steamer or an independent one, but there was one there.

2354. Mr. *Crawford.*] Was it known in London on the 29th of June that there would be a steamer at Suez on the 7th of July, ready for the purpose of employment?—Yes, about that time one was expected there.

2355. *Chairman.*] Would there have been any difficulty in the Government here ascertaining at that time that there was a likelihood of a steamer being on the 7th or 8th at Suez?—I imagine not.

2356. You say six days down the Red Sea, one day coaling at Aden, and seven days to Bombay?—Yes.

2357. Does that make a total of 19 days?—Yes; that would be 19 days from Marseilles to Bombay.

2358. Mr. *Crawford.*] That implies no interruption?—Yes.

2359. What would you allow for the chances of interruption?—I allowed about two or three days; I called it 23 days for the chances of interruption. The Governor-General ought to have received the telegraph in 23 days at the extreme.

2360. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of the Governor-General having had some anticipations, or of his having taken these very matters into his consideration or not?—I heard it spoken of; but I think Mr. Allen will be able to give you more accurate information than I can; mine is only from hearsay.

2361. You are not aware of Lord Canning having given some orders for a ship to be prepared?—I have heard it reported that he placed himself in communication with our superintendent at Calcutta on that subject.

2362. Assuming that Lord Canning received this communication on the 23d, in how many days would he have been enabled to send back a communication to this Government stating what he had been able to do?—The same number of days that he received the information in from this country; that is, 23 days.

2363. Recollecting that it was towards the end of July?—Yes.

2364. In what number of days could he have sent to Malta, supposing that our Government had apprised the Governor there that he was to attend to any orders he might receive from the Governor-General?—Deduct a couple or three days from that, say 20 days.

2365. Assuming that, in 20 days after the 23d of July, the Governor of Malta had received a communication from the Governor-General, at what date would that be?—It would reach him about the 12th of August.

2366. You assume that the Government here had directed the Governor of Malta to be in readiness to avail himself of such communication?—Yes.

2367. Assuming that the Governor-General acted entirely upon this proposition from the Government, what number of days would it have required for ships, either steamers or clippers, to arrive at Suez to receive the troops?—About 16 days from Bombay to Suez by steamers.

2368. How many days from Calcutta?—A few more; I should say about 24 days from Calcutta. It would depend upon the class of the vessel.

2369. At that season?—Yes.

2370. At what date would that bring them to Suez, supposing they started on the 25th July?—Adding 16 days on to that would bring it to about the 10th or 12th of August from Bombay; that is, steamers.

2371. And how long for clippers?—They would be longer; they would have to go away south.

2372. How much longer?—It is uncertain; they might be a fortnight or three weeks longer. They would have to stretch away south nearly to the line before they got the monsoon to run up.

2373. So that a clipper would not get to Suez till the end of August?—Certainly not; but I think many vessels might have been obtained at Aden, sailing ships, which would have made a fair voyage from Aden to Bombay, and then one or two steamers may have run between Suez and Aden, carrying the troops to Aden.

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2374. In case 1,000 or 2,000 troops had been successfully transported to Aden, could they have been accommodated there?—There is no question about it; they might have been put under canvass, the same as they would be if they go into the field; there is plenty of open space there.

2375. And plenty of provisions?—Yes, any quantity of fresh provisions; plenty of sheep.

2376. Is there not some difficulty about water?—There is plenty of water; it is a little brackish, but the people in Aden have lived upon it for years, and European troops have been there, and they have used that same water from the wells.

2377. In the peninsula?—Yes.

2378. They have not had their water from the other side usually?—No, not for the general use; I have known some people get it from a well on the other side, when the natives were at peace with them, but there was a considerable risk in sending for it there.

2379. But our troops and the inhabitants use the water on the peninsula?—Yes.

2380. If 1,000 or 2,000 men were placed there, no inconvenience you think would arise?—None whatever.

2381. Then in case of steamers having been sent, they would have arrived on the 12th of August at Suez?—About that time.

2382. And clippers at the end of August?—Not at Suez, going there; there would be a doubt as to clippers getting to Suez, unless they were towed.

2383. Then the clippers should all stop at Aden?—Yes, unless towed up. There is no difficulty in towing them up to Suez, as the water is comparatively smooth in the Red Sea.

2384. Not in all seasons?—Yes, for towing: I never saw any sea there to prevent a vessel being towed, it is a short chopping sea; there is no room for a heavy sea to get up there.

2385. Very rarely anything approaching to a storm?—Rarely anything exceeding a double-reefed topsail breeze.

2386. Mr. *Crawford.*] Suppose you got a norther off the island of Shadwan with a ship in tow?—There is no sea on; there is nothing to prevent her being towed up.

2387. *Chairman.*] If there was one large steamer between Suez and Aden, the troops could be transferred, and the steamer could tow the sailing vessel between Suez and Aden, depositing them at Aden?—Yes, I see no difficulty at all in it; the wind does not last long; it may be a squall for a few hours, but it moderates again immediately.

2388. Supposing a communication had reached the Governor of Malta by the 12th of August, at what date do you suppose two regiments could have been transported to Aden from Malta?—I should think that a regiment could have been put down at Aden in about 12 days, and that would bring it to the 24th of August.

2389. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] Including the time taken up in embarking?—Yes, the whole of it.

2390. *Chairman.*] Perhaps at Alexandria there would be some delay and difficulty?—No difficulty at all; I have no doubt that the Pacha would have assisted with his boats there; there is a great command of boats and small steamers.

2391. Mr. *Willoughby.*] You could not have done it without a previous communication?—A few hours would have done it.

2392. *Chairman.*] What is your calculation as to the time of those regiments getting, say one of them to Bombay and the other to Calcutta?—In sailing ships they would get there in, say 10 days, about the 2d of September, to Bombay.

2393. And when to Calcutta?—That would be somewhat longer; I should say to Calcutta would be about the 10th of September.

2394. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] And to Kurrachee?—You might give the same time as to Bombay.

2395. *Chairman.*] It is about 150 miles short of Bombay, is it not?—Yes; you may call it the same distance; I may say that there are always eight or a dozen ships discharging coals at Aden.

2396. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Would you put European troops on board coal ships?

ships?—The finest ships in the world carry coals; Green's, and Wigram's, and others, have all brought me coals out to Calcutta; they are not necessarily colliers because they carry coals; some of the finest ships in the kingdom carry coals to those places.

2397. Captain *Vivian.*] Could you birth men in those vessels?—Perfectly; there is not the least difficulty about it.

2398. Have they all awnings and coverings all ready?—Yes; all those first-class ships; of course, you would select proper ones.

2399 Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] Did you ever know an instance of one of Green's or Wigram's first-class ships taking a coal cargo out to Aden?—I am not certain about that.

2400. *Chairman.*] They go to India, do they not?—They go to Bombay, generally.

2401. Mr. *Crawford.*] They only take, I believe, 200 or 300 tons of coal as ballast?—Yes; I know that very fine ships of 1,000 and 1,200 tons have gone to Aden with coals, coal laden, entirely from this country; a large number of the cotton ships that go to Bombay take coals, and drop them at Aden.

2402. *Chairman.*] Have you any reason to think that there was an ample supply of coals during the month we have spoken of, and during the following month?—We always have a very large stock there, and the East India Company have also a large stock; there is generally at Aden, from 20,000 to 30,000 tons of coals; 30,000 may be extreme, but certainly 20,000 between the two companies.

2403. What is the quantity at Suez?—There is not so much there; the stock there is small.

2404. Do the Peninsular and Oriental Company keep a supply of preserved provisions at Suez, in case of emergency?—We keep a very large stock there of all kinds of provisions.

4205. In case of their being required?—No; we look at it as a depôt for our supplies in the East; our ships coming from India replenish at Suez; there are many things, such as hams, cheese, and butter; you get them in a better state at Suez. We have all kinds of salt provisions, cheesemongers' stores, and sugar; there is nothing that we have not at Suez; they are large stores.

2406. When did that store begin to be established?—Some years ago.

2407. You have no stores at Cairo?—No.

2408. I suppose there are such ample means of obtaining things of that sort there, that it would be quite unnecessary?—Quite so; you can get any quantity of bread baked at Cairo, at a very short notice, and they bake very good biscuit.

2409. Can you procure meat there?—Yes.

2410. Beef and mutton?—Yes.

2411. Do you consider the locality of Cairo particulary healthy?—I do.

2412. With regard to the Red Sea, on which you have frequently been, you conceive that there are really no difficulties of a serious nature on an emergency at any time to be apprehended in the Red Sea?—None whatever. In fact, a body of troops being conveyed by one of our ships would be much more comfortable than under canvas in the field at that season of the year. A vessel going nine or ten knots an hour always creates a draught, and with double awnings, and sails over the usual awnings, and wetting them, you might make them exceedingly comfortable. I found it equally warm in India as in the Red Sea in June, July, and August.

2413. With regard to a good portion of the troops, they would be on deck; what do you say would be the state of things as to rain?—I have never seen any rain in the Red Sea. I believe there has been a shower occasionally.

2414. There is often rain in the Indian Ocean, is there not?—It comes in squalls occasionally, but not continuous at sea.

2415. Not at all so continuous as the monsoon rains are in the peninsula in India?—Certainly not: it comes in squalls generally. I have crossed from Point de Galle to Aden during the monsoon, and never had a shower of rain.

2416. Are there not sometimes during the monsoon very heavy seas between Aden and India?—Yes; they are heavy, but they are nothing like the Atlantic seas; I have never seen any sea in the Indian Ocean so heavy as those in the Atlantic: it is a short sea.

2417. With regard to the disposition of the Pasha and of the Egyptian authorities

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rities generally to facilitate our transport, whether mercantile or of troops, do you believe that to be beyond all doubt?—Most decidedly. I believe the Pasha would render every possible assistance either for troops, merchandise, or anything else. I have never known but one feeling, either with the old Pasha or the present one, and that is to give every facility in sending things through Egypt, troops and baggage and everything else.

2418. That railway by which the troops go from Alexandria to Cairo is not a very good one is it?—I have not travelled by it; but it is very good, and there is no difficulty in sending the troops. I can give the Committee the particulars of it from the authorities. This is a copy of a letter from Lieutenant-colonel Pocklington, who is the Quartermaster-general there to Sir Richard Airey, the Quartermaster-general at the Horse Guards, London, dated the 11th of October 1857; "I have the honour to report the arrival in Egypt, and successful passage across the Isthmus of Suez, detachment 57th regiment specified on the margin, proceeding from Malta to Aden in plain clothes, as per instructions from home to that effect."

2419. Did the Pasha require that?—No; he said he did not wish anything of that kind, that they might march through with their arms. He turned into ridicule the idea of our sending them with plain clothes. "the arms, accoutrements and kits of the men were packed in arm chests adapted to the purpose, but not exceeding 200 lbs. the case. The detachment disembarked at Alexandria the morning of the 6th instant, being conveyed by steam tug and lighters to the railway wharf apart from the town, and were immediately placed in second class carriages holding 30 men (10 in each compartment). In this manner the party were carried to No. 12 Station in the Desert (about 189 miles from Alexandria and 58 from Cairo) where vans were in readiness to convey the men, six per van to Suez, distant 25 miles. The whole journey, deducting stoppage and certain accidental detentions, was completed in 17 hours. No necessary delay occurred in shipping the men on board the contract mail steamer 'Alma' in the Red Sea, a small steam boat performing this service. The men had one day's cooked provisions in the havresacs in case of need." Those were cooked by us, before they left, at Alexandria; "but the arrangements for giving them two meals *en route* were excellent, viz. at Kap-zajat, the crossing of the Nile, and again at No. 12 Station in the Desert; the whole 200 men on each occasion sitting down at a time. For quick transit of troops through Egypt intended for embarkation in mail steamer in the Red Sea, it would not be advisable at present to move more than 250 men at once." That is by the mail steamers (200 being the readier number for transport by vans), "the transit administration not being able conveniently to appropriate a larger proportion than 38 to 40 vans for this especial service across the Desert; but on occasions where expedition is necessary, such as troops being conveyed in ships not carrying mails or passengers, donkeys" (I have known 800 or 900 of them employed lately, there is a great deal of pluck in them, and they can carry men at a trot with perfect ease) "may be obtained from 200 to 300, in addition to vans, for carriage of men from No. 12 Station to Suez. The railway is capable of carrying any number of men, the Viceroy frequently being accompanied in his excursions through the country by 5,000 troops at a time." This is from the Government's own officer: "By the end of this year the railway will be extended to within 12 miles of Suez, and by April next it is expected the entire line from sea to sea will be completed. No package accompanying troops for Desert transit should weigh more than 200 lbs. Two such is considered an easy camel load; the Egyptian camel, however, is often made to carry for short distances (25 miles) as much as 600 lbs. The 'Zenobia' hulk at Suez, belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, capable of holding 300 men comfortably, is being prepared for the reception of troops, in case of need, and will prevent the necessity of any encampment in Egypt. The active co-operation of Mr. Holton, the Peninsular and Oriental Company's agent at Alexandria, has secured this and other resources; his influence with the Egyptian transit administration and personal exertions have been most beneficial to Her Majesty's service. Nothing could exceed the orderly behaviour and willing deportment of the detachment throughout the journey, on voyage from Malta, in every way most creditable to the 57th Regiment and the British service."

2420. Do you suppose that the transit of troops in the months of July and August

August might be effected in pretty nearly as complete a manner as is represented by that letter?—Most decidedly; we were prepared for it. When we first heard of the outbreak in India in the last part of May, there was but one buzz about it, and the remark made was, "Well, of course the Government will take up our steamers now, or send some troops overland by each mail steamer;" and we made our arrangements complete.

2421. Was that as early as May?—Yes, when we first heard of the outbreak in India.

2422. Then there was a feeling prevalent at that time that already matters had assumed a very serious aspect in India?—Yes, I am speaking of Southampton.

2423. Are you aware of what the feeling at Calcutta upon the subject might have been?—From reports it was identical with ours that they expected troops to be sent overland immediately, and the same at Bombay.

2424. Mr. *Osborne.*] You are only speaking from newspaper reports?—Yes.

2425. And the common course of conversation?—Yes; some officers who landed said that the moral effect of sending even a small number of troops would have been very great; for supposing that only 250 men went out in each ship, that number would have been magnified into thousands by the native.

2426. *Chairman.*] This was the opinion of officers coming home?—Yes.

2427. Mr. *Osborne.*] You had some differences with the Admiralty, had you not, previous to your appointment as Superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—Yes, they scratched me off the list; we know who the matter rested with; the Admiralty were quite ready to do their part. The Admiralty had plenty of ships, and had they been desired they would have sent the troops overland; but it rested with people in another quarter. I have nothing to say against the Admiralty, though they did not behave very handsomely to me. When I first heard of the determination of the Government not to send troops overland, I said, "Surely there must be some independent Member in the House of Commons who will insist upon the Government sending on the troops overland in a crisis of that kind."

2428. *Chairman.*] Are there not some ledges of rocks in the Red Sea?—Nothing of any consequence; there are no rocks, but what steamers can always avoid. I do not think it is safe for sailing vessels alone, unless they are fast or towed.

2429. But sailing ships do not generally go up the Red Sea?—There are some occasionally which go up, but they take a long time going up; there are vessels that go periodically from Bombay and Calcutta to Djiddah on pilgrimage, and they sometimes take six weeks or two months, but they generally take the monsoon time; I have known deeply laden ships six and eight weeks beating up the Red Sea from Aden to Suez; it is not a navigation at all suitable for sailing ships; not as a general navigation; you can avail yourselves of the monsoon.

2430. Except for steamers, and a steamer towing a sailing ship it is not convenient, generally speaking, for sailing ships?—Certainly not.

2431. But after leaving Aden, how is it?—Then, during a certain season of the year, it is a fair wind from Aden to Bombay.

2432. During what months is that?—June, July, August, and September; after the end of September you get very variable winds; the wind generally coming round to the eastward.

2433. Mr. *Crawford.*] Does not the wind generally blow down the Red Sea in the months of July and August?—Yes, I think it does; but my experience of the Red Sea is that you rarely find the same wind carry you all the way down the Red Sea; you may have a fair wind from Suez to Djiddeh, and then a calm from Djiddah or a foul wind on to Aden, but I have rarely carried the same wind the whole way the one way or the other; it is generally varied.

2434. Taking a practical view of this case, without giving an opinion founded on the experience which you have acquired during the last six months, supposing you had been applied to by the Government at the end of the month of June last, when the disastrous news from Delhi reached us, to make an arrangement for them, for the conveyance of troops to be sent to India overland, what should you have recommended?—To have immediately sent out small parties of about 250 men in each of the passenger ships; in fact at that season we might have taken more; there are usually not many passengers travelling in the hot season;

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it so happened when this news came about the disturbance, that many officers on furlough were ordered out, but certainly 250 men would not have inconvenienced the passengers in the least.

2435. The intelligence of the Meerut outbreak arrived here on Saturday the 27th of June; do you suppose that if the Government had applied to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, to make arrangements for the conveyance of troops by the overland route, there would have been any difficulty whatever in sending out 200 or 300 men by the steamer that left Southampton on the 19th of July?—No; we could have sent them on the 4th of July; one went on the 4th; in 24 hours you could get 200 men ready.

2436. You do not think that there would have been any risk to the health of the troops in the passage down the Red Sea or across the Indian Ocean, either to Bombay or to the Bay of Bengal?—Not the least; not a bit more than if they had been under canvas in the field, and not so much; they would have been much more comfortable.

2437. Mr. *Osborne.*] With regard to Green's ships, you spoke of them as I understood you, as being very well adapted for transports?—Yes, very good.

2438. Have you any reason to suppose, or do you know that any of Green's ships or Wigram's have been in the habit of going to Aden with coals?—I cannot say just now; I think it is very likely if they could not get any other cargo.

2439. You mentioned this not upon any precise authority?—No; I only said that I had received coals by them; I have known them nearly loaded with coals for me in India; Green's, Wigram's, and Smith's ships also.

2440. I am speaking of Aden?—I cannot say what ships of Green's have gone to Aden; but I have seen some very first class ships at Aden from 1,000 to 1,200 tons.

2441. Were they able to carry troops?—Yes.

2442. Without any preparation?—Yes, they have a troop deck ready; it is usually laid between decks. I will endeavour to supply the Committee with a list of the ships lying at Aden at the period referred to; it is not the kind of voyage to send a very inferior ship upon, coal laden.

2443. *Chairman.*] It has been said that coal becomes damaged after a certain period, so that it is not advisable always to make large depôts of coals; in what period do you think a deterioration takes place of a serious nature?—There is no doubt that it does deteriorate in a warm climate; I should say that coals after lying 12 months would be damaged; that is all the outer surface of the coal that is exposed to the heat.

2444. Only the outer surface of the coal?—No; I have seen the inner surface of large stacks of coal come out quite fresh.

2445. Then there is no great impediment to having a two years' depôt?—No; you may thatch them over with the ordinary thatch of the country.

2446. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] In speaking of sending steamers from Bombay at the end of July, do you think that you made full allowance for the strength of the south-west monsoon?—Yes, I think so; for first class steamers.

2447. There are steamers in Bombay Harbour, are there not, that would find some difficulty in making head against it?—They would not take the direct route. Some take the route which carries them further on the Arabian coast, others take a southerly direction, and take the five degree channel.

2448. What difference would that make?—I think perhaps four days.

2449. What route do the ordinary packet vessels take from Bombay to the Red Sea?—Not always the same route; some take the route direct, according as they find the monsoon; others go to the southward; in the early days of steam navigation, they invariably went to the southward; never the direct route.

2450. Mr. *Crawford.*] Do they go to the windward of the Laccadives?—Yes, some pass down; go through the 5° channel.

2451. Mr. *Byng.*] Did the Peninsular and Oriental Company ever make any private representations, either to the Government or the East India Company, soon after the news arrived in England?—I do not know.

2452. You had not any official or private communications?—Not individually.

2453. Do you think that there would have been any risk whatever, in sending out a limited number of men by the overland route?—None whatever.

2454. Would not the difficulty as to the want of water at Suez, be perhaps a bar to their success?—No, because they would have had no detention there; in fact, if it was a question of water, it might have been brought from the steamer, and given to them; we condense our water and make any quantity. At this moment there is a steam-engine put up at Aden to condense the water, and another at Suez.

2455. Within the last three months?—Yes.

2456. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Do your steamers go to India by the Cape without coaling on the road?—Frequently.

2457. Do you know the average time that they take?—They average from 67 to about 84 days.

2458. Do you know that Sir Charles Wood stated in the House of Commons that sailing vessels make as quick passages to India as steamers?—Yes; I thought it an absurdity, and that it came from a man who knew nothing about it.

2459. Were you not surprised that so many experienced officers should give such an opinion?—Very much surprised.

2460. Have you any doubt that sending troops by steam to India by the Cape would have been preferable to sending sailing vessels?—Certainly not.

2461. Was that your opinion at the time?—Yes, decidedly.

2462. Was your opinion ever asked?—Never.

2463 Did you offer any opinion upon the subject, knowing the emergency?—Not directly to any officials; it was the subject of remark continually to different people that I came in contact with.

2464. That it was quite absurd to send troops by sailing vessels in preference to steam?—Yes.

2465. Did you make no offer to take out troops to India by the Cape?—I am not aware of it.

2466. How many troops could your steamers have taken by the Cape route?—I should say, perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 men.

2467. How many in each steamer?—They were of various sizes. Our first class steamers, such as the "Nemesis," might have taken out perhaps 800 men at a trip; the others varied; they might have taken perhaps 500 or 400, according to their size.

2468. There were about 1,000 or 1,200 marines in the Mediterranean in the different ships there; supposing the Admiralty had ordered them to proceed immediately to Alexandria, could your steamers on the other side have taken them to India by the Red Sea?—We could have taken them out by detachments.

2469. How many?—I should think with perfect ease in the Red Sea, we might have taken 300 or 400 men without inconveniencing the passengers, and they were all military officers: you might have taken 500 in a case of emergency.

2470. You would have ventured to take more marines, they being accustomed to the sea, than troops, who were not accustomed to it?—Certainly.

2471. If the Admiralty had ordered those marines to be sent by the Red Sea, it would have been necessary to send more marines out to join the ships of the fleet; could you have taken them out easily in your steamers?—Yes.

2472. How many?—Two hundred and fifty at a time.

2473. Not more?—Not from this country, I think. The orders of the Government are at present that you shall give every man a position under cover; but under the old system, having one-third on deck and two-thirds below, you could have taken out more.

2474. In a case of emergency, would you not, as the superintendent of that Company, have taken more than 250 men from this country to Alexandria?—Decidedly.

2475. You have been across the Isthmus of Suez?—Yes.

2476. Is there any difficulty in sending troops across the isthmus?—None whatever.

2477. Mr. *G. S. Booth.*] If your suggestion had been adopted, and if the Government had applied to you immediately after the 29th of June, the sending out of 250 men by your vessels would have been a matter that would have required no peculiar arrangement on your part?—None whatever; we should have been ready in 24 hours.

2478. *Chairman.*] It would not have been necessary to wait for communications?—Not the least; 24 hours are always sufficient for us to make provision.

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2479. Mr. *G. S. Booth.*] There would have been no occasion to telegraph to Lord Elphinstone?—None whatever.

2480. *Chairman.*] It would be each fortnight that you would send?—Yes.

2481. Was there not also the Australasian Company?—Yes; but they were uncertain; their passages to Suez were uncertain.

2482. If, at the end of June or by the 1st day of July, 500 men or a regiment had been ordered from Malta, the Governor of Malta would have received the communication in three days from hence, and if that regiment had been sent by the 3d of July from Malta to Alexandria, how soon would that regiment have reached Bombay?—If the regiment was about 800 strong, we should have put 200 men in each ship. We could have put the 800 men down in a month, I have no doubt.

2483 They would have all arrived at Bombay by the end of July?—Yes.

2484. Mr. *G. S. Booth*] That suggestion of the Chairman's would have disordered your usual packet arrangements, would it not?—No; it would have been only crowding the men a little more than we should otherwise have done.

2485. Every fortnight you could have sent 250 men?—Yes. They had only to give us the order, and we would have provisioned them, and made all the arrangements, and put them down at Bombay.

2486. *Chairman.*] Or Calcutta?—Yes.

2487. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Referring to your evidence in chief, the steamer chartered at Marseilles on the 1st of July would have been exclusively employed to convey a message to Alexandria, the message being conveyed by telegraph to Suez, the steamer which you represent was at Suez on the 7th of July would have been also exclusively employed to convey the message to Bombay, and this message might, you think, have reached Bombay in 23 days. Can you give the Committee any idea of the cost that would have been incurred in conveying the said message?—I suppose about 600 *l.* or 800 *l.*

2488. Including both vessels?—No; there is no vessel to charter at Suez; I think the chances are that our company would only have charged the Government the price of the coals and the wages; we frequently do liberal acts of that kind, merely charging them the coals and the wages for the work done.

2489. That, you think, would be about 600 *l.* or 700 *l.*?—I am speaking of a vessel chartered at Marseilles; the other would be a question of wages and coals; I should think it would be 1,600 *l.* or 1,800 *l.*

2490. *Chairman.*] Would that be the total expense?—Yes.

2491. Going and coming?—No; going from Suez to Bombay.

2492. Mr. *Willoughby.*] When would the mail steamer, leaving in the middle of July, be due?—I am not prepared to give that answer without looking into the dates.

2493. You cannot state what the gain would have been in time in regard to sending the message alluded to, in the first instance, by a mail steamer?—The probability is that the vessel was about ready to start with her usual passengers.

2494. Therefore there would not have been much gain?—No.

2495. Can you give the Committee a return of the number of steamers which left Suez, say from the 1st of June to 30th of September, either from Bombay or Calcutta?—I will supply the Chairman with that information.

2496. You are acquainted, are you not, with the native craft at Suez?—Yes.

2497. Are they suitable for the conveyance of European troops to Aden or to Bombay?—No; I should not select them certainly.

2498. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] You are a lieutenant in the navy, are you not?—I was.

2499. How many years were you in the navy?—Seventeen years.

2500. You were one of the officers on board the "Excellent," were you not?—Yes, I was the first officer who passed an examination in naval gunnery, and was promoted by Sir James Graham for my proficiency in that particular branch.

2501. You went out to India as superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—Yes.

2502. You were resident there for a good many years in that capacity?—About eight years off and on.

2503. Will you state whether, at the time that those occurrences took place, about the 1st of July, there was any shipping at Suez, supposing that the Government had sent the troops on from Malta, to take them down to Aden?—I am not prepared to say.

2504. Are there very frequently and usually large ships there?—There are sometimes coal ships there, and large native ships.

2505. Those coal ships are not necessarily colliers?—No; it requires a very first class ship to go with coals to Suez.

2506. You require ships of considerable sailing power to work up the Red Sea?—Yes.

2507. Consequently, had there been any ships there they would have been of a sufficiently good class to have embarked troops, and you could have towed 400 or 500 men down to Aden?—Yes.

2508. Suppose troops had been taken to Bombay, was there not a very large amount of first class shipping in Bombay Harbour?—I have heard so.

2509. It is in evidence from Mr. Lumsden, that there were 150 ships at that time in Bombay Harbour. Supposing that three or four of those vessels had been taken up and despatched with all speed to Aden, in what time would they have reached Aden, clipper ships?—I should think it would take them from 25 days, or from that to 30, to have got to Aden; that is, clipper ships.

2510. The difficulties of making way across the Arabian Sea, during the south-west monsoon, is estimated generally with reference to the steamers of the Indian navy, and not with reference to your first-class steamers?—Yes.

2511. People form their opinion of the formidable nature of the south-west monsoon with reference to those vessels?—Yes.

2512. A first-class steamer, such as the "Pottinger," would face the monsoon at the strongest?—Yes.

2513. During the south-west monsoon, is it not the fact that the rains expend themselves on the mountains on each side, and that in the open sea it is always fine weather, with mere passing squalls?—I have given that in evidence already.

2514. Lord *John Hay*.] And that there is no sea?—There is no rain in the ocean, only squalls.

2515. Sir *James Elphinstone*.] With regard to the Red Sea, I want to establish two points; first, how far does the northerly wind blow down that sea?—Generally, as far as Djudah; sometimes a little further.

2516. In summer time?—Not always in summer time.

2517. As far as Cosseir?—Yes.

2518. Not further, generally, in the summer?—No; I have generally looked at Djudah as about the half-way house, where you lose the wind.

2519. You meet the southerly wind in the south-west monsoon, a little to the southward of Djudah, do you not?—Yes.

2520. You distil the water at Suez, do you not?—Yes, now we do; we distil the water on board of all our ships.

2521. Supposing 200 or 300 troops had been sent on to Suez, they could have been supplied with water from your ships?—Yes; perfectly.

2522. You distil water in all your ships?—Yes.

2523. You would have had no difficulty whatever in gaining the Pacha's assent to the passage of troops through Egypt, had they been sent on?—Not the slightest.

2524. Supposing 300 men had arrived at Alexandria in their ships, would any difficulty have arisen?—None, whatever; judging from an expression made use of by the Pacha since.

2525. He is, to all intents and purposes, an independent man?—Most decidedly, and friendly to us; I recollect during the disturbances with the old Mehemet Ali, when we were knocking down Acre, I was in the first ship that went in; in the "Great Liverpool;" and I had a good deal of conversation with the old man; and he said, "I am not at war with the British nation, but only with Lord Palmerston, and therefore I shall give you every facility in passing your passengers and mails through Egypt; look to me as a friend, and when you go home, explain to your nation my sentiments." Further conversation went on,

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on, and he said, "It is very bad policy on the part of your Government to fight with me; this is your high road to India, and I shall always promote it. Suppose a disturbance took place in India, how would you get your troops out? You must come to me, and I will give every assistance." This was during the time that Sir Charles Napier was bombarding Acre. I never experienced any other feeling, or heard any other expressed by the old Pacha or by the new, than a friendly one towards this nation.

2526. There was no reason to anticipate the slightest difficulties with the authorities in Egypt?—None whatever.

2527. You have been on the Coromandel Coast in the summer time, have you not?—No, not much; I have been at Madras.

2528. In the summer time?—Yes.

2529. Is it not as hot there as in the Red Sea?—Yes, every bit.

2530. Was it not the opinion of all seafaring people in the month of May last that there was great danger to be apprehended from the aspect of affairs?—Decidedly.

2531. Did not everybody wonder that means were not taken by the Government to meet the then state of things?—There was but one expression of opinion from every one at that time.

2532. That did not rest upon newspaper reports?—No, it was the general opinion; the common talk.

2533. Lord *John Hay.*] You were talking about the desire of the Pacha to assist us, and how independently he acted, under all circumstances, of the Sultan?—Yes; it is a mere make-belief: but take the Sultan, to show the then importance of it, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, at Constantinople, got a firman from the Sultan to get the troops through Egypt; he saw the importance of it at Constantinople; and for some time after the firman was given there were none sent out.

2534. With regard to sending troops round the Cape of Good Hope, I think you said that you could have sent 4,000 or 5,000 round in your steamers?—Not so many as that, I think.

2535. Could you have been quite certain of having coal on the route?—Yes. Taking nothing but troops out you fill your holds with coal.

2536. Where would you have coaled?—At St. Vincent's.

2537. What quantity of coal is there there?—Always a large stock.

2538. Where next?—Then the chances are that we should not have touched anywhere till we got to the Mauritius.

2539. Is there a large stock there?—Yes, generally speaking, several thousand tons. Independently of that we might have made a very good average passage; if we had gone to the Cape and found a deficiency of coals there we might have gone on to the Mauritius and taken in coals there. Independently of that we could get to Point de Galle, where there is a large stock.

2540. In what time would you have guaranteed the arrival of troops in India round the Cape?—In about 84 days.

2541. *Chairman.*] You have not been much engaged with regard to that passage?—I have gone that route in steamers.

2542. You have not been employed upon it, have you?—No, we merely send ships out to take their stations when they get to India.

2543. Lord *John Hay.*] Are you confident as to the quantity of coal there was at those various stations?—Yes, I have inquired as to the different ships that have arrived, and of the persons that have come home.

2544. Can you supply a return of the quantity of coal at those various stations?—I have no doubt I can.

2545. *Chairman.*] The Peninsular and Oriental Company have no depôts at those places that have been mentioned?—None; we have depôts at the Mauritius and at Point de Galle.

2546. Lord *John Hay.*] I think you were rather disposed to think that Sir Charles Wood's remarks with regard to the relative merits of sailing vessels and steamers were very incorrect?—Decidedly, I thought so.

2547. Is it not the case, that some of the sailing ships have beaten the steamers in going out?—In very few instances, taking the general run of steamers; you will find perhaps that casually a sailing vessel will make a very quick passage.

2548. Some two or three of those sailers have done so?—Yes, fast ships.

2549. Therefore

2549. Therefore it was quite possible and even probable, that they would beat a good many of the steamers?—There was just a chance that some of them might; just a probability certainly; but I do not think the Government were justified in taking up sailing ships until they had made themselves masters of the whole of the available steamers.

2550. *Chairman.*] Until they had ascertained that they could not get steamers? —Yes, and then get the fastest sailing ships.

2551. Lord *John Hay.*] Suppose that in the opinion of those competent to give an opinion on the subject, it was thought probable that some of the sailers would beat the steamers, do you think that they would be improper vessels to employ in that way?—No.

2552. So that taking all things into consideration, you think that a certain proportion of sailers of the best description might have been employed by the Government?—I do not see that the Government could help themselves, as they had exhausted the stock of first class steamers for the Cape route; but they employed sailing ships before they had exhausted them.

2553. Do you think it would not have been better to employ fast sailing vessels rather than to have exhausted the stock of steamers?—Certainly not.

2554. Would it not have been better to employ a fast sailing vessel than, for instance, to employ the "Robert Lowe," celebrated as being a slow vessel?—You cannot call her a steamer hardly; she is of very small power indeed, not a first class steamer.

2555. I once made a passage from India in 74 days in a sailing vessel; was that not a very fast passage?—A very good passage; it is an exception to the rule.

2556. Was not that faster than any steamer that has gone out?—No.

2557. What steamer beat that passage?—I think the "Sydney;" I am not certain; I cannot give you the name of the steamer, but I know there was one or two that made a quicker passage than that.

2558. Is it an uncommon passage now for a sailer about 80 or 82 days?—Yes, I should say so; they generally average from 90 to 100, and from that to 130 days; I think that that is more the average of the sailing ships.

2559. Is it not a common passage with the new class of sailing ships to make the passage in from 80 to 90 days?—Not many of them do it in that time.

2560. It depends, I suppose, upon the season very much?—Yes, and a great deal upon the experience of the commander.

2561. I think you stated that it would have taken a steamer lying at Bombay 15 days to come to Suez, suppose them ordered after the Governor-General of India had been apprised by telegram?—Yes.

2562. Did you allude to a steamer belonging to the Indian Navy, or to the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—To some of the first class belonging to the Indian Navy, as well as some of our own.

2563. Is there more than one very efficient vessel in the Indian Navy?—Yes, several first class steam frigates; good serviceable ships.

2564. What is the speed of those first class vessels in the Indian Navy?—On an average, from 9 to 10 knots.

2565. Under very favourable circumstances?—Yes.

2566. What is the average of your own vessels?—They vary; some average nine, and others about 11 knots.

2567. Do you look upon your own vessels as superior or inferior to the Indian steamers?—We consider them faster.

2568. Do some of them go nine knots?—Yes.

2569. What vessels were lying in the Indian ports at the time, say at Bombay?—I cannot say; you can get at them in the Bombay shipping lists.

2570. With regard to the practical value to be derived from sending news to India, what reason have we to suppose that there were any vessels lying in the harbour of Bombay? —There usually are.

2571. You said, I think, that you rather approved of the plan of towing small country vessels down the Red Sea with troops on board?—No, not country vessels; I referred to colliers; some of the vessels discharging coal at Aden.

2572. With regard to the provisions at Suez, that you said would have been available for the troops; how many days' provisions would you have had there for 5,000 men?—We had not that number of men to deal with.

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2573. Then say for 1,000?—There would have been an abundance.

2574. Can you give the Committee an idea of the number of days?—Thirty days' provisions.

2575. For 1,000 men?—We had provisions there for 2,000 men for 30 days' with the exception of bread; it is not merely the stock at Suez, for every week we can renew the stock from England or Malta.

2576. What description of provisions is it?—We have tea, sugar, salt beef, and salt pork, and suet suited for troops.

2577. And biscuit?—Yes, there is plenty of biscuit to be had in Cairo.

2578. Are those provisions for the men belonging to your steamers?—Yes.

2579. It has been stated that a portion of those provisions was objected to by some troops?—Yes; we have some of them now at Southampton, and I wish the Committee could only see what the troops refused.

2580. Do you not sometimes find that a considerable portion of those provisions have to be condemned?—Occasionally, perhaps, if they are not turned over and looked at, the salt provisions will deteriorate.

2581. Therefore it is quite possible that portions of them might have been bad?—Yes; but I do not think it was so; I do not think that we keep anything long in store that is not first rate.

2582. With regard to the space which you have to spare in a steamer for the conveyance of troops, what do you do now with the space in which you would put 250 men?—We put some of them in cabins, and some we hang up on the main deck, and others we put in the orlop decks below.

2583. What do you do usually with the space now in which you put the men?—Sometimes we have a cargo there, and sometimes not.

2584. What sort of room would there be; would you give every man a hammock?—Yes, or a bed-place.

2585. What space would you allot to a hammock; how many cubic feet?—Nine feet by 21 inches.

2586. You do not anticipate any bad results from the troops being placed on deck; during the bad season of the year they could not all be below, but must be on deck?—No, decidedly not; I should prefer being on deck; I have always preferred being on deck to being below, and the troops would rather remain on deck. It is only a question of doubling the awnings with sails, and you put them then in much more comfortable quarters than they would have in the field.

2587. With regard to the comparative comfort of the men in those vessels and when under canvas, is there not this great difference, that in the one case they would be about to land under a certain amount of excitement which would make them less likely to take disease, while in the other case, from being huddled together and having nothing to do, they are more depressed?—Not a bit; there would be a certain amount of excitement with those men who were going out to India to be engaged in the field, and there would be an anxiety to get over the voyage, and to get into the fight; passengers experience no inconvenience, and they have nothing to excite them.

2588. You were not in the Royal Navy in India, I believe?—No, but I was in the West Indies many years, and in South Africa.

2589. Is it not the case, that in the large ships which have lately gone out from England, the men are never allowed to sleep on deck?—Yes, but it is a very absurd notion.

2590. Do you consider it to be an absurd notion if it was recommended, most strongly, by all the experienced medical men in the navy?—Yes; I think my experience is better than theirs.

2591. Better than even those who may have spent many years in studying the subject?—Yes; suppose you put 500 or 600 men on the lower deck, they would be inhaling their own atmosphere over and over again; they are in a perfect bath, and when they turn out in the morning they are more like drowned rats than men, and I have seen men sleeping on the deck as fresh as a lark in the morning.

2592. Were those men who had been acclimatized, or who had just gone out from England?—Who had just gone out from England; but if you take notice of the passengers who travel by the overland route, you will find them pricking for the softest plank to sleep on deck at night at all seasons of the year.

2593. Is it not the fact that there is a larger proportion of passengers and

others going out to India by the overland route who become ill, and suffer from the climate immediately on arriving in India, than there used to be when they went round by the Cape?—I never heard that, and to show that must be incorrect, I find that no single person who has ever made the overland passage ever will go round by the Cape. I do not think that there is an instance of a person who has once tasted the sweets of the overland route who would go round the Cape, and be shut up in a ship for months.

2594. Is it not the fact that medical men frequently recommend people who are going to England to go round the Cape for the benefit of their health?—That was the old fashion habit for a change of air as being most desirable; but if you send them round the Cape in a ship, and they are on board a ship which is laden with sugar or saltpetre, they inhale the smell of the bilge-water and all the filth in the ship, whereas if they go by steamer, they get pure air, and get home sooner; there is a miasma arising from the bilge-water, the sugar, and the saltpetre.

2595. The objection to their going round the Cape seems to arise more from the cargo than from the route?—The route too; you have to cross the line twice when going round the Cape, whereas you do not cross it at all going overland.

2596. *Chairman.*] What may be the average time during which ships are becalmed with light winds crossing the line on both occasions?—I have been becalmed there, and have not made more than 160 miles in three weeks, and in a smart frigate too.

2597. Was that in one passage?—In one passage; they are frequently becalmed 10 days or a fortnight, making little or no progress, or a knot or two an hour.

2598. You stated that it was an old fashion idea, to send sick people round the Cape; when was that practice given up?—Some years ago.

2599. How long ago?—When I was in India first, about 18 years ago, it was the cry out among the medical men, "Do not go by the overland route; go on board a ship and round the Cape; the sea air will do you good;" and so it went on until those invalids happened to have finished their sick leave, and when they came out again they came overland.

2600. After they had recovered?—Yes; and then they came in communication again with the medical men, and I have heard them say, "What a nice fellow you were to recommend me to go round the Cape, smelling the bilge water all the way, when I could have got home in six weeks;" and now all the European population of India who have travelled by both routes know the difference between the two, and you find that none of those men who have once made the passage overland, go round by the Cape.

2601. You would probably be surprised to hear, that in the last two or three years, by some of the first medical authorities in India, people have been strongly recommended to go round by the Cape?—A relative of mine came round that way, but that was because he could not walk or stand, and therefore he was obliged to remain in a cot, but for an ordinary invalid, suffering from liver or fever, I say that the overland route decidedly is the best; in fact, going round the Cape is spending so many months of your life in a way that you cannot account for, and it neither does your health good or anything else.

2602. Have you no ships that go round the Cape of Good Hope?—Yes, we have occasionally.

2603. But you have no regular interest in going round the Cape?—None whatever, except the vessels that we send from this country to take up their stations in India

2604. Lord *John Hay.*] Do you pay the stokers the same in the Mediterranean as in the Red Sea?—No; our stokers in the Red Sea get about a fourth less; they do not get more than a fourth of the wages or a third that they get in the Mediterranean; our stokers are natives; we only have perhaps two or three men Europeans as leading stokers to take charge of the watches.

2605. Do you pay the ship's company the same?—No; if you take the gross wages of the crews, the amount of wages is about the same.

2606. Do you employ Lascars?—Yes, to a considerable extent.

2607. Do you pay the English engineers the same?—No, we give them a little more.

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2608. Why is that?—Because we consider the heat of the climate, and their occupation in the engine-room to be rather distressing.

2609. Suppose you sent a steamer round the Cape of Good Hope, when do you commence to pay the engineers more?—Upon day of signing articles.

2610-11. And you pay your officers more in consequence of the increased heat and inconvenience?—It is an inconvenience, but the principal thing is that they are away from their associations and families.

2612. Mr. *Osborne.*] Could you get Europeans to act as stokers in the Red Sea?—Yes, we first commenced with Europeans.

2613. You would have, I presume, to pay them a very considerable advance of wages?—Yes, but I would not recommend it; you knock them up; the work is very heavy indeed.

2614. Lord *John Hay.*] Did you happen to have anything to do with the ships that took the troops to the Persian Gulf during the recent war?—No.

2615. You recollect the transport of those troops?—Yes, but that was done nearly entirely in India; I know nothing about it.

2616. With regard to the healthiness of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, do you think that they are about the same?—I do not think the Red Sea is so bad as the Persian Gulf; I think it is more distressing in the Persian Gulf, in warm weather, than in the Red Sea; I speak not from experience, but from what officers who have served in both places have told me.

2617. Is Aden a healthy place?—It is considered very healthy; I believe that the European regiments which have been there have suffered very little indeed.

2618. Can you tell the Committee whether those regiments generally have gone out straight to Aden from England?—No, generally from India, at least I think so.

2619. Therefore, on all occasions, acclimatised troops should be selected to be sent to Aden?—I do not know.

2620. Have we ever had troops in the Red Sea before?—Not of late years, but we had during the French war troops at Suez.

2621. Were there any troops at Mocha once?—I am not certain.

2622. *Chairman.*] The 10th and 12th Dragoons were out there during the Crimean war?—Yes, and we took some of them from Bombay to Suez.

2623. Are you aware that any sickness occurred either to the men or to the horses?—No; on the contrary, I have heard people say, that when they landed at Suez they were fresher than when they left Bombay, and the horses were ready to be saddled.

2624. How long did they remain in Egypt?—I am not prepared to say.

2625. Lord *John Hay.*] Do you not think that an unacclimatised European going to a place where human beings are likely to suffer from sickness is more likely to suffer than one who has been acclimatised in India?—Yes.

2626. So that, speaking generally, a man would suffer most in the Red Sea who came from England, fed upon beef and beer, than a man who had been acclimatised in India, supposing that one went one way and the other the other?—The time is so short that I do not think that it would affect him; I have heard passengers say that it was very warm, but it is over in five or six days.

2627. Do you think that it does not make some difference whether a man going to a place that is unhealthy has been previously acclimatised or not?—No doubt it does; but I think that a man who has been stationed at Malta is acclimatised for any place; it is as hot there as in the Red Sea.

2628. What is the heat at Malta?—I have seen the thermometer up to 106°.

2629. What is the heat in the Red Sea at Aden in the shade?—I think about the same, at particular times in the year; it ranges from 80° to 90° and 92°, and 96°.

2630. Malta is celebrated, is it not, for its healthiness?—Yes, people generally go there for six months in the year.

2631. We selected it for that reason, did we not, as a station for our shipping, and for a hospital also?—Yes.

2632. *Chairman.*] In the summer season, I believe the town of Valetta is not considered very desirable?—No; not if you can get out of it.

2633. Lord *John Hay.*] When the men are sick at Aden, do they not send them away as soon as they can?—Yes; to Bombay, for change of air.

2634. *Chairman.*]

2634. *Chairman.*] The sickness there, I suppose, is attributable to the great dryness of the atmosphere?—There is no unusual illness there; there is no more than in any other tropical climate, or so much, but the Committee will be able to get at those records at the India House; but I think there is less mortality at Aden than in any other station in India, as to the Europeans there.

2635. Do you know what it is that the troops arriving there, first of all, complain of or suffer from; is it the brackishness of the water?—I never heard that they suffered; I have heard them complain of it as I have done myself; it has a peculiar metallic taste.

2636. Mr. *Byng.*] Do you think there would be any great danger in sending any number of men who have not been acclimatised by the overland route on an emergency?—None whatever.

James Allan, Esq., called in; and Examined.

2637. *Chairman.*] YOU are secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—I am a managing director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

2638. How long have you been managing director?—About six years.

2639. You have heard the evidence of Mr. Engledue; is there any particular point in that evidence that appears to you to require modifications?—Yes, I think it is desirable to let him read the evidence over again.

2640. Is there any particular part of it that you differ from?—There are some facts which perhaps are doubtful, and which on examination he may find reason to alter.

2641. I believe when the Government send troops to India either overland or round the Cape they enter into a contract with the company that you belong to for the expenses; do you undertake all the expenses in that contract, and charge so much per man?—Yes, we charge so much per man.

2642. You undertake to take troops from Southampton to Bombay or Calcutta as it may be, and charge so much per man to the Government?—Yes; no extra charge whatever.

2643. You also undertake in that contract to discharge whatever may be payable to the Pacha of Egypt?—Yes.

2644. What is the amount of your charge to the Government per man?—On one occasion we charged 49 *l.* per head.

2645. To Bombay or to Calcutta?—To Calcutta; on all other occasions we charged only 40 *l.*

2646. What was the cause of that great difference?—At that time screw vessels were taken up by the East India Company, *viâ* the Cape, at the same rate, and we charged no more.

2647. You thought you were entitled to charge the same amount?—Yes.

2648. Then why did you lower the price afterwards to 40 *l.*?—We had some communication with the East India Company, and they thought the price was rather high, and believing that the troops would be sent by Egypt, we sent to say that if there was to be a continuance, the charge would be 40 *l.*

2649. You continue to carry at the scale of 40 *l.* now?—Yes.

2650. You provide provisions also?—Everything; there is no charge whatever beyond the rate per man.

2651. Your contract is with the East India Company?—Yes.

2652. What sum of money do you pay to the Pacha of Egypt for each man?—I should think it would be about 5 *l.* for the men, and 10 *l.* for the officers.

2653. That is a sort of duty that the Pacha levies; you pay it?—Yes, for the use of his railway, and for the use of his carriages.

2654. So that now, in fact, it is a payment for the assistance he affords?—Quite so.

2655. Is that charge of 10 *l.* usually required for the passengers?—Yes.

2656. Do you think there is anything unreasonable in that charge?—No; it is very likely there will a reduction of the charge when the railway is completed to Suez.

2657. The providing vans and beasts of burthen are more costly?—Yes.

2658. When do you expect the railway will be completed?—I suppose about October next. It was stated that it would be completed in May, but I do not think so.

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2659. It is now within how many miles of Suez?—About 20, I think, it is now.

2660. You have not been much in Egypt?—I have been twice there.

2661. Have you had any opportunities of appreciating the disposition of the authorities to promote the transit of our troops and passengers through Egypt? Yes. The Egyptian government are very anxious to do everything in the best manner possible; in fact, they have always taken a particular interest to assist in forwarding the mails and passengers with the greatest regularity.

2662. There are particular charges for different kinds of mercantile commodities?—Yes.

2663. Gold and silver and jewellery, I believe, form a considerable portion of them?—Yes, a very large portion.

2664. What are the duties levied by the Pacha upon that class of merchandise?—Seven shillings and sixpence per cent. on silver and five shillings per cent. on gold.

2665. Have you ever made a calculation as to the quantity of that description of valuable merchandise that passes over Egypt?—Yes; but I do not remember it at the present time. During the last year I think we forwarded at least a million and a half of silver every month.

2666. Do you mean about a million and a half sterling?—Yes.

2667. There must be a very large profit to the Pacha?—Yes. That has fallen a good deal this year, in consequence of silk from Shanghae and Hong Kong not coming home to the same extent as in the last year, in consequence of the war in China and other causes in this country.

2668. With regard to passengers, can you inform the Committee what number of passengers pass per annum to and from India?—We have it made up, and I will let the Committee have a memorandum of it.

2669. Is there a total payment from the passengers to your company for the whole transit to and from India to England, or are there separate charges?—No, one charge; the passengers pay a trifle for wine in crossing the Desert, but nothing more.

2670. What is the amount of the whole charge?—£. 105. from Southampton to Calcutta.

2671. Is it the same back?—Yes, there is no difference.

2672. Are you able to say whether, of late years, the great proportion of the passengers pass overland rather than round the Cape?—There is a very large number of passengers go round the Cape still.

2673. Can you state the proportion?—No; but speaking of merchants and families, who are in the habit of going by the overland route, we generally find that they come and go that way, but there are still a large number of passengers, I have been told, who proceed from choice round the Cape.

2674. Do you think that the number passing by the overland route is augmenting or diminishing?—Augmenting.

2675. With regard to ladies and their families, do they pass at all seasons of the year overland?—At all seasons of the year; but they prefer generally to come over here in the summer, to leave about March, April, and May, and in the other months from October, November, and December; they generally make a practice of leaving England to get to India in the cold weather. At certain seasons our ships are comparatively empty of passengers, and on one occasion we reduced the fare, thinking that they would distribute themselves over the year, but it had no effect.

2676. Lord *John Hay*.] They do not go at other times?—They do go, a very large proportion go.

2677. *Chairman*.] Do you think that you are working your ships at a loss during that dull period?—Yes; but it is made up in the other part of the year; we pay a good dividend, and have done so.

2678. What amount per annum?—I think since 1840 up to 1856 the average of our dividends, including bonuses, and insurances, and other payments, has not exceeded nine per cent.

2679. What is the sum allowed by the Government or the East India Company; what does the Company receive for assistance in transmitting the mails?—Over 200,000 *l.*

2680. How many ships have you employed in India on the one side, and in England and the Mediterranean on the other?—I suppose about 46.

2681. What

2681. What is the class generally of those 46 steamers?—They rank from 1,800 tons to 2,600 tons, and then from 700 tons to about 1,500 tons.

2682. Two classes?—Yes; we have a few smaller than that.

2683. Whereabouts are those employed ranging from 700 to 1,400 tons?—On the Peninsular Line, from Marseilles to Alexandria, from Bombay to China, and from Bombay to Suez.

2684. Are you in the habit on both sides of the isthmus of keeping a certain number of steamers in reserve for emergencies of any kind?—Yes; but the loss that we have had of the "Ava," and the breaking down of the "Alma," does not interfere with the regular carrying of the mails or the passengers; our means are quite ample, even though those vessels are not available.

2685. You have a certain reserve?—Yes, always.

2686. What does your reserve at Bombay and Calcutta probably amount to?—One or two vessels generally.

2687. What may it be now after the loss of the "Ava"?—We have a spare vessel now, in consequence of that loss; we have one more than is necessary for the service.

2688. Is the traffic much greater now than it has been in ordinary years?—Yes; last year it was very much greater.

2689. You consider that the passengers have increased within the last year or two, but that the silver has diminished?—The silver has diminished from the beginning of this year, but that I attribute to the China difficulties; silver is now coming back again. (*a*.)

2690. Have you any particular details in your office, as to the expense of sending troops round the Cape?—Yes, we have carried troops occasionally round the Cape, when we were sending vessels to put on the stations in India. (*a*.)

2691. Even steamers?—Yes. (*a*.)

2692. What is the customary charge for those?—It is so very seldom that we have done it, but I suppose about the same price, about from 40 *l*. to 50 *l*. (*a*.)

2693. Mr. *Crawford*.] Have you let any steamers during the last six or eight months to carry troops round the Cape?—No.

2694. You are one of the managing directors of the Peninsular and Oriental Company?—Yes.

2695. You have in your hands, I believe, to a considerable degree, the responsibility of conducting the affairs of the Company?—Yes.

2696. Your attention, I presume, was drawn in the middle of last year to what was going on in India, probably expecting that you would be called on to assist the Government in forwarding troops to India?—Yes.

2697. I suppose you would have been fully prepared, if called upon to give your opinion to the Government, as to the means of sending troops out by Egypt?—Yes.

2698. Should you have been prepared to receive any proposition from the Government, if made to you early in the month of July?—Yes.

2699. But none was made?—No.

2700. What was the earliest date at which any proposition was made?—On the 8th of September. One of the directors of the India House called upon me to know what we could do; I told him that we could carry by each of our fortnightly ships a certain number of men, and he put the question to me whether I knew that there was any difficulty in Egypt. I answered, "No," and we wrote a letter on the same day to the India House.

2701. Did you volunteer any communications yourself to the India Company before that?—No.

2702. Had

(*a*) With reference to questions Nos. 2690 to 2692, and to my answers thereto, I have since ascertained that the Peninsular and Oriental Company have never carried troops to India *viâ* the Cape, but that in March 1851, the time of the Caffre War, the Company placed their steamer "Singapore," of 1,190 tons, and 470 horse-power, then under orders for India, at the disposal of Government gratuitously for the transport of 300 troops to the Cape, which offer was accepted, the Government merely finding provisions and the extra coals required, to enable her to proceed under full instead of half steam.

Upon one or two occasions the Company have taken second-class passengers to India *viâ* the Cape, and the rate has been about 40 *l*.

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2702. Had you any private communications with them as to the nature of the service?—No; not until the 8th of September.

2703. *Chairman.*] Had you not an interview with Mr. Vernon Smith on one occasion?—No.

2704. Mr. *Crawford.*] You have always maintained a certain amount of intimate connexion between your company and the Government of Egypt?—Always.

2705. Have you carried on your relations with Egypt through the occasional visits of the manager of your company to the Egyptian authorities and the Government of Egypt?—Yes.

2706. From the experience which you have had of the authorities in Egypt, should you have been prepared to have anticipated any difficulty on political grounds in forwarding troops to India overland in the month of July, if it had been proposed to you?—None whatever.

2707. You would have been surprised then if you had been told that there would have been difficulties in the transmission of troops overland?—Yes.

2708. You are not at all aware yourself of the nature of the objections which were entertained by the Government as to forwarding troops overland?—No; I am aware that reasons were given that on political grounds it was not done.

2709. Were you in any way instrumental in getting over any of those difficulties?—No; I do not believe that they ever existed in Egypt.

2710. A question was put to the President of the Board of Control in this room as to whether your company were at all instrumental in getting over the political difficulties in Egypt, and the answer he gave was, that they flattered themselves that they were, but he did not think they had been?—We had not the slightest influence whatever; it was never asked.

2711. Then the President of the Board of Control must have been under a misapprehension?—Yes, I should think so.

2712. You have said that the Pacha attaches great importance to the overland transit through Egypt?—No doubt of it.

2713. And he would rather wish that his Government would do anything in reason to maintain the connexion?—Immediately after the communication was made to the India House we wrote to our agent in Egypt to ascertain whether there would be any difficulty; we did not anticipate it. The agent answered immediately that the Pacha stated that he could convey 10,000 men, if necessary, across Egypt.

2714. That was after you had been in correspondence with the Government on the 8th of September?—Yes.

2715. Did you communicate that answer to the Government?—To the India House we did.

2716. If the authorities at the India House had called upon you in the beginning of the month of July to send troops for them overland, you would have been prepared to have done so, and you would not have anticipated any difficulties whatever from the Egyptian Government in forwarding troops through Egypt?—I anticipated no difficulties whatever; we could have done it then just the same as we have done it since.

2717. With regard to the troops that you have sent out, you are not aware that any difficulties have arisen?—None whatever; I have understood that the troops that came from Bombay were somewhat troublesome, and the Pacha did not like it very much.

2718. *Chairman.*] You refer to the 10th Dragoons?—Yes.

2719. Mr. *Crawford.*] With regard to the troops who are understood to have made some objection the other day to proceeding from Suez to the Red Sea, have you any official advices on that subject?—Yes. This is a memorandum that was made up from our own office; it contains our agent's information to us.

2720. That is made up from the correspondence you have received from your agent in Egypt?—Exactly.

Vide Appendix.

[*A Paper was handed in*].

2721. Have you had any correspondence with the Government yet upon that subject?—None. The moment we heard of it we communicated with the India House, with whom the contract was made.

2722. Then.

2722. Then the communication to the India House was in reference to the contract which you had with them to convey troops to India, which was broken through by the troops being removed, under some authority or other, from one of your ships to the ships of another company?—Yes.

2723. What has become of the "Pottinger"?—She sailed immediately after with the mails.

2724. With regard to the provisions that you transferred from the "Pottinger" to the "Columbian," under whose authority were they so transferred?—The senior Admiralty agent and the Colonel of the regiment.

2725. You have been in the habit of sending troops overland by the regular mail-boats for some time past?—Yes.

2726. Have you heard any complaints of inconvenience arising to the regular passengers from the number of troops which were put on board your vessels?—On one occasion a good deal of inconvenience was experienced, as our steamers had to take on troops engaged for ourselves, and those sent out by the "Australasian." The "Emu," the corresponding ship on the other side, broke down on the Red Sea. But we would not recommend it as a system, only in a case of emergency.

2727. Do you think yourself, as a matter of opinion, that it is altogether a fair thing to the passengers who take their passages in a passenger vessel set aside for the conveyance of mails and passengers, to put troops on board those vessels?—No, I do not think so, only in a case of emergency.

2728. Nothing but an emergency would justify it?—No; but I do not think that the passengers would care about 150 men.

2729. But so large a number of soldiers on board a passenger vessel must be, to a certain extent, an intrusion upon the comforts of the passengers, who may be supposed to have paid something in their passage money for a certain degree of comfort, which the presence of so large a number of soldiers would abridge?—Undoubtedly.

2730. *Chairman.*] On all ordinary occasions for sending out the regular reliefs to India there would be no thought of sending them overland, as it is so much more expensive?—Yes; I suppose that the expense of sending them round by the Cape in sailing vessels is about 13*l.* or 14 *l.* a head, or less.

2731. Mr. *Crawford.*] Upon what principle do you charge for the conveyance of troops overland, and in the mail-boats?—I think it is about as second-class passengers.

2732. Do you diet them as you would diet second-class passengers, or upon a scale peculiar to the occasion?—There are certain rations which they get upon all occasions; when we have carried troops we have generally conveyed sufficient provisions from this country, and have not depended entirely upon the Suez stock.

2733. In the case of second-class passengers going down the Red Sea, do you feed them on salt provisions?—No; generally fresh.

2734. In this case did you feed the soldiers with salt provisions?—Principally on fresh; and we get poultry sometimes; but they prefer salt provisions if they are very good.

2735. Mr. *Osborne.*] I understood you to say, in answer to a question of the Chairman, that you did not agree with Captain Engledue's evidence?—There were some matters that he mentioned, and perhaps a reference to records might make some little difference in his opinion.

2736. I thought you said that he was incorrect as to facts?—I think so.

2737. Will you mention what the facts were?—I think some of the dates.

2738. The dates of the vessels sailing?—Yes.

2739. Mr. *Crawford.*] Captain Engledue has no access to documentary evidence in your office, has he?—He can if he wishes.

2740. Sir *Edward Colebrooke.*] Do you agree with him in the estimates that he made of the times that would be taken up by vessels to reach Bombay and to return to Aden?—I was going to suggest that I could send a memorandum to the Chairman containing all these facts, which might be relied on fully.

2741. Mr. *Crawford.*] I think it would be very desirable if you could give the Committee a statement of what you think could have been done in the way of transmitting intelligence to India from this country, if it had been deemed

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necessary to send out express intelligence after the receipt of the news in this country of the outbreak at Meerut?—I shall be very glad to furnish such a statement.

2742. *Chairman.*] Have you ever been in the Red Sea?—Yes.

2743. At Aden, of course?—Yes.

2744. Are you of opinion that there are generally a considerable number of ships of a superior class at Aden which have either brought out cargoes of coals or otherwise?—Yes; we generally have, I suppose, about 8 or 10 coal ships discharging and waiting turn.

2745. Are those coal ships, do you suppose, of a class in which troops might be properly sent?—Some of them; but that was one of the points in Captain Engledue's evidence that I do not agree with; I think it is very doubtful whether those ships could have been availed of for the purpose.

2746. Do you mean all of them, or some of them?—Some of them might; but I do not think that that would have hastened matters.

2747. Mr. *Osborne.*] Then you are quite at issue with Captain Engledue on that subject?—Some of them are very excellent; but I question whether they could have been diverted from their regular trade.

2748. *Chairman.*] Why not?—Their commanders would have had to act upon their own authority, the vessels being mostly under charter to proceed to ports in China or India, and then they would have had to have been all discharged, and they could not be discharged all at once; they must be discharged one at a time, or two at a time.

2749. In case adequate compensation were given to them I suppose that they would not have refused to comply with the wishes of the Government?—They could have been compelled to do so; but I question whether it would have been of much advantage in the transport of troops to India if there were other means.

2750. Mr. *Osborne.*] And better available?—Yes.

2751. *Chairman.*] By ships from Bombay?—There were very few steamers available in India. I think that the utmost we had in India was only two, unless the Government had taken the mail packets.

2752. You do not mean the coal vessels?—No; steam ships.

2753. Mr. *Osborne.*] It would not have occurred to you to use those coal ships for the transport of troops?—Never.

2754. *Chairman.*] But in the case of an emergency you think some might have been used?—Yes.

2755. Mr. *Osborne.*] But there would have been no very great gain?—I do not think there would.

2756. *Chairman.*] Are you aware that there was a large number of very fine ships at Bombay at that time?—There are usually. I have heard that there were a great many at Bombay at the time.

2757. Mr. *Osborne.*] Are you aware of the effect of the water at Aden; is it bad; and when the troops first arrived there, are you aware of any cases of sickness?—No, but I have understood that at Aden they are very healthy. I have tasted the water; it is a little brackish; and some of the inhabitants get water from Bombay.

2758. *Chairman.*] Out of the ships passing by?—Yes.

2759. Mr. *Osborne.*] It is not attended with any sickly effects upon the troops?—I have not heard it; I have been at the camp at Aden, and the men looked very healthy.

2760. Mr. *Willoughby.*] There is a great scarcity of water at Aden, is there not?—It is scarce sometimes.

2761. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Have you ever been round the Cape of Good Hope?—No.

2762. Your steamers go round, do they not?—They only go round the Cape to take up their stations in India.

2763. How long do they take to go round; give me the average time?—From 80 to 84 days; there was one 90 days.

2764. Lord *John Hay.*] What is the shortest passage?—Seventy-six days.

[*The*

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[*The following Paper was handed in:*]

PASSAGE of STEAMERS to *India*, viâ *Cape of Good Hope*.

STEAMERS.	YEAR.	STOPPAGES.	DESTINATION.	TIME.
Cadiz - - -	1853	Six hours at Galle - -	Bombay - -	90 days.
Doura - - -	1854	- None - - -	- „ - -	79 „
Nubia - - -	1855	One hour at Galle - -	Calcutta - -	88 „
Alma - - -	1856	- None - - -	- „ - -	80 „
Ava - - - -	1856	Ten hours at Galle - -	- „ - -	76 „
Rajah - - -	1856	- None - - -	Bombay - -	79 „
Ottawa - - -	1857	- „ - - - -	- „ - -	78 „
Candia - - -	1857	Mauritius, Galle, and Madras (6 days 10 hours in all).	Calcutta - -	82 „

2765. Sir *Charles Napier.*] Do they coal on the route generally?—No.

2765*. Do they take in coal enough to carry them to India?—Yes, the entire; they take in from 1,000 to 1,600 tons.

2766. How many men could they carry?—Not a great many.

2767. How many?—From 300 to 500 men.

2768. Did you happen to notice that Sir Charles Wood stated in the House of Commons that sailing vessels were just as expeditious for the voyage to India as steamers?—Yes.

2769. What did you think of that statement?—I did not think he was very far out; you will find that the average is not more than 15 or 20 days over full-powered screw ships.

2770. Very different evidence has been given before this Committee with regard to sailing ships and steamers?—Some of them make very good voyages, others make very long ones.

2771. Did your company offer to take troops out to India by the Cape?—I think we did on one occasion, and they had not any ready at the time.

2772. Did you repeat your offer?—No; it is very seldom that we have vessels going round the Cape; we had in fact none to go round the Cape; we could not spare them from the mail service.

2773. Do you mean when the news arrived from India?—Yes.

2774. Are you not in the habit of sending steamers to Australia?—No; *viâ* the Cape.

2775. Have you no regular steamers between Southampton and India?—None; we never have any except in sending them round to take up their stations for the mail service.

2776. Of those that you have sent round, the average passage has been 80 days?—Yes; 82 perhaps.

2777. Suppose you had been charged with sending troops to India on an emergency, and that you had had steamers at your command, would you have taken steamers in preference to sailing vessels?—I doubt it, unless the emergency was so very great.

2778. I am speaking of an emergency?—My notion was that most of the sailing vessels, at least a certain class of them, would get to India as soon as the steamers.

2779. You are aware that there are two ways of going to the Cape of Good Hope, one being quite a straight course, and the other following the same route that a sailing vessel would take?—Yes.

2780. From your knowledge of steam, if a sailing vessel and a steamer were to start at the same time, and both took the same route, do you not think that when the sailing vessel was becalmed on the line with light winds, as she might be, and at various other places for a fortnight, the steamer would be steaming away at the rate of 200 miles a day?—Yes; but the lost time of the sailing ship would be counterbalanced by the time taken by the steamer coaling at the several stations.

2781. But you have stated that you sent them out with coal, sufficient to take them to India?—Yes, the average is 82 days; and we know that now vessels

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vessels carry so many men, that they put in only a small quantity of coal, and coal at several places; the holds are all taken up with coals.

2782. I put this to you; supposing that two vessels were to follow the same route, the steamer taking all the coals that she could carry, and that both arrived within the calms at the same time, would not the steamer be going on at the rate of 200 miles a day, when the other ship was lying becalmed?—I do not think that a clear answer can be given to that question; a steamer would not follow the same course as a sailing ship.

2783. But in my question, I assume that she does do so. In that case, when the sailing vessel was lying idle, would not the steamer be going ahead?—Yes, but she could not carry anything like the number of men if she did.

2784. Why?—Because her holds would be full of coals, and there would be no room for the men and the baggage.

2785. How comes it that the steamers have done it since, and if it has been done since, it could have been done then?—Yes.

2786. I have been alluding to a screw steamer?—Yes, I know.

2787. Mr. *G. S. Booth.*] With respect to the interest of the Pacha in the overland route, you stated that you pay *7s. 6d.* per cent. on the transit of bullion; does that include the cost of the transit?—Yes.

2788. But the 5*l.* or 10*l.* a head for the passengers includes everything, passage money and all?—Yes.

2789. There is no black mail levied?—Not except what I have mentioned, if any of the passengers indulge in wine.

2790. The Pacha does not say, "I will have so much per head for every man that passes"?—No.

2791. It includes the cost of the conveyance?—Yes.

2792. Mr. *Willoughby.*] I gather from your evidence, that you do not altogether concur in the opinion of Captain Engledue with regard to the comparative superiority of steamers and sailing vessels?—No, certainly not.

2793. Then you do consider (leaving out of consideration the experience we have since obtained), that at the time when the intelligence of the mutiny arrived, there being a difference of opinion which would be the best mode of conveying troops, that there were grounds for entertaining a different opinion upon the subject?—Yes.

2794. Have you any return of the number of steamers that left Suez for Bombay or Calcutta, between the 1st of June and the 30th of September?—I think there were about four or five a month.

2795. You have stated that you pay 5*l.* per man, and 10*l.* per officer, to the Pacha of Egypt, and that your contract price with the East India Company was at one time 49*l.*, and now it is 40*l.* a man; what amount is paid for each officer; does it vary with the rank?—It is the same as for a first-class passenger, I think. The charge for the conveyance of a regiment to Bombay was made at the rate of 95*l.* for each officer, and 40*l.* per man.

2796. That is latterly?—Yes.

2797. The first contract was at 49*l.*?—Yes.

2798. The officers are now taken of all ranks at 95*l.*, and 40*l.* for the men?—Yes.

2799. *Chairman.*] I believe it is about the same charge which is made for a passage on board a steamer round the Cape?—The charge has been higher, I believe; it is less now.

2800. What may it be now, do you suppose?—I suppose about perhaps the same price, but they had as large a price as 49*l.* a head.

2801. But you think it has fallen to about the same price now?—I think so.

2802. You stated that there were some dates as to which you did not entirely concur with Captain Engledue?—The principal point in which I do not entirely concur with him is about availing of those coal ships.

2803. Was there any other point of consequence; with regard, for instance, to the calculations that he made; and if so, perhaps you will favour the Committee with a memorandum on the point?—Yes.

2804. Mr. *Willoughby.*] Do you think that Captain Engledue's opinion regarding the transmission of a message, first of all by telegraph to Marseilles, and then from Marseilles by chartering a special steamer to Alexandria; then from Alexandria to Suez, and then by a steamer, which he believed was at Suez, was correct?—There would have been no necessity for any chartered vessel from Marseilles;

Marseilles; we should have found our steamer there, and the steamer from Marseilles would leave about the 29th of June, and the next steamer would have been the 12th of July, and the corresponding steamers all throughout.

2805. Then there would have been no necessity to charter a vessel from Marseilles?—Not the smallest necessity.

2806. *Chairman.*] Then you would make a reduction in the expense as calculated by Captain Engledue?—There would be no expense incurred; all the expense would have been for the telegraphic message to Marseilles.

2807. Mr. *Willoughby.*] When would the steamer have started from here?—The 4th of July; but I will furnish the Committee with all those dates.

2808. You have alluded to the Pacha of Egypt's readiness to facilitate the transport of troops through Egypt; does it rest entirely with him to say that troops shall or shall not pass by that route?—Yes; I suppose the Sultan could prevent it, although I believe the Pacha did not consult him about it.

2809. *Chairman.*] You do not know whether the Sultan would object or not?—No.

2810. Mr. *Willoughby.*] What are the months in which the passengers are the fewest in your ships by the overland route?—May, June, and July.

2811. Is not that owing to those being the monsoon months?—It is the heat, which is the most oppressive in those months, and they prefer landing in India in the cold months; they do not get so much of the heat of the Red Sea.

2812. You have stated that the East India Company communicated to you on the 8th of September, did your company spontaneously make any previous tender for the conveyance of troops?—It was on the same day.

2813. Not before?—No.

2814. Lord *John Hay.*] Referring to the brackishness of the water at Aden; do the troops drink it?—Yes.

2815. Have they no other water to drink?—I do not think they have.

2816. No rain water?—They do not very often have that.

2817. Is there not a tank there to collect the rain water?—They have tanks there.

2818. Can you positively state that the troops drink the brackish water at Aden?—They have no other water to drink.

2819. Are there not tanks?—Yes; I do not know whether they may not get a certain amount of water from Bombay.

2820. Are you aware that Captain Engledue has stated that your company was able to send out ships round the Cape of Good Hope?—I am aware of that.

2821. Do you agree with that?—No; I do not think that we had any available for that purpose; we had no ships to spare from the mail line.

2822. *Chairman.*] What number of ships have you on this side of Egypt, and what number in the eastern seas?—I suppose there were about two-thirds in the eastern seas.

2823. Lord *John Hay.*] What quantity of provisions do you keep at Suez?—Sufficient only to supply the passengers and crews.

2824. What quantity of provisions do you suppose you keep there regularly; sufficient for 1,000 men?—We do not keep any at Suez for the supply of troops at all.

2825. I mean for your own purposes; salt provisions?—Generally from three to four months' consumption.

2826. For how many men?—Perhaps for from 400 to 500 men a month.

2827. You do not agree with Captain Engledue's evidence upon that point; you consider that he overstepped the mark?—Yes; on every occasion we have carried provisions from Southampton in the same ship to be sent to Suez.

2828. Then you had not provisions at Suez available for the troops there?—No; we might have had a certain portion.

2829. With regard to those provisions that were refused by some troops, and which I think it was stated were sent in another ship with other troops, were those provisions that were condemned?—No; there was only a cask of beef and a bag of biscuit that were condemned; and I believe the beef and biscuit came from Bombay.

2830. I think Captain Engledue stated that the provisions which you supply your men with are superior to those in the navy; are they as good?—They are as good as can be had.

2831. Do you not find them frequently turn out bad in a hot climate?—Occasionally; but they are all invariably condemned when they are bad.

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2832. Do you imagine that the reason why people do not go out in the months which you have mentioned is that they do not think the route so healthy, perhaps, with reference to their landing in India?—I think it is with reference to their landing in India; that it is a bad season to land in.

2833. Then, would people going out at that time of year go round the Cape of Good Hope?—No; they generally wait.

2834. Then, in fact, they would not go unless they went overland at that time of the year?—Many would not; ladies.

2835. But that would not prevent troops going, would it?—No.

2836. The space in which Captain Engledue proposed, and I presume you do, to put 250 men on board a large steamer at Suez for conveyance to India, is the space which is generally devoted to the stowage of the cargo. I want to know by what means air is to be admitted to that part of the ship?—They cut spaces in the deck, and put up temporary ventilators.

2837. In the deck above?—Yes.

2838. Is that deck above not confined to the cabins?—No; or we let air in through the sky-lights.

2839. Are the passengers' cabins not above that part of the deck?—No, they are not; they are on the sides.

2840. What is there there?—Merely the side cabins.

2841. Do you mean that you cut holes in the upper deck?—Yes, or through the skylights, and admit air to where the troops are: it is quite a common practice.

2842. You say that you cut holes; you would have to cut them through two decks?—Yes.

2843. There is nothing between the deck above where the troops would be put to prevent your doing that?—No.

2844. Sir *James Ephinstone.*] Does the Pacha in his communications with you act independently of the Sultan?—Entirely.

2845. He never refers to him?—Not that I am aware of. We have no direct communication with the Pacha at all; it is all done through our agent.

2846. *Chairman.*] You doubt whether your ships would carry more than 250 or 300 men, how does it happen that ships of from 2,000 to 2,700 tons have any difficulty in transporting more than 300 men. I spoke of the regular mail ships going from Suez to Bombay?—The "Oriental," a special ship, delivered troops in 37 days from London to Kurachee; 800 men.

2847. There would have been no difficulty in her taking a great many more from Suez?—Not the smallest.

2848. What did you allude to when you spoke of 200 or 300 men?—The question put to me referred to sending our steamers by the Cape to India.

Edward Hertslet, Esq, called in; and Examined.

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2849. *Chairman.*] ARE you aware of the date upon which a communication was received, to which the Prime Minister adverted in the House of Commons, containing an offer from the Emperor of the French to admit of the passage of troops through France to Marseilles to facilitate their progress to India?—It was between the 6th and 10th of October 1857; I cannot give you the precise date; but on the 10th of October, Lord Cowley was informed that such a communication had been received from the French chargé d'affaires in London.

2850. That was a spontaneous offer on the part of the Emperor?—Yes.

2851. Are you aware of the date at which it is supposed that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe applied to the Sultan for his authority to send troops over Egypt?—I am not aware of the date when his Lordship applied to the Sultan, but on the 5th of October the Sultan sent a firman from Constantinople to Egypt.

2852. Are you aware that there was any official communication from the Viceroy of Egypt, and at what date it was communicated to our Government that he had no objection?—On the 28th of September; in answer to an application that was made by our consul in Egypt, not exactly an application, but the consul informed the Viceroy, that it was the intention of the British Government to send two companies of the 57th regiment through Egypt in plain clothes, upon which the Viceroy voluntered to allow them to pass; that was on the 28th of September; we received that on the 16th of October in London.

2853. He never was applied to before, was he?—I am unable to answer that question.

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George Stewart Beatson, M.D., called in; and Examined.

2854. *Chairman.*] THE Committee have been informed by Mr. Vernon Smith, that you can give them some information about the Red Sea in a sanitary point of view; have you been much in the Red Sea?—I passed down the Red Sea in the month of August.

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2855. Did you pass through the Red Sea more than once?—Only once.

2856. In what year did you pass down?—In 1851.

2857. Did you find any difficulty in passing through Egypt?—None.

2858. In what class of vessel did you embark at Suez?—On board the "Haddington," one of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers.

2859. How long were you in arriving at Aden?—We arrived at Aden on the morning of the 7th day.

2860. Did you find it very hot on board?—Very hot; the most intense heat I ever experienced.

2861. Was there much sickness on board?—No; there was no sickness; we had one death between Aden and Galle, one of the engine men; there was no death amongst the passengers.

2862. Was the engine man an Englishman?—Yes.

2863. There was no particular malady amongst them?—No, beyond very great discomfort from the intense heat.

2864. Did you go on to Calcutta?—To Madras.

2865. Was it a long voyage?—We left Aden on the 15th, having been six and a half days from Suez; we reached Galle on the 25th, and arrived at Madras on the 28th of August; we were altogether from Southampton 39 days; from the 20th of July to the 28th of August.

2866. On the whole, you thought it rather a good mode of transit to India?—Yes, as far as I myself was concerned, I certainly preferred it very much to four months' voyage round the Cape, though I felt the heat very much; I had, however, been many years in Ceylon before that, and was therefore pretty well accustomed to heat; I was, in fact, acclimated.

2867. You were in the Burmese war?—I was.

2868. We understand that you have had particular experience of the injury to the health of troops when going to Burmah from being on deck?—Yes. We embarked at Madras on the 31st of March with the right wing and head quarters of the 51st, and in consequence of there being no accommodation for the men below, they were 12 days and nights on the deck; in fact, till we landed at Rangoon on the 12th of April, the first case of cholera that we had was on the morning of the 11th of April.

2869. Was it severe after that?—Very severe until the end of the month. I think we lost 43 men between the 12th and the end of the month from cholera alone. We had one case on board the steamer. We disembarked at Rangoon on the 12th of April 1852.

2870. That was in the last war?—Yes.

2871. What class of ship was it that your troops were in?—We were on board the "Feroz," the senior officers' ship of the Indian navy, a steam frigate, commanded by Captain Lynch.

2872. What might her tonnage have been?—I think she was 1,800 tons; she was a first-class ship.

2873. Had she her guns on board?—Yes; seven 68-pounders.

2874. Did not those guns interfere with the accommodation of the men?—No, not a great deal.

2875. They interfered with the deck, did they not?—Not very much; she was very roomy on deck.

2876. Was she a paddle-wheel steamer?—Yes.

2877. What number of men had you on board of her?—Of the 51st we had about 500 men, exclusive of officers; the regiment consisted of nine companies, and we embarked 900 men; of these, the right wing (five companies) and head-quarters were on board the "Feroz," and the left wing, consisting of four companies, in another steamer, a somewhat smaller one, the "Sesostris." We left Madras on the 31st of March 1852.

2878. A very

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2878. A very hot time, was it not?—The hot weather was commencing; in fact, had commenced.

2879. Were they on deck the whole of the time?—Yes, the whole time.

2880. Was there no alternative?—No; there was no space below; there was accommodation merely for the crew of the vessel; she was a man-of-war on the war establishment, with 250 men on board of her own, and our camp followers besides.

2881. Amounting altogether to about 1,000?—I think over 1,050.

2882. Had you any awnings?—Yes; after the first day or two, Captain Lynch was good enough to keep them up at night, which protected the men in some degree; but the dews were so heavy that we were wet through every morning. Officers and men all slept on deck, there being no accommodation whatever below, except for the ship's officers and crew.

2883. Then the cholera broke out?—On the 10th or 11th of April.

2884. Did any other disease break out?—After we had got into Rangoon cholera was succeeded by dysentery; we got into the place on the evening of the 14th; we were three days in front of Rangoon.

2885. Were the men employed immediately on disembarkation in any operations?—Yes; we took a strong outwork, and remained in front of it until the heavy guns were landed from the fleet.

2886. Did you commence action on disembarking?—The fleet had destroyed all the stockades in the river before disembarking.

2887. When you disembarked you were also engaged?—Yes; we immediately attacked a strong outwork of Rangoon; the following day they landed the heavy guns, and on the next day the place was assaulted and captured

2888. During those proceedings had you tents for the men?—No.

2889. They had to bivouac without any covering?—Yes, on a dry rice flat.

2890. Do you suppose that that increased the attack of cholera?—Yes; I think it all helped; I think the men were landed in a state that predisposed them very much to any disease.

2891. Had they any other hardships to undergo, such as a deficiency of preparation with regard to the cooking and rations, and all that sort of thing?—Yes; we had very little to eat the first day, and not much more the second.

2892. You have told us pretty nearly what you know regarding the Red Sea?—Yes.

2893. Mr. *Osborne.*] You heard, I believe, Captain Engledue's evidence?—I did, part of it.

2894. He stated, with regard to invalids, that now the old system had been changed with regard to sending them home from India by the Cape; are you of opinion that invalids can be safely sent by the Red Sea route?—I do not think it is at all a desirable route for invalids, if they are at all seriously ill.

2895. Is it not much better for them to come by the Cape?—Yes, and they do come by the Cape, as far as I am aware, to this day.

2896. Then in fact, so far as he gave evidence upon that point, it appears that he was wrong?—I should say so decidedly; I think that a man not in good health cannot be sent home in a more desirable way than in a good comfortable ship round the Cape.

2897. *Chairman.*] Have you any particular sources of knowledge with regard to the relative numbers that go by each route?—Troops have never been sent home as invalids through Egypt unless at the present moment. Individual invalid officers come home often by that route. I have had some experience of the Cape route for invalids; I have brought invalids home from Ceylon by the Cape, and I have been perfectly satisfied with the results; we embarked about 80 men without losing one until we got to the Western Islands, when one man died of consumption; many of the men on leaving Ceylon were very ill.

2898. Mr. *Osborne.*] I think Captain Engledue stated that those who had tasted the sweets of the overland route would never go by the Cape; you do not think that that applies to invalids?—I think that many men, if they would forego the pleasure of arriving in England a few weeks sooner, would benefit much more by coming round the Cape.

2899. From your experience of the Red Sea, would you say, as Captain Engledue said, that the troops might be put on deck, or do you think that would be advisable?—I cannot fancy that the men could be embarked at Suez, and kept on deck till they reached Calcutta, without serious detriment to their general health. It would involve 22 or 23 days' and nights' exposure.

2900. As a medical man, you would protest against it?—Yes. It is true, passengers often sleep on deck going down the Red Sea, but that only involves four or five nights' exposure; besides, it is not at all a fair case for comparison; the passengers, although they sleep occasionally on deck at night, have cabins to retire to during the day; in the morning they have the comfort of a bath and clean clothes, which soldiers so circumstanced could not have.

2901. *Chairman.*] But suppose there was a great emergency?—I should not hesitate in a great emergency. I do not think the risk is great enough for that, provided suitable arrangements existed for embarking the men at Suez on their arrival there.

2902. Mr. *Osborne.*] On the whole, you would not recommend it?—No, not in ordinary circumstances.

2903. *Chairman.*] With regard to a great body of the men remaining below during the night, would that be preferable in mild weather to being on deck, if there were good awnings?—That depends upon the number and the amount of ventilation: you might crowd men to an extent that would be most injurious.

2904. It is very difficult to have perfect ventilation, is it not, between decks?—A good deal depends upon the weather; very often the ports require to be shut, and when a large portion of the men are asleep on the lower deck, it is difficult in such circumstances to keep it at that temperature or supplied with that purity of air that one would desire.

2905. What sort of weather had you when going down the Red Sea?—We had rather stormy weather for two days; one of those heavy sand squalls, or sand storms, as I believe they call them there, that made everything very disagreeable.

2906. There was no danger?—No.

2907. Did you stop at Aden?—A day.

2908. Sir *James Elphinstone.*] What number of men had you on the sick list when you got into the Irrawaddy?—I must mention, first, that when we were ordered to embark we left all our sick behind; we embarked nobody not in perfect health.

2909. How long had the regiment been in India?—About five years, and for seven or eight years before in Van Diemen's Land.

2910. Do you recollect how many men you had on the sick list when you went into the river?—Not more than four, I think.

2911. Are you aware that ships coming in from England to Bombay, having gone round the Cape, have sometimes been seized with cholera to a very great extent a day or two after their arrival?—All fresh arrivals are very subject to outbreaks of cholera.

2912. Do you not know that on one occasion an Indiaman lost 49 men out of 149 in 11 hours, having arrived from England only two days before?—I do not remember that particular fact; I have known cholera attack a man-of-war at sea; but it is a very unusual thing.

2913. Would not troops going out round the Cape be just as likely to have cholera when they arrived in Bengal as troops going down the Red Sea?—That would depend very much upon the amount of accommodation that they had going down the Red Sea, and the style of ship in which they were embarked.

2914. Evidence has been given before this Committee that one-third of the men, or a half, could have been below, and the other half upon deck?—I think that the accommodation below would have been so unpleasant that the men could not remain there. I mean the available accommodation in a Peninsular and Oriental steamer.

2915. Are you aware that they have a large main deck in which they would be accommodated with ports and scuttles in it?—The main deck is always occupied by cabins, excepting the centre engine space; I slept in one of the cabins on the main deck, just opposite the engine space.

2916. In an emergency, would you have considered it an extraordinary thing to send men out by the overland route?—No, certainly not, provided due arrangements existed.

LIST OF APPENDIX.

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Return of the Names of Transports taken up for India (Steamers and Sailing Vessels), their Tonnage, Horse Power, the Number of Men each carried, Rate of Passage Money, the Date of Taking-up and of Sailing, and the Date of Arrival, as far as known - - - - p. 198

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RETURN of the NAMES of TRANSPORTS taken up for *India* (Steamers and Sailing Vessels), their Tonnage, Horse Power, the Number of Men each carried, Rate of Passage Money, the Date of Taking up and of Sailing, and the Date of Arrival, as far as known.

NAME of TRANSPORT.	Whether Steamer or Sailing Vessel.	Tonnage.	Horse Power.	Rate of Passage Money. £. s. d.	Date of Engagement.	Number of Men carried.	Date of Sailing.	Date of Arrival as far as is known.
Amazon	Sailing	791	-	11 17 -	8 May - 1857	238	11 June - 1857	Calcutta - 5 October.
Nile	- ditto	1,182	-	11 14 -	8 „ „	102	15 „ „	Calcutta - 5 „
Areta	- ditto	678	-	12 5 -	29 „ „	214	19 „ „	Calcutta - 5 „
Bucephalus	- ditto	985	-	11 19 6	29 „ „	219	2 July „	Calcutta - 23 „
Barham	- ditto	1,148	-	12 19 -	9 June „	124	2 „ „	Calcutta - 8 November.
Cressy	- ditto	720	-	11 15 6	29 May „	217	12 „ „	Calcutta - 17 „
Ellenborough	- ditto	1,031	-	12 16 -	29 „ „	218	12 „ „	Calcutta - 23 „
Adelaide	- ditto	640	-	12 17 -	22 June „	212	12 „ „	Calcutta - 6 „
Ulysses	- ditto	934	-	12 9 6	9 „ „	288	10 „ „	Calcutta - 30 October.
Prince Arthur	Steamer	1,166	108	16 - -	3 July „	300	11 „ „	Madras - 10 „
Sir George Seymour	Sailing	850	-	12 18 8	9 June „	227	15 „ „	Kurrachee - 23 November.
Bombay	- ditto	1,279	-	11 10 6	29 May „	348	22 „ „	Kurrachee - 28 „
Albuera	- ditto	887	-	12 5 6	29 „ „	227	22 „ „	Kurrachee - 24 „
Roman Emperor	- ditto	793	-	14 12 6	2 July „	193	18 „ „	Kurrachee - 17 „
Castle Eden	- ditto	930	-	15 18 4	2 „ „	234	18 „ „	Kurrachee - 24 December.
Cambodia	- ditto	914	-	11 11 -	9 June „	207	19 „ „	Calcutta - 30 November.
Surrey	- ditto	1,089	-	12 2 6	9 „ „	339	16 „ „	Calcutta - 31 October.
Calabar	- ditto	754	-	12 4 6	9 „ „	222	18 „ „	Calcutta - 24 November.
Ramillies	- ditto	740	-	13 2 6	9 „ „	213	22 „ „	Kurrachee - 22 „
Octavia	- ditto	1,055	-	11 11 -	29 May „	231	26 „ „	
Blenheim	- ditto	1,313	-	12 5 -	9 June „	233	26 „ „	Calcutta - 26 „
Caledonia	Steamer	998	150	29 10 -	10 July „	360	26 „ „	Calcutta - 17 October.
Robert Lowe	- ditto	1,225	100	34 - -	10 July „	420	28 „ „	Galle - 23 „
Alnwick Castle	Sailing	1,057	-	16 19 -	10 „ „	402	23 „ „	Madras - 29 „
Whirlwind	- ditto	1,003	-	17 8 10	10 „ „	340	30 „ „	Galle - 29 „
Forerunner	- ditto	618	-	17 10 -	24 „ „	251	6 August „	Bombay - 8 December.
Louisiana	- ditto	1,264	-	16 16 9	10 „ „	432	2 „ „	Galle - 5 November.
Walmer Castle	- ditto	1,064	-	16 9 -	10 „ „	402	1 „ „	Madras - 1 „
Carthage	Steamer	1,003	180	19 - -	10 „ „	198	2 „ „	Madras - 1 „
Thebes	- ditto	1,003	180	19 - -	10 „ „	198	31 July „	Calcutta - 14 October.
Warrior Queen	Sailing	988	-	17 17 7	24 „ „	360	12 August „	Bombay - 1 December.
Sir Robert Sale	- ditto	741	-	12 14 9	27 June „	285	30 July „	Calcutta - 23 November.
Monarch	- ditto	1,282	-	11 14 6	9 „ „	352	27 „ „	Calcutta - 24 „
Aliquis	- ditto	1,247	-	12 5 9	9 „ „	377	26 „ „	Calcutta - 24 „
Sutlej	- ditto	1,150	-	12 9 -	9 „ „	265	22 „ „	Calcutta - 5 „
Scotland	Steamer	1,150	150	39 - -	24 July „	300	3 August „	Kedgeree - 6 „
Seringapatam	Sailing	870	-	12 19 -	9 June „	218	21 July „	Kurrachee - 28 „
Merchantman	- ditto	1,018	-	17 8 10	10 July „	340	24 „ „	Galle - 9 „
William Hammond	- ditto	683	-	17 9 4	10 „ „	230	24 „ „	Galle - 30 October.
Defiance	- ditto	954	-	15 15 -	10 „ „	404	5 August „	Madras - 21 „
Tyburnia	- ditto	1,012	-	16 18 10	10 „ „	402	9 „ „	Galle - 6 Novemher.
Lady Jocelyn	Steamer	2,242	300	49 - -	24 „ „	732	9 „ „	Calcutta - 1 „
Golden Fleece	- ditto	2,768	300	49 - -	24 „ „	901	8 „ „	Calcutta - 15 October.
Champion of the Seas	Sailing	2,237	-	25 - -	24 „ „	997	8 „ „	Calcutta - 17 November.
James Baines	- ditto	2,275	-	25 - -	24 „ „	996	8 „ „	Calcutta - 19 „
Liverpool	- ditto	1,454	-	16 18 9	10 „ „	462	8 „ „	Galle - 23 „
Ballarat	- ditto	713	-	18 19 6	10 „ „	277	15 „ „	Galle - 4 „

Genghis Khan	-	-	ditto	1,305	-	18 19 –	24 „	„	200	11 „	„	Bombay	10	„	
Agamemnon	-	-	ditto	1,430	-	12 19 –	27 June	„	250	12 „	„	Calcutta	16	„	
Sarah Sands	-	-	Steamer	1,300	200	40 – –	1 August	„	354	15 „	„	Burnt off Mauritius,	12	„	
Australian	-	-	ditto	1,391	300	43 15 –	24 July	„	290	15 „	„	Calcutta	1	„	
Sydney	-	-	ditto	1,391	300	43 15 –	24 „	„	288	14 „	„	Calcutta	23	October.	
Victoria	-	-	ditto	1,877	450	43 15 –	24 „	„	408	16 „	„	Calcutta	6	November.	
United Kingdom	-	-	ditto	1,066	300	30 15 –	10 „	„	390	4 „	„	Madras	20	October.	
John Bell	-	-	ditto	1,050	240	30 15 –	10 „	„	390	5 „	„	Galle	29	„	
Sussex	-	-	Sailing	959	-	21 9 9	17 „	„	348	7 „	„	Galle	29	„	
Vernon	-	-	ditto	995	-	14 19 –	24 „	„	204	21 „	„	Bombay	12	December.	
Owen Glendower	-	-	ditto	989	-	13 12 6	9 June	„	263	22 July	„	Kurrachee	24	November.	
Hersilia	-	-	ditto	623	-	16 12 –	10 August	„	258	27 August	„	Madras	12	Jan. 1858.	
Matilda Atheling	-	-	ditto	714	-	16 8 10	13 „	„	296	28 „	„	Bombay	5	„	„
Khersonese	-	-	Steamer	1,273	200	49 – –	10 „	„	544	30 „	„	Madras	26	Nov. 1857.	
Lightning	-	-	Sailing	2,090	-	26 – –	10 „	„	654	28 „	„	Calcutta	23	„	„
Queen of the South	-	-	Steamer	2,250	300	49 – –	10 „	„	732	30 „	„	Madras	1	Dec.	„
Sedgmoor	-	-	Sailing	965	-	19 8 –	10 „	„	354	29 „	„	Bombay	28	„	„
Waterloo	-	-	ditto	898	-	18 19 6	10 „	„	300	29 „	„	Bombay		Jan. 1858.	
Southampton	-	-	ditto	971	-	19 15 –	10 „	„	354	26 „	„	Bombay	24	Dec. 1857.	
Athletæ	-	-	ditto	1,056	-	18 9 –	13 „	„	185	2 Sept.	„	Kurrachee	31	„	„
Alipore	-	-	ditto	811	-	18 – –	13 „	„	273	7 „	„	Kurrachee		Jan. 1858.	
City of Manchester	-	-	Steamer	1,906	350	49 – –	10 „	„	658	26 „	„	Calcutta	8	Nov. 1857.	
Gloriana	-	-	Sailing	1,057	-	18 15 –	22 „	„	220	10 „	„	Madras	12	Jan. 1858.	
Scotia	-	-	Steamer	1,020	300	38 – –	13 „	„	326	4 „	„	Bombay	10	Dec. 1857.	
Gosforth	-	-	Sailing	810	-	13 19 6	24 „	„	352	20 „	„	Bombay	29	„	„
Hydaspes	-	-	Steamer	2,250	300	49 – –	15 „ / 3 Sept.	„	607	19 „	„	Calcutta	28	„	„
Ireland	-	-	ditto	1,150	150	43 – –	11 „	„	301	24 „	„				
Italian	-	-	ditto	784	180	45 – –	11 „	„	201	25 „	„	Bombay	3	„	„
Bahiana	-	-	ditto	1,130	300	45 – –	11 „	„	423	4 Oct.	„	Kurrachee	2	Jan. 1858.	
Great Britain	-	-	ditto	3,209	500	49 – –	11 „	„	1,057	8 „	„	Bombay	17	Dec. 1857.	
Malabar	-	-	Sailing	647	-	13 9 –	11 „	„	132	13 „	„				
Bengal	-	-	ditto	582	-	13 18 3	11 „	„	212	12 „	„				
Calcutta	-	-	Steamer	2,245	Not stated	49 – –	18 „	„	803	11 „	„	Bombay	29	„	„
Southampton	-	-	ditto	2,190	400	45 – –	3 „	„	627	17 „	„				
Viscount Canning	-	-	ditto	780	Not stated	45 – –	3 October	„	186	21 „	„				
Prince Albert	-	-	ditto	2,000	400	44 18 9	22 August	„	482	21 „	„	Bombay	28	„	„
Indomitable	-	-	ditto	1,160	80	25 – –	27 October	„	360	13 Nov.	„				
Statesman	-	-	Sailing	874	-	11 18 8	30 „	„	188	17 „	„				
Maria Somes	-	-	ditto	785	-	12 9 –	9 „	„	230	14 „	„				
Princess Charlotte	-	-	Steamer	2,200	360	45 – –	11 Sept.	„	703	14 „	„				
Austria	-	-	ditto	2,190	400	49 – –	11 „	„	- -	Agreement cancelled. Men sent overland.					
Leopold	-	-	ditto	2,000	360	45 – –	11 „	„	603	2 Dec.	„				
George Marshall	-	-	Sailing	1,361	-	14 8 8	2 Nov.	„	450	16 Nov.	„				
Australasian	-	-	Steamer	2,760	700	30 – –	6 „	„	453	—					
Gertrude	-	-	Sailing	948	-	11 9 6	13 „	„	349	5 Dec.	„				
Nimrod	-	-	ditto	893	-	11 2 5	20 „	„	245	19 „	„				
Argo	-	-	Steamer	2,300	300	36 – –	4 Dec.	„	777	19 „	„				
Lord Dalhousie	-	-	Sailing	912	-	11 8 5	13 Nov.	„	186	15 „	„				
Stuart Wortley	-	-	ditto	891	-	13 14 6*	20 „	„	245	13 „	„				

* For 200, and 11 *l.* 17 *s.* for the remainder.

Secretary's Office, Marine Branch, 5 February 1858.

James C. Melvill, Secretary.

Appendix, No. 2.

LIST of STEAM and SAILING VESSELS which proceeded *to India* with TROOPS between the 1st June and the 1st December 1857.

SHIPS.	Whether Sailing or Steam Vessel.	Date of Sailing.	SHIPS.	Whether Sailing or Steam Vessel.	Date of Sailing.
Nile	sailing	10 June.	Warrior Queen	sailing	4 August.
Amazon	sailing	10 June.	James Baines	sailing	6 August.
Areta	sailing	18 June.	Champion of the Seas	sailing	6 August.
Barham	sailing	1 July.	Sussex	sailing	7 August.
Bucephalus	sailing	1 July.	Liverpool	sailing	7 August.
Ellenborough	sailing	8 July.	Tyburnia	sailing	8 August.
Ulysses	sailing	9 July.	Genghis Khan	sailing	10 August.
Adelaide	sailing	10 July.	Sydney	screw steamer	13 August.
Cressy	sailing	11 July.	Victoria	screw steamer	13 August.
Agamemnon	sailing	11 July.	Australian	screw steamer	14 August.
Prince Arthur	screw steamer	11 July.	Ballarat	sailing	14 August.
Sir George Seymour	sailing	14 July.	Sarah Sands	screw steamer	15 August.
Surrey	sailing	15 July.	Vernon	sailing	19 August.
Calabar	sailing	17 July.	Southampton	sailing	23 August.
Cambodia	sailing	18 July.	City of Manchester	screw steamer	24 August.
Roman Emperor	sailing	18 July.	Hersilia	sailing	26 August.
Castle Eden	sailing	18 July.	Matilda Atheling	sailing	26 August.
Seringapatam	sailing	20 July.	Lightning	sailing	27 August.
Ramillies	sailing	20 July.	Waterloo	sailing	27 August.
Owen Glendower	sailing	20 July.	Sedgmoor	sailing	28 August.
Sutlej	sailing	21 July.	Queen of the South	screw steamer	29 August.
Bombay	sailing	21 July.	Kersonese	screw steamer	29 August.
Albuera	sailing	21 July.	Athletæ	sailing	1 September.
William Hammond	sailing	22 July.	Alipore	sailing	1 September.
Alnwick Castle	sailing	22 July.	Scotia	screw steamer	4 September.
Merchantman	sailing	24 July.	Gloriana	sailing	7 September.
Monarch	sailing	25 July.	Hydaspes	screw steamer	17 September.
Blenheim	sailing	25 July.	Gosforth	sailing	22 September.
Octavia	sailing	25 July.	Ireland	screw steamer	23 September.
Aliquis	sailing	25 July.	Italian	screw steamer	25 September.
Caledonia	screw steamer	25 July.	Bahiana	screw steamer	3 October.
Sir Robert Sale	sailing	28 July.	Great Britain	screw steamer	6 October.
Robert Lowe	screw steamer	28 July.	Calcutta	screw steamer	9 October.
Whirlwind	sailing	29 July.	Malabar	sailing	10 October.
Thebes	screw steamer	30 July.	Bengal	sailing	10 October.
Walmer Castle	sailing	31 July.	Southampton	screw steamer	15 October.
Louisiana	sailing	1 August.	Indomitable	screw steamer	10 October.
Carthage	screw steamer	1 August.	Prince Albert	screw steamer	17 October.
Scotland	screw steamer	1 August.	Viscount Canning	screw steamer	19 October.
Defiance	sailing	4 August.	Maria Somes	sailing	11 November.
United Kingdom	screw steamer	4 August.	Princess Charlotte	screw steamer	12 November.
John Bell	screw steamer	5 August.	George Marshall	sailing	16 November.
Lady Jocelyn	screw steamer	4 August.	Statesman	sailing	16 November.
Golden Fleece	screw steamer	4 August.	Leopold	screw steamer	27 November. / 2 December.
Forcrunner	sailing	4 August.			

Secretary's Office, Marine Branch, 5 February 1858.

James C. Melvill, Secretary.

Appendix, No. 3.

COPIES of all CORRESPONDENCE that has taken place with reference to the CONVEYANCE of TROOPS to *India* by way of *Egypt*, either between Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or between Her Majesty's Government or the Court of Directors and the Peninsular and Oriental, the European and American, or other Steam Packet Companies. Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, East India House, 31 August 1857.

WE have the honour, at the request of the Court of Directors, to communicate to you and to Her Majesty's Government their strong opinion, after perusing the despatches from India by the mail which arrived on Saturday, that considering the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, that it is in the highest degree desirable that such additional reinforcements as may now be available for despatch to India, should be sent overland as soon as steamers can be provided for that purpose by the Government of India, to convey the troops from Suez to Bombay, for operations in Central India, and to Kurrachee for service in the Punjaub.

We have, &c.
(signed) *R. D. Mangles.*
Frederick Currie.

The Rt. Hon. R. V. Smith, M.P.,
&c. &c. &c.
India Board.

Gentlemen, India Board, 2 September 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, stating the strong opinion of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, "after perusing the despatches from India by the mail which arrived on Saturday, that, considering the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta, it is in the highest degree desirable that such additional reinforcements as may now be available for despatch to India should be sent through Egypt, as soon as steamers can be provided for that purpose by the Government of India, to convey the troops from Suez to Bombay for operations in Central India, and to Kurrachee for service in the Punjaub."

I request that I may be informed,—

First. What is the date at which you calculate that a regiment, now ordered for embarkation, might reach Calcutta, Bombay, or Kurrachee, in a sailing vessel or in a steam vessel, according to the average duration of such voyages at this time of the year; and

Secondly. What is the date at which you calculate that a regiment would reach Bombay or Kurrachee, if instructions were sent to the Government of India by the mail of the 10th inst., as proposed by you; showing the data on which your calculation is founded.

I should be glad to see the comparison for which I have asked; but, in examining it, we must not forget that a considerable allowance must be made for delay in the negotiations which would be necessary on the plan of sending through Egypt, and for disappointments likely to arise from the more complicated character of the arrangement, even if political reasons, of which Her Majesty's Government alone can be the judges, should not prevent the undertaking.

I presume you feel satisfied that the store of coal in the Red Sea will be sufficient, and I should be glad to be apprised of your latest information as to the supply of coal on the ordinary route.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. V. Smith.*

The Chairman and the Deputy Chairman
of the East India Company.

Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, East India House, 2 September 1857.

We have had the honour to receive your letter of the 2d instant, requesting to be furnished with certain information in reference to the strong opinion of the Court of Directors, which was conveyed in the letter we addressed to you, by their desire, on the 31st ultimo, that such additional reinforcements as may now be available for despatch to India should be sent through Egypt.

2. In reply, we beg to enclose a Memorandum, from which it appears that, supposing that orders were sent to Bombay by the mail of the 10th of this month, for the despatch of steamers to Suez to convey the troops from thence to Bombay, and that the troops arrive at Alexandria so that they may be transported across the isthmus to Suez in time to be embarked by the 9th November, the troops might be expected to arrive at Bombay about the last week in November.

3. If proceeding direct from Suez to Kurrachee, it is understood that the troops would arrive there about four days sooner than they would arrive at Bombay.

4. As regards the Cape route, it appears from the calculation in the Memorandum that, supposing troops were despatched by sailing vessels by the 24th September (the earliest date at which their departure could be effected), they might be expected to arrive at Calcutta about the 10th January, or at Bombay about the 30th December. If sent by steamers, their arrival, whether at Calcutta or at Bombay, may be assumed at about the 15th to the 19th December. Sailing vessels for Kurrachee might be expected to arrive there by the end of January, and steamers between the 19th and the 22d December.

5. With respect to coal, the enclosed Memorandum (No. 2) shows the quantity expected to be available at Bombay, at Madras, at Point de Galle, at Aden, and at Suez. On the "ordinary route," presuming that the voyage *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope is meant, it is understood that the Admiralty have considerable stores at Teneriffe, Ascension, at Simon's Town (Cape of Good Hope), and at Trincomalee.

We have, &c.
(signed) *R. D. Mangles.*
F. Currie.

The Right Hon. R. Vernon Smith, M.P.

MEMORANDUM, No. 1.

FIRST.—OVERLAND ROUTE.

ORDERS sent by the steamer of 10th September will reach Bombay 10th October.

It will take 10 days to equip, victual, and coal steamers to proceed to Suez.

From the 20th October to the 4th November will be occupied in the voyage to Suez.

A detention of 10 days must be calculated upon for coaling and for embarking the troops.

The departure thereof, of the steamer from Suez, would be about the 9th November, and

The arrival at Bombay on return may be about the last week in November.

At Kurrachee about four days sooner.

SECOND ROUTE.—Round the Cape.

Ships and steamers cannot be procured ready to sail before 24th September, though the embarkation may be commenced earlier.

It is computed that the voyage to Calcutta by a sailing vessel taking her departure on the 24th September, and having to contend with the north-east monsoon in the Bay of Bengal, would not be expected to be accomplished in less than 110 days; the ship would therefore not arrive before the 10th January.

The voyage to Bombay would probably occupy about 10 days less; time of arrival there, say 30th December.

Steamers proceeding to Calcutta, if well coaled on the voyage, might be expected to arrive between the 15th and 19th December.* The same time may be assumed for Bombay.

* 80 and 85 days.

For Kurrachee, four days longer should be assumed in the case of steamers; but with respect to sailing vessels, about 129 days must be allowed, which would make the arrival about the close of January next.

Appendix, No. 3.

MEMORANDUM, No. 2.

EAST India Company's Coal expected to be available in India.

	Tons.	
At Bombay:		
In store	2,073	
In transit	5,000	will arrive in October.
Under contract	5,000	„ „ November and December.
TOTAL	12,073 Tons.	
At Madras:		
In store	1,700	
In transit	1,500	
Under contract	3,000 coal 2,000 fuel	Will arrive in November and December.
TOTAL	8,200 Tons.	
At Galle:		
Will be delivered in October	4,000	
December	1,000	
TOTAL	5,000 Tons.	
At Aden:		
In store	5,200	
Will be delivered in October	4,900	
TOTAL	10,100 Tons.	
At Suez:		
In store	2,900 Tons.	

2 September 1857.

Gentlemen, India Board, 4 September 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant as to the preferable route for sending to India the additional troops which may be ordered to that country in consequence of your last requisition.

It appears, according to the memorandum enclosed in your letter, that a regiment sent through Egypt might be expected to reach Bombay about the last week in November.

And that a regiment despatched on a steamer round the Cape of Good Hope might be expected to reach Bombay or Calcutta between the 15th and 19th December.

Thus the advantage in point of time in favour of the new route, even if no part of the arrangement disappointed your expectations, would be little more than a fortnight.

This being the case, Her Majesty's Government are decidedly of opinion that it would not be advisable to incur all the embarrassment and inconvenience which must arise from adopting the unusual line of conveyance, as well as to involve themselves in the necessary negotiations for the purpose, especially now that troops will for the next three months be continually arriving in India.

I have therefore to request that you will take immediate measures for obtaining freight to India, *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope, for all the troops—artillery, cavalry, and infantry—about to be despatched thither. If possible they should all be embarked on screw steamers.

With respect to the supply of coal I would suggest that particular inquiries should be made at the Admiralty as to the stores of which they may have an account.

It has occurred to me that it might be of great advantage if a number of revolving pistols were sent to India, for the use of military men, as well as civilians. Many an officer who has been murdered might perhaps have saved his life if he had the power to discharge rapidly five or six barrels.

I have, &c.

The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company. (signed) *R. Vernon Smith.*

Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, East India House, 9 September 1857.

1. In reference to your letter dated the 4th instant, we are requested by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to express their regret that it is not deemed expedient by Her Majesty's Government to take advantage of the route by way of Egypt for forwarding any considerable number of the troops intended as a reinforcement for India.

2. The Court, feeling that Her Majesty's Government must be the best, if not the only competent judges of the difficulties which may be opposed to the adoption of the course in question, will not further press the views expressed in our letter of the 2d instant, and which from the first, as is known to you, the Court have been led to entertain.

8 September 1857.

3. Connected with this subject we have the honour to transmit to you copy of a letter from the Peninsular and Oriental Company, offering to convey a small number of troops by the overland route each fortnight, and to express the hope of the Court that the objections felt to the general arrangement may be so far waived as to enable the Court to accept this proposal, in which case the Court will immediately make arrangements for the purpose.

We have, &c.
(signed) *R. D. Mangles.*
F. Currie.

The Right Hon. R. Vernon Smith, M.P.

(Immediate.) Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.

Sir, 8 September 1857.

It having occurred to the Directors of this Company, that the forwarding to India of small detachments of troops *viâ* Egypt, might be of importance in the present situation of affairs, they feel it proper to state to you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that they could make arrangements for the conveyance of from 100 to 150 men by the fortnightly mail steamers of this Company to Alexandria, and from Suez to Bombay or Calcutta.

The means of transit through Egypt are sufficient, they consider, to admit of the men being conveyed from Alexandria to Suez in the same time as the other passengers.

The terms on which the Directors would undertake the conveyance and victualling, including the expense of transit and victualling through Egypt, are *50 l.* per man, whether disembarked at Bombay or Calcutta.

Half of the men to be on deck alternately, but with sufficient shelter from the weather.

Should this suggestion be adopted, the Directors are prepared to despatch to Alexandria a special steamer with a supply of provisions and victualling stores for their depôt at Suez, and which steamer would at the same time take out 300 men with the necessary complement of officers.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,* Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Gentlemen, India Board, 18 September 1857.

In reply to your letter of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have decided to send to Aden two companies of infantry, with their arms, accoutrements, and military clothing made up as baggage, by the vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Company; and that they will be ready at Malta to embark on the steam vessel which is to leave Southampton on the 20th instant. I request that you will make arrangements accordingly.

I observe it stated in a parenthesis at the conclusion of the second paragraph of the letter above-mentioned, that the views expressed in your letter of the 2d instant, meaning, I presume, your letter of the 31st ultimo, as to the passage of troops through Egypt, were those "which, from the first, as is known to me, the Court have been led to entertain."

To this statement I wish to reply, that it is entirely inconsistent with the words used by you in the letter of the 31st ultimo, which are, "After perusing the despatches from India by the mail which arrived on Saturday," "considering the lateness of the season for ships departing for Calcutta;" thereby clearly showing that this view had never been previously expressed to the Board by the Court.

It is true that this subject, with very many others relating to the speedy despatch of troops to India, had been discussed in the conversations which I have frequently had the honour of holding with you since the commencement of the late unfortunate events. But as no steps had been taken of a formal nature to bring before Her Majesty's Government the views of the Court of Directors upon this head, I of course concluded that they agreed through you in the views of Her Majesty's Government; and I think it would lead to any end rather than that of the united government of the Court of Directors and the Board, if every proposal that had been broached at our confidential interviews was, in times of great public emergency, to be advanced as a scheme submitted to and rejected by the Board.

These

These interviews are eminently useful between the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman, who originate, and the President of the Board who finally sanctions, all public acts of the Indian administration. They are intended to avoid constant collision between the Government and the Board by previous arrangement, and to smooth the passage of measures through the Court. If, however, they are not considered confidential, but may be used at the will of either party as public communications, of which there is no record, it is obvious that the President of this Board would be under a great disadvantage; and, that instead of facilitating they would impede, by most unpleasant recriminations and differences of recollections as to what had passed the united action, as well as the good feelings of the component parts of the Government of India.

I must conclude, therefore, by totally disclaiming the construction put by the Court as to the expression of any opinion on their part upon the subject, previously to the 31st of August.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. Vernon Smith.*

The Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the East India Company.

Sir, India Board, 19 September 1857.

With reference to your letter of the 9th instant, I am desired by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have determined to send through Egypt the two companies of Royal Engineers destined for Calcutta, and the two companies of the same corps destined for Kurrachee; and the Board request that the Court of Directors of the East India Company will make arrangements with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company for the transport of these troops on board their vessels, commencing with the one which is intended to leave Southampton for Kurrachee on the 4th October. The Board presume that it will be found convenient that the number taken at one time from England should be made up from the Calcutta and Kurrachee detachments, and that at Suez the men should be divided between the Bengal and Bombay steam vessels. The arms, accoutrements, and military clothing are to be packed as baggage.

I have, &c.
(signed) *George Clerk.*

Sir James Melvill, K.C.B.

N.B.—A company consists of 120 men.

Sir, East India House, 25 September 1857.

We have had the honour to receive and have laid before the Court of Directors your letter dated the 18th instant.

2. The Court are aware that, previously to our communication of the 31st ultimo, the desire that troops should proceed by way of Egypt had not been expressed in writing. But they do not perceive that this circumstance renders the passage in our letter of the 9th instant, to which you take exception, inconsistent with the expressions which you quote from our letter of the 31st ultimo, because you frankly admit all that is alleged, namely, that from the commencement of the late unfortunate events, the subject had been discussed between you and ourselves on the part of the Court. We had, in point of fact, stated to you the opinion and desire of the Court as distinctly as if it had been formally expressed; and when you apprised us that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to adopt the course recommended, that reply was communicated by us to the Court. Consequently, regarding the question as one of European policy, which had rested, and must rest with Her Majesty's Government to decide, the Court abstained from pressing their views, until the receipt of further intelligence from India showed the increasing urgency of the necessity for sending troops as expeditiously as possible; when the Court thought it to be their duty once more, and in writing, to urge upon Her Majesty's Government to take the route by Egypt, which had become the more desirable, owing to the nearer approach of the season which would cause additional delay in the passage by the Cape.

3. Under these circumstances, it only remains for the Court to express their satisfaction at finding that Her Majesty's Government have availed themselves of the route by Egypt, so far as to send by it, periodically, small bodies of troops.

We have, &c.
(signed) *R. D. Mangles.*
F. Currie.

The Right Hon. R. Vernon Smith, M.P.
&c. &c.

Appendix, No. 3.

Gentlemen, India Board, 26 September 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant.

I cannot admit the doctrine laid down in your second paragraph, which would place conversations between you and the President of this Board upon the same footing as letters.

I never understood that the propriety of sending troops through Egypt had been discussed between me and yourselves on the part of the Court, nor do I understand how you could speak on the part of the Court, without having ascertained the opinion of the Court in the usual manner, as I have so often found in our intercourse that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman have been entirely mistaken in what they believed would be the decision of the majority of the Directors.

I must distinctly deny that you ever stated it to me to be the opinion and desire of the Court that you should urge upon Her Majesty's Government to take the route by Egypt, or that I apprised you that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to adopt the course recommended. I discussed that question in all its bearings as has been hitherto usual between yourselves and me, previously to any decision either of the Court or the Cabinet.

You say that my reply was communicated to the Court, but no record of that reply is placed upon your minutes, and by adopting the course proposed by you the opinion of the President would be expressed in such words as you may think it right to use, and not in those which to him might seem best adapted to convey his meaning. I must therefore request that whenever the Court make you the channel of imparting to me their views with the intention of bringing them before me as a matter of official record to which public reference may thereafter be made, you will have the goodness to set forth those views formally in writing.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. Vernon Smith.*

The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company, &c. &c.

Sir, East India House, 1 October 1857.

1. WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, which we have laid before the Court of Directors.

2. The Court have no wish to continue a discussion which can have no other foundation than the recollections of the two parties concerned, as to the scope of conversations held upon several different occasions, and to the degree of weight to be attached to the communications made by each party to the other. But, as you have so formally disclaimed the construction put by us upon those conversations, we feel that it is due to ourselves to declare with equal distinctness, that we certainly intended, and believed that you understood us, to speak the general opinion of the Court in regard to the expediency of sending troops through Egypt, and not merely our individual sentiments; and that we as certainly understood you to favour us, in reply, not with your own views only, but with those also of Her Majesty's Government. In fact, it was that impression upon our own minds, and communicated by us to our colleagues, which alone prevented the Court from submitting to you their recommendation on the subject in the more formal shape of a letter.

3. Thus we represented to the Court, as we conceived that our duty bound us, what we believed to be your opinion and that of Her Majesty's Government, and to that opinion they deferred. But we are not aware that, as stated in the last paragraph of your letter, we have proposed any course with the object of expressing your opinion in words other than your own. At the same time, we entirely concur with you in thinking it desirable that henceforward all communications of importance involving the deliberate opinion of the Court on the one hand, or your decision to be communicated to the Court on the other, should pass between us "formally in writing."

We have, &c.
(signed) *R. D. Mangles.*
F. Currie.

Right Hon. Vernon Smith, M.P. &c. &c. &c.

Sir, East India House, 1 October 1857.

I AM commanded by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to transmit to you the copy of a letter which the Court have this day received from the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and to express the opinion of the Court, that it may be desirable to take advantage of the opportunity for sending, by the route of Egypt, such number of men forming part of the reinforcements now in progress, or intended to supply casualties, as have not already been provided for in the shipping arrangements for sending troops round the Cape.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Appendix, No. 3

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall Street, London, E.C.,
1 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that, considering the present crisis in India would be likely to induce the Home Government to send out as many troops as practicable by the overland route, the Directors of this Company instructed their agents at Calcutta and Bombay, by the mail of the 10th September, to despatch the steam ships "Oriental" and "Precursor" to Suez, so as to be available for that purpose if required, and at the same time to assist in the conveyance of the wounded and distressed to this country.

I am further to add, that each of these vessels is capable of carrying 1,000 men with the stores necessary for the voyage, and that the agents of the Company at Calcutta and Bombay, having anticipated the probability of the services of the vessels being required in this way, and accordingly prepared them for sea, the "Precursor" may be expected to reach Suez about the first week in November and the "Oriental" towards the latter end of the same month.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Jas. Allan,*
For the Managing Directors.

Sir James C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
East India House.

Sir,

India Board, 6 October 1857.

WITH reference to the proposal by the manager of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company to convey troops to India by the overland route, transmitted in your letter of the 1st instant, I am desired by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to request that you will move the Court of Directors of the East India Company to ascertain, for the information of the Board, the means at the disposal of the Peninsular and Oriental Company for provisioning soldiers on the voyage from Suez to India, particularly with respect to the arrangements they have adopted to ensure a sufficient supply of salt provisions for this service.

I am, &c.
(signed) *George Clerk.*

Sir James Melvill, K.C.B.

Sir,

East India House, 8 October 1857.

I AM desired to forward, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter just received from Mr. Olding, for the managing Directors of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, dated the 7th October 1857, in reply to the inquiry made at the instance of the Board, as communicated in Sir George Clerk's letter of the 6th of this month, as to the means at the disposal of the Steam Company for provisioning soldiers on the voyage from Suez to India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall street, London, E.C.,
7 October 1857.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of yesterday, requesting to be informed what means this Company have at their disposal for provisioning soldiers on their voyage from Suez to India, I am desired by the Managing Directors to state, that the Company's depôts at Alexandria and Suez are fully stocked with salt provisions, medical comforts, and all other troop stores for the immediate supply of at least one thousand men.

In addition to these stores, the Company's steamers "Precursor" and "Oriental," which have been ordered up to Suez from Bombay and Calcutta, if available for that service, will bring with them supplies for one thousand men each, the former for 15 days and the latter for 30 days; and the Company's agents at the several posts *en route* have been instructed to make all the necessary preparations for supplying the same number of men with fresh provisions and water.

I am desired to add, that the Company's general arrangements with regard to supplies of all kinds at their eastern stations warrant them in undertaking to provision any further number of men it may be thought expedient to forward by their lines to India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. D. Olding,*
For the Managing Directors.

Sir James C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
East India House.

Appendix, No. 3.

East India House,
10 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to my letter of the 8th inst., as to the means at the disposal of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company for provisioning soldiers from Suez to India, I am desired to forward for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter just received from Mr. Allan for the Managing Directors of the Steam Company, explaining the expression used in his letters of the 1st and 7th inst., as to the steam vessels "Precursor" and "Oriental" being at Suez for the conveyance of troops thence to India, if available for that service.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
London, 10 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to my letters under date 1st and 7th instant, respecting the instructions which the Company had forwarded to their agents at Bombay and Calcutta by the mail of 10th September, for the despatch of the steam ships "Precursor" and "Oriental" to Suez, so as to be available for the conveyance of troops to India,

I have the honour to acquaint you in reply to your inquiry that unless the local government should have withdrawn these vessels for special employment prior to the arrival of those instructions in India, the Directors have every reason to believe that the "Precursor" will be at Suez about the first week in November, and the "Oriental" toward the latter end of the same month.

In any case, the mail due in London about the 14th November will bring advices from the Company's agent at Bombay regarding the "Precursor," and the Company will have information respecting the "Oriental" by the mail arriving about 29th November.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Jas. Allan,*
For the Managing Directors.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
East India House.

Sir,

East India House, 21 October 1857.

We are requested by the Court of Directors to state that they have had under their consideration the minute of the Right Honourable the Governor of Madras, dated the 24th August 1857, as laid before them this day by the Secret Committee, representing the urgent want of further reinforcements of European troops.

The Court observe that, subsequent to the date of Lord Harris' Minute, his Lordship will have received intelligence of additional and very large reinforcements having been ordered to be sent to India, of which some are destined specially to Madras; and the whole will be available for the general service of the empire.

The Court are, however, of opinion that two more regiments of the line should be sent to Madras as soon as possible.

The Court, therefore, request that Her Majesty's Government will place this force at their disposal for service at that Presidency.

The Court consider it very desirable to send these regiments overland; and they would request permission to make arrangements for that purpose, if found to be practicable, with the Peninsular and Oriental Company and with the Royal Mail Packet Company.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ross D. Mangles.*
Frederick Currie.

The Right Hon. R. Vernon Smith, M.P.,
&c. &c.

Sir,

East India House, 22 October 1857.

21 October 1857.

I am commanded by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to forward for communication to the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, and of the extract therein enclosed, of a letter from that Company's agent at Alexandria, reporting the safe transit through Egypt, and embarkation at Suez *en route* for Aden, of the 200 men who had been conveyed from Malta by the steamship "Ripon."

12 October 1857.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary, India Board.

Appendix, No. 3.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
London, 21 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure to forward to you, for submission to the Honourable Court of Directors, the enclosed extract of a letter received this morning from the Company's agent at Alexandria, reporting the safe transit through Egypt and embarkation at Suez, *en route* for Aden, of the 200 men who had been conveyed from Malta by the steam ship "Ripon."

I have, &c.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B. (signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.
&c. &c. &c.

EXTRACT of Letter from the Superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 12 October 1857.

"I RETURNED from Suez on Saturday evening. The 200 men of the 57th Regiment were embarked in the 'Alma' on morning of the 7th, apparently well contented with their journey.

"From Alexandria to the end of the railway (opposite No. 12 station-house) they were conveyed in one train; but from the end of the railway to Suez it was necessary to dispatch them in two parties, each of 20 vans, and at an interval of three hours.

"The men were disembarked from the 'Ripon' at five a. m. of the 6th, and landed in lighter, towed by steamer. The train got clear of the station at 7.30 a. m.; they were fed at Kafr Sarjat, and again at the end of the railway, where also a ration of grog was served them.

"The first party of 100 embarked on board the 'Alma' at 7.30 a. m. of 7th, having made the journey from ship to ship in 26½ hours. The second party were on board by 10.30 a.m., having occupied 29½ hours.

"The baggage, arms, and ammunition had been sent forward, and shipped in advance of the men.

"No delay occurred to the mails, as the men were on board seven hours before the ship was ready for sea. The 'Bombay' steamed away at four p. m. of 7th, and 'Alma' six p. m. All the men left in 'Alma,' and she could have taken other 100 or 200 without much inconvenience to the passengers.

"The 'Tamar' leaves at 11 a. m., and as Colonel Pocklington, who is at Cairo, collecting information, is not aware of the departure of this vessel, will you please make known to the authorities the embarkation of the men in 'Alma.'"

Sir,

East India House, 23 October 1857.

WITH reference to the letter of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the 21st instant, addressed to the President of the India Board, I am desired to forward to you herewith, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter, with enclosures, from the Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, respecting the facilities for transporting the troops already dispatched for India by the overland route, by the steam ships "Ripon" and "Sultan," and stating that his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt promises to give every assistance in the transit from Alexandria to Suez of any further number of troops it may be considered expedient to send by that route, not only "*en bourgeois*," but in uniform, and with their arms, if required.

16 October 1857.

I have, &c.

(signed) *James C. Melvill*,
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
London, 16 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, by order of the Directors of this Company, to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, the accompanying extracts of letters received this morning from the Company's agent at Alexandria, respecting the facilities for transporting the troops already dispatched for India by the overland route, and stating that his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt had promised to give every assistance in the transit from Alexandria to Suez of any further number of troops it may be considered expedient to send by this route.

I beg also to enclose extract of a letter from the Company's agents at the Mauritius, reporting the transfer of a cargo of coals belonging to this Company, to the representatives of the Honourable East India Company, and of which measure the Directors will signify their approval by the next outgoing mail.

I have, &c.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B. (signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.
&c. &c. &c.

P. S.—The biscuit indented for by Mr. Holton to be forwarded from Malta, is independent of the supplies sent out by the Company.

Appendix, No. 3.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Messrs. *Hunter, Ireland & Co.*, dated Mauritius, 11 September 1857.

"A BARQUE, called the 'Sarah Scott,' Captain Bell, with coals for Aden, on account of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, arrived here on 16th ultimo, assisting into this port a leaky ship, the 'Silistria.' While she was here the steam frigate 'Assaye,' belonging to the Indian navy, and several others, came here for coals, with troops on board for India. As sufficient coals could not be obtained here, Lieutenant Robinson, of the Indian navy, being duly authorised by his Government, intimated to Captain Bell, of the 'Sarah Scott,' his desire to take his coals from him here for the use of the service. Captain Bell said, in a case of so much importance he would consent to do so, on a guarantee from Lieutenant Robinson on the part of the East India Company, backed by a guarantee from the Mauritius government, that his owners would be held harmless and irresponsible for not delivering the coals at Aden, as per charterparty; those guarantees being promised, Captain Bell delivered over his cargo of coals to Lieutenant Robinson, of the Indian navy. Captain Skoltowe tells us it would be all right. We have written to inform Mr. Thomas, at Aden."

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. *T. H. Holton*, Peninsular and Oriental Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 5 October 1857.

"I NOTE that 'Sultan' will be despatched, in anticipation of the mail of 4th proximo, with 250 men and 20 officers for passage to India by the overland route. There is no difficulty in the transit of these men, and all their baggage, nor in that of any quantity of stores you may be pleased to send, so long as the latter are placed on the Indian manifest for Suez.

"I have written Mr. Davidson to forward me the supply of 15,000 lbs. of biscuit; he will easily procure it from the commissariat at Malta; of flour, we have a fair quantity in store, and I am despatching Mr. West an additional supply. For the mere transit, no contract with Shepherd* is necessary. The transit supply the men with meals *en route*, one meal at Kafi Azzyat, and one at the end of the railway: the first, Shepherd cannot furnish, as a Mr. César has the contract with the transit; the latter Shepherd supplies by virtue of his contract with the administration.

* Mr. Shepherd, hotel keeper and contractor, of Cairo.

"The entire transit of the men will be a matter of 20 or 24 hours, and there will be plenty of water *en route*.

"Mr. West has his arrangements already made for supplying his requirements in the way of sheep, &c., and, I think, is in a better position to provide than Shepherd.

"When at Suez, the men will be better placed on board the 'Zenobia' than at the hotel.

"The troops brought by 'Ripon' leave for Suez at 5 A.M. to-morrow; they will, I expect, pass Cairo about noon, and be at the end of the railway about 4 P.M., and in Suez very early before daylight of 7th.

"I shall accompany the men to Suez to initiate Colonel Pocklington, who is in charge of them, and who remains to superintend the transit of any future parties of troops that may be sent this way. The whole of them will go in 'Alma,' as Colonel Pocklington does not wish them divided."

EXTRACT of a Letter, dated 29 September, from the Same.

"THE answer of the Viceroy respecting the passage of the troops *ex* 'Ripon' through Egypt was received last evening. His Highness states that it will be a satisfaction to him to give facility to the passage of not only 200 men, as in the present instance, but to that of 20,000, if necessary, and not *'en bourgeois'* but in uniform, and with their arms, if required.

"No physical difficulty exists in the passage of troops through this country; 10,000 men might easily be transported to Suez in 60 hours."

EXTRACT of a Letter from a Passenger on board "*Ripon*."

"WE have 200 troops on board, and they conduct themselves so well that positively one would not know they were here."

Appendix, No. 3.

East India House, 26 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to the letter addressed by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to the President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, under date 21st October 1857, I am desired to forward to you herewith, for the information of the Board, copies of letters* from Mr. Reep, the Secretary to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, and from Mr. Howell, the Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, stating the terms upon which those companies are willing to convey troops from Southampton to India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London, 21 October 1857.

Sir,

I am desired by the Directors of this Company to state, for the information of the Honourable the East India Company, that they will undertake to convey 400 soldiers, with the usual proportion of officers, by the steam-ship "Tamar," appointed to leave Southampton on the 12th November for Alexandria, and to carry them forward by a corresponding ship from Suez, as far as Galle, where they would arrive about the 14th December, at a charge at the rate of 40 *l.* per man for the soldiers, for conveyance from England to Galle, to include the expense of victualling and transit across the Isthmus of Suez, and for the officers, of the customary rate of passage money.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep*,
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B., Secretary,
East India House.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London, 22 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to my communication of yesterday's date, respecting the conveyance of troops, *viâ* Egypt to Galle, I beg leave to observe that an ample supply of salt meat and other provisions is forwarded by the steamer which takes on the troops from Southampton to Alexandria, and transmitted thence across to Suez for embarkation on board the corresponding vessel, which conveys the troops from that port to Galle.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep*,
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
26 October 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour, by order of the Directors of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 23d instant, requesting to be informed what number of troops the Company can undertake to convey from Southampton to Alexandria, across the Isthmus of Suez, and forward to Madras by their regular fortnightly steam vessels, suitably berthing the men, conveying them across Egypt, so as to prevent straggling, providing them with proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts, and attendance, during the entire journey hence to India; and engaging to keep the men at the expense of this Company on board their vessel at Alexandria or at Suez in case there should be no corresponding vessel at the latter port to carry them forward to India when they shall have reached Egypt. Also, the earliest date upon which the Company would be prepared to commence such an operation, each man being permitted to take with him a suitable equipment, or allowance of baggage, packed as on recent occasions; likewise requesting the attention of this Company to their present charge per man for this mode of transport, and expressing the Court's opinion that it is too high when the number of men is considerable, and inquiring at what rate per man the Company will undertake the transport as above described, in the event of the Court determining to send further troops to India by the overland route.

In

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* One letter from Mr. Reep to Sir J. C. Melvill, dated 21 October 1857; and one letter from ditto to ditto, dated 22 October. Letter from Mr. Howell to Sir James C. Melvill, dated 26 October 1857.

Appendix, No. 3.

In reply, I am instructed to state, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that the Company can undertake the conveyance of 300 men by each of their fortnightly steamers to Madras or Calcutta, the arrangements for the service being as follows:

The Company would have to provide special steamers for carrying the troops from England to Alexandria, as it would not be possible to convey them during that part of the voyage in the ordinary mail steamers leaving Southampton on the 4th and 20th of the month, and to furnish the men with berths, or with adequate protection against the weather. The departures of these special steamers would be so arranged as to ensure their arrival at Alexandria sufficiently in advance of the packets from Southampton to enable the transit administration in Egypt to effect the transport of the men to Suez without interfering in any way with the mails and the passengers. The troops would not, however, be disembarked at Alexandria until the receipt of a telegraphic announcement of the arrival of the corresponding steamer at Suez, and would then be conveyed from ship to ship with all practicable dispatch. The facilities which have been afforded to the Company on a recent occasion by the authorities in Egypt, warrant them in anticipating the performance of the journey of the troops from Alexandria to Suez in 24 or 28 hours under ordinary circumstances.

From Suez to Madras the troops would be conveyed by the regular fortnightly mail steamers, and in that climate could be accommodated comfortably on deck, under awnings and partially between decks; as in the case of the two companies of infantry recently conveyed from Suez to Aden by the "Alma."

The steamers employed between Suez and Madras, being constructed with spar decks, affording complete shelter in all weather, the men could always be removed to between decks in the event of temporary bad weather.

In the event of the Honourable Court determining to send further troops to India by the overland route, in the manner herein described, and in considerable numbers (say not less than 200 men on each occasion), the Company are willing to undertake the transport of the men from England to Madras or to Calcutta at the rate of 40 *l.* per man, providing the men with proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts and attendance during the entire journey hence to India, and (provided they are favoured with instructions by the 28th or 29th instant) to commence the operations with the despatch of a special steamer from England not later than the 2d November, so that the first detachment might go forward to Madras by the mail steamer leaving Suez about 20th November.

As regards the rate now named, of 40 *l.* per man, the Directors wish me to observe that were it practicable to convey the troops throughout from Southampton to Madras in the regular fortnightly mail vessels, the Company could have undertaken the service at a somewhat lower rate; but as it would be necessary, especially during the winter season, to carry the men to Alexandria, in vessels provided specially for the purpose, the Directors consider the proposed charge of 40 *l.* per head to be fair and reasonable.

I am desired to add, that in addition to the conveyance of 300 men fortnightly from England to Madras or Calcutta, the Company could undertake the transport of a similar number of men fortnightly to Bombay, by special steamers to Alexandria, in correspondence with the regular mail steamers leaving Suez twice a month for Bombay; the rate per head being also 40 *l.*

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Sir,

East India House, 29 October 1857.

1. With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of sending troops by the vessels of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, I am desired to forward for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of my letter * to Mr. Reep, the Secretary to that Company, and of that gentleman's reply,† from which it will be seen that the Steam Company are willing to undertake the conveyance of troops from Southampton to Point de Galle, *viâ* Egypt, at 31 *l.* per man instead of 40 *l.*, as proposed in Mr. Reep's communication of the 21st instant.

* Letter to Mr. Reep, dated the 27th October 1857.
† Letter from ditto, same day.

2. It appearing by a letter from Major-general Sir Richard Airey, dated the 27th October, that Her Majesty's 68th and 69th regiments have been held in readiness to embark for Madras, the former from Portsmouth and the latter from Plymouth, the Court of Directors propose that a wing of one of these regiments should be transported as far as Point de Galle, on their way to Madras, by the Mail Company's Steam Vessel "Tamar," upon the terms above specified; and that instructions should be sent by the next mail to the Government of Madras to send a vessel down to Galle for the purpose of carrying the men to that Presidency, should the Commissioners for the Affairs of India approve of this arrangement.

68th Regiment, 41 officers, 920 men.
69th Regiment, 41 officers, 811 men.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Sir, East India House, 27 October 1857.

With reference to your letter, dated the 21st October 1857, stating that the Directors of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company will undertake to convey 400 soldiers by their steam vessel "Tamar" from Southampton to Alexandria, across Egypt, and onward from Suez by a corresponding ship as far as Point de Galle, at a charge of 40*l.* per man throughout the journey, I am desired to request that you will bring to the notice of the Directors of the Royal Mail Company, that the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company are prepared to convey troops throughout, from Southampton to Madras *viâ* Egypt, for 40*l.* per man, engaging special steamers for the purpose on this side of Egypt; and that they have apprised the Court of Directors that, were it practicable for them to convey the troops direct from Southampton to Madras in their regular vessels, they could have undertaken the service at a somewhat lower rate.

Under these circumstances it appears to the Court reasonable to expect that the Royal Mail Company, who propose to use their own regular vessels only, and to convey the troops no further than Point de Galle, should make a reduction in their present charge of 40*l.* a man, in the event of the Court sending troops by the "Tamar" to Galle, *en route* for Madras or Calcutta.

I am, &c.

(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

R. T. Reep, Esq.,
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
55, Moorgate-street.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London, E.C.,
27 October 1857.

Sir,

Your letter of this date having engaged the consideration of the Directors of this Company, I am instructed to state in reply, that they are willing to undertake the conveyance of troops from Southampton to Galle *viâ* Egypt at 31*l.* per man instead of 40*l.*, as proposed in my communication of the 21st instant, and that they will be happy to enter into an arrangement for conveying troops to Galle at the same rate by the steamer leaving Southampton on the 12th of each month.

I am also to observe, that it is the intention of the Directors eventually to extend their line from Galle to Calcutta, and that they will then be in a position to negotiate for taking troops the whole way.

I am to take this opportunity of stating that the Directors will be glad to learn, as early as possible, if it is the intention of the Honourable the East India Company to accept the offer made in my letter of the 21st instant, to convey troops by the "Australasian" to Calcutta.

I have, &c.

(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.,
East India House.

Gentlemen, India Board, 28 October 1857.

In reply to your letter of the 21st instant, conveying a requisition from the Court of Directors of the East India Company for the services of two more regiments of Her Majesty's infantry, and expressing an opinion that those regiments might advantageously be sent through Egypt, I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty's Government think that regiments may be despatched through Egypt at the present favourable season, as our recent experience in sending small bodies of troops by that route will justify the attempt being made with complete regiments.

I transmit to you some observations of the Secretary of State for the department of War upon the subject of how this experiment may be most safely effected.

I have, &c.

(signed) *R. Vernon Smith.*

The Chairman and Deputy Chairman
of the East India Company.

Sir, War Office, 26 October 1857.

I am directed by Lord Panmure to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from the President of the Board of Control, dated the 22d instant, with its enclosure, expressing the wish of the Court of Directors of the East India Company that two additional regiments of infantry may be placed at their disposal for service in the Madras Presidency, and I am to request that you will acquaint Mr. Vernon Smith in reply, that his Lordship has given directions for having the requisition of the Court complied with without delay.

I am

Appendix, No. 3.

I am to add that Lord Panmure concurs in the suggestion of the Court, that these regiments should be despatched through Egypt, as our experience in sending small parties of troops by that route justifies the attempt with a complete regiment.

The success, however, of this important experiment depends on the accuracy with which the arrangements are made, and it would be absolutely necessary to know that transport awaits them at Suez, and that every facility for their embarkation, immediately on their arrival at that port, exists. His Lordship will be glad to receive from the Commissioners for the Affairs of India all the information they can give him upon the subject.

In his opinion the troops should leave this country in roomy vessels, and if more than one is required to convey a regiment complete with all its necessary light baggage, together with its spare ammunition, then the transports should rendezvous at Alexandria, so that the regiment may disembark in a body, and be conveyed across Egypt to Suez continuously, till the whole reaches the transports at Suez.

The very heavy baggage, which is not likely to be required by a regiment in the field, might go by the Cape of Good Hope, but a detachment, however small, of the regiment should accompany it, so as to take charge of and prevent it going astray.

Lord Panmure will, on his part, undertake to have proper staff officers at Alexandria to make arrangements for the route of the regiment through Egypt, and its embarkation at Suez. He will also make the medical arrangements necessary to meet any temporary sickness which may break out, unless the East India Company prefer to undertake the precautionary measures themselves.

At the same time Lord Panmure thinks it will be desirable to make the experiment with one regiment in the first instance, though he feels so convinced of its success that he is of opinion that the East India Company may safely take up shipping for both, should the terms of the market be at present advantageous for immediate contracts.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. Storks.*

Sir, East India House, 29 October 1857.

1. We have had the honour to receive your letter, dated the 28th October, stating, in reply to our letter of the 21st, that Her Majesty's Government think that regiments may be dispatched through Egypt at the present favourable season, as the recent experience in sending small parties of troops by that route will justify the attempt being made with complete regiments; and enclosing some observations of the Secretary of State for the department of War upon the subject.

2. Consequent upon the requisition from the Court of Directors, conveyed by our letter of the 21st instant, for the services of two more regiments of infantry at Madras, the Court have been apprised, by letter from the Quartermaster-general, under date the 27th October, that Her Majesty's 68th and 69th Regiments are held in readiness for embarkation for India, the former at Portsmouth and the latter at Plymouth. These two regiments the Court have proposed to forward to Madras by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt.

3. The correspondence of the Court with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, and with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which has been already forwarded for the information of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, will have explained fully and clearly the mode of transport of the soldiers throughout their route from Southampton to India, including their accommodation, diet, medical attendance, medical comforts, and care in Egypt. It will also have shown the complete arrangements of the steam companies, as well as the facilities already afforded, and promised for the future, in the transit of the men from Alexandria to Suez by the authorities in Egypt; the cost of the entire passage to Madras by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels being 40 *l.* per man, and the cost by the vessels of the Royal Mail Company being 31 *l.* per man as far as Point de Galle, Ceylon, whither the Government of Madras will be directed to dispatch steamers to carry the men on to that Presidency.

4. As the Royal Mail Company will undertake to convey 400 men in their steamer each month, beginning with the "Tamar," on the 12th November, and as the Peninsular and Oriental Company can take 300 men by their fortnightly steamers, commencing with a steam vessel from Southampton to Alexandria about the 18th of November, arrangements should be at once made with these two companies, whereby the embarkation of the whole of the regiments now under orders for Madras may be effected by about the 18th December, that is to say, Her Majesty's 69th regiment, which consists of 41 officers and 811 men, may be embarked, in equal numbers, by the Royal Mail Company's monthly steam vessels of the 12th November and 12th December next; and Her Majesty's 68th regiment, consisting of 41 officers and 920 men, may be embarked on the three successive steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, in equal proportions, about the 18th November, the 2d December, and the 18th December next; all with their light or personal baggage properly packed for the convenience of carriage across Egypt.

5. The heavy baggage of both regiments must, of course, be sent to Madras, round the Cape of Good Hope, by sailing vessels, and it can be despatched hence as soon as it is packed

packed and ready for shipment. Passages also may be engaged in the same ship for the small detachments of each regiment which Lord Panmure has proposed to accompany the baggage, so as "to take charge of it, and to prevent it going astray."

6. If these arrangements meet the approval of the Board of Commissioners, the Court request us to intimate to you that they will immediately carry them into effect.

7. As the Secretary of State for War desires that a staff officer should be entrusted with the duty of making arrangements for the route of these regiments through Egypt, and their embarkation at Suez, the Court will raise no objection to that measure. But they are persuaded that the regimental officers, with the cordial assistance which they will receive from the officers and agents of the two steam packet companies concerned, and from the transit administration of His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, would find no difficulty in carrying out the plan of transport in a perfectly satisfactory manner.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Ross D. Mangles.*
Fredk Currie.

The Right Honourable
R. Vernon Smith, M.P.

East India House,
31 October 1857.

Sir,

I AM desired to forward to you herewith, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, with reference to previous correspondence on the subject of sending troops to India by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt, copy of a letter just received from Mr. Howell, the Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, under date the 29th October, with two enclosures,* reporting the arrival at Alexandria of the steamer "Sultan," having on board the two companies of Royal Engineers which left Southampton on the 2d October, and their embarkation at Suez on the 19th October, on board the "Nubia," destined for Calcutta; adding that the company intended for Bombay (*en route* for Kurrachee), was to be transhipped from the "Nubia" to the "Pekin," bound thither on the following day.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
29 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure to transmit to you, for submission to the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, the enclosed extracts of letters from the Agent of this Company at Alexandria, reporting the arrival there of the "Sultan," having on board the two companies of the Royal Engineers which left Southampton on the 2d instant, and their embarkation at Suez on the 19th instant on board the steam ship "Nubia."

I beg also to enclose copy of a complimentary letter addressed to the commander of the "Sultan" by the officer in charge of the troops.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

EXTRACT of a Letter received from Mr. *T. H. Holton*, Peninsular and Oriental Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 16 October 1857.

"The 'Sultan' arrived at 6.30 a.m. yesterday; the men and officers of the Royal Engineers are still on board, but the stores and baggage have gone forward to Suez. The departure of the troops will be arranged upon receipt of telegraphic intelligence of the arrival of the 'Nubia,'† now hourly expected at Suez. It will be so timed as to enable them to go direct on board. I shall again accompany them."

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* Letter from Mr. Howell to Sir J. C. Melvill, dated 29th October 1857. Enclosures: Extract letter from Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 16th and 20th October 1857, and testimonial from Engineer officers per "Sultan," dated 14th October 1857.

† Arrived at Suez 17th October.

Appendix, No. 3.

Also EXTRACT, dated from Alexandria, 20 October, Midnight.

"I HAVE just returned from Suez. The troops *ex* 'Sultan,' were embarked in 'Nubia' yesterday. The first detachment, 15 vans, in 19½ hours; the second, of 15 vans, in 24½ hours; the third detachment of eight vans, in 29½ hours.

"The 'Pekin' was to be ready to receive the men for Bombay to-day, when they would be transhipped *from* 'Nubia.'

"'Nubia' and 'Pekin' will be leaving for their respective destinations to-morrow evening.

"The troops expected by 'Dutchman' shall have every attention. A thousand men can easily be transported across the Isthmus in 30 hours; baggage and stores in 48 hours.

"I have had the 'Zenobia'* made ready for the reception of men coming out. If the transport of troops is likely to be continued, I would suggest a clerk in charge and purser's storekeeper to be sent to her, which would somewhat more perfect our arrangements at Suez."

Steam-ship "Sultan,"
14 October 1857.

WE, the undersigned officers of Royal Engineers, conveyed from Southampton to Alexandria by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam ship "Sultan," cannot part with Captain N. Cook and his officers without congratulating them on the extremely pleasant manner in which the duties of the ship have been carried on; and at the same time specially thanking them for their courteous consideration of our comfort.

We are indebted to Captain N. Cook and his officers for an extremely pleasant voyage; and, in saying adieu, most cordially wish them every happiness and success.

We beg to subscribe ourselves,

(signed) *H. D. Harness*, Lieut.-Col. R.E.
F. Linweeh, Capt. R.E.
Luttmann Nicholson, B.M., R.E.
T. C. Haverty, 2d Staff Surgeon.
T. G. Cumberland, Capt. R.E.
P. Beaumont, Lieut. R.E.
P. H. Scratchley, Lieut. R.E.
P. Macquay, Lieut. R.E.
C. R. Wynne, Lieut. R.E.
D. C. Walker, Lieut. R.E.
T. P. Paterson, Lieut. R.E.
W. Keith, Lieut. R.E.
C. H. Brown, Assistant Surgeon.

India Board,
6 November 1857.

Sir,

I AM desired by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to state that Her Majesty's Government are prepared, if suitable accommodation can be procured at a reasonable rate, to sanction the despatch by the route through Egypt of the various drafts, whether going to Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay, which will be ready, to the extent of one thousand men monthly, for the Queen's regiments stationed in India.

I am desired to request that the Court of Directors will furnish the Board, from time to time, with the provision made monthly on the conveyance of the drafts.

I have, &c.

Sir James Melvill, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

(signed) *George Clerk.*

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* A hulk belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company stationed at Suez.

East India House,
12 November 1857.

Sir,

1. HAVING laid before the Court of Directors Sir George Clerk's letter of the 6th instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government are prepared, if suitable accommodation can be obtained at a reasonable rate, to sanction the dispatch *viâ* Egypt, of recruits for Her Majesty's regiments to the extent of 1,000 per month.

2. I have received their commands to state in reply, that the rate of passage for troops overland by the Peninsular and Oriental Company is 40*l.* each, whilst the average rate of passage by sailing vessels round the Cape, taking the rates of the seven vessels last engaged, is 14*l.* 2*s.* 7*d.* each.

3. Considering the youth and inexperience of the recruits, and the great advantage which will arise by their being sent by the long sea voyage, and trained during the same, so far as circumstances will admit, the Court are sending all the recruits for the Company's European regiments and artillery round the Cape. The advantage from pursuing the same course with the drafts for the Queen's regiments is probably greater, as they include lads of 18, whilst the Company do not admit any under 20 years of age. The Court would further observe, that the urgent demand for the presence of these drafts with their regiments has somewhat lessened.

4. Should this explanation be satisfactory, the Court will provide tonnage for the recruits *viâ* the Cape.

I have, &c.

The Secretary to the
India Board.

(signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

Sir,

India Board, 14 November 1857.

I AM desired by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 12th instant, stating the opinion of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, that it would be better to send round the Cape of Good Hope than through Egypt, the soldiers who may be ordered from time to time to join the Queen's regiments serving in India.

The Board request to be informed whether the Court wish a copy of your letter to be transmitted to the Secretary of State for War, who, having been apprised of what was understood to be the Court's original request, namely, that as many soldiers as possible should be sent by the shorter route, conceived that he was acting in accordance with the Court's views, when he suggested that the drafts for regiments in India should proceed through Egypt.

I am, &c.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

(signed) *George Clerk.*

East India House,
19 November 1857.

Sir,

HAVING laid before the Court of Directors Sir George Clerk's letter of the 14th instant relative to the mode of sending recruits to India, I have received their commands to state that their reply of the 12th instant was intended for communication to the Secretary of State for War, and that they now await the communication of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this subject. The Court annex a list of the detachments, specifying the present stations of the regiments to which they belong.

I have, &c.

The Secretary, India Board.

(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

Appendix, No. 3.

LIST.

CORPS.	SERGEANTS.	DRUMMERS.	RANK AND FILE.	WHERE STATIONED.
8th Foot			14	Jullundur.
10th „			6	Dinapore.
20th „			11	On the passage out.
23d „	1		7	
24th „			7	
29th „			6	Pegu and Calcutta.
32d „			19	Lucknow.
37th „			36	On passage out.
75th „			23	Kussowlie.
82d „			18	On passage out.
84th „			8	
90th „			5	
6th Dragoon Guards			10	Meerut.
34th Foot	1		30	On passage out.
38th „			20	
60th Foot, 1st Battalion			8	Delhi and Meerut.
88th Foot			30	On passage out.
Rifle Brigade, 2d Battalion			81	
Rifle Brigade, 3d „			4	
42d Foot			46	
78th „			11	
19th „			33	—
79th „			23	—
7th „			51	On passage out.
27th „			16	Nowshera.
52d „			12	Sealkote.
61st „			11	Ferozepore.
70th „			8	Peshawur.
87th „			16	Ditto.
94th „			21	On passage out.
98th „			35	
13th „			70	
93d „			14	
18th „			53	
51st „			64	
83d „			2	
86th „			23	Bombay, Surat, and Poonah.
56th „			9	On passage out.
72d „			23	
89th „	4	4	71	
3d Dragoon Guards			6	
14th Light Dragoons			3	Deccan, Mhow, and Sattara.
43d Foot			6	Fort St. George.
12th Lancers			25	Madras and Bombay.
60th Foot, 3d Battalion			17	On passage out.
66th Foot			5	
74th „			6	Jackatalla and Cannanore.

Appendix, No. 3.

Sir, East India House, 19 November 1857.

I AM desired to forward herewith, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter, dated the 12th November 1857, from the secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, and of its enclosure, being a certificate from the officers of 10th and 21st companies of the Royal Engineers, who embarked at Chatham on the 14th October on board the steamship "Dutchman," and who were landed at Alexandria on the 31st of that month, expressing their satisfaction with the messing of themselves and of the men during the passage.

I have, &c.

The Secretary to the India Board. (signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London,
12 November 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a certificate from the officers of the 10th and 21st companies of the Royal Engineers, who embarked at Chatham on board this Company's chartered steamer "Dutchman" on the 14th October, and who were landed at Alexandria on the 31st idem, expressing their satisfaction with the messing of themselves and the men during the voyage.

I have, &c.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B., (signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.
Secretary, East India House.

Alexandria, 31 October 1857.

WE, the undersigned officers of the Royal Engineers, have much pleasure in bearing testimony to the liberal manner in which both the messing of ourselves and of the 10th and 21st companies Royal Engineers has been provided on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer "Dutchman."

We have also great pleasure in adding our testimony to the efficient and agreeable manner in which the above duty, as well as the superintendence of the stewards in general, has been performed by Mr. Hare.

(signed) *F. E. Cox*, Capt. & Adjt. R.E.
A. A. Fisher, Capt. R.E.
G. Nevill, Capt. R.E.
J. B. Edwards, Lieut. R.E.
W. R. Gossett, Lieut. R.E.
J. H. Halshan, Surgeon, R.A.
R. Thains, Lieut. R.E.
T. V. Newell, M.D. 83d Regt.
C. S. Webber, Lieut. R.E.
J. H. Maitland, Lieut. R.E.
C. R. Testing, Lieut. R.E.

Sir, East India House, 26 November 1857.

I AM desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to forward herewith for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter, with enclosures, from the secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, dated the 19th November, regarding the facilities which exist, and are likely to be continued and increased, for the conveyance through Egypt of troops sent to India by the overland route.

I have, &c.

The Secretary, &c. &c. &c. (signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.
India Board.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
19 November 1857.

Sir,

THE enclosed extracts of letters recently received from this Company's agent at Alexandria, regarding the facilities which exist and are likely to be continued and increased for the conveyance through Egypt of troops sent to India by the overland route, will, no doubt, be interesting to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, and I am accordingly instructed to forward them for submission to the Honourable Court.

I have, &c.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B., (signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.
&c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 3.

EXTRACTS of a Letter from the Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 27 October 1857.

"YOU may assure the authorities in England that no difficulty exists in the transit of any number of men and horses by this route, provided only a few days' notice be given: of infantry 200 may be transported by railway and vans from ship in Alexandria to ship at Suez in 24 hours; 270 in 29 hours; 360 in 33 hours; 1,000 men can be conveyed by rail and donkeys in 30 hours from ship to ship, and 10,000 men by rail and marching in 60 hours; baggage and stores would occupy about 48 hours in transit.

"Artillery could also be transported, but until the completion of the railway it would have to be limited to very light field-pieces.

"The Viceroy is very desirous to convey through his country as many soldiers as possible, and so great a disposition does he display to facilitate their movements, that he adds, 'I will consider them not as transit passengers but as my own, and will carry them by my own private engines, carriages and trucks.'"

Also from Letter dated Alexandria, 31 October 1857.

"COULD the authorities at the Horse Guards only see the facility existing by this route for the conveyance of troops, I am of opinion it would pretty generally be adopted."

Sir, India Board, 28 November 1857.

I AM directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to acknowledge your letter of the 26th instant, enclosing information received from the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company respecting the facilities existing and likely to be continued by them for the conveyance of troops through Egypt.

The Board observe from the telegram last received, that it is stated that a steamer belonging to this Company was to be at Suez on the 24th of this month; and they are anxious to know if, in the opinion of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, this is likely to prove correct, and whether it is likely that any other vessels may be at Suez for the same purpose.

I am, &c.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *Wm. Leach.*

Sir, India Board, 30 November 1857.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th instant, I am desired by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to acquaint you, for the information of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, that Her Majesty's Government agree that the drafts for the Queen's regiments stationed in India shall be sent to that country *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope.

I am, &c.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

(signed) *Henry D. Seymour.*

Sir, East India House, 30 November 1857.

I AM desired to state, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, with reference to Mr. Leach's letter of the 28th instant, that inquiry was made of the Peninsular and Oriental Company on the 26th November respecting their steam-vessel being expected at Suez; and that the reply received from Mr. Howell, the Secretary to the Steam Company (dated the 27th November), has been forwarded to the Board with my letter of this day's date, proposing to avail of the services of that steam-vessel for the conveyance from Suez to Kurrachee of Her Majesty's 94th Regiment, which has been disembarked at Plymouth from the steam-ship "Austria," put back for repair.

I have, &c.

(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Sir, East India House, 9 December 1857.

I AM desired to forward, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter received from Mr. Howell, the secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, under date the 5th instant, in reply to the inquiry made by order of the Court of Directors of the East India Company respecting the arrangements made by the Steam Company for supplying the troops during their passage by the overland route with fresh meat and other victuals, besides those which have been cured or salted.

I have, &c.

(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

The Secretary to the India Board.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
5 December 1857.

Sir,

In reply to your letter of the 3rd instant, requesting to be informed regarding the provision which has been made for supplying the troops during their passage in this Company's vessels with fresh meat and other materials than those which have been cured or salted, I am desired to state that each steamer is amply supplied with medical comforts for the voyage, including soup and bouilli and preserved potatoes, and that on leaving every port touched at, fresh meat and vegetables are furnished for as many days as they will keep good.

I have the honour to annex, for the information of the Court of Directors, extract from a letter received this day from the Company's agent at Aden, which will prove satisfactory to them as showing that the arrangements made by the Company have, as far as that port, been attended with success.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Extract of a Letter from the Agent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Aden, dated 14th November 1857.

"The 'Pottinger' arrived yesterday at 1.45 A.M., and left last evening at 5.30.

"The 'Hindostan' arrived this morning at 6.30, and will start about six this evening; both ships all well. All the troops were in excellent health, and were in want of nothing but what we were able to supply here."

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
8 September 1857.

Sir,

It having occurred to the Directors of this Company, that the forwarding to India of small detachments of troops *viâ* Egypt might be of importance in the present situation of affairs, they feel it proper to state to you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that they could make arrangements for the conveyance of from 100 to 150 men by the fortnightly mail steamers of this Company to Alexandria, and from Suez to Bombay or Calcutta.

The means of transit through Egypt are sufficient, they consider, to admit of the men being conveyed from Alexandria to Suez in the same time as the other passengers.

The terms on which the Directors would undertake the conveyance and victualling, including the expense of transit and victualling through Egypt, 50 *l.* per man, whether disembarked at Bombay or Calcutta.

Half of the men to be on deck alternately, but with sufficient shelter from the weather.

Should this suggestion be adopted, the Directors are prepared to despatch to Alexandria a special steamer with a supply of provisions and victualling stores for their depôt at Suez, and which steamer would at the same time take out 300 men, with the necessary complement of officers.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*,
Secretary.

Sir James Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

East India House,
9 September 1857.

Sir,

With reference to that part of your letter of the 8th inst., in which you state that the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company are prepared to despatch to Alexandria a special steamer with a supply of provisions and victualling stores for their depôt at Suez, which steamer would at the same time take 300 men with the necessary complement of officers, the Court of Directors of the East India Company have desired me to inquire what arrangement is made or in contemplation for the conveyance of any men who may be sent hence by that steamer, and across the Desert, and from Suez to Bombay or to Calcutta.

I am, &c.
(signed)

C. W. Howell, Esq., Leadenhall-street.

Appendix, No. 3.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
11 September 1857.

Sir,

In reply to the inquiry contained in your letter of yesterday, as to what arrangement is made, or in contemplation, for the conveyance of any men who may be sent hence by a special steamer across the Desert and from Suez to Bombay or Calcutta, I have the honour to acquaint you that the men so conveyed to Alexandria would be provided for in the regular fortnightly steamers of the Company from Suez to Bombay or to Calcutta, in allotments of about 150 men in each ship.

I beg also to explain, that a special ship is proposed on this side of the Isthmus, inasmuch as the troops and the necessary stores, &c., cannot be conveyed in the ordinary mail steamers between Southampton and Alexandria.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
East India House.

East India House,
19 September 1857.

Sir,

I am desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to state that it has been determined by Her Majesty's Government that two companies of infantry shall be sent to Aden, with their arms, accoutrements, and military clothing made up as baggage, by vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. These two companies will be ready at Malta to embark on the steam-vessel which is to leave Southampton on the 20th of this month; and the Court have directed me to request that the Peninsular and Oriental Company will cause every facility to be afforded for their reception and accommodation on board their vessels from Malta to Aden, and for their conveyance across Egypt from Alexandria to Suez.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

C. W Howell, Esq.,
Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, Leadenhall-street.

Sir,

East India House, 21 September 1857.

With reference to your letters of the 8th and 11th instant, stating the terms upon which the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company are willing to convey a number of soldiers to Calcutta or to Bombay, by the fortnightly mail steamers for those places, I am desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to state their readiness to avail themselves of that offer, to the extent of two companies of Royal Engineers for Calcutta, and two companies for Kurrachee, *viâ* Bombay, at the rate of 49*l.* for each man, such being the full amount they have ever paid for the conveyance of troops to India by steam vessels round the Cape of Good Hope.

Each company will consist of 120 men, with five (probably six) officers; and their arms, accoutrements, and military clothing are to be packed as "baggage."

It is proposed that the transport of these troops shall commence with the Peninsular Company's vessel which is intended to leave Southampton for Alexandria on the 4th October; that one company for Calcutta and one company for Bombay shall be received with their baggage on board that vessel at Southampton, and conveyed to Alexandria, thence across Egypt, and placed on board the corresponding vessel at Suez, for their ultimate destination in India; and that the same course shall be pursued with the other company, for each port in India, by the Peninsular Company's vessel which will leave Southampton on the 20th October next.

I am commanded to request that the Peninsular and Oriental Company will cause the necessary arrangements to be made for the reception on board ship, transport, and accommodation of these four companies of Engineers, with their officers and baggage; and that you will apprise me, as early as practicable, with information as to the time and manner of the men being embarked.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,* Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq.,
Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
23 September 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 19th instant, stating that it has been determined by Her Majesty's Government that two companies of infantry shall be sent from Malta to Aden, with their arms, accoutrements, and military clothing made up as baggage, by this Company's steamer of the 20th inst., and requesting that the Directors will make arrangements accordingly; and, in reply, I am instructed to state, that the Company's agents at Malta and in Egypt, and the commanders of the steamers, have been instructed to use their utmost endeavours to facilitate the operations, and that every measure that the shortness of the notice would permit was adopted to provide for the accommodation of the men on board the "Ripon," the steamer which left Southampton for Alexandria on the 20th instant.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K. C. B.
&c. &c. &c.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
23 September 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, by order of the Board of Directors, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 21st instant, stating that the Court of Directors of the East India Company were ready to avail themselves of this Company's offer to convey a number of soldiers to Calcutta or Bombay, by their fortnightly steamers, to the extent of two companies of Royal Engineers for Calcutta, and two companies for Bombay; the transport of these troops to commence with one company for Calcutta and one company for Bombay, by the steamer to leave Southampton on the 4th proximo, leaving a similar number for each place, to proceed by the steamer of the 20th proximo.

In reply, I am instructed to state, that with a view to facilitate the operation, and ensure the comfortable transport of the officers and men between Southampton and Alexandria, it is the intention of the Directors to dispatch a special steamer from Southampton to that place on the 2d proximo, being days in advance of the mail packet, and that they will endeavour to do the same, for the conveyance of the two companies to follow on the 20th proximo.

Every possible arrangement is also being made for the reception, transport, and accommodation of these men throughout the whole distance; and as, on arrival at Suez, the company for Bombay will embark in one steamer and that for Calcutta in another, the Directors have every confidence that, assisted, as they will no doubt be, by the goodwill of the officers and men, the whole operation will be carried out to the satisfaction of the Honourable Company, and of the other authorities.

Under this arrangement the first two companies would embark at Southampton early on the morning of the 2d proximo, and this Company's superintendent at that place will be instructed to make provision for the reception of the baggage, &c., at such previous time as may be convenient.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill,
&c. &c. &c.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
24 September 1857.

Sir,

REFERRING to my letter of yesterday's date on the subject of conveying troops by overland route to India, I have now the honour, by order of the Board of Directors, to enclose for the information of your Honourable Court, a memorandum showing the details of the arrangement by which it is proposed to pass the men through Egypt. With the co-operation of Her Majesty's Consul in Egypt, and the Admiralty agents of the respective mail steamers which are to receive the troops at Suez, the Directors are confident that transport will be effected without difficulty.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Appendix, No. 3.

MEMORANDUM on the Dispatch of Troops through *Egypt* for conveyance to *India* by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's Steamers from *Suez*.

No difficulty would be experienced in passing troops (numbering, say 250 at a time) through Egypt, provided they were landed at Alexandria one or two days in advance of the Company's passengers intended for the same steamer at Suez.

By this arrangement they could with perfect ease proceed direct from the railway station at Alexandria to the centre station in the Desert, and no necessity would arise for them to leave their carriages, unless they were permitted to do so at the station called Kafr-el-eish, which is upon the banks of the Nile on the Cairo side. Here there are spacious refreshment-rooms, where they could be provisioned without fear of their getting into any disturbance with the people of the country.

At Cairo it is possible that they might have to change carriages, but this could be done without letting them stray beyond the Company's premises; their next point of stoppage would be the centre station in the Desert, or probably one nearer Suez, to which it was expected the rail would have been extended by this date; the remainder of the journey would not, therefore, exceed 40 miles, and might be less; this could be accomplished for 250 men in about eight hours, as all the vans would be at their disposal. At Suez they could either be accommodated, until ready for embarkation, in the large hotel there, or on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's hulk "Zenobia."

No difficulty would occur in victualling them *en route*, as provisions could be forwarded with them to make up any deficiencies which might arise from so sudden a demand upon the contractors along the line.

Should it be necessary, from any circumstance, to detain the men at Alexandria, they could either be accommodated on board the steamer which takes them out, or in the Company's hulk lying in the harbour.

The Directors are desirous of affording every facility in carrying out this operation, and there is every probability of their being able to dispatch a special steamer on the 18th October.

Sir,

East India House, 1 October 1857.

REFERRING to your letter of the 24th September, forwarding a memorandum of the arrangements which the Directors of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company have made for the landing at Alexandria and despatch through Egypt of the Royal Engineers about to be sent from Southampton to Calcutta and to Bombay by their steam vessels, I am desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to express their expectation, that as it is most essential to prevent straggling and to provide that the men should cross Egypt to Suez in a body, the Directors of the Steam Company will strongly impress upon the masters of the steamers and upon their agents in Egypt, the importance of strictly observing their arrangements, which appear to the Court to be judicious, and, if strictly observed, sufficient to secure the object in view.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill*,
Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq.,
122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
1 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that, considering the present crisis in India would be likely to induce the Home Goverment to send out as many troops as practicable by the overland route, the Directors of this Company instructed their agents at Calcutta and Bombay by the mail of 10th September to dispatch the steam-ships "Oriental" and "Precursor" to Suez, so as to be available for that purpose if required, and, at the same time, to assist in the conveyance of the wounded and distressed to this country. I am further to add, that each of these vessels is capable of carrying 1,000 men, with the stores necessary for the voyage; and that the agents of the Company at Calcutta and Bombay having anticipated the probability of the services of the vessels being required in this way, have accordingly prepared them for sea; the "Precursor" may be expected to reach Suez about the first week in November, and the "Oriental" towards the latter end of the same month.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Jas. Allan*,
For the Managing Directors.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
East India House.

Appendix, No. 3.

East India House, 6 October 1857.

Sir,

WITH reference to the proposal of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company to convey troops to India by the overland route, I am desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to request that you will have the goodness to inform me what are the means at the disposal of the Steam Company for provisioning soldiers on the voyage from Suez to India, particularly with respect to the arrangements they have adopted to ensure a sufficient supply of salt provisions for this service?

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq, 122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
7 October 1857.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of yesterday, requesting to be informed what means this Company have at their disposal for provisioning soldiers on the voyage from Suez to India, I am desired by the Managing Directors to state that the Company's depôts at Alexandria and Suez are fully stocked with salt provisions, medical comforts, and all other troop stores, for the immediate supply of at least 1,000 men.

In addition to these stores the Company's steamers "Precursor" and "Oriental," which have been ordered up to Suez from Bombay and Calcutta, if available for that service, will bring with them supplies for 1,000 men each, the former for 15 days and the latter for 30 days; and the Company's agents at the several ports *en route* have been instructed to make all the necessary preparations for supplying the same number of men with fresh provisions and water.

I am desired to add, that the Company's general arrangements with regard to supplies of all kinds, at their Eastern station, warrant them in undertaking to provision any further number of men it may be thought expedient to forward by their lines to India *viâ* Egypt.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. D. Olding,*
For the Managing Directors.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
East India House.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
9 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that the arrangements for the conveyance to Alexandria of the second detachment of the Royal Engineers, in correspondence with the Company's mail steamers to Bombay and Calcutta, will be as follows, viz.:

The troops to embark on board a steamer engaged by the Company for the purpose, on the 14th instant, at Chatham, together with their baggage, so as to enable the vessel to take her departure for Alexandria the same day.

The arms and accoutrements it is proposed to take on board on the day previous. The carbines should be packed in cases containing six each.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. D. Olding,*
For the Managing Directors.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
London, 10 October 1857.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letters under date 1st and 7th instant, respecting the instructions which the Company had forwarded to their agents at Bombay and Calcutta by the mail of 10th September, for the dispatch of the steam ships "Precursor" and "Oriental" to Suez, so as to be available for the conveyance of troops to India,—

I have the honour to acquaint you in reply to your inquiry, that unless the local government should have withdrawn those vessels for special employment prior to the arrival of those instructions in India, the Directors have every reason to believe that the "Precursor" will be at Suez about the first week in November, and the "Oriental" towards the latter end of the same month.

In any case, the mail due in London about the 14th November will bring advices from the Company's agent at Bombay regarding the "Precursor," and the Company will have information respecting the "Oriental" by the mail arriving about 29th November.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Jas. Allan,*
For the Managing Directors.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
East India House.

Appendix, No. 3.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
16 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour by order of the Directors of this Company to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, the accompanying extracts of letters received this morning from the Company's agent at Alexandria, respecting the facilities for transporting the troops already dispatched for India by the overland route, and stating that His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt had promised to give every assistance in the transit from Alexandria to Suez, of any further number of troops it may be considered expedient to send by this route.

I beg also to enclose extract of a letter from the Company's agents at the Mauritius, reporting the transfer of a cargo of coals belonging to this company to the representatives of the Honourable East India Company, and of which measure the Directors will signify their approval by the next outgoing mail.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

P.S.—The biscuit indented for by Mr. Holton to be forwarded from Malta, is independent of the supplies sent out by the Company.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Messrs. *Hunter, Ireland & Co.*, dated Mauritius, 11 September 1857.

"A BARQUE called the 'Sarah Scott,' Captain Bell, with coals for Aden on account of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, arrived here on 16th ultimo, assisting into this port a leaky ship, the 'Silistria.' While she was here, the steam frigate "Assaye," belonging to the Indian Navy, and several others, came here for coals with troops on board for India; as sufficient coals could not be obtained here, Lieutenant Robinson of the Indian Navy, being duly authorised by his government, intimated to Captain Bell, of the 'Sarah Scott,' his desire to take his coals from him here for the use of the service. Captain Bell said, in a case of so much importance he would consent to do so, on a guarantee from Lieutenant Robinson on the part of the East India Company, backed by a guarantee from the Mauritius government, that his owners would be held harmless and irresponsible for not delivering the coals at Aden, as per charterparty. Those guarantees being promised, Captain Bell delivered over his cargo of coals to Lieutenant Robinson of the Indian Navy. Captain Skoltowe tells us it would be all right; we have written to inform Mr. Thomas at Aden."

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. *T. H. Holton*, Peninsular and Oriental Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 5 October 1857.

"I NOTE that 'Sultan' will be despatched in anticipation of the mail of 4th proximo, with 250 men and 20 officers for passage to India by the overland route. There is no difficulty in the transit of these men, and all their baggage, nor in that of any quantity of stores you may be pleased to send, so long as the latter are placed on the Indian manifest for Suez.

"I have written Mr. Davidson to forward me the supply of 15,000 lb. of biscuit; he will easily procure it from the commissariat at Malta; of flour we have a fair quantity in store, and I am despatching Mr. West an additional supply. For the mere transit no contract with Shepheard* is necessary; the transit supply the men with meals *en route*, one meal at Kafr Azzyat, and one at the end of the railway: the first Shepheard cannot furnish, as a Mr. César has the contract with the transit; the latter Shepheard supplies by virtue of his contract with the administration.

"The entire transit of the men will be a matter of 20 *or* 24 hours, and there will be plenty of water *en route*.

"Mr. West has his arrangements already made for supplying his requirements in the way of sheep, &c., and I think is in a better position to provide than Shepheard.

"When at Suez, the men will be better placed on board the 'Zenobia' than at the hotel.

"The troops brought by 'Ripon' leave for Suez at 5 A.M. to-morrow; they will, I expect, pass Cairo about noon, and be at the end of the railway about 4 P.M., and in Suez very early before daylight of 7th.

"I shall accompany the men to Suez to initiate Col. Pocklington, who is in charge of them, and who remains to superintend the transit of any future parties of troops that may be sent this way. The whole of them will go in 'Alma,' as Colonel Pocklington does not wish them divided."

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* Mr. Shepheard, hotel keeper and contractor, of Cairo.

Also, EXTRACT of a Letter, dated 29 September, from the Same.

"THE answer of the Viceroy respecting the passage of the troops ex 'Ripon' through Egypt was received last evening. His Highness states that it will be a satisfaction to him to give facility to the passage of not only 200 men, as in the present instance, but to that of 20,000 if necessary, and not *en bourgeois*, but in uniform and with their arms, if required.

"No physical difficulty exists in the passage of troops through this country; 10,000 men might easily be transported to Suez in 60 hours."

EXTRACT of a Letter from a Passenger on board '*Ripon*.'

"WE have 200 troops on board, and they conduct themselves so well, that positively one would not know they were here."

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
21 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure to forward to you for submission to the Honourable Court of Directors the enclosed extract of a letter, received this day from the Company's agent at Alexandria, reporting the safe transit through Egypt, and embarkation at Suez *en route* for Aden, of the 200 men who had been conveyed from Malta by the steam ship 'Ripon.'

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*,
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

EXTRACT of a Letter from the Superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 12 October 1857 (Monday).

"I RETURNED from Suez on Saturday evening. The 200 men of the 57th Regiment were embarked in 'Alma' on the morning of the 7th, apparently well contented with their journey.

"From Alexandria to the end of the railway (opposite No. 12 Station-house) they were conveyed in one train, but from the end of the railway to Suez it was necessary to despatch them in two parties, each of 20 vans, and at an interval of three hours.

"The men were disembarked from the 'Ripon' at 5 a.m. of the 6th, and landed in lighter towed by steamer; the train got clear of the station at 7.30 a.m. They were fed at Kafr Sayat, and again at the end of the railway, where also a ration of grog was served them.

"The first party of 100 embarked on board the 'Alma' at 7.30 a.m. of 7th, having made the journey from ship to ship in 26½ hours; the second party were on board at 10.30 a.m., having occupied 29½ hours.

"The baggage, arms, and ammunition had been sent forward and shipped in advance of the men.

"No delay occurred to the mails, as the men were on board seven hours before the ship was ready for sea. The 'Bombay' steamed away at 4 p.m. of 7th, and 'Alma' at 6 p.m.; all the men left in 'Alma,' and she could have taken other 100 or 200 without much inconvenience to the passengers.

"The 'Tamar' leaves at 11 a.m.; and as Colonel Pocklington, who is at Cairo collecting information, is not aware of the departure of this vessel, will you please make known to the authorities the embarkation of the men in 'Alma?'"

Sir,

East India House, 23 October 1857.

I AM desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to request that you will inform me what number of troops the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company can undertake to convey from Southampton to Alexandria across the Isthmus, and forward to Bombay by their regular forthnightly steam vessels, suitably berthing the men, conveying them across Egypt, so as to prevent straggling; providing them with proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts, and attendance during the entire journey hence to India; and engaging to keep the men (at the expense of the Steam Company) on board their vessels at Alexandria or at Suez, in case there should be no corresponding vessel at the latter port to convey them forward to India when they shall have reached Egypt; and that you will further inform me what would be the earliest date when the Steam Company would be prepared to commence such an operation, each man being permitted to take with him a suitable equipment or allowance of baggage, and packed as on recent occasions.

Appendix, No. 3.

The Court have directed me likewise to request the attention of the Directors of the Peninsular Company to their present charge per man for this mode of transport, which is, in the Court's opinion, too high when the number of men to be conveyed is considerable; and to inquire at what rate per man the Company will undertake the transport above-mentioned, in the event of the Court determining to send further troops to India by the overland route.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill*,
Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
26 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, by order of the Directors of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 23d instant, requesting to be informed what number of troops the Company can undertake to convey from Southampton to Alexandria, across the Isthmus of Suez, and forward to Madras, by their regular fortnightly steam-vessels, suitably berthing the men, conveying them across Egypt so as to prevent straggling; providing them with proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts, and attendance during the entire journey hence to India; and engaging to keep the men at the expense of this Company on board their vessel at Alexandria or at Suez in case there should be no corresponding vessel at the latter port to carry them forward to India when they shall have reached Egypt. Also the earliest date upon which the Company would be prepared to commence such an operation, each man being permitted to take with him a suitable equipment or allowance of baggage, packed as on recent occasions. Likewise requesting the attention of this Company to their present charge per man for this mode of transport, and expressing the Court's opinion that it is too high when the number of men is considerable; and inquiring at what rate per man the Company will undertake the transport as above described, in the event of the Court determining to send further troops to India by the overland route.

In reply, I am instructed to state, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, that the Company can undertake the conveyance of 300 men by each of their fortnightly steamers to Madras or Calcutta, the arrangements for the service being as follows:

The Company would have to provide special steamers for carrying the troops from England to Alexandria, as it would not be possible to convey them during that part of the voyage in the ordinary mail-steamers leaving Southampton on the 4th and 20th of the month, and to furnish the men with berths, or with adequate protection against the weather. The departures of these special steamers would be so arranged as to ensure their arrival at Alexandria sufficiently in advance of the packets from Southampton to enable the transit administration in Egypt to effect the transport of the men to Suez without interfering in any way with the mails and the passengers. The troops would not, however, be disembarked at Alexandria until the receipt of a telegraphic announcement of the arrival of the corresponding steamer at Suez, and would then be conveyed from ship to ship with all practicable despatch. The facilities which have been afforded to the Company on a recent occasion by the authorities in Egypt, warrant them in anticipating the performance of the journey of the troops from Alexandria to Suez in 24 to 28 hours, under ordinary circumstances.

From Suez to Madras the troops would be conveyed by the regular fortnightly mail steamers, and in that climate could be accommodated comfortably on deck under awnings and partially between decks, as in the case of the two companies of infantry recently conveyed from Suez to Aden by the "Alma."

The steamers employed between Suez and Madras being constructed with spar decks, affording complete shelter in all weather, the men could always be removed to between decks in the event of temporary bad weather.

In the event of the Honourable Court determining to send further troops to India by the overland route in the manner herein described, and in considerable numbers (say not less than 200 on each occasion), the Company are willing to undertake the transport of the men from England to Madras or to Calcutta at the rate of 40 *l.* per man, providing the men with proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts, and attendance during the entire journey hence to India; and (provided they are favoured with instructions by the 28th or 29th instant) to commence the operation with the despatch of a special vessel from England not later than the 2d November, so that the first detachment might go forward to Madras by the mail steamer leaving Suez about 20th November.

As regards the rate now named of 40 *l.* per man, the Directors wish me to observe that were it practicable to convey the troops throughout from Southampton to Madras in the regular fortnightly mail vessels, the Company could have undertaken the service at a somewhat lower rate; but as it would be necessary, especially during the winter season, to convey the men to Alexandria in vessels provided specially for the purpose, the Directors consider the proposed charge of 40 *l.* per head to be fair and reasonable.

I am desired to add, that in addition to the conveyance of 300 men fortnightly from England to Madras or Calcutta, the Company could undertake the transport of a similar number

number of troops fortnightly to Bombay by special steamers to Alexandria in correspondence with the regular mail steamers leaving Suez twice a month for Bombay; the rate per man being also 40 *l.*

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London,
29 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure to transmit to you, for submission to the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, the enclosed extracts of letters from the agent of this Company at Alexandria, reporting the arrival there of the "Sultan," having on board the two companies of the Royal Engineers which left Southampton on 2d instant, and their embarkation at Suez on the 19th instant, on board the steam-ship "Nubia."

I beg also to enclose copy of a complimentary letter addressed to the commander of the "Sultan" by the officer in command of the troops.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. *T. H. Holton*, Peninsular and Oriental Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 16 October 1857.

"THE 'Sultan' arrived at 6.30 A.M. yesterday. The men and officers of the Royal Engineers are still on board, but the stores and baggage have gone forward to Suez. The departure of the troops will be arranged upon the receipt of telegraph intelligence of the arrival of the 'Nubia,'* now hourly expected at Suez. It will be so timed as to enable them to go direct on board. I shall again accompany them."

* Arrived at Suez 17th October.

Also, Extract from Alexandria, dated 20 October, Midnight.

"I HAVE just returned from Suez. The troops ex 'Sultan' were embarked in 'Nubia' yesterday. The first detachment, 15 vans in 19½ hours, the second of 15 vans in 24½ hours, the third detachment of eight vans in 29½ hours.

"The 'Pekin' was to be ready to receive the men for Bombay to-day, when they would be transhipped from 'Nubia.'

"'Nubia' and 'Pekin' will be leaving for their respective destinations to-morrow evening.

"The troops expected by 'Dutchman' shall have every attention. A thousand men can easily be transported across the Isthmus in 30 hours; baggage and stores in 48 hours.

"I have had the 'Zenobia'† made ready for the reception of men coming out, if the transport of troops is likely to be continued.

"I would suggest a clerk in charge and purser's storekeeper to be sent to her, which will somewhat more perfect our arrangements at Suez."

Steam-ship "Sultan," 14 October 1857.

WE, the undersigned officers of Royal Engineers, conveyed from Southampton to Alexandria by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-ship "Sultan," cannot part with Captain N. Cook and his officers without congratulating them on the extremely pleasant manner in which the duties of the ship have been carried on, and at the same time specially thanking them for their courteous consideration of our comfort.

We are indebted to Captain N. Cook and his officers for an extremely pleasant voyage; and in saying adieu, most cordially wish them every happiness and success.

We beg to subscribe ourselves,

(signed) *H. D. Harness*, Lieut.-Col. R.E.
T. Linweeh, Capt. R.E.
Lottmann Nicholson, B.N., R.E.
T. C. Haverty, 2d Staff Surgeon.
T. G. Cumberland, Capt. R.E.
P. Beaumont, Lieut. R.E.
P. H. Scratchley, Lieut. R.E.
P. Macquay, Lieut. R.E.
C. R. Wynne, Lieut. R.E.
D. C. Walker, Lieut. R.E.
J. P. Paterson, Lieut. R.E.
W. Keith, Lieut. R.E.
C. H. Brown, Assist. Surgeon.

† A hulk belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, stationed at Suez.

Appendix, No. 3.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London,
30 October 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, by order of the Directors of this Company, to transmit to you, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, the accompanying extract of a letter received from the Company's agent at Calcutta, together with copies of correspondence with the Bengal Government relative to assistance in the supply of coals at Calcutta and Point de Galle to the steam-ships of the Honourable Company, Her Majesty's Government, and of the steam transports conveying troops.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.

The Secretary of the
Honourable East India Company.

COAL DEPARTMENT.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Calcutta, 24 September 1857.

Gentlemen,

ON this point I have much to communicate.

In former letters I have advised my having supplied three of the East India Company's vessels with 314, and Her Majesty's ship "Himalaya," with 900 tons of English coal.

As there are several of Her Majesty's steamers now in port which require good coal, Government have made a further demand on me to supply it, as they are entirely out; this being of urgent importance I shall accede to, especially as they having ordered large supplies to be sent out, and feel confident in being able to replace them before my stock can be exhausted.

I will take care, however, to run no risk of such a mishap, as the north-east monsoon will shortly commence; I shall get 1,000 tons of country coal and issue a certain proportion, say 20 per cent. to each ship, and thus husband my English fuel.

I shall be glad to know in what way you would wish to deal with Government with respect to the coals they obtained from me, whether they should be paid for or returned in kind; by the latter method we run the risk of receiving inferior coal, and by the former may charge a less price than it will cost to replace them.

It will be desirable to let me know by every mail what the probable cost of coals landed here will amount to; Government are paying now to other parties 55*s.* per ton.

The Government have also applied to me to supply coal to the steamers expected from England with troops, and which will touch at Point de Galle for the purpose of coaling. I enclose for your information copies of correspondence on the subject, duplicates of which have been forwarded to Captain Twynam. Government have appointed a transport agent to assist in expediting the various vessels as they arrive in coaling and watering, and who goes down by the "Nubia."

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*,
Superintendent.

The Managing Directors
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
London.

(No. 5430.)

To Captain *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company.

Sir,

BY direction of the Superintendent of Marine I have the honour to inform you that we have been called on by Government to state what quantity of coal is available at Point de Galle for steamers expected from England with troops, and I am to request the favour of your intimating what quantity you are likely to be able to spare. Since the transfer of the coal depôt at Point de Galle to your Company, the Government have completely depended on it for the supply of its steamers at that port, and at present it is of the utmost importance that as large a supply as possible should be forthcoming.

2. Should you now or hereafter have one or more cargoes of coal at Calcutta that you could spare, Government would be very glad to purchase them for the purpose of sending on to Ceylon, to replace what you might there furnish to vessels in the service of Government.

3. The Superintendent on the part of Government would agree to pay the amount that it might cost your Company to replace the coal at Calcutta, or the actual cost of the coal sent from hence, whichever was preferred.

4. The

4. The Superintendent of Marine feels that he has only to intimate to you that it is of the very greatest importance that as much coal as possible should be available at Point de Galle for steamers arriving there, to induce you to give to Government all the assistance in your power; and he has suggested to this Government that that of Bombay should at once be called on to despatch 5,000 tons to Galle, or as much as can possibly be spared.

I have, &c.
(signed) *F. E. Rogers*,
for Secretary.

Fort William, Marine Superintendent's Office,
16 September 1857.

(No. 467.)

Sir, Calcutta, 19 September 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 5430, dated the 16th inst., requesting to know what quantity of coals this Company are likely to have at Point de Galle available for the steamers expected from England with troops.

In reply I beg to inform you, that on the 1st July (which is the latest account I have received from our agent) there were 6,909 tons at that port; but the consumption is very large, there being eight mail steamers to supply monthly, so that unless some very extensive shipments have arrived since, I question whether there will be much to spare.

With respect to cargoes arriving here, I shall be able to transfer some to Government; but the difficulty will be with the ships, which most probably will have a return cargo engaged for them by the agents, and therefore would insist on being discharged here.

Under these circumstances it may be of service to Government to know that there is (if I be rightly informed) a large stock at Point de Galle belonging to the European and Australian Mail Company, who may be induced, in the present public emergency, to render what assistance lays in their power.

There is also a large depôt at Trincomalee, where some of the transport steamers might, with advantage, be directed to coal, the harbour being easy of access, and there being every facility for coaling.

In conclusion I beg to assure you, that I shall have much pleasure in rendering every assistance in my power to Government, and in doing so have only to guard against running any risk of endangering the efficient performance of the mail service, which, of course, is of paramount importance.

On the arrival of the next mail I trust to be able to give you fuller information on the above points.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

H. Howe, Esq.,
Secretary to the Superintendent of Marine.

(No. 5475.)

Fort William, Marine Superintendent's Office,
17 September 1857.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter, No. 5430, of the 16th inst., I have the honour to inform you, that since it was written the superintendent has received from Government intimation that the following vessels have left England with coals, to be landed at Galle for the use of this department:

	Tons.	Left England.
"Seaforth" - - -	771	- - - 29 May.
"Abbey Longdon" -	1,400	- - - 16 June.
"Argo" - - -	503	- - - 13 „
"Morlaine" - - -	536	- - - 13 „
"Naibal" - - -	423	- - - 13 „
"St. Yves" - - -	452	- - - 3 July.
	4,085 tons.	

2. The "Suebad," for Calcutta, with 824 tons of coal, sailed from England 28th July.

3. Under the above circumstances, the superintendent trusts that you will be enabled to forward instructions to your agents at Galle by the next steamer, to supply vessels in the Government service to the full extent of the expected supply.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Howe*, Secretary.

Capt. H. P. Lovell,
Superintendent Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Company.

Appendix, No. 3.

(No. 5502.)

Fort William, Marine Superintendent's Office,
19 September 1857.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter, No. 5475, of the 17th inst., I have the honour, by desire of the Superintendent of Marine, to forward to you herewith bills of lading for coals laden on board the vessels therein referred to, and to request the favour of your issuing instructions to your agent at Galle, to take charge of the coals as soon as each vessel arrives at his port.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Howe*, Secretary.

Captain H. P. Lovell,
Superintendent Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Company.

(No. 469.)

Calcutta, 21 September 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letters, No. 5475, of the 17th, and 5502, of the 19th inst., the former advising me that Government have received intimation that coals, to the extent of 4,085 tons, have been shipped from England to Galle, for the use of the Marine department, and requesting me to forward instructions to the Company's agent at that port, to supply vessels in the Government service to the full extent of the expected shipments; the latter forwarding me the bill of lading for the above coals, with a request that the Company's agent be instructed to take charge of the same.

In reply I beg to say, that I shall have much pleasure in forwarding the bill of lading by the next steamer, and in complying with your latter request; but must decline giving positive instructions to the effect required in the former.

I shall, however, forward copies of this correspondence to Captain Twynam, and desire him to do all in his power to forward the wishes of Government, leaving entirely to his own discretion the extent to which to supply vessels in the Government service, as he is better acquainted than I with the requirements of his own department.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

H. Howe, Esq.,
Secretary to the Superintendent of Marine.

(No. 1917.)

From *Cecil Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, to Captain *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, Marine Department.

Sir,

I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to request that you will be so good as to instruct the agent of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company at Galle to supply with English coal to the full extent of their wants, so far as that is compatible with the efficient conduct of the mail service, the steamers that may touch there for the purpose of bringing up troops to Calcutta and Madras, whether they belong to the Royal Navy, or are hired by, or belong to, the East India Company.

2. It is needless to explain to you the urgency of the occasion, which requires that every possible means should be adopted to convey the troops as rapidly as possible to their destination; and his Lordship in Council relies upon you to impress upon the agent at Galle the importance of meeting the requisitions that may be made upon him by officers commanding the steamers of the Royal or Indian navy engaged in this service, promptly and to the utmost extent of his power.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cecil Beadon*,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Council Chamber,
21 September 1857.

(No. 470.)

To *Cecil Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.

Calcutta, 22 September 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 1917 of the 21st instant, intimating to me that his Lordship the Governor-General is desirous that I should send instructions to the Company's agent at Galle to supply with English coal, to the full extent of their wants, so far as that is compatible with the efficient conduct of the mail service, the steamers that may touch there for the purpose of bringing up troops to Calcutta and Madras.

In

In reply I beg to annex copy of my letter to Captain Twynam, which will go forward by the steamer of the 25th instant, and to express my conviction that he will exert himself to the utmost to further the wishes of Government. Appendix, No. 3.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

Sir, Calcutta, 22 September 1857.

HEREWITH I enclose copies of correspondence with Government on the subject of supplying with English coal the steamers that may touch at your port, bringing up troops to Calcutta and Madras, whether they belong to the Royal navy, or are hired by or belong to the East India Company.

The Government wished me to issue instructions to you in accordance, but you will observe I have declined doing so, preferring to leave the matter to your own discretion, and feeling satisfied that their wishes would meet with every attention from you.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

Captain T. H. Twynam, Agent,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Point de Galle.

(True copies.)
(signed) H. P. Lovell, Superintendent.

Sir, East India House, 6 November 1857.

I HAVE laid before the Court of Directors of the East India Company your letter, dated the 26th October 1857, stating the terms upon which the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company will undertake to convey troops from Southampton to India, by special steamer from Southampton to Alexandria, so as to ensure their arrival there sufficiently in advance of the packet to enable the transit administration in Egypt to effect the transport of the men to Suez without interfering in any way with the mails and passengers, and on from Suez to Madras, by the Peninsular Company's regular fortnightly mail steamers, at the rate of 40*l.* per man, to include proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts and attendance, during the entire journey hence to India, to an extent of not less than 200 men upon each occasion.

In reply, the Court have commanded me to state, that they have about 26 officers and 500 men of Her Majesty's 69th regiment to forward to Madras by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt, and that they have resolved to accept the offer conveyed in your letter of the 26th October to that extent; one half of the number to be despatched hence by the special steamer of the middle of this month, and the other half by the special steamer of the beginning of December.

I am, therefore, to request that you will inform me as early as practicable of the exact time when the troops, with their baggage, &c. ready packed, must be at Southampton for embarkation by each of the Peninsular Company's special steamers.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq.,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,

Sir, 6 November 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, stating that the Honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company, have about 26 officers and 500 men of Her Majesty's 69th regiment, to forward to Madras by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt, and that they have resolved to accept the offer contained in my letter of the 26th ultimo, regarding the terms of their conveyance; one half of the number to be despatched hence by the special steamer of the middle of this month, and the other half by the special steamer of the beginning of December.

In reply, I am desired to acquaint you that the Company will accordingly be prepared to despatch the "Sultan" from Southampton on the 16th instant with the first half, and the "Euxine" on the 1st December with the remainder.

Appendix, No. 3.

(No. 5502.)

Fort William, Marine Superintendent's Office,
19 September 1857.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter, No. 5475, of the 17th inst., I have the honour, by desire of the Superintendent of Marine, to forward to you herewith bills of lading for coals laden on board the vessels therein referred to, and to request the favour of your issuing instructions to your agent at Galle, to take charge of the coals as soon as each vessel arrives at his port.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Howe*, Secretary.

Captain H. P. Lovell,
Superintendent Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Company.

(No. 469.)

Calcutta, 21 September 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letters, No. 5475, of the 17th, and 5502, of the 19th inst., the former advising me that Government have received intimation that coals, to the extent of 4,085 tons, have been shipped from England to Galle, for the use of the Marine department, and requesting me to forward instructions to the Company's agent at that port, to supply vessels in the Government service to the full extent of the expected shipments; the latter forwarding me the bill of lading for the above coals, with a request that the Company's agent be instructed to take charge of the same.

In reply I beg to say, that I shall have much pleasure in forwarding the bill of lading by the next steamer, and in complying with your latter request; but must decline giving positive instructions to the effect required in the former.

I shall, however, forward copies of this correspondence to Captain Twynam, and desire him to do all in his power to forward the wishes of Government, leaving entirely to his own discretion the extent to which to supply vessels in the Government service, as he is better acquainted than I with the requirements of his own department.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

H. Howe, Esq.,
Secretary to the Superintendent of Marine.

(No. 1917.)

From *Cecil Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to Government of India, to Captain *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, Marine Department.

Sir,

I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to request that you will be so good as to instruct the agent of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company at Galle to supply with English coal to the full extent of their wants, so far as that is compatible with the efficient conduct of the mail service, the steamers that may touch there for the purpose of bringing up troops to Calcutta and Madras, whether they belong to the Royal Navy, or are hired by, or belong to, the East India Company.

2. It is needless to explain to you the urgency of the occasion, which requires that every possible means should be adopted to convey the troops as rapidly as possible to their destination; and his Lordship in Council relies upon you to impress upon the agent at Galle the importance of meeting the requisitions that may be made upon him by officers commanding the steamers of the Royal or Indian navy engaged in this service, promptly and to the utmost extent of his power.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Cecil Beadon*,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Council Chamber,
21 September 1857.

(No. 470.)

To *Cecil Beadon*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.

Calcutta, 22 September 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 1917 of the 21st instant, intimating to me that his Lordship the Governor-General is desirous that I should send instructions to the Company's agent at Galle to supply with English coal, to the full extent of their wants, so far as that is compatible with the efficient conduct of the mail service, the steamers that may touch there for the purpose of bringing up troops to Calcutta and Madras.

In

In reply I beg to annex copy of my letter to Captain Twynam, which will go forward by the steamer of the 25th instant, and to express my conviction that he will exert himself to the utmost to further the wishes of Government. Appendix, No. 3.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

Sir, Calcutta, 22 September 1857.

HEREWITH I enclose copies of correspondence with Government on the subject of supplying with English coal the steamers that may touch at your port, bringing up troops to Calcutta and Madras, whether they belong to the Royal navy, or are hired by or belong to the East India Company.

The Government wished me to issue instructions to you in accordance, but you will observe I have declined doing so, preferring to leave the matter to your own discretion, and feeling satisfied that their wishes would meet with every attention from you.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. P. Lovell*, Superintendent.

Captain T. H. Twynam, Agent,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Point de Galle.

(True copies.)
(signed) H. P. Lovell, Superintendent.

Sir, East India House, 6 November 1857.

I HAVE laid before the Court of Directors of the East India Company your letter, dated the 26th October 1857, stating the terms upon which the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company will undertake to convey troops from Southampton to India, by special steamer from Southampton to Alexandria, so as to ensure their arrival there sufficiently in advance of the packet to enable the transit administration in Egypt to effect the transport of the men to Suez without interfering in any way with the mails and passengers, and on from Suez to Madras, by the Peninsular Company's regular fortnightly mail steamers, at the rate of 40 *l.* per man, to include proper and sufficient diet, medical comforts and attendance, during the entire journey hence to India, to an extent of not less than 200 men upon each occasion.

In reply, the Court have commanded me to state, that they have about 26 officers and 500 men of Her Majesty's 69th regiment to forward to Madras by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt, and that they have resolved to accept the offer conveyed in your letter of the 26th October to that extent; one half of the number to be despatched hence by the special steamer of the middle of this month, and the other half by the special steamer of the beginning of December.

I am, therefore, to request that you will inform me as early as practicable of the exact time when the troops, with their baggage, &c. ready packed, must be at Southampton for embarkation by each of the Peninsular Company's special steamers.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq.,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
Sir, 6 November 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, stating that the Honourable Court of Directors of the East India Company, have about 26 officers and 500 men of Her Majesty's 69th regiment, to forward to Madras by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt, and that they have resolved to accept the offer contained in my letter of the 26th ultimo, regarding the terms of their conveyance; one half of the number to be despatched hence by the special steamer of the middle of this month, and the other half by the special steamer of the beginning of December.

In reply, I am desired to acquaint you that the Company will accordingly be prepared to despatch the "Sultan" from Southampton on the 16th instant with the first half, and the "Euxine" on the 1st December with the remainder.

Appendix, No. 3.

The troops for embarkation by the "Sultan" ought therefore to be at Southampton with the baggage properly packed as early as practicable on the morning of the 16th, and those for "Euxine" on 1st December also at an early hour.

In the event of arms and ammunition being sent, it would be necessary for the packages containing them to be at Southampton for shipment on the day previous to the departure of the respective vessels.

I have, &c.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

(signed) *C. W. Howell*, Secretary.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company.
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
12 November 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a certificate from the officers of the 10th and 21st companies of the Royal Engineers, who embarked at Chatham on board the Company's chartered steamer "Dutchman" on 14th October, and who were landed at Alexandria on the 31st idem, expressing their satisfaction with the messing of themselves and the men during the voyage.

I have, &c.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

(signed) *C. W. Howell*,
Secretary.

Alexandria, 31 October 1857.

WE, the undersigned officers of the Royal Engineers, have much pleasure in bearing testimony to the liberal manner in which both the messing of ourselves and of the 10th and 21st companies Royal Engineers has been provided on board the Peninsular and and Oriental Company's steamer "Dutchman."

We have also great pleasure in adding our testimony to the efficient and agreeable manner in which the above duty, as well as the superintendence of the stewards in general, has been performed by Mr. Hare.

(signed) *F. E. Cox*, Capt. & Adjt. R. E.
A. A. Fisher, Capt. R.E.
G. Nevill, Capt. R. E.
J. A. Edwards, Lieut. R. E.
W. R. Gossett, Lieut. R. E.
J. H. Halshan, Surgeon, R. A.
R. Thaine, Lieut. R. E.
T. V. Newell, M. D. 83d Regt.
C. S. Webber, Lieut. R. E.
J. H. Maitland, Lieut. R. E.
E. R. Testing, Lieut. R. E.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C.,
19 November 1857.

Sir,

THE enclosed extracts of letters recently received from this Company's agent at Alexandria, regarding the facilities which exist, and are likely to be continued and increased, for the conveyance through Egypt of troops sent to India by the overland route, will no doubt be interesting to the Court of Directors of the East India Company; and I am accordingly instructed to forward them for submission to the Honourable Court.

I have, &c.

Sir J. C. Melvill, KC.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

(signed) *C. W. Howell*,
Secretary.

EXTRACTS of a Letter from the Company's Superintendent in Egypt, dated Alexandria, 27 October 1857.

"YOU may assure the authorities in England that no difficulty exists in the transit of any number of men and horses by this route, provided only a few days' notice be given; of infantry 200 may be transported by railway and vans from ship in Alexandria to ship at Suez, in 24 hours; 270 in 29 hours; 360 in 33 hours; 1,000 men can be conveyed by rail and donkies in 30 hours, from ship to ship; and 10,000 men, by rail and marching in 60 hours; baggage and stores would occupy about 48 hours in transit.

"Artillery

"Artillery could also be transported, but until the completion of the railway it would have to be limited to very light field pieces."

"The Viceroy is very desirous to convey through his country as many soldiers as possible; and so great a disposition does he display to facilitate their movements, that he adds, 'I will consider them not as transit passengers, but as my own, and will carry them by my own private engines, carriages, and trucks.'"

Also from Letter, dated Alexandria, 31 October 1857.

"Could the authorities at the Horse Guards only see the facility existing by this route for the conveyance of troops, I am of opinion it would pretty generally be adopted."

Sir, East India House, 26 November 1857.

I AM desired to inquire of you, for the information of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, whether, in the event of its being determined to send troops hence to India by the overland route *viâ* Egypt, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company have certain assurance that there will be a special steam vessel at Suez ready to receive them; and, if so, how long that vessel will remain at Suez.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq.,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
27 November 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, inquiring, for the information of the Court of Directors of the Honourable East India Company, whether, in the event of its being determined to send troops hence to India by the overland route *viâ* Egypt, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company have certain assurance that there will be a special steamer at Suez ready to receive them; and, if so, how long that vessel will remain at Suez.

In reply, I have the honour to state, that the Company have this morning received telegraphic intelligence of their steam-ship "Oriental" being on her way to Suez, in conformity with the instructions which the Directors had transmitted to their agent at Calcutta to place one of the Company's large steamers at Suez, so as to be available for the conveyance of troops to India, should her services be required for that purpose.

The "Oriental" may be expected to have reached Suez about 25th or 26th instant, and will remain there for orders from England.

This vessel is capable of carrying 1,000 men and about 30 officers, and I am now desired to acquaint you that the Company would be prepared, upon receiving a few days' notice, to provide a steamer having similar accommodation for the conveyance of troops to Alexandria, to be embarked at Suez on board the "Oriental" for Bombay, Madras, or Calcutta, at the rate already agreed upon for the conveyance of troops to India *viâ* Egypt, namely, 40 *l.* per man, including victualling, &c.

The Company's agent at Calcutta was directed to provision the "Oriental" for 1,000 men for six weeks, but in the event of having been unable to comply with these instructions, the Company have already an ample supply of all regular stores at their depôt at Suez.

I am desired to add, that the vessel which the Company would provide for the passage from England to Alexandria could embark the troops at Southampton, or at any other port in this country which might be more convenient to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London,
30 November 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to my letter of 27th instant, that the Company will be prepared to convey 850 to 900 men and about 30 officers, from Plymouth to Alexandria by the steam-ship "Abeona," to be embarked at Suez for Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, or Kurrachee, on board the Company's steam-ship "Oriental."

The "Abeona" can be at Plymouth in readiness to embark the troops on the morning of the 8th December, and under ordinary circumstances will reach Alexandria about 22d or 23d.

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The troops would thus reach Egypt at such a time as not to interfere in any way with the ordinary transit of passengers, &c., by the regular mail steamers. In consequence of the number of men, it would be necessary for them to proceed between No. 12 Station in the Desert and Suez, a distance of 25 miles, on donkies, there not being a sufficient number of vans available for the conveyance of so many men at one time.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Sir,

East India House, 3 December 1857.

WITH reference to the arrangements in progress for the conveyance of troops to India by the overland route, viâ Egypt, with the assistance of the steam-vessels of the Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, I am desired to request that you will communicate to me, for the information of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, the provisions which have been made by the Steam Company for supplying the troops during their passage with fresh meat and other victuals than those which have been cured or salted.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

C. W. Howell, Esq., Secretary,
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
122, Leadenhall-street.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
5 December 1857.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 3d instant, requesting to be informed regarding the provision which has been made for supplying the troops during their passage in this Company's vessels with fresh meat and other materials than those which have been cured or salted, I am desired to state that each steamer is amply supplied with medical comforts for the voyage, including soup and bouilli and preserved potatoes, and that on leaving every port touched at, fresh meat and vegetables are furnished for as many days as they will keep good.

I have the honour to annex, for the information of the Court of Directors, extract from a letter received this day from the Company's agent at Aden, which will prove satisfactory to them, as showing that the arrangements made by the Company have, as far as that port, been attended with success.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

EXTRACT of a Letter from the Agent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Aden, dated 14 November 1857.

"THE 'Pottinger' arrived yesterday at 1.45 A.M., and left last evening at 5.30.

"The 'Hindostan' arrived this morning at 6.30, and will start about 6 this evening; both ships all well. All the troops were in excellent health, and were in want of nothing but what we were able to supply here."

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London,
22 September 1857.

Sir,

SHOULD the Directors of the Honourable the East India Company contemplate sending troops for India by way of Suez, I am instructed to state that the Directors of this Company are prepared to undertake the conveyance of 300 men by the steamer to leave Southampton on the 12th proximo, for Alexandria, and to carry them forward by a corresponding ship from Suez as far as Galle, where they would arrive about the 14th of November. The charge for conveyance from England to Galle, including victualling and transit expenses across the Isthmus of Suez, would be 40 *l.* per man.

As

As the dates of departure of the European and Australian Company's ships come between the departures of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels, there is no fear of the transit arrangements of one Company interfering with those of the other.

The Directors desire me also to add, that they will be prepared to convey a similar number of men to Galle by each steamer leaving Southampton on the 12th of every successive month.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Rd. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

To J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
Secretary.

Sir, East India House, 2 October 1857.

With reference to your letter stating the terms upon which the Directors of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company are prepared to convey troops from Southampton to Alexandria, thence across Egypt, and forward to Point de Galle, by the steamers of that Company, I am desired to request that the Directors will furnish the Court of Directors of the East India Company with a memorandum explanatory of the arrangements which they propose to make for ensuring the prompt and certain landing and despatch of any soldiers who may be forwarded by those steamers to Alexandria, immediately after their arrival at that port, as it is most essential to prevent straggling, and to provide that the men shall cross to Suez in a body, and embark immediately on the steamer for Point de Galle.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

R. T. Reep, Esq.
55, Moorgate-street.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
55, Moorgate-street, London,
2 October 1857.

Sir,

In reply to your inquiry of this date, I am instructed to acquaint you that the arrangements of this Company with regard to any soldiers who may be embarked by their steamers for conveyance *viâ* Egypt to Galle, are, that the men shall be forwarded by railway from Alexandria to a station in the Desert about 40 miles from Suez, and from that station to the ship which is to take them on to Galle.

To prevent the men, however, from straggling, the Directors propose that the whole of them shall be kept on board the ship at Alexandria up to the latest period possible, and then be sent across in a body for embarkation, thus avoiding delay on the road and depriving the men of any opportunity to get beyond control.

I am to add, that in consequence of a letter dated 29th ultimo, from the Horse Guards, inquiring at what time the two companies of artillery were to be ready for embarkation at Southampton on the 12th instant, the Directors have ordered supplies of provisions, and made every other arrangement necessary for victualling and accommodating the men on their passage to Galle.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
Secretary.

Sir, East India House, 3 October 1857.

In reply to your letter, dated the 22d September, stating that the Directors of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company are prepared to undertake the conveyance of 300 men by their steamer to leave Southampton on the 12th instant for Alexandria, and to carry them forward by a corresponding ship from Suez as far as Point de Galle, where they would arrive about the 14th November, the charge for conveyance from England to Galle, including victualling and transit expenses across the Isthmus of Suez, to be 40 *l.* a man, the Court of Directors of the East India Company have desired me to state, that they will avail themselves of the offer conveyed in your letter to the extent of two companies of Royal Artillery, numbering 220 men, with their officers, about 11 in number; and that their arms, accoutrements, and military clothing are to be packed and conveyed with them as "baggage."

I am commanded to request that the Directors of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company will cause the necessary arrangements to be made for the reception on board ship,

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transport, and accommodation of these two companies of Artillery, with their officers and baggage, throughout from Southampton to Point de Gâlle; and that you will apprise me, as early as practicable, with full information as to the time and manner of the men being embarked at Southampton, so that due notice may be given to the authorities at the Horse Guards.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

R. T. Reep, Secretary.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London,
5 October 1857.

Sir,

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 3d instant, intimating that 220 men, with their officers, about 11 in number, are to embark on the steamer to leave Southampton on the 12th instant, upon the terms of my letter of the 22d ultimo, and requiring that the necessary arrangements be made for their reception on board, &c., and to be furnished with full information as to the time and manner of the men being embarked.

In reply I beg to inform you, that it will be necessary for the two companies in question to proceed to Southampton, and to be ready to embark at the Southampton Dock at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 12th instant, as already communicated to the Horse Guards in my letter of the 29th ultimo, copy of which is enclosed.

I am to add, that all the necessary arrangements will be made for the reception and accommodation of the men in question.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
East India House.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London,
29 September 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to state in reply to your letter of this date that the two companies of Royal Artillery ordered to proceed to Egypt (for Ceylon) by the steamer appointed to leave Southampton on the 12th October, should be ready to embark at the Southampton dock at 8 o'clock on the morning of that day.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Alex. Gordon, Esq.,
Deputy Quartermaster-General,
Horse Guards.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, No. 55, Moorgate-street,
London, 6 October 1857.

Sir,

WITH reference to the accommodation of the troops who are to proceed in the steam-ship "Australasian," *viâ* Suez, to Ceylon on the 12th inst., I have to beg that directions may be given to the proper authorities for the packing of their carbines in boxes containing six each, as was done in the case of the troops sent by the last Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer from Southampton, and that these boxes may be sent addressed to Captain Vincent, the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's superintendent there, on or before Friday night, the 9th instant.

I have also to beg that you will, as in the case above alluded to, be good enough to give instructions that a sufficient number of hammocks (say 220), each containing a bed and blanket, made up in bundles of six, be sent to Captain Vincent, so as to reach him at the same time as the cases containing the carbines. The hammocks, beds, and blankets to be sent back from Alexandria in the "Australasian," and returned to the proper Government department.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, Secretary.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, No. 55, Moorgate-street,
London, 6 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to your letter of the 3d October, and my reply thereto, dated 5th idem, as to the time and manner of the troops being embarked on board the "Australasian" at Southampton, I beg to annex copies of communications which have passed this day between Captain Freeth, deputy adjutant quartermaster-general, Royal Artillery, and this office, upon the subject in question.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
Secretary,
East India House.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, No. 55, Moorgate-street,
London, 21 October 1857.

Sir,

I am desired by the Directors of this Company to state, for the information of the Honourable the East India Company, that they will undertake to convey 400 soldiers, with the usual proportion of officers, by the steam-ship "Tamar," appointed to leave Southampton on the 12th November for Alexandria, and to carry them forward by a corresponding ship from Suez, as far as Galle, where they would arrive about the 14th December, at a charge at the rate of 40 *l.* per man for the soldiers, for conveyance from England to Galle, to include the expense of victualling and transit across the Isthmus of Suez; and for the officers, of the customary rate of passage money.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Rd. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
Secretary,
East India House.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, No. 55, Moorgate-street,
London, 22 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to my communication of yesterday's date, respecting the conveyance of troops *viâ* Egypt to Galle, I beg leave to observe that an ample supply of salt meat and other provisions is forwarded by the steamer which takes on the troops from Southampton to Alexandria, and transmitted thence across to Suez for embarkation on board the corresponding vessel which conveys the troops from that port to Galle.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Rd. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir James C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

East India House, 27 October 1857.

Sir,

With reference to your letter, dated the 21st October 1857, stating that the Directors of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company will undertake to convey 400 soldiers by their steam vessel "Tamar," from Southampton to Alexandria, across Egypt, and onward from Suez by a corresponding ship as far as Point de Galle, at a charge of 40 *l.* per man throughout the journey, I am desired to request that you will bring to the notice of the Directors of the Royal Mail Company that the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company are prepared to convey troops throughout, from Southampton to Madras *viâ* Egypt, for 40 *l.* per man, engaging special steamers for the purpose on this side of Egypt; and that they have apprised the Court of Directors that, were it practicable for them to convey the troops direct from Southampton to Madras in their regular vessels, they could have undertaken the service at a somewhat lower rate.

Under these circumstances it appears to the Court reasonable to expect that the Royal Mail Company, who propose to use their own regular vessel only, and to convey the troops no further than Point de Galle, should make a reduction in their present charge of 40 *l.* per man, in the event of the Court sending troops by the "Tamar" to Galle, *en route* for Madras or Calcutta.

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

R. T. Reep, Esq.,
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
55, Moorgate-street.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London,
27 October 1857.

Sir,

Your letter of this date having engaged the consideration of the Directors of this Company, I am instructed to state in reply, that they are willing to undertake the conveyance of troops from Southampton to Galle, *viâ* Egypt, at 31 *l.* per man, instead of 40 *l.*, as proposed

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in my communication of the 21st instant, and that they will be happy to enter into an arrangement for conveying troops to Galle at the same rate by the steamer leaving Southampton on the 12th of each month.

I am also to observe that it is the intention of the Directors eventually to extend their line from Galle to Calcutta, and that they will then be in a position to negotiate for taking troops the whole way.

I am to take this opportunity of stating that the Directors will be glad to learn, as early as possible, if it is the intention of the Honourable East India Company to accept the offer made in my letter of the 21st instant, to convey troops by the "Australasian" to Calcutta.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Rd. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill,
&c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Sir,

East India House, 6 November 1857.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company have considered your letters of the 21st and 27th October, offering to convey troops from Southampton to Point de Galle *vid* Egypt by the Royal Mail Company's steam vessel "Tamar," appointed to leave Southampton on the 12th November for Alexandria, and to carry them forward by a corresponding ship from Suez as far as Galle, where they would arrive about the 14th December next, at the rate of 31 *l.* per man for the soldiers, for the conveyance from England to Galle, including the expense of victualling and transit across the Isthmus of Suez, and for the officers at the customary rate of passage money.

14 officers, 280 men.

In reply, the Court have desired me to inform you that they have resolved to accept the offer conveyed in those letters to the extent of about 14 officers and 280 men of Her Majesty's 69th Regiment; and I have to request that you will inform me, as early as practicable, of the time when the troops, with their baggage ready packed, must be at Southampton for embarkation on the "Tamar."

I am, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill,*
Secretary.

R. T. Reep, Esq.,
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
55, Moorgate-street.

Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,
No. 55, Moorgate-street, London, E.C.,
6 November 1857.

Sir,

I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, informing me that the Honourable East India Company purpose sending, per "Tamar" to Galle, about 14 officers and 280 men of Her Majesty's 69th Regiment; and in reply to your inquiry upon the subject, I am to state that the troops with their baggage must be ready at the Southampton Docks for embarkation at latest by 8 o'clock on the morning of the day of sailing, the 12th instant.

It may probably be found more convenient to ship the baggage before the 12th instant, in which case, upon hearing from you to that effect, the necessary arrangements shall be made.

I am desired to request, as on the occasion of troops being sent to Ceylon by the steamer of the 12th ultimo, that a sufficient number of hammocks (according to the number of men embarked), each containing a bed and blanket, made up in bundles of six, may be sent to Captain Vincent, the Company's Superintendent at Southampton, for the use of the troops on the passage to Alexandria, and to be sent back from that place in the "Tamar," and returned to the proper Government department.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. T. Reep,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B.,
Secretary,
East India House.

European and American Steam Shipping Company (Limited),
11, King William Street, Mansion-street, London, E. C.,
22 August 1857.

Gentlemen,

We submit to your earnest consideration and for your early decision, the following plan for a semi-monthly overland transport service between England and Bombay, by means of the fleet of the European and American Steam Shipping Company (limited):

This

This fleet consists of eight powerful screw steamers, all in perfect state of equipment, all similarly fitted up, and each capable of carrying for a voyage of 20 to 25 days from 1,000 to 1,200 troops, viz.:—

The "Golden Fleece" - - - -	2,768 $\frac{29}{100}$	*Tons.*
"Lady Jocelyn - - - -	2,242 $\frac{57}{100}$	"
"Queen of the South" - - -	2,221 $\frac{23}{100}$	"
"Hydaspes" - - - - -	2,248 $\frac{88}{100}$	"
"Indiana" - - - - -	2,364 $\frac{80}{100}$	"
"Argo" - - - - -	2,248 $\frac{96}{100}$	"
"Calcutta - - - - -	2,260 $\frac{60}{00}$	"
"Jason" - - - - -	2,667 $\frac{65}{100}$	"

The first four of this fleet are now under contract with your Company for India. The "Golden Fleece" and "Lady Jocelyn" may be expected at Calcutta not later than 15th October, and one or the other of them could be at Suez, after allowing 15 days' detention at Calcutta, about the middle or end of November.

The other four are now engaged in the Bremen and New York trade, and could be disengaged so as to place them at the disposal of your Company the latter end of October or beginning of November, at a port in England.

After the first ship shall have arrived at Suez, the others would arrive at intervals of about two weeks, and at the same intervals the ships on this side the Isthmus could be placed at your service.

Whatever number of troops should be sent by either ship on either side, the same number would be certain of being accommodated by a corresponding ship on the other side.

The price at which we would undertake this service would be 40 *s.* per gross ton per month for the vessels employed on this side, and 60 *s.* per ton per month for those employed the other side of the Isthmus; the East India Company to find coals and to pay all port charges, and the engagement to be for six months certain for each ship, commencing from the date they may respectively be at Suez or at a port in England ready to receive troops, and terminating upon the final discharge of each ship at a port in England.

It is needless, and perhaps would be presumptuous, in us to point out all or any of the advantages to be derived by your Honourable Company and the country by the adoption of this plan; and we can only regret the probable necessity which may render your acceptance of this proposal not only a matter of choice, but of policy.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Croskey & Co.*

The Chairman and Directors
of the Honourable the East India Company.

European and American Steam Shipping Company (Limited),
11, King William-street, Mansion House, London, E. C.,
7 September 1857.

Gentlemen,

In calling your renewed attention to the plan proposed in our letter of the 22d ultimo for a semi-monthly overland transport service between England and Bombay, we beg to submit a few remarks by way of explanation and modification of our said letter; and to say that by the last mail for India we wrote to our correspondents to detain the "Golden Fleece" and the "Lady Jocelyn" in the eastern waters until they should hear from us by the mail of the 10th instant, whether our proposal had been accepted or rejected by you.

We would therefore respectfully urge you to give us an answer to our said letter of the 22d ultimo, taken in connexion with our present remarks, in time to enable us to send out the corresponding instructions by the mail of the 10th instant.

As a modification of our terms, in lieu of requiring the ships employed on the other side of the Isthmus being returned to us at a port in England, we would be content to receive them at a port in India, after the expiration of six months from the date of their being respectively at your disposal at Suez.

If more convenient to the East India Company, we shall be prepared to contract for the victualling of the troops on the Company's scale, at 1 *s.* 6 *d.* per man per diem, from date of embarkation in England to date of disembarkation at Bombay. We shall have a large supply of provisions on the other side of the Isthmus; the surplus stores of the ships sent out under charter with the East India Company.

We shall also be prepared to enter into a contract for the transit of the troops and regimental baggage across the Isthmus at 5 *l.* per head, in which price will be included the victualling and transport of the troops, tents for encampment, railway and canal expenses for men and baggage, and for their disembarkation at Alexandria and re-embarkation at Suez; in fact, all the expenses of the Isthmus transit for troops and baggage. £. 5.

In the case of cavalry or artillery, other arrangements suited to such service would be entered into by us, and on satisfactory terms. The transit of the Isthmus can be performed in from four to five days.

As to coaling, which would, by our proposal, fall upon the East India Company, we would contract to supply the requisite quantity, after the present stocks belonging to the East India Company at Suez, Aden, and Bombay are consumed, delivered from the ship's side at Bombay and Aden, for 44 *s.* per ton at the former, and for 50 *s.* at the latter port.

Appendix, No. 3.

At Suez supplies can be sent overland to cost about 84 *s.* per ton. At Alexandria we could keep up the needful supplies at 36 *s.* per ton. These prices are predicated upon your coming to an early decision.

10 *s.*

But if you should prefer that we include the coaling in our contract, we would undertake to do so, on your giving us an additional 10 *s.* per gross register ton per month; the East India Company on their part placing at our disposal all the coal in magazine, and which belongs to them, either at Suez, or Aden, or Bombay, or on its way to either of those ports, and we paying for the same at cost price.

The enclosed copy of a letter, this day received from a gentleman sent out by us to represent us in India, will be interesting, as showing the character of the ships we offer you, and the satisfactory manner in which the service we propose, if accepted by you, is likely to be performed. The "Golden Fleece" and "Lady Jocelyn," the one sailing on the 8th August from Portsmouth, the other the 9th from Cork, made the same passage to St. Vincent. This is a regularity much to be admired.

If our proposal be accepted, we shall be able to offer to Her Majesty's Government the use of the vessels we purpose to employ on this side of the Isthmus, for bringing home troops from Canada, on their return from the United States. They would be fitted up for the conveyance of troops in New York instead of on their arrival in England, and would arrive here in ample time to meet the ships ordered to Suez. The first ship would start from England on or about the 1st November, and the others would follow at distances of two weeks. We enclose an itinerary, showing the working of this transport line.

Being fully aware of the importance which the success of the Peninsular and Oriental Company bears upon the interests of British commerce, and feeling how unpopular any movement would be that might be construed into an interference with their prosperity, we would be permitted at once to dispel any such inference as connected with our proposal, by pledging ourselves to withdraw these ships from the overland Indian trade when this special service shall have been performed; and as an earnest of the sincerity of this pledge, we beg to say we have entered into arrangements with the Government of Newfoundland for a mail service for our entire fleet, immediately on the release of the vessels from the employment now proposed.

As it may facilitate your coming to a more prompt decision, we hand you herewith a sketch of the cost of transporting 1,000 men from England to Bombay on the plan proposed, and we shall be happy, personally, to give any further explanation that may be required.

We are, &c.

The Chairman and Directors of the Honourable the East India Company.

(signed) *Croskey & Co.*

P. S.—By the ships now offered leaving Southampton or other port in England at intermediate dates with those of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, a double mail service would be obtained, without cost to the Government, for the time being. The ships by touching at Malta could receive the mails sent *viâ* Marseilles.

St. Vincent, Cape de Verdes,
Thursday, 20 August 1857.

Gentlemen,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you of the arrival of the "Golden Fleece" at this port on Tuesday last, having made the islands in 9 days 18 hours after leaving Spithead.

Saturday, August 15.—At. 6 a.m. passed the troop-ship "Octavia," which sailed from London July 25th, 21 days out; at this time we had been from Spithead only 6 days 13 hours, having left that anchorage on Saturday, 8th August, at 5 p.m.

On the same day, at 4 p m, in lat. 28° 58′, long. 20° 25′, passed the troop-ship "Monarch," belonging to Messrs. Green of Blackwall, bound for the East Indies, 20 days out.

By comparison with the progress made by these ships, it appears that the superiority of screw steamers over mere sailing ships, bears the relation of 3 to 1; the "Golden Fleece" having accomplished, in 6 days 23 hours, that for which the "Octavia" and "Monarch" required from 20 to 21 days.

August 17.—At 4 p.m. saw another troop-ship, having a white streak on side; at 6.30 she was out of sight.

The "John Bell" steam troop-ship, which left Dublin on the 6th August (two days before the "Golden Fleece left Portsmouth), arrived here only a few hours before us.

Wednesday, August 19.—The "United Kingdom" steam troop-ship arrived here this day, having left Kingstown on the 4th August.

I have much pleasure in being authorised by the quartermaster, the colonel in command, and the whole of the officers on board, to convey to you their full and entire approval of all the arrangements and provisions made for their speedy and comfortable passage to India.

I have this moment received permission from Colonel Kelley to state, that from the very superior accommodation on board this ship, not only for the officers, but for the large number of troops on board, he has deemed it a duty due to the owners to forward a letter to the "Times" paper on the subject.

It is further pleasurable to state, that in the purser and steward's department the utmost order and ability prevails.

Captain

Captain Hall and his officers are very popular with all on board, and I think very justly so; in fact, it has never fallen to me to observe so much contentment on board a ship; not a murmur, or even a look of dissatisfaction have I seen amongst crew, servants, soldiers or officers in command, or ship's officers. Appendix, No. 3.

5 p.m.—The "Lady Jocelyn" has just come in.

Yours, &c.

Messrs. Croskey & Co., London. (signed) *Hy. Roper.*

Sketch of the Itinerary of the Eight Steam Ships, on the proposed Semi-monthly Transit Line.

Ships on Suez side of Isthmus.

"Golden Fleece" could reach Suez on or about the 30th November; on arrival there her pay would commence.

"Lady Jocelyn" could reach Suez at about same time, but her pay would not commence until two weeks after the pay of "Golden Fleece" shall commence.

"Queen of the South" could reach Suez about a month after "Golden Fleece;" her pay to commence four weeks after that of "Golden Fleece."

"Hydaspes" could reach Suez two weeks after "Queen of the South;" her pay to commence six weeks after that of "Golden Fleece."

The above and following order or rotation of the ships may be changed by substituting any others of same fleet.

Ships on Alexandria side of Isthmus.

"Jason" could be ready to embark troops at Portsmouth on 1st November, when her pay will commence. By sailing on 10th November her troops would meet the "Golden Fleece" at Suez.

"Calcutta" would follow two weeks after, say on 24th November, her pay commencing on the 14th November. Her troops could meet the "Lady Jocelyn."

"Indiana" would follow two weeks after "Calcutta," say on 10th December, her pay commencing on 1st December. The "Queen of the South" would take on her troops.

"Argo" would succeed "Indiana" two weeks later, say on 24th December, her pay commencing on 14th December. Her troops would be taken on by the "Hydaspes."

Each ship, on either side the isthmus, would take from 15 to 18 days to perform their respective voyages, say from England to Alexandria, or from Suez to Bombay; allow the same time for returning, would give 36 days steaming each ship for each voyage; then allow 10 days at each port at each end of each voyage, or 20 days in port at both ends, would give to each ship 56 days or eight weeks to be ready to commence the next voyage. Thus, the "Golden Fleece" would be able to leave Suez on her second voyage eight weeks after she shall have first left; and the "Jason," in like manner, to leave England for her second voyage eight weeks from date of departure on her first voyage. In this manner, the "Jason," leaving port in England on the 10th November, would be able to take her second departure eight weeks afterwards, say on the 10th January, or two weeks after the "Argo" shall have left on her first voyage.

Cost of Transporting 1,000 Men and their Ordinary Equipment by the Proposed Overland Transport Line.

Average tonnage of ships employed - - - 2,350 tons.

Average price per ton, the East India Company finding coal - - 50*s.*

	£.	s.	d.
Eight weeks hire of vessel from Suez and back, say two months, 2,350 tons, at 50*s.* per ton per month, is - - - -	11,750	–	–
Same of vessel from England to Alexandria and back - -	11,750	–	–
Coal, 36 or 40 days on each side:			
1,200 tons this side - - - - 1,800 – –			
1,200 tons other side - - - 3,600 – –			
	5,400	–	–
Transport across Isthmus - - - - - - -	5,000	–	–
Victualling for 40 days, at 1*s.* 6*d.* per man per diem - -	3,600	–	–
Add 500*l.* for port charges - - - - - - -	500	–	–
Or 38*l.* per man - - - - - £.	38,000	–	–

Appendix, No. 3.

Or, if the owners find coal, the average price per ton would be 60*s.* per ton instead of 50*s.* The cost would then be as follows:—

	£.	*s.*	*d.*
Eight weeks' hire of ship on other side, at 50*s.* - - -	11,750	-	-
Ditto - ditto - this side - „ - - - -	11,750	-	-
Add 10*s.* additional per ton for coaling, say 2,350 × 2 ships × 2 months, at 10*s.* - - - - - - - -	5,700	-	-
Transport across Isthmus - - - - - - -	5,000	-	-
Victualling - - - - - - - - - -	3,600	-	-
Port charges - - - - - - - - -	500	-	-
£.	38,300	-	-

Gentlemen, East India House, 17 September 1857.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letters, with enclosures, addressed to the Chairman and Directors of the East India Company, under date the 22d August and the 7th September 1857, proposing a plan for a semi-monthly overland transport service between England and Bombay, by means of the fleet of eight powerful screw steamers of the European and American Steam Shipping Company, all similarly fitted up, and each capable of carrying for a voyage of 20 to 25 days from 1,000 to 1,200 troops, in which letters are explained very fully your terms for undertaking this service, besides the transit of the troops across the Isthmus of Suez, and their victualling throughout the voyage, the East India Company either finding all coals, or making you an extra allowance for the same, likewise paying all port charges; and the engagement proposed by you to be for six months certain for each ship, commencing from the date they may respectively be at Suez, or at a port in England, ready to receive troops, and terminating at the final discharge of each ship at a port in England, or at a port in India, after six months from the date of its having been at the Company's disposal at Suez.

In reply, I am desired to inform you that, as it is not at present the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send any considerable body of troops through Egypt, the Court are unable to avail themselves of your offer, which might otherwise have been accepted with advantage to the public service.

I am, &c.

(signed) *James C. Melvill*, Secretary.

Messrs. Croskey & Co.
11, King William-street, Mansion House.

Secretary's Office, Marine Branch,
5 February 1858.

James C. Melvill,
Secretary.

Appendix, No. 4.

PAPERS delivered in by *P. Melvill*, Esq., 16 February 1858.

MILITARY LETTER to India, dated 22 July 1857, No. 131.

Appendix, No. 4.

1. IN our letter of the 8th instant we informed you of the measures which had, up to that date, been taken for sending additional troops to India.

2. Immediately on the receipt of the intelligence brought by the mail which arrived on the 13th instant, we intimated to Her Majesty's Government our opinion that a further additional force of six regiments of infantry should be forthwith despatched to India. Her Majesty's Government immediately complied with our requisition, and placed the following regiments at our disposal; viz.—20th Foot, 34th Foot, 42d Foot, 54th Foot, and 97th Foot; 2d Battalion of Rifle Brigade.

3. Being also of opinion that, under the present emergency, it is desirable to strengthen the artillery force of the several governments in India, by the temporary addition of some companies of Royal Artillery, we requested that eight companies might be made available for immediate embarkation for India, Her Majesty's Government have in consequence placed at our disposal two troops Royal Horse Artillery and six companies Royal Foot Artillery. These are allotted in the proportion as specified in the margin.* The materiel for these troops and companies will be supplied from the arsenals in India.

4. We send a number in the packet, a list of the ships and steamers engaged for the conveyance of the troops specified in our letter of the 8th instant, containing all requisite information as to numbers, destination, and time of departure.

5. It will be important that your Government should as many steamers as possible to Point de Galle, to meet the sailing vessels conveying these regiments, and to tow them to their destination.

6. It is also very important that coal should be sent there to replenish the steamers that may arrive with their fuel exhausted.

7. The additional six regiments and the artillery specified in this despatch will be sent out by the most speedy means of conveyance which may be found available for the purpose.

8. We forward copy of a letter from the India Board, expressing the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that in the event of your requiring the services of another European regiment, application should be made by your Government to the Governor of Ceylon, for one of the regiments now stationed there.

Dated 17 July 1857.

9. The 2d Regiment of Dragoon Guards, as specified in the list herewith sent, embarked for Calcutta by the ships named in the margin on the 25th July. As we presume that you will desire to retain for the present the services of the 9th Lancers, immediate measures should be taken by your Government to procure and train the requisite number of horses for mounting the 2d Dragoon Guards, so as to render the regiment on its arrival available as soon as possible for actual service.

"Monarch." "Blenheim."

10. The 3d Regiment of Dragoon Guards will embark for Bombay on or about the 30th July 1857.

11. A party for each of the dragoon regiments, as specified in the margin,† will be sent immediately by the overland route, for the purpose of training horses for the effective amounting of these regiments.

12. I

* Two troops horse artillery; two companies foot artillery, Calcutta. Two ditto, ditto, Madras. Two ditto, ditto, Bombay.

† One captain; one riding-master; one veterinary surgeon; nine non-commissioned, and privates.

Appendix, No. 4.

12. In order to guard against a probable deficiency in the supply of horses for the cavalry and artillery, we have stated to Her Majesty's Government that we thought it very desirable that they should direct the Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the Cape of Good Hope to purchase geldings and mares suited for cavalry and artillery to such extent, not exceeding 1,000 in number, as may be procurable there, provided tonnage can be obtained for their conveyance to India. To facilitate the provision of tonnage, we shall intimate to the shipping interest in this country, that freight of this description may probably be in demand at the Cape.

Dated 17 July 1857.

13. We forward to you copy of a letter from the India Board, enclosing copy of orders given by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to the senior officers of Her Majesty's ships at Singapore, for the purpose of facilitating the transport of troops to India.

MILITARY DESPATCH to Bombay, dated 22 July 1857, No. 74.

1. IN order that you may be fully informed of the arrangements made for the despatch of troops to India under the present emergencies, we forward a number in the packet, a copy of our letters to the Government of India on that subject.

2. The 3d Dragoon Guards, which had been ordered to proceed as a relief to the 14th Dragoons, will embark for your Presidency on or about the instant. If it is found necessary to retain the services of the 14th Dragoons after the arrival of the 3d Dragoon Guards, immediate measures will doubtless be taken by your Government for procuring and training the requisite number of horses for mounting the 3d Dragoon Guards on its arrival. A party from the regiment, of the strength specified in the margin,* will proceed by the overland route for the purpose of training horses, if required.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

(Separate.) No. 177 of 1857.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honourable Sirs,

IN our despatch from this department, No. 168, dated the 19th May 1857, we recommended your Honourable Court to raise forthwith three new regiments of European infantry, in place of six regiments of native infantry which were on that date known to have been lost to the Bengal establishment. Since that date information has reached us, as has been reported† in another despatch, of the mutiny and desertion of the native officers and men of several other regiments of native infantry. It is now too certain that the final list of these misguided regiments will be a long one. We propose hereafter to make the same recommendation in regard to the last-mentioned regiments that we made in regard to the first six of the lost regiments; for it appears to us that the only means by which an adequate increase to the European troops serving in India can be made, and a safe balance between the European and native armies can be obtained, without such an increased expenditure as the revenues of the country will not support, is by employing the European officers of the lost native regiments to officer new levies of Europeans, to be added to the Company's establishment. Our present despatch, however, has a more immediate object.

Your Honourable Court have been informed by a separate communication, of the steps we have taken to suppress, as soon as possible, what it is now apparent is the revolt of a large part of the Bengal native army. The present crisis found us with our fixed establishment of European infantry deficient by two regiments, one in Madras, and one in Bengal; these two regiments having been withdrawn from India during the Russian war, and not having been yet replaced. At the first decided symptom of a dangerous spirit in the Bengal army (which occurred in the case of the 19th Regiment of native infantry at Berhampore), one European regiment was brought to Bengal from Pegu. On hearing of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi, no time was lost in drawing to this Presidency all the European regiments that could in any way be made available from other quarters. Part of a second regiment was ordered from Pegu and Tenasserim, which also has arrived. Of the three regiments of European infantry opportunely relieved from service in Persia, one has proceeded to the north-west by way of the Indus, and two have been ordered to this port. Of these two a part have already arrived, and the rest are expected daily. A steamer has been despatched for Ceylon, from whence we have the promise of 500 men. One more regiment will be drawn from Pegu. Application has been made to Lord Elgin for the immediate services of the regiments now on their way to China, which we trust it may be possible to stop at Singapore. Considering the aspect of affairs in India, we have every confidence

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* One captain; one veterinary surgeon; one riding-master; nine non-commissioned troopers.

† In the Narrative of Events submitted with separate letter, No. 176, dated 5th June 1857.

confidence that we shall obtain, at no very distant time, powerful assistance by the temporary diversion of that expedition from its original object. Appendix, No. 4.

We trust that the Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub will be strong enough to curb the native army in that province, where a considerable European force is posted, and where, so far as we are aware, the large force of native irregulars have shown no sign of disaffection. The greater part of four regiments of European infantry, and two regiments of dragoons, with an adequate proportion of European artillery, are already formed into an army for offensive operations, and are advancing against Delhi. With this strong moveable column, with the additional European forces now arriving from all sides, as above indicated, and moving towards our central provinces, and, as we trust, with the help some weeks hence of the Chinese expedition, we hope very shortly to be strong enough to destroy the open rebels, to overawe the disaffected, and abandoning everywhere the defensive, to restore order in the fertile and flourishing provinces which have been thrown more or less into anarchy by the late sudden revolt of our troops. But when we have succeeded in this, it is evident that much will still remain to be done before we can hope to recover that absolute mastery over the native army, regular and irregular, which is the first necessary step towards the restoration of permanent security. For this purpose it is obvious that a large increase of European troops is essential. The troops forming the expedition to China, or others to replace them, when the immediate crisis is over here, must proceed to their original destination. The troops lent by the Government of Ceylon must be returned to that colony; and it is impossible, with any regard to safety, to leave for any long time the rest of India so bare of European troops, as the present imminent danger in Bengal has obliged us to make it for the moment.

We earnestly solicit, therefore, that measures may be taken *without delay* for the immediate despatch of a large body of Her Majesty's troops to this Presidency. We have given our attention to the question of what permanent augmentation of the European forces on the Bengal establishment has been shown by the present mutiny to be necessary. We are not prepared, however, at present with a detailed and complete scheme with regard to this question. But we are prepared, after carefully considering the more immediate question of what augmentation is necessary forthwith, pending the arrangement to be ultimately adopted, to report to your Honourable Court, our unanimous and strong conviction, that it is necessary for the safety of the Indian empire to obtain for the Bengal Presidency, and for the several great provinces under the direct administration of the Government of India, an immediate augmentation of eleven regiments of Her Majesty's infantry, and one regiment of dragoons. This is exclusive of the two regiments whereby the Indian establishments are at present deficient, which we presume are now, or shortly will be, on their way out. We respectfully recommend that this force be despatched at the earliest possible date, in which case it will arrive at a good season for its distribution and employment in the provinces where it will be required.

This may appear a large increase of European strength, but we have satisfied ourselves that the time requires the whole of it.

The current revenues of India, of course, will be unable to meet the large increase of current expenditure which this augmentation will involve. It may be (although looking at the great population and the immense extent of territory to be guarded, and the very large native force of regulars and irregulars to be overawed, we cannot flatter ourselves that such a result is probable), that when the strength and the reputation for strength of the British Government is restored, and the native army is re-organized, some small diminution of this augmented strength may be possible as a permanent arrangement. But it may be taken as certain that the greater part of the augmentation is permanently necessary. In order permanently to provide for this large increase of our European troops, we know of no available resource but to save an equal or nearly an equal amount by an equivalent or nearly equivalent reduction of our native troops. The officers of a regiment of regular troops, whether Europeans or natives, cost a large proportion of the whole cost of the regiment; and the European officers in the Company's service must be retained, whatever becomes of their men. Therefore, we regard the employment of the European officers of the native regiments which have mutinied, or which may mutiny, or which may be found untrustworthy, as officers of new regiments of Company's Europeans, not only as in all respects the best possible arrangement, but also as the only arrangement financially possible. It is already too apparent that this arrangement, if adopted, will relieve the Indian finances from all burthen on account of at least a large proportion of the augmentation proposed. The remainder, if there shall be any remainder, may be provided for by an extension of the system, or by a moderate augmentation of the number of Her Majesty's regiments on the establishment, or by both methods combined.

We earnestly recommend, therefore, that the measure of recruiting proposed in our letter No. 168, dated the 19th May 1857, may be proceeded with as vigorously as possible, irrespectively of the despatch of Her Majesty's regiments, recommended in our present letter, and we consider it absolutely necessary, in order to the permanent equalisation of Indian income and expenditure, and the stability of your finances, that the Governor-general of India in Council should be authorised, at a year's notice, to return from time to time such portions of the temporary augmentation now asked for in the shape of Her Majesty's regiments, as from time to time, whether by the organisation of new regiments of Company's

Appendix, No. 4.

Europeans, or for any other reason, he may find himself in a position to spare. It is in the full confidence that this fair and financially indispensable condition will be conceded that we make the general recommendation conveyed in this despatch.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Canning.*
J. Dorin.
J. Low.
J. P. Grant.
B. Peacock.

Fort William, 6 June 1857.

EXTRACT-Military Letter to India, dated 5 August 1857, No. 139.

1. CONSEQUENT on the receipt by the last mail, of representations from the Governor-general of India, and from the Governors of Madras and Bombay, we expressed to Her Majesty's Government our opinion that further reinforcements of Queen's troops, to the following extent, are required to meet the emergencies which have arisen in India; viz. two regiments of dragoons, four regiments of infantry, six companies of Royal Artillery.

2. The regiments of dragoons will be sent to Calcutta direct. The regiments of infantry are specially intended as reinforcements for the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, which have been almost entirely denuded of European troops by the requisitions from Bengal. Two of these regiments will accordingly be sent direct to Madras, and two direct to Bombay.

3. Of the Royal Artillery, two companies of foot, or one company of foot and one troop of Horse Artillery, will be sent direct to Kurrachee, and four companies of foot artillery to Ceylon for orders as to the ports at which they are to be landed in India. You will, accordingly, send the requisite instructions to meet this force on their arrival at Point-de-Galle.

2.
Dated 25 July 1857.
Dated 24 July 1857.

4. We forward for your information copies of letters from the India Board, with their enclosures, regarding a further addition to be made to the strength of Her Majesty's Infantry regiments in India, and an intended increase of corporals with certain of the regiments now on their voyage to India.

Dated 14 July 1857.

5. With reference to the communication made in our letter of the 8th July last, we now forward to you copy of a letter from which you will learn that the instructions conveyed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, is, that he will, if possible, send a regiment forthwith from that colony to Ceylon, to replace the troops which have been drafted from thence to Calcutta.

EXTRACT Military Letter to India, dated 26 August 1857, No. 154.

No. 112.

Para. 1. YOU will have learned from our letter of the 8th July last, that the 3d Battalion 60th Rifles, now on the voyage to Ceylon or Madras, with the other regiments touching there for orders, is destined for service in the Madras Presidency, to replace the regiment withdrawn in 1854 without relief. Of the four regiments of Her Majesty's infantry referred to in our letter of the 5th August, the 44th and 66th will proceed to Madras, and the 56th and 72d to Bombay.

Dated 12 Aug. (2) and 17 August.

2. We forward for your information copies of letters (three) from the India Board, received since our letter to you of the 5th instant (August), regarding the establishment of the 1st Dragoon Guards and 7th Hussars, now under orders for Calcutta; and of the future establishments of the regiments of infantry serving in India, or under orders for service in that country.

3. We forward to you a return showing the names of the steamers or ships engaged for the conveyance of troops to India, of the numbers of men embarked on them, and of their respective destinations, completed to the latest date to which the embarkation returns have been received.

EXTRACT Military Letter to Madras, dated 26 August 1857, No. 112.

1. IN continuation of our letter, dated 3d August, we forward to you copy of a despatch this day addressed by us to the Supreme Government on the subject of the despatch of officers and troops of Her Majesty's service to India, together with a copy of its accompanying list of ships conveying the several regiments and detachments.

2. The screw steamer "Victoria," eventually destined to Calcutta, has on board a division of Royal Artillery consisting of 286 men for your Presidency. The articles of agreement with

with the owners have been transmitted to the Chief Secretary at Calcutta, where the freight accounts of that vessel will be adjusted. A copy of them is sent in the packet. Care must be taken on the arrival of the vessel at Madras, that every facility be afforded for landing the troops with the least possible delay, so as to detain the vessel as short a time as possible. The master must be furnished with the certificates necessary to enable him to obtain payment for his freight account under his agreement, on reaching Calcutta.

3. Of the ships conveying the regiments appointed to rendezvous at Galle, eight are complete with one regiment only. The others have portions of different regiments on board, some of which will require to be transhipped in order that they may proceed direct to their destination. As this arrangement will require to be superintended by a responsible officer, we consider it necessary that the Deputy Quartermaster-general of Her Majesty's forces at your Presidency, should be directed to proceed to Galle for the performance of this duty.

MILITARY LETTER from Fort William, dated 19 June 1857, No. 183.

WE beg to reiterate in the most urgent manner the requisition which we transmitted to your Honourable Court by the last mail, for additional European regiments to the extent of eleven regiments of infantry and one of dragoons; and we trust that your Honourable Court will arrange for these additional regiments being sent to this Presidency with the utmost despatch.

2. The progress of disaffection in the Bengal army has convinced us that an additional regiment of British cavalry is necessary, inasmuch as there is great reason to fear that the irregular cavalry will be in a disorganised state for a long time to come. We accordingly request that your Honourable Court will take measures to obtain for us the services of a regiment of dragoons, in addition to the one asked for in our letter (No. 177), dated the 6th instant.

MILITARY LETTER from Fort William, dated 4 July 1857, No. 195.

IN the letters which were addressed to your Honourable Court on the 6th and 19th ultimo, we urged that 11 regiments of European infantry and two regiments of cavalry should be sent to India without delay.

2. Although the rescue of Delhi from the mutineers has not taken place so quickly as we then hoped, we remain of opinion that the force which has been asked, joined with the regiments which have since been drawn from Bombay, Madras, Pegu, and Ceylon, and with the reinforcement expected from the China expedition, will be sufficient to restore and maintain peace and order in Bengal and the North Western Provinces.

3. But during the last fortnight intelligence has reached us that disaffection has shown itself in some portions of the army in Southern India. A cavalry regiment of the Hyderabad contingent at Aurungabad has been mutinous, and has needed to be coerced. There has been some excitement, although, according to the last accounts, allayed at Hyderabad, and there has been an attempt to provoke discontent at Sattara. Disaffection has shown itself in a regiment at Nagpore, and the Gwalior contingent has broken out against its officers. Meanwhile the European strength in the Presidency of Madras, at no time equal to its requirements, has been reduced by one regiment of infantry and a wing of cavalry, and another regiment of infantry is tied to Pegu. Bombay has despatched two European regiments to Bengal and one to Mooltan.

4. In neither of these Presidencies (Madras and Bombay) is the army in a condition to put down summarily this widely spread outbreak; and if any such should occur before order is restored in Bengal, it might be out of the power of the Government of India to give efficient aid for that purpose.

5. We desire, therefore, to press upon your Honourable Court the expediency of obtaining reinforcements of Her Majesty's troops for each of the two Presidencies, and we strongly recommend that the army of Madras be strengthened immediately by five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, and that of Bombay by four regiments of infantry and one of cavalry.

8. We would further beg your Honourable Court, in anticipation of the demand which we shall shortly make for a large increase of the artillery in the three Presidencies, to commence at once to entertain recruits for that arm of the service, to the extent of ten companies of foot artillery. If, meanwhile, your Honourable Court should be able to obtain the service of a force of Royal Artillery to any amount within that limit, we advise that this should be done, and that it should be despatched in the proportion of five companies to Bengal, three to Madras, and two to Bombay.

Appendix, No. 4. MILITARY LETTER from Fort William, dated 21 July 1857, No. 206.

Cons. 17 July 1857, No.
Letter to the Dy. A. G. A., No. 570, dated 14 July 1857.
Letter from Dy. A. G. A., No. 657, dated 16 July 1857.
Memo. by Sir P. Grant, C. in C., dated 18 June 1857.
Memo. by Sir P. Grant, C. in C., dated 29 June 1857.
Return of European troops serving at the three Presidencies, prepared in the Military Department.

WE desire again to address your Honourable Court upon the subject of reinforcements of European troops.

Since the date of our last letter upon this subject no marked progress towards the suppression of revolt has been made, except in the complete defeat of the rebels at Futtehpore and Cawnpore, under Brigadier-general Havelock, and the rescue of the latter place from them.

2. The operations against Delhi had not been brought to a close on the 1st of this month. There has been a rising at Indore, which, taken in conjunction with the revolt of the Gwalior Contingent, makes it probable that the flame will spread through Central India; and though we have much confidence in the fidelity of the Madras army, it is clear that this state of things in Central India, coupled with the delay of a success at Delhi, brings the Deccan and Southern India into danger. Indeed, the protraction of the operations at Delhi alone, will act far and wide as an encouragement to the disaffected in every part of India.

3. We trust, then, that your Honourable Court will use every effort to place in our hands all the means attainable for dealing at all points effectually, and as far as practicable, simultaneously, with an already wide-spread revolt, which may possibly become still further extended.

4. We enclose a letter from the Deputy Adjutant-general of the army of the 16th instant, accompanied by two memorandums by the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 18th and 29th ultimo.

In the first of these memorandums his Excellency describes the amount, nature and disposition of the additional European force,* which he would consider necessary to preserve tranquillity throughout the Bengal Presidency.

5. We hope and believe that this force will eventually be found larger than necessary for the security of Bengal alone, and that when peace shall once have been restored, and the mutineers of the Bengal army shall have been punished and put down, a smaller European army than is suggested by his Excellency will be found equal to the maintenance of order in this Presidency.

6. We believe that the five moveable columns suggested by his Excellency, might in that case be greatly reduced, and perhaps altogether dispensed with, provided that the fixed garrisons at a few of the most important points be made somewhat stronger than is proposed in the memorandum.

It is needless to urge the paramount importance of keeping the cost of our European army within the most moderate limits consistent with perfect safety.

7. But upon this subject, viz. the amount and disposition of the permanent European force of Bengal, and of other parts of India, as well as upon the subjects of the Commander-in-Chief's memorandum of June 29th, which treats mainly of the native army, we shall address your Honourable Court separately. That which we now desire to press upon your consideration is the expediency of supplying at once a large extraordinary force, to effect the early restoration of peace throughout the country.

8. The Commander-in-Chief considers that at least 80,000 European soldiers of all arms will be required for the protection of our Indian possessions; and his Excellency strongly urges that our forces be completed to that extent.

9. In the state of things adverted to at the beginning of this letter, we agree that an increase to this amount is desirable for the present at least; and, in order to reach it, it would be necessary that your Honourable Court should obtain the services of about 15,000 men beyond the number † already asked for in our letters of 6th and 19th of June and 4th of July.

10. We fear that it may be impossible to obtain this further number from the Queen's army, which would be the readiest and most effectual source of supply. Should this be the case, we would suggest to your Honourable Court that no time should be lost in raising and despatching to India European recruits for the East India Company's army, over and above those who may have been collected to form the three regiments which we requested in our letter of the 19th of May, might be raised immediately.

11. It

* 25 companies of artillery; 2 regiments of dragoons; 19 regiments of infantry.

† This consists of 20 regiments infantry, 4 regiments dragoons, 10 companies artillery, which, at the Indian complement, will amount to something more than 24,000 men. The accompanying memorandum shows that the European troops already in the three Presidencies amount to about 41,000 men, exclusive of about 1,200 taken from Ceylon and from the China expedition.

11. It is unnecessary for us to say, that if it should be in the power of the Court of Directors to obtain the services of bodies of men drafted from militia regiments, and already drilled and subjected to discipline, the advantage would be very great. Appendix, No. 4.

12. No embarrassment will in our view arise if, in the event of no troops of Her Majesty's army being available, your Honourable Court should have the power and should be willing to raise the entire 15,000, if necessary, as troops of the Honourable Company's service. The number of native infantry and cavalry regiments of the Bengal army which may be considered as no longer existent, certainly exceeds 40; and we are strongly of opinion, that the principle of substituting one European for two native corps may be safely and immediately carried out, to the extent of replacing 30 of those native regiments by 15 English regiments for the Bengal establishment.

13. It is, however, very requisite that a portion of the 15,000 men now asked should consist of cavalry and artillery.

14. We would urge that the force of cavalry should be four regiments, or at least 2,000 men, and that the artillery should number 1,200.

15. We trust that this amount of cavalry and artillery may be procured ready trained from the Royal army.

16. There would remain 12 regiments of infantry to be supplied either from the same source or as recruits for the East India Company's army, according as circumstances shall lead your Honourable Court to decide.

17. We trust that these recommendations will be carried out by your Honourable Court as fully as may be possible.

EXTRACT Military Letter to India, dated 9 September 1857, No. 165.

1. IMMEDIATELY on the receipt of your letter, dated 21 July 1857, No. 206, containing a requisition for further reinforcements of European troops, we obtained from Her Majesty's Government the following troops, in addition to those already sent; viz.

1 Troop Horse Artillery.	4 Companies Royal Engineers.
3 Field Batteries.	3 Regiments Dragoons.
5 Companies Royal Artillery.	4 Regiments Infantry.

2. Measures have been taken for obtaining steamers or sailing vessels for the conveyance of these troops, to embark, those in England on the 17th, and those in Ireland on the 22d instant, to the following destinations; viz.

For Calcutta:	Bombay—*continued.*
1 Field Battery.	18th Regiment Foot.
2 Companies of Royal Artillery.	51st " "
2 Companies of Royal Engineers.	1 Troop Horse Artillery.
For Madras:	For Kurrachee:
1 Field Battery.	7th Dragoon Guards.
1 Company of Royal Artillery.	94th Regiment Foot.
For Bombay:	98th " "
8th Hussars.	1 Field Battery } Royal Artillery.
17th Lancers.	2 Companies }
	2 Companies Royal Engineers.

3. In addition to one regiment of Infantry from the Cape of Good Hope, for which, as you were advised in our letter, dated 8 July last, No. 114, we had made a requisition, and two, which it was understood would be sent from that colony, in compliance with an application to that effect from the Government of Bombay, Her Majesty's Government contemplate being able to spare two other regiments from the Cape, and will send orders to that effect accordingly. These regiments are to be despatched to Calcutta direct. Para. 8.

4. By these additions Her Majesty's forces in India will be raised to—

11 Regiments of Dragoons.	11 Companies of Artillery.
55 Regiments of Infantry.	7 Field Batteries.
4 Troops of Artillery.	4 Companies of Engineers.

5. Drafts to complete the regiments in India, both of the Queen's and Company's services, to their full strength, will be despatched from time time, as soon as they can be got ready.

6. The establishment of the European troops in India, after the arrival of the additional

Appendix, No. 4.

reinforcements, will amount to 86,968 men, as specified in the margin,* exclusive of regimental and staff officers.

* * * * *

18. Referring to the announcement now made, that three additional regiments of dragoons and additional artillery have been ordered to proceed to India, we must impress upon our Government the necessity for using the most strenuous exertions for procuring the required number of horses.

19. Being of opinion that Major Apperley, Deputy Superintendent of the Stud, Central Provinces, on furlough in Europe, could render very valuable aid in the selection of the horses to be procured at the Cape, that officer has been required to proceed to the Cape for this purpose, and to place himself under the orders of the Governor of that colony. We shall leave it to your Government to fix the allowances to be received by him whilst employed on this duty.

20. Major Apperley embarked for the Cape on the ship "Trafalgar" on the 1st instant.

MILITARY LETTER from Fort William, dated 8 August 1857, No. 218.

Cons. 31 July 1857, No.
Cons. August 1857, No.

WE have the honour to submit to your Honourable Court copy of correspondence marginally recorded, regarding a suggestion for obtaining from England 400 thoroughly trained Sappers and Miners by next cold season.

2. It will be observed that his Excellency the Acting Commander-in-Chief approves of the proposed measure, and suggests that the services of Colonel J. R. Western and Major J. H. Maxwell, of the Bengal Engineers, now in England, may be made available to organise the corps, as recommended by the officer commanding the Sappers and Miners.

3. We beg to recommend the propositions to your Honourable Court's favourable consideration.

EXTRACT Military Letter to India, dated 23 September 1857, No. 178.

7. WE have to apprise you that it has been resolved to send a detachment to Aden, to replace the wing of the European regiment withdrawn from that port to Bombay.

8. The detachment will be found by the garrison at Malta, and will consist of two companies (say 200 men), with the usual proportion of non-commissioned officers, under the command of a field-officer.

9. This detachment will be taken on from Malta by the steamer "Ripon," and will be conveyed from Suez to Aden by the Peninsular and Oriental steamer which takes on the mail now under despatch.

10. It has been arranged that the Royal Engineers—two companies for Calcutta, and two for Kurrachee—shall be sent overland to Calcutta and Bombay, by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer, commencing with that of the 4th October.

MILITARY LETTER to India, dated 6 October 1857, No. 187.

1. WE have accepted the offer of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company to convey two companies of Royal Artillery, composed of 220 men destined for Calcutta, by the steamer to leave Southampton on the 12th instant, for Alexandria, and to carry them forward by a corresponding ship from Suez as far as Galle, where they may be expected to arrive about 14th November.

2. Fearing

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* 11 Regiments Dragoons	7,766
55 Regiments Infantry	59,950
Royal Artillery, say	3,500
Royal Engineers, say	400
	71,616
Company's Artillery	6,862
This does not include the contemplated additions to this item.	
Company's Infantry	8,490
TOTAL	86,968

2. Fearing that time will not permit of your Government providing conveyance to Calcutta for these two companies, to be ready at Galle on their arrival in that harbour, we have desired the Government of Bombay to communicate the present information by telegraph to the Government of Madras, in the hope that that Government may be able to make the required arrangements for transhipping the artillery to a steamer, or some other vessel, if a steamer is not immediately available. Appendix, No. 4.

3. If you shall be of opinion that the services of this detachment would be more useful at Madras or elsewhere, than in Bengal, you will exercise your discretion in diverting them to the point where they may be most needed.

MILITARY LETTER to Bombay, dated 14 October 1857, No. 121.

YOU will have learnt from the enclosure to our military letter, dated 23 September 1857, that two companies of Royal Engineers would embark for Bombay, *en route* to Kurrachee, by the overland steamer in October. One company proceeded by the steamer "Sultan" from Southampton on the 2d October. The other company will embark from Chatham on the 14th instant on a special steamer for Alexandria. No. 106. About 120 men.

MILITARY LETTER from Fort William, dated 22 August 1857, No. 231.

WITH reference to your Honourable Court's letter, No. 114, of the 8th July 1857, paragraphs 3 and 5, we have the honour to state for your information that we have requested the Government* of Fort St. George and the Honourable the Colonial Secretary at Colombo, to instruct the commanders of the vessels which are bringing out the regiments noted in the margin† to cause the three regiments which may first arrive to proceed on to Calcutta, and the regiment last arriving to proceed to Madras. * No. 859 and 860, dated 21 August 1857.

2. With regard to para. 7 of your Honourable Court's letter, under notice, in which you propose to make further requisitions on Her Majesty's Government for troops upon the receipt of information from us, we beg to refer your Honourable Court to our separate letter, No. 206, of the 21st July last, in which we estimated our wants to an extent of 15,000 men, beyond the number of troops previously asked for in our letters of the 6th and 19th June and 4th July 1857.

EXTRACT Military Letter to India, dated 4 November 1857, No. 220.

IN compliance with the urgent demand of the Government of Madras for a further reinforcement of European troops for that Presidency, we applied to Her Majesty's Government for the services of two additional regiments of infantry. The 68th and 69th Foot have in consequence been placed under orders to embark for Madras as soon as possible. One of these regiments, the 69th, will be sent overland, the other round the Cape.

MILITARY LETTER to Madras, dated 4 November 1857, No. 158.

IN compliance with the urgent demand of your Government for a further reinforcement of European troops for your Presidency, we have applied to Her Majesty's Government for the services of two additional regiments of infantry. The 68th and 69th foot have in consequence been placed under orders to embark for Madras as soon as possible; one of these regiments, the 69th, will be sent overland, the other round the Cape.

A portion of the 69th Regiment, as specified in the margin, will be conveyed to Galle by the Australian mail steamer of the 12th instant. It will be necessary that you should immediately provide conveyance for the detachment from that place to Madras. The Australian steamer is timed to reach Galle on the 14th December 1857.

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† 1st Foot, 1st Battalion; 19th ditto, ditto; 38th ditto, ditto; 79th ditto, ditto.

Appendix, No. 4.

Military Letter from Fort William, dated 9 October 1857, No. 267.

Cons. 11 September 1857, No. 7.
Cons. 2 October 1857, No. .
Letter to the Deputy Quartermaster-General of the Army, No. 1,390, dated 29, and his reply, No. 2,028, dated 30 September 1857.
Letters from Captain Key, R.N., dated 26 September and 1 October 1857.
Letters to the Honourable the Colonial Secretary, Ceylon.
Captain Key, R.N., Secretary to Government of Madras, No. 67, 68, and 69, dated 2 October 1857.
Letter to Captain Sir William Wiseman, Bart., R.N., No. 262, dated 8 October 1857.

In continuation of our separate letter, No. 231, of the 22d August 1857, reporting that we had instructed the Government of Fort St. George, and the Honourable the Colonial Secretary at Colombo, respecting the destinations to be assigned to the ships on which Her Majesty's regiments had been ordered to Ceylon and Madras; we have now the honour to transmit copies of the further instructions issued by us, and which will be carried into effect by Sir William Wiseman, Bart., R.N., who has been deputed for the purpose to Ceylon.

Extract Military Letter to India, dated 25 November 1857, No. 232.

* Two sergeants; two corporals; twenty sappers.

6. A detachment of Royal Engineers, as shown in the margin,* under the command of a subaltern officer, will proceed from Malta to Calcutta by the steamer "Euxine" on the 10th December. This detachment is intended to make up the strength of the company of Royal Engineers which was diverted from service in China, to the strength of the other companies serving in India.

Extract Military Letter to India, dated 9 December 1857, No. 251.

No. 165, para. 2.

1. Referring to our letter of the 9th September last, we have now to apprise you that Her Majesty's 94th regiment proceeds to Kurrachee by the overland route, and has embarked on the "Abeona" for Alexandria.

Military Letter to Bombay, dated 9 December 1857, No. 146.

1. We have to inform you that Her Majesty's 94th regiment, which you will have learned from the enclosure to our letter, dated 9th September last, No. 93, was intended to proceed to Kurrachee, *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope, will now proceed to that port by the overland route. The regiment, of the strength specified in the margin,† embarked at Plymouth on the steamer "Abeona" on the 8th instant.

† 40 officers, 864 men.

No. 135.

2. In continuation of our letter, dated the 25th November, we forward to you copy of communication this day addressed to the Government of India, and of the enclosures referred to in paras. 3 and 7 of letter (No. 251) dated 9th December 1857.

‡ Captain A. W. Johnson.

3. A detachment, consisting of a commissioned officer‡ and 40 men of the Royal Artillery, embarked by the steamer of the 4th December from Southampton for your Presidency, to complete companies to their proper strength.

Military Letter to India, dated 6 January 1858, No. 8.

Having taken into our serious consideration the vast extent of the operations which must necessarily be carried on during the present season in so many parts of India, the great mortality both in action and from disease which appears to have taken place in those regiments which have hitherto been actively engaged, the difficulty which must be expected to be felt in supplying casualties with well trained recruits, thoroughly efficient for immediate service; the great importance of maintaining an ample and efficient European force in India, whilst the reorganisation of the native army is under consideration, and the certainty that the troops diverted from the expedition to China, or an equal force in their stead, will shortly be required for employment in that country, we have thought it desirable to apply to Her Majesty's Government for an addition of two regiments of the line. Her Majesty's Government have in consequence placed the 71st and 92d regiments in orders for India. It is intended that both regiments should proceed to Bombay overland in the course of this month.

Appendix, N° 5.

AN ACCOUNT showing the Quantities of COALS and PATENT FUEL remaining in Store on the 31st May and 30th June 1857; the Quantities Shipped prior to 31st May 1857, but not received at the *Cape* on that Date; and the Quantities shipped in each Month since 31 May 1857. Appendix, No. 5

	Tons.	Ascension. *Tons.*	
Store, 31st May 1857 - -	*1,554	739	* Viz., 907 tons at Simon's Town. 618 „ Cape Town. 29 „ Port Elizabeth.
Store, 30th June 1857 - -	†1,018	221	† Viz., 301 tons at Simon's Town. 558 „ Cape Town. 159 „ Port Elizabeth.
Quantity shipped prior to 31st May 1857, but not received -	6,927	3,739	
Quantity shipped in June 1857	991	1,155	
„ „ July „	—	—	
„ „ August „	2,687	—	
„ „ Sept. „	919	—	
„ „ Oct. „	6,163	—	
„ „ Nov. „	2,738	3,587	
„ „ Dec. „	1,058	600	
„ „ Jan. 1858	664	—	
„ „ Feb. „	501	—	
TOTAL SHIPPED - -	22,648	9,081	

Admiralty, 22 February 1858.

R. Dundas.

A RETURN showing the Quantities of COALS and PATENT FUEL remaining in Store at *St. Vincent* (*Cape de Verdes*), *Ascension*, and the *Cape of Good Hope*, on the 29th June 1857.

STATION.	QUANTITY IN STORE. 29 June 1857.	
	Tons.	
St. Vincent - - -	548	The agreement with the Patent Fuel Company, dated 12th March 1857, was for 2,000 tons of fuel to be supplied as demanded. On the 29th June 1857, 548 tons of this quantity remained to be supplied.
Ascension - - -	256	
Cape of Good Hope - -	1,018	viz. 301 tons at Simon's Town. 558 „ Cape Town. 159 „ Port Elizabeth.

Admiralty, 20 February 1858.

R. Dundas,
Storekeeper-general.

Appendix, No. 5. RETURN of Her Majesty's Steam Vessels in Commission in the *Mediterranean* and in *England* on the 29th June 1857.

MEDITERRANEAN.

Royal Albert.	Curlew.	Caradoc.
Conqueror.	Swallow.	Harpy.
Centurion.	Desperate.	Redpole.
Brunswick.	Coquette.	Hearty.
Curaçoa.	Vigilant.	Shearwater.
Gorgon.	Osprey.	Arrow.
Centaur.	Wanderer.	Boxer.
Vulture.	Recruit.	Medina.
Ariel.	Weser.	

IN ENGLAND.

Agamemnon.	Rhadamanthus.	Pigmy.
Exmouth.	Dee.	Bullfinch.
Ajax.	Cuckoo.	Sprightly.
Blenheim.	Otter.	Fire Queen.
Edinburgh.	Alban.	Stork.
Hogue.	Locust.	Jackal.
Cornwallis.	Lizard.	Porcupine.
Hawke.	Wildfire.	Seagull.
Pembroke.	Banshee.	Advice.
Hastings.	Bustler.	Asp.
Leopard.	Prospero.	Victoria and Albert, Yacht.
Devastation.	Brisk.	Black Eagle, Yacht.
Terror.	Brune.	Osborne, Yacht.
Vulcan.	Volcano.	Fairy, Yacht.
Cyclops.	Dasher.	Elfin, Yacht.

Admiralty, February 1858.

Appendix, No. 6.

ABSTRACT of PASSAGES, 1857, of Her Majesty's Ships and Transports and Freight Ships.

NAMES.	CALCUTTA.	SAILED.	VERDES.	ASCENSION.	CAPE.	SINGAPORE.	HONGKONG.	
Simoom	4 July	5 Feb.	-	-	57 2 April	136 Went to Mauritius.		Called at Mauritius.
Sans Pareil	17 Sept.	17 March	Madeira, 10 (1)	34 (1½)	60 (1)	104	116	Former Passages to Cape.
Himalaya	20 July	16 April	13	-	39 30 June	Calcutta, 20 July		Vulcan - - - 56
Transit	-	14 April	15	-	42	Lost, 10 July	Bama	Vulcan - - - 58 Megæra - - - 66
Adventure	9 Sept.	22 May	20	-	58			Encounter - - 45
Assistance	-	22 May	15	-	64			Niger - - - 56 Imperador - - 38
Shannon	-	17 March	-	-	52 (4)	89	107	Imperatrice - - 45
Chesapeake	-	24 Sept.	-	-	62	Galle, 99		Cleopatra - - 45 Packets, Average 41
Cordelia	-	6 June	-	-	54			Auxiliary Screw 52
	Average, 11 Passages		-	-	50			Ditto - - - 49
Belleisle, Sailing S.	24 Sept.							Average - 50
Mauritius	-	17 June	-	-	55			
Cleopatra	-	18 June	Madeira, 7	26	49			
Imperador	-	10 Aug.	Madeira, 5	19	-	67		
Imperatrice	-	12 Aug.	Madeira, 5	19	38 ½			
Adelaide	-	15 Aug.	-	-	49	95	108	
	Average, 24 Passages		-	-	51 ½			
Northfleet	-	25 Feb.	-	-	-	-	88	
Pride of Ocean	-	April	-	-	-	-	89	
Gauntlet	-	31 March	-	-	-	-	117	
Neleus	-	23 April	-	-	-	-	108	
Mooresfoot	-	18 April	-	-	-	-	112	
Canaan	-	25 April	-	-	-	-	111	
Admiral	-	25 April	-	-	-	101	117	Called Singapore.
Violet	-	27 April	-	-	-	-	106	
Earl of Eglington	-	30 April	-	-	-	-	103	Average - - 105

Various Vessels' Passages.

NAMES.	DATE.	VERDES.	ASCENSION.	CAPE.	MAURITIUS.	GALLE.	CALCUTTA.
Australian	15 Aug.	12		38			78
John Bell	6 Aug.	14		54		86	94
Lady Jocelyn	6 Aug.			44		88	
Robert Lowe	29 July			56			88
Golden Fleece	8 Aug.	13	Steamed all the way except 18 days.				68 (68)
Scotland	2 Aug.						94
Prince Arthur	1 July						90 Madras.
Victoria	6 Aug.						99 (85)
Sydney	15 Aug.						69 (71)
City of Manchester	26 Aug.						74
Queen of South	30 Aug.						92 Madras.
Ireland	end Sept.			51			
Great Britain	October			39			
Calcutta	October			40			
Southampton	October			42			
Thebes	31 July	14		42			76
Carthage	2 Aug.			46			79 Madras.
Caledonian	26 July	9 Teneriffe				75	
United Kingdom	5 Aug.	16				86	
Cleopatra	17 June				69		
Kersonese							88 Madras.
Scotia							98 Bombay.
W. Hammond	Aug.					99	
Alnwick Castle						99 Madras.	
Merchantman						109	
Whirlwind						92	
Walmer Castle						93	
Louisiana						96	
Defiance						94 Madras.	
Sussex						84	
Tyburnia						88	
Ballarat						82	
James Barnes							103
Champion of the Seas							101
Lightning							92

---

1 July 1858:

Mediterranean Fleet	Royal Albert Conqueror. P. Royal. Centurion - - - 4.	Conqueror came from Gibraltar, with the 47th Regiment, on 25th August, at Portsmouth.
Home Ports	Ajax, 60 Blenheim. Edinboro. Hague. Cornwallis. Hawke. Pembroke. Hastings - - - 8.	September 1856. Fury, Highflyer, Niger, Cruizer, and 7 gunboats, to China. May 1857. Furious, Cormorant, Surprise, and 12 gunboats to China.

Over rate, 1 July 1857=1,505 Men.

Troop Ships	Himalaya. Transit. Simoom. Adventure. Assistance.

Perseverance, in West Indies.
Vulcan, from Cape.
Urgent, new engines.
Megæra at Cape.

To face page 259.

SKETCH OF SAILS AS PROPOSED FOR "URGENT" AND "PERSEVERANCE."



J.Basire Lith.

0 27 Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed, 1st July, 1858.

Henry Hansard Printer

Appendix, No. 7.

DIMENSION of MASTS and YARDS of Her Majesty's Ships "Urgent" and "Perseverance," of Guns.

(No. 301.)

Orchard Yard, Blackwall, August 1854.

	As Fitted April 1855.		Length.	
	Feet.	*Ins.*	*Feet.*	*Ins.*
Main Mast - - Housing from the heel to the deck - - -	—		—	
From deck to lower side of trussel-trees - -	52	0	57	6
Head - - - - - - -	13	6	15	6
Extreme length of mast - - - -	—		—	
„ Topmast - - Whole length, head included - - - -	39	6	52	6
Head - - - - - -	5	6	7	6
„ Top-gallant-mast From lower side of fid-hole to hounds - -	18	0	24	6
Pole - - - - - -	12	3	17	0
„ Yard - - Whole length, yard-arms included - - -	74	0	86	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	3	0	4	6
„ Topsail-yard - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	55	0	62	6
Yard-arms, each - - - -	4	6	5	0
„ Top-gallant-yard Whole length, yard-arms included - -	38	6	42	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	1	8	2	0
„ Royal-yard - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	30	0	30	6
Yard-arms, each - - - -	1	3	1	6
Fore Mast - - Housing from heel to deck - - - -	—		—	
From deck to lower side of trussel-trees - -	48	6	54	0
Head - - - - - -	12	6	15	6
Extreme length of mast - - - -	—		—	
„ Topmast - - Whole length, head included - - - -	39	6	52	6
Head - - - - - -	5	6	7	6
„ Top-gallant-mast From lower side of fid-hole to hounds - -	18	0	24	6
Pole - - - - - -	12	3	17	0
„ Yard - - - Whole length, yard-arms included - - -	74	0	86	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	3	0	4	6
„ Topsail-yard - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	55	0	62	6
Yard-arms, each - - - -	4	6	5	0
„ Top-gallant-yard - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	38	6	42	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	1	8	2	0
„ Royal-yard - - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	30	0	30	6
Yard-arms, each - - - -	1	6	1	6
Mizen Mast - - Housing from heel to deck - - - -	—		—	
From deck to lower side of trussel-trees -	41	6	48	0
Head - - - - - -	10	0	11	0
Extreme length of mast - - - -	—		—	
„ Topmast - Whole length, head included - - - -	30	0	37	6
Head - - - - - -	4	0	5	6
„ Top-gallant-mast From lower side of fid-hole to hounds - -	15	0	18	6
Pole - - - - - -	10	0	15	6
„ Cross-jack-yard Whole length, yard-arms included - -	52	0	59	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	2	2	3	0
„ Topsail yard - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	39	0	44	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	3	3	4	0
„ Top-gallant-yard Whole length, yard arms included - -	26	6	30	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	1	2	2	0
„ Royal-yard - Whole length, yard-arms included - -	20	3	22	0
Yard-arms, each - - - -	0	10	1	6

Appendix, No. 7.

Dimensions of Masts and Yards of H. M. S. "Urgent" and "Perseverance, &c.—*continued.*

	As Fitted April 1855.		Length.	
	Feet.	*Ins.*	*Feet.*	*Ins.*
Mizen Gaff	32	0	32	0
„ Trysail Gaffs, Fore and Main	32	0	32	0
Spanker Boom	47	0	56	6
Bowsprit, length, exclusive of housing	36	0	35	0
Housing	—		—	
Jib-boom — Whole length, housing included	34	0	30	6
Housing	—		—	
Flying Jib-boom	36	0	49	0
Ensign Staff	—		—	
Jack Staff	—		—	

J. Graff.

COMPARATIVE Dimensions, Tonnage, and Surface of Sails of the 30 Gun Frigate "Curaçoa," the General Screw Company's Ship, "Queen of the South," and the Troop Ship, "Perseverance," the last as originally masted.

"CURAÇOA."		"QUEEN OF THE SOUTH."	"PERSEVERANCE,"
	Ft. In.	*Ft. In.*	*Ft. In.*
Length	192 0	240 0	273 3
Breadth	43 0	39 0	38 5
Tonnage	1,570	1,752	1,964
Surface of sail, square feet	21,136	17,779	19,584

From which it will be seen that the "Perseverance" was not masted originally as an 80 gun ship, but that her masts were less than those of a 30 gun screw frigate, and not much larger than those of the "Queen of the South," a vessel of less tonnage than the "Perseverance;" and also built by Messrs. Mare. And it may be observed, that although the "Perseverance" was fitted with a poop and forecastle of increased size, her stability was not in consequence reduced, inasmuch as 50 tons of ballast were placed in her when launched to compensate for this top weight.

In comparing the "Perseverance" with "Curaçoa" it should be borne in mind that the latter carries in armament and shot 99 tons on her decks.

8 May 1857.

EXTRACT of Letter from Commander *M'Donald.*

"Perseverance," Portsmouth.—Reporting on the Capabilities, &c. of the Ship.

H. M. Ship "Perseverance," Portsmouth,
Sir, 23 September 1857.

IN compliance with your orders of the 22d September, I have the honour to submit for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a report of the capabilities of Her Majesty's ship "Perseverance," and a list of additions and alterations, which from my experience in carrying 2,798 troops from the Mediterranean to England, also 4,556 troops

troops in the West Indies, I consider will render her a most efficient troop ship to accommodate 1,000 men in any climate. Appendix, No. 7.

I consider her capabilities to be as follows:—

1. Rolls deep but very easy.

2. Pitches very easy.

3. Never, in bad weather, ships any seas.

4. Answers her helm very well indeed.

5. She is very stiff at all times, even with a small quantity of provisions, and only one day's coal on board.

6. Carries her helm very well indeed, when on a wind screw up, both in light and heavy weather.

I consider the ship in every respect to be a capital sea boat, and she answers very well, rigged as a ship.

Admiral Sir G. F. Seymour, G.C.H.,
&c. &c. &c.

Appendix, No. 8.

Oaklands, Clonmel, 3 March 1858. Appendix, No. 8.

Sir,

I HAVE seen in the papers that you are Chairman of a Committee of the House of Commons to inquire, amongst other matters, as to the practicability of conveying troops to India in the summer, through Egypt and the Red Sea. It appears to me that the question was solved when a large force under Sir David Baird proceeded from India in the year 1801, and landed at Kosseir in May and June; crossed in nine days the Desert to Kherie, on the Nile; proceeded down that river, garrisoned Alexandria; and in the following year, 1802, several regiments returned to India by Suez and the Red Sea, in the month of June. That force, amounting to 5,000 men, consisted of a troop horse artillery, six guns, some field batteries, a troop of dragoons, and several regiments of infantry. They had with them guns and small arms, ammunition, camp equipage, baggage, and 126 chests of treasure. The troops generally were very healthy. The march across the Suez Desert from the Lake of Pilgrims, near Grand Cairo, to Suez, was performed in four days with the greatest ease; marching by night and encamping during the day. In June the ships proceeded to India, the wind at that season blowing down the Red Sea. They made a very quick passage.

There are probably several officers in England, who, like myself, served the whole campaign under Sir David Baird; but I am very willing to give any information on the subject, if the Committee should wish me to do so.

I have marched through the whole of Oude in June and July, and I found the heat much more oppressive than I did in the Suez Desert.

I have, &c.
(signed) *P. Phipps,*
Colonel, E. I. C.

Lieut.-General
Sir De Lacy Evans, G.C.B., M.P.

Appendix, No. 9.

Appendix, No. 9.

STATEMENT showing the Average Number of DAYS to and from

SOUTHAMPTON to ALEXANDRIA.

YEAR.	Jan. No. of Days.	Feb. No. of Days.	Mar. No. of Days.	April. No. of Days.	May. No. of Days.	June. No. of Days.	July. No. of Days.	Aug. No. of Days.	Sept. No. of Days.	Oct. No. of Days.	Nov. No. of Days.	Dec. No. of Days.	Total Average.
1850	15	16	16	15	15	15	15	16	15	14	16	15	
1851 *	15	16	16	14	15	14	16	15	15	15	15	15	
1852	15	13	13	13	13	14	13	14	13	14	18	14	
1853	14	14	14	13	14	13	14	13	13	14	16	13	
1854	14	14	14	15	15	13	15	15	14	15	16	14	
1855	15½	15¼	15¼	15	13¾	15¼	14¼	*15½	14¾	14¾	15	14¾	
1856	†20	15	15½	14¼	14¼	14¼	15¼	14½	14½	15	14	‡18	
Monthly Average	15½	14¾	14¾	14	14¼	14	14¾	14¾	14¼	14½	15¾	15¼	14¾

* "Ava," first voyage 20th August, remained at Malta, having broken her screw; Mails carried to Alexandria and back by "Valetta."
† "Pera," first voyage, broke down and put into Lisbon, remained eight days.
‡ "Ripon" put into Corunna through stress of weather.

SUEZ to CALCUTTA.

YEAR.	Jan. No. of Days.	Feb. No. of Days.	Mar. No. of Days.	April. No. of Days.	May. No. of Days.	June. No. of Days.	July. No. of Days.	Aug. No. of Days.	Sept. No. of Days.	Oct. No. of Days.	Nov. No. of Days.	Dec. No. of Days.	Total Average.
1850	28	26	25	22	24	22	22	23	21	23	29	25	
1851	25	25	22	24	25	21	22	23	23	23	27	24	
1852	25	*	25	23	22	24	21	22	21	21	27	25	
1853	24	24½	24	22	22	24	22	22	24	25½	27	24½	
1854	25	23	23	23	24½	23	23½	21½	23	23½	25	29	
1855	25	26½	23½	23	23½	23	23½	22½	22½	27	28	27½	
1856	25½	24½	24½	22	22	21	22	23½	23½	25½	24	25½	
Monthly Average	25¾	25	24	22¾	23¼	22½	22¼	22½	22½	24	26¾	25¾	24

* "Haddington" remained at Suez, having broken intermediate shaft.

POINT DE GALLE to HONG-KONG.

YEAR.	Jan. No. of Days.	Feb. No. of Days.	Mar. No. of Days.	April. No. of Days.	May. No. of Days.	June. No. of Days.	July No. of Days.	Aug. No. of Days.	Sept. No. of Days.	Oct. No. of Days.	Nov. No. of Days.	Dec. No. of Days.	Total Average.
1850	22	21	19	19	17	16	16	15	16	18	17	22	
1851	23	21	19	17	15	17	*14	15	16	14	20	17	
1852	20	18	15	16	16	13	16	14	12	17	15	17	
1853	17	17	16	15	15	16½	14	15½	16	18	18	18	
1854	17	19½	16½	16½	15½	15	15	14½	15	17½	†24	22	
1855	21	18	19	16	14	15	16	17	16	17	21	19	
1856	17	21	18	15	14	16	17	16	18	19	22	16	
Monthly Average	19½	19¾	17½	15	15¼	15½	15½	15¼	15½	17¼	19½	18¾	17¼

* Collision between "Erin" and "Pacha," in Straits of Malacca
† "Chusan" put back to Singapore through stress of weather, and transferred Mails to "Ganges."

Stoppages allowed to the Contract Steamers, which, subtracted from

Southampton to Alexandria - - - - - - - 18 Hours.
Suez to Calcutta - - - - - - - - - 108 „
Galle to Hong-Kong - - - - - - - - 54 „
14 Days from Suez to Galle, including stoppages.
Suez to Bombay, 14 days.

London, May 1857.

Appendix, No. 9.

the Undermentioned PORTS, for Seven Years, Stoppages inclusive.

HONG-KONG to POINT DE GALLE.

YEAR.	Jan. No. of Days.	Feb. No. of Days.	Mar. No. of Days.	April. No. of Days.	May. No. of Days.	June. No. of Days.	July. No. of Days.	Aug. No. of Days.	Sept. No. of Days.	Oct. No. of Days.	Nov. No. of Days.	Dec. No. of Days.	Total Average.
1850 - -	16	14	16	17	18	21	19	21	20	16	19	15	
1851 - -	14	16	14	17	18	17	19	17	19	20	14	16	
1852 - -	14	13	14	14	15	18	17	19	16	*15	14	15	
1853 - -	14	14	13½	18	†24	18	19	17½	17½	15	14½	15½	
1854 - -	13	15½	16	15½	17½	22	18½	19	18	16	16	14	
1855 - -	14	15	17	15	18	17	19	20	20	16	15	16	
1856 - -	15	14	14	17	16	18	20	19	18	20	16	16	
Monthly Average	14¼	14½	14¾	16½	18	18¾	18¾	19	18½	17	15½	15½	16¾

* The "Ganges" struck on the Dido Shoal, China Sea. † "Ernn" put back to Penang.

CALCUTTA to SUEZ.

YEAR.	Jan. No. of Days.	Feb. No. of Days.	Mar. No. of Days	April. No. of Days.	May. No. of Days.	June. No. of Days.	July. No. of Days.	Aug. No. of Days.	Sept. No. of Days.	Oct. No. of Days.	Nov. No. of Days.	Dec. No. of Days.	Total Average.
1850 - -	28	27	26	28	28	32	32	29	28	28	25	24	
1851 - -	26	24	25	28	33	29	32	29	27	29	25	24	
1852 - -	25	25	25	26	29	30	32	29	26	25	23	27	
1853 - -	23	25	25	24	32	29½	30	29	26	26⅓	23⅓	23½	
1854 - -	24	23½	24½	26	25½	33	28½	30	29	27½	26½	23½	
1855 - -	24½	25	24⅓	26½	31	31⅔	31	27	29⅓	24½	24½	23	
1856 - -	23⅓	26½	24	25½	28	31½	31	27½	24½	24½	24	24	
Monthly Average	25	25	25	26¼	29¼	31	31	28½	27	26¼	24½	24	27

ALEXANDRIA to SOUTHAMPTON.

YEAR.	Jan. No. of Days.	Feb. No. of Days.	Mar. No. of Days.	April. No. of Days.	May. No. of Days.	June. No. of Days	July. No. of Days.	Aug. No. of Days.	Sept. No. of Days.	Oct. No. of Days.	Nov. No. of Days.	Dec. No. of Days.	Total Average.
1850 - -	19	16	18	17	16	14	16	14	17	17	17	17	
1851 - -	15	14	17	15	15	14	13	16	13	15	14	13	
1852 - -	14	14	14	13	14	13	14	13	14	13	15	15	
1853 - -	15	16	15	13	14	14	14	14	14	13	15	14	
1854 - -	13	15	14	15	13	14	15	16	14	14	16	15	
1855 - -	16½	14¾	17	15¾	13½	15¾	*21¾	14¼	†14	13¾	14½	14	
1856 - -	‡20¼	13	§14½	13½	13½	14¼	11½	14	13½	11½	‖14	14	
Monthly Average	16	14¾	15½	14½	14	14	15	14½	14¼	13¾	15	14½	14

* "Sultan" broke down between Malta and Gibraltar, and was detained for repairs above a week.
† "Valetta" brought mails to Malta, where they were transferred to "Ava." ‡ "Pera" put back to Malta.
§ "Euxine" went on to Marseilles from Malta, on account of break down of "Alhambra."
‖ The "Candia" broke her shaft.

the respective averages, will give the approximate Time under weigh.

Hong-Kong to Galle - - - - - - - - 54 Hours.
Calcutta to Suez - - - - - - - - 120 „
Alexandria to Southampton - - - - - - 24 „
Galle to Calcutta average seven days, including stoppage at Madras.

Appendix, No. 10.

No. 1.—STATEMENT of the Regiments of CAVALRY, INFANTRY, and ARTILLERY, of Her Majesty's Service, which have been embarked for *India* from the 1st of July to the 10th of September; showing the Strength of each Regiment, Rate per Head, Name of Ship, Tonnage, Destination, &c., according to the Embarkation Returns received at the Adjutant-General's Office to the 10th of September inclusive.

REGIMENTS.	Names of Ships.	Tonnage	Rate per Head.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date of Embarkation.	Destination.
CAVALRY:		*Tons.*	£. s. d.					1857:	
1st Dragoon Guards	City of Manchester, screw.	1,906	49 – –	23	507	–	–	August 24	Calcutta.
	Lightning	2,090	26 – –	1	–	–	–	„ 27	Ditto.
	Overland	–	– – –	5	5				
						29	512		
2d Dragoon Guards	Ellenborough	1,031	12 16 –	1	–	–	–	July 11	Ditto.
	Blenheim	1,313	12 5 –	12	331	–	–	„ 25	Ditto.
	Monarch	1,282	11 14 6	7	250	–	–	„ 25	Ditto.
	Overland	–	– – –	4	4				
						24	585		
3d Dragoon Guards	Warrior Queen	988	17 17 7	2	74	–	–	August 4	Bombay.
	Forerunner	558	17 10 –	7	251	–	–	„ 4	Ditto.
	Genghis Khan	1,306	18 19 –	16	289	–	–	„ 10	Ditto.
	Overland	–	– – –	4	4				
						29	618		
7th Hussars	Lightning	2,090	26 – –	21	511	–	–	„ 27	Calcutta.
	Candia	–	– – –	3	3				
	Overland	–	– – –	4	2				
						28	516		
			TOTAL CAVALRY			110	2,231		
INFANTRY:									
1st Foot, 1st Battalion (at Madras).	Caledonia, screw †	997	29 10 –	16	357	–	–	July 25	Ceylon, for order
	Robert Lowe, screw †	1,280	34 – –	17	420	–	–	„ 28	Ditto.
	Carthage, screw †	1,003	19 – –	3	3	–	–	August 1	Ditto.
	Defiance †	945	15 15 –	6	307	–	–	„ 4	Ditto.
	United Kingdom, screw.†	1,066	30 15 –	3	3	–	–	„ 4	Ditto.
	John Bell, screw †	1,050	30 15 –	2	1	–	–	„ 5	Ditto.
						47	1,091		
7th Foot	Sir George Seymour	850	12 18 8	9	227	–	–	July 14	Kurrachee.
	Castle Eden	930	15 18 4	1	57	–	–	„ 18	Ditto.
	Seringapatam	870	12 19 –	16	218	–	–	„ 20	Ditto.
	Ramillies	740	13 2 6	11	213	–	–	„ 20	Ditto.
	Owen Glendower	989	13 12 6	14	263	–	–	„ 20	Ditto.
						51	978		
19th Foot (at Calcutta)	Alnwick Castle †	1,087	18 9 –	20	402	–	–	„ 22	Ceylon, for order
	William Hammond †	683	17 9 4	1	–	–	–	„ 22	Ditto.
	Merchantman †	1,018	17 8 10	12	340	–	–	„ 24	Ditto.
	Whirlwind †	1,003	17 8 10	10	264	–	–	„ 29	Ditto.
	Candia,* screw †	–	– – –	2	–	–	–	August 15	Ditto.
						45	1,006		
20th Foot	Champion of the Seas	2,470	25 – –	33	817	–	–	„ 6	Calcutta.
	Candia,* screw †	–	– – –	4	–	–	–	„ 15	Ditto.
	Lightning	2,090	26 – –	1	1	–	–	„ 27	Ditto.
						38	818		
34th Foot	Golden Fleece, screw	2,768	49 – –	30	755	–	–	„ 7	Calcutta.
	Candia,* screw †	–	– – –	9	–	–	–	„ 15	Ditto.
						39	755		
38th Foot (at Calcutta)	Thebes, screw †	1,003	19 – –	11	198	–	–	July 30	Ceylon for orde
	Carthage, screw †	1,003	19 – –	9	195	–	–	August 1	Ditto.
	United Kingdom, screw.†	1,066	30 15 –	11	229	–	–	„ 4	Ditto.
	John Bell, screw †	1,050	30 15 –	14	386	–	–	„ 5	Ditto.
						45	1,088		
			Carried forward			265	5,656		

* Not taken up by tender; the rate per head, therefore, not given.
† Ships marked thus (†), taking out the 1st, 19th, 38th, and 79th Foot, also detachments, call at Ceylon for orders.

No. 1.—STATEMENT of the Regiments of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery embarked for *India*, &c.—*continued.*

REGIMENTS.	Names of Ships.	Tonnage.	Rate per Head.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date of Embarkation	Destination
		Tons.	£. s. *d.*						
INFANTRY—*continued.*			Brought forward - - -			265	5,656	1857:	
42d Foot, Highlanders -	Whirlwind † - -	1,003	17 8 10	3	76	- -	- -	July - 29	Calcutta.
	Champion of the Seas	2,470	25 - -	3	180	- -	- -	August 6	Ditto.
	James Baines - -	2,515	25 - -	5	178	- -	- -	„ - 6	Ditto.
	Golden Fleece, screw	2,768	49 - -	4	144	- -	- -	„ - 7	Ditto.
	Australian, screw -	1,391	43 15 -	16	290	- -	- -	„ - 14	Ditto.
	Lightning - -	2,090	26 - -	1	1	- -	- -	„ - 27	Ditto.
	Candia,* screw † -	- -	- - -	8	8	- -	- -	„ - 15	Ditto.
						40	877		
44th Foot - - -	Khersonese, screw -	1,273	49 - -	19	544	- -	- -	„ - 29	Madras.
	Hersilia - - -	623	16 12 -	14	258	- -	- -	„ - 26	Ditto.
	Gloriana - - -	- -	- - -	2	2	—	—		
	Overland - -	- -	- - -	1	—	—	—		
	For embarkation -	- -	- - -	1	3	—	—		
						37	807		
54th Foot - - -	Lady Jocelyn, screw	2,242	49 - -	18	352	- -	- -	„ - 4 (Portsmouth.)	Calcutta.
	Sarah Sands, screw -	1,300	40 - -	14	353	- -	- -	August 15	Ditto.
	City of Manchester, screw.	1,906	49 - -	6	151	- -	- -	„ - 24	Ditto.
						38	856		
56th Foot - - -	Ballarat † - -	713	18 19 -	2	76	- -	- -	„ - 14	Bombay.
	Southampton - -	971	19 15 -	14	354	- -	- -	„ - 23	Ditto.
	Waterloo - -	898	18 19 6	15	300	- -	- -	„ - 27	Ditto.
	Italian - - -	- -	- - -	2	1	—	—		
	Great Britain - -	- -	- - -	8	65	—	—		
						41	796		
60th Foot, 3d Battalion -	Defence † - -	945	15 15 -	2	98	- -	- -	„ - 4	Madras.
	John Bell, screw † -	1,050	30 15 -	- -	3	- -	- -	„ - 5	Ditto.
	Liverpool † - -	1,454	16 18 9	17	462	- -	- -	„ - 7	Ditto.
	Sussex - - -	959	21 19 9	- -	12	- -	- -	„ - 7	Ditto.
	Tyburnia † - -	1,012	16 18 10	9	260	- -	- -	„ - 8	Ditto.
	Ballarat † - -	713	18 19 -	11	194	- -	- -	„ - 14	Ditto.
						39	1,029		
66th Foot - - -	Queen of the South, screw.	2,250	49 - -	28	732	- -	- -	„ - 29	Madras.
	Gloriana - -	- -	- - -	10	123	—	—		
						40	855		
72d Foot - - -	Matilda Atheling -	714	16 8 10	14	296	- -	- -	„ - 26	Bombay.
	Scotia, screw - -	1,196	- - -	15	325	- -	- -	Sept. - 4	Ditto.
	Prince Albert - -	- -	- - -	10	263	—	—		
						39	884		
79th Foot (at Calcutta) -	Walmer Castle † -	1,064	17 19 -	18	402	- -	- -	July - 31	Ceylon, for orders.
	Louisiana † - -	1,263	16 16 -	18	432	- -	- -	August 1	Ditto.
	Tyburnia - -	1,012	16 18 10	9	142	- -	- -	„ - 8	Ditto.
						45	976		
88th Foot - - -	Ulysses - - -	934	12 9 6	10	288	- -	- -	July - 9	Calcutta.
	Surrey - - -	1,269	15 17 6	15	339	- -	- -	„ - 15	Ditto.
	Calabar - - -	754	12 4 6	7	222	- -	- -	„ - 17	Ditto.
	Cambodia - -	914	11 11 -	10	97	- -	- -	„ - 18	Ditto.
	Blenheim - -	1,313	12 5 -	4	2	- -	- -	„ - 25	Ditto.
	Monarch - -	1,282	11 14 6	4	5	- -	- -	„ - 25	Ditto.
						50	953		
97th Foot - - -	James Baines - -	2,515	25 - -	36	818	- -	- -	August 6	Ditto.
	Candia,* screw † -	- -	- - -	3	- -	- -	- -	„ - 15	Ditto.
						39	818		
Rifle Brigade, 2d Battalion	United Kingdom, scr. †	1,066	30 15 -	6	158	- -	- -	„ - 4	Ditto.
	Lady Jocelyn, screw	2,242	49 - -	14	356	- -	- -	„ - 10 (Cork.)	Ditto.
	Sussex - - -	959	21 19 9	17	336	- -	- -	Aug. - 6	Ditto.
	Ballarat † - -	713	18 19 -	- -	8	- -	- -	„ - 14	Ditto.
						37	858		
Rifle Brigade, 3d Battalion	Barham - - -	1,148	12 8 6	7	124	- -	- -	July - 1	Ditto.
	Cressy - - -	720	11 15 6	6	198	- -	- -	„ - 11	Ditto.
	Sutlej - -	1,150	12 9 -	16	265	- -	- -	„ - 21	Ditto.
	Aliquis - - -	1,247	12 9 5	12	377	- -	- -	„ - 25	Ditto.
						41	964		
Drafts for different regiments already in India, per numerous ships.	- - - -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	63	2,649	- - -	Ditto.
Ditto - ditto for Madras -	- - - -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	4	95	- - -	Madras.
Ditto - ditto for Bombay -	- - - -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	13	465	- - -	Bombay.
			TOTAL INFANTRY - - -			831	19,538		

* Not taken up by tender, the rate per head therefore not given.

† Ships marked thus (†), taking out the 1st, 19th, 38th and 79th Foot, also detachments, call at Ceylon for orders.

No 1.—STATEMENT of the Regiments of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery embarked for *India*, &c.—*continued.*

REGIMENTS.	Names of Ships.	Tonnage	Rate per Head.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date of Embarkation.	Destination.
ARTILLERY:		*Tons.*	£. s. d.						
Royal Artillery	Marlbro'	-	-	-	7 (with stores.)	-	7	-	Calcutta.
	Scotland, screw	1,150	39 - -	13	300	13	300	August 1	Ditto.
	Lady Jocelyn, screw	2,242	49 - -	2	24	2	24	„ 4 (Portsmouth.)	Ditto.
	Warrior Queen	988	17 17 7	11	286	11	286	August 4	Bombay.
	Victoria, screw	1,877	43 15 -	14	284	14	284	„ 13	Madras and Calcutta.
	Sydney, screw	1,391	43 15 -	12	288	12	288	„ 13	Calcutta.
	Sedgemoor	921	19 8 -	2	-	2	-	„ 28	Bombay.
	Alpore	811	18 - -	10	208	10	208	Sept. 1	Kurrachee.
	Athletæ	1,056	18 9 -	6	185	6	185	„ 1	Ditto.
	Hydaspes, screw	2,250	49 - -	24	608	24	608	-	Ceylon, for orders.
	Overland	-	-	-	-	13			
			TOTAL ARTILLERY	-	-	107	2,190		

RECAPITULATION.

	Total Officers.	Total Men.
CAVALRY	110	2,231
INFANTRY (including Drafts)	831	19,538
ARTILLERY	107	2,190
TOTAL QUEEN'S TROOPS	1,048	23,959
Add, EAST INDIA COMPANY'S RECRUITS	26	1,555
GRAND TOTAL FROM ENGLAND	1,074	25,514

FORCE intercepted en route for *China*, and obtained from the Colonies.

	Officers.	Men.	Total Men.
FROM CHINA:			
23d Foot (as per strength at embarkation)	51	972	
82d Foot - ditto	48	900	
90th Foot - ditto	52	1,046	
93d Foot - ditto	54	1,066	
Royal Artillery	23	411	
Royal Engineers	4	96	
			4,491
FROM MAURITIUS:			
4th Foot (part only)	16	320	
5th Foot	27	826	
33d Foot	37	855	
Royal Artillery	3	59	
			2,060
FROM CEYLON:			
37th Foot	18	443	
Royal Artillery	4	63	
			511
FROM THE CAPE:			
13th Foot	35	764	
89th Foot	33	712	
95th Foot	40	725	
			2,201
Add, above	445	-	9,263
	1,074	-	25,514
GRAND TOTAL	1,519	-	34,777

LIST of SHIPS in the Order of Sailing; with their Destination, Place of Embarkation, Troops on Board each; made up to 10 September 1857. (Corrected at Lloyd's.)

Name, and Date Tender was Sanctioned.	Destination.	Place of Embarkation.	Date of Sailing.	Troops on Board.	Arrivals or Latest Report.
			1857:		
1. Barham - June 9	Calcutta -	Portsmout -	July - 2	3d Batt. Rifle Brigade	At Calcutta Nov. 8.
2. Ulysses - ,, 9	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 10	88th Foot - -	,, ,, Oct. 29
3. Cressy - May 29	Ditto -	Gravesend -	,, - 11	3d Batt. Rifle Brigade D	,, ,, Nov. 17.
4. Ellenborough ,, 29	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 11	2d Dragoon Guards D	,, ,, Nov. 22.
5. Sir George Seymour - June 9	Kurrachee -	Portsmouth -	,, - 15	7th Foot - - -	,, Kurrachee, Dec. 18.
6. Surrey - ,, 9	Calcutta -	Ditto - -	,, - 16	88th Foot - -	,, Calcutta Oct. 30.
7. Calabar - ,, 9	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 18	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Nov. 24.
8. Castle Eden July 2	Kurrachee -	Gravesend -	,, - 18	7th Foot - - D	,, Kurrachee, Dec. 12.
9. Cambodia - June 9	Calcutta -	Portsmouth -	,, - 19	88th Foot - D	,, Calcutta Nov. 30.
10. Seringapatam ,, 9	Kurrachee -	Ditto - -	,, - 21	7th Foot - - -	,, Kurrachee, Nov. 28.
11. Ramillies - ,, 9	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 22	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Nov. 23.
12. Owen Glendower ,, 9	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 22	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Nov. 24.
13. Sutlej - ,, 9	Calcutta -	Ditto - -	,, - 22	3d Batt. Rifle Brigade	,, Calcutta Nov. 5.
14. Alnwick Castle ,, 9	Ceylon -	Ditto - -	,, - 23	19th Foot - -	,, ,, Nov. 15.
15. William Hammond - July 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 24	Ditto - - D	,, Galle Oct. 30.
16. Merchantman ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 24	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Nov. 9.
17. Caledonia, scr. ,, 10	Ditto -	Dublin - -	,, - 26	1st Foot - - -	,, ,, Oct. 8.
18. Aliquis - June 9	Calcutta -	Portsmouth -	,, - 26	3d Batt. Rifle Brigade	,, Calcutta Nov. 25.
19. Monarch - ,, 9	Ditto -	Gravesend -	,, - 27	2d Dragoon Guards D	,, ,, Nov. 23.
20. Blenheim - ,, 9	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 27	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Nov. 25.
21. Robert Lowe, screw - July 10	Ceylon -	Dublin -	,, - 28	1st Foot - - -	,, Galle Oct. 25.
22. Whirlwind - ,, 10	Ditto -	Portsmouth -	,, - 30	19th and 42d Foot -	,, ,, Oct. 29.
23. Thebes, screw ,, 10	Ditto -	Dublin -	,, - 31	38th Foot - -	,, ,, Oct. 1; at Calcutta, Oct. 14.
24. Walmer Castle ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	Aug. - 1	79th Foot - -	,, Galle Nov. 25.
25. Louisiana - ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 2	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Nov. 5.
26. Carthage, screw ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 2	1st and 38th Foot -	,, ,, Oct. 13; at Madras, Oct. 19.
27. Scotland, screw ,, 23	Calcutta -	Woolwich -	,, - 3	Artillery - - -	,, Calcutta Nov. 6.
28. Forerunner ,, 24	Bombay -	Gravesend -	,, - 4	3d Dragoon Guards -	,, Bombay Dec. 8.
29. Defiance - ,, 10	Ceylon -	Dublin - -	,, - 4	1st and 60th Foot -	,, Madras Nov. 5.
30. John Bell, screw ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 5	1st, 38th, and 60th Foot	,, Galle Oct. 30.
31. Warrior Queen ,, 24	Bombay -	Gravesend -	,, - 4 (Portsmouth, August 12.)	3d Dragoon Guards and Artillery.	,, Bombay Dec. 1
32. United Kingdom, screw ,, 10	Ceylon -	Dublin - -	Aug. - 6	1st and 38th Foot; Rifles, 2d Battalion	,, Galle Oct. 20.
33. Sussex - ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 7	Rifles, 2d Battalion; 60th Foot.	,, ,, Oct. 29.
34. Champion of the Seas - ,, 24	Calcutta -	Portsmouth -	,, - 8	20th and 42d Foot -	,, Calcutta Nov. 17.
35. James Baines ,, 24	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 8	97th and 42d Foot -	,, ,, Nov. 19.
36. Golden Fleece, screw - ,, 24	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 8	34th and 42d Foot -	,, ,, Oct. 15.
37. Liverpool - ,, 10	Madras -	Dublin - -	,, - 8	60th Foot - -	,, Galle Nov. 24, and sailed 30th for Calcutta.
38. Tyburnia - ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 9	60th and 79th Foot -	,, Galle Nov. 9.
39. Lady Jocelyn, screw - ,, 24	Calcutta -	Cork - -	,, - 9 (Portsmouth, August 6.)	54th Foot, 2d Batt., Rifles, Artillery.	,, Calcutta Nov. 1.
40. Genghis Khan ,, 24	Bombay -	Gravesend -	Aug. - 11	3d Dragoon Guards D	,, Bombay Nov. 10.
41. Sydney, screw ,, 24	Calcutta -	Woolwich -	,, - 14	Artillery - - -	,, Calcutta Oct. 23.
42. Australian, screw ,, 24	Ditto -	Portsmouth -	,, - 15	42d Foot - -	,, ,, Oct. 31.
43. Sarah Sands, scr. Aug 12	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 15	54th Foot - -	,, Mauritius, Nov. 23 (with damage).
44. Ballarat - July 10	Ceylon -	Dublin -	,, - 15	56th and 60th Foot, 3d Battalion Rifles.	,, Galle Nov, 4.
45. Candia, screw Aug. 12	Ditto -	Southampton	,, - 15	19th, 34th, 20th, 42d, and 97th Foot. Officers mostly.	,, ,, Oct. 25.
46. Victoria, screw July 24	Madras and Calcutta.	Woolwich and Portsmouth.	,, - 16	Artillery - D	,, Calcutta Nov. 13.
47. City of Manchester, screw Aug. 10	Calcutta -	Gravesend -	,, - 26	54th Foot and 1st Dragoon Guards.	,, ,, Nov. 8.
48. Hersilia - ,, 10	Madras -	Portsmouth -	,, - 27	44th Foot - -	,, Table Bay, Nov. 6, and sailed 8, for India.
49. Matilda Atheling ,, 13	Bombay -	Ditto - -	,, - 28	72d Foot - - -	,, Bombay Jan. 5.
50. Lightning - ,, 10	Calcutta -	Gravesend -	,, - 28	7th Hussars, 1st Dragoon Guards, 20th and 42d Foot D	,, Calcutta Nov. 26.
51. Sedgemoor - ,, 10	Bombay -	Ditto - -	,, - 29	Artillery - - D	,, Bombay Dec. 28.
52. Southampton ,, 10	Ditto -	Cork - -	,, - 26	56th Foot - -	,, ,,
53. Waterloo - ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 29	Ditto - - -	,, ,, Jan. 8.
54. Khersonese, scr. ,, 10	Madras -	Portsmouth -	,, - 30	44th Foot - -	,, Madras Nov. 26.
55. Queen of the South, screw ,, 10	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, - 30	66th Foot - -	,, ,, Dec. 1.
56. Athletæ - ,, 13	Kurrachee -	Cork - -	Sept. - 2	Artillery - - -	,, Kurrachee, Dec. 31. *
57. Alipore - ,, 13	Ditto -	Woolwich and Gravesend.	,, - 2	Ditto - - D	
58. Scotia, screw ,, 13	Bombay -	Portsmouth -	,, - 5	72d Foot - -	,, Bombay Dec. 9.
59. Hydaspes, screw ,, 13	Ceylon -	Woolwich -	(Gravesend, Sept. 19.)	Artillery - -	,, Galle Dec. 14.

Alnwick Castle -	14.
Aliquis - -	18.
Alipore - -	57.
Australian -	42.
Athletæ - -	56.
Ballarat - -	44.
Barham - -	1.
Blenheim - -	20.
Caledonia - -	17.
Calabar - -	7.
Cambodia - -	9.
Candia - -	45.
Carthage - -	26.
Castle Eden -	8.
Champion of the Seas - -	34.
City of Manchester	47.
Cressy - -	3.
Defiance - -	29.
Ellenborough -	4.
Forerunner -	28.
Genghis Khan -	40.
Golden Fleece -	36.
Hersilia - -	48.
Hydaspes - -	59.
John Bell - -	30.
James Baines -	35.
Khersonese -	54.
Lady Jocelyn -	39.
Lightning - -	50.
Liverpool - -	37.
Louisiana - -	25.
Matilda Atheling	49.
Merchantman -	16.
Monarch - -	19.
Owen Glendower	12.
Queen of the South	55.
Ramillies - -	11.
Robert Lowe -	21.
Sarah Sands -	43.
Scotia - -	58.
Scotland - -	27.
Sedgemoor -	51.
Seringapatam -	10.
Sir Geo. Seymour	5.
Southampton -	52.
Surrey - -	6.
Sussex - -	33.
Sutlej - -	13.
Sydney - -	41.
Thebes - -	23.
Tyburnia - -	38.
Ulysses - -	2.
United Kingdom	32.
Victoria - -	46.
Walmer Castle -	24.
Warrior Queen -	31.
Waterloo - -	53.
William Hammond	15.
Whirlwind -	22.

D convey also drafts.

* No account yet received of arrival at Kurrachee.

No. 2.—STATEMENT of Regiments of CAVALRY, INFANTRY, and ARTILLERY of Her Majesty's Service which have Embarked for *India* from 11th September 1857 to 18th February 1858.

REGIMENT, &c.	NAME OF SHIP.	Tonnage.	Rate per Head.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date and Place of Embarkation.	Destination.
CAVALRY:			£. s. d.					1857:	
7th Dragoon Guards	Southampton, screw	2,190	48 – –	24	473	– –	– –	October 15, Gravesend.	Kurrachee.
	Overland	– –	– – –	4	4				
						28	477		
8th Light Dragoons	Great Britain, screw	3,209	49 – –	24	486	– –	– –	October 5, Cork.	Bombay.
	Overland	– –	– – –	4	4				
						28	490		
17th ditto	Great Britain, screw	3,209	49 – –	20	481	– –	– –	October 6, Cork.	Ditto.
	Overland	– –	– – –	5	4				
						25	485		
			TOTAL CAVALRY			81	1,452		
INFANTRY:									
18th Foot	Italian, screw	784	45 – –	8	200	– –	– –	September 24, Cork.	Bombay.
	Princess Charlotte, screw.	2,200	45 – –	28	645	– –	– –	November 12, Cork.	
	Overland	– –	– – –	4	– –	– –	– –	September 24, Cork.	
						40	845		
51st Foot	Calcutta, screw	2,300	49 – –	29	773	– –	– –	October 9, Cork.	Ditto.
	Overland	– –	– – –	7	– –	– –	– –	October 8, Cork.	
						36	773		
94th Foot	Overland	– –	– – –	33	860	33	860	December 8, Plymouth.	Kurrachee.
98th Foot	Bahiana, screw	1,530	45 – –	15	423	– –	– –	October 3, Portsmouth.	Ditto.
	Ireland, screw	1,150	43 – –	19	301	– –	– –	September 23, Portsmouth.	
	Leopold, screw	2,000	45 – –	2	81	– –	– –	November 27, Portsmouth.	
						36	805		
68th Foot	Australasian, screw	2,760	36 – –	21	434	– –	– –	December 22, Portsmouth.	Madras.
	Argo, screw	2,300	36 – –	18	371	– –	– –	December 15, Portsmouth. December, 22, Plymouth.	
						39	805		
69th Foot	Overland	– –	– – –	39	760				
	Australasian, screw	2,760	36 – –	1	19	– –	– –	December 23, Plymouth.	Ditto.
	York	940	13 7 5	– –	11	– –	– –	1858: January 18, Plymouth.	
						40	790		
71st Foot	Overland, from Malta	– –	– – –	25	836	25	836	January 4, Malta.	Bombay.
92d Foot	Overland, from Gibraltar	– –	– – –	30	792	30	792	January 20, Gibraltar.	Ditto.
			TOTAL INFANTRY REGIMENTS			246	5,646		
DRAFTS FOR HER MAJESTY'S REGIMENTS:									
Drafts	Southampton, screw	2,190	48 – –	1	154	– –	– –	October 15, Gravesend.	Kurrachee.
Ditto	Leopold, screw	2,000	45 – –	1	114	– –	– –	December 27, Portsmouth.	Ditto.
Ditto	Calcutta, screw	2,300	49 – –	– –	30	– –	– –	October 8, Cork.	Bombay.
Ditto	Great Britain, screw	3,209	49 – –	1	23	– –	– –	October 5, Cork.	Ditto.
Ditto	Indomitable, screw	1,160	25 – –	3	61	– –	– –	November 10, Gravesend.	Madras.
Ditto	George Marshall	1,361	14 8 8	7	451	– –	– –	November 16, Gravesend.	Calcutta.
Ditto	Princess Charlotte, screw.	2,200	45 – –	2	53	– –	– –	November 12, Cork.	Bombay.
Ditto	Argo, screw	2,300	36 – –	9	358	– –	– –	Dec. 15 & 17, Portsmouth.	Madras and Calcutta.
			Carried forward	24	1,244				

No. 2.—STATEMENT of Regiments of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery embarked for *India*, &c.—*continued.*

REGIMENT, &c.	NAME OF SHIP.	Tonnage.	Rate per Head.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date and Place of Embarkation.	Destination.
			£. s. d.						
DRAFTS FOR HER MAJESTY'S REGIMENTS—*continued.*									
			Brought forward -	24	1,244			1857:	
Drafts - - - -	Overland - -	- -	- - -	- -	18	- -	- -	December 19, Southampton.	Calcutta.
Ditto - - - -	Salamanca - -	980	11 - -	8	351	- -	- -	December 28, Gravesend.	Bombay and Kurrachee.
								1858:	
Ditto - - - -	Overland - -	- -	- - -	- -	16	- -	- -	January 4, Southampton.	Calcutta.
Ditto - - - -	York - - -	940	13 7 5	3	152	- -	- -	January 9, Gravesend.	Madras.
Ditto - - - -	Jason, screw - -	2,668	36 - -	22	925	- -	- -	January 12, Plymouth.	Calcutta.
Ditto - - - -	United Service, screw	1,030	35 - -	9	334	- -	- -	January 14, Gravesend.	Bombay and Kurrachee.
Ditto - - - -	Overland - -	- -	- - -	5	226	- -	- -	February 3, Southampton.	Madras.
Ditto - - - -	Overland (part of 92d Regiment).	- -	- - -	6	234	- -	- -	February 10, Southampton.	Bombay.
Ditto, to proceed this month	Overland - -	- -	- - -	11	230	- -	- -	Mail, Feb. 24, Southampton.	Ditto.
Ditto - - ditto - -	Antelope, screw -	1,007	40 - -	4	155	- -	- -	About -	Kurrachee.
Ditto - - ditto - -	Indiana, screw -	2,364	38 - -	- -	742	- -	- -	About -	Calcutta.
Ditto, ready for 1st March	- - - - -	- -	- - -	- -	1,560				
			TOTAL DRAFTS - - - - - - -			92	6,187		
			TOTAL INFANTRY REGIMENTS - -			246	5,646		
			TOTAL INFANTRY - -			338	11,833		
ARTILLERY:									
								1857:	
Foot Artillery, two companies.	Overland - -	- -	- - -	13	221	- -	- -	October 12, Southampton.	Bengal.
1 Troop Horse ditto - -	Prince Albert, screw -	1,024	44 18 9	8	219	- -	- -	October 15, Woolwich.	Bombay.
1 Field Troop and two companies.	Leopold, screw -	2,000	45 - -	15	407	- -	- -	November 24, Woolwich: November 27, Portsmouth.	Kurrachee.
1 Field Troop - - -	Viscount Canning, screw.	780	45 - -	6	186	- -	- -	October 19, Woolwich.	Bengal.
1 Field Troop and one company.	Indomitable, screw -	1,160	25 - -	11	296	- -	- -	Nov. 9 & 10, Woolwich and Gravesend.	Madras.
	Gosforth - - -	810	13 19 6	- -	2*	- -	- -	September 19, Gravesend.	Bombay.
Drafts - - - -	George Marshall -	1,361	14 8 8	1	80	- -	- -	November 16, Gravesend.	Bengal.
Ditto - - - -	Overland - -	- -	- - -	2	80	- -	- -	December 4, Southampton	Madras and Bombay.
Ditto - - - -	Argo, screw - -	2,300	36 - -	- -	47	- -	- -	December 15, Portsmouth.	Madras.
Ditto - - - -	Salamanca - -	980	11 - -	- -	21	- -	- -	December 28, Woolwich.	Bombay.
								1858:	
Ditto - - - -	Jason, screw - -	2,668	36 - -	- -	82	- -	- -	January 12, Gravesend.	Bengal.
			TOTAL ARTILLERY - -			56	1,641		
ENGINEERS:									
Engineers - - -	Overland - -	-	- - -	11	235	- -	- -	October 2, Southampton.	Bombay and Calcutta.
Ditto - - -	Dutchman, screw -	1,024	48 15 -	10	244	- -	- -	October 14, Chatham.	Bombay and Bengal.
Ditto - - - -	Overland - -	- -	- - -	1	- -	- -	- -	October 11, Malta.	Calcutta.
Ditto - - - -	Overland - -	- -	- - -	1	24	- -	- -	November 30, Malta.	Ditto.
						23	503		
Ditto - - - -	Deduct, sent to China	- -	- - -	- -	- -	- -	24		
			TOTAL ENGINEERS - -			23	479		

* With East India Company's recruits.

No. 2.—Statement of Regiments of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery embarked for *India*, &c.—*continued.*

REGIMENT, &c.		NAME OF SHIP.	Tonnage.	Rate per Head.	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date and Place of Embarkation.	Destination.
EAST INDIA COMPANY'S RECRUITS:				£. s. d.					1857:	
Recruits	Sept.	Gosforth	810	13 19 6	4	353	- -	- -	September 19, Gravesend.	Bombay.
Ditto	October.	Malabar	647	12 9 —	3	132	- -	- -	October 10, Gravesend.	Madras.
Ditto	October.	Bengal	582	13 8 3	3	212	- -	- -	October 10, Gravesend,	Ditto.
Ditto	November.	Maria Soames	785	12 9 —	4	230	- -	- -	November 11, Gravesend.	Calcutta
Ditto	November.	Statesman	874	11 18 8	4	188	- -	- -	November 16, Gravesend.	Ditto.
Ditto	December.	Gertrude	948	11 9 6	3	349	- -	- -	December 5, Gravesend.	Ditto.
Ditto	December.	Stuart Wortley	891	13 14 6	3	249	- -	- -	December 12, Gravesend.	Ditto.
Ditto	December.	Lord Dalhousie	912	11 8 5	3	186	- -	- -	December 15, Gravesend.	Bombay.
Ditto	December.	Nimrod	893	11 2 5	3	245	- -	- -	December 19, Gravesend	Calcutta.
									1858:	
Ditto	Jan.	Burlington	778	11 12 6	5	300	- -	- -	January 20, Gravesend.	Ditto.
Ditto	Feb.	Akbar	819	11 9 5	- -	500	- -	- -	About Feb. 25 & 26	Ditto.
Ditto to embark	Feb.	Vittoria	848	13 12 6						
							35	2,944		

RECAPITULATION.

	Number of Officers.	Number of Men.	Total Officers.	Total Men.	Date and Place of Embarkation.	Destination.
Cavalry Regiments	- - -	- - -	81	1,452		
Infantry: Regiments	246	5,646	338	11,833		
Infantry: Drafts	92	6,187				
Artillery	- - -	- - -	56	1,641		
Engineers	- - -	- - -	23	479		
			498	15,405		
Add East India Company's Recruits			35	2,944		
Grand Total from England			533	18,349		
UNDER ORDERS, AND SENT FROM THE CAPE:						
Her Majesty's 6th Foot - About	20	766	- - -	- - -	(August 12 and Dec. 4, Cape of Good Hope).	Bengal.
Her Majesty's 13th Foot	35	764				
Royal Artillery	9	230				
			64	1,760		
GRAND TOTAL			597	20,109		

G. A. Wetherall, Adjutant-General.

LIST of SHIPS in the Order of Sailing, with their Destination, Place of Embarkation, Troops on Board, &c.; made up to 18th February 1858.

Name of Ship, with Date Tender was Sanctioned.	Destination.	Place of Embarkation.	Date of Sailing.	Troops on Board.	Arrivals, or latest Report.
1857:			1857:		
1. Gosforth - Aug. 24	Bombay -	Gravesend -	September 19	E. I. Co.'s recruits -	At Bombay, Dec. 30.
2. Ireland, screw Sept. 11	Kurrachee -	Portsmouth -	,, 24	98th Foot - -	At Kurrachee, Dec. 29
3. Italian, screw ,, 12	Bombay -	Cork - -	,, 25	18th Foot - -	At Bombay, Dec. 3.
4. Bahiana, screw ,, 11	Kurrachee -	Portsmouth -	October 4	98th Foot - -	At Kurrachee, Jan. 2.
5. Great Britain, screw ,, 11	Bombay -	Cork - -	,, 8	8th & 17th Light Dragoons, and Drafts.	At Bombay, Dec. 17.
6. Calcutta, screw ,, 18	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, 11	51st Foot - -	At Bombay, Dec. 29.
7. Malabar - ,, 22	Madras -	Gravesend -	,, 10	E. I. Co.'s recruits -	Sailed from Table Bay for Madras, Dec. 14.
8. Bengal - - ,, 22	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, 10	Ditto - - -	Spoken Oct. 27, 29° N. 25° W.
9. Dutchman, screw ,, 18	Bombay and Bengal.	Chatham -	,, 14	Engineers - -	
10. Southampton, screw ,, 3	Kurrachee -	Gravesend -	,, 17	7th Dragoon Guards	At Kurrachee, Jan. 7
11. Prince Albert, screw Aug. 29	Bombay -	Woolwich -	,, 16	Artillery - - -	At Bombay, Dec. 28.
12. Viscount Canning, screw Oct. 3	Bengal -	Ditto - -	,, 21 (Deal.)	Ditto - - -	Sailed from Simon's Bay for Calcutta, Dec. 7.
13. Indomitable, screw ,, 27	Madras -	Woolwich and Gravesend.	November 11	Artillery and Drafts -	At Cape de Verds previous to Dec. 4.
14. Maria Soames ,, 9	Calcutta -	Gravesend -	,, 13	E. I. Co.'s recruits -	Spoken Nov. 25, 36° N. 19° W.
15. Princess Charlotte, screw Sept. 11	Bombay -	Cork - -	,, 14	18th Foot, and Drafts	Arrived at Table Bay, Dec. 29.
16. George Marshall - Nov. 2	Calcutta -	Gravesend -	,, 17	Drafts, and Artillery ditto.	Spoken Dec. 23, 24° S. 31° W.
17. Statesman - Oct. 30	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, 17	E. I. Co.'s recruits.	Spoken Jan. 3, 29° S. 24° W.
18. Leopold, screw Sept. 11	Kurrachee -	Portsmouth -	December 3	Artillery, and 98th Foot.	Sailed from Cape de Verds for Bombay, Dec. 19.
19. Gertrude - Nov. 13	Calcutta -	Gravesend -	,, 5	E. I. Co.'s recruits -	
20. Stuart Wortley - ,, 13	Ditto -	Ditto - -	,, 13	Ditto - - -	No account since sailing.
21. Lord Dalhousie ,, 13	Bombay -	Ditto - -	,, 16	Ditto - - -	
22. Nimrod - ,, 20	Calcutta -	Ditto - -	,, 19	Ditto - - -	
23. Argo, screw - Dec. 4	Madras -	Plymouth and Portsmouth.	,, 22	68th Foot, and Artillery.	Sailed from Cape de Verds for Madras, Jan. 1.
24. Australasian, screw Nov. 6	Ditto -	Portsmouth -	,, 23	68th and 69th Foot -	Arrived at Cape de Verds Jan. 2.
25. Salamanca - Dec. 17	Bombay -	Woolwich -	,, 28	Artillery - - -	No account since sailing.
26. Jason, screw ,, 28	Calcutta -	Gravesend and Plymouth.	1858: January 13	Artillery and Drafts -	Sailed from Cape de Verds for Calcutta, Jan. 31.
27. United Service, screw ,, 28	Bombay and Kurrachee.	Gravesend -	,, 14	Drafts - -	Arrived at Cape de Verds from London, and was to sail about Feb. 3 for Bombay.
28. York - - ,, 28	Madras -	Ditto - -	,, 19 (Plymouth.)	Drafts, 69th Foot -	Sailed from Plymouth Jan. 19 for Calcutta.
1858:					
29. Burlington - Jan. 4	Calcutta -	Ditto - -	,, 22	E. I. Co.'s recruits -	No account since sailing.
30. Indiana, screw Feb. 17	Ditto -	- - -	Not yet sailed	Ditto.	
31. Akbar - - Jan. 23	Ditto -	- - -			
32. Vittoria - ,, 23	Ditto -	- - -			
33. Antelope, screw Feb. 17	Bombay -	- - -			

31. Akbar.
33. Antelope.
23. Argo.
24. Australasian.
4. Bahiana.
8. Bengal.
29. Burlington.
6. Calcutta.
9. Dutchman.
16. George Marshall.
19. Gertrude.
1. Gosforth.
5. Great Britain.
20. Indiana.
13. Indomitable.
2. Ireland.
3. Italian.
26. Jason.
18. Leopold.
21. Lord Dalhousie.
7. Malabar.
14. Maria Soames.
22. Nimrod.
11 Prince Albert.
15. Princess Charlotte.
25. Salamanca.
10. Southampton.
17. Statesman.
20. Stuart Wortley.
27. United Service.
12. Viscount Canning.
32. Vittoria.
28. York.

Corrected from "Lloyd's List" up to February 18, 1858.

Military Department, India Board. *Geo. A. Halsted*, Secretary.

Appendix, No. 11.

REPORT.

THE Committee to whom was referred the petition of Ira Schofield and others, officers who served during the late war with the United States, beg leave to report: Appendix, No. 11.

That on the 27th June 1812, the United States of America declared war against Great Britain, at a time when she was struggling against the united power of all Europe, and when the only regular force at her disposal consisted of the 41st regiment of infantry, and a few companies of veterans and artillery, not exceeding in all 1,000 men above Montreal.

The entire population of Canada, both militia and Indians, came forward and tendered their services. Volunteer troops of cavalry, companies of artillery, and two flank companies of infantry from each regiment of militia, were organised in the shortest possible time, in the defence of a frontier of many thousand miles.

The Government of the United States had made the most extensive preparation for the conquest of Canada by concentrating their forces on the Detroit, Niagara, St. Lawrence, and Richelieu Rivers, the most accessible points on the boundary of the respective countries.

Appendix, No. 11.

The first campaign opened by invading Canada by the army of the west under General Hull, at Sandwich, in the western district, from whence he issued a proclamation extending protection to those who remained peaceably at home; extermination to every white man fighting by the side of an Indian, and indiscriminating desolation to the whole country.

The second invasion by the army of the centre under General VanRensalaer at Queenston, in the Niagara district.

The third at Frenchman's Creek, under Colonel Boerstler.

The fourth under General Smith, at Waterloo, near Fort Erie.

The fifth, by the army of the north under the command of General Dearborne, commander-in-chief, at Lacolle, near the boundary of Lower Canada. The first campaign ending by making prisoners of every man who landed on our soil, and capturing Michilimackinaw, Detroit, the Territory of Michigan, and the entire western portion of the United States.

In 1813, the second campaign opened by the invasions of Lower Canada by General Wilkison, commanding the army of the north, at the River Raisin in Michigan, York in the Lower District, Fort George in the Niagara District, Isle aux Noix, Chateauguay in Lower Canada, and Chrysler's Farm, ending in the defeat and making prisoners of General Winchester and army, Colonel Boerstler, Generals Chandler and Winder, and capturing Fort Niagara.

In 1814, the third campaign opened by the invasion of Lower Canada by the army of the north, under General Hampden, ending in repelling them at Lacolle Mills, in Lower Canada, Fort Erie in Upper Canada, Long Woods in the Western District, and capturing Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi River.

In addition to numerous engagements of lesser moment, fifty different actions are briefly recapitulated in the Appendix hereto, marked A.

Few instances are recorded where the inhabitants of any country evinced a greater degree of patriotism under the desolation in which the frontier was left by the contending armies.

His Royal Highness, in a despatch from London on the 13th January 1815, attributes the immediate preservation of the province and its future security to its inhabitants, Appendix B. Few, very few of the actors are now living, not exceeding, by the Adjutant-general's Return C., some 65 men; and in recalling their distinguished service at the eventful period above referred to, it has appeared to your Committee that the application they have made to your Honourable House soliciting an appeal on their behalf to Her Majesty, is deserving of respectful consideration, and your Committee accordingly recommend that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, soliciting that the surviving officers of the flank companies and provincial corps, may be placed upon the same footing as the late incorporated militia, who were similarly engaged in the defence of the country during the last war, and were rewarded by being placed upon half pay.

The whole nevertheless respectfully submitted.

Wm. H. Merritt, Chairman,
With the unanimous consent of the Committee.

APPENDIX.

Adjutant-General's Office, Toronto,
8 June 1857.

Sir,

With reference to the information required by you as Chairman of the Committee on the petition of Ira Schofield, who served in active militia force which was called into the field for the defence of the province, and served during the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814, I am of opinion that the surviving officers of that force of the different grades, artillery, cavalry and infantry, in both provinces, do not exceed at the present day, over sixty-five, Lieutenant-Colonel de Salaberry and myself having had recourse to the best information on the subject.

I have, &c.
(signed) *D. Macdonell*,
Deputy Adjutant-General Militia, U. C.

The Hon. Wm. H. Merritt, M. P. P.,
Legislative Assembly.

(Copy.)

Extract from a Despatch of the Right Hon. Earl *Bathurst*, Principal Secretary of State for the War and Colonies, to His Excellency Sir *Gordon Drummond*, dated Downing-street, 13th January 1815.

"Nor is His Royal Highness insensible of the merits of the inhabitants of Upper Canada, or to the great assistance which the militia of the province afforded during the whole of the war; His Royal Highness trusts that you will express to them in adequate terms the high sense which he entertains of their services at having mainly contributed to the immediate preservation of the province and its future security."

(signed) *Bathurst*.

(A true copy.)
(signed) C. Foster, Military Secretary.

SCHEDULE of Actions in the War of 1812, 1813, and 1814.

DATE.	No.	Point of Attack.	British Officers in Command.	British Force.	American Officers in Command.	American Forces.	REMARKS.
1812:							
July 12	1	Sandwich, U. C.	Major Muir	-	General Hull	2,500	First invasion of Canada. Landed near Sandwich from Detroit.
Ditto 17	2	Michilimacinac, U. S.	Captain Roberts, R.N.	45 men	Lieutenant Hawks	60	Garrison surrendered unconditionally.
18, 19, 20	3	River Canard, U. C.	Colonel St. George	300	Major Denny	1,000	Three attempts to cross the River Canard repulsed.
Aug. 4	4	Brown's Town, U. S.	Captain Hutton	50	Major Vauthorn	200	An important victory in its results.
Ditto 7, 8	5	Sandwich, U. C.	Colonel St. George	300 mil.	General Hull	2,500	Recrosses the Detroit River.
Ditto 9	6	Megnago, U. S.	-	500	Lieut.-colonel Miller	600	Seven actions.
Ditto 16	7	Detroit, U. S.	General Brock	700	General Hull	3,000	Gen. Hull and army surrender, with Fort Detroit, the territory of Michigan and western portion of the U. S. to Gen. Brock.
Oct. 13	8	Queenston Heights, U. C.	General Brock	400	General Wadsworth	1,000	Second invasion. General Brock killed by a rifle shot of the enemy.
Nov. 17	9	Odeltown and Lacolle, L. C.	Major De Salaberry	-	General Dearborne, Commander-in-Chief	10,000	Advanced upon Lower Canada, but retired without any decisive action. General Sheaffe resumes the battle. General Wadsworth and forces surrender.
Ditto 25	—	Fort Erie Batteries, U. C.	Major Ormsby	50	Captain King	60	Third invasion. Captain King, under the command of Colonel Boerstler, attacks batteries and Fort Frie, and surrenders to Colonel Bishop.
Ditto 27	—	Black Rock Batteries, U. S.	Lieut.-colonel Meyers	60	General Porter	200 & artil.	American Batteries at Black Rock dismounted.
Ditto 27	—	Fort Erie, U. C.	Lieut.-colonel Bishop	600	General Smith	3,000	Fourth invasion. General Smyth, of proclamation notoriety, attempts to cross the Niagara, but did not effect a landing.
		Lacolle, L. C.	-	-	General Wilkinson	-	Fifth invasion.
1813:							
Jan. 23	—	River Raisin, U. S.	Colonel Proctor	500	General Winchester	1,000	Sixth invasion. General Winchester surrendered to Colonel Proctor.
Feb. 23	—	Ogdensburgh, U. S.	Lieut.-col. McDonell	480	General Macomb	500	Americans retired. Munitions of war, shipping and barracks destroyed.
April 27	—	York (Toronto), U. C.	General Sheaffe	500	General Dearborne	2,500	Seventh invasion. General Sheaffe retires towards Kingston; town capitulates.
May 1	—	Miama, U. S.	Colonel Proctor	900	General Harrison	1,500	After a warm defence, Americans retire, so did Colonel Proctor.
Ditto 27	—	Sacket's Harbour, U.S.	Sir George Prevost	750	General Brown	2,500	After landing, Americans retire; British destroy arsenal and re-embark.
Ditto 27	—	Fort George, U. C.	General Vincent	600	General Dearborne	3,000	Eighth invasion. After opposing the landing of the enemy, General Vincent retires to Burlington.
June 5	—	Stoney Creek, U. C.	General Vincent	704	Generals Chandler and Winder.	3,550	Night attack; hard fighting; near one-fourth of troops engaged killed and wounded; two generals made prisoners; enemy retreat.
Ditto 17	—	Beech Woods, U. C.	Lieutenant Fitzgibbon	50	Lieut.-colonel Boerstler	700	Americans surrender, due to the gallant conduct of Fitzgibbon and hard fighting of Caughnawaga Indians of Lower Canada.

(continued)

SCHEDULE of Actions in the War of 1812, 1813, and 1814—*continued.*

DATE.	No.	Point of Attack.	British Officers in Command.	British Force.	American Officers in Command.	American Forces.	REMARKS.
1813—*continued.*							
July 4	–	Fort Schlosser, U. S.	Lieut.-colonel Thomas Clark.	100	No defence	–	Stores destroyed; provisions brought away.
Ditto 11	–	Black Rock, U. S.	Lieut.-colonel Bishop	240	General Porter	300	Enemy retired; barracks and stores destroyed; enemy rallied, and Lieut.-colonel Bishop was wounded, and died therefrom.
Ditto 18	–	Goose Creek, U. S.	Major Frend	200	Not known	–	Captain Frien killed; an unfortunate affair.
August 2	–	Lower Sandusky, U.S.	General Proctor	391	Major Grogan	500	No impression made on American Fort; General Proctor retires to his shipping.
Ditto 24	–	Fort George, U. C.	Sir George Prévost	1,000	General Dearborne	4,000	Sir George Prévost makes a recognisance in the American lines.
Sept. 17	–	Isle aux Noix, L. C.	Major Taylor	250	–	–	This terminates in the garrison capturing two American schooners on Lake Champlain.
Ditto 20	–	Lake Erie	Com. Barclay	345	Com. Perry	580	The fleet surrenders to Com. Perry. In consequence of Barclay's defeat on Lake Erie, Proctor evacuates Det.
Ditto 26	–	Fort Detroit and Amherstburg, U. S.	General Proctor	830	–	–	Ninth invasion. Battle of Moravian Town; defeat of General Proctor.
Oct. 5	–	Moravian Town, U.C.	General Proctor	500	General Harrison	3,500	Gallant conduct of Tecumseh, who was killed.
Ditto 10	–	Ball's Farm	Gen. De Rottenburg	–	–	–	This action took place in the recovery of the army medicine chest at Cassel Choms. The success of this action is due to the Chippawa Indians under Black Bird.
Nov. 11	–	Chrysler's Farm or Fields, U. C.	Lieut.-col. Morrison, 89th.	800	Gens. Wilkinson and Covington.	3,000	Tenth invasion. Gen. Covington wounded and retires, leaving the field in possession of Capt. Murray. Gallant action. American army recrossed the river.
Ditto 25	–	Chateauguay River, L. C.	Colonel De Salaberry	300	General Hampden	8,000	After a repulse by Colonel De Salaberry, General Hampden retires.
Dec. 10	–	Town of Niagara, U.C.	Colonel Murray	100	General M'Clure	1,500	Gen. M'Clure burns the Tower, recrosses the river, leaving his tents and camp equipage behind.
Ditto 10	–	Town of Niagara, U.C.	Colonel Murray	375			
Ditto 18	–	Fort Niagara, U. S.	Colonel Murray	500	Captain Leonard	600	Fort Niagara surrenders. Public stores to a large extent captured.
Ditto 19	31 32	Lewiston, Youngstown, and Manchester.	General Riall	500	Number not known	–	The entire frontier in U. S. between Lakes Erie and Ontario chiefly, including Black Rock, was burned by militia of W. District in return for the destruction of Niagara.
Ditto 30	33	Black Rock and Buffalo.	General Riall	1,000	General Hall	2,500	Made a slight defence.

1814: Mar. 12	34	La Colle Mills	Major Hancock	500	General Wilkinson	4,000	Eleventh invasion. Being repulsed, retired to his own lines.
May 10	35	Oswego	Lieut.Gen.Drummond	750	General Brown	3,000	British landed from their shipping, Gen. Brown retires, British demolish stores, &c. &c.
July 3	36	Fort Erie	Major Buck	300	General Brown	5,000	Twelfth invasion. No defence, garrison surrendered.
Ditto 5	37	Plains of Chippawa	General Riall	1,500	General Brown	5,000	Gen. Riall, after attacking enemy, retired within his own fortifications; severe action.
	38	- - - -	Colonel ——	- -	General Brown	- -	Gen. Shaft, U. S. Militia on ——— a number of sharp engagements Queenston, St. David's, Stamford, &c. Retreat from Fort St. George to Chippawa.
Ditto 25	38	Lundy's Lane	Lieut.Gen.Drummond	2,800	General Brown	5,000	After a well fought battle, Americans were repulsed and retreat up Niagara River.
Ditto 27	39	Michilimacinac	Lieut. Col. McDonald	100	Major Groghan	- -	After landing, enemy are repulsed and retire to shipping.
Ditto 27	40	Prairie du Chien	Lt.Col.McKay, J.Day	650	No defence.		
Ditto 29	41	Plattsburg	Colonel Murray	1,000	General Moore	1,500	Enemy retire and Colonel Murray succeeds in his enterprise of destroying stores, shipping, &c.
Aug. 5	42	Conjocela Creek	Lieut. Col. Tucker	400	Major Morgan	400	Lieutenant Colonel Tucker returns to quarters without effecting anything.
Ditto 12	43	Lake Erie	Captain Dobbs	75	Lieut. Conklin, Navy	200	Captain Dobbs, R. N., captured two war schooners, Somers and Ohio.
Ditto 15	44	Fort Erie	Lt. Gen. Drummond	1,000	General Gaines	3,000	Lieutenant Colonel Drummond repulsed and retreats to batteries.
Sept. 7	45	Michilimacinac	Lieut. Wolsey, R. N.	- -	- - - -	- -	Lt. Wolsey, R. N., captures two American schooners, Lake Michigan.
Ditto 19	46	Brit. Batt. Fort Erie	General De Watteville	1,000	General Brown	2,500	General Brown acquires possession of British Batteries, and General De Watteville recovers them.
Oct. 25	48	Lyon's Creek	Colonel Murray	650	General Bissell	1,100	After a little sharp shooting, General Bissell retires.
Dec. 10	49	River Thames	Captain Basden	250	General McArthur	800	Thirteenth invasion. Long Woods, W. District. Invaders retire.
Ditto 31	50	Fort Erie	- - - -	- -	General Izzard	8,000	General Izzard having reinforced General Brown's force to 8,000 at Fort Erie, retired to his own territory for winter quarters.
		Plattsburg	Sir George Prévost, Com.-in-Chief.	12,000	- - - -	- -	Sir George Prévost, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, with 12,000 men, the flower of the British army, attempted a demonstration upon Plattsburg, U. S. which unfortunately eventuated in the loss of our fleet on Lake Champlain, and loss of the gallant Downie killed. Our faithful Indian allies are not enumerated, but to their bravery is the successful defence of Canada to be attributed, in common with the militia and regular forces with whom they were allies. It will be seen by this statement that different invasions were made, and fifty actions fought during 1812–13–14, and at the peace of January 1815, not an acre of her soil was in possession of her invaders.

A true copy from extract written by Lieutenant Colonel Clark, 2nd Lincoln, and Assistant Adjutant General Militia, Niagara Frontier, during the war 1812-13 and '14.

Saml. Wood, Secretary Militia.

Appendix, No. 12.

A RETURN of the NAMES of TRANSPORTS taken up for *India* (Steamers and Sailing Vessels), their Tonnage, Horse Power, the Number of Men each carried, Rate of Passage Money, Date of Sailing, and Date of Arrival, as far as is known; showing the Number of Days occupied in the Passage by each Ship, and the Average Length of the Passages to each Port or Presidency.

FOR WHAT SERVICE ENGAGED.	NAME OF SHIP.	Whether Steam or Sailing Vessel.	Tonnage.	Horse Power.	Date of Engagement.	Number of Men.	Rate per Head.	Date of Sailing.	Date of Arrival.	Number of Days from Port to Port.	Average Number of Days.
Her Majesty's Regiments:	FOR CALCUTTA:				1857:		£. s. d	1857:	1857:		
For passage, &c. of the 84th Regiment, 42d Regiment, 54th Regiment, 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade, 328 men Horse Artillery, and 580 men Foot Artillery	Scotland	Steamer	1,150	150	24 July	300	39 — —	6 Aug.	7 Nov.	93	
	Sydney	ditto	1,391	300	24 „	288	43 15 —	14 „	23 Oct.	70	
	Australian	ditto	1,391	300	24 „	290	43 15 —	15 „	1 Nov.	78	
	Lady Jocelyn	ditto	2,242	300	24 „	732	49 — —	6 „	1 „	87	
	Golden Fleece	ditto	2,768	300	24 „	901	49 — —	8 „	15 Oct.	68	
	Victoria	ditto	1,877	450	24 „	408	43 15 —	14 „	6 Nov.	84	
						including 290 men Foot Artillery to be landed at Madras.					Average of nine steamers, 82⅓
For passage, &c. of 1st Dragoon Guards	City of Manchester	ditto	1,906	350	10 Aug.	658	49 — —	26 „	8 „ 1858:	74	
For passage, &c. of a Field Battery of Artillery.	Viscount Canning	ditto	780	180	3 Oct.	186	45 — —	21 Oct.	16 Jan. 1857:	87	
For passage, &c. of 1 Troop Horse Artillery, and 2 Field Batteries.	Hydaspes	ditto	2,250	300	15 Aug.	607	49 — —	19 Sept.	28 Dec.	100	
For passage, &c. of Detachments and Drafts, Her Majesty's Service	Sarah Sands	ditto	1,300	200	1 „	354	40 — —	15 Aug.	burnt, off Mauritius, 12 Nov. 1857.		
	Argo	ditto	2,300	300	4 Dec.	777	36 — —	19 Dec.	arrival not reported.		
	Jason	ditto	2,700	375	29 „	1,007	36 — —	1858: 13 Jan.	ditto.		
			Tonnage.								
For passage, &c. of the 2d Dragoon Guards	Monarch	Sailing	1,282		9 June	352	11 14 8	1857: 26 July	24 Nov.	121	
	Blenheim	ditto	1,313		9 „	233	12 5 —	26 „	26 „	123	
For passage, &c. of the 3d Battalion Rifles and 88th Regiment	Cambodia	ditto	914		9 „	207	11 11 —	19 „	30 „	134	
	Surrey	ditto	1,089		9 „	339	12 2 6	16 „	31 Oct.	107	
	Calabar	ditto	754		9 „	222	12 4 6	18 „	24 Nov.	129	
	Aliquis	ditto	1,247		9 „	377	12 5 9	26 „	24 „	121	
	Sutlej	ditto	1,150		9 „	265	12 9 —	22 „	6 „	107	
	Ulysses	ditto	934		9 „	288	12 9 6	10 „	30 Oct.	112	
	Barham	ditto	1,146		9 „	124	12 19 —	2 „	8 Nov.	129	
For passage, &c. of the 97th Regiment and 20th Regiment	James Baines	ditto	2,275		24 July	996	25 — —	8 Aug.	19 „	103	Average of 22 ships, 116⁹⁄₂₂
	Champion of the Seas	ditto	2,237		24 „	997	25 — —	8 „	17 „	101	
For passage, &c. of the 7th Hussars	Lightning	ditto	2,090		10 Aug.	654	26 — —	27 „	23 „	88	

For passage, &c. of Detachments and Drafts, Her Majesty's Service	Octavia	ditto	1,055	20 May	231	11	11	–	25 July	16 Nov.	114	
	Cressy	ditto	720	29 „	217	11	15	6	11 „	17 „	129	
	Bucephalus	ditto	985	29 „	219	11	19	6	1 „	25 Oct.	115	
	Ellenborough	ditto	1,031	29 „	218	12	16	–	11 „	23 Nov.	135	
	Agamemnon	ditto	1,430	27 June	250	12	19	–	11 Aug.	16 „	97	
	George Marshall	ditto	1,361	2 Nov.	450	14	8	8	16 Nov.	Arrival not reported.		
East India Company's Service:												
For passage, &c. of Recruits, East India Company's Service	Nile	ditto	1,182	8 May	102	11	14	–	10 June	4 Oct.	116	
	Amazon	ditto	791	8 „	238	11	17	–	10 „	5 „	117	
	Areta	ditto	678	29 „	214	12	5	–	18 „	23 „	129	
	Adelaide	ditto	640	22 June	212	12	17	–	10 July	5 Nov.	118	
	Sir Robert Sale	ditto	741	27 „	285	12	14	9	30 „	23 „	116	
	Maria Soames	ditto	785	9 Oct.	230	12	9	–	14 Nov.	Arrival not reported.		
	Statesman	ditto	874	30 „	188	11	18	8	17 „	Arrival not reported.		
	Gertrude	ditto	948	13 Nov.	349	11	9	6	5 Dec.	Arrival not reported.		
	Nimrod	ditto	893	20 „	245	11	2	5	19 „	Arrival not reported		
	Stuart Wortley	ditto	891	20 „	249	13	14	6	13 „	Arrival not reported.		
				1858:					1858:			
	Burlington	ditto	778	4 Jan.	300	11	12	6	22 Jan.			
	Vittoria	ditto	848	23 „	292	13	12	6	25 Feb.			
	Akbar	ditto	819	23 „		11	9	5	27 „			
Her Majesty's Regiments:	For Madras:		Tonnage. / Horse Power.	1857:					1857:	1857:		
For passage, &c. of the 66th Regiment and 44th Regiment	Queen of the South	Steamer	2,250 / 300	10 Aug.	732	49	–	–	30 Aug.	1 Dec.	93	Average of 2 steamers, 90½.
	Khersonese	ditto	1,273 / 200	10 „	544	49	–	–	30 „	26 Nov.	88	
For passage, &c. of 1 Field Battery, 1 Company of Artillery, and Drafts.	Indomitable	ditto	1,160 / 80	27 Oct.	360	25	–	–	13 Nov.	Arrival not reported.		
For passage, &c. of the 68th Regiment	Australasian	ditto	2,760 / 700	6 Nov.	453	30	–	–	25 Dec.	Arrival not reported.		
			Tonnage.							1858:		
For passage, &c. of Detachments, Her Majesty's Service	Hersilia	Sailing	623	10 Aug.	258	16	12	–	27 Aug.	12 Jan.	138	Average of 2 ships, 131½.
	Gloriana	ditto	1,057	22 „	220	18	15	–	9 Sept.	12 „	125	
	York	ditto	939	29 Dec.	163	13	7	5	1858: 9 Jan.	Arrival not reported.		
East India Company's Service:												
For passage, &c. of Recruits, East India Company's Service	Malabar	ditto	647	11 Sept.	132	13	9	–	1857: 13 Oct.	Arrival not reported.		
	Bengal	ditto	582	11 „	212	13	18	3	12 „	Arrival not reported.		

(continued)

RETURN of the Names of Transports taken up for *India*, &c.—*continued*.

FOR WHAT SERVICE ENGAGED.	NAME OF SHIP.	Whether Steam or Sailing Vessel.	Tonnage.	Horse Power.	Date of Engagement.	Number of Men.	Rate per Head.	Date of Sailing.	Date of Arrival.	Number of Days from Port to Port.	Average Number of Days.
	For BOMBAY:				1857:		£. s. d.	1857:	1857:		
Her Majesty's Regiments: For passage, &c. of the 72d Regiment	Scotia	Steamer	1,020	300	13 Aug.	326	38 – –	4 Sept.	10 Dec.	97	
For passage, &c. of the 8th Hussars, 17th Lancers, and 18th Regiment	Great Britain	ditto	3,209	500	11 Sept.	1,057	49 – –	8 Oct.	17 „	70	Average of 5 steamers, 76⅔.
	Princess Charlotte	ditto	2,200	360	11 „	703	45 – –	14 Nov.	– –	– –	
	Italian	ditto	784	180	11 „	201	45 – –	25 Sept.	3 Dec.	69	
For passage, &c. of the 51st Regiment	Calcutta	ditto	2,245	–	18 „	803	49 – –	11 Oct.	29 „	79	
For passage, &c. of Artillery and Detachments.	Prince Albert	ditto	2,000	400	22 Aug.	482	44 18 9	22 „	28 „	67	
								1858:			
For passage, &c. of Detachments, Her Majesty's Service.	United Service	ditto	903	300	29 Dec.	334	35 – –	14 Jan.	Arrival not reported.		
			Tonnage.					1857:			
For passage, &c. of the 3d Dragoon Guards and 290 men Royal Artillery	Forerunner	Sailing	618		24 July	251	17 10 –	4 Aug.	8 Dec.	126	
	Warrior Queen	ditto	988		24 „	360	17 17 7	6 „	1 „	117	
	Genghis Khan	ditto	1,306		24 „	400	18 19 –	10 „	10 Nov.	92	
									1858:		
For passage, &c. of the 72d Regiment	Matilda Atheling	ditto	714		13 Aug.	296	16 8 10	28 „	5 Jan.	130	
For passage, &c. of the 56th Regiment, and Drafts, Her Majesty's Service	Waterloo	ditto	898		10 „	300	18 19 6	27 „	17 „	143	
									1857:		
	Southampton	ditto	971		10 „	354	19 15 –	24 „	24 Dec.	122	Average of 9 ships, 118⅓.
	Sedgmoor	ditto	965		10 „	354	19 8 –	29 „	28 „	121	
For passage, &c., of Detachments, Her Majesty's Service.	Salamanca	ditto	981		18 Dec.	372	11 7 –	30 Dec.	Arrival not reported		
East India Company's Service:											
For passage, &c. of Recruits, East India Company's Service	Vernon	ditto	995		24 July	204	14 19 –	20 Aug.	12 Dec.	114	
	Gosforth	ditto	800		24 Aug.	352	13 19 6	20 Sept.	29 „	100	
	Lord Dalhousie	ditto	786		13 Nov.	186	11 8 5	15 Dec.	Arrival not reported		
			Tonnage.	Horse Power.							
	For KURRACHEE:								1858:		
Her Majesty's Regiments: For passage, &c. of the 7th Dragoon Guards, and Detachments, Her Majesty's Service.	Southampton	Steamer	2,190	400	3 Sept.	627	45 – –	16 Oct.	12 Jan.	88	Average of 3 steamers, 91.
For passage, &c., of the 98th Regiment	Bahiana	ditto	1,130	300	11 „	423	45 – –	5 „	2 „	89	
	Ireland	ditto	1,150	150	11 „	301	43 – –	24 Sept.	1857: 29 Dec.	96	
For passage, &c. of the 94th Regiment, 1 Field Battery, and 2 Companies of Artillery	Austria	ditto	2,190	400	11 „	– – Agreement cancelled; men sent overland, and arrived 13 January 1858, in 37 days.					
	Leopold	ditto	2,000	360	11 „	603	45 – –	2 Dec.	Arrival not reported.		

			Tonnage.								
For passage, &c. of the 7th Regiment	Sir George Seymour	Sailing	850	9 June	227	12	18	8	15 July	23 Nov.	131	Average of 10 ships, 128.
	Seringapatam	ditto	870	9 „	218	12	19	—	21 „	28 „	130	
	Ramillies	ditto	740	9 „	213	13	2	6	22 „	22 „	123	
	Owen Glendower	ditto	989	9 „	263	13	12	6	22 „	24 „	125	
For passage, &c. of 2 Field Batteries, and Detachments, Her Majesty's Service	Alipore	ditto	811	13 Aug.	273	18	—	—	2 Sept.	8 Jan. 1858:	128	
	Athletoe	ditto	1,056	13 „	185	18	9	—	2 „	31 Dec. 1857:	120	
For passage, &c. of Detachments and Drafts, Her Majesty's Service	Bombay	ditto	1,279	29 May	348	11	10	6	22 July	28 Nov.	129	
	Albuera	ditto	887	29 „	227	12	5	6	22 „	24 „	125	
	Castle Eden	ditto	930	2 July	234	15	8	4	18 „	12 Dec.	147	
	Roman Emperor	ditto	793	2 „	193	14	12	6	18 „	17 Nov.	122	

For Ceylon, to await orders as to Port of Disembarkation:

			Tonnage.	Horse Power.								
For passage, &c. of the 1st Battalion 1st Foot, 3d Battalion 60th Rifles, 38th Regiment, and 79th Regiment	Carthage	Steamer	1,003	180	10 July	198	19	—	—	2 Aug.	13 Oct.	72	Average of 6 steamers, 76½.
	Thebes	ditto	1,003	180	10 „	198	19	—	—	31 July	3 „	64	
	Caledonia	ditto	998	150	10 „	360	29	10	—	26 „	8 „	74	
	John Bell	ditto	1,050	240	10 „	390	30	15	—	5 Aug.	29 „	85	
	United Kingdom	ditto	1,066	300	10 „	390	30	15	—	4 „	20 „	77	
	Robert Lowe	ditto	1,225	100	10 „	420	34	—	—	28 July	23 „	87	
			Tonnage.										
	Defiance	Sailing	954		10 „	404	15	15	—	5 Aug.	5 Nov. at Madras.	92	Average of 11 ships, 91½.
	Louisiana	ditto	1,264		10 „	432	16	16	9	2 „	5 Nov.	95	
	Liverpool	ditto	1,454		10 „	462	16	18	9	8 „	23 „	107	
	Tyburnia	ditto	1,012		10 „	402	16	18	10	9 „	9 „	92	
	Walmer Castle	ditto	1,064		10 „	402	16	9	—	1 „	31 Oct. Madras.	91	
	Ballarat	ditto	713		10 „	277	18	19	6	15 „	4 Nov.	81	
	Sussex	ditto	959		17 „	348	21	9	9	7 „	29 Oct.	83	
For passage, &c. of the 19th Regiment	Whirlwind	ditto	1,003		10 „	340	17	8	10	30 July	29 „	91	
	Merchantman	ditto	1,018		10 „	340	17	8	10	24 „	15 „	83	
	William Hammond	ditto	683		10 „	230	17	9	4	24 „	29 „	97	
	Alnwick Castle	ditto	1,057		10 „	402	18	9	—	23 „	28 „ Madras.	97	

East India House, Marine Department,
27 February 1858.

J. C. Mason.

Appendix, No. 13.

RETURN of Troops of Her Majesty's Service sent to *India* by the Overland Route, viâ *Egypt*, to the close of February 1858.

REGIMENT, or DETACHMENT.	STEAMER.	Number of Officers and Men Embarked. Officers	Men.	Where and When Embarked.	Destination.	Date of Arrival.	No. of Days.
Part of 57th Foot -	‡ Ripon, P. & O. S. N. Co.	9	200	Malta, 1 October - -	Aden - - -	13 October, P. and O. Steamer "Alma."	12
Royal Engineers, 4th and 11th Companies.	† Sultan, P. & O. S. N. Co.	6	118	Southampton, 2 October -	1 Company to Kurrachee, viâ Bombay.	6 Nov. at Bombay, P. and O. Steamer "Nubia."	35
		7	117	" "	1 Company to Calcutta.	12 November, P. and O. Steamer "Pekin."	41
Artillery, 6th and 8th Companies.	† Australasian -	12	221 Also 37 Medical Officers belonging to different Regiments already in India.	Southampton, 12 October	Calcutta - -	5 December. P. and O. Steamer ‖ "Hindostan,"	54
Royal Engineers, 10th and 21st Companies.	† Dutchman, P. & O. S. N. Co.	6	122	Chatham, 14 October -	1 Company to Kurrachee, viâ Bombay.	23 Nov., at Bombay, P. and O. Steamer "Pottinger."	40
		§ 5	122	" "	1 Company to Galle	26 November, P. and O. Steamer "Hindostan,"	43
		1	- -	" "	Calcutta - -	5 December, P. and O. Steamer "Hindostan."	52
Part of 69th Foot -	† Tamar, R. M. S. P. Co.	14	281	Southampton, 11 November	Madras - -	15 December, at Galle, disembarked Troops.	34
Ditto ditto -	† Sultan, P. & O. S. N. Co.	14	251	Plymouth, 17 November	Madras - -	26 December, P. and O. Steamer "Bengal."	39
Ditto - ditto -	† Euxine - -	*11	225	Plymouth, 2 December -	Madras - -	9 February, P. and O. Steamer "Candia."	69
Artillery (Foot) -	‡ Indus, P. & O. S. N. Co.	*2	40	Southampton, 4 December	Madras - -	9 February, P. and O. Steamer "Candia."	67
		1	40	" "	Bombay - -	6 January, P. and O. Steamer "Pekin."	33
94th Foot - - -	† Abeona, P. & O. S. N. Co.	32	831	Plymouth, 8 December -	Kurrachee - -	14 January, P. and O. Steamer "Oriental."	37
				Reached Alexandria. / Left Suez.			
71st Foot, from Malta	H. M. S. Vulture -	25	836	10 Jan. / Per "Punjab," I. N., 20 Jan.	Bombay - -	7 February - -	18
	H. M. S. Princess Royal.			17 Jan. / Per "Feroze," I. N., 22 Jan.			16
92d Foot, from Gibraltar.	H. M. S. Urgent -	31	793	- - / Per "Oriental," P. & O. Vessel, 17 February.	Bombay.		
Drafts for various Regiments in India.	† Pera, P. & O. S. N. Co.	5	226	Southampton, 4 February	Madras.		
Drafts (92d Foot) -	‡ Ripon, P. & O. S. N. Co.	8	234	Southampton, 11 February	Bombay.		
Drafts for various Regiments in India.	† Sultan - -	10	237	Southampton, 24 February	Bombay.		
	Total - -	199	4,894				

Of the preceding total number of officers and men, there have arrived in India 145 officers and 3,404 men.

* Owing to an accident to the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer "Alma," they were embarked on the East India Company's steamer "Ajdha," which, proving leaky, returned to Aden; they were afterwards embarked on the P. and O. Company's steamer "Candia," for Madras.

† Screw steamers. ‡ Paddle steamers.

§ This Company was intended for Calcutta, when "Hindostan" arrived at Galle (en route to Calcutta). Orders from the Indian Government were waiting for the Company to be sent on to China; the men were therefore disembarked at Galle for transmission to China.

‖ Were to have been sent on per steamer "Emeus," but in consequence of that vessel grounding in the Red Sea, they were taken on by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer "Hindostan."

East India House, Marine Department, 13 March 1858. *J. C. Mason.*

Appendix, No. 14.

STATEMENT of the REGIMENTS, TROOPS, and DETACHMENTS (or Drafts) of CAVALRY, INFANTRY, and ARTILLERY of Her Majesty's Service, and of RECRUITS for the East India Company's Service, transported by the Company to the Presidencies and Ports of *India* by Sailing Ships or Steam Vessels, or by the Overland Route, *viâ* Egypt, between the Month of June 1857 and February 1858, both inclusive; specifying the NAMES of the several VESSELS, the DATES of the DEPARTURE of each from the Port of Embarkation, the DATES of ARRIVAL in *India*, and the Number of Days occupied in the Passage of each Vessel from Port to Port.

Marine Department, East India House,
13 March 1858.

J. C. Mason.

The RELIEFS and REINFORCEMENTS of Her Majesty's Army, and the Recruits for the East India Company's European Regiments despatched to *India* by Sailing Vessels, Steam Vessels, or by the Overland Route, from June 1857 (inclusive) to the end of February 1858, as hereafter detailed under separate Heads, consisted of—

7 Regiments of Cavalry (including two Relief Regiments).
26 Regiments of Infantry (including four Relief Regiments).
4 Troops of Royal Horse Artillery.
7 Field Batteries, and
11 Companies of Royal Artiliery, and
4 Companies of Royal Engineers; besides
7,212 Drafts for Her Majesty's Regiments already in India, or on the way thither; and
4,583 Recruits for the East India Company's Service in India.

HER MAJESTY'S REGIMENTS AND TROOPS; CAVALRY, INFANTRY, ARTILLERY, AND ENGINEERS.

RELIEFS under Orders for India, and despatched hence with reference to their Arrival there at the most favourable Season for the Health of the Troops.

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days
CALCUTTA:						
RELIEFS:						
2d Dragoon Guards (20 Officers, 582 Men.)	Blenheim	12	331	26 July 1857	26 Nov. 1857	123
	Monarch	7	250	26 „ –	24 „ –	121
	(Ellenborough)	1	1	11 „ –	23 „ –	135
88th Foot (50 Officers, 953 Men.)	Ulysses	10	288	10 „ –	30 Oct. –	112
	Surrey	15	339	16 „ –	31 „ –	107
	Calabar	7	222	18 „ –	24 Nov. –	129
	Cambodia	10	97	19 „ –	30 „ –	134
	(Blenheim)	4	2	26 „ –	26 „ –	123
	(Monarch)	4	5	26 „ –	24 „ –	121
Rifle Brigade, 3d Battalion (41 Officers, 964 Men.)	Barham	7	124	2 „ –	8 „ –	129
	Cressy	6	198	11 „ –	17 „ –	129
	Sutlej	16	265	22 „ –	6 „ –	107
	Aliquis	12	377	26 „ –	24 „ –	121

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
BOMBAY:						
RELIEFS—*continued.*						
3d Dragoon Guards - - (25 Officers; 614 Men.)	Forerunner - - -	7	251	4 Aug. 1857	8 Dec. - 1857	126
	Ghenghis Khan - -	16	289	10 „ -	10 Nov. -	92
	(Warrior Queen) -	2	74	6 „ -	1 Dec. -	117
KURRACHEE:						
7th Foot - - - - (52 Officers, 977 Men.)	Sir George Seymour -	9	227	15 July -	23 Nov. -	131
	Seringapatam - -	16	218	21 „ -	28 „ -	130
	Ramillies - - -	11	212	22 „ -	22 „ -	123
	Owen Glendower - -	14	263	22 „ -	24 „ -	125
	(Castle Eden) - -	2	57	18 „ -	12 December -	147
CEYLON, for Orders to be given by the Government of India:						
60th Rifles, 3d Battalion - (39 Officers, 1,029 Men.)	Liverpool - - -	17	462	8 Aug. -	23 Nov. -	107
	Tyburnia - - -	9	260	9 „ -	4 „ -	87
	Ballarat - - -	11	194	15 „ -	4 „ -	81
	Defiance - - -	2	98	4 „ -	- - Did not call at Galle; arrived at Madras, 5 Nov.	93
Sent on to Madras; arrived during November.	S.S. John Bell - -	-	3	5 „ -	29 Oct. -	85
	Sussex - - - -	-	12	7 „ -	29 „ -	83

FIRST Requisition of the Court of Directors of the East India Company for Additional Troops, complied with 1st July 1857.

CEYLON, for Orders to be given by the Government of India:						
1st Division—Additional Troops:						
1st Foot, 1st Battalion - (47 Officers, 1,095 Men.)	S.S. Caledonia - -	15	360	26 July 1857	8 Oct. - 1857	74
	S.S. Robert Lowe - -	18	420	28 „ -	23 „ -	87
	Defiance - - -	6	308	4 Aug. -	- - Did not call at Ceylon; arrived at Madras, 5 Nov.	93
Sent on to Madras; arrived during November.	S.S. Carthage - -	3	3	2 „ -	13 „ -	72
	S.S. United Kingdom -	3	3	5 „ -	20 „ -	76
	S.S. John Bell - -	2	1	5 „ -	29 Oct. -	85
19th Foot - - - - (45 Officers, 1,006 Men.)	Alnwick Castle - -	20	402	23 July -	- - Did not call at Ceylon; arrived at Calcutta, 15 Nov.	115
	Merchantman - -	12	340	24 „ -	9 Nov. -	108
Sent on to Calcutta; arrived during November.	Whirlwind - - -	10	264	30 „ -	29 Oct. -	91
	(William Hammond)	1	- -	24 „ -	30 „ -	98
	(Candia P. & O. vessel)	2	- -	15 Aug. -	25 „ -	71
38th Foot - - - - (45 Officers, 1,008 Men.) Sent on to Calcutta; arrived during November.	S.S. Thebes - - -	11	198	31 July -	3 Oct. -	64
	S.S. Carthage - -	9	195	2 Aug. -	13 „ -	72
	S.S. United Kingdom -	11	229	5 „ -	20 „ -	76
	S.S. John Bell - -	14	386	5 „ -	29 „ -	85
7th Foot - - - - (45 Officers, 976 Men. Sent on to Calcutta: arrived during November.	Walmer Castle - -	18	402	1 „ -	1 Nov. -	92
	Louisiana - - -	18	432	2 „ -	5 „ -	95
	Tyburnia - - -	9	142	9 „ -	4 „ -	87

SECOND Requisition of the Court of Directors of the East India Company for Additional Troops, complied with 17th July 1857.

CALCUTTA:						
2d Division—Additional Troops:						
20th Foot - - - - (37 Officers, 818 Men.	Champion of the Seas -	32	817	8 Aug. 1857	17 Nov. 1857	101
	Lightning - - -	1	1	27 „ -	23 „ -	88
	Candia (P. & O. vessel) -	4	- -	15 „ -	5 „ -	82
34th Foot - - - - (38 Officers, 757 Men.)	S.S. Golden Fleece -	29	757	8 „ -	15 Oct. -	68
	Candia (P. & O. vessel) -	9	- -	15 „ -	5 „ -	82
42d Foot - - - - (40 Officers, 877 Men.)	Whirlwind - - -	3	76	30 July -	- - Disembarked troops at Galle in October.	
	Champion of the Seas -	3	180	8 Aug. -	17 Nov. -	101
	James Baines - - -	5	178	8 „ -	19 „ -	103
	S.S. Golden Fleece -	4	144	8 „ -	15 Oct. -	68
	S.S. Australian - -	16	290	15 „ -	1 Nov. -	78
	Lightning - - -	1	1	27 „ -	23 „ -	88
	Candia (P. & O. vessel) -	8	8	15 „ -	5 „ -	82

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
CALCUTTA—*continued.*						
2d Division—Additional Troops—*continued.*						
54th Foot (38 Officers, 857 Men.)	S.S. Lady Jocelyn	18	352	6 Aug. 1857	1 Nov. 1857	87
	S.S. Sarah Sands	14	354	15 „ —	— Burnt 12 Nov; arrived at Mauritius 21 Nov. (all saved).	
97th Foot (39 Officers, 818 Men.)	S.S. City of Manchester	6	151	26 „ —	8 Nov. 1857	74
	James Baines	36	818	8 „ —	19 „ —	103
	Candia (P. & O. vessel)	3	—	15 „ —	5 „ —	82
2 Troops Horse Artillery (15 Officers 324 Men.)	S.S. Scotland	13	300	6 „ —	7 „ —	93
	S.S. Lady Jocelyn	2	24	6 „ —	1 „ —	87
2 Companies Foot Artillery (12 Officers, 288 Men.)	S.S. Sydney	12	288	14 „ —	23 Oct. —	70
MADRAS:						
2 Companies Foot Artillery (14 Officers, 286 Men.)	S.S. Victoria	14	286	14 „ —	6 Nov. —	84
BOMBAY:						
2 Companies Foot Artillery 11 Officers, 286 Men.)	Warrior Queen	11	286	6 „ —	1 Dec. —	117
CEYLON, for Orders to be given by the Government of India:						
Rifle Brigade, 2d Battalion (37 Officers, 858 Men.) Sent on to Calcutta; arrived during November.	S.S. United Kingdom	6	158	5 „ —	20 Oct. —	76
	S.S. Lady Jocelyn	14	356	6 „ —	— Did not call at Ceylon; arrived at Calcutta, 1st November.	87
	Sussex	17	336	7 „ —	29 Oct. 1857	83
	Ballarat	—	8	15 „ —	4 Nov. —	81

THIRD Requisition of the Court of Directors of the East India Company for Additional Troops, complied with 5 August 1857.

CALCUTTA:						
3d Division—Additional Trooops:						
1st Dragoon Guards (24 Officers, 507 Men.)	S.S. City of Manchester	23	507	26 Aug. 1857	8 Nov. 1857	74
	Lightning	1	—	27 „ —	23 „ —	88
7th Hussars (22 Officers, 511 Men.)	Lightning	22	511	27 „ —	23 „ —	88
MADRAS:						
44th Foot (33 Officers, 802 Men.)	Hersilia	14	258	27 „ —	12 Jan. 1858	138
	S.S. Kersonese	19	544	30 „ —	26 Nov. 1857	88
66th Foot (38 Officers, 855 Men.)	S.S. Queen of the South	28	732	30 „ —	1 Dec. —	93
	Gloriana	10	123	9 Sept. —	12 Jan. 1858	125
BOMBAY:						
56th Foot (31 Officers, 730 Men.)	Southampton	14	354	24 Aug. —	24 Dec. 1857	122
	Waterloo	15	300	29 „ —	17 Jan. 1858	141
	Ballarat	2	76	15 „ —	— Transhipped to H.M.S. "Simoom" at Galle, for conveyance to Bombay in November.	
72d Foot (39 Officers, 886 Men.)	Matilda Atheling	14	296	28 „ —	5 Jan. 1858	130
	S.S. Scotia	15	327	9 Sept. —	10 Dec. 1857	92
	S.S. Prince Albert	10	263	22 Oct. —	28 „ —	67
KURRACHEE:						
2 Field Batteries of Artillery (16 Officers, 393 Men.)	Alipore, 1 Battery	10	208	2 Sept. —	8 Jan. 1858	128
	Athletæ, 1 Battery	6	185	2 „ —	31 Dec. 1857	120
CEYLON, for Orders to be given by the Government of India:						
1 Troop of Artillery (10 Officers, 227 Men.)	S.S. Hydaspes	10	227	19 „ —	14 „ —	86
2 Field Batteries of Artillery (14 Officers, 380 Men.) Sent on to Calcutta; arrived during December.	S.S. Hydaspes	14	380	19 „ —	14 „ —	86

FOURTH Requisition of the Court of Directors of the East India Company for Additional Troops, complied with 7 September 1857.

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
CALCUTTA:						
4th Division—Additional Troops:				1857:	1858:	
1 Field Battery of Artillery (6 Officers, 186 Men.)	S.S. Viscount Canning	6	186	21 October	16 January	87
2 Companies Foot Artillery (12 Officers, 221 Men.)	S.S. Australasian (Overland from Southampton.)	12	221	12 „	1857: 5 December Per "Hindostan," from Suez.	54
2 Companies Engineers (13 Officers, 239 Men.)	S.S. Dutchman (Overland from Chatham.)	6	122	14 „	5 December Ditto.	52
	S.S. Sultan (Overland from Southampton.)	7	117	2 „	12 November Per "Pekin," from Suez.	41
MADRAS:						
1 Field Battery (6 Officers, 186 Men.)	S.S. Indomitable	6	186	11 Nov.	—	
1 Company Foot Artillery (5 Officers, 110 Men.)		5	110			
BOMBAY:						
8th Hussars (24 Officers, 486 Men.)	S.S. Great Britain	24	486	8 October	17 December	70
17th Lancers (21 Officers, 483 Men.)	S.S. Great Britain	21	483	8 „	17 „	70
18th Foot (36 Officers, 848 Men.)	S.S. Italian	8	200	25 Sept.	3 „	69
	S.S. Princess Charlotte	28	648	14 Nov.	7 Feb. 1858	85
51st Foot (37 Officers, 773 Men.)	S.S. Calcutta (Overland route.)	29	773	11 Oct.	29 Dec. 1857	79
		8				
1 Troop Horse Artillery (7 Officers, 219 Men.)	S.S. Prince Albert	7	219	22 „	28 „	67
KURRACHEE:						
7th Dragoon Guards (24 Officers, 473 Men.)	S.S. Southampton	24	473	16 „	12 Jan. 1858	88
94th Foot (33 Officers, 862 Men.)	S.S. Abeona (Overland from Plymouth.)	32	831	8 Dec.	14 „	37
	Sultana	1	31	29 „	Per "Oriental," from Suez. —	
98th Foot (36 Officers, 806 Men.)	S.S. Ireland	19	301	24 Sept.	29 Dec. 1857	96
	S.S. Bahiana	15	423	5 October	2 Jan. 1858	89
	S.S. Leopold	2	82	3 Dec.	—	
1 Field Battery of Artillery (6 Officers, 185 Men.)	S.S. Leopold	6	185	3 „	—	
2 Companies of Foot Artillery (9 Officers, 222 Men.)		9	222			
2 Companies of Engineers (12 Officers, 240 Men.)	S.S. Dutchman (Overland from Chatham.)	6	122	14 Oct.	23 Nov. 1847 Per "Pottinger," from Suez.	40
	S.S. Sultan (Overland from Southampton.)	6	118	2 „	6 Nov. 1847 Per "Nubia," from Suez.	35

FIFTH Requisition of the Court of Directors of the East India Company for Additional Troops, complied with 26 October 1857.

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Sailing.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
MADRAS						
5th Division, additional Troops:				1857:	1857:	
68th Foot - - - - (40 Officers, 805 Men.)	S.S. Argo - - -	19	371	19 Dec.	—	
	S.S. Australasian - -	21	434	25 „	—	
69th Foot - - - - (40 Officers, 776 Men.)	S.S. Tamar - - - (Overland from Southampton)	14	281	11 Nov. -	Galle, 15 Dec. - Disembarked troops.	34
	S.S. Sultan - - - (Overland from Plymouth.)	14	251	17 „ -	26 December - Per "Bengal," from Suez.	39
	S.S. Euxine - - - (Overland from Plymouth.)	11	225	2 Dec. -	9 Feb. 1858 - Per "Candia" from Suez.	69
	S.S. Australasian - -	1	19	25 „	—	

SIXTH Requisition of the Court of Directors of the East India Company for Additional Troops, complied with 28 December 1857.

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Reached Alexandria.	Left Suez.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
BOMBAY:							
6th Division, additional Troops:				1858:	1858:	1858:	
71st Foot, from Malta - - (25 Officers, 836 Men.)	H.M.S. Vulture - -	25	836	10 Jan	Per "Punjab," I.N., 20 Jan.	7 Feb.	18
	H.M.S. Princess Royal -			17 „	Per "Feroze," I.N., 22 Jan.		16
92d Foot, from Gibraltar - - (31 Officers, 793 Men.)	H.M.S. Urgent - -	31	793	- -	Per "Oriental," P. & O. vessel, 17 February.	—	

REGIMENTS.	Ships or Steamers.	Officers.	Men.	Left Malta.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
ADEN:				1857:	1857:	
57th Foot, 2 Companies - - (9 Officers, 200 Men.)	S. Ripon - - - (Overland from Malta.)	9	200	1 October -	13 October - Per "Alma," from S---	12

Appendix, No. 14.

DETACHMENTS or DRAFTS for Her Majesty's Regiments already in *India*, or under Transport thither.

Ships or Steamers.	REGIMENTS.	Officers in Charge.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
CALCUTTA:	For Her Majesty's—			1857:	1857:	
Bucephalus	35th Foot	3	219	1 July	25 Oct.	115
	53d „	1	—			
Cressy	8th „	—	19	11 „	17 Nov.	129
Ellenborough	6th Dragoon Guards	3	25	11 „	23 „	135
	35th Foot	2	117			
	60th Rifles, 1st Batt.	2	75			
Cambodia	8th Foot	2	110	19 „	30 „	134
Octavia	32d „	2	140	25 „	16 „	114
	53d „	1	—			
	75th „	2	91			
Monarch	9th Lancers	4	50	26 „	24 „	121
	8th Foot	1	47			
Agamemnon	10th „	3	46	11 August	16 „	97
	84th „	3	204			
S.S. Victoria	53d „	1	—	14 „	6 „	84
	84th „	1	122			
Lightning	8th „	—	5	27 „	23 „	88
	10th „	—	5			
	29th „	3	11			
	32d „	—	10			
	35th „	—	6			
	53d „	—	29			
	60th Rifles, 1st Batt.	—	5			
	75th Foot	—	13			
	82d „	1	57			
George Marshall	1st Dragoon Guards	—	9	17 Nov.	—	
	2d „ „	—	24			
	6th „ „	—	30			
	7th Hussars	—	6			
	9th Lancers	—	30			
	Artillery	1	80			
	5th Foot	—	1			
	20th „	1	42			
	23d „	—	20			
	35th „	—	18			
	53d „	—	19			
	54th „	1	16			
	60th Rifles	1	13			
	61st Foot	1	15			
	84th „	1	11			
	90th „	1	25			
	Rifle Brigade, 2d Batt.	—	62			
	„ „ 3d Batt.	—	30			
S.S. Argo	6th Dragoon Guards	—	10	19 Dec.	—	
	12th Lancers	—	25			
	Artillery	—	47			
	8th Foot	1	14			
	10th „	1	6			
	13th „	—	71			
	19th „	—	33			
	20th „	—	11			
	23d „	—	8			
	24th „	1	7			
	29th „	—	6			
	32d „	—	19			
	34th „	1	40			
	37th „	1	27			
	43d „	—	6			
	60th Rifles, 3d Batt.	1	17			
	66th Foot	1	5			

Appendix, No. 14.

DETACHMENTS OR DRAFTS—*continued.*

Ships or Steamers.	REGIMENTS.	Officers in Charge.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
CALCUTTA—*cont^d.*	For Her Majesty's—					
	Artillery	-	82			
	5th Foot	2	104			
	8th „	1	17			
	10th „	1	5			
	13th „	4	20			
	19th „	-	36			
	20th „	-	27			
	23d „	-	32			
	24th „	1	33			
	29th „	-	24			
	32d „	-	8			
	34th „	1	54			
	35th „	-	22			
	37th „	-	7	1858:		
S. S. Jason	38th „	-	40			
	42d „	1	46	13 Jan.	—	
	53d „	-	31			
	54th „	2	34			
	60th Rifles (1st Batt.)	1	10			
	75th Foot	-	31			
	78th „	1	14			
	79th „	1	22			
	82d „	-	10			
	84th „	1	10			
	88th „	-	47			
	90th „	-	15			
	93d „	2	26			
	97th „	1	49			
	Rifle Brigade (2d Batt.)	2	97			
	„ „ (3d Batt.)	-	54			
Burlington	84th Foot	1	-	22 Jan.	—	
	TOTAL	72	3,216			
MADRAS:	For Her Majesty's—					
	12th Lancers	1	20	1857:	1858:	
	43d Foot	1	8			
Gloriana	44th „	2	2	9 Sept.	12 Jan.	125
	60th Rifles	-	13			
	74th Foot	1	54			
	12th Lancers	1	16			
	44th Foot	1	3			
S.S. Indomitable	60th Rifles	-	10	11 Nov.	—	
	„ „ (3d Batt.)	2	26			
	66th Foot	-	9			
S. Indus (Overland) from Southampton).	Artillery	2	40	4 Dec.	9 Feb. per "Candia" from Suez.	67
	75th Foot	1	23			
S.S. Argo	82d „	-	18			
	84th „	-	8	19 „	—	
	90th „	-	5			
	1st „ (1st Batt.)	-	50			
	43d „	1	8			
	44th „	1	37			
York	60th Rifles (3d Batt.)	-	13	19 „	—	
	66th Foot	-	32			
	69th „	-	11			
	74th „	-	12			
	95th „	1	-			
	1st „ (1st Batt.)	-	43			
	43d „	1	-			
	44th „	1	28	1858:		
S.S. Pera (Overland) from Southampton)	60th Rifles	-	36			
	66th Foot	1	60	4 Feb.	—	
	68th „	-	17			
	69th „	-	33			
	74th „	2	9			
	TOTAL	20	644			

Appendix, No. 14.

DETACHMENTS OF DRAFTS—*continued.*

Ships or Steamers.	REGIMENTS.	Officers in Charge.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
BOMBAY:	For Her Majesty's—			1857:	1857:	
Genghis Khan	64th Foot	- -	12	10 August	10 Nov.	92
	86th „	1	99			
Sedgmoor	14th Light Dragoons	1	60	29 „	28 Dec.	121
	Artillery	2	—			
	32d Foot	1	—			
	64th „	1	59			
	78th „	4	98			
	83d „	3	136			
	86th „	2	1			
S.S. Italian	56th „	2	1	25 Sept.	3 „	69
S.S. Great Britain	14th Light Dragoons	- -	14	8 Oct.	17 „	70
	33d Foot	- -	7			
	56th „	8	65			
S.S. Calcutta	33d „	- -	10	11 „	29 „	79
	83d „	- -	20			
S.S. Prince Albert	Foot Artillery	1	—	22 „	28 „	67
S.S. Princess Charlotte	33d Foot	1	14	14 Nov.	—	
	97th „	1	41		1858:	
S. Indus (Overland from Southampton.)	Artillery	1	40	4 Dec.	6 Jan. per "Pekin" from Suez.	33
Salamanca	3d Dragoon Guards	1	6	30 „	—	
	14th Light Dragoons	- -	3			
	Artillery	- -	21			
	18th Foot	1	105			
	51st „	1	84			
	56th „	- -	9			
	72d „	- -	23			
	83d „	- -	12			
	86th „	1	23			
	89th „	2	81			
S.S. United Service	18th „	1	21	1858: 14 Jan.	—	
	51st „	- -	15			
	83d „	1	14			
	86th „	2	9			
	56th „	- -	12			
	72d „	- -	6			
	95th „	2	36			
S. Ripon (Overland from Southampton.)	64th „	1	—	11 Feb.	—	
	92d „	7	234			
S.S. Sultan (Overland from Southampton)	Artillery	1	16	24 Feb.	—	
	18th Foot	1	72			
	33d „	- -	6			
	51st „	- -	15			
	56th „	1	19			
	71st „	7	63			
	72d „	- -	13			
	83d „	- -	8			
	86th „	- -	11			
	89th „	- -	5			
	92d „	- -	2			
	95th „	- -	7			
	TOTAL	59	1,628			

Appendix, No. 14.

DETACHMENTS OF DRAFTS—*continued.*

Ships or Steamers.	REGIMENTS.	Officers in Charge.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
KURRACHEE:	For Her Majesty's—			1857:	1857:	
Roman Emperor	27th Foot	2	-	18 July -	17 Nov. -	122
	61st „	1	90			
	87th „	2	103			
Castle Eden	27th „	1	-	18 „ -	12 Dec. -	147
	52d „	2	177			
	61st „	1	-			
Bombay	24th „	4	75	22 „ -	28 Nov. -	129
	70th „	3	273			
Albuera	27th „	3	35	22 „ -	24 „ -	125
	81st „	2	192			
	87th „	1	-			
					1858:	
Alipore	7th „	-	2	2 Sept. -	8 Jan. -	28
	24th „	-	20			
	27th „	1	40			
	52d „	-	2			
	87th „	-	1			
S.S. Southampton	7th „	1	33	16 Oct. -	12 Jan. -	88
	24th „	-	11			
	27th „	-	14			
	52d „	-	20			
	61st „	-	10			
	70th „	-	19			
	81st „	-	29			
	87th „	-	18			
S.S. Leopold	7th „	-	51	3 Dec.	—	
	27th „	-	16			
	52d „	1	12			
	61st „	-	11			
	70th „	-	8			
	87th „	-	16			
Sultana	51st „	2	-	29 „	—	
Salamanca	98th „	1	5	30 „	—	
S.S. United Service	7th „	-	46	1858:		
	27th „	1	33			
	52d „	1	44			
	61st „	-	7	14 Jan.	—	
	70th „	-	20			
	94th „	-	15			
	98th „	1	56			
	TOTAL - - -	31	1,504			
CEYLON, for Orders to be given by the Government of India:						
	For Her Majesty's—			1857:	1857:	
William Hammond, sent on to Calcutta, arrived in November	29th Foot -	4	86	24 July -	30 Oct. -	99
	53d „ -	3	124			
	60th Rifles (1st Batt.)	-	20			
	TOTAL - - -	7	230			

Appendix, No. 14.

RECRUITS for the East India Company's EUROPEAN REGIMENTS in *India*.

SHIPS OR STEAMERS.	Officers in Charge.	Men.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days.
CALCUTTA:					
Nile	2	102	10 June 1857	4 Oct. 1857	116
Amazon	4	238	10 „ –	5 „ –	117
Aréta	3	214	18 „ –	25 „ –	129
Bucephalus	1	– –	1 July –	25 „ –	115
Adelaide	4	212	10 „ –	5 Nov. –	118
Octavia	1	– –	25 „ –	16 „ –	114
Sir Robert Sale	5	285	30 „ –	23 „ –	116
Agamemnon	1	– –	11 Aug. –	16 „ –	97
Maria Somes	4	230	13 Nov. –	—	
Statesman	4	187	17 „ –	—	
Gertrude	4	349	5 Dec. –	—	
Stuart Wortley	3	249	13 „ –	—	
Nimrod	3	245	19 „ –	—	
Burlington	4	300	22 „ –	—	
Vittoria	4	292	25 Feb. 1858	—	
Akbar	4	294	26 „ –	—	
TOTAL	51	3,197			
MADRAS:					
SS. Prince Arthur (E. I. Company's vessel.)	4	300	11 June 1857	10 Oct. 1857	91
Gloriana	1	– –	9 Sept. –	12 Jan. 1858	125
Malabar	3	132	10 Oct. –	—	
Bengal	3	212	10 „ –	—	
TOTAL	11	644			
BOMBAY:					
Vernon	3	204	20 Aug. –	12 Dec. 1857	114
Sedgemoor	1	– –	29 „ –	28 „ –	121
Gosforth	4	352	20 Sept. –	29 „ –	100
Lord Dalhousie	3	186	15 Dec. –	—	
TOTAL	11	742			

SUMMARY.

	REGIMENTS.	Officers.	Men.	PRESIDENCY.	
Reliefs - -	2d Dragoon Guards -	20	582	Calcutta.	
	3d „ „ - -	25	614	Bombay.	
	8th Foot - - -	50	953	Calcutta.	
	Rifle Brigade (3d Batt.)	41	964	- ditto.	
	7th Foot - - -	52	977	Kurrachee.	
	60th Rifles (3d Batt.) -	39	1,029	Ceylon, for orders.	
	TOTAL - - -	227	5,119		
1st Division (additional Troops) -	1st Foot (1st Batt.) -	47	1,095	Ceylon, for orders.	
	19th „ - - -	45	1,006		
	38th „ - - -	45	1,008		
	79th „ - - -	45	976		
2d Division (additional Troops) -	20th Foot - - -	37	818	Calcutta.	
	34th „ - - -	38	757		
	42d „ - - -	40	877		
	54th „ - - -	38	857		
	97th „ - - -	39	818		
	2 Troops Horse Artillery	15	324	- - -	- - With equipment, guns, materiel, harness and stores; 16 tons heavy, and 240 tons measurement.
	2 Companies Foot Artillery	12	288		
	2 „ - „ -	14	286	Madras.	
	2 „ - „ -	11	286	Bombay.	
	Rifle Brigade (2d Batt.)	37	858	Ceylon, for orders.	
3d Division (additional Troops) -	1st Dragoon Guards -	24	507	Calcutta.	
	7th Hussars - - -	22	511		
	44th Foot - - -	33	802	Madras.	
	66th „ - - -	38	855		
	56th „ - - -	31	730	Bombay.	
	72d „ - -	39	886		
	2 Field Batteries Artillery	16	393	Kurrachee -	- - With equipment, guns, stores, harness and materiel; 20 tons heavy, and 260 tons measurement.
	1 Troop Horse „	10	227	Ceylon, for orders	- - With equipment, guns, stores, materiel, harness, &c.; together, 28 tons heavy, and 380 tons measurement.
	2 Field Batteries „	14	380		
	1 Field Battery „	6	186	Calcutta - -	- - With equipment, guns, materiel, stores and harness; 10 tons heavy, and 130 tons measurement.
	2 Companies „	12	221	- ditto.	
	2 „ Engineers	13	239	- ditto - -	- - With implements and tools; 20 tons measurement.
4th Division (additional Troops) -	1 Field Battery Artillery	6	186	Madras - -	- - With equipment, guns, materiel, stores and harness; 10 tons heavy, and 130 tons measurement.
	1 Company - „	5	110	- ditto.	
	8th Hussars - - -	24	486	Bombay.	
	17th Lancers - -	21	483	- ditto.	
	18th Foot - - -	36	848	- ditto.	
	51st „ - - -	37	773	- ditto.	
	1 Troop Artillery -	7	219	- ditto - -	- - With equipment, guns, materiel, stores and harness; 8 tons heavy, and 130 tons measurement.
	7th Dragoon Guards -	24	473	Kurrachee.	
	94th Foot - - -	33	862	- ditto.	
	98th „ - - -	36	806	- ditto.	
	1 Field Battery Artillery	6	185	- ditto - -	- - With equipment, guns, materiel, stores and harness; 10 tons heavy, and 130 tons measurement.
	2 Companies „	9	222	- ditto.	
	2 „ - Engineers	12	240	- ditto - -	- - With implements and tools; 20 tons measurement

(continued)

SUMMARY—*continued.*

	REGIMENTS.	Officers.	Men.	PRESIDENCY.
5th Division (additional Troops)	68th Foot	40	805	Madras.
	69th „	40	776	- ditto.
6th Division (additional Troops)	71st „	25	836	Bombay.
	92d „	31	793	- ditto.
	57th „ (2 Companies)	9	200	Aden.
	TOTAL	1,122	25,414	
Detachments, H. M's. Service	Cavalry	7	209	Calcutta.
	Infantry	71	3,028	
	Artillery	1	209	
	Cavalry	2	36	Madras.
	Infantry	16	568	
	Artillery	2	40	
	Cavalry	2	83	Bombay.
	Infantry	52	1,468	
	Artillery	5	77	
	Infantry	30	1,504	Kurrachee.
	TOTAL	188	7,212	

Recruits for the East India Company's Service	51	3,197	Calcutta.
	11	644	Madras.
	11	742	Bombay.
TOTAL	73	4,583	

	Officers.	Men.
Reliefs	227	5,119
Six Divisions of additional Troops	1,122	25,414
Detachments (or Drafts) of Her Majesty's Service	188	7,212
Recruits for the East India Company's Service	73	4,583
GRAND TOTAL	1,610	42,328

Of the preceding Total Number of Troops of all Arms thus despatched to *India*, there have arrived at their destination, 1,383 Officers, and 33,646 Men.

The following Statement specifies the Number arrived in each Month, and distinguishes the Ports or Places where the Officers and Men were Landed, as far as can be ascertained; viz.:

AT CALCUTTA.			AT MADRAS.			AT BOMBAY.			AT KURRACHEE.			AT ADEN.			TOTAL.		
	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
1857:			1857:			1857:			1857:			1857:					1857:
October - -	93	2,589	October - -	4	300	October - -	- -	- -	October - -	- -	-	October (Overland).	9	200	106	3,089	October.
November - -	518	12,202	November -	110	2,954	November -	19	476	November -	68	1,688	- - -	- -	- -	724	17,320	November.
(Overland) -	7	117	(Overland) -	- -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	(Overland) -	12	240	- - -	- -	- -	19	357	
December - -	24	607	December -	28	732	December - -	181	4,743	December -	31	720	- - -	- -	- -	264	6,802	December.
(Overland) -	19	343	(Overland) -	28	532	(Overland) -	8	- -	- - -	- -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	55	875	
1858:			1858:			1858:			1858:								1858:
January - -	6	186	January - -	30	478	January - -	29	596	January - -	51	1,323	- - -	- -	- -	116	2,583	January.
						(Overland) -	1	40	(Overland) -	32	831	- - -	- -	- -	33	871	
February - -	- -	- -	February - -	- -	- -	February - -	28	648	- - -	- -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	28	648	February.
			(Overland) -	13	265	(Overland) -	25	836	- - -	- -	- -	- - -	- -	- -	38	1,101	
TOTAL - -	667	16,044	- - -	222	5,261	- - -	291	7,339	- - -	194	4,802	- - -	9	200	1,383	33,646	

East India House, Marine Department,
13 March 1858.

J. C. Mason.

Appendix, N° 15.

DRAFT of a LETTER from Sir *G. Clerk* to Sir *J. Melvill.*

Sir, 7 January 1858.

Appendix, No. 15.

I AM directed to transmit to you copy of a correspondence addressed to the War Department respecting the defective arrangements made for the sick in the transport of troops between Suez and India, and I have to state that it is the wish of the Government that stringent orders to remedy this evil may be issued.

I am also to request that you will move the Court of Directors to call the attention of the Peninsular and Oriental Company to the want of accommodation on board the "Indus" and the "Pekin."

DRAFT of a LETTER from the Secretary of the East India Company to the Under-Secretary of State for War.

Sir, East India House, September 1857.

No. 13. Medical Staff. 42.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Godley's letter, dated the 28th instant, with its enclosure, from the Director-general of the Army Medical Department, regarding the provision of passages for the medical staff officers referred to therein.

In reply, I am instructed to state that inquiries have been made as to the most speedy means of furnishing the officers in question with a passage to Calcutta. It is found that no passages are available by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers from Southampton earlier than December.

3 deputy inspectors-general.
2 staff surgeons, 1st class.
5 staff surgeons, 2d class.
46 staff assistant surgeons.
56 officers.

Accommodation can be provided for the whole of the officers by the Royal Mail packet of the 12th October to Galle, from whence an early conveyance might be obtained to Calcutta.

Passages can be obtained for them direct to Calcutta by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's steam ship "Granada," leaving Southampton *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope on the 31st October next. This steam-ship was intended to be sent to Bombay; but should the 56 medical officers for whom passages are now requested be embarked on her, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company would despatch her to Calcutta direct.

The favour of an immediate answer as to the course which is considered most advisable is requested.

I have, &c.

COPY of a LETTER from Sir *H. Storks* to Sir *G. Clerk.*

Sir, War Office, 2 January 1858.

I AM directed by Lord Panmure to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter from the Director-general of the Army Medical Department, with its enclosure from the medical officer in charge of the detachment hospital at Suez, respecting the want of special accommodation for sick on board the transports conveying troops to India, and I am to request that you will move Mr. Vernon Smith to cause the same to be transmitted to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, with an expression of Lord Panmure's opinion, that it is of the utmost importance that proper accommodation should be provided on board all transports for the sick, and his wish that stringent orders may be issued on the subject.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. K. Storks.*

Sir, Army Medical Department, 1 January 1858.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information and consideration of the Minister for War, the enclosed copy of a communication which I have received from Dr. Fraser, surgeon, 10th Hussars, in medical charge of the Detachment Hospital at Suez, dated the 22d ultimo.

I take this step chiefly on account of feeling it my duty to earnestly recommend that it may be at once distinctly laid down that a suitable provision should exist, in every vessel carrying troops, for the comfortable accommodation of such cases of sickness as may occur during the voyage, and that in all instances the sufferers should have an opportunity of lying in the horizontal position whenever that is found desirable.

It

It is satisfactory to observe that hitherto there has been, in all but one vessel, some amount of accommodation available; but as it does not appear very clear that such is regularly considered essential, I feel that a necessity exists for the issue of definite and imperative instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*,
Director-General.

Colonel Sir H. M. Storks, K.C.B.

Sir, Suez, 22 December 1857.

I HAVE the honour to report that the third and last detachment of the 69th Regiment arrived here on the 18th instant, and a detachment of Royal Artillery on the 20th instant. From the former four men were admitted into this hospital, and one from the latter.

Owing to the non-arrival of the Calcutta steamer, by which they were to have proceeded to their destination (Madras), the whole of this detachment of the 69th, and a portion of the Royal Artillery, are still lying in Suez Roads, and will be here some days yet. By that time two of the 69th will be quite in a fit state to accompany their detachment if there is any accommodation for the reception of sick on board the vessel by which they proceed; but I wish to acquaint you that I am led to understand that no such provision is usually made; that in the regular passenger steamers merely a deck passage is provided for the troops; and that, if a man should fall sick by the way, no other accommodation is expected to be provided for him; that suitable accommodation being available must depend upon some of the second-class cabins or saloons being unoccupied.

I am informed by the medical officer (Assistant-Surgeon Inkson, 37th Regiment), who came in charge of a detachment of Royal Artillery from England in the "Indus," that he could obtain no accommodation but the deck for his sick; and that in consequence they were not able to lie down.

This renders it necessary to detain here all cases in which the recumbent posture is required for their treatment, such as severe cases of syphilitic sores, buboes, &c., which did not appear to me, from your instructions, to be the intention of establishing an hospital here; but even if it should be, and all cases requiring such treatment are detained here, it is not to be expected but that so large a number of men must furnish a few sick during the rest of the voyage, and that accordingly some arrangement should be made by which suitable accommodation should be reserved for such, so as to be available whether the ship is crowded or not.

Hitherto it has so happened that suitable accommodation to a small extent was available in all the vessels which left this with troops since my arrival here, and it was only yesterday I learned that such a requirement as a "sick bay" was not calculated upon. This was in the case of a detachment of Royal Artillery proceeding to Bombay by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam ship "Pekin." I write this in haste to overtake the mail.

I have, &c.
(signed) *R. Fraser*, M.D., Surgeon, 10th Hussars,
In charge British Military Hospital, Suez.

The Director-General
Army Medical Department.

COPY of a LETTER from Sir *J. C. Melvill* to Secretary to India Board.

Sir, East India House, 20 January 1858.

I AM commanded by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to forward, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter which has been received from Mr. Howell, the secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, under date the 15th January, respecting the complaints made by Dr. Fraser as to the want of proper accommodation for the sick on board steam-vessels of that company in the passage from Suez to India. The original papers upon this subject, which were enclosed in the letters from Mr. Leach of the 24th December, and from Sir George Clerk of the 7th January, are herewith returned to you, as requested.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill.*

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's Offices,
Sir, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E. C., 15 Jan. 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, enclosing copies of papers from the department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War, respecting the accommodation provided for Her Majesty's troops who proceeded from Suez to India in some of this Company's vessels, and pointing out the necessity of a sick bay for invalids.

In reply, I am desired respectfully to observe that Dr. Fraser, by whom the representations in question have been made, could either not have understood, or have made due allowance for the circumstances and the conditions under which the troops in question were sent forward.

Appendix, No. 15.

The Honourable Court will remember that in all cases, except that of the 94th Regiment, the troops had to go forward from Suez in the ordinary mail steamers, which, besides having their full complement of passengers on board, were of course unprovided with some of the extra conveniences which might have been introduced, could the Company's agents at Calcutta and Bombay have been made acquainted with the likelihood of troops being about to be conveyed by them.

In the vessels specially provided by the Company for the conveyance of the troops from England to Alexandria, and in the "Oriental," which took forward Her Majesty's 94th Regiment from Suez to Kurrachee, all requisite fittings and conveniences for the troops were arranged prior to the embarkation of the men.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell*,
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B., &c. &c.
East India House.

COPY of a LETTER from Sir *H. Storks* to Sir *G. Clerk*.

Sir, War Office, 22 January 1858.

I AM directed by Lord Panmure to transmit to you, with reference to the previous correspondence on the subject, copies of a further letter and its enclosure from Dr. Smith, in reference to the accommodation of the sick on their passage to India; and I am to request that the particular attention of the Court of Directors may be called to the importance of adequate preparation being made for their treatment and comfort on board steamers in the Red Sea.

I am, &c.
(signed) *H. K. Storks*.

Sir, Army Medical Department, 16 January 1858.

IN continuation of former extracts of letters received from Dr. Fraser, surgeon, 10th Hussars, in medical charge of the detachment hospital at Suez, which I have forwarded for the information of the Secretary of State for War, I now beg to transmit an extract from a communication addressed to me by that officer, dated the 3d instant, from which it will be observed that there is reason to fear it may not always be practicable to furnish accommodation for sick on board vessels conveying troops to the East *viâ* Egypt, on which point there should be no doubt; and I would therefore suggest that it may in future be understood that whenever beds are wanted for the sick they should be secured without regard to any inconvenience that may result to persons in health.

I have, &c.
(signed) *A. Smith*,
Director-General.

Colonel Sir H. Storks, K.C.B.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from Dr. *Fraser*, Surgeon, 10th Hussars, to the Director-General Army Medical Department, dated Suez, 3 January 1858.

A DETACHMENT of Royal Artillery, which left England per "Indus," has also left one sick man behind. This man has now recovered, and will proceed to his destination (Bombay) by the first opportunity; that is, in a day or two.

With regard to the accommodation provided for this draft of artillery on board the "Indus," I reported in my last letter that I was informed by the assistant-surgeon in charge (Dr. Inkson, 37th Regiment), that he could not obtain suitable accommodation for the treatment of sick on board. On further inquiry from other sources, I have been since then informed that upwards of one-half of the men were provided with berths on board the "Indus." I cannot understand how these statements are to be reconciled. I have, however, satisfied myself that from this point onwards the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company have engaged themselves to provide for the troops a deck passage only, and that in their contract no special provision for the suitable accommodation of men falling sick by the way has been made, though, when such accommodation is available by berths remaining unoccupied, it is readily given up. But it appears to me that it would be advisable to arrange, if possible, that the comfort of sick should not remain dependent upon such contingencies.

The temporary hospital I have opened here succeeds satisfactorily.

COPY of a LETTER from Sir *J. C. Melvill* to the Secretary to the India Board.

Sir, East India House, 29 January 1858.

I AM commanded by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to forward to you, for the information of the Commissioenrs for the Affairs of India, copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, dated the 21st January,

January, to whom the Court communicated the letter of the Deputy Quartermaster-general* of Her Majesty's forces respecting the want of hospital accommodation on board the steam ship "Nubia," which conveyed a detachment of Royal Engineers from Suez to Calcutta in November last. Copy of Colonel Gordon's letter is also forwarded.

Appendix, No. 15.

* Dated Horse Guards, 15 Jan. 1858.

I have, &c.
(signed) *James C. Melvill.*

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London, E.C.,
21 January 1858.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, referring to your previous communication of 13th instant, and enclosing for any observation the Company may have to offer, copy of a letter received from the Deputy Quartermaster-general of Her Majesty's Forces under date 15th January respecting the want of hospital accommodation on board the steam-ship "Nubia," which conveyed a detachment of Royal Engineers from Suez to Calcutta in November last, and in reply to state that my reply of 15th instant to the first-named letter is applicable in all respects to the case now brought forward.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

Sir J. C. Melvill, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.
East India House.

Horse Guards, 15 January 1858.

Sir,

BY desire of the General Commanding-in-Chief, I have the honour to transmit, for the information of the directors of the East India Company, the enclosed copy of a letter from the medical officer in charge of a detachment of Royal Engineers proceeding by the overland route to India, in which he reports that a rather large proportion of sickness occurred to the men during the passage from Suez to Calcutta in the steamer "Nubia," owing to the defective accommodation provided for the troops on board.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Alex. Gordon,*
D. Q. M. G. for Q. M. G.

Sir Jas. C. Melvill, K.C.B.
East India House.

On board Steamer "Nubia," Calcutta,
12 November 1857.

Sir,

As medical officer in charge of this detachment of Royal Engineers under your command, I have the honour to submit for your consideration one or two remarks in reference to the transport of the men from Suez to this port.

A rather large proportion of cases of diarrhœa, with traces of dysentery in some, have occurred during the passage; there are, besides, three instances of well-marked affection of the liver, and one of ophthalmia, and I am led to believe that much of all this is owing to the want of better accommodation for the reception of troops on board; in fact, that exposure on deck day and night for so long a period is decidedly prejudicial to the health of the men, and that in the event of future transport of troops by the overland route, some more favourable system might be adopted with great advantage.

Had our passage too not been extremely favourable as regards weather, or, instead of the few showers of rain that fell, had the men been exposed to a frequent recurrence of it, I have no doubt a considerable increase of sickness would have resulted.

A want which I would especially allude to is hospital accommodation, for which no provision whatever had originally been made; and the very scanty substitute which the crowded state of the ship enabled me to obtain has been a serious obstruction in the effective treatment of the sick.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. C. Haverty,*
Staff Surgeon, 2d Class.

Lieutenant-colonel Harness,
Commanding Detachment Royal Engineers.

DRAFT of a LETTER from Sir *G. Clerk* to Sir *J. C. Melvill.*

Sir,

3 February 1858.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter of the 29th ult., covering a letter from the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Company, in reply to a representation of the Quartermaster-general as to the want of hospital accommodation on board the steamer "Nubia."

The Board desire me to observe that they consider the letter of the Peninsular and Oriental Company by no means satisfactory, and that in every case in which any shipping company have engaged to transport troops, they should be required to furnish an explanation where deficiency of hospital accommodation is complained of.

Appendix, No. 15.

COPY of a LETTER from *J. D. Dickinson*, Esq., to Secretary to India Board.

Sir, East India House, 11 March 1858.

WITH reference to the letter from Sir George Clerk, dated the 3d February, I am desired by the Court of Directors of the East India Company to forward herewith to you, for the information of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, copy of a further letter from Mr. Howell, Secretary to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, dated the 6th inst., on the subject of the representation of the Quartermaster-general of the Forces as to the want of hospital accommodation on board the steamer "Nubia," which conveyed a detachment of Engineers from Suez to Calcutta in November last.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. D. Dickinson.*

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,
Offices, 122, Leadenhall-street, London,
6 March 1858.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, stating that the Court of Directors having transmitted to the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India copy of my letter dated 21st January, relative to a representation of the Quartermaster-general as to the want of hospital accommodation on board the "Nubia," which conveyed a detachment of Royal Engineers from Suez to Calcutta in November last: you are desired to inform this Company that it has been intimated to the Court that my letter is by no means satisfactory, and that an explanation ought to be furnished in every case where a deficiency of hospital accommodation is complained of, and requesting a specific explanation in respect to the "Nubia."

In reply, I am instructed by the directors to state that they cannot afford any further explanation in the matter, and have only to repeat, that neither the "Nubia," or any of the mail steamers on the other side of the isthmus, came to Suez, with a previous knowledge on the part of the Company's agents at Calcutta or Bombay, or of the commanders, that troops were to be conveyed by them to India, and that the Company in all these cases have carried out their undertaking to provide the troops with the best accommodation available, under the peculiar circumstances, with a fidelity and success better certified by the condition in which the men have been landed at their destination than by any other observations the directors can offer.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. W. Howell,*
Secretary.

J. D. Dickinson, Esq.

Appendix, No. 16.

Appendix, No. 16.

MEMORANDUM Communicated by Mr. *Lumsden*, late Senior Member of the Council at *Bombay*, subsequent to his Examination.

For Lieut.-General Sir *De Lacy Evans*, G.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

A few Brief Notes on the Transport of Troops Overland to *India*, viâ *Suez* and the *Red Sea*.

THE news of the mutiny at Meerut, the capture and massacre of Delhi, the alarming spread of the mutiny, and the sudden and imminent danger in which the Government was placed, were known to the Ministry in England by telegraph on the 26th or 27th of June 1857, and the news was published in detail in the Homeward Mail, dated the 30th June.

The question then arose by what route reinforcements should be sent to India, whether by the direct route of the Red Sea or round the Cape.

It would be a waste of time to contrast the two routes under ordinary circumstances, the whole western world has accepted the former; and the fact that it is almost universally preferred by delicate women with their children, and by invalids, at all seasons of the year, while the difference of time in arriving at their respective destinations (India or England) may be broadly stated as one month to four, or three at the earliest, places it beyond all question that the Red Sea route should have been preferred, provided transports could be found for troops so forwarded at the port of Suez.

This

This is, in fact, the main point for inquiry. Supposing the Home Government had telegraphed at once to the Government at Bombay, on hearing of the serious danger in which we were placed in India, which, as I have said, was known on the 27th of June, that troops would be immediately sent by that route, and that every effort should at once be made to convey them to India from Suez:

1st. How soon would these instructions have reached Bombay?

2d. How soon, and in what quantity, would steam and sailing transports have been at Suez?

3d. How soon would such transports have reached Bombay with troops?

The following remarks may be open to objections by those who defend the course pursued, that they suppose a state of things altogether too favourable, and which experience would have contradicted.

I shall only reply that I speak with deference, and with the wish and intention of speaking fairly and to the best of my limited knowledge; before what I say is received as authority I should wish to be tested by collation with the evidence of those who are better informed.

In the computations which follow, the following considerations should never be lost sight of: —

1st. The extreme and pressing exigency of the case; it was no time for red tape formalities, for a strict adherence to precedent and routine, either as regarded the nature of the transport employed, or of military duties exacted from troops during a voyage; what was required was to get men to India as quickly as possible, and to get them there in health, and efficient for immediate service.

2d. There were 10 regiments of infantry at that time at Malta; four, I believe, at Gibraltar; how many at the Ionian Islands I cannot say; all places much nearer to India for sending immediate reinforcements than any other dependencies, except the Mauritius. There was no want of means of transport, I believe, at Malta, and the regiments taken from thence could with ease and dispatch have been replaced from home.

3d. The monsoon, as it is called, or rainy season, ordinarily begins at Bombay from the 2d to the 8th of June, and lasts to the close of September; during these four months the wind in the Indian Ocean is from the south-west to the south-south-west, that is, fair from Aden to Bombay, and directly adverse from Bombay to Aden; it does not blow home to Aden by 120 miles or thereabout, and for that distance from Aden it is desirable that sailing vessels, where speed is an object, should be towed down the Gulf of Aden; once within the influence of the monsoon, and sailing vessels bound to Bombay will make as speedy a passage as steamers.

This will be clear by a reference to the map and to direction of the wind, which is steady and strong. Bombay is in, say 18° 56″; Aden in, say 12° 45″. In leaving Bombay to proceed to Aden against the monsoon, steamers go down to the southward under fore-and-aft sails, as far as 8° north or thereabout; then they go about and make Aden on the port tack. Sailing vessels do the same, only they proceed further south; I believe, however, not further than 2° north, when they also tack and lie up for Socotra and Aden. Paddle-wheel steamers occasionally come straight across in the teeth of the monsoon, as we nearly did in the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Pekin," 1,200 tons, 450 horse power, in August 1857; but I do not think that any time is gained thereby, as we had to struggle directly in the face of a heavy gale and a tremendous sea; we were 12 days on the Bassage, nearly.

Aden is 1,600 miles from Bombay, Suez 1,350 from Aden.

4th. The average length of passage by steamer from Bombay to Aden is, say in the fair season, seven days; in the monsoon, 12 days. From Aden to Suez, say, all the year round (for the monsoon is not felt in the Red Sea, and makes no difference) about six and a half days; then there is a detention for coaling at Aden, which is never less than 12 hours.

The average passage of a sailing ship to Aden is, I should say, in the fair season, from 14 to 16 days; in the monsoon, not more (if a clipper) than 22 days at farthest, or say three weeks; but here I speak less confidently.

5th. From Aden a ship of 1,000 tons, towed by a steamer of the same size, would reach Suez, I should say, in from 12 to 14 days at the outside; from Suez to Aden, as ships would have the advantage of a strong northerly wind half way down the sea, with smooth water and comparatively lighter winds after passing the region of calms, probably ten days, and not more, should be allowed for the passage of such a steamer, even with more than one ship in tow; but as the services of the steamer would be required for a day or two days after leaving Aden, to tow sailing vessels with monsoon, we will call the average passage either way as, under such circumstances, 12 days. Making this allowance, the passage from Aden to Bombay during the monsoon, which is the time in question, should not be put down as over seven days, whether for sailing vessels or steamer, as before observed. As examples

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in point I may mention that the Bombay mails have been brought down in the monsoon from Aden, by sailing vessels, in six days, and that a sailing vessel (I think the "Camillus") left the Isle of France two days after the steamer "Pottinger," of 1,600 tons, having on board a portion of the troops sent to our assistance, on board these vessels, by Governor Higgenson and General Hay, and came into Bombay harbour not two hours after the "Pottinger," thus beating her by nearly two days. I saw them both arrive. This was about the 10th or 12th of August 1857; I left India on the 15th.

6th. The time occupied by a telegraphic message between Malta and England, I have been told, whether rightly or wrongly, is 70 hours; if wrong, the following computations can be corrected.

Now, if we apply the foregoing data to the question which I have proposed in the earlier part of these remarks, we arrive at the following results. The disastrous news from India reached the Ministry, as I have observed, on the 27th June, at the latest, by telegraph. The 10 regiments at Malta would surely have furnished a force of 4,000 men. The Bombay news of the 15th of June was published in London (see Homeward Mail) on the 15th July; a Bombay steamer which brought it must, therefore, have arrived at Suez by the end of June, or at the latest on the 1st to 4th July.

The home news mail reached Bombay by the same Suez steamer, if I recollect rightly, about the 22d July; as then she did not take, at the most, above 15 days, and probably less, in coming from Suez to Bombay, she must have been at Suez on the 7th July.

Now, if the Ministry had done what I think they ought to have done—if they had on the 28th of June telegraphed to Malta and to the Government of Bombay—to the former, instructions to send on 4,000 men, *viâ* Egypt, to India without delay, and to send on the Indian message by an immediate steamer, which should also carry to Egypt agents to prepare for reception and accommodation of the troops, and to warn the consular authorities in that country to employ at once the best agency and adopt the most efficient measures for the reception, maintenance, and transport of the troops through Egypt, locating them in the most favourable place for troops to be stationed, Cairo, pending the arrival of transports at Suez, and communicating with the Pasha's Government—the Indian message would have reached Suez in time for the steamer which must have left it about the 7th July, and all would have gone smoothly.

Thus, telegraph to Malta on the 28th June, 70 hours; delay at Malta, 24 hours; passage to Alexandria, 78 hours. Telegraph message to Suez, say 6 hours, or 70 + 24 + 78 = 178 hours, or 7 days 10 hours. I think I have allowed a sufficient margin for delays. The message to the Bombay Government from the Ministry would have reached the commander of the steamer at Suez on the 6th July, at the latest.

If by the same telegraph Ministers had instructed the political agent at Aden to have taken up any available tonnage for the transport of troops from Suez, he could, unquestionably, have engaged at least four vessels of from 500 to 1,000 tons, and warned the Bombay Government that he had done so. He would have been able to do much to these vessels by way of preparation, pending the arrival of steamers from Bombay to tow them up the Red Sea.

The mail having reached Bombay about the 22d July, I have shown by the returns of shipping in the harbour (which I sent to you, and which are published daily in the "Bombay Times," with the exception of the steamers of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company), that there were at the time ample means of transport at hand for a very large force, and in clipper vessels. Indeed, the transports which brought back the 14th Dragoons from Persia were, I rather think, at that time in the harbour properly fitted for troops.

There were several of the Honourable Company's men of war steamers, and at least two or three of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company's; two fine steamers of this Company, the and "Pioneer." It also happened that the season was unusually favourable for sailing vessels and steamers both for going to and coming from Aden, the monsoon not having set in with its usual force, and in several directions early in August.

I have no doubt but that we could have despatched three steamers, averaging 1,000 tons each, on the 25th July, also any required number of sailing clipper vessels by the end of the month. Sir Henry can speak to this.

The steamers so despatched would have been at Aden within 10 days, say the 5th August If they took each a ship in tow from Aden (to prevent misunderstanding, mark that they could not tow ships from Bombay to Aden against the monsoon), they might have arrived at Suez on the 17th to 19th of August, if they took no ship in tow on the 12th to 13th of August.

The most expeditious mode of carrying on troops at that season would, I think, have been for every available steamer to have been employed towing troop ships up and down the Red Sea, carrying of course as many men as they could to Aden in addition, and from thence towing them out within the influence of the monsoon and then casting them off; we will therefore not consider what steamers alone would have done passing up and down the Red Sea between Suez and Aden, and bringing troops down to the transports which would have rendezvoused at the latter place.

Such

Such transports leaving by the 30th or 31st July would have been at Aden, I should say at the latest, by the 20th of August, considering the season. Appendix, No. 16.

The three steamers, each with a ship in tow (say averaging 800 tons) would, as I have said, been at Suez by the 17th to the 19th of August; I shall presently show that the troops might have been waiting for them at Cairo ready, and within a day's transport of Suez, returning full of troops, and if thought desirable, with three or four native boats in tow besides the ships; they would have been very probably at Aden by the 10th day after leaving Suez, or say the 12th; allow two days for transporting from Cairo, and embarking at Suez as many men as the vessels could carry without prejudice to the men's health, and we have 14 days to reach Aden on (from the latest date, the 19th of August) the 2d September, and allowing two for re-embarking them on board transports at Aden, if any came down in boats, and for towing them into the monsoon, or say three days, and seven days for the passage to Bombay, and the first batch of troops could have reached India by the 12th September, after making all allowances for delays.

Between 3,000 or 4,000 men, I consider, might have at once been brought this way, but when once steam service was arranged between Suez and Aden, and vessels sent to rendezvous at Aden, any number of troops might have been brought on very rapidly.

I do not conceive that there was the slightest reason for hesitation then, either on the score of want of transport on the Suez side, or on that of health; good awnings, wholesome fresh provisions, care not to overcrowd, and the allowing the men to remain in undress, and be about deck during the passage down the Red Sea to Aden, would have secured the latter; and at Aden they would have found (at least such as were not embarked, good roomy ships at Suez) some of the most splendid, airy, and fast vessels in the world, waiting for them.

I have shown that steamers, with ships in tow, might have been at Suez by the 17th to the 19th of August. It remains to consider when the troops to be sent from Malta could have reached Cairo.

Telegraph to Malta, 28th June, would reach in 70 hours, or say three days, that is by the evening of the 1st July. The embarkation of troops might have occupied (as I think there is no doubt that transport by steam could have been obtained within a week or 10 days) say until the 12th July; on the 16th they might have been at Alexandria, when arrangements would have been made for them by agents previously dispatched, and before the 20th they would have been all encamped or accommodated at Cairo. The rail could have taken them up easily in a day if necessary.

I am quite sure that the Pasha would have done all in his power, as he did on a previous occasion, to have assisted our officers and troops, and facilitated their movements, while it is an absurdity to think at a want of supplies at Cairo, even for double the force here supposed. Cairo has somewhere near 400,000 inhabitants, and there are barracks for several Egyptian regiments, horse, foot, and artillery, I think, close by.

I have shown that steamers and transports would pretty certainly have been at Aden by the 17th to the 19th of August, so that whatever delay for transport at Malta, which, looking to our powerful steamers in the Mediterranean, could not have been under any circumstances very great, there was ample time for the troops to be sent to Cairo, and there to wait, and be in time for ships from India.

Appendix, No. 16.

Communicated by Mr. *Lumsden*.

VESSELS in *Bombay Harbour*, 9 June 1857.

NAME.	TONNAGE.	DESTINATION.
South Sea	953	London.
Premier	835	"
Stewart Wortley	-	"
Acadia	2,030	"
Mangerton	960	"
John M. Wood	1,180	Liverpool.
Ohio	450	"
Euroclydon	1,325	"
Natolia	1,075	"
Winifred	-	"
Shooting Star	1,400	"
James M'Henry	1,537	"
Khunjee Oodowjee	909	"
Cornelia	1,184	"
Joseph Turratt	-	"
Balmoral	-	"
Covenanter	1,274	"
Hecla	477	Clyde.
Rose Ellis	-	Falmouth.
Southern Cross	688	"
Thomas Arbuthnot	921	"
Asia	-	"
Milton	536	"
Caroline Chisholm	366	"
Tyfon	400	"
Admiral Baudin	600	Havre.
Malabar	834	—
Ocean	346	—
Pondicherry	-	—
Damblat	470	Dunkerque.
Belle Virginie	-	Marseilles.
Jacques Elizabeth	-	"
Nouvelle Ascension	366	"
Cumbrick	900	"
Esther	-	"
Heloise	470	"
Sebastopol	-	"
Montesquieu	-	"
Leonie	-	"
St. Elioi	-	"
Amelie	-	"
Angele	-	"
Courier	658	Antwerp.
Mystery	410	Trieste.
Borgund	-	"
J. P. Chapman	1,032	Genoa.
Atalanta	930	"
Edward Boustead	413	"
Ganges	505	"
Balkan	399	Lisbon.
Faiz Allum	-	Saim.
Assaye	847	New York.
Mary Robinson	1,348	"
Sarah	-	Persian Gulf.
Stamboul	-	Calcutta.
Earl of Clare	-	"
Nabob	-	"
Victor Emmanuel	956	"
Dowthorpe	-	Rangoon.
Adino	241	Singapore.
Glendaragh	644	—
Fullock Shadan	-	China.
Tenassarim	-	Mauritius.
Atieth Ruhimion	-	"
Jemina	-	Macao.
Kronprinz	460	Not fixed.
Futtay Salam	-	"

NAME.	TONNAGE.	DESTINATION.
Jasper	625	Not fixed.
Courser	-	"
Great Tasmania	-	"
Persia	1,603	"
Henry Tanner	-	"
Iona	-	"
Burmese	-	"
Ram	670	"
Intrepid	701	"
Sillery	986	"
Surat	930	"
Castino II.	356	"
Vizier	370	"
Eagle	615	"
Gertrude	1,301	"
Windsor	-	"
Flying Scud	-	"
Finchley	-	"
Mary Stenhouse	1,243	"
Conflict	1,326	"
Justyn	913	"
Anne Armstrong	-	"
Balaclava	465	"
Ticonderogo	-	"
Scottish Chief	1,052	"
Frazen	480	"
Crimea	519	"
British Empire	2,679	"
Grand Bey	-	"
Waterloo	406	"
Dacotah	-	"
Coromandel	-	"
Prince of Orange	526	"
Abyssinian	1,000	"
Ocean Monarch	I think 1,800 tons.	"
Eugen	450	"
Mahi	523	"
Hibernia	1,065	"
Lilley Dale	-	"
Annie Cropton	523	"
Wansfell	727	"
Trafalgar	739	"
Julia	-	"
Storm Cloud	-	"
Lydia	541	"
Alchemist	914	"
Time and Truth	-	"

INDIAN NAVY.

Schooner Augusta	—	—
Brig Palinurus	—	—
Steamer Goolanair	—	—
Steamer Queen	—	—
Steamer Ajdaha	—	—
Steamer Berenice	—	—
Receiving Ship Acbar	—	—

PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S STEAMERS.

Bombay	—	—
Chusan	—	—

Appendix, No. 16.

VESSELS in *Bombay Harbour*, 14 July 1857.

NAME.	TONNAGE.	DESTINATION.
Acadia	2,030	London.
Windsor	1,009	"
W. Miles	—	—
Khimjee Oodowjee	909	Liverpool.
Covenanter	1,274	"
Mary Stenhouse	1,243	"
Florine	1,042	"
Crimea	519	"
Alchemist	914	"
Gertrude	1,301	"
Sebastopol	-	Marseilles.
Montesquieu	-	"
Leonie	-	"
St. Eloi	-	"
Amelie	-	"
Jeune Felix	450	"
Celibataire	391	"
Lormont	-	"
Vizier	370	"
Pierre Alexander	-	"
Pondicherry	-	Havre.
Surat	930	—
Dowthorpe	-	Hull.
Ganges	505	Genoa.
Falanto	352	"
Castino II.	356	Gibraltar.
Eugen	450	—
Mary Robinson	1,348	New York.
Adino	241	Singapore.
Faiz Allum	-	Siam.
Thomas Arbuthnot	921	Falmouth.
Asia	-	"
Intrepid	701	"
Balaclava	465	"
Waterloo	406	"
Windsor Castle	"	"
Jasper	625	"
Acolus	620	"
Fullock Shadan	-	China.
Ticonderoga	-	"
Abyssinian	1,000	"
Lucie	-	Calcutta.
Earl of Clare	-	"
Fairlie	756	"
Gabriel	-	"
Ann Buckle	-	Mauritius.
Tenassarim	-	"
Royal Albert	-	Colombo.
Franzen	480	Zanzibar.
Ann Armstrong	-	Moulmain.
Gossypium	-	"
Ville de Lille	-	Dunkirk.
Tartar	641	Rangoon.
Melbourne	-	Government Employ.
Great Tasmania	-	Not fixed.
Persia	1,603	"
Iona	-	"
Flying Scud	-	"
Conflict	1,326	"
Justyn	913	"
Scottish Chief	1,052	"
British Empire	2,679	"
Grand Bey	-	Not fixed.
Coromandel	-	"
Prince of Orange	526	"
Ocean Monarch	-	"
Wansfell	727	"
Lydia	541	"
Futtay Shah Allum	-	"
Sirocco	1,132	"
Tasmanian	1,136	"
Semiramis	901	"
Cosmos	410	"
Mirzapore	846	"
Earl Grey	570	"
Flying Venus	-	"
Tamarac	802	"
Tiger	-	"
St. Vincent de Paul	-	"
Punjaub	-	"
Delphin	550	"
Caduceus	1,106	"
Queen of the North	-	"
Elizabeth	920	"
Simoom	-	"
Arthur the Great	-	"
Queen of the West	1,400	"
James Carson	-	"
General Wyndham	864	"
Eliza Bonsall	-	"
Alert	394	"
Indian Queen	1,000	"
Napoleon III.	1,462	"
Bonne Marie	-	"
Hydree	-	"
Elizabeth	-	"
Wings of the Wind	-	"
James Pilkington	-	"
Carpentari	-	"
Boyne	-	"
Abdulla	-	"
Aurifera	459	"
John Masterman	600	"
Bissite et Pecoul	-	"
Futty Allum	-	"

INDIAN NAVY.

Schooner Augusta	—	—
Brig Palinurus	—	—
Steamer Goolanair	—	—
Steamer Victoria	—	—
Steamer Queen	—	—
Steamer Ajdaha	—	—
Receiving Ship Acbar	—	—

PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S STEAMERS.

Madras	—	—
Norna	—	—
Precursor	—	—
Chusan	—	—
Aden	—	—
Cadiz	—	—

Appendix, No. 16.

VESSELS in *Bombay Harbour*, 30 July 1857.

NAME.	TONNAGE.	DESTINATION.	NAME.	TONNAGE.	DESTINATION.
Windsor	1,009	London.	Prince of Orange	-	Not fixed.
William Miles	-	"	Wansfell	777	"
Covenanter	1,274	Liverpool.	British Empire	2,679	"
Florine	1,042	"	Ann Buckle	963	"
Alchymist	-	"	Semiramis	-	"
Crimea	-	"	Earl Grey	570	"
Gertrude	1,309	"	Flying Venus	-	"
James Pilkington	-	"	Tiger	-	"
Heloise	476	Marseilles.	St. Vincent de Paul	-	"
St. Eloi	290	"	Queen of the North	743	"
Jeune Felix	450	"	Tamarac	802	"
Amelie	690	"	Eliza Bonsell	1,264	"
Lormont	-	"	Napoleon III.	1,462	"
Visir	370	"	Hyderee	675	"
Pondicherry	1,000	Havre.	Wings of the Wind	-	"
Gyptis	-	"	Melbourne	1,169	"
Falanto	-	Genoa.	Boyne	619	"
Eugen	379	Gibraltar.	Abdulla Clarke	961	"
Alert	394	"	Futtay Allum	-	"
Adino	241	Singapore.	Bissite et Pecoul	-	"
Faiz Allum	-	Singapore and Siam.	Aurifera	499	"
			J. P. Wheeler	1,000	"
Intrepid	-	Falmouth.	Mangerton	-	"
Windsor Castle	813	"	Santiago	-	"
Jasper	629	"	Mana Gray	-	"
Dolphin	-	"	Montesquieu	-	"
Futtay Salum	-	China.	W. E. Malcolm	-	"
Abyssinian	1,000	"	Ellen Bates	-	"
Ticonderoga	-	"	Bee Rais	-	"
Fairlie Corvan	756	Calcutta.	Walter Morris	-	"
Elizabeth Kimbull	-	"	Sweepstakes	1,735	"
Punjaub	-	"	Sirocco	-	"
Persia	1,603	Madras.	Hydroos	-	"
Nith	-	Mauritius.	Xiphias	-	"
Futtay Shah Allum	-	"	Magnet	-	"
Bonnie Marie	271	"			
Cosmos	410	Trieste.	**INDIAN NAVY:**		
Gossypium	-	Moulmain.			
Ville de Lille	603	Dunkirk.	Schooner Augusta	—	—
Lydia	541	Rangoon.	Brig Palinurus	—	—
Sirocco	-	"	Steamer Goolanair	—	—
John Masterman	608	"	Steamer Queen	—	—
Royal Albert	617	Colombo.	Steamer Ajdaha	—	—
Arthur the Great	-	Bushire.	Steamer Victoria	—	—
Great Tasmania	2,163	Not fixed.	Steamer Assaye	—	—
Tasmania	-	"	Receiving Ship Acbar	—	—
Iona	-	"			
Flying Scud	-	"	**PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY'S STEAMERS.**		
Conflict	1,326	"			
Earl of Clare	-	"	Precursor	—	—
Scottish Chief	1,052	"	Chusan	—	—
Justyn	913	"	Bombay	—	—
Grand Bey	-	"	Singapore	—	—
Ocean Monarch	-	"			

Appendix, No. 17.

MEMORANDUM from Mr. *Mead*, subsequently to his Evidence.

HAD the offer of Lord Elphinstone to send an officer to overtake the mail of the 11th of May from Bombay been attended to, the most important results would have been obtained.

He would have ascertained at Aden that there were 20,000 tons of coal at that place, and could have assured Her Majesty's Government that as regarded transport vessels and steamers to tow them, the most abundant means existed for forwarding any number of troops on this side of the Red Sea.

Whilst going across the Desert he would have ascertained the state of the railway, and the nature of the facilities for moving a body of men from Cairo to Suez by rail, camels, and horse-vans.

At Alexandria he could have had an interview with Her Majesty's Consul-General, and inquired if there were any difficulties likely to be offered to the passage of our soldiers across the isthmus.

Arriving at Malta, it would be open to him to ascertain how far the island could supply needful requisites for a large military force embarking at a short notice.

He would reach London on the 6th of June. Allow four days for the deliberations of Government, two days from London to Marseilles, and three days from that port to Malta, and we have the instructions of Government for the despatch of troops conveyed to the General commanding in the island on the 15th of June.

The distance from Malta to Alexandria is 800 miles. Allow four days for the embarkation of the troops and six days for the voyage, the mail steamers doing it in less than three days, the force is landed then in Egypt, say on the 28th of June.

A steamer chartered at Liverpool or Southampton on the 10th of June, and waiting five days for stores, would have reached Alexandria with ease by the time the troops disembarked. She could have conveyed surgeons and medical supplies, hammocks, preserved provisions, and a couple of suits of linen clothing per man.

Two trains would each carry 500 men to Cairo in 10 hours; from that place they could have been pushed forwards 40 miles by the Suez Railway; but if any obstacle was made in that respect, the ordinary transit arrangements would have placed them at Suez in four days. It is a very common occurrence for the homeward and outward passengers to cross each other in the Desert, the two usually averaging more than 250 persons. The time occupied in doing the 80 miles is about 14 hours; the stages are five miles apart, and the pace kept up by the vans not less than eight miles an hour.

Say that the first 1,000 troops arrived at Suez on the 5th of July, they would be put on board three (3) transports and be towed by steamers to Aden, about 1,200 miles distant. The ordinary run occupies six days, and the wind being fair, they could set sail and would be of little encumbrance to the steamers. Give them, however, nine days to Aden, and allow four days for embarkation, and they reach that port on the 18th of July. From Aden to Bombay, the monsoon blowing strongly, would be a perfectly fair wind, and being cast off, they could accomplish the voyage without a chance of impediment, humanly speaking, in eight days. They would thus have reached India in 20 days from the date of their arrival in Egypt, and each fortnight would have diminished the time occupied in the transit. From the 18th of July to the 18th of October, 10,000 might have been landed in India by the overland route without the smallest difficulty.

On the breaking out of the mutiny at Meerut and Delhi there were lying at Calcutta the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers "Oriental" and "Hindostan," in addition to the vessels employed in the postal service between Suez and Calcutta.

The "Oriental" was ready for sea, having been employed for months as a troop ship; the "Hindostan" could have been got ready in a couple of days. Had they been despatched on the 20th of May, seven days after Government were informed of the capture of Delhi, they would have arrived at Suez at the very latest by the 20th of June. It

Appendix, No. 17.

was the universal expectation at Calcutta that those vessels would have been sent to bring troops arriving by the overland route. The steamers in question could have brought with ease 500 men each.

At Bombay, it will be seen by the accompanying list of shipping that in the month of May 14 sailing ships arrived from the Persian Gulf with troops on board. Five of these were regular hired transports, fitted up for the reception of soldiers; in addition to which there were four Government steamers. Four of these sailing vessels came on to Calcutta with the 78th and other troops, forming part of the reinforcements despatched from Bombay. Independent of the ships returned from Bushire, there was a large amount of unemployed tonnage in the harbour. Nothing was easier than the despatch during all May of a fleet of transports to Suez, where they would have arrived long before the troops appeared from the other side.

I have made six journeys by the overland route, and have been in the Red Sea in the months of January, May, July, September, and October. In the aggregate more than 1,000 persons, men, women and children, must have travelled with me on those occasions; and I believe not a single death occurred either in the Desert or the Red Sea. I should never hesitate to send my wife by that route on the score of its insalubrity.

At the same time, it must be admitted that had troops been sent overland, they would have found at Calcutta on arrival neither barracks, commissariat, nor means of carriage. I could speak very strongly on all these points.

H. Mead.

ARRIVAL of Transports at *Bombay* from *Persia* with Troops, May 1857.

May 11	-	Mount Stuart Elphinstone, steamer.
„ 12	-	Result.
„ 14	-	Julie, transport.
„ „	-	Raby Castle, do.
„ 15	-	Pioneer, do.
„ „	-	Belgravia, do.
„ 17	-	Storm Cloud.
„ 21	-	Ajdaha, steamer.
„ „	-	Earl of Clare.
May 22	-	Avalanche.
„ „	-	Kingston.
„ „	-	Bride of the Seas, transport.
„ „	-	Punjaub, steamer.
„ 23	-	Semiramis.
„ 25	-	Dacota.
„ 29	-	Ocean Monarch.
„ „	-	Berenice.
„ 31	-	Hibernia.

	detained to Coal	Total	
		52	
½	3½	68	
		69	
		105	
		95	
ius		2350	m.
		3500	"
		2500	"
		1500	"
		1600	"
		5850	"
		13050	"



Appendix, No. 18.

Admiralty, 24 March 1858.

I BEG herewith to transmit, for the information of the Chairman and Members of the Committee on the Transport of Troops to India, a return of various screw and paddle-wheel steamers, which at various periods have made passages from England to the Cape of Good Hope. Appendix, No. 18 — 2.

I also transmit a chart, on which is marked the tracks of the following vessels:—

1. H.M. screw-frigate Shannon - - - from England to the Cape.
2. The screw-steamer Golden Fleece - - from England to Calcutta.
3. The screw-steamer Sydney - - - ditto - ditto.
4. The clipper sailing-ship "City of Dublin," in September 1856 - - - - - - ditto - ditto.
5. Ditto - ditto - in June 1857 - - - ditto - ditto.

The tracks of the clipper-ship "City of Dublin" have been marked on the chart, as Messrs. Baines and Co. have not received the tracks of their clipper ships which conveyed troops to Calcutta; and with reference to a request from a Member of the Committee to insert the tracks of Her Majesty's ships, which left the Cape of Good Hope for Calcutta, I regret I have not been able to obtain them, as the log-books of those ships have not reached the Admiralty from India.

I have, &c.
Alex. Milne, Rear-Admiral.

The Chairman of the Committee on Transport of Troops to India, House of Commons.

A RETURN of PASSAGES made by STEAM VESSELS from *England* to the *Cape of Good Hope*, at the respective Dates.

Whether Screws or Paddle.	NAME.	Tonnage.	Horse Power.	Sailed.	Arrived.	Number of Days on Passage.
Screw -	H.M.S. Vulcan -	1,764	350	16 March 1851	11 May 1851	56
„ -	„ Vulcan -	1,764	350	12 Oct. —	9 Dec. —	58
Paddle	„ Birkenhead -	1,405	556	24 June —	8 Aug. —	45
„ -	„ Cyclops	1,195	320	7 July —	29 „ —	53
„ -	„ Retribution -	1,641	400	15 „ —	19 Sept. —	66
„ -	„ Sidon - -	1,316	560	15 „ —	20 „ —	67
Screw -	Contract Packets, 17 voyages -	chiefly 2,200	300	1852 - and	- 1853 -	39½
„ -	Contract Packets, 13 voyages -	chiefly 1,000	80 to 150	1855 - - to	- 1857 -	49
„ -	H.M.S. Vulcan -	1,764	350	Nov. 1856	January 1857	71
„ -	„ Simoom -	1,980	350	Feb. 1857	April - —	56
„ -	„ Megæra -	1,395	350	„ —	„ —	56
„ -	„ Shannon -	2,667	600	17 March 1857	7 May 1857	51
„ -	„ Sans Pareil -	2,339	400	„ —	25 „ —	69
„ -	„ Transit -	2,587	500	14 April 1857	28 „ —	44
„ -	„ Himalaya -	3,508	700	16 „ —	25 „ —	39
„ -	„ Assistance -	1,902	400	22 May —	25 July —	64
„ -	„ Adventure -	1,902	400	22 „ —	19 „ —	58
„ -	„ Chesapeake -	2,377	400	27 Sept. —	15 Nov. —	49
„ -	Hired ship Charity -	1,239	202	14 April —	22 May —	38
„ -	„ „ Imperador	1,739	300	27 July —	3 Sept. —	38
„ -	„ „ Mauritius -	2,134	300	16 June —	15 Aug. —	60
„ -	„ „ Cleopatra -	1,452	250	18 „ —	6 „ —	49
„ -	„ „ Adelaide -	1,859	450	13 August —	3 Oct. —	51
„ -	„ „ Imperatriz	1,739	300	11 „ —	20 Sept. —	40

Appendix, No. 19.

Appendix, No. 19.

STATEMENT of the Average of 50 Voyages to *Bengal*, 25 Voyages to *Madras*, and 50 Voyages to *Bombay*, by Ships of not less than 1,200 Tons belonging to the East India Company's late Maritime Service, prior to the Year 1832, inclusive.

50 Voyages to Bengal between 1824 and 1832	- Averaged 108 days each voyage.
50 Voyages to Bombay between 1822 and 1832	- Averaged 110 days each voyage.
25 Voyages to Madras between 1824 and 1832	- Averaged 105 days each voyage.

Marine Department, East India House, 27 February 1858.

J. C. Mason.

Appendix, No. 20.

CAPTAIN FORD'S SUGGESTIONS respecting the best Route to *India* for TROOPS, and the best CLASS of SHIPS to embark them in.

Appendix, No. 20.

THE failure of all endeavours hitherto made to effect a rapid and direct communication with India, *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope, whether attempted in auxiliary or full-powered steam-ships, has been occasioned by the insufficiency of tonnage and power of the vessels employed, and by the loss of time inseparable from coaling at so many different stations. Our only independent and natural high road to India is by the ocean: we command that route, but have not yet made the best use of it. In order to overcome the delays and difficulties adverted to, I suggest the immediate establishment of a line of first-class iron screw steam-ships, of 5,000 tons measurement each, and fitted with engines of 1,000 horse-power.

These ships can be so constructed as to average 300 miles per day; a rate of speed that would enable them to perform the voyage to or from India, with certainty, in 41 days, viz.,—

England to Cape of Good Hope, or *vice versâ* - - -	20 days.
Coaling at the Cape - - - - - - - -	3 „
Cape of Good Hope to Calcutta, or *vice versâ* - -	18 „
TOTAL - - -	41 days.

The stowage capacity of each ship would comprise ample space for 2,000 troops, with their officers, officers' horses, artillery, baggage, and a large amount of munitions of war, together with twenty-four days' fuel, and the requisite quantity of provisions and stores.

The political advantages of Great Britain possessing a distinct available fleet of this description, are so obvious as to require no comment, except to mention that, in the event of an European war, and an urgent demand for troops, each of these capacious and powerful vessels, upon an emergency of that nature, could convey 3,000 men from India and land them at Gibraltar in 36 days, or at Malta in 39 days. Should neither the Admiralty nor the East India Company feel disposed to build and manage the ships referred to, such an addition to our national resources can only be created and properly worked by a public company, established under the auspices of Her Majesty's Government, and which company, if adequately supported, I am prepared to organise without delay. The whole matter is simply a question of tonnage, steam-power, and capital; and the events arising out of the Indian mutiny are likely to be such as to give continuous employment, during many years, to the class of powerful ships alluded to. The "Times" has truly remarked, that—

"Transport is the weak point of our naval system. It is too evident that we have not yet completed this part of our national establishment, and it ought to be done without delay."

Under these circumstances, and considering the grave position of public affairs in the East, I have well-founded hopes that my suggestions will be ultimately adopted, although, in the meantime, much discomfort and disappointment will have to be endured before Her Majesty's troops are conveyed to and from India in the spacious, well-ventilated, swift, and powerful transports which I am anxious to establish on this important route as early as practicable.

(signed) *John Ford.*

City Club, 12 August 1857.

Appendix, No. 21.

(No. 239.)

COPY of a DESPATCH from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P., to Governor Sir *G. Grey*, K.C.B. Appendix, No. 21.

SIR, Downing-street, 14 September 1857.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 5th June last, answering yours, No. 38, of 25th March last, in which you stated the reasons which rendered it, in your opinion, necessary to call out the German military settlers under arms, I wish to inform you that the subject has received the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government since the brief notice which I then took of the circumstances of this transaction.

Her Majesty's Government wish to refer you to the printed "conditions" of the 24th September 1856, which were communicated to you when the German military settlers were sent to the Cape. In those conditions it is distinctly specified that "when called out into service in the field against the enemy," the extra expense thus occasioned would be borne by imperial funds; when called out in aid of the civil power by colonial funds.

Your despatch to which I have already referred, intimates that you had kept these settlers under arms as soldiers, not on account of service against the enemy nor to aid the civil power, but for certain temporary reasons connected with their own management and discipline, into which it is not necessary for me to enter, as they have been already discussed. But at the same time this department received information through the War Department, that Baron Von Stutterheim reported "that you had called these settlers out for active service in the field on account of the uncertain state of the country."

I have now received from Lord Panmure copy of a general order issued on the 27th February last by your direction, and his Lordship adds that it has been intimated to him by the general commanding at the Cape colony, that, in accordance with that order, full pay and allowances as in the field had been issued to the German military settlers from the date of their disembarkation, for which the general requested a covering authority.

The result of these proceedings would appear to be, that although the particular case contemplated in the conditions for the throwing a farther expense on this country had not arisen, although there was no enemy in the field, nor any present apprehension of such an enemy, these settlers were to be retained as a military force, in addition to no less than ten British regiments, besides the Cape Mounted Rifles; for no part of which expense (as far as can be collected from your despatch) did you appear to intend to call on the colony to provide.

The necessity of maintaining order among these newly disembarked settlers, reported in your despatch already referred to, may have been a sufficient justification for the step of keeping them under arms in a case not provided for by the conditions. But I am bound to point out to you that your course should have been, in reporting the circumstance, to have stated that you had acted irrespectively of those conditions, and, in particular, to have stated that you meant to apply for payment of the expense from home funds, which in your despatch you omitted to do, leaving me altogether uninformed of the nature and extent of the liability which you intended thus to throw on Her Majesty's Government.

As, however, subsequently to the issue of the general order in question, the disturbed state of India has made it necessary to require that a large force of British troops should proceed thither from the Cape, Her Majesty's Government will not insist, as they would otherwise have felt bound to do, on the discontinuance of these extra payments out of home funds to the military settlers. But I must instruct you that so long as they are kept on full pay they must be kept embodied, and doing duty as regular troops, and in this manner to supply the place of soldiers required for the public service in India.

Nor should the soldiers of the German Legion be embodied on any subsequent occasion without a special report to Her Majesty's Government, showing on which of the grounds specified in the "Conditions" they were so embodied, or if on any different and exceptional ground, then to what account it is proposed to charge the expenditure.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Labouchere.*

Appendix, No. 21.

(No. 286.)

COPY of a DESPATCH from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P., to Governor Sir *George Grey*, K.C.B.

Sir, Downing-street, 5 January 1858.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 154, of 30th October, in reply to mine of the 14th September preceding, relative to your having called out the German military settlers at the Cape of Good Hope under arms. You state that you think it due, alike to yourself and to Her Majesty's Government, at once to reply to that portion of my despatch in which I remarked that you appeared to have stated no military reasons for your having taken that step.

I regret that there should be any necessity for my prolonging the correspondence on this subject, but I think it right to point out to you the discrepancies which exist in the statements made to Her Majesty's Government.

In your despatch No. 38, of 25th March 1857, you represented, that in consequence of the comparatively small number of females who had accompanied the German military settlers, it would be impossible to detain them in their villages as ordinary settlers, as they would roam over the whole country, whilst as a military force they would be quite useless for the defence of the colony. You were therefore of opinion, that the only way in which these and other evils which you mentioned could be prevented, until a due proportion of female emigrants had been sent out to the colony, would be to keep the settlers under arms as soldiers, and that this had accordingly been done.

The necessity, therefore, of embodying the settlers seemed to rest mainly on considerations of internal police. Her Majesty's Government showed their desire to contribute to remedy the evil complained of, by sending out to the colony a vessel with female emigrants from Ireland.

A few days after the receipt of your despatch, Lord Panmure forwarded to me a copy of a letter addressed to him by the Baron Von Stutterheim, in which he represented, that on account of the uncertain state of the country, you had called the military settlers out for active service in the field, and that you intended to keep them embodied for some time, and he mentioned the military posts at which they were to be encamped.

I received subsequently from Lord Panmure a copy of a General Order, dated 27th February 1857, stating that you had been pleased to call out for service in the field, as against an enemy, the corps of the British German Legion, under the 10th condition of their enrolment, from the date of their disembarkation.

But before the receipt of this communication from Lord Panmure, I had received a later despatch from you (dated 4th April 1857), in which, after reporting that everything in Kaffraria continued tranquil, you stated that the German military settlers were taking up their several locations; that their conduct was entirely satisfactory, and that you had no doubt that the experiment of sending them to the country would prove successful.

It was with these conflicting statements before me, that my despatch No. 239, of 14th September last, was written; and my assertion, that the settlers had been retained as a military force, although there was no enemy in the field, nor any present apprehension of such an enemy, was founded on your representations, that the power and influence of the Kaffir chiefs continued rapidly to decline, and that the tribes themselves were broken up, large numbers of the natives having gone into the Cape Colony to be employed as labourers.

I certainly therefore do not think that I had, at that time, reason to suppose that you entertained so strong a belief of the necessity of embodying the German Legion, for the purpose of the defence of the colony, as you now appear to have done. But I see no advantage in protracting this controversy. I assure you that I do full justice to the energy and ability which you have evinced in the protection of the colony at a most critical and trying period; to the success of which the prosperity it now enjoys is to be attributed. If the maintenance of the German Legion under arms has enabled you, as I trust it will, considerably to increase the succours which you will have afforded to the Government of India, the result of that step will have been a fortunate one, on whatever grounds it may have originally been taken.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Labouchere.*

(173—289.)

(No. 296.)

COPY of a DESPATCH from the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P., to Governor Sir *G. Grey*, K.C.B.

Sir, Colonial Office, 3 February 1858.

I HAVE to acknowledge the ~~receipt of your despatches~~, No. 155, of 31st October, and No. 173, of 26th November; the former transmitting further documents to show the military necessity which existed for calling out the German military settlers under arms, and the latter showing that the necessity for maintaining order amongst them would alone have rendered it necessary for you to have taken that step.

It

It appears clearly from these despatches, that in your opinion the justification of calling out the German military settlers rested on the twofold ground of the requirements of military defence and of considerations of police. Appendix, No. 21.

I do not feel it necessary to add anything to what I have said on this subject in my despatch, No. 286, of the 5th instant.

You will, I trust, take care, on any future occasion when the Legion is called out for active service, to specify distinctly in so doing on what grounds it is embodied for active service, and on what funds the expense thereby incurred should consequently be charged.

I have, &c.
(signed) *H. Labouchere.*

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

(No. 154.)

COPY of a DESPATCH from Governor Sir *George Grey*, K.C.B., to the Right Honourable *H. Labouchere*, M.P.

Sir, Cape Town, 30 October 1857.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 239, of the 14th of September last, in which you notify to me the disapproval of Her Majesty's Government of my having called out the German military settlers, stating, although apparently with some doubt, that the necessity of maintaining order among the newly disembarked German military settlers may have been a sufficient justification for keeping them under arms in a case not provided for in the "conditions;" and then going on to add, apparently upon some remarks which have emanated from the War Department, that, although the particular case contemplated in the conditions for throwing a farther great expense upon Great Britain had not arisen, although there was no enemy in the field, nor any present apprehension of such an enemy, the German settlers were retained as a military force, in addition to no less than ten British regiments, besides the Cape Mounted Rifles; for no part of which expense did I appear to intend to call upon the colony to provide.

2. I beg to state that I will hereafter show that the necessity for maintaining order among the German military settlers would alone have necessitated my keeping them under arms, but I think it due alike to myself and to Her Majesty's Government at once to reply to that portion of your despatch in which you state that there were no military reasons for my so doing.

3. Previously to my taking this step, I had, in various despatches, reported to Her Majesty's Government the disturbed state of Kaffraria, arising from the chiefs compelling their people, either by superstition or by threats, to destroy all their means of subsistence. At the moment of the arrival of the German military settlers this infatuation was at its height, and war was by everybody momentarily expected. The great majority of persons in this country believed that war could not be prevented, unless indeed most extraordinary measures were taken. This is so well known that no one who has any knowledge of South Africa could venture to deny it. How much this was the case will best be seen from the enclosed letters and extracts of letters, which passed between Major-general Michel and myself; in which that general gave it as his opinion, upon the 18th of February 1857, that we were then unprepared for war, owing to the non-armament of the Fingoes, or authority for the same, and the destruction of the Cape Corps; and he adds, that unless a system was adopted which, at the first outbreak, would, within three days, arm and call together in an organised manner Burghers, Fingoes, &c., a system well before prepared by the civil-military Government, disastrous results would occur; and that, if a grand onslaught of the Kaffirs were to take place, Albany and Victoria would be overrun in three days, and various Fingoe locations attacked. The Major-general then, in a memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed, shows more fully the state of his apprehensions by proposing his plan of operations, which amounted, in fact, to this: that I was at once to fall back, abandoning a part of the colony to the Kaffirs by withdrawing all the troops and police from the south of the Peddie Road, in Victoria, abandoning the farmers and farms, as well as the Fingoes in Lower Victoria, to the chances which might follow, and which sacrifice, the Major-general considered, the interests of the colony, as a whole, required.

Enclosure No. 1. General Michel to his Excellency the Governor, 18 February 1857.
His Excellency the Governor to General Michel, 6 March 1857.
King William's Town. Extract.

Enclosure, No. 2. Memorandum of General Michel, 13 February 1857.

4. My reasons for determining not to adopt the Major-general's opinion are contained in the memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed; I determined not to abandon a single farm or farmer until every effort had been made to keep the Kaffirs out of the colony, but to maintain a resolute front; and I feel satisfied that my so doing was the means of maintaining general confidence, and of carrying the country through the crisis which it had to pass.

Enclosure, No. 3. Memorandum of his Excellency the Governor, 5 March 1857.

5. How terrible the crisis was will be best shown by the enclosed return, which, by a curious coincidence, I received at the same moment that I received your despatch. From this it will be found that 68,034* souls, that is, two-thirds of the population, have disappeared from British Kaffraria alone in the first seven months of this year. British Kaffraria is separated from Kaffraria Proper by a stream fordable in many directions; the same disappearance of the population has taken place in the latter country, but at least to double the extent,

Enclosure, No. 4. Return.

*(Sixty-eight thousand and thirty-four.)

Appendix, No. 21.

extent, so that about 200,000 * barbarians, desperate from starvation and of a peculiarly fierce and warlike character, had to be got rid of out of the country before the means of subsistence left would support the remaining population. From this terrific inundation Her Majesty's possessions in this country had to be protected. This has been done; the Kaffir population has dispersed, upwards of 30,000 have become hired servants in the colony, some thousands have fled to Faku's country and beyond it; some thousands to Moshesh's country, some thousands, I fear, have perished, and some thousands have been supported by charitable aid afforded to them, but Her Majesty's possessions and Her Majesty's subjects have suffered no harm. This great crisis has passed, the colony is peaceful and prosperous, and Her Majesty's forces, instead of being engaged in an expensive and desolating war, are, after having saved this colony, now in a high state of efficiency and discipline, either proceeding or ready to proceed to India, there to render, I trust, as good services as they have here.

* (Two hundred thousand)

(Thirty thousand.)

6. I am well aware that, had I allowed this flood of famished barbarians to have overrun the frontier districts of this colony by my supineness or by my fear of incurring responsibility, and that I had consequently at this moment, when Great Britain is pressed by great difficulty, made fresh demands upon her resources, I should then have failed in my duty to the Queen and to Great Britain. However much, therefore, I may have incurred the displeasure of Her Majesty's Government by my proceedings in this respect, I feel quite confident that I have done my duty, and that no one acquainted with South Africa will admit that I took the steps I did when there was no enemy in the field, nor any apprehension of such an enemy, as Her Majesty's advisers have been led to believe.

7. I beg further to point out that, although it is true there were ten British regiments in this colony, it should be borne in mind that one of these regiments consisted of only 408 rank and file, and that four other regiments consisted of but little more than 700 rank and file each, so that five out of the ten regiments gave a total strength of only 3,266 rank and file, and several of the other regiments were very much below their complement.

(Four hundred and Eight.)

(Seven hundred.)

(Three thousand Two hundred and Sixty-six.)

8. I hope, therefore, that a review of the fearful crisis (one but rarely equalled in history) through which this colony has in safety passed, taken in connexion with the fact that it has consequently at this moment of difficulty shown itself a source of strength, and not of weakness to Great Britain, will satisfy Her Majesty's advisers that I was, even in a military point of view, justified in calling out the German military settlers.

I have, &c.

(signed) *G. Grey.*

(No. 1.)

Enclosure to Despatch, No. 154, 30 October 1857.

Dear Sir, Fort Beaufort, 13 February 1857.

I was in hopes that ere this I should have had the satisfaction of meeting you on the frontier, as rumour perpetually spoke of your intention of proceeding there.

I was desirous of meeting you in order that I might personally inform you of the result of my military investigation of the state of our preparations in the event of an outbreak.

The position I am placed in prevents my writing officially to you, and the conversation I had the honour of holding with you at Cape Town, makes me consider that you would not be averse to the reception of such a document as I have taken the liberty of herewith enclosing, marked No. 1.

I have added thereto a paper, marked No. 2, the only excuse I can allege for sending which is, that I conceive the military and civil government of the Eastern Provinces so of necessity interwoven, that I could not satisfactorily give you my ideas on the whole matter without adding that paper. I may add, that I came out to this colony under the delusion, fostered by the colonel and war ministers, that I should find myself at the head of the military affairs of this colony. I am therefore differently situated to an ordinary subordinate officer. These reasons I trust will plead my excuse for the course I have now adopted. I have considered the papers sent entirely of a private nature.

You will perceive by those papers that I consider that we are unprepared for war at present owing to the "non-armament of the Fingoes," or authority for the same, and "the destruction of the Cape Corps."

I may add, that unless a system which, at the first outbreak, would within three days arm and call together in an organised manner Burghers, Fingoes, &c., a system well prepared before hand by the civil-military government, disastrous results would occur.

If a grand onslaught of Kaffirs were to take place, Albany and Victoria would be in all probability overrun in three days, and various Fingoe locations attacked.

I have, &c.

(signed) *J. Michel,*
Major-General.

Sir G. Grey, K.C.B.

Enclosure to Despatch, No. 154, 30 October 1857.

EXTRACT.

King William's Town, 6 March 1857.

"You tell me that you consider the papers sent, entirely of a private nature; I am very sorry that I cannot permit that such should be the case. At the present moment of danger and difficulty, divided councils will never do; you are evidently not contented with the line of policy I am pursuing, and are entrusted with the carrying out of operations of which you do not approve. I therefore fear, and I think not unreasonably, for the future success of those plans.

"I also cannot consent to keep from Sir James Jackson a knowledge of your views. I must have the benefit of his advice and opinions, as to whether he thinks I am wrong and you are right, or the contrary, and as to whether he can still cheerfully and cordially co-operate in the plan of operations on which we had agreed.

"You must excuse me for doing this; but I do not think that when the safety of part of Her Majesty's possessions and the good of the service are at stake, you are justified in sending me the papers you have done, and saying that you consider them entirely private. For all I know to the contrary, you may have imparted the same sentiments to other persons.

"I must therefore request that you will, in such manner as you think most fitting, lay before the Lieutenant-general commanding, copies of the two memorandums which you have sent to me, and I shall, when I receive them from him, put before him the memorandum of which I now enclose you a copy."

I remain, &c.

(signed) *G. Grey.*

Major-General Michel,
&c. &c. &c
Fort Beaufort.

(No. 2.)

Enclosure to Despatch, No. 154, 30 October 1857.

MEMORANDUM on the Military Defence of the Colony.

Beaufort, 13 February.

1. THIS memorandum supposes the Kaffirs located as at present; namely, in positions from whence they can always pass across the Breakfast Vlei ridge into the colony without any possibility of preventing them.

2. This being assumed, it must be considered, what would be the state of affairs if the Basutos, the Tambookies, and Kaffir tribes were to commence a war simultaneously.

3. This must on their part be a war necessarily of aggression.

4. As respects Moshesh, I conceive that he would not quit his fastnesses in force, and that the bodies with which he might operate, might be held in check by the Boers of the north-east until we might be enabled to march against him in force.

5. The Tambookies, and Kreli's Kaffirs, together with those to the west of the Kei, would pass by the Winterberg to the Cowie district, or by Kama's country to Albany and Lower Somerset, as also into the Waterkloof, Auckland, and (if possible) the Amatolas.

6. If the Kaffirs are denuded of cattle and other tangible possessions this movement would be made in swarms, spread over a vast extent of country. Considerable loss to the colonists would at first ensue; but to feed themselves, the enemy must disperse into small bodies.

7. To ward off loss, as far as possible, and to prevent the enemy returning to any fastnesses with booty, the system which I have already proposed, and has been generally accepted by the Lieutenant-governor, is as follows:—

8. Wherever the country is very open, as for instance, that from the Stormberg to the Winterberg, I should drive all cattle and stock to the rear of a line, on which line I should establish one or two rallying points, of say, one company of soldiers, for the wives, children, &c., of the burghers, leaving the whole country to be patrolled by the mounted burghers and police.

9. In a more close country, where particular passes and fords must be sought by the enemy, the stock should be driven to the rear, and I should establish small posts as rallying posts, giving the burghers, police, and Fingoes, the duty of watching these outlets; or, larger posts, with say 70 or 100 men, leaving three-fourths available for any duty of the same description within reasonable range of their posts.

Appendix, No 21.

10. The posts I consider necessary in case of an outbreak are,—

		MEN.	
1. Near the Stormberg		100	Already sanctioned by Lieut.-Governor.
2. Mancazana		50	
3. Gilbert's farm	Beaufort district.	25	
4. Ayton's farm		30	
5. Lieu Fontaine		70	
6. If troops to spare on the Fish River Randt		60	
7. Two or three posts along the right bank of the Fish River, on the heights between Bothas Post and Peat Apple Tower.			Graham's Town district.

On the Front Line.

	MEN.	
1. Buoy's farm, Kat River	30	Already sanctioned.
2. Fort Armstrong	25	
3. Hogs Back	150	

With cavalry and Fingoes.

One or two other small posts in the Chumie and Auckland valleys.

10. All existing detachments might remain, but the Germans might hold Fort White.

11. The Amatola Basin Fingoes should be laagared under the Amatola Rock.

12. The Fingoes at the base of the Seven Kloof Mountain should be laagared about three miles south-east of the Chumie Port.

13. The Gulu valley should be held by Fingoes, as high up as might be reckoned safe.

14. The posts along the Buffalo might be strengthened.

15. The camp at the Tovie is of no service, except to aid the Germans on the Keiskamma. These latter are placed in situations of the utmost peril, and would in case of war be only just able to defend themselves, but could not save their stock, and would give but little aid in their present position to the common cause.

16. The country south of the Peddie road, without any troops in that district except at Peddie, was in the wars of 1846-47, 1850-51, unoccupied by Kaffirs.

17. A small body of troops, say 50 men, might be required at Newcastle, and therewith the Fingoe line to the Peat Apple Tower would effectually cover all that frontier.

18. The farms at the Beka would, however, be sacrificed, unless some Germans were on this stream; as also the homesteads bordering the sea from the Keiskamma mouth towards the Fish River mouth. But I consider the general interests of the colony will require this latter sacrifice, as the expenditure of troops which would be required for their defence, would be quite disproportionate to the benefit accruing to the public.

19. The line of defence proposed by me would, I conceive, render the attempt to take stock from the colony almost hopeless, and the quantity of frontier farmers thus gained, would give a body of cavalry for this description of warfare far superior to any Her Majesty could elsewhere produce, and who would in detail destroy the marauders.

20. The whole of the above supposes the Fingoes to be armed by the Government, and such of the Hottentots as may be deemed fit to be trusted. Without this, the whole falls to the ground, and no amount of troops could keep the Kaffirs out of the Amatolas, Waterkloof, and the other strongholds, or prevent their carrying off the stock, and otherwise ravaging the country.

1. But this is defensive warfare.

21. For offensive, from the deficiency of well armed horsemen, who can ride and shoot well, we are comparatively powerless; and at the present crisis, even had we these, in some parts of the country we should be equally so.

22. Offensive warfare against the native tribes is merely a search for cattle. The burning of kraals of little service; and unless cattle are to be taken, no Kaffirs would be seen by any infantry patrol; and in that executed by cavalry, the Kaffirs would only be found in positions where they could destroy the cavalry. This would be the case in the country west of the Kei (if their cattle has been destroyed to the extent reported).

23. Where cattle exist, there a large body of horsemen are required. In Kreli's country, not less than 1,000 to 1,500 mounted men and burghers are not as valuable for this sort of work as for fighting in their own country.

In marching against Moshesh, the same remarks are applicable.

24. For the future, until the Kei is finally crossed by the Kaffir nation, I consider that 4,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry (but differently armed from the present mode) are required.

25. Perhaps

25. Perhaps when this is effected, and Pato's and Umhala's countries are thoroughly taken possession of, when roads are made therein, when an agricultural population, either English or German, is located there, perhaps the infantry force might be reduced to 2,500.

26. The removal of the Kaffirs across the Bashee would reduce the number still further. I should then consider 1,500 infantry, with perhaps 1,500 cavalry, sufficient; 500 of the latter might be mounted police.

In time, perhaps, even this body of infantry might be reduced.

27. But of the cavalry, at least 1,000 must either be bastards, hottentots, naturalised Kaffirs, or men born in this country. Of those not born in this country, few should be taken after the age of 16, and those of a low standard.

If they are taken older, they must be thoroughly good horsemen, and able to use their arms with dexterity on horseback. This is seldom if ever to be learnt in the riding school. I consider a cavalry soldier generally unfit for the work.

28. I am of opinion that a system which renders the Cape Corps drilled cavalry, and objects to Hottentot recruits, is exceedingly faulty, and will be productive of very serious consequences in the event of war. It is a matter of so serious a nature, that a remedy cannot be too early applied.

29. As respects artillery, one battery horsed I consider ample. The Kaffirs will seldom if ever fight where mounted artillery can move, and invariably in skirmishing order. I should, however, in addition, deem it desirable to have some extra artillerymen, and two to four guns ready to move by bullock draught.

30. In reference to the Hottentot soldier, I am of opinion that the extraordinarily dilatory distribution of the Kaffir medal (not yet given to the Cape Corps) is highly impolitic.

I am moreover doubtful of the policy of so considerable a limit to the rationing of the Hottentot soldiers' wives.

At any rate, both the wives and children should be rationed in time of war. It is an extra hold on the fidelity of by far the most valuable species of soldier we have in this country.

The fact is patent to every practical soldier in Kaffir warfare, that the Cape Corps Hottentots are our mainstay in all our aggressive warfare; and I conceive that no pains should be spared to render them attached to our rule, no false economy permitted to interfere with the attainment of this most material object.

31. In conclusion I may add, that I consider that a limited distribution of medals to burghers who have distinguished themselves in the last war, and to officers of levies, would for a future occasion bring into the field a larger levy of the better description of burgher soldier, and render them more amenable to command, than any other measure that could be adopted.

(signed) *J. Michel*, Major-General.

(No. 3.)

Enclosure to Despatch, No. 154, 30 October 1857.

MEMORANDUM.

MAJOR-GENERAL MICHEL has raised a very serious question regarding the defence of this colony by proposing a plan of his own for this purpose, which is entirely opposed to that which I have directed should be adopted, after frequently discussing the question with the Lieutenant-General commanding the forces. I presume that nothing but his being entirely convinced of the imprudence of the course I was adopting, induced him to draw up the documents he has done.

Major-General Michel's plan relates principally to the district of Victoria, with the defence of which he is entrusted. It is very unfortunate that an officer should be required to carry out a plan of operations of which he disapproves. It is to be feared that if great difficulties arise, operations which have to be conducted under such circumstances can hardly be hoped to be either energetically or successfully carried on; whilst if they fail, it would be very difficult to tell upon whom the blame should rest.

I should therefore have felt it right at once to have foregone the plans which I had determined to adopt, and to have acted on those proposed by Major-General Michel, if I could have done so consistently with a sense of duty. But I believe that the adoption of the plan he proposes would bring down most immediate and imminent perils on this country. It is therefore right that I should place on record the reasons which have led me to reject General Michel's plan.

Appendix, No. 21.

Major-General Michel's recommendations amount to this:—

That I am about to locate those men of the German Legion who are to be posted on the Keiskamma, in situations of the utmost peril, as in case of war they could only just support themselves, could not save their stock, and could give but little aid to the common cause.

That, therefore, the troops on the lower Keiskamma are of no service except to aid the Germans.

That the country south of the Peddie road, without any troops in that district except at Peddie, was in the war of 1846 and 1847, and in that of 1850 and 1851, unoccupied by Kaffirs.*

That a small body of troops, say 50 men, might be required at Newcastle, and that these, with the Fingoe line to the Peat Apple Tower, would effectually protect all that frontier.

That the farms at the Beka would, however, be sacrificed (unless some Germans were on the stream), as also the homesteads bordering the sea and the Keiskamma mouth, towards the Fish River mouth.

Major-General Michel considers, however, the general interests of the colony require this latter sacrifice, as the expenditure of troops which would be required for their defence would be quite disproportionate to the benefit accruing to the public.

Major-General Michel further considers that the line of defence he thus proposes, would render the attempt to take stock from the colony almost hopeless, and that the quantity of frontier farmers thus gained, would give a body of cavalry far superior, for Kaffir warfare, to any Her Majesty could elsewhere produce, and they would in detail destroy the marauders.

Major-General Michel adds, that he proposes the Fingoes to be armed by the Government, as well as such of the Hottentots who may be deemed fit to be trusted; without this, the whole falls to the ground; and in his opinion, no amount of troops can keep the Kaffirs out of the Amatolas, Waterkloof, and the other strongholds, or prevent them from carrying off the stock, and otherwise ravaging the country.

The above plan, in a few words, amounts to this:—I am to withdraw all the troops and police from the south of the Peddie road, in Victoria, to throw a garrison of 50 men into Newcastle, with the Fish River in their rear; to abandon the farmers and farms, as well as the Fingoes in Lower Victoria, to the mercy of the Kaffirs; to arm and supply with ammunition the Fingoe population, and to entrust the defence of our frontier to them.

To do this would, in my belief, spread consternation throughout the European population, discourage the Fingoes, and bring down the whole of the Kaffir hordes upon the colony. I believe that in one week after I had adopted this course, the Kaffirs would have streamed into Lower Victoria, have occupied that country, from which hereafter we should have to dislodge them with great difficulty; that the Fingoes, terrified at what they would regard as rank timidity on our part, would, in many instances, join the Kaffirs; that a general feeling of triumph and exultation would prevail throughout all Kaffir-land; that the Fish River bush would swarm with marauders, and that a most disastrous and unnecessary war would be brought into the heart of the most fertile districts of the colony; and that hereafter we should be degraded in the eyes of the whole coloured population, even if the war closed in our favour, as it would be said that the Fingoes had saved men who could not help themselves.

In as far, therefore, as I am concerned, I am still of opinion that in the first instance a stand should, if necessary, be made on the banks of the Keiskamma, in front of the Fingoes, to encourage and support them to maintain the line in our rear; and I am equally of opinion that not a single farm or farmer should be sacrificed to the Kaffirs until after every effort has been made to keep them out of the country.

If a war takes place, I believe that this line of proceeding will be the proper one, but I am, moreover, quite satisfied that our maintaining at the present time that bold and resolute front which I am determined shall be maintained (and in which view of the case I am sure the Lieutenant-General will thoroughly and heartily concur with me), will go very far towards preventing a war, and compelling the Kaffirs to respect an enemy, who they will see is thoroughly prepared to meet them.

(signed) *G. Grey.*

King William's Town,
6 March 1857.

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* *Note.*—Major-General Michel is quite mistaken in this statement. The Kaffirs occupied all this country in the war of 1846–47.

(signed) *G. G.*

(No. 4.)

Enclosure to Despatch No. 154, October 31, 1851.

BRITISH KAFFRARIA (exclusive of Crown Reserve).

RETURN called for by the CHIEF COMMISSIONER, in Circular dated 1st August 1857, relative to Population.

Probable Number of Kraals, Population, and Fire-arms, 1st January 1857.								Probable Number of Kraals, Population, and Fire-arms, 31 July 1857.							REMARKS.
MAGISTRATES.	Location.	No. of Kraals.	No. of Guns.	Men.	Women.	Children.	No. of Souls.	No. of Kraals.	No. of Guns.	Men.	Women.	Children.	No. of Souls.	Total decrease of Souls.	
Captain Reeve	Kama	418	380	3,416	3,277	6,245	12,938	185	345	1,512	1,438	3,046	5,996	6,942	
Major Gawler	Umhala	855	538	4,842	5,253	12,619	22,714	336	200	1,210	1,314	3,153	5,677	17,037	
Lieutenant Lucas	Macomo	47	500	600	750	1,650	3,000	18	Not accurately ascertained.	77	123	200	400	2,600	
	Botman	35	400	500	600	900	2,000	27		98	150	200	448	1,552	
	Sandilli	750	1,200	14,000		17,000	31,000	101	300	890	900	2,760	4,550	26,450	
Mr. Brownlee	Xoxo	75	100	1,400		1,800	3,200	11	28	98	100	310	508	2,692	
	Fynn	100	150	1,720		1,900	3,620	16	40	130	136	396	662	2,958	
Mr. Ayliff	Toise	68	Not reported.	362	428	861	1,651	56	126	312	371	720	1,403	248	
Major Hawkes	Siwani	309	377	1,478	1,747	2,803	6,028	321	435	1,558	1,918	3,094	6,570	—	Increase, 542 souls. The increase in Siwani's location is accounted for by the great influx of refugees from other tribes, although many of Banji's tribe have left the location for service in the colony.
	Pato and Stock	846	1,800	2,235	2,400	4,261	8,896	373	900	800	895	1,672	3,367	5,529	
Mr. Vigne	Iali	110	225	463	525	950	1,938	90	175	280	367	420	1,067	871	
Captain Fielding	Ian Tzatzoe	90	74	592	703	1,086	2,381	82	70	518	641	1,012	2,171	210	
Captain Robertson	Oba	68	Not accurately ascertained.	600	750	1,275	2,625	53	Not accurately ascertained.	504	630	1,071	2,205	420	
	Anda	71		624	780	1,326	2,730	56		504	630	1,071	2,205	525	
	TOTAL	3,842	—	50,045		54,676	104,721	1,725	—	8,491	9,613	19,125	37,229	68,034	

Note.—Reports of the special magistrates under docket.

The accuracy of these Returns may be depended on for all the locations except those of Umhala and Pato; the great extent of these prevented the magistrates from taking a strict census, but the numbers given for these two locations have been carefully examined.

I propose to call upon the magistrates to furnish me with a similar return early next year, exhibiting any effect produced on the population between the 31st July and the 31st December, in which census the Crown Reserve will be included.

(signed) *John Maclean*, Chief Commissioner.

Appendix, No. 21.

Cape of Good Hope.

(No. 173.)

Copy of a DESPATCH from Governor Sir *George Grey*, K.C.B., to the Right Honourable *Henry Labouchere*, M.P.

Sir, Cape Town, 26 November 1857.

No. 239, 14 Sept. 1857.

In my despatch, No. 154, of the 30th ultimo, in reply to your despatch, noted in the margin, I promised to show that the necessity for maintaining order amongst the German military settlers would alone have rendered it necessary for me to have called them out under arms upon their first arrival in the colony; I now beg, in reference to that point, to report as follows:

(Eight thousand.)

The statement which, by direction of Her Majesty's Government, I made to the Colonial Parliament in regard to the German Legion was, that the number of non-commissioned officers and privates who would offer themselves and be eligible for this service would amount, perhaps, to 8,000, and that it was likely that a large proportion of officers would accompany them; the greater number of the men would have wives and families, and, if it were thought desirable, others, not at present married, would be glad to enter into that state, with a prospect of a fixed settlement.

(Two thousand Three hundred.)
(Three hundred and Thirty.)
(One hundred and Thirty.)
(Two hundred.)
(Sixteen hundred.)

2. The number of non-commissioned officers and privates who actually arrived was only 2,300; they were accompanied by an unusually large proportion of officers and gentlemen cadets. The total number of females accompanying this force was 330, of which number at least 130 must have been either wives or children of the officers of the force, thus leaving only 200 females (a number of whom must have been female children) for the entire body of non-commissioned officers and privates of the German Legion, instead of at least 1,600 wives alone, as the inhabitants of this country would have been justified in expecting from the terms of the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government.

(Two thousand.)

3. This unmarried force was not to be quartered in barracks, where the men could have been kept under some control, but each man was to have a separate cottage. It would, in practice, have been impossible to have kept together more than 2,000 unmarried men under such a system as this, at a rate of pay which barely sufficed for their support, whilst, by dispersing, they could have obtained an exorbitant rate of wages. The experiment must have resulted in the force breaking up and dispersing, and this more especially as they were at that time not subject to the provisions of the Mutiny Act.

4. Although the German Legion contained many excellent men, it contained also many desperate characters, collected from several nations, and from some of the worst continental towns. Even subject to the strict control and discipline under which I have kept them, they have committed three or four desperate murders in less than a year, the details of one of which has reached me whilst I am writing this despatch, in the enclosed newspaper. Unnatural offences have on various occasions been committed by some of them, and other offences of a very grave character.

Enclosure. Extract from newspaper.

5. If I had let these men loose from control, and they had prowled in bands, probably armed, through a country, the language of which they did not speak, the inhabitants of which are chiefly farmers living in homesteads far apart from each other, quite unprotected, with much property about them, it is fearful to think what scenes must have followed, and what would have been the feelings of the inhabitants of South Africa as regards both myself and Her Majesty's Government. It is not too much to say that, under such circumstances, the German Legion would at this moment have been lost as a protection to this country; large numbers of troops would have been required to hunt down bands of robbers; a sullen disaffection would have prevailed amongst the people of South Africa, whilst disturbances, created by the troops being employed elsewhere, would have prevailed with the native tribes on the frontier.

6. On the contrary, the inhabitants of South Africa are now exceeded, in their loyalty and attachment to the Crown, by no people in the world. They are making exertions by their personal services, by large subscriptions, in fact by every means in their power, to aid Her Majesty's Government in the present crisis in India, and to set troops free for service in that country. The German Legion is in hand in an efficient state, and is ready to take up the duties of the troops we are sending on to India; the entire country is prosperous, tranquil, and contented.

7. I see, farther, that it has been stated that I have been the means of destroying the Anglo-Saxon spirit of the people in this country, by teaching them not to rely in any degree upon their own exertions for their protection, but to look for that to an exterior source. On this point, I can appeal confidently to the Parliament and people of this country to rebut such a statement. Let the whole past history of the colony be examined, and be compared with the last three years, and then after such a comparison let any person, partial or impartial, decide whether or not the exertions made by the people of South Africa to provide for their own defence during my administration have not far surpassed those which they have made at any previous time.

1st. They

1st. They felt that their best source of defence would consist in their European population bearing, at least, some reasonable numerical proportion to the coloured races; and therefore, although they had many prejudices to overcome, they, at my request, voted 50,000*l.* to enable the Government to commence a system of introducing immigrants, upon a large scale, into the colony. (Fifty thousand pounds sterling.)

2d. There was no law, when I arrived here, for compelling the inhabitants of the colony to take the field against an enemy. A burgher law for that purpose has been passed by the colonial Parliament.

3d. When I assumed the Government there were no Volunteer corps in existence. Since my arrival here, 19 such corps have been raised, all armed, clothed, and mounted (in the case of the cavalry) at their own cost. These are now generally in a state of high efficiency.

4th. So far have I been from encouraging the colony to look to have bodies of troops quartered in their towns, that during the whole time of my residence here, Cape Town has been almost denuded of troops, and during a portion of that time not a single effective soldier, with the exception of a few artillery men, was in the place, whilst the inhabitants of the town had to take the garrison duty.

5th. When I arrived here there were only a few mounted police, employed in some border divisions of the colony, under the direction of the civil commissioner of each of such divisions, but with no power of moving out of it. The cost of this force was paid out of a small reserved schedule of 14,000*l.* per annum, kept under the control of the Home Government for frontier purposes. The colonial Parliament have now, at my recommendation, passed a law organising an irregular mounted military force of 500 men, which I am increasing to 600 men. This force is under the command of the General, may be employed either in the colony or beyond its limits, like any other regiment in Her Majesty's service. The colonial Parliament pays all the cost connected with this force, already exceeding 40,000*l.* per annum, and which will soon probably amount to 60,000*l.* a year. (Fourteen thousand pounds sterling.) (Five hundred.) (Six hundred.) (Forty thousand pounds sterling.) (Sixty thousand pounds sterling.)

6th, and lastly. All operations against an enemy have lately been carried on by the burghers of the country and this mounted irregular force, which have thus been trained to act against an enemy in the field, and have gained confidence in themselves, whilst troops have yet been in the country. These military operations, which would have formerly constituted a Kaffir war, have been conducted at no expense whatever to Great Britain, have been most entirely successful, and have attained all the objects contemplated.

I have, &c.
(signed) *G. Grey.*

The Right Honourable H. Labouchere, M.P.

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closure to Despatch No. 173, 26 November 1857.

DELIBERATE MURDER.

A MOST deliberate and atrocious murder was committed in this town last evening, shortly after 8 o'clock. The origin and cause, of which this is the shocking effect, as far as circumstances have yet transpired and can be gathered by us, are as nearly as possible as follows; and, in tracing the circumstances to the consummation of the event, display on the part of the murderer a disposition so naturally or habitually bad as to lead one to the supposition that no moral influence would restrain him in the perpetration of the most dreadful atrocities. Amongst the police doing duty in King William's Town was a German, or rather a Frenchman, drafted from the German Legion, of the name of Grouillore. Shortly after coming into the town he formed a connection with a girl of colour, named Hattingh, whom he retained by means of presents of money and other articles from time to time. Being a man of very strong passions, shortly after becoming acquainted with the girl, who was a resepctable-looking bastard, his jealousy was aroused in the highest degree by a combination of circumstances, which induced a doubt as to the constancy of the girl Hattingh. With the unreasonableness of men entirely swayed by temper, he never for a moment appeared to think that faithfulness in persons of the class to which she belonged is inconsistent with their usual character, and at once determined that a confirmation of his suspicions would be the death warrant for her immediate execution. In this frame of mind he was yesterday morning heard to declare that such was his intention; but, instead of being at once taken into custody, he was permitted to roam at will, and while doing so, it appears that circumstances came to his knowledge which he considered a realisation of his fears, and induced him no longer to delay his threatened vengeance. Proceeding in the direction of the river, beyond the gaol, he discovered the girl, pounced upon her, and there and then, twice stabbed her, and afterwards cut her throat. After performing this deed, the man at once presented himself at the Contractor's Kraal, and lodged information against himself. Search was immediately made, and the body discovered in the locality described by him, breath being then almost extinct. The district surgeon was summoned, and on his arrival promptly endeavoured to close the gaps, and staunch the flowing of

Appendix, No. 21.

blood; but, about one hour after receiving the wounds, she breathed her last, without having uttered a single sentence in crimination of her murderer. These are the circumstances as correctly as they can be gleaned, until after the preliminary examination (which is to take place some time to-day) has been completed. The consummate coolness with which the crime was committed has created much sensation amongst the inhabitants of the town; and considerable curiosity has been aroused to hear the defence of a man who could thus wantonly take away the life of a human being, at the same time that he was perfectly aware of, and indeed quite willing to meet, the certain result. That the murder was premeditated there are, as our readers will have seen, the surest evidences; and, in addition to these, it was discovered that the prisoner had even prepared himself against the contingency of cold during his incarceration—such being the reason alleged by him when asked to explain the object of two suits of clothing in which his person was encased.

Having intimated above that the prisoner is a private in the German police, we think it a fitting opportunity, and, indeed, our bounden duty, to bear strong testimony to the general good conduct of the body of which he is an unworthy member. They have now, for some months past, been actively engaged in preserving peace and order in King William's Town. It is quite unnecessary to inform those who can recall to mind the state of the town eight or ten months since, the losses and annoyance to which the inhabitants were subjected by the nightly thefts of cattle, horses, and "winkle" goods, and the awkward crowding of the causeways by Kaffirs during the day, that their efforts have been successful in an eminent degree. The police is formed of the most respectable men (mostly serjeants) connected with the legion, and, with its experienced superintendent, is certainly entitled to the thanks of the entire community.

Appendix, No. 22.

Appendix, No. 22.

PAPERS transmitted to the Chairman of the Committee from the War Department.

(1.)

Lieutenant-Colonel *Pocklington*'s Communications respecting the Transit of Troops through *Egypt*.

Sir, Alexandria, 20 October 1857.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, the satisfactory passage through Egypt of the 4th and 11th companies Royal Engineers, which arrived at Alexandria under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Harness of that corps, on the morning of the 15th instant. As the Indian Mail Steamer had not reached Suez, the troops were kept on board the "Sultan" steam freight ship until the "Nubia" steamer in the Red Sea was reported ready to receive them. This system is found to answer, and will be adopted for the future as far as practicable. The Royal Engineers disembarked the evening of the 18th instant, and left per rail immediately for No. 12 Station in the Desert; the remainder of the journey to Suez was performed by vans, the average time being about 18 hours, deducting stoppages. The conduct of the troops *en route* was most exemplary, and the attention of the officers to their several duties highly commendable. The general outlines for passage of these troops were similar to those adopted by the 57th regiment, except that the first portion of the journey was performed at night. His Royal Highness has already been made acquainted therewith. No difficulty whatever exists in the transit; small bodies of troops being treated in every respect as ordinary overland passengers. The transit administration evince every disposition to favour our troops, and to attend to their individual comfort and the security of the stores.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*,
Lieut.-Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Major-General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

Sir, Alexandria, 27 October 1857.

CONSIDERING His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief may be desirous of being made acquainted with the rates at which the Egyptian Government are willing to convey troops across the Isthmus, I have the honour to annex a memorandum of prices, with my observations thereon, the items having been this day very kindly supplied to me by Mr. Halton, the agent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company here, who has, from the first moment of my arrival in Egypt, afforded me the most valuable information and assistance in carrying out the service in which I am at present engaged.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*,
Lieut.-Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Major-General Sir C. Yorke, K.C.B.,
&c. &c &c.

Appendix, No. 22.

MEMORANDUM showing the Rates payable to the Egyptian Government, and at which British Troops would be charged in their Transit across the Isthmus.

1. By third-class carriages, roofed and fitted with wooden seats, to No. 12 Station in the Desert, 25 miles from Suez (or to Adjroot, 12 miles from Suez, when the railway is open to this latter station), and thence marching to Suez, including conveyance of 112 lbs. of baggage, landing by steamer at Alexandria, and shipment at Suez, 2 *l.* per head.	1. WHENEVER the railway is completed to Adjroot (and which is expected in about two months' time), this arrangement would answer perfectly well; and the charge, too, appears very reasonable. But marching the longer distance (25 to 26 miles) two days, and encamping in the Desert, is objectionable, and should be avoided.
2. By second class carriages to No. 12 Station, and thence to Suez, 25 miles, by donkeys, including conveyance of 112 lbs. of baggage, landing at Alexandria, and shipment at Suez, 3 *l.* per head.	2. No objection can be offered to this mode of transit, as the journey on donkey-back might be performed, part in the morning and part in the afternoon, and would only entail a few hours' halt; the Peninsular and Oriental Company procuring tents, &c. for the occasion. Cooked provisions could be taken in the haversacks. This transit performed in about 24 to 26 hours.
3. By second class carriages to No. 12 Station, thence by vans to Suez, including conveyance of 1½ cwt. of baggage; landing at Alexandria, and shipment at Suez, 5 *l.* per head.	3. This mode is in practice at present, and has proved most comfortable to the troops. Average transit about 17 hours, deducting stoppages.

Sir, Alexandria, 26 October 1857.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, the arrival, yesterday afternoon, at this port, of the mail steam-ship "Australian," with two companies of the Royal Artillery under command of Lieut.-Colonel Maberly, strength as per margin. Officers 12; non-commissioned officers and men 221.

The baggage and ammunition were immediately disembarked and forwarded to Suez, an officer and party proceeding there to be present at its shipment.

As the steam-ship "Emeu," from Australia, is still due, the troops per "Australian," remain on board that vessel.

The gunner and driver named in the margin met with a very serious accident the night of the 25th inst. whilst on duty removing baggage, having fallen down the hatchway into the main hold, and received a concussion of the brain. Should he recover he will be sent back to Malta in the "Australian." No. 3204. Gunner and driver Wm. Henderson, 6th company, 11th battalion.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington,*
Lieut.-Col. Dep. Quartermaster-General.

Major-General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.
Military Secretary, Horse Guards, London.

Sir, Alexandria, 31 October 1857.

I HAVE the honour to report to you, for the information of His Royal Highness the General Commanding in Chief, that the steam-ship "Dutchman," with two companies (10th and 21st) Royal Engineers, under the command of Captain Cox of that corps, strength as per margin, reached this port this morning, and will proceed in the usual way (viz., by rail to No. 12 Station in the Desert, thence in vans) to Suez to-morrow, at noon; embarking, on arrival, on board the "Zenobia" hulk, which has been fitted up to receive them. Officers 12. Men 244.

This move, before the arrival of the steamers from Bombay and Calcutta, is performed so as to anticipate the presence on the transit administration, likely to occur on arrival of the above steamers; moreover, the Royal Artillery, now detained at Alexandria by the non-arrival of the "Emeu," have to be conveyed across.

A sharp attack of ophthalmia prevents my accompanying the engineers to-morrow, but they are in good hands with Mr. Halton, Peninsular and Oriental Company's agent here. And I have given such clear written instructions for the guidance of the commanding officer, both *en route* and at Suez, that I have no anxiety for their well being. I am endeavouring to get myself well enough to cross with the Royal Artillery.

Should the Australian steamer "Emeu" not have reached Suez in a few days, I shall confer with the Acting Consul-General Mr. Green, so as to obtain his co-operation in procuring conveyance for the Royal Artillery to Calcutta, in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's mail steamer "Hindostan," taking it for granted the "Emeu" must have met with some accident.

I trust His Royal Highness will approve of my so doing, for, to judge by antecedents, the Australian steamers might be detained for weeks.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington,*
Lieut.-Col. Dep. Quartermaster-General.

Major-General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B., &c. &c. &c.
Horse Guards, London.

Appendix, No 22.

Sir, Alexandria, 10 November 1857.

In continuation of my letter of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report, for His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief's information, that the two companies of Royal Artillery, ex "Australian," under command of Lieut.-Colonel Maberly, successfully, and in the most orderly manner, performed their journey overland during portions of the 5th and 6th instant, embarking at Suez as a temporary measure, on board the "Zenobia" hulk, which had been vacated by the two companies of Royal Engineers removing to their respective Bombay and Calcutta ships.

As might have been expected, the Australian steamer "Emeu" was discovered to be totally unfit for sea, and the arrangements in that contingency previously made were, on the 7th instant, carried out, by embarking the artillery companies, and as many medical officers as could possibly be received, on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-ship "Hindostan," the vessel sailing that evening.

Total Troops Embarked.

	Officers.	Men.
Royal Artillery	12	219
Royal Engineers	6	122
Medical Officers	22	—
Total - -	40	341

I beg to enclose, for His Royal Highness's information, copies of communications that have passed on this subject, with Dr. Linton and the Superintendent of the Australian Company, who happened to be on the spot.

There is no doubt that the "Hindostan" was considerably crowded with passengers and military stores, under the existing emergencies, and injury to "Emeu," but as she is a capacious paddle-steamer, with immense beam, the certainty of fine weather, with Aden and Point de Galle as places of relief, should the commanding officer consider it necessary to ease the ship of a portion of the troops, I did not hesitate, bearing in view the urgency with which the services of both arms were required in India, to embark the whole.

I trust His Royal Highness will permit me to bring to his favourable notice the conduct of the superintendent of the Peninsular and Oriental Company in Egypt, as well as the energy and ready resources displayed by the captain and officers of the steamer "Hindostan" on this occasion, but the feeling seemed to animate each and every one, viz., the interest of Her Majesty's service, and to this alone is to be attributed the embarkation of so many troops and stores for Calcutta which would otherwise have been detained in this country.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington,*
Lieut.-Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Major-General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B.,
Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

Memorandum.

Suez, 7 November 1857.

For the information and guidance of Lieut.-Colonel Maberly, commanding Royal Artillery, and Dr. Linton, C.B., Inspector-general of Hospitals.

1. There are 14 berths available for Royal Artillery and medical officers on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's ship "Hindostan," and will be pointed out by the purser, to be occupied by the above officers according to seniority.

2. In addition to the above, 20 mattresses are available for officers of both branches of the service to sleep upon in the saloon or on deck. By the foregoing arrangements 34 officers, Royal Artillery, and medical staff are provided for, and this number will be required to embark on board the "Hindostan."

3. Any other officers proceeding on board the "Hindostan" will have to take their chance as to accommodation, but as every officer in the ship, including the captain, have given up their cabins and berths, it is evident that the Peninsular and Oriental Company's officers are desirous of making all parties as comfortable as possible under the present emergencies.

4. As the number of artillery officers is 12, all of which embark, Dr. Linton will have the kindness to give Lieut.-Colonel Pocklington the names of 22 medical officers who are willing to put up with a little discomfort during their voyage to Calcutta, where, Dr. Linton has stated, their services are so urgently required; Dr. Linton will also favour Lieut.-Colonel Pocklington with the names of such medical officers who decline taking advantage of the present opportunity of communication direct to India.

(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington,*
Lieut.-Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Addenda.

Since writing the above memorandum, a communication has been received from the captain of the steam ship "Hindostan," stating after further consideration that it is quite impossible

impossible to take more than 34 Royal Artillery and Medical Staff Officers on board his ship; under these circumstances that number only will embark; and Dr. Linton will confine his portion of medical officers to 22; the remainder, names of whom to be forwarded, will remain in Egypt, and be considered as Government passengers with the Australian Company, until an opportunity occurs of their proceeding to their destination. Appendix, No. 22.

(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Suez, 7 November 1857. Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Sir, Alexandria, 9 November 1857.

In reply to your communication of the 7th instant, intimating for my information and guidance, "that the Royal Mail Chartered Steam Ship 'Emeu' having suffered severe injury from stranding in the Red Sea, and being unable to proceed to sea with the mails and passengers on the return voyage to Sydney, this Company is not at present prepared to forward to Ceylon the officers and men of the Royal Artillery, and medical officers landed at Alexandria ex 'Australian,' and transmitted through Egypt to Suez, in terms of our instructions to that effect."

I have the honour to state, that anticipating such a result, and considering the immense importance attached to the immediate departure of the said troops and officers for their ultimate destination, arrangements were made through Her Majesty's Acting Consul General at this place, to forward such portions of officers and troops as could be accommodated by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam ship "Hindostan," direct to Calcutta.

The numbers, as per margin,* have accordingly embarked in that ship, being the utmost she could receive; the remainder, viz., 15 medical officers, remain in Egypt as Government passengers in the hands of the Australian and Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, until a favourable opportunity occurs of their being conveyed to their destination.

	Officers.	Men.
Royal Artillery -	12	219
Medical Officers	22	—
Total embarked as connected with "Australian" -	34	219

I beg to enclose a nominal list of the medical officers embarked in the "Hindostan," and those remaining in Egypt.

As it was utterly impossible for the "Hindostan" to receive the ammunition landed from the "Australasian," the same must of necessity be obtained at Suez, until conveyance is available *en route* to Calcutta.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*, Lieut.-Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster-General.

C. Welton, Esq.
&c. &c. &c.
Superintendent, Australian or Royal Mail
Steam Packet Company, Cairo.

Sir, Alexandria, 2 December 1857.

I have the honour to report, for the information of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, the arrival at Alexandria per Royal Mail Steam Ship "Tamar," on the 27th ultimo, of the detachment 69th regiment specified in the margin, under command of Major Fenwick, of that corps.

The troops disembarked the same afternoon, and accompanied by Captain Maylock and myself, proceeded in the usual way, per rail and van, to Suez, and embarked on the 28th ultimo, on board the chartered steamer "Simla," for conveyance to Point de Galle. The "Simla" sailed the afternoon, 29th ultimo. Four companies, officers 14, men 281.

It is with much pleasure that I beg to bring to His Royal Highness's knowledge the excellent conduct of the men of this division throughout the transit.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*, Lieut.-Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster-General.

Major General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.
Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

Sir, Alexandria, 5 December 1857.

I have the honour to report, for the information of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, the arrival at Alexandria on the 1st instant of the Head Quarter Division, 69th regiment, on board the steam-ship "Sultan," strength as per margin. Head Quarters, three companies, officers 14, men 251.

This detachment crossed to Suez on the 3d instant in good order by the usual conveyances and will sail about the 7th instant for Madras, in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steam-ship "Bengal."

Appendix, No. 22.

Royal Engineers, officers 1, men 24, Lieut. Hannison, Commanding.

I have further to report the arrival yesterday, per steam-ship "Nemesis," from Malta, of the detachment Royal Engineers mentioned in the margin, *en route* to Calcutta; this party proceeded at once to Suez for embarkation also on board the steam-ship "Bengal."

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*, Lieut.-Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster-general.

Major General Sir Charles Yorke, K.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.
Military Secretary, Horse Guards.

(*Viâ* Marseilles.)

Sir, Alexandria, 4 January 1858.

In obedience to the commands of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, conveyed to me in your communication of the 26th ultimo, respecting a report made by the medical officer in charge of the detachment hospital at Suez, of the nature of accommodation afforded to troops on board ship proceeding to India, I have the honour to state that Dr. Fraser's observation regarding the "deck passage" provided for the soldiers in question is correct; but I think that officer gives too high a colouring to the inconvenience occasioned to the men by "the live stock."

The vessel, though not mentioned, was, I presume, the "Simla," with the 1st division 69th regiment, 281 men, on board; the said vessel having embarked these troops on the 28th November last, and the extract from Dr. Fraser's letter is dated Suez, the 30th of the same month. The "Simla" is a magnificent screw steamer, of 2,000 tons, and from personal observation on the occasion under consideration, is perhaps the cleanest and best ordered ship in the service of the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

The troops, as deck passengers, were consequently as well off, possibly better, than many other detachments proceeding *viâ* Egypt to India, and had full space to sleep under awnings as far aft as the quarter deck. The commanders of all these vessels are exceedingly well-disposed towards the troops, and anxious to render them every comfort and protection within their power during the voyage; but as the accommodation between decks is wholly and exclusively occupied by passengers, the troops are necessitated to remain on deck, where awnings are kept spread all day and night. In this manner the men have been conveyed ever since the overland transit has been used.

In every instance, the troops have been furnished with a blanket, in addition to their great coats; and latterly, since the weather has become cooler, two blankets, or a blanket and rug, have been issued to each man thus sleeping on deck.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*, Lieut.-Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster-general.

Sir, Alexandria, 7 April 1858.

In obedience to the instructions of His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief, contained in your letter of the 22d ultimo, with enclosure from the War Office, dated 20th March 1858, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, the report called for respecting the advantages or disadvantages of the overland route for the transport of troops to India.

I have, &c.
(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington*,
Col. Dep. Quartermaster-gen.

Major General Sir Charles Yorke, K. C. B.,
&c. &c. &c.
Military Secretary, Horse Guards, London.

Report on the Overland Route to India as a means of Transport for Her Majesty's Troops.

Advantages.

The advantages of the overland route are very considerable, and the trajet most simple.

A thousand men per week can be conveyed across the Isthmus by the Transit Administration of Egypt, without interference with the ordinary passenger traffic.

Between 300 and 400 men can move at a time, and perform the distance from ship to ship in 26 hours.

The transit by rail is completed to within almost 20 miles of Suez.

This last portion of the journey is performed by the soldiers on donkies in about six hours.

The same activity does not exist as heretofore in the completion of the line of rail to Suez, but it is expected to be finished throughout before the end of the current year.

Number of troops crossed overland from 5 October 1857 to 7 April 1858:—Officers, 214; Men, 5,303.

There can be no doubt as to the experiment having succeeded, and the chief cause of good order and success arises from the practice of conveying the troops continuously from ship to ship on either side of the isthmus, never allowing them to land for detention in the country.

Troops

Troops, if practicable, should not arrive at Alexandria till corresponding tonnage is available in the Suez Roads to receive them. Moreover, it is highly important that all troops, moving by passenger ships down the Red Sea, should receive "between deck" accommodation, accessible at all times, for, at the minimum, one-half of the number of men embarked, the same as in transports specially chartered for the conveyance of soldiers. The absence of this has created very natural dissatisfaction, and been a subject of complaint by the troops. No article of baggage accompanying the troops is allowed to exceed 250 lbs. in weight; two such are a camel's load. An occasional package of three and a half to four tons can, on an emergency, be conveyed across the Desert at the present moment.

Two meals during the transit are furnished to the soldiers at the cost of the steam-ship company conveying the troops.

One day's cooked provisions are taken in their haversacks in case of accidents in the Desert.

For passage across the Isthmus, including disembarkation at Alexandria and re-shipment at Suez (performed by lighters and steam-tugs), but exclusive of refreshments, the Transit Administration of Egypt charge 5*l.* for each officer, first-class carriage, and 224 lbs. of baggage allowed to each; 3*l.* for each soldier, second-class carriage, and 112 lbs. of baggage to each.

First-class carriages hold 24 persons; second-class carriages hold 30 persons.—Line of rail single.

A thousand camels could, at 10 days' notice, be procured for Desert transport.

A thousand donkies at Cairo by 48 hours' previous warning.

During six months' experience (autumn, winter, and early spring) of the Overland Route, I am not prepared to mention a single disadvantage this line possesses, as a medium of transport for troops to reinforce Her Majesty's army in India.

The limited amount of material that just at present can be conveyed, seems the only military difficulty, but on completion of the railway to Suez this will no longer exist.

The expediency of forwarding troops overland to India in the summer, exposed to the Desert's sun, with the great heat of the Red Sea following, is a matter for consideration, and how far the injurious effects likely to arise from the said exposure, would or would not prove detrimental to the health and stamina of the men.

The last detachment of young soldiers (260 men of various corps) that crossed the Desert on the 27th ultimo, seemed, on arrival at Suez, to feel the effects of their six hours' exposure to the sun.

To perform the trajet on donkeyback during dark nights would be most tedious, liable to accidents, and unadvisable.

The advantages of the overland route have been greatly enhanced by the facilities afforded our troops by his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt, followed by the ready and most obliging co-operation of the director and executive officers of the Transit Administration, whose prompt attention has been invariably given to any suggestion it was thought requisite to offer for the convenience or comfort of Her Majesty's troops.

(signed) *E. H. F. Pocklington,*
Colonel and Deputy Quartermaster-general.

Alexandria, 7 April 1858.

(2.)

RETURN showing the Number of HORSES Despatched from the *Cape of Good Hope* to *India*.

CALCUTTA:		Horses.
H. M. S.	"Penelope"	63
"	"Megæra"	83
"	"Himalaya"	250
Transport	"Judith"	130
"	"Blue Jacket"	200
"	"Mystery"	130
"	"Iatona"	75
"	"Viscount Canning"	85
	TOTAL to Calcutta	1,016

Appendix, No. 22.

		Horses.
BOMBAY:		
Transport	"Persia"	120
"	"Ocean Monarch"	160
"	"Ville de Metz"	90
"	"Granville"	80
	TOTAL to Bombay	450
	GRAND TOTAL	1,466

Sir George Grey, in his despatch of the 20th December, states that the greater portion of these horses had then been despatched, and that the remainder would leave about the middle of January. He adds, that he did not propose to send any more horses to Bombay, after the departure of the "Granville," unless a further application was made to him by the Governor of that Presidency.

(3.)

REGULATIONS.

NOTICE of Conditions of Service in the 100th Regiment.

IN pursuance of the above proclamation the Governor-General desires to state that His Royal Highness "the General Commanding-in-Chief" has been pleased to allow his Excellency to submit the names of gentlemen residing in Canada, including such as may have already served in the army, or may be in the receipt of half pay, as applicants for a certain number of commissions in the 100th regiment.

These commissions will be as follows: one major, six captains, and eight lieutenants, and will be given without purchase, on the conditions hereinafter stated.

1. The fitness of every applicant shall be certified by a Board of Officers under the direction, and subject in each case to the approval of the Lieutenant-general Commanding Her Majesty's troops in British North America.

2. Every applicant so certified and approved shall be recommended by his Excellency the Governor-General.

3. Any gentleman receiving the major's commission shall have previously brought to one or more of the depôts for recruits at least 200 men, passed and attested.

4. Every gentleman receiving a captain's commission shall have previously brought to one or more of such depôts at least 80 men, passed and attested.

5. Every gentleman receiving a lieutenant's commission shall have previously brought to one or more of such depôts at least 40 men, passed and attested.

6. His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-Chief has, moreover, been pleased to signify that he will permit the Governor-General to recommend the names of a limited number of gentlemen residing in Canada, and duly certified and approved as above, as fit and proper persons to receive commissions as ensigns in the 100th regiment, with or without purchase, according to the discretion of His Royal Highness.

7. No gentleman receiving a commission in the 100th regiment will be permitted to sell or dispose of the same, except under the restriction, and after the time and service usual in the army.

8. The Governor-General will not consider any gentleman as qualified to obtain a recommendation from him, until he shall have transmitted to the Assistant Military Secretary of his Excellency an attested copy of the certificate of a Board of Officers, countersigned by the lieutenant-general commanding.

9. Such board of officers will assemble at Montreal on the day of next ensuing, and will sit at such times and at such places as may be directed by the Lieutenant-General, for the purpose of examining and reporting from time to time on the military qualifications of such gentlemen as may be referred to the Lieutenant-General for examination and approval by his Excellency the Governor-General. The certificates of the examining Board shall have special reference to the rank which the person examined may seem qualified to fill with credit to the service.

10. In order, in the first instance, to obtain the necessary certificate and approval from the military authorities, it will, as a general rule, be requisite, that the applicant should either be personally known to the Governor-General, or should present himself to his Excellency

Excellency at Toronto, for the purpose of obtaining a reference to the Lieutenant-General; but no such reference will imply a pledge or promise on the part of his Excellency, ultimately to recommend the applicant for a commission, even if he is certified to be fit. Appendix, No. 22

11. Any gentleman passed and approved as fit to receive the commission of major, captain, or lieutenant, respectively, who shall have been informed by the Assistant Military Secretary of the Governor-General, that he has been selected by his Excellency, may then, and not before, bring to any recruiting department the recruits whom he shall have collected. Such recruits will be examined, and if approved and attested, credit at head quarters for the number so brought will be given to the person bringing them, until the number requisite for the commission, according to the scale recited above, shall be completed.

12. A recruit presenting himself at a depôt, without being brought by any applicant for a commission, or who may be brought by a person not previously selected by the Governor-General, will not be carried to the credit of any applicant for a commission without purchase; but, in submitting the names of applicants for ensigncies, regard will be had by the Governor-General to the number of recruits which any such applicant may have contributed to procure.

13. Every recruit will receive the usual bounty and kit, that is to say: (*see* General Order, No. 697, dated 23d January 1858, Horse Guards); but the last instalment of the said bounty will not be paid to any man attested, until he shall have been actually shipped for the purpose of joining the depôt of the 100th Regiment, to be formed in Europe.

(signed)
Assistant Military Secretary.

Appendix, No. 23. Appendix, No. 23.

(No. 1.)

Colonel Sir *H. Storks* to the Secretary of the India Board.

Sir, War Office, 24 August 1857.

I AM directed by Lord Panmure to transmit to you, for the information of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, the accompanying copies of communications received from Lieut.-Colonel Fraser, late of the Bombay Army, in reference to a scheme for the conveyance of Her Majesty's troops, by the overland route, to India.

I am, &c.,
(signed) *H. E. Storks.*

(No. 2.)

Lieut.-Colonel *Fraser* to Mr. *Peel.*

La Rosière, St. Saviour's, Jersey,
Sir, 18 July 1857.

IN submitting the accompanying memorandum for the consideration of Lord Panmure, Secretary of War, I would beg leave to observe that it was drawn up some months since, anterior to the present crisis in India, and intended to apply more particularly to the transmission of recruits, limiting the number of men to the accommodation that could be afforded by the Peninsular bi-monthly steamers, namely, about 800 men per month.

I need not observe that the transit of any greater number could, of course, be as easily effected by the increase of steam-transport from Suez to India, or steam and sailing vessels combined, as in the case of the late cavalry transit, overland, to the Crimea, the former vessels towing the latter.

As a retired officer of a service that has liberally maintained its officers, I trust to be held excused for thus offering suggestions, framed on practical experience, of the overland route as applicable to troops,* as they may, in the hands of superior authority, facilitate the transport of European troops to India, at a crisis like the present, when time is everything.

The removal of political obstacles to the line may, it is hoped, as readily give way to the pressure of present emergency, as they did on the occasion of the cavalry transit to the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. G. Fraser*, Lieut-Colonel,
Retired Bombay Army, late Assistant Commissary-General,
on Special Duty in Egypt.

(No. 3.)

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* The writer served as an officer of an European regiment twenty-five years.

Appendix, No. 23.

(No. 3.)

Lieut.-Colonel *Fraser* to Mr. *Peel.*

La Rosière, St. Saviour's, Jersey,
Sir, 18 July 1857.

DURING my employment in Egypt, in the transit of the cavalry regiments to the Crimea, such great facilities presented themselves of forwarding the European recruits, or even troops of Her Majesty's service and of the Honourable Company's, to India through that province, and thereby greatly economising time and expenditure, that I have ventured to submit to the Honourable Court the following proposal for the transmission of the European recruits, for both services, directly to their respective presidencies, by the overland route, rather than by the present protracted and expensive one, *viâ* the Cape, an alteration from the established mode of transit, that the increase to the European forces in the East of late years might appear to call for.

Little political difficulty could, it is presumed, exist to such an arrangement as the transit of unarmed men through Egypt, in common with other passengers; no period, however, could be more favourable than the present, friendly relations existing between the British and Turkish Governments, for the entertainment of a proposal which promised to be so considerable a source of revenue to the Egyptian provinces of the latter Government.

The Honourable Company's European regiments of the three Presidencies, comprising artillery, engineers, and infantry, amount in the aggregate to about 18,000 men, and would require, I presume, about 300 recruits to keep up the supply for each of the minor presidencies annually, and 800 for Bengal, forming a total of 1,400 or 1,500 recruits per annum, exclusive of those for Her Majesty's regiments, requiring, probably, a somewhat larger number to supply their contingencies, say:—

Her Majesty's regiments, 20,000 men, recruits annually - -	1,600
Honourable Company's regiments, 18,000 men, recruits annually -	1,400
Total - - - -	3,000

To enable the men for the more distant stations in Bengal to reach their destination during the cold months, the recruits for that presidency should not leave the port of embarkation later than October; those for Bombay and Madras early in December and January; in charge, as usual, of officers returning to India, each detachment not exceeding 200 men, a number convenient for movement, and which the vans at Cairo could easily give accommodation to.

Their dispatch from Southampton, or the port fixed on as most convenient, should be so timed as to ensure the arrival at Alexandria of the recruits in the intervals of the bi-monthly steamer's arrival with the mails and passengers; the first batch of 200 men to reach that port three days after the passengers and mails, and so on, 200 more at intervals of three days, until the period of the next mail arriving at Alexandria, when the transit should be discontinued for three or four days, and then recommenced: thus, by detachments of 200 men at a time, without interference with the passengers and mails, 800 men could be forwarded every month, from October to January inclusive.

On the arrival of each detachment at Alexandria, every man provided with great-coat and blanket, besides the usual soldier's necessaries in a knapsack, but, of course, unarmed and without arm equipments, an agent there having made the necessary arrangements for their reception and departure by rail for Cairo, the recruits should be marched, directly on landing, to the Alexandrian railway station, and thence proceed by cars to Cairo.

The object in view during transit being to keep the men together, and to prevent communication with the people of the towns, their passage through Egypt and arrival at Suez should therefore be as rapidly conducted as is consistent with the health of the men; and accordingly were they dispatched from Alexandria, after breakfast on board their transport, for Cairo, by rail at 10 A.M., they could dine at Cairo at 3 P.M., and starting thence again by van at 5 P.M., could arrive at Suez at 9 or 10 the following morning, and then, after breakfast, at once embark on steamer-transport; either the Peninsular and Oriental vessels, or the Honourable Company's steam-cruisers, or both combined, being made available for conveyance to their respective presidencies. Arrangements similar to the above were submitted by me from Egypt to the Indian Government in July before last, in the event of additional troops being sent from India to the Crimea, which were entirely approved of by the Governor-General, and directed to be adopted (as far as the Egyptian transit was concerned) on such a contingency occurring.

Thus the transport of the entire number of recruits for both services, say 3,000 men yearly, could be easily effected during the four months of October, November, December, and January, and insure the arrival at the presidency for which they were intended, in a period of from 30 to 35 days, unimpaired in health, and landing at the best period of the year in India (the cold weather) for joining the regiments, unvitiated, moreover, by a long and idle voyage; besides effecting a vast saving of time and expense: advantages so obvious

obvious and palpable at all times, but especially so in the event of war in Europe, or in India, requiring the immediate reinforcement of our regiments in the East, as to require, I think, no further comment in support of its immediate consideration.

The cost of each recruit's passage at present, *viâ* the Cape, inclusive of medicines and medical attendance, is, I believe, on an average, about 18 *l.* a head, exclusive, however, of four months' pay and clothing during the voyage. The transport charges alone, therefore, for 3,000 men yearly, for the services of Her Majesty and the Honourable Company's regiments in India, would, *viâ* the Cape, amount to, as follows:—

	Per Man. £.	s.	d.
Transport cost round Cape	9	–	–
Provisions for 135 days, at 1 *s.* 3 *d.* per diem	8	8	3
Medical attendance for ditto, at 2 *d.* per month	–	9	–
Pay for three extra months while on board	4	10	–
Total	£. 22	7	3
Or, for 3,000 men yearly	£. 67,129	13	4

Whereas by the overland route, by inquiries made at the shipping offices in London, the cost per man to Alexandria, judging by the cost per ton of steam transport to that port, and thence on to India, would stand nearly thus:—

	Per Man. £.	s.	d.
From Southampton to Alexandria	5	–	–
Provisions from and to ditto, 16 days, at 1 *s.* 3 *d.* per day	1	–	–
Transit by rail to Cairo, 3d class	–	16	–
Ditto, from Cairo to Suez, by vans	–	10	–
Provisions for two days, through Egypt, 2 *s.* per day	–	4	–
Embarkation by small steamers at Suez, at 10 *l.* per trip, or per man	–	1	–
Steam-transport from Suez to Bombay, by Indian Navy steamer, inclusive of provisions, 15 to 20 days	10	–	–
Total	£. 17	11	–
Or, for 3,000 men annually	52,650	–	–
Difference cost by Cape route	67,129	13	4
	£. 14,479	13	4

Exact correctness in the above calculations cannot be assumed, as cost of tonnage varies considerably, but it is sufficiently near the truth to exhibit the saving in expenditure that the adoption of the overland route would effect; but of considerably greater importance would be the saving in time of transit to India, by rendering the men available for the ranks three months earlier than they would be by the Cape route. In the facilities of operation in the overland route, nothing is on supposition, but by actual inquiry, and the experience acquired during eight months I was engaged in the transit of Her Majesty's regiments of cavalry to the seat of war.

I have, it is true, submitted but the outline of a proposal, that can, however, be so matured in its details as to render the adoption of the European route for the transmission of recruits for our European troops in India, if conducted with common care and arrangement, at once easy, rapid, and economical. The reduction of a long and tedious voyage, both morally and physically relaxing to the recruit, to one-third of its former duration, is of itself no trifling consideration; but when it is recollected that 3,000 men are placed at the disposal of Government three months earlier than they would otherwise be, no further advocacy is necessary, I presume, to insure a consideration, at least, of the suggestion I have ventured to submit to the Honourable Board.

(signed) *T. G. Fraser*, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Appendix, No. 23.

(No. 4.)

Lieutenant-Colonel *Fraser* to Mr. *Peel.*

La Rosière, St. Saviour's, Jersey,
14 August 1857.

Sir,

WITH reference to the communication I had the honour to submit regarding the overland transit of troops to India, allow me to add that when engaged in the march of the cavalry through Egypt during the late war, I suggested to the Supreme Government, in the event of additional cavalry from India being forwarded to the Crimea during the sultry months of June, July, and August, a plan of transporting troops and horses similar to that I lately forwarded; the horses to be marched under the charge of Arab horsekeepers across the Desert in two successive nights, halting, watering, and feeding at the large central station, which has a large reservoir; the men to be transported in vans. The proposed scheme was not only approved of by the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, but was directed to be strictly adhered to in the event of a further transit.

In the transmission of cavalry by ordinary marches across the Desert, besides rations for the men, large quantities of forage and water require to be laid down at the different stations in the Desert; and the latter article especially requires some time for conveyance. All this preparation is, however (except at the central station), obviated by the above plan of marching the horses through at night; the men proceeding in vans, their baggage being conveyed in 24 hours from Cairo to Suez, by the usual overland camels.

I would respectfully observe that I have prepared large European forces for movements in the field; and the transmission of infantry from Alexandria to Suez offers less obstacles than in India, and can be easily effected even by regular marches, much less by the readier and more rapid method I have proposed, which, by dispensing with the two great considerations, water and tent equipage, will occupy but 24 hours in transit.

Having just retired from the Indian army, containing many relatives, I hope for pardon in offering my humble services in any capacity of the overland transit wherein they may prove useful during the present crisis.

I have, &c.
(signed) *T. G. Fraser*, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Bombay Army, Retired.

(No. 5.)

The Secretary of the India Board to the Secretary of the East India Company.

Sir,

India Board, 26 August 1857.

I AM directed by the Commissioners for the Affairs of India to transmit to you, for the observations of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, a copy of a letter dated the 14th instant, which Lieut.-Colonel T. G. Fraser, lately of the Bombay Army, has addressed to "The Secretary, War Office," on the subject of sending English troops to India through Egypt. The former communication to which Colonel Fraser refers is a letter of the 18th July, enclosing a paper which he appears to have sent to the Court on that day.

I have, &c.
(signed) *George Clerk.*

Appendix, No. 24.

Sir *F. Currie* to General Sir *De Lacy Evans.*

East India House, 23 March 1858.

Sir Frederick Currie presents his compliments to General Sir De Lacy Evans, and has the pleasure to enclose a statement, by the Military Secretary to the Court of Directors, regarding the letter addressed by Major-General Sir Henry Storks to the Secretary to the India Board, dated 14th April 1847, as requested by the Committee on India Transport Service. Appendix, No. 24.

Memorandum.

Inquiry has been made whether a letter, dated the 14th April 1857, addressed by Major-General Sir Henry Storks, K. C. B., to the Secretary to the India Board, conveying the recommendation of the Secretary of State for War that two regiments of Infantry should be added to the permanent establishment of Infantry in India, was transmitted by the India Board to the Court of Directors.

In reply, I beg to say that this document is not mentioned in any letter from the India Board to the Court of Directors, and that no trace of it can be found on the records of this house.

The "Correspondence" referred to in the letter from the Chairs to the President of the Board, dated 29th April 1857, is that which took place in September 1856, of which copies have been laid before the House of Commons.

Philip Melvill,
Secretary Military Department.

East India House,
23 March 1858.

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3. *Calling out of the German Legion at the Cape.*
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Despatch from Governor Sir George Grey to the Colonial Secretary, dated Cape Town, 30 October 1857, relative to the circumstances under which he called out the German military settlers, *App. p.* 311, 312——Enclosures in this despatch in further explanation of the course adopted by Sir G. Grey, *ib.* 312-317.

Further despatches from Sir George Grey to the Right Honourable H. Labouchere, dated 26 November 1857, relative to the calling out of German military settlers; enclosure in this despatch, showing the desperate character of some of these men, *App. p.* 318, 319.

4. *Consideration of the Conduct of the Governor in not forwarding a greater Number of Troops:*

Reference to some papers presented, or to be presented, to Parliament, as showing the force at the Cape when intelligence was received there of the Indian mutiny; on the 31st July there was a total of 10,666 men in rank and file, including the German Legion and the Cape Mounted Rifles, *Right Hon. H. Labouchere* 2095-2105. 2110, 2111. 2126——Reference to a despatch from witness to Sir George Grey, on the 26th August, and to the reply thereto, dated 5 November, relative to the non-transmission of so many as six regiments to India, *ib.* 2106-2108.

Strong ground for apprehension of a war at the Cape, adverted to in justification of the unwillingness of Sir G. Grey to reduce too largely the forces at his disposal, *Right Hon. H. Labouchere* 2119-2124. 2137. 2155. 2160——Expediency of a reserve force at the Cape, for the protection of Natal, *ib.* 2125-2127——Measures taken with reference to the emigration of German and Irish females to the Cape; funds available for the purpose, *ib.* 2130-2134——Extract from a despatch from witness to Sir G. Grey, on the subject of the force despatched from the Cape, *ib.* 2135.

Witness entertains a very high opinion of the ability, energy, and public spirit of Sir G. Grey, and believes that he forwarded to India all the troops that he could with safety spare under the then circumstances of the case, *Right Hon. H. Labouchere* 2135 *et seq.*——Inaccuracy of a statement as to Sir G. Grey when Governor of New Zealand, having accumulated six regiments there, *ib.* 2136——Growing prosperity of the Cape since Sir G. Grey has been Governor, *ib.* 2138.

Excellent conduct of the Cape colonists with reference to the reinforcement of the Indian army, *Right Hon. H. Labouchere* 2155——Larger force at the Cape in 1852 than in 1857, when the Indian mutiny broke out, *ib.* 2170-2172.

Estimate of witness, and of the late Sir George Cathcart, that 4,000 troops would be sufficient for the protection of the colony from the Kaffirs, *Sir G. Clerk* 2224-2226. 2233——Usefulness of the levies of Fingoes and Kaffirs during the late war, *ib.* 2226-2228. 2232——Ability of the Dutch settlers to protect the frontier, unassisted by the Queen's troops, *ib.* 2229-2231. 2233. 2237. 2243, 2244——Slight part taken until lately by the Cape colonists in the protection of the frontier, *ib.* 2233.

All the troops, after a few years, might be withdrawn, *Sir G. Clerk*, 2234, 2235——Advantage of the military expenditure to the colony, which, save at Natal, has no natural resources, *ib.* 2233-2236. 2241, 2242——Formidability of the Kaffirs if their pastures be encroached upon, *ib.* 2237, 2238——Adequacy of a force of four regiments and the Cape Corps for the protection of the colony during the late starvation among the Kaffirs, *ib.* 2245-2253.

Resolution that the Governor of the Cape, without loss of time, forwarded treasure and horses, together with a portion of the troops at his disposal, but that he did not send the whole

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CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—continued.

4. *Consideration of the Conduct of the Governor, &c.*—continued.

whole amount of the force which he was instructed by the Home Government to transmit to India; that the Committee have not the means of judging whether the circumstances of the colony did or did not justify Sir George Grey in taking this course, *Rep. p.* iv.

Cape Route. See *Board of Control. Coaling of Steamers. Cost. Court of Directors. Overland Route, 5. Sailing Vessels. Steamers.*

Cavalry. During the Russian war two regiments of dragoons went from India to the Crimea through Egypt, but did not return by that route; reasons for their coming to England before return to India, and for their being returned without horses, *Melvill,* 121-123. 224-228. 250-265. 270-274.

Good health both of men and horses on the occasion of the two cavalry regiments being sent up the Red Sea from India, for service in the Crimea, *Sir H. Leeke,* 1569, 1570; *Engledue,* 2622-2624——Facility of the passage through Egypt of these regiments, *Sir H. Leeke,* 1571. 1618.——Supplies of provision available on the passage, *ib.* 1573, 1574——Several vessels employed in taking the two cavalry regiments, including horses, fodder, &c., from Bombay to Suez; number of infantry which these vessels might have carried, *ib.* 1578-1588.

Statement of the regiments of cavalry of her Majesty's service, which have embarked for India from the 1st of July to the 10th of September 1857; showing the strength of each regiment, rate per head, name of ship, tonnage, destination, &c., according to the embarkation returns received at the Adjutant-General's office to the 10th of September inclusive, *App. p.* 264-266——Statement of regiments of cavalry which have embarked for India from 11 September 1857 to 18 February 1858, *ib.* 268-270.

Total of seven regiments of cavalry despatched to India from June 1857 to March 1858, *App. p.* 281——Particulars as to their mode of despatch, place of destination, date of arrival, &c., *ib.* 283 *et seq.*

Ceylon. High praise due to Sir Henry Ward, who sent from Ceylon almost all the European troops at his disposal; antagonism among the coloured population of Ceylon adverted to hereon, *Right Hon. H. Labouchere* 2142-2154. 2161, 2162.

Total of 511 men and officers obtained from Ceylon up to a certain date, *App. p.* 266.

Resolution that the Governor of Ceylon gave early and valuable assistance to the Government of India, and deserves great praise for the zeal and promptitude with which he acted, *Rep. p.* iv.

"Champion of the Seas" The. Return showing the rate of passage-money by this vessel, the number of men carried, the date of sailing, and date of arrival &c., *App. p.* 198.

Chartering of Vessels. In chartering the vessels the practice of accepting the lowest tender was departed from in order to select the best vessels without reference to expense, *Shepherd* 375. 523. 643——Attention paid in taking up any ship, to the question of its previous performances; doubt as to their having been any Admiralty information on this point, *Mason* 1184-1188——Advantage of the practice of having troop ships merely for the transport to India, and discharging them at the end of the voyage, *Milne* 1698, 1699. 1720.

See also *Board of Control. Mail Packets.*

China Force. The four regiments that embarked for China and were subsequently diverted to India, were originally intended for India, and would have embarked at the same time independently of the Chinese affair, *Sir H. Storks* 1939-1943——The troops for China were diverted at the Cape to India on the responsibility of Sir G. Grey, *Right Hon. H. Labouchere* 2111-2113.

Statement of the force intercepted *en route* for China; total of 4,491 officers and men, *App. p.* 266.

Clerk, Sir George, K.C.B. (Analysis of his evidence.)—Was Special Commissioner on the Kaffir frontier at the termination of the late war there, 2220-2222——Estimate of witness, and of the late Sir George Cathcart, that 4,000 troops would be sufficient for the protection of the colony from the Kaffirs, 2224-2226. 2233——Usefulness of the levies of Fingoes and Kaffirs during the late war, 2226-2228. 2232——Ability of the Dutch settlers to protect the frontier, unassisted by the Queen's troops, 2229-2231. 2233. 2237. 2243, 2244.

Slight part taken, until lately, by the Cape colonists in the protection of the frontier, 2233——All the troops might, after a few years, be withdrawn, 2234, 2235——Advantage of the military expenditure to the colony, which, save at Natal, has no natural resources, 2233-2236. 2241, 2242——Formidability of the Kaffirs if their pastures be encroached upon, 2237, 2238——Adequacy of a force of four regiments and the Cape corps for the protection of the colony during the late starvation among the Kaffirs, 2245-2253.

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Clerk, Sir George, K.C.B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Witness is now secretary to the India Board, 2254——After the news of the mutiny the Court of Directors showed an early anxiety for the adoption of the overland route, but had not a correct notion of the great practical obstacles thereto, 2255 *et seq.*——The route could not with advantage have been adopted earlier, 2256——Particulars as to the unhealthy character of the voyage down the Red Sea, unless there be ample previous preparation, and the season of the year be favourable, 2257-2259. 2267-2287.

Opinion that Suez is a very unfavourable depôt for the detention of troops, 2259-2261——Most of the troops since sent overland have been conveyed very successfully, previous arrangements having been made, 2262, 2263. 2266——Strong political objections to the permanent adoption of the overland route, 2264, 2265. 2277——Want of means, in the first instance, for the transport of troops from Suez to India, 2277-2280. 2287——Highest and lowest prices paid per head for the transport of troops in screw steamers and clippers, 2288.

Clippers. See *Sailing Vessels.*

Coaling of Steamers. Difficulty at first about the employment of steam transports, on account of the uncertainty in regard to the supply of coals at the Cape, &c., *Mason* 279. 284-289; *Shepherd* 339. 365-371. 374. 1126, 1127——Arrangement for coaling at St. Vincent's, *Shepherd* 339. 367-370. 374——Ample supply of coals at Suez and Aden in connexion with the overland route, *ib.* 394-401; *Harris* 922-926; *Sir H. Leeke* 1575——Further evidence relative to the reluctance at first to employ steamers, on account of the difficulty about coals, *Shepherd* 455-470——Obstacles to an empty steamer towing a laden steamer part of the way from England, in order to enable the latter to complete the voyage without re-coaling, *Shepherd* 469, 470. 557-562; *Harris* 1063-1075; *Milne* 1690-1693.

The coal depôts at Aden, Suez, and Point-de-Galle, are supplied from England, *Shepherd* 542-545——High price of coals at Suez; supplies are provided there by the India House and the Peninsular and Oriental Company, *Lumsden* 790-792——Difficulty about coaling, which induced the Admiralty at first to look unfavourably on the employment of screw vessels for transport to India, *Milne* 1728, 1729——Steps taken to keep up the supply of coals at the different stations, *ib.* 1730-1732——The Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels coaled at St. Vincent, *ib.* 1752.

The question of steam transport to India turns entirely on the supply of coal, *Hoseason* 1784——Nature of the coaling accommodation at Table Bay and Simon's Bay, *ib.* 1785-1787——Slight deterioration in having large depôts of coals, *Engledue* 2443-2445——Supply of coals available if the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers had taken troops *viâ* the Cape, *ib.* 2534-2545.

Statements as to the supply of coal, as shown in certain correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or between Her Majesty's Government or the Court of Directors and the Peninsular and Oriental, the European and American, or other steam-packet companies, *App. p.* 201 *et seq.*

Account, dated Admiralty, 22 February 1858, showing the quantities of coals and patent fuel remaining in store at different points on the 31st May and 30th June 1857; the quantities shipped prior to 31st May 1857, but not received at the Cape at that date; and the quantities shipped in each month since 31st May 1857, *App. p.* 255——Return showing the quantities of coals and patent fuel remaining in store at St. Vincent (Cape de Verdes), Ascension, and the Cape of Good Hope, on the 29th June 1857, *ib.*

Commander-in-Chief. Objections made by the Commander-in-Chief in England to sending out the regiments in detachments, *Shepherd*, 531-533.

Cost. Immense difference in the expense of despatching troops by sailing vessels and by steamers, *Melvill* 129. 141-143. 240-249——Including the victualling in each case, the difference between sailing vessels and steamers is as between about 10 *l.* and 50 *l.*, *ib.* 142, 143. 240-249——The best vessels, both steamers and sailing vessels, were taken up for the additional force, regardless of expense, *Mason* 305; *Shepherd* 340. 375. 523; *Mangles* 1201. 1203, 1204——Some of the freights seemed unduly high, but were necessarily submitted to, *Shepherd* 490.

With a properly organised system of transport in connexion with the overland route, witness considers that such route would be less expensive as well as more rapid than the route by the Cape in steamers, *Harris* 1079-1102.

Much less expense of transport *viâ* the Cape than overland, *Mangles* 1380, 1381——The overland passage now costs 40 *l.* a man, *ib.* 1380, 1381——The Cape route costs about 15 *l.* a man, *ib.*——The highest price paid for screws has been 49 *l.*, and the lowest 19 *l.*, *Sir G. Clerk* 2288——The highest price per head paid for transport in clippers has been 26 *l.*, and the lowest £. 11. 7 *d.*, *ib.*

Contracts of the Peninsular and Oriental Company with the East India Company to take troops to Calcutta at the rate of 40 *l.* a head for the privates and 95 *l.* for the officers; explanation as to the charge having on one occasion been 49 *l.* per man for the privates, *Allen* 2641-2651. 2795-2798.——About 5 *l.* for each man and 10 *l.* for each officer as passengers, is paid by witness's company to the Pacha of Egypt for the use of

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of the railway and carriages, *Allan* 2652-2657. 2788-2791——Charge of 105*l.* for the conveyance of each passenger, overland, from England to Calcutta, *ib.* 2669-2671——The expense of the Cape route is about 13*l.* or 14*l.* a-head for sailing vessels, *ib.* 2730——Troops are charged for by the Peninsular and Oriental Company at about the same rate as second-class passengers; how they are fed, *ib.* 2731-2734——The cost per head in steamers *viâ* the Cape is less than it was, *ib.* 2799-2801.

Rate of passage-money paid to the several vessels (steamers and sailing vessels), *App. p.* 198, 199.

Statements as to the cost of the overland route, as shown in correspondence on the part of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and other companies, *App. p.* 204, *et seq.*

Statement of the regiments of cavalry, infantry, and artillery of Her Majesty's service, which have embarked for India, from the 1st of July to the 10th of September 1857, showing the rate per head, &c., in each case, whether by the Cape route or overland, *App. p.* 264-266——Statement of regiments of cavalry, infantry, and artillery of Her Majesty's service which have embarked for India from 11 September 1857 to 18 February 1858, showing the rate per head, &c., *ib.* 268-270——Return, dated 27 February 1858, of the names of transports taken up for India (steamers and sailing vessels), their tonnage, horse-power, the number of men each carried, rate of passage money, &c., *ib.* 276-279.

See also *Board of Control. Chartering of Vessels.*

Court of Directors. The 29 June, when the news of the Meerut affair arrived, was the first period when the Directors considered that urgent measures were required, but a feeling of anxiety previously prevailed, *Melvill* 139, 140. 179-193. 233-239. 268, 269——On the receipt of the news of the 29th June, the necessity of employing increased maritime transport was first impressed on witness, *Mason* 277, 278——Special steps were first taken in regard to the transport of troops on the arrival, on the 29th June, of the news of the Meerut affair, *Shepherd* 334-337.

On the whole, witness considers that the transport arrangements have been carried out with much despatch and regularity, and with peculiar exemption from casualty, *Shepherd* 522. 672-675——The staff of witness's department have been most efficient, and deserve much credit in the matter, *ib.* 522, 669-671.

The news of the 29 June was looked upon as very alarming, and a court met on the 29th to consider the steps to be taken, *Mangles* 1197, 1198——For some weeks after the 29th June, the Directors continued constantly to hold courts for carrying out the transport arrangements, *ib.* 1206-1209—— Reference to correspondence between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, in July, August, and September, relative to the expediency of the quickest means of transport, *ib.* 1281. 1284, 1285.

As regards the expression attributed to witness, "that he found it necessary to put the spur into the Court of Directors," he certainly considered that, in some instances, their action was not sufficiently prompt, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith* 1807. 1858.

Copies of all correspondence that has taken place with reference to the conveyance of troops to India by way of Egypt, either between Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or between Her Majesty's Government or the Court of Directors and the Peninsular and Oriental, the European and American, or other steam packet companies, *App. p.* 201-244.

Resolution of the Committee that the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the Mutiny at Meerut to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption, *Rep. p.* iii.

Considering the suddenness of the danger and the distance to which the troops were to be sent, the Committee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of Directors for the promptitude and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of transmitting reinforcements to the army in India during the past year, *Rep. p.* iv.

See also *Board of Control. Canning, Lord. Intelligence of Mutiny. Overland Route. Reinforcements. Requisitions for Troops. Sailing Vessels*, 1. *Steamers*, 1.

Crimean Expedition. Character of the arrangements respectively for the expedition to the Crimea, and for that to India, *Mason* 1189.

Croskey & Co., Messrs. See *European and American Steam Shipping Company.*

Currie, Sir Frederick. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Between the 29th June and the 31st July, Mr. Mangles, as chairman, and witness as deputy chairman, of the Court of Directors, had frequent interviews with Mr. Vernon Smith relative to the despatch of troops to India, and discussed the question generally, but the adoption of the overland route was not formally pressed upon Mr. Smith, 2173-2193. 2198——There was from the first a strong feeling in the Court of Directors in favour of the overland route, but no record of their opinion was made previously to the letter of the 31st August to the President of the Board of Control, 2175-2179.

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Currie, Sir Frederick. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Discussion by the Court of Directors, some time early in August, with reference to a motion for making a formal application relative to the overland route, 2175, 2176. 2181, 2182——At this discussion the chairman was requested to communicate to the President of the Board of Control the feeling of the Court, 2175. 2211-2213——Political objections, and objections on other grounds, were adduced by Mr. Smith against an early adoption of the overland route, previously to the discussion of the Directors early in August, 2175, 2176——Impression that the actual discussion of the question by the Directors was not communicated by Mr. Mangles to Mr. Smith, 2176. 2185.

The letter of 31 August, which was unanimously adopted, was the result of more serious news from India, and not of the objections raised by Mr. Smith, 2176, 2177. 2183, 2184——In consequence of the political objections to the adoption of the overland route, Mr. Mangles and witness felt precluded from pressing the matter; but witness, from the first, was strongly in favour of the route, 2180. 2199, 2,200. 2219——The weekly interviews with the President in July and August were of an official, but hardly of a confidential character, 2194-2197. 2201-2210.

With regard to a certain letter from the Secretary of State for War to the President of the Board of Control, dated 14 April 1857, witness believes that no such letter was ever laid by the latter before the Court of Directors, 2214-2218.

D.

Delays in Sailing. Necessary delay of from a fortnight to three weeks after certain requisitions before vessels could be finally prepared for the troops, *Mason* 301-304——Explanation in regard to the first batch of troops not having sailed till the latter end of July; the ships were required to be ready in ten days, but the troops were not ready under three weeks, *Shepherd* 414-417——Premium offered for expediting the departure of the sailing vessels, *ib.* 457——Lapse of time before the four regiments ordered on the 29 June were ready for embarkation; reference to a return as to the transport of those regiments, *Sir H. Storks* 1953-1955. *See* also *Artillery. Sailing Vessels.*

Desert of Egypt. See *Overland Route,* 3. 7.

Detachments of Regiments. See *Commander-in-Chief. Drafts.*

Directors (East India Company). See *Court of Directors.*

Discipline of Troops. Apprehension felt as to the want of proper discipline among the troops, if sent overland without previous preparation, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith,* 1827. 1842-1845. 1868-1871.

Distilled Water. Means for distilling water on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels; all transports in the Red Sea should be so provided, *Harris* 914-917-976.

Draft Report. Draft report proposed by the Chairman of the Committee, *Rep. p.* viii-xxvii——Resolution of the Committee adverse, by a majority of one vote, to the consideration of the proposed report, *ib. p.* xxviii.

Drafts (Queen's Troops.) Approval by the Government in India of the measures taken by the home Government for sending out drafts to supply vacancies, *Melvill* 130-132——Transmission, generally, of drafts before the end of August, in order that they may arrive at the healthy season, *ib.* 137. 146-148. 151, 152. 204-210. 214, 215——The drafts were sent out in 1857 earlier than usual, *ib.* 138.

Statement as to the drafts sent out for Her Majesty's regiments, between 11 September 1857 and 18 February 1858: total of 92 officers and 6,187 men, *App. p.* 268, 269——Total of 7,212 drafts despatched up to the end of February 1858, *ib.* 281——Particulars as to the mode of despatch, place of destination, date of arrival, &c., *ib.* 286-289.

Duke of Wellington," H. M. S. The "Duke of "Wellington" might have taken 1,000 troops to India, without difficulty, if her lower deck guns and main deck guns had been taken out, and if her marines had been discharged; she might have been got ready in a few days, *Hoseason* 1770, 1781. 1798.

E.

Egypt. See *Overland Route.*

Elphinstone, Lord. Lord Elphinstone showed, from the first, the greatest energy and activity, *Lumsden* 828——Regret privately expressed by Lord Elphinstone that the overland route had not been adopted, *Mangles* 1262-1265. 1355-1357——Lord Elphinstone frequently spoke to witness about the overland route, *Sir H. Leeke* 1566-1568.
See also *Canning, Lord.*

Engineers. Total of 23 officers and 679 men sent out between 11 September 1857 and 18 February 1858, *App. p.* 269——Total of four companies of Royal Engineers despatched up to March 1858, *ib.* 281.

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Engledue, John Ralph. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Superintendent to the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Southampton, 2289——Has for the last eighteen years been employed in Egypt, India, or this country, in connexion with the overland route, 2290-2293. 2501, 2502——Difficulty in the entrance of line of battle ships into Alexandria harbour, the depth over the bar not being at all times sufficient, 2294-2322——Ships which could not enter the harbour might anchor safely in Abouker Bay, whence troops could be landed at Alexandria in steamers in a few hours, 2306-2309.

The roadstead at Suez is perfectly safe, and there is very good anchorage there, 2323, 2324——Witness found Suez a peculiarly healthy place, 2325——By means of wells or reservoirs there is always a large supply of good water at Suez, 2326-2339——Calculation showing that a communication despatched from this country on 1 July might have reached Calcutta about 23 July, 2340-2359——Impression as to Lord Canning having expected some communication from the home Government towards the end of July about the overland route, 2360, 2361.

A communication from the Governor-general to the Governor of Malta might have been made in about 20 days after 23 July, which would bring it to 12 August, 2362-2366——Steamers might have been sent from Bombay to Suez in about 16 days, and from Calcutta in about twenty-four days after the supposed receipt of news on 23 July; clippers would take a longer time; these might be towed between Aden and Suez, 2367-2373. 2381-2387.

Ample means for the accommodation of 1,000 or 2,000 troops at Aden, if sent thither from Malta in August, 2374-2380——Character of the water at Aden, 2376-2379. 2635——A regiment or two sent from Malta, on 12 August, might have got to Aden in about 12 days, 2388-2391——A regiment embarked at Aden in a sailing vessel, on 24 August, would have got to Bombay, or Kurrachee, by about 2 September, and to Calcutta by about 10 September, 2392-2395——First class sailing vessels constantly discharge coals at Aden, which ships would have been perfectly fit for conveying troops to Bombay or Calcutta, 2395-2401. 2437-2442. 2571.

Ample supply of coals at Aden in August and the following months, 2402——Large stock of provisions always kept at Suez by the Peninsular and Oriental Company, 2404-2406. 2572-2581——Large supplies of provisions available at Cairo, 2408-2410——Cairo is a very healthy locality, 2411——Troops might have been conveyed down the Red Sea in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels in August and September with every facility, and with greater comfort than if they were under canvas in the field, 2412, 2413. 2434-2436——The rains are not severe, nor are the seas heavy in crossing the Indian Ocean from Aden or Bombay, 2414-2416. 2513, 2514.

Disposition of the present Pacha of Egypt, as well as of the late pacha, to grant every facility towards the transmission of troops overland, 2417. 2419. 2523-2526. 2533——Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Pocklington, dated 11 October 1857, showing the successful passage overland of the 57th regiment, and containing particulars as to the capabilities of the route, 2418, 2419——Detachments might have been sent overland with the same facility in July or August, as in October, 2420——On the first news of the disturbances the Peninsular and Oriental Company expected that their vessels would at once be made use of, 2420-2422——There was a general feeling at Calcutta that the overland route would be adopted and would be most useful, 2423-2426.

Witness, who was formerly in the navy, has been scratched off the list at the Admiralty, but has no complaint to make against the Admiralty in regard to the non-adoption of the overland route, 2427——Difficulty in the navigation of the Red Sea, unless for steamers or sailing vessels towed by steamers, 2428-2430——In August and September it is a fair wind for sailing vessels, from Aden to Bombay, 2431, 2432——Conflicting winds between Suez and Aden, 2433. 2515-2519——In each of the company's vessels, dating from the one which left Southampton 4 July, 250 troops might have been sent to Bombay or Calcutta without injury to health, 2434-2436. 2453-2455. 2477-2486.

Slight deterioration in having large depôts of coals, 2443-2445——Different routes which steamers going from Bombay to Suez take at different periods, 2446-2450——Supply of water at Suez further adverted to, 2454, 2455. 2520-2522——Great advantage if troops had been sent *viâ* the Cape in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers, rather than in sailing vessels, 2456-2467——Witness always felt that steamers were far preferable to sailing vessels for the sea route, 2458-2464——On an emergency from 300 to 500 marines might have been conveyed from Malta to Suez in each of the company's vessels, 2468-2474——There is no difficulty whatever in sending troops across the Isthmus of Suez, 2475, 2476.

Probable expense of sending a special communication to Calcutta on arrival of the news of the Meerut affair, 2487-2491——Very little time would be saved by sending a message specially instead of by the next boat of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, 2492-2494——The native craft at Suez are not suitable for the conveyance of troops, 2496, 2497——Doubt as to the shipping actually available at Suez in July or August, 2503-2507——Probable time in which clipper ships might have got from Bombay to

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Aden in July or August, 2508, 2509——First class steamers can face the monsoon at the strongest, 2510-2512.

It is quite as hot at Madras during the summer time as in the Red Sea, 2527-2529——It was the general opinion in July, that the overland route should be adopted, 2530-2532——Lord Stratford de Redcliffe saw the importance of the overland route, and got a firman from the Sultan on the subject, 2533——Supplies of coal available if the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamers had taken troops *viâ* the Cape, 2534-2545——Further statement in favour of steamers as compared with sailing vessels for the cape route, 2546-2560——Doubt as to the number of the better class of steamers available at Bombay in July or August, 2561-2570.

Nature of the accommodation which might be provided on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels for 250 men, 2582-2586——Advantage in having the men on deck under awnings rather than down below when passing down the Red Sea, 2586-2592——Preference given by invalids, and for good reasons to the overland route; none who have once gone overland ever give it up for the cape route, 2593-2601——Frequent detentions in calms on the Cape route, 2596, 2597——Witness's company have no vessels on the route *viâ* the Cape, 2602, 2603.

Explanation as to the higher wages paid by the Company to their engineers, &c. in the Red Sea, than in the Mediterranean, 2604-2613——Belief that the warm weather is more distressing in the Persian Gulf than in the Red Sea, 2616——Aden is by no means an unhealthy place or unfit for Europeans *en route* to India, 2617-2636——Good health of the troops and horses sent overland from India to the Crimea, 2622-2624.

European and American Steam Shipping Company. Remarks relative to the non-acceptance of proposals by Messrs. Croskey, &c., on the part of the European and American Steam Company, in August and September, for sending troops overland and by the Cape, *Shepherd* 679-682——Explanation of the grounds of refusal of an offer made by Messrs. Croskey & Co., for carrying troops by the overland route, *Mason* 1167-1172.

Proposition on the part of the Company to the Court of Directors in August and September 1857, for a semi-monthly overland transport service between England and Bombay, *App. p.* 241-244.

Letter in reply dated, East India Board, 17 September 1857, stating that it is not at present the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send any considerable body of troops through Egypt, *App. p.* 244.

European Troops. In February 1857, the establishment of the Queen's troops in India was deficient by about 4,000 men, including about 400 cavalry, *Melvill* 2-9——Two regiments or about 2,000 men had, contrary to Lord Dalhousie's remonstrance been withdrawn during the Russian war, and had not been replaced by February, *ib.* 9. 20-22 26-29——There was a deficiency in February of about 1,000 men in the Company's European troops, but this deficiency is usual in the earlier part of the year, *ib.* 10-16——The total establishment of European troops in February was about 40,000 men, *ib.* 17-19.

Further reference to the deficiency in the establishment of European troops in consequence of the regiments withdrawn for service in the Crimea, *Melvill* 67-70. 118——It was settled in 1848, that the establishment in India should comprise twenty-four of Her Majesty's regiments, *ib.* 115-117——In February 1857, the European force in India was 38,306 men, *ib.* 172——Less the Persian force, the troops in India were about 34,000 men of whom 21,000 were in Bengal, *ib.* 172-178——When the mutiny broke out there was a deficiency in the establishment of European troops of 8,747 men, including those in Persia, *ib.* 267. 275.

Statement as to Mr. Melvill having been in error in regard to the deficiency of the Company's European troops at the outbreak of the mutiny, *Shepherd* 683, 684——At the beginning of 1857, the establishment of Queen's troops in India was short by two regiments, Sir *H. Storks* 1939.

With regard to a certain letter from the Secretary of State for War to the president of the Board of Control, dated 14 April 1857, witness believes that no such letter was ever laid by the latter before the Court of Directors, Sir *F. Currie* 2214-2218——Statement by Mr. P. Melvill, dated 23 March 1858, that no trace can be found at the East India House of any letter from Sir Henry Storks, to the Secretary to the India Board, with reference to the addition of two regiments of infantry to the permanent establishment of infantry in India, *App. p.* 331.

Evans, Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy. Draft report proposed by the chairman of the Committee. *Rep. p.* viii-xxvii——Resolution of the Committee adverse by a majority of one vote to the consideration of the proposed report, *ib.* xxviii.

Expense. See *Cost.*

F.

Ford, Captain John. Suggestions by Captain Ford respecting the best route to India for troops, and the best class of ships to embark them in, *App. p.* 308.

France. Between the 6 and 10 October, a spontaneous offer was made by the Emperor of the French to allow the passage of troops through France, *Hertslet* 2849, 2850.

Fraser, R., M. D. Letter from Dr. Fraser to the Director-general of the Army Medical Department, dated Suez, 22 December 1857, with reference to the want of proper accommodation for the sick on board the "Indus" and "Pekin" steam transports between Suez and India, *App. p.* 295——Extract of a letter from Dr. Fraser to the Director-general, Army Medical Department, dated Suez, 3 January 1858, in further reference to the want of proper accommodation on board the "Indus," *ib.* 296.

Fraser, Lieutenant-colonel T. G. Strong approval of the overland route by Lieutenant-colonel Fraser, who was employed to transport the two cavalry regiments from India overland during the Crimean war, *Mangles* 1259-1261——Reference to some letters from Colonel Fraser relative to the overland route, *Sir H. Storks* 1998-2000.

Letters from Lieutenant-colonel Fraser, dated 18 July 1857, offering sundry suggestions with a view to the adoption of the overland route, *App. p.* 327-329——Further letter on the subject, dated 14 August 1857, *ib.* 330.

"*Friend of India*" *Newspaper.* Explanation as to witness's connexion with the "Friend of India;" this paper was not suspended, *Mead* 1474-1484. 1488.

G.

General Screw Steam Navigation Company. Unfavourable inference, as regards the employment of steamers, drawn by the Court of Directors from the defective working of the postal communication with the Cape of Good Hope, *Mason* 1173-1182——Failure of the General Screw Company to perform their mail contract, *viâ* the Cape, adverted to and explained, *Hoseason* 1788-1795.

"*Golden Fleece,*" *The.* Remarkably quick voyage of the "Golden Fleece" to Calcutta; this was owing to her having gone direct from St. Vincent to Calcutta without re-coaling at the Cape, *Milne* 1702-1710. 1735-1737——Opinion that she is one of the best ships that ever was built, *ib.* 1705.

Return showing the rate of passage-money by this vessel, the number of men carried, the date of sailing, and date of arrival, &c., *App. p.* 198.

Letter dated 20 August 1857, showing the very satisfactory progress made by the vessel up to the time of reaching St. Vincent, *App. p.* 242, 243.

Good Hope, Cape of. See *Cape of Good Hope.*

Grey, Sir George. See *Cape of Good Hope.*

H.

Harris, Captain Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has navigated the Red Sea nearly seventy times, 847, 848——The navigation is not at all dangerous for steam vessels, 849, 850——It would be dangerous at times to employ the Arab coasting vessels in conveying troops, 851, 852——The passage up and down the Red Sea, or the heat encountered, has not, in witness's experience, caused any unusual suffering among his crews or passengers, 854-856. 880-892. 1014, 1015——Excellent capacity of the Bay of Aden as a maritime station, 857-861——Difficulty as regards water supply at Aden, 862-864——As regards the supply of provisions at Aden, there are sheep in abundance, 864. 1002-1005.

Witness has for nine years been in command of a steamer of the Peninsular and Oriental Company between Calcutta and Suez, 868-870——Without previous preparation, about 250 troops might be carried in each of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels from Suez to Calcutta, in addition to the ordinary passengers; on an emergency, it might be contrived to carry 500 men, 871-879. 909-913. 1000, 1001. 1025-1037——Impression that there were three vessels of the Company at Bombay available for transport when the mutiny occurred, 876. 1011-1013.

The length of the Red Sea from Babelmandel to Suez is 1,200 miles, 893——Particulars as to the prevailing winds and monsoons in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and their effect upon the navigation, 894-899. 927-937. 997-999——Protection on the deck during the monsoons by means of awnings, 900-908. 1032-1037——Means for distilling water on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels; all transports in the Red Sea

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Harris, Captain Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—*continued.*

should be so provided, 914-917. 976——Adequate supplies of provisions might have been had at Suez, 918-921. 1031——Absence of difficulty in regard to coals at Suez or Aden, 922-926.

Doubt whether a steamer could tow a clipper from Bombay to Aden against the monsoon; during the south-west monsoon, or from June to October, the passage takes a very long time, 927-937——Difficulties of the passage across the desert to Suez; when the railway is completed there will be no further difficulty, 938-945. 1048-1050——Any detention of troops at Suez, which is a very healthy place, would not have been injurious, 946-949.

Great want of lights at different points in the Red Sea; detailed suggestions hereon, as contained in a letter from witness to the secretary of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, dated 9 July 1857, in reply to a letter from Lord Clarendon, 957-966——Peculiar disaster if a transport were wrecked in the Red Sea, 963-965——As regards a lighthouse constructed in this country, by order of the Pacha of Egypt, for the port of Suez, for which place it is not at all calculated, measures should be taken for procuring its erection on Shadwan Island, 967-974.

The Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels between Calcutta and Suez are amply supplied with provisions for the return voyage, 975——Sailing ships are quite unsuitable as transports on the Red Sea, 977——Experience of witness as commander of the Government troop steamer "Perseverance;" fitness of this class of vessel for the Red Sea, 978-994. 1052-1058——From the Cape to Bombay would occupy from thirty-five to forty days, 995, 996——From the Mauritius to Bombay would occupy about thirty days, 995——From Malta to Bombay, *viâ* Alexandria, would occupy about twenty days, 995. 1040-1044.

If orders had been sent to Bombay by the return mail, after 29 June, to send steamers to Suez for troops, they would have got to Suez about the middle of September, 1006-1010. 1091, 1092——Heat of the water and of the atmosphere of the Red Sea further adverted to, 1016-1024——The monsoon need not have interfered with the health of troops if sent by the Red Sea, 1032-1037. 1045-1047——Obstacles to an empty steamer towing a laden steamer part of the way from England in order to enable the latter to complete the voyage without re-coaling, 1063-1075.

Witness is now nautical assessor to the Board of Trade; he was also made a member of the congress assembled in Paris to consider the Suez Canal scheme, 1076-1078——With a properly organized system of transport, in connexion with the overland route, witness considers that such route would be less expensive as well as more rapid than the route by the Cape in steamers, 1079-1102——Screw steamers are better than clippers for the Cape route, but probably are much more expensive, 1089. 1095, 1096. 1103-1106.

Health of Troops. As regards the passage down the Red Sea in connexion with the overland route, it was objected to by some that the heat would be injurious to the troops; character of the heat adverted to hereon; it is very great at certain periods, *Shepherd* 402. 433-442. 579-581. 605-610——The monsoon, as well as the heat, rendered the passage from Suez to Bombay objectionable in the autumnal months, *ib.* 527, 528——Prejudice to the health of the troops if they arrive in India during some of the months preceding October, *ib.* 556.

Witness has been several times up and down the Red Sea, and does not consider the passage at all unhealthy, *Lumsden* 700-702. 725——The heat in the Red Sea is very severe for a few days, but with proper awnings might be rendered innocuous, and would not have operated against the transmission of troops by that route, *ib.* 703. 705. 715, 716. 731, 732. 737. 764-768. 781. 783-785. 797-803. 825, 826——Good health of passengers in crossing the desert, *ib.* 706.

The passage up and down the Red Sea, or the heat encountered, has not in witness's experience caused any unusual suffering among his crews or passengers, *Harris* 854-856. 880-892. 1014, 1015——Heat of the water and of the atmosphere, *ib.* 1016-1024——Probability of some loss of life if troops had been sent overland in the hot season as suggested; the emergency excused the risk, *Mangles* 1376-1378——Witness has made six passages through the Red Sea, and does not remember any deaths among his fellow passengers on any one occasion, *Mead* 1391. 1407——Good health of the troops and horses sent overland from India to the Crimea, *Sir H. Leeke* 1569, 1570; *Engledue* 2622-2624——Great heat for a few days of the passage down the Red Sea; it does not interfere with the health, *Sir H. Leeke* 1594-1597——Absence of injury to the health of troops detained in Egypt through want of means of transport, *Hoseason* 1764.

Belief as to the great risk to the health of the troops if sent by the Red Sea earlier than September; grounds for this conclusion, *Right Honourable R. V. Smith* 1827. 1878. 1894-1896. 1900-1902. 1907, 1908——Excellent condition of the troops as sent out in both sailing and steam vessels, *ib.* 1883-1885——Evidence with reference

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reference to the unhealthy character of the Red Sea route at certain seasons, *Sir H. Storks* 1915-1923, 1996-2012——Witness has passed through Egypt and the Red Sea in the months of May and October; there were two deaths on board the vessel in the Red Sea in October 1851, *ib.* 1915-1923——Belief that the passage of troops through Egypt in the summer is very unhealthy, *ib.* 1924-1927——Particulars as to the unhealthy character of the voyage down the Red Sea unless there be ample previous preparation, and the season of the year be favourable, *Sir G. Clerk* 2257-2259. 2267-2287.

It is quite as hot at Madras during the summer time as in the Red Sea, *Engledue* 2527-2529——Advantage of having the men on deck under awnings rather than down below when passing down the Red Sea, *ib.* 2586-2592——Explanation as to the higher wages paid by the Peninsular and Oriental Company to their engineers, &c. in the Red Sea than in the Mediterranean, *ib.* 2604-2613——Belief that the warm weather is more distressing in the Persian Gulph than in the Red Sea, *ib.* 2616——In May, June, and July the heat is very great in the Red Sea, and the passengers to India are not so numerous in these months, *Allen* 2810, 2811. 2832-2835——Means of ventilation if the troops were placed in the space usually devoted to stowage, *ib.* 2836-2843.

Witness passed down the Red Sea in August 1851; the heat was most intense, and great discomfort was experienced, but there was no actual sickness at the time, *Beatson* 2854-2866——Unless there had been proper arrangements previously troops could not have been sent down the Red Sea in July or August without suffering severely from the want of accommodation on board, *ib.* 2854-2856. 2899-2915——Preference given to the sea route over the overland route for invalids from India; large use still made of the former route, *ib.* 2893-2898——In a great emergency witness would not disapprove so much of the use of the overland route, *ib.* 2901. 2906.

See also *Burmese War.*

Hertslet, Edward. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Between 6 and 10 October a spontaneous offer was made by the Emperor of the French to allow the passage of troops through France, 2849, 2850——On 5 October the Sultan sent a firman to the Pasha authorising the passage of troops through Egypt, 2851——The Pasha consented to admit troops through Egypt, in accordance with an application made on 28 September, 2852.

Hoseason, Captain John Cochrane. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Is well acquainted with the Mediterranean ports, 1754-1757——Safety and capacity of the port of Alexandria, 1758-1762——Over the Mediterranean generally steamers might lie outside the ports in safety, 1763——Absence of injury to the health of troops detained in Egypt through want of means of transport, 1764——Practical objection to the employment of screw men-of-war in conveying troops for long distances, on account of the limited space available for provisions and stores, 1765-1769.

The "Duke of Wellington" might have taken 1,000 troops to India without difficulty if her lower deck guns and main deck guns had been taken out, and if her mainmast had been discharged; she might have been got ready in a few days, 1770-1781. 1798——In the absence of any emergency witness would prefer to select transports from the mercantile marine service rather than from the navy, 1782-1784——The question of steam transport to India turns entirely on the supply of coal, 1784——Nature of the coaling accommodation at Table Bay and Simon's Bay, 1785-1787.

Failure of the General Screw Company to perform the mail contract *viâ* the Cape adverted to and explained, 1788-1795——Necessarily different course of a steamer under sail and steam, and of a steamer under sail only, or of a clipper in going to India, 1795-1797——Difference of about forty days in the passage between Calcutta and the Cape accordingly as the monsoon is favourable or unfavourable, 1798.

I.

India Board. See *Board of Control.*

Indian Navy. During August and September the Indian navy had no vessels at Bombay, *Mason*, 1135.

Indian Ocean. See *Overland Route*, 6.

Infantry. Statement of the regiments of infantry in Her Majesty's service who have embarked for India from 1 July to 10 September 1857, showing the strength of each regiment, rate per head, name of ship, tonnage, destination, &c., according to the embarkation returns received at the Adjutant-general's office, to 10 September inclusive, *App. p.* 264-266——Statement of regiments of infantry which have embarked for India from 11 September 1857 to 18 February 1858, together with sundry particulars as to their transport, *ib.* 268-270——Total of twenty-six regiments of infantry despatched,

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from June 1857 to February 1858, both inclusive, *App. p.* 281——Particulars as to their mode of despatch, place of destination, date of arrival, &c., *ib.* 281 *et seq.*

See also *European Troops. Reinforcements.*

Intelligence of Mutiny. The news of the disaffection at Barrackpore on 23 January 1857 reached the Court of Directors early in March, *Melvill* 31-34——Intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut, and the seizure of Delhi, was received on 29 June, *ib.* 35——Previously to the news of 29 June as to the outbreak in Meerut no news causing any real apprehension had arrived from India, *Mangles* 1192-1196.

On the arrival in Calcutta, in May 1857, of the news from Delhi and Meerut, two large steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the "Bentinck" and the "Oriental," were at Calcutta and available for transport, *Mead* 1392-1396. 1427, 1428——News at Calcutta about the middle of May, both of the Meerut and the Delhi outbreaks, and from Sir Henry Lawrence urging the Government to provide troops, *ib.* 1400-1404.

The news of 27 June was probably communicated to witness by the Court of Directors on the day of its arrival or the following day, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith* 1803-1805.

See also *Board of Control. Canning, Lord. Court of Directors.*

J.

"James Baines," The. Return showing the rate of passage money by this vessel, the number of men carried, the date of sailing, and date of arrival, &c., *App. p.* 198.

K.

Kurrachee. Return, dated 5 February 1858, showing the arrivals of transports at Kurrachee, as far as known at that date, together with the number of troops on board, *App. p.* 198, 199——Return, dated 27 February 1858, of the names of transports sent to Kurrachee, their tonnage, horse power, the number of men each carried, rate of passage money, date of sailing and date of arrival, as far as known, showing the number of days occupied in the passage by each ship, *ib.* 276-279——Statement containing particulars as to the reinforcements sent to Kurrachee up to March 1858, *ib.* 282 *et seq.*

L.

Labouchere, The Right Honourable Henry (Member of the House). (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Explanation of the grounds upon which the Colonial Office declined to accept certain offers from Canada to raise volunteer troops for service in the Crimea and India, 2087-2095——The Legislative Council of Canada were averse to the raising of a volunteer corps, but made no objection to a system of recruiting in Canada for the Queen's service, if thought expedient by the Imperial Government, 2088-2093——Measures are now in progress for raising a Canadian regiment in the service of the empire generally, 2091——It was proposed to raise two regiments in British North America, and witness would like to see such proposal carried out, 2092——The raising of a black regiment in Canada was under consideration by the late Government, but was not finally decided upon, 2096.

Reference to some papers presented or to be presented to Parliament, as showing the force at the Cape when intelligence was received there of the Indian mutiny on 31 July; there was a total of 10,666 men, in rank and file, including the German Legion and the Cape Mounted Rifles, 2099-2105. 2110, 2111. 2126——Reference to a despatch from witness to Sir George Grey (Governor at the Cape) on 26 August, and to the reply thereto, dated 5 November, relative to the non-transmission of so many as six regiments to India, 2106-2108.

In the first instance Sir G. Grey sent two regiments to Bombay, 2109——The troops for China were diverted at the Cape to India on the responsibility of Sir G. Grey, 2111-2113——Particulars, as contained in despatches of Sir G. Grey in November, of the measures actually adopted by him for reinforcing the Indian army, 2114. 2124, 2125——Four regiments of foot and a detachment of artillery were sent, 2114. 2135——Large and useful supply of horses also sent from the Cape to India, 2114, 2115.

Explanation as to the German Legion having been called out shortly after arrival at the Cape, and placed on full pay, 2116-2118——Strong grounds for apprehension of a war at the Cape adverted to in justification of the unwillingness of Sir G. Grey to reduce too largely the forces at his disposal, 2119-2124. 2137. 2155. 2160——Expediency of a reserve force at the Cape for the protection of Natal, 2125-2127.

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Labouchere, The Right Hon. Henry, M.P. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—*continued.*

The German Legion are now in process of becoming settlers, 2129——Measures taken with reference to the emigration of German and Irish females to the Cape,; funds available for the purpose, 2130-2134.

Witness entertains a very high opinion of the ability, energy, and public spirit of Sir G. Grey, and believes that he forwarded to India all the troops that he could with safety spare under the then circumstances of the Cape, 2135 *et seq.*——Extract from a despatch from witness to Sir G. Grey on the subject of the force despatched from the Cape, 2135——Way in which the four regiments from the Cape were conveyed to India, 2139. 2140.

Amount of the force sent to India by the Governor of the Mauritius; testimony to his conduct in the matter, 2141. 2166——High praise due to Sir Henry Ward, who sent from Ceylon almost all the European troops at his disposal; antagonism among the coloured population of Ceylon adverted to hereon, 2142-2154. 2161, 2162——Excellent conduct of the Cape colonists with reference to the reinforcement of the Indian army, 2155——Larger force at the Cape in 1852 than in 1857, when the Indian mutiny broke out, 2170-2172.

Lady Jocelyn" The. Return showing the rate of passage-money by this vessel, the number of men carried, the date of sailing, and date of arrival, &c., *App.* p. 198.

Leeke, Admiral Sir Henry. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Has been Commander-in-Chief of the Indian navy for more than five years, 1510, 1511——Had the direction of the embarkation of the troops for the Persian Gulf; returned to Bombay on the 29th December 1856; 1512-1518——Previously to the news of the Meerut affair, witness had been directed by Lord Elphinstone to hasten the return of the Persian squadron and troops, but the first vessel did not arrive until about the 17th May, 1518-1524——Immediate despatch to Calcutta, &c. of the first troops that returned from Persia to Bombay, 1524-1529.

Witness left Bombay on the 17th September last, 1531——Between May and September there were numerous sailing vessels at Bombay available for transport between Suez and Bombay; on one occasion, in June, witness counted 140 merchantmen near Bombay, 1532. 1541-1561. 1590——Besides the "Assaye" there was only one other steamer, the "Ajdaha," at Bombay when the news of the mutiny arrived; defective condition of this steamer, although, on an emergency, witness would not have hesitated in sending her to Suez for troops, 1533-1540. 1589. 1621-1628——Probable time required for a sailing-vessel from Bombay to Suez and back, if she had sailed from Bombay towards the end of May, 1541-1561. 1624, 1625. 1634-1636.

Great advantage if, on the news of the mutiny, Lord Lyons had conveyed some troops from Malta to Cairo, or had landed some marines there to be despatched overland, 1562-1565——Lord Elphinstone frequently spoke to witness about the overland route, 1566-1568——Good health of both men and horses on the occasion of the two cavalry regiments being sent up the Red Sea from India for service in the Crimea, 1569, 1570——Facility of the passage through Egypt of these regiments, 1571. 1618——Supplies of provisions available in the passage, 1573, 1574——Available supplies of coal at Suez and at Aden, 1575.

There were no spare ships of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Bombay when the news of the mutiny arrived, 1576——Several vessels employed in taking the two cavalry regiments, including horses, fodder, &c., from Bombay to Suez; number of infantry which these vessels might have carried, 1578-1588——Considerable advantage if a few men-of-war had been sent at first to Calcutta and Bombay; great moral effect which would have been produced, 1591. 1603-1607——Great heat for a few days of the passage down the Red Sea; it does not interfere with the health, 1594-1597.

Doubt whether troops would have reached India any sooner than they did by the Cape route, if instructions had been sent from England to Bombay by the mail of the 10th July, to provide tonnage at Suez, 1598-1600——Non-objection to the conveyance of troops in line-of-battle ships; practicability of this means of transport, 1608-1617. 1637-1641——The local shipping at Suez is not available for transport, 1619, 1620——The arrival at Bombay of the troops from the Mauritius was most opportune, but did not obviate the want of speedy reinforcements, 1630-1633.

Line-of-Battle Ships. See *Men-of-War.*

Lumsden, James Grant. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Was senior member of Council at Bombay, 696——Left Bombay in ill health on the 15th August last, and came home by the overland route, 697-699——Has been several times up and down the Red Sea, and does not consider the passage at all unhealthy, 700-702. 725——The heat in the Red Sea is very severe for a few days, but with proper awnings might be rendered innocuous, and should not have operated against the transmission of troops by that route, 703-705. 715, 716. 731, 732. 737. 764-768. 781. 783-785. 797-803. 825, 826.

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Lumsden, James Grant. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—continued.

Good health of passengers in crossing the desert, 706——Healthy character of the climate at Cairo, 707, 708——Resources of Cairo for the accommodation, supply, and transport of troops, 709-714. 795, 796——Character of the coasting craft in the Red Sea available for the transport of troops arriving at Suez; difficulty in their beating up the Red Sea against the north winds, 717-723. 727-730. 733-740. 771. 782. 786-789. 845——Nature of the navigation of the Red Sea; prevailing winds, 719-723. 729. 786-788.

Particulars as to the vessels at Bombay at the outbreak of the mutiny; how far these might have been made available for transport from Suez, as well as in bringing troops from the Persian Gulf, the Mauritius, and the Cape, 726. 741-754. 776-780. 835-839——Want of accommodation for troops if detained at Suez; want of water, provisions, &c., 727. 733, 734. 770. 793, 794. 817-824——Means for sending troops inland from Bombay as well as from Calcutta, to certain of the revolted districts, 755-763.

On the very day that witness heard of the mutiny he suggested that measures should be taken for obtaining troops from Malta by the overland route, but it was determined by Lord Elphinstone to send instead to the Mauritius and the Cape, 772. 804-816. 827-846——Witness also suggested sending a special steamer to Suez, to convey news to England, but understood from Lord Elphinstone that Lord Canning did not consider such a proceeding necessary, 774, 775——High price of coals at Suez adverted to; supplies are provided there by the India House, and the Peninsular and Oriental Company, 790-792.

Lumsden, Mr. Memorandum communicated by Mr. Lumsden, late senior member of the Council at Bombay, subsequent to his examination, with reference to the advantages of the overland route, and offering sundry suggestions in the use of such route, *App. p.* 298-301.

M.

Mac Nab, Sir Allan. (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Served in the war of 1812-14; has since held high appointments in Canada, 2036, 2037——General feeling in Canada during the Crimean war in favour of the organisation of a Canadian regiment to be added to the British Army, 2038-2041——Suggestion that in raising a regiment of the line in Canada, all the officers except the staff be taken from the gentlemen of the country, and that their appointments be given them, in virtue of their bringing recruits, 2042 *et seq.*

Peculiarly loyal character of the settlers throughout Canada, including the French Canadians; instances of this loyalty, 2047, 2048. 2057-2066——Increasing population and commerce of the two Canadas, 2049-2054——Probable amount of the black population of Canada; they are a very loyal class, 2070, 2071. 2082-2086——Suggestions with reference to the enlistment of a regiment or corps of the black population, with a view to their service or settlement in India, 2072-2081.

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For some weeks after the 27 June the directors continued constantly to hold courts for carrying out the transport arrangements, 1206-1209——Early in July the expediency of partly adopting the overland route was discussed by the Court of Directors, and the result was, that witness upon several occasions was instructed to represent the matter to the President of the Board of Control, 1211, 1212. 1232. 1238. 1243-1258. 1341-1354——Witness and also Sir Frederick Currie urged the question of the overland route several times upon the President; letter signed by them, dated 1 October, adverted to, as explaining the steps taken by them on this subject, 1212-1214. 1233-1238. 1343, 1344.

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Overland Route:

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2. *Verbal Communications, in the first instance, between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control.*
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2. *Verbal Communications, in the first instance, between the Court of Directors and the Board of Control:*

Evidence as to the Chairman of the Court of Directors having in the first instance verbally communicated with the President of the Board of Control relative to the transmission of troops overland; circumstance of the matter not having been recorded, and of the President of the Board having denied that such communication was made, *Shepherd* 377-388. 391-393. 529. 547, 548. 570-577. 582-604.

Early in July the expediency of partly adopting the overland route was discussed by the Court of Directors, and the result was that witness upon several occasions was instructed to represent the matter to the President of the Board of Control, *Mangles* 1211, 1212. 1232. 1238 1243-1258. 1341-1354——Witness, and also Sir Frederic Currie, urged the question of the overland route several times upon the President; letter signed by them, dated 1 October, adverted to as explaining the steps taken by them on this subject, *ib.* 1233-1238. 1343, 1344——The instructions to witness to urge the adoption of the overland route were not recorded, but there is no doubt as to the Directors having generally expressed themselves in favour of his urging the matter, *ib.* 1238. 1243-1258. 1341-1353——An official application in writing relative to the overland route would have been made to the Board of Control but for the fear of embarrassing the Government on the political question, *ib.* 1246. 1270-1272. 1354. 1367-1371——Rare instances of representations made by the chairs being subsequently over-ruled by the Court, *ib.* 1349. 1353. 1372.

Between 29 June and 31 July Mr. Mangles, as chairman, and witness, as deputy chairman of the Court of Directors, had frequent interviews with Mr. Vernon Smith relative to the despatch of troops to India, and discussed the question generally; but the adoption of the overland route was not formally pressed upon Mr. Smith, *Sir F. Currie* 2173-2193. 2198——Discussion by the Court of Directors some time early in August with reference to a motion for making a formal application relative to the overland route, *ib.* 2175, 2176. 2181, 2182——At this discussion the chairman was requested to communicate to the President of the Board of Control the feeling of the Court, *ib.* 2175. 2211-2213——Impression that the actual discussion of the question by the Directors was not communicated by Mr. Mangles to Mr. Smith, *ib.* 2176. 2185——The weekly interviews with the President in July and August were of an official, but hardly of a confidential character, *ib.* 2194-2197. 2201-2210.

Non-official character of the oral communications between the chairman and deputy chairman of the Court of Directors and witness, previously to 31 August, relative to the use of the overland route, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith*, 1809. 1852-1855——Duty of the Directors not to have trusted to oral communication with witness, if they considered the adoption of the overland route to be a matter of vital importance, *ib.* 1809. 1861. 1911——Comment on the statement that the Directors were deterred from more urgent representation in regard to the overland route, on account of the political objections assigned by witness against its adoption, *ib.* 1812-1815. 1825. 1904-1906. 1911-1913——Witness did

OVERLAND ROUTE—continued.

2. *Verbal Communications, in the first instance, &c*—continued.

did not understand, from his interviews with the chuvis previously to 31 August, that they were formally representing the views of the court in regard to the overland route, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith*, 1823, 1824.

3. *Obstacle raised to the use of the Route on the ground of Political Objections:*

Communication between the chairman of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, early in July, relative to the use of the overland route, which ended in an intimation from the latter that for political reasons it was considered inexpedient to adopt that route, *Shepherd*. 377-388. 391-393——Witness does not wish to make any comment upon the political objections first raised to the adoption of the overland route, *ib.* 508-512——He does not know any precise reason why the Government objection to the overland route did not continue after 14 September, *ib.* 535-537.

Political reasons were started by the president to be obstacles to the overland route, and on that score witness and the directors could urge it no further than they did *Mangles* 1214-1237. 1269-1272——At a later stage the directors had information that the Viceroy of Egypt was not unfavourable to the passage of troops through his territories, *ib.* 1228-1230. 1251, 1252——Reasons for expecting there would be no political objection by the Porte to the use of the overland route, *ib.* 1325-1327.

As regards any political objection by the Pacha to the passage of troops through Egypt it might have been obviated by dressing the troops in blouses or plain clothes, *Mead* 1417, 1418. 1432, 1433——Considerable financial advantage to Egypt of the passage of British passengers and goods to and from India, *ib.* 1418-1422.

Political objections, and objections on other grounds, were adduced by Mr. Smith against an early adoption of the overland route previously to the discussion of the directors early in August, *Sir F. Currie* 2175, 2176——In consequence of the political objections Mr. Mangles and witness felt precluded from pressing the matter, but witness, from the first, was strongly in favour of the route, *ib.* 2180-2199. 2200-2219.

Strong political objections even now to the permanent adoption of the overland route, *Sir G. Clerk* 2264, 2265. 2277.

Disposition of the present Pacha of Egypt, as well as of the late Pacha, to grant every facility towards the transmission of troops overland, *Engledue* 2417-2419. 2523-2526. 2533——The Pacha turned into ridicule the idea of the men being sent in plain clothes, *ib.* 2419——The Egyptian Government are most anxious to promote the use of the passage through Egypt, *Allan* 2661. 2712, 2713——The Peninsular and Oriental Company had not the slightest reason to anticipate any objection on the part of the Egyptian Government to the transmission of troops overland, *ib.* 2704-2708. 2712-2717——Doubt as to the views of the Sultan in regard to the use of the overland route; the Pacha seems to act independently in the matter, *ib.* 2808, 2809. 2844, 2845.

On the 5th of October the Sultan sent a firman to the Pacha authorising the passage of troops through Egypt, *Hertslet* 2851——The Pacha consented to admit troops through Egypt in accordance with an application made on the 28th September, *ib.* 2852.

4. *Use of the route in September subsequently to official applications from the Court of Directors*

Arrangements were first made in September for sending troops overland, *Melvill* 216-219——On the 31st of August a letter was written to the Board of Control relative to the overland route; reply of the latter thereto, *Shepherd* 389-391——After a second letter from the directors in September the Government decided on using the overland route, *ib.* 409, 410——Successful conveyance of troops by the Peninsular and Oriental Company since September 1857. *ib.* 443-448. 476-480——Number of troops despatched overland in September and October, *ib.* 534.

Date of the first transmission of troops overland; official application in this case, *Mangles* 1253-1255. 1374, 1375——The 31st August was the date of the first official communication from the Court of Directors to witness in favour of the use of the overland route, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith*, 1808-1810. 1824. 1862, 1863——The letter of the 31st August which was unanimously adopted, was the result of more serious news from India and not of the objections raised by Mr. Smith, *Sir F. Currie*, 2176, 2177. 2183 2184——Most of the troops since sent overland have been conveyed very successfully previous arrangements having been made, *Sir G. Clerk*, 2262, 2263. 2266.

5. *Saving of time if Troops had at first been sent Overland:*

Arrival of the 94th Regiment at Kurrachee after a passage by the overland route of only thirty-seven days, *Shepherd* 405, 406. 476-479——If troops had at first been sent overland there would have been a saving of about a fortnight in the arrival of the troops at Calcutta, and a greater saving in arrival at Bombay and Kurrachee, *ib.* 423-432——Troops might have been landed at Bombay in the last week in September, *ib.* 423-428——If the overland route had been adopted at first the troops would have com-

Report, 1857-8—*continued.*

OVERLAND ROUTE—continued.

5. *Saving of time if Troops had at first been sent Overland*—continued.

menced to arrive at Calcutta about the beginning instead of the middle of October, *Shepherd*, 611-616.

From Malta to Bombay *viâ* Alexandria would occupy about twenty days, *Harris* 995, 1040-1044——If orders had been sent to Bombay by the return mail, after the 29 June, to send steamers to Suez for troops, they would have got to Suez about the middle of September, *ib.* 1006-1010. 1091, 1092——On an emergency, and with proper arrangements, the overland route is very much the better, *Mason* 1144; *Mangles* 1382——Gain of rather more than a fortnight if troops had at the first been sent overland to Bombay; importance of such gain, *Mangles* 1215-1221. 1239-1241. 1358-1363——Great saving in distance and time if reinforcements had been sent overland from Malta, *ib.* 1222-1227——Time which might have been saved if the overland route had been adopted for troops to Calcutta, *ib.* 1239-1242, 1360. 1364-1366——Troops might at the first have been sent without difficulty, *ib.* 1376.

If a special agent had been sent at once from India with the news of the mutiny, and if proper steps had been taken in connexion with the overland route, there might have been 900 troops in Calcutta by the end of July, *Mead* 1440 *et seq.*——Great advantage if, on the news of the mutiny, Lord Lyons had conveyed some troops from Malta to Cairo, or had landed some marines there to be despatched overland, *Sir H. Leeke* 1562-1565.

Calculation showing that a communication despatched from this country on 1 July might have reached Calcutta about 23 July, *Engledue* 2340-2359——A communication from the Governor-General to the Governor of Malta might have been made in about twenty days after 23 July, which would bring it to 12 August, *ib.* 2362-2366——A regiment or two sent from Malta on 12 August might have got to Aden in about twelve days, *ib.* 2388-2391——A regiment embarked at Aden in a sailing vessel on 24 August would have got to Bombay or Kurrachee by about 2 September and at Calcutta by about 10 September, *ib.* 2392-2395——Detachments might have been sent overland with the same facility in July and August as in October, *ib.* 2420.

Probable expense of sending a special communication to Calcutta on arrival of the Meerut officer, *Engledue* 2487-2491——Very little time would be saved by sending a message specially instead of by the next boat of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, *ib.* 2492-2494——It was the general opinion in July that the overland route should be adopted, *ib.* 2530-2532——Preference given by invalids, and with good reasons, to the overland route; none who have once gone overland would ever give it up for the Cape route, *ib.* 2593-2601.

The passengers by the overland route are increasing; the number varies greatly at certain seasons, *Allan* 2674-2677. 2688, 2689——Witness went on one occasion from Southampton to Madras in thirty-nine days, *Beatson* 2865.

Statement showing the average number of days to and from Southampton and Alexandria, Suez, and Calcutta, and Pointe de Galle and Hong Kong, for seven years, stoppages included, *App. p.* 262, 263.

6. *Means of Conveyance in the first instance from Suez or Aden to Calcutta or Bombay: probable time required:*

Witness never heard that vessels in the first instance were kept at Bombay, or sent to Suez, in anticipation of the troops being sent overland, *Shepherd* 515-518——The monsoon as well as the heat, rendered the passage from Suez to Bombay objectionable in the autumnal months, *ib.* 527, 528——Without previous preparation, about 250 troops might be carried in each of the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels from Suez to Calcutta, in addition to the ordinary passengers; on an emergency it might be contrived to carry 500 men, *Harris* 871-879, 909-913, 1000, 1001, 1025-1037——Impression that there were three vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Bombay available for transports, when the mutiny occurred, *ib.* 876, 1011-1013.

Particulars as to the prevailing winds and monsoons in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and their effects upon the navigation, *Harris* 894-899, 927-937, 997-999——Protection on the deck during the monsoons by means of awnings, *ib.* 900-908, 1032-1037——Doubt whether a steamer could tow a clipper from Bombay to Aden against the monsoon; during the south-west monsoon, or from June to October, the passage takes a very long time, *ib.* 927-937——The Company's vessels between Calcutta and Suez, are amply supplied with provisions for the return voyage, *ib.* 975——The monsoon need not have interfered with the health of troops if sent by the Red Sea, *ib.* 1032-1037. 1045-1047.

Vessels available at Bombay if news of the adoption of the overland route had at first been despatched, *Mangles* 1277-1280——Statement as to there being six steamers monthly from Suez, that is, two to Bombay, two to Calcutta, and two on the Australian line, to Ceylon, which might at the first have conveyed 150 men each, *Mead* 1441-1443, 1467-1473. 1494-1497——Information relative to the steamers and sailing vessels

which

Report, 1857–8—*continued.*

OVERLAND ROUTE—continued.

6. *Means of Conveyance in the first instance, &c.*—continued.

which were at Bombay during May, many having come from the Persian Gulf; their availableness in conveying large numbers of troops from Suez, *Mead* 1447–1452, 1498–1509——With the monsoon in its favour a sailing vessel would get from Aden to Bombay, in from seven to nine days, *ib.* 1465, 1509——The "Oriental" and the "Bentinck "might each have carried 500 men, *ib.* 1466.

Between May and September there were numerous sailing vessels at Bombay available for transport between Suez and Bombay; on one occasion in June witness counted 140 merchantmen near Bombay, *Sir H. Leeke,* 1532, 1541–1561, 1590.

Besides the "Assaye," there was only one other steamer at Bombay, the "Ajdaha," when the news of the mutiny arrived; defective condition of this steamer, although on an emergency witness would not have hesitated in sending her to Suez for troops, *ib.* 1533–1540, 1589, 1621–1628——Probable time required for a sailing vessel from Bombay to Suez and back if she had sailed from Bombay towards the end of May, *ib.* 1541–1561, 1624, 1625, 1634–1636——Somewhat longer time required from Aden to Kurrachee than to Bombay, *ib.* 1549–1551——Sailing vessels leaving Bombay for Suez about 25th May, would have got back towards the middle of August, *ib.* 1559——There were no spare ships of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Bombay when the news of the mutiny arrived, *ib.* 1576.

Doubt whether troops would have reached India any sooner than they did by the Cape route if instructions had been sent from England to Bombay by the mail of 10th July, to provide tonnage at Suez, *Sir H. Leeke,* 1598–1600——The local shipping at Suez is not available for transport, *ib.* 1619, 1620.

Want of means in the first instance for the transport of troops from Suez to India, *Sir G. Clerk* 2277–2280. 2287——Serious effect of the heavy rains of the monsoons if troops had been provided only with deck passages, *ib.* 2281–2283.

Steamers might have been sent from Bombay to Suez in about sixteen days, and from Calcutta in about twenty-four days after the supposed receipt of news on 23 July; clippers would take a longer time; these might be towed between Aden and Suez, *Engledue* 2367–2373. 2381–2387——The rains are not severe, nor are the seas heavy in crossing the Indian ocean from Aden to Bombay, *ib.* 2414–2416. 2513, 2514——In August and September it is a fair wind for sailing vessels from Aden to Bombay, *ib.* 2431, 2432——Different routes which steamers going from Bombay to Suez take at different periods, *ib.* 2446–2450.

The native craft at Suez are not available for the conveyance of troops, *Engledue* 2496, 2497——Doubt as to the shipping actually available at Suez in July and August, *ib.* 2503–2507——Probable time in which clipper ships might have got from Bombay to Aden in July or August, *ib.* 2508, 2509——First class steamers can face the monsoon at the strongest, *ib.* 2510–2512——Doubt as to the number of the better class of steamers available at Bombay in July and August, *ib.* 2561–2570.

There are generally one or two spare vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental Company at Bombay and Calcutta, *Allan* 2684–2687. 2751——Dissent from Captain Engledue's calculations in regard to the time in which vessels would get from Bombay to Aden or from Aden to Bombay, *ib.* 2735–2742——Witness has heard that there were many ships at Bombay available as transports about the end of July, *ib.* 2756——There were about four or five steamers monthly between Suez and Bombay, or Calcutta, between June and September, *ib.* 2794——A message might have been sent to Calcutta by the Company's steamer to Alexandria in the beginning of July, without the expense of any special means of communication, *ib.* 2803–2807——The vessels of the Company between Suez and Bombay might take many more than 300 men at a time, *ib.* 2846–2848.

Statement showing the average number of days of certain stations to and from Suez and Calcutta for seven years, *App. p.* 262, 263.

Statement of the vessels in Bombay harbour at the respective dates of 9 June, 14 July, and 30 July 1857, *App. pp.* 302–304.

7. *Passage across the Desert:*

Passengers on crossing the desert are not unhealthy, *Lumsden* 706——Difficulties of the passage across the desert to Suez; when the railway is completed there will be no further difficulty, *Harris* 938–945. 1048–1050——Facilities for the conveyance of troops across the desert in the vans of the Transit Administration; without preparatory arrangements 300 men might have been moved through Egypt in two days and a half, *Mead* 1408–1415. 1429–1431——Satisfactory passage through the desert, &c. in the case of the troops sent overland from India to the Crimea, *Sir H. Leeke* 1569, 1570; *Engledue* 2622–2624——Belief that in summer the passage of troops through Egypt is very unhealthy, *Sir H. Storks* 1924–1927——There is no difficulty whatever in sending troops across the Isthmus of Suez, *Engledue* 2475, 2476——The railway which now goes within about twenty miles of Suez will hardly be completed before October, *Allan* 2658, 2659

OVERLAND ROUTE—continued.

7. *Passage across the Desert*—continued.

——Charge made for the passage of silver, &c. through Egypt; large amount derived therefrom, *Allan* 2662-2667. 2787.

8. *Passage down the Red Sea:*

The passage down the Red Sea was objected to on the ground that the heat would be injurious to the troops; character of the heat adverted to hereon; it is very great at certain periods, *Shepherd* 492. 433-442. 579-581. 605-610——Witness has been several times up and down the Red Sea, and does not consider the passage at all unhealthy, *Lumsden* 700-702. 725——The heat in the Red Sea is very severe for a few days, but with proper awnings might be rendered innocuous, and would not have operated against the transmission of troops by that route, *ib.* 703-705, 715, 716. 731, 732. 737. 764-768. 783-785. 797-803. 825, 826——Character of the coasting craft on the Red Sea available for the transport of troops arriving at Suez; difficulty of their beating up the Red Sea against the north winds, *ib.* 717-723. 727-730. 733-740. 771. 782. 786-789. 845——Nature of the navigation of the Red Sea; prevailing winds, *ib.* 719-723. 786-788.

Witness has navigated the Red Sea nearly seventy times, *Harris* 847, 848——The navigation is not at all dangerous for steam vessels, *ib.* 849, 850——It would be dangerous at times to employ Arab coasting vessels in conveying troops, *ib.* 851, 852——The passage up and down the Red Sea, or the heat encountered, has not in witness's experience caused any unusual suffering among his crews or passengers, *ib.* 854-856. 880-892. 1014, 1015——The length of the Red Sea from Babelmandel to Suez is 1,200 miles, *ib.* 893.

Great want of lights at different points in the Red Sea; detailed suggestions hereon as contained in a letter from witness to the secretary of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, dated 9 July 1857, in reply to a letter from Lord Clarendon, *Harris* 957-966——Peculiar disaster if a transport were wrecked in the Red Sea, *ib.* 963-965——Sailing ships are quite unsuitable as transports, *ib.* 977——Heat of the water and of the atmosphere, *ib.* 1016-1024.

Witness has made six passages through the Red Sea, and does not remember any death among his fellow passengers on any one occasion, *Mead* 1391. 1407——Great heat for a few days of the passage down the Red Sea; it does not interfere with the health, *Sir H. Leake* 1594-1597.

Belief as to the great risk to the health of the troops if sent by the Red Sea earlier than September; grounds for this conclusion, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith* 1827. 1878. 1894-1896. 1900-1902. 1907, 1908——Evidence with reference to the unhealthy character of the Red Sea route at certain seasons, *Sir H. Storks* 1915-1923. 1990-2012——Witness has passed through Egypt and the Red Sea in the months of May and October; there were two deaths on board the vessel in the Red Sea in October 1851, *ib.* 1915-1923——Particulars as to the unhealthy character of the voyage down the Red Sea, unless there be ample previous preparation and the season of the year be favourable, *Sir G. Clerk* 2257-2259. 2267-2287.

Troops might have been conveyed down the Red Sea in the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels in August and September with every facility, and with greater comfort than if they were under canvass in the field, *Engledue* 2412, 2413. 2434-2436——Difficulty of the navigation unless for steamers or sailing vessels towed by steamers, *ib.* 2428-2430——Conflicting winds between Suez and Aden, *ib.* 2433. 2515-2519——It is quite as hot at Madras during the summer time as in the Red Sea, *ib.* 2527-2529——Advantage of having the men on deck under awnings rather than down below when passing down the Red Sea, *ib.* 2586-2592——Explanation as to the higher wages paid by the Peninsular and Oriental Company to their engineers, &c. in the Red Sea than in the Mediterranean, *ib.* 2604-2613——Belief that the warm weather is more distressing in the Persian Gulf than in the Red Sea, *ib.* 2616.

In May, June and July the heat is very great in the Red Sea, and the passengers to India are not so numerous in those months, *Allan* 2810, 2811. 2832-2835——Means of ventilation of the troops when placed in the space usually devoted to stowage, *ib.* 2836-2843.

Witness passed down the Red Sea in August 1851; the heat was most intense, and great discomfort was experienced, but there was no actual sickness at the time, *Beatson* 2854-2866——Unless there had been proper arrangements previously troops could not have been sent down the Red Sea in July or August without suffering severely from the want of accommodation on board, *ib.* 2854-2856. 2899-2915.

9. *Views adverse generally to an earlier use of the Route:*

Absence in the first instance of those preparations necessary in connexion with the despatch of troops overland, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith* 1816. 1825-1827. 1842-1845. 1864-1867. 1894. 1903——Witness believes that the route was used at the earliest period at which proper arrangements could be made, *ib.* 1828. 1852. 1878, 1879.

Difficulty

Report, 1857-8—*continued.*

OVERLAND ROUTE—continued.

9. *Views adverse generally to an earlier use of the Route*—continued.

Difficulty at first about the overland route on account of the political objections, the climate at that season, and the want of previous preparation, *Sir H. Storks* 2001——Facilities for transport overland for about eight months in the year, due arrangements being previously made, *ib.* 2001–2007. 2019–2027. 2033–2035.

The route could not with advantage have been adopted earlier, *Sir G. Clerk* 2256.

10. *Feeling in India that troops would be sent Overland:*

There was a strong and general feeling in Calcutta that vessels should be sent to Suez for troops and that troops would be sent overland, *Mead* 1397–1405. 1434–1436——Universal impression among the natives and sepoys that troops would be poured in by the overland route, *ib.* 1423, 1424. 1437——There was a general feeling at Calcutta that the overland route would be adopted and would be most useful, *Engledue* 2423–2426.

11. *Views of Mr. Lumsden in favour of the Overland Route; Memorandum on the Subject:*

On the very day that witness heard of the mutiny he suggested that measures should be taken for obtaining troops from Malta by the overland route, but it was determined by Lord Elphinstone to send instead to the Mauritius and the Cape, *Lumsden* 774, 775. 792. 804–816. 827–846.

Memorandum by Mr. Lumsden relative to the advantages and practicability of the overland route, and the important results which would have accrued had it been sooner adopted, *App. p.* 298–301.

12. *Communication on the subject from Mr Mead:*

Further statement by Mr. Mead, subsequent to his examination, as to the practicability and advantages of the overland route, *App. p.* 305, 306.

13. *Communication from Colonel Phipps:*

Letter from Colonel Phipps, dated Clonmel, 2 March 1858, as to the perfect practicability and the advantages of the overland route for the conveyance of troops, *App. p.* 261.

14. *Sundry communications from Colonel Pocklington:*

Communications from Colonel Pocklington as to the practicability and advantages of the overland route, *App. p.* 320–325.

15. *Communication from Lieut.-Colonel Fraser:*

Sundry suggestions by Lieut.-Colonel T. G. Fraser, with a view to the adoption of the overland route, *App. p.* 327–330.

16. *Correspondence between the Court of Directors, the Board of Control, &c.:*

Copies of all correspondence that has taken place with reference to the conveyance of troops to India by way of Egypt, either between Her Majesty's Government and the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or between Her Majesty's Government or the Court of Directors and the Peninsular and Oriental, the European and American, or other steam packet companies, *App. p.* 201–244.

17. *Number of Troops sent Overland up to the end of February* 1858:

Statement of regiments of cavalry, infantry, and artillery of Her Majesty's Service, which have embarked for India, and which have gone by the overland route from 11th September 1857 to 18th February 1858, *App. p.* 268–270——Statement of the regiments, troops, and detachments (or drafts) of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, of Her Majesty's Service, and of recruits for the East India Company's service, transported by the company to the Presidencies and Ports of India by the overland route, *via* Egypt, up to the end of February 1858, showing the dates of departure from the port of embarkation, and the dates of arrival in India, &c., *ib.* 281–293——Return of the number of troops of Her Majesty's Service sent to India by the overland route to the close of February 1858; total of 199 officers and 4,894 men: number of days occupied in each case, *ib.* 280.

18. *Conclusions of the Committee:*

Resolution that the Court of Directors appear from the first intelligence of the mutiny at Meerut, to have been sensible of the advantages of the overland route, and to have lost no time in recommending its adoption; but that political and other considerations deterred Her Majesty's Ministers from at once assenting to that recommendation, *Rep. p.* iii.——The Committee cannot judge of the validity of the political objections, as they have felt themselves precluded from inquiring into them, but they ceased to prevail in the first week of September, *ib.*

Report, 1857–8—*continued.*

Overland Route—continued.

18. *Conclusions of the Committee*—continued.

Resolution that it would have been desirable, independently of political considerations, to have taken advantage of the overland route at the earliest possible period, and apart from such considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date, *Rep. p.* iii——The transport, however, of any large body of troops would have required previous arrangements, and the evidence laid before the Committee leaves great room to doubt whether any considerable reinforcements could have been sent in the months of July and August, with a prospect of their arrival in India so far in advance of those sent round the Cape as to give any great advantage in favour of this route, *ib.*

Resolution, that although the overland route may be advantageously employed in times of emergency, it would not be advisable that it should be relied upon as the ordinary route for the transmission of troops to India, *Rep. p.* iii.

See also *Aden. Alexandria. Board of Control. Cairo. Canning, Lord. Cost. Discipline of Troops. Elphinstone, Lord. France. Intelligence of Mutiny. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. Sick Troops (Transport Accommodation). Suez.*

P.

Pacha of Egypt. See *Overland Route*, 3.

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. It was suggested by witness, shortly after the intelligence of the mutiny, to send out about 200 men fortnightly by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's vessels; since September these vessels have been thus employed very successfully, *Shepherd* 403–408. 443–448. 476–480——The present arrangements with the company originated in witness's department, *ib.* 513, 514——Probable difficulties to be encountered in sending troops at first by the vessels, *ib.* 525, 526——Doubt whether the numerous civilians and military officers at first going out overland need have materially interfered with the passage of troops by the same vessels, *ib.* 617–625.

Shortly after 31 August arrangements were entered into with the Peninsular and Oriental Company for sending small detachments overland, *Right Hon. R. V. Smith* 1816——Circumstance of the chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Company having stated that the use of the overland route in July and August was altogether inexpedient, *ib.* 1825–1827. 1846–1848——Doubt whether the Peninsular and Oriental Company were instrumental in removing any political difficulties about the use of the overland route, *ib.* 1876.

Admirable arrangements of the company in connexion with the overland route, *Sir H. Storks* 2024–2027——The company did all they could in regard to conveyance overland, *Sir G. Clerk* 2277.

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2. *As to the Navigation.*

1. *As to the effect of the Heat upon the Health of the Troops:*

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RED SEA—continued.

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1. *Arrangements in regard to the Troops under Orders when the News of the Mutiny arrived.*
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3. *Returns*

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3. *Returns containing Particulars as to the Cost, Date of Sailing, Date of Arrival, &c. of each Transport:*

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Statement of the regiments, troops, and detachments (or drafts) of cavalry, infantry, and artillery of Her Majesty's service, and of recruits for the East India Company's service, transported by the Company to the presidencies and ports of India by sailing ships or steam-vessels, or by the overland route, *viâ* Egypt, between the month of June 1857 and February 1858, both inclusive, specifying the names of the several vessels, the dates of departure of each from the port of embarkation, the dates of arrival in India, and the number of days occupied in the passage of each vessel from port to port, *App. p.* 281-293.

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3. *Advantages respectively of Steamers and Sailing Vessels*—continued.

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6. *Conclusions of the Committee*—continued.

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REPORT

FROM THE

SELECT COMMITTEE

ON

TRANSPORT SERVICE;

TOGETHER WITH THE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE,

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE,

APPENDIX AND INDEX.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
26 *June* 1861.

Martis, 26° die Februarii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the Organisation and Management of those Branches of the Admiralty, War Office, India Office, and Emigration Board, by which the business of transporting, by means of Shipping, Troops, Convicts, Emigrants, Materials of War, Stores, and any other similar Services, is now performed.

Lunæ, 4° die Martii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members.

Committee nominated of—

Mr. Lindsay.	Mr. Henry Baillie.
General Peel.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Lord Clarence Paget.	Mr. Brooks.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Caird.
Sir Frederic Smith.	Admiral Duncombe.
Mr. Fortescue.	Colonel Dickson.
Colonel Lindsay.	Mr. Dalglish.
Sir Michael Seymour.	Mr. Longfield.
Mr. Jackson.	

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

Ordered, THAT Five be the Quorum of the Committee.

Lunæ, 17° die Junii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT the Report from the Select Committee on the Transport Service in Session 1860, be referred to the Committee.

Mercurii, 26° die Junii, 1861.

Ordered, THAT the Committee have power to report their Observations, together with the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, to The House.

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REPORT.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE appointed to inquire into the ORGANIZATION and MANAGEMENT of the Branches of the ADMIRALTY, WAR OFFICE, INDIA OFFICE, and EMIGRATION BOARD, by which the Business of TRANSPORTING by means of SHIPPING, Troops, Convicts, Emigrants, Materials of War, Stores, and any other similar Services is now performed; —HAVE considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following REPORT:—

YOUR Committee, in considering the matters referred to them by the House, have examined witnesses from the various departments of the Government, as also others engaged in commerce conversant with the subject.

During the Peninsular War the whole of the transport service was conducted by a Board consisting of five commissioners, a secretary, accountant, and a large staff of surveyors and clerks. This Board corresponded directly with each of the various departments of the Government, and with the agents and masters of transports; but shortly after the close of the war it was abolished, and the business was transferred to the Navy Board, the duties of which were, in 1830, merged in the Board of Admiralty. From that period till February 1855, the business was mainly conducted by the Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport Service, under the supervision and control of one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; but when this country suddenly found itself at war with Russia the pressure brought to bear upon the transport branch of the service was so great; and the more legitimate duties of the Superintending Lord, were so numerous and so arduous, that the transport department was unable to carry out its duties satisfactorily. Q. 2769. 511. 596. 557. 2109. 2155.

It appears by the evidence that at the time to which your Committee refer there was "no perfect system" by which the number of troops, and the quantities description of stores despatched to the seat of war could be ascertained without much labour. For these and other reasons a Transport Board was established in February 1855, and continued in operation till the early part of 1857, after the Russian war was brought to a termination. This Board was composed of a naval officer as chairman, one military member, and a gentleman from the merchant service. It had also a secretary with the requisite staff of surveyors and clerks, and through the medium of its chairman was daily in direct and close communication with the Secretary of State for War and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to whom it was more immediately responsible. 557. 561. 567. 511. 603. 3085.

It appears that the sums voted for the hire of transports were in 1854-55, 3,582,474 *l.*; in 1855-56, 5,181,465 *l.*, and in 1856-57, 6,971,537 *l.*, showing a total in those three years of 15,735,476 *l.* It has been stated in evidence to your Committee, that previously to the formation of this Transport Board, the average rate of hire paid to sailing vessels was 27 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton; but when the Board was in existence, the rates at which similar vessels were engaged averaged only 16 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton; and the rates paid for steam ships were reduced from 60 *s.* to, in many instances, 30 *s.* per ton register per month. It has been further stated in evidence to your Committee, that by the reduction of rates, and by the change of system, a saving was effected of no less than 1,080,540 *l.* per annum; but your Committee are of opinion that this enormous gain is also in some measure to be attributed to the greater supply of shipping which was 515. 516, 517. 527. 2179, *et seq.* 723.

offered as the war progressed, and the consequent reduction in the rates of freight.

175. 410. S. S. The branch of the Transport Service at present under the Admiralty is conducted in as satisfactory a manner by the Comptroller of Victualling and Transports as the system will permit, but which is not applicable to a time of war. It is now as it was previous to 1855, under the superintendence of one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; and there is very little change in the system which then existed. The cargo books introduced by the Transport Board have been partially discontinued, and the code of regulations which it compiled in 1857 before its dissolution has never been adopted. But apart from the necessity of a change in the entire system of transport, the duties of engaging and fitting vessels for the conveyance of troops and stores, and the purchase and examination of provisions for the Navy, seem to your Committee to be of so widely different a character that it would tend to the interest of the public service if they were separated.

3117. 894. 570, 571. 593.

32-35. 178. 242. 244. 181. The vessels employed by the Comptroller of Victualling and Transports are engaged in various ways, and often at very different rates. Sometimes the vessels are hired by the month. At other times they are engaged at a fixed sum for the passage or the voyage. In many cases at a certain rate per man, with or without provisions, depending upon circumstances and the nature of the voyage. When large quantities of stores require to be transported, a ship or ships are chartered expressly for the purpose. When less than 300 tons have to be forwarded, space at an agreed rate per ton is hired in a vessel loading for the port to which these stores are destined. In almost every instance, the tonnage is engaged by public tender, and your Committee have every reason to believe that, unless when there is a very extraordinary demand for shipping, the rates of freight demanded by the shipowners, and paid by the public, do not exceed the current rates in the market at the time. In some instances they are lower.

Besides the private vessels chartered in the manner just named, there are various steam transports belonging to the Government, which are solely under the control and management of the Admiralty. Last year, as appears by the evidence, the Government owned eight, varying in size from 1,475 to 3,700 tons register; but since that time two of these vessels have been lost, so that the number is now reduced to six, four of which have during the last two years been chiefly employed in Her Majesty's service in China. The relief of troops on the Home, Mediterranean and West India stations has therefore, during that time, been carried on by these two vessels, with the aid of private ships hired for the service.

17. *Vide* App. (B). 137, evidence, second session. 500. S. S. *et seq.* *Vide* Appendix.

133. S. S. Your Committee have had much conflicting evidence as to the relative cost to the country of Government and hired transports. Captain Eden is of opinion that it is necessary for the Government to possess not less than eight powerful troop ships of its own, and he states that the employment of those vessels ought to be confined to the Home, Mediterranean, Cape of Good Hope, and West India stations; but he is not prepared to say that it would be more economical to transport troops and stores in those vessels than it would be in ships hired for the special service. Mr. Willis, of the Transport Office, goes much farther, and recommends, on the ground of economy, that not merely all the ordinary reliefs should be conducted in Government troop ships, but that such vessels should be employed in the transport of troops to and from India, and he has furnished your Committee with estimates with a view of corroborating his statement. On the other hand, Mr. Mason, the secretary to the Transport Department of the India Office, is of opinion that Government vessels ought not to be employed in the transport of troops to and from India; and Mr. C. A. Wood, formerly of the Emigration Office, has furnished your Committee with calculations for the purpose of showing that the employment of such vessels would entail a very serious loss to the country.

148. S. S. 243. S. S. *Vide* Appendix. 326. S. S. 1460. 1486. 1490. 1495. *Vide* App. S. S.

Vide Appendix. Your Committee have had also before them, the evidence and returns which Sir Alexander Milne gave to the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy. They are based upon 13 years' experience at the Admiralty, and upon the actual cost of Government and hired transports, and appear to your Committee to show conclusively that, as a general rule, Government transports are much more costly

costly than hired troop ships; and considering the vast extent of the mercantile marine of this country, and the magnificent steam ships and vessels of every description, which can at all times be obtained, your Committee are of opinion that Government should in future rely still more on the mercantile marine for the transport of troops. App. pp. 387–389. App. p. 385. 243. S. S. *et seq.* 294. S. S. *et seq.* 439. S. S. *et seq.* 600. S. S. *et seq.*

From the evidence of Mr. Mason, it appears that the transport of troops and stores to and from India is conducted by the Marine Branch of the East India Office independently, and without reference to any other department of the Government. This branch of the Transport Service has been well and economically conducted. *Vide* App. S. S. 1439.

The Marine Branch of the East India Office, has, besides the transport of troops and stores, other and important duties to perform, such as the supervision of the Marine Departments in India, and the conduct of all correspondence connected with maritime affairs in which India is interested. 1760.

The Emigration Office is another department of the Government engaging shipping independently of either the Transport or India Office.

Mr. Murdoch, the Chairman of the Emigration Board, states in his evidence, that during the 13 years he has filled that office, 883 ships have been despatched with 261,000 emigrants, to distant stations. Out of that large number only one vessel has been lost, and the mortality of the passengers which on the average did not exceed 1·89 per cent. fell as low in 1859, as to be under one per cent. Emigration has, however, greatly diminished, and now only about 6,000 persons are annually despatched by this Office, whereas in 1854, 41,000 emigrants were sent to Australia and our other colonies. 993.

This department also engages many of the vessels required for the conveyance of Chinese emigrants and coolies to our colonies; and reports on all casualties to emigrant or coolie ships. It has further to correspond with the emigrants and select and collect them at the port of embarkation. For the performance of these duties it has depôts at the principal sea ports of this country, agents or correspondents throughout the United Kingdom, and at all the leading ports of our colonies and possessions, as well as an efficient staff of clerks and surveyors in London. But the emigration office has other duties to perform of an entirely different character. It examines all laws passed by the Colonial Legislatures relating to land, reports on claims to land, draws up the leases for minerals, and drafts orders in Council relating to land or emigration. 964.

It has recently been employed to forward to India the wives and families of European soldiers serving in that country.

Besides these three departments now acting independently of each other in the transport of troops, passengers, and stores, the War Office and Commissariat have occasionally, in time of war, engaged vessels for their own purposes. 587.

Your Committee, after a most careful inquiry, consider that the whole system requires consolidation and reform. Even in peace there is a great want of harmony. Each department has different forms of charter-parties, different scales of provisions, different modes of fitting and ventilating the ships, and the regulations which guide each are different, and in many cases conflicting. At times there is unnecessary competition, which is injurious to the public service, inasmuch as the various departments are often advertising for tonnage at the same moment, and consequently rates of freight are enhanced to the benefit of the shipowners and to the public loss. 276. 801. 2328. 414. S. S. *et seq.* 519. S. S. 2414. 2905. 2459. 254. 2950 *et seq.*

There is also the permanent cost to the country of maintaining three departments to perform a service which, in the opinion of your Committee, could be more economically and more efficiently conducted by one compact and well regulated office. But it is on the sudden emergency of war, when prompt action and undivided responsibility are so much wanted, that the necessity of a change becomes alarmingly apparent. Requisitions pour in from the military authorities for the immediate transport of troops, and the shipment of enormous quantities of stores. At that very moment the whole staff of the victualling and transport office is engaged in the purchase, selection and shipment of provisions and stores for the navy; and the superintending lord has so much to do in the outfit 3133. 31 2105. 5

and manning of the vessels of the royal navy, and is so fully occupied with various important matters, immediately connected with his other duties, that it is quite impossible for him to attend to the engagement of merchant vessels, the embarkation of troops and the shipment of military stores. Your Committee have been furnished with the clearest and most conclusive evidence on this point.

The consequences are that either the victualling of the navy or the transport of troops cannot but be neglected, and, as was the case at the outbreak of the Russian war, great loss to the public service must ensue. Your Committee therefore recommend :—

275. 521. S.S. 413. S.S.

1st. The immediate separation of the Transport from the Victualling Department of the Admiralty.

2778. 2109 *et seq.* 276. 2774. 574. 801. 1247. 1109 *et seq.* 2411. 2906. 414. S. S. *et seq.* 74. 578. 676–682. 1050. 2945.

2dly. The removal from the India Office of the transport of all troops and stores to and from our East India possessions.

3dly. The abolition of the Emigration Office, and consequently the transfer to the Colonial Office, to which it legitimately belongs, of all business connected with the various laws passed by the Colonial Legislatures relating to land or emigration, the consideration of land claims, the preparation of mineral leases, the framing of orders in council relating to land, and all similar duties now performed by the Commissioners of Emigration.

73. 574 *et seq.* 2109. 522. S. S. 2777. 2785 *et seq.* 3152. 3252. 3135, 3136. 2906. 622. S. S. 416. S. S.

Simultaneously with these important, but necessary changes, your Committee recommend the formation of a distinct and separate Transport Office on the principle of the late Transport Board, properly organised, and directly responsible to a Department of the State, for transport of every kind required by the Government to any part of our coast, and to all our colonies and possessions, including India.

2185 *et seq.*

Under the charge of this office your Committee recommend that there should be placed the depôts at Southampton, Birkenhead and Plymouth, and so much of the valuable and already organised machinery of the Emigration Office as may be found necessary, as also the services of the most competent agents, clerks and surveyors now attached to the India Transport and Emigration Offices who may be willing to transfer their services if required.

2906–2913.

When these changes are effected, every department of the Government requiring transport would apply to the Transport Office, the head of which office should be held responsible for the quality and soundness of all vessels engaged by it, and the manning, fitting, provisioning and ventilating of those vessels. He should also be responsible for the stowage of all cargo, and for due care of the health, comfort and safety of all troops and Government passengers, from the time they were embarked till landed at their port of destination. Separate and distinct accounts should, in the opinion of your Committee, be kept at the Transport Office of the cost of the work done for each department of the Government, and rendered periodically, and a distinct estimate of the entire annual cost, divided into separate heads, should be annually laid before Parliament as a Transport Estimate.

For instance, if the Secretary of State for War gave an order for the transport of 1,000 troops from Woolwich to Malta, the cost should be debited to the War Office. The certificate from the officer commanding the troops at Malta, to the effect that the work had been satisfactorily performed, would, when countersigned at the Transport Office, entitle the owners of the vessels hired for the service to receive payment of the freights due to them. All other departments requiring transport should be debited with the cost in a similar way.

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Vide

The Transport Office should be required to report to their responsible Minister on all casualties at sea, to any ships, or to any persons or goods in ships engaged by them; and it would be advisable that one of their officers should board every vessel arriving in this country with troops or invalids, receiving, previous to disembarcation, a report from the surgeon of the sanitary condition of the vessel, and a copy of his journal on the voyage to be recorded for reference at this office. With observations thus compiled of all occurrences on the voyage affecting the health of the troops, vast improvements might be effected,

e Appen[illegible]

effected, tending materially to the greater efficiency and economy of this most important branch of the public service.

The duties to be performed at the new transport office will demand the care of able, efficient, and experienced men, whose appointments should rest upon knowledge and merit, apart from all political considerations. Even in periods of peace their time will be fully occupied; and in the emergency of war, the organisation can be so extended by the addition of temporary clerks, surveyors, and other subordinates, that the office ought to be competent to meet, with promptitude and efficiency, every demand, however great, made upon it for the conveyance of troops, munitions of war and other stores. By means of a well-organised establishment, the work ought to be done in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of the public again sustaining those losses to which the country was subjected during the early part of the war with Russia. 2922 *et seq.*

The advantages to be derived from the changes your Committee venture to recommend would be:—

1st. Direct responsibility in the event of casualties to either the troops, public passengers, or stores, from the time they were embarked till they were landed at their port of destination. Differences of opinion, as to who was in fault, could hardly then arise, as there would be only one department whose defined responsibility would commence from the time that orders were issued for the shipment of troops, stores, &c. &c., till these were exchanged for certificates of disembarcation.

2dly. Greater efficiency and economy. Well-matured regulations would be framed, and the competition between the various offices which now enhances the rates of freight would cease; and, 1050.

3dly. The conflicting conditions now imposed by the various public departments engaging shipping, in regard to the manner in which vessels are to be fitted, ventilated, stowed and provisioned, and which are found to be injurious, could, by the proposed amalgamation, be brought into perfect harmony.

Your Committee have had very important, but somewhat conflicting evidence in regard to the Minister under whose charge the Transport Office should be placed; but they are of opinion that this new department should be placed under the sole control of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. The weight of authority is unquestionably in favour of this course, and the reasons given in support of it are, as a whole, unanswerable. 2109 & 2111 *et seq.* 1057 *et seq.* 2337 *et seq.* 2785 *et seq.* 531. S. S. *et seq.* 427. S. S. *et seq.* 3145.

Your Committee are of opinion that after the inspection and approval of a vessel by the transport office for the conveyance of troops, the military officer charged with the embarkation of the troops should not have power of himself to disturb the arrangements sanctioned under proper authority; but he should represent anything which may appear to him to be deficient, for decision previous to the sailing of the ship. In future the Commissioners of transports should, under the control of the First Lord of the Admiralty, be responsible for all details incidental to the service. If they are not so, the inevitable consequences, apart from matters of a more serious nature, must be an increased expense to the country, as shipowners will necessarily charge extra rates of freight for their liabilities under a system of double inspection, and the conflicting opinions of officers serving under two different departments. 2077. 1316, 1317. 2064. 460. S. S.

As the army reliefs affect very materially the cost of transport, your Committee consider that their report would be incomplete if they did not direct the attention of your Honourable House to the evidence they have received upon this important question. Regiments, it would appear, are often kept abroad for very long periods, and their deficiencies supplied by annual draughts. But as the casualties by death, invaliding, and discharge to our soldiers in India are never less than 10 per cent. per annum, the men, according to the evidence of Colonel Gordon, are "practically changed twice in 10 years." It has been proposed to substitute for those annual draughts, reliefs by entire battalions every fifth year; but your Committee would hesitate to offer any opinion either on the military reasons in favour of transporting entire battalions to India or the difficulties 1877. 229 188 2220 2

2419. 2737. 2981. App. 9, p. 389. App. No. 5, p. 294. in the way of carrying into effect so great a change in the system of Indian relief; this proposal, however, has raised the question of the saving which could be effected by the hire of vessels for the voyage to and from India, and as it has been stated to your Committee by witnesses whose opinions on such matters ought to have great weight, that vessels could be engaged for the double voyage at 30*l.* per man, including provisions, &c., &c., your Committee recommend the suggestion of thus engaging vessels to the favourable consideration of the Government.

In conclusion, your Committee have not considered it necessary to offer an opinion at any length upon matters of mere detail. Such matters can be best understood by reference to the evidence, and ought to be dealt with by the Executive. But having given to the questions, involving great principles, referred to them, their most earnest and attentive consideration, they trust that your Honourable House will support the recommendations of your Committee, so that these may receive at an early period the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

26 *June* 1861.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE.

Lunæ, 11° *die Martii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Admiral Duncombe.	Mr. Baillie.
Sir Frederic Smith.	Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Longfield.	Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Kinnaird.	Mr. Dalglish.
Mr. Lindsay.	

Mr. LINDSAY was called to the Chair.

The Committee deliberated as to their course of proceedings.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, March 19, at One.

Martis, 19° *die Martii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LINDSAY in the Chair.

Admiral Duncombe.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Longfield.	Colonel Dickson.
Mr. Brooks.	Mr. Dalglish.
Lord Clarence Paget.	

Mr. *John William Smith* and Admiral *Robert Craigie* examined.

[Adjourned to Tuesday, 9th April.

Jovis, 11° *die Maii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Lindsay.	Colonel Dickson.
Admiral Duncombe.	Mr. Jackson.
Sir Michael Seymour.	Mr. Baring.
Mr. Longfield.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Lord Clarence Paget.	Mr. Dalglish.
Mr. Brooks.	Sir F. Smith.

Captain *Charles Eden*, R.N., C.B., and Mr. *William Willis* examined.

Room cleared.

The Committee deliberated.

[Adjourned to Thursday next, at One o'clock.

Jovis, 25° die Aprilis, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LINDSAY in the Chair.

Admiral Duncombe.	Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Longfield.	Mr. Dalglish.
Sir Michael Seymour.	Mr. Caird.
Lord Clarence Paget.	Colonel Dickson.
Mr. Kinnaird.	Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Hy. Baillie.	

Mr. *William Willis* further examined.

The Right Honourable Sir *James R. G. Graham,* a Member of the House, examined.

[Adjourned to Thursday next, at One o'clock.

Jovis, 2° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LINDSAY in the Chair.

Admiral Duncombe.	Mr. Baillie.
Mr. Jackson.	Sir Michael Seymour.
Colonel Dickson.	Mr. Dalglish.
Lord Clarence Paget.	Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Kinnaird.	

The Right Honourable the Earl of *Dalhousie,* Mr. *John Chas. Mason,* Mr. *Alexander Wood,* and Sir *Morton Peto,* examined.

[Adjourned to Wednesday, 12th June, at One o'clock.

Mercurii, 12° die Junii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LINDSAY in the Chair.

Admiral Duncombe.	Sir Michael Seymour.
Lord Clarence Paget.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Longfield.	Mr. Caird.
Mr. Brooks.	Mr. H. Baillie.
Mr. Baring.	Mr. Dalglish.
Mr. Jackson.	

Report proposed by the Chairman, read a first time, as follows:—

"The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Organization and Management of the Branches of the Admiralty, War Office, India Office, and Emigration Board, by which the Business of Transporting by means of Shipping, Troops, Convicts, Emigrants, Materials of War, Stores, and any other similar Services is now performed;—Have considered the matters to them referred, and have agreed to the following Report:—

"Your Committee, in considering the matters referred to them by the House, have examined witnesses from the various departments of the Government, as also others engaged in commerce conversant with the subject.

"During the Peninsular War the whole of the transport service was conducted by a Board consisting of five commissioners, a secretary, accountant, and a large staff of surveyors and clerks. This Board corresponded directly with each of the various departments of the Government, and with the agents and masters of transports; but shortly after the close of the war it was abolished, and the business was transferred to the Navy Board, the duties of which

which were, in 1830, merged in the Board of Admiralty. From that period till February 1855, the business was mainly conducted by the Comptroller of the Victualling and Transport Service, under the supervision and control of one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; but when this country suddenly found itself at war with Russia, the pressure brought to bear upon the transport branch of the service was so great; and the more legitimate duties of the Superintending Lord were so numerous and so arduous, that the victualling and transport department fell into a state of great confusion. 511. 596. 557. 2109. 2155.

"It appears by the evidence that at the time to which your Committee refer there was 'no system whatever as to any record of what the ships were doing,' that an account of the number of troops, and of the quantities and description of stores despatched to the seat of war could only be ascertained with much labour, and that if a ship had proceeded to any other than her port of destination there would have been 'great difficulty' in tracing what became of her cargo. For these and other reasons a Transport Board was established in February 1855, and continued in operation till the early part of 1857, when the Russian war was brought to a termination. This Board was composed of a naval officer as chairman, one military member, and a gentleman from the merchant service. It had also a secretary with the requisite staff of surveyors and clerks, and through the medium of its chairman was daily in direct and close communication with the Secretary of State for War and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to whom it was more immediately responsible. 557. 561. 567. 511. 603. 3085.

It appears that the sums voted for the hire of transports were in 1854–55, 3,582,474 *l.*; in 1855–56, 5,181,465 *l.*; and in 1856–57, 6,971,537 *l.*, showing a total in those three years of 15,735,476 *l.* It has been stated in evidence to your Committee, that previously to the formation of this Transport Board, the average rate of hire paid to sailing vessels was 27 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton; but when the Board was in existence, the rates at which similar vessels were engaged averaged only 16 *s.* 6 *d.* per ton; and the rates paid for steam ships were reduced from 60 *s.* to, in many instances, 30 *s.* per ton register per month. It has been further stated in evidence to your Committee, that by the reduction of rates, and the change of system, a saving was effected of no less than 1,080,540 *l.* per annum; but your Committee are of opinion that this enormous gain is in part to be attributed to the greater supply of shipping which was offered as the war progressed, and the consequent reduction in the rates of freight. 515. 516, 517. 527. 2179, *et seq.* 723.

"The transport service is at present conducted in as satisfactory a manner as the system will permit by the Comptroller of Victualling and Transports. It is now as it was previous to 1855, under the superintendence of one of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; and there is very little change in the defective system which then existed. The cargo books introduced by the Transport Board have been discontinued, and the code of regulations which it compiled in 1857 before its dissolution has never been adopted. But apart from the necessity of a change in the system, the duties of engaging and fitting vessels for the conveyance of troops and stores, and the purchase and examination of provisions for the Navy, seem to your Committee to be of so widely different a character that it would tend to the interest of the public service if they were separated. 175. 410. S. S. 3117. 894. 570, 571. 593.

"The vessels employed by the Comptroller of Victualling and Transports are engaged in various ways, and often at very different rates. Sometimes the vessels are hired by the month. At other times they are engaged at a fixed sum for the passage or the voyage. In many cases at a certain rate per man, with or without provisions, depending upon circumstances and the nature of the voyage. When large quantities of stores require to be transported, a ship or ships are chartered expressly for the purpose. When less than 300 tons have to be forwarded, space at an agreed rate per ton is hired in a vessel loading for the port to which these stores are destined. In almost every instance, the tonnage is engaged by public tender, and your Committee have every reason to believe that, unless when there is a very extraordinary demand for shipping, the rates of freight demanded by the shipowners, and paid by the public, do not exceed the current rates in the market at the time. In some instances they are lower. 32–35. 178. 242. 244. 181.

"Besides the private vessels chartered in the manner just named, there are various steam transports belonging to the Government, which are solely under the control and management of the Admiralty. Last year, as appears by the evidence, the Government owned eight, varying in size from 1,475 to 3,700 tons register; but since that time two of these vessels have been lost, so that the number is now reduced to six, four of which have during the last two years been chiefly employed in Her Majesty's service in China. The relief of troops on the Home, Mediterranean and West India stations has therefore, during that time, been carried on by these two vessels, with the aid of private ships hired for the service. The number of men conveyed in hired vessels coastwise during 1860, appears from a return deposited by Mr. Richards to have amounted to 575 officers, 14,861 men, and 1,021 horses, coastwise; and 71 officers, 1,517 men, and 6 horses, to and from the Mediterranean and West India stations, besides the usual number of women and children, at a cost to the country of 28,320 *l.* 10 *s.* 8 *d.*, including provisions and fodder. So that, in fact, the whole charge to the country of effecting the above reliefs does not amount to the annual cost of one of Her Majesty's troop ships. 17. *Vide* App. (B). 137, evidence, second session. 500. S. S. *et seq.* *Vide* Appendix.

133. S. S. "In the face, however, of these returns, your Committee have had much conflicting evidence as to the relative cost to the country of Government and hired transports. Captain Eden adheres to the opinion that it is necessary for the Government to possess eight troop ships of its own, while half that number is sufficient to perform the work he recommends; for he states that the employment of those vessels ought to be confined to the Home, Mediterranean and West India stations, and that they should not be dispatched to any port beyond the Cape of Good Hope. He is not, however, prepared to say that it would be more economical to transport troops and stores in those vessels than it would be in ships hired for the special service. Mr. Willis, of the Transport Office, goes much farther, and recommends, on the ground of economy, that not merely all the ordinary reliefs should be conducted in Government troop ships, but that such vessels should be employed in the transport of troops to and from India, and he has furnished your Committee with elaborate estimates with a view of corroborating his statement. On the other hand, Mr. Mason, the secretary to the Transport Department of the India Office, is of opinion that Government vessels ought not to be employed in the transport of troops to and from India; and Mr. C. A. Wood, formerly of the Emigration Office, has furnished your Committee with calculations for the purpose of showing that the employment of such vessels would entail a very serious loss to the country.

148. S. S.

243. S. S. *Vide* Appendix. 1460. 1486. 1490. 1495. *Vide* App. S. S.

Vide Appendix. 490. S. S. "Your Committee have had also before them, the evidence and returns which Sir Alexander Milne gave to the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy. They are based upon 13 years' experience at the Admiralty, and upon the actual cost of Government and hired transports, and appears to your Committee to settle this question conclusively. Independently altogether of insurance, interest and depreciation, his evidence, confirmed by the accounts he has furnished, shows that the cost of transport in Government troop ships is no less than 100 per cent. greater than the sum for which similar services could be as efficiently performed in vessels hired for the purpose. Though the mode in which the Admiralty accounts are kept renders it difficult to ascertain the actual cost to the country of Her Majesty's troop ships, nevertheless the evidence furnished to your Committee has been altogether conclusive in regard to the greater economy of hiring vessels when their services are required, and considering the vast extent of the mercantile marine of this country, and the magnificent steam ships and vessels of every description, which can at all times be obtained, your Committee are of opinion that it is not advisable to increase the number of transports now owned by Her Majesty. Those six vessels, if not despatched to China and other remote parts, as has been the case during the last two years, would, in the opinion of your Committee, be more than sufficient to effect the ordinary reliefs on the Home, Mediterranean, and West India Stations, and their services, as a rule, should be retained especially for that object. But as some of those vessels are not so efficient as could be desired, and as many of the witnesses familiar with the transport of soldiers and the wants of the service (while admitting that the cost of Government troop ships is greater than that of vessels hired for the service) consider it to be expedient and politic that a limited number of troop ships should be retained, your Committee are of opinion that as those six vessels now possessed by the Government wear out, or are lost, it might be desirable to replace them by others of a class somewhat similar to the 'Himalaya,' but of smaller dimensions.

2189-2797. 3178. 382-1460, *et seq.* 2115. 2249. 2256. 2272-2191. App. pp. 387-389. App. p. 385. 243. S. S. *et seq.* 294. S. S. *et seq.* 439. S. S. *et seq.* 600. S. S. *et seq.* *Vide* App. S. S. 675. S. S. *et seq.* 485. S. S. 689. S. S. *et seq.* 2189-2215.

1439. "From the evidence of Mr. Mason, it appears that the transport of troops and stores to and from India is conducted by the Marine Branch of the East India Office independently, and without reference to any other department of the Government. This branch of the Transport Service has been well and economically conducted.

1760. "The Marine Branch of the East India Office, has, besides the transport of troops and stores, other and important duties to perform, such as the supervision of the Marine Departments in India, and the conduct of all correspondence connected with maritime affairs in which India is interested.

"The Emigration Office is another department of the Government engaging shipping without the knowledge of either the Transport or India Office.

993. "Mr. Murdoch, the Chairman of the Emigration Board, states in his evidence, that during the 13 years he has filled that office, 883 ships have been despatched with 261,000 emigrants, to distant stations. Out of that large number only one vessel has been lost, and the mortality of the passengers, which, on the average, did not exceed 1·89 per cent. fell as low in 1859, as to be under one per cent. Emigration has, however, greatly diminished, and now only about 6,000 persons are annually despatched by this Office, whereas in 1854, 41,000 emigrants were sent to Australia and our other colonies.

"This department also engages many of the vessels required for the conveyance of Chinese emigrants and coolies to our colonies; and reports on all casualties to emigrant or coolie ships. It has further to correspond with the emigrants and select and collect them at the port of embarkation. For the performance of these duties it has depôts at the principal sea ports of this country, agents or correspondents throughout the United Kingdom, and at all the leading ports of our colonies and possessions, as well as an efficient staff of clerks and surveyors in London. But the emigration office has other duties to perform of

964. an entirely different character. It examines all laws passed by the Colonial Legislatures relating

relating to land, reports on claims to land, draws up the leases for minerals, and drafts orders in Council relating to land or emigration.

"It has also been employed to forward to India the wives and families of European soldiers serving in that country.

"Besides these three departments now acting independently of each other in the transport of troops, passengers, and stores, the War Office and Commissariat have occasionally, in time of war, engaged vessels for their own purposes. 587.

"Your Committee, after a most careful inquiry, consider that the whole system requires consolidation and reform. Even in peace there is a great want of harmony. Each department has different forms of charter-parties, different scales of provisions, different modes of fitting and ventilating the ships, and the regulations which guide each are different, and in many cases conflicting. At times there is unnecessary competition, which is injurious to the public service, inasmuch as the various departments are often advertising for tonnage at the same moment, and consequently rates of freight are enhanced to the benefit of the shipowners and to the public loss. 276. 801. 2328. 414. S. S. *et seq.* 519. S. S. 2414. 2905. 2459. 254. 2950, *et seq.*

"There is also the permanent cost to the country of maintaining three departments to perform a service which, in the opinion of your Committee, could be more economically and efficiently conducted by one compact and well regulated office. But it is on the sudden emergency of war when prompt action and undivided responsibility are so much wanted, that the necessity of a change becomes alarmingly apparent. Requisitions pour in from the military authorities for the immediate transport of troops, and the shipment of enormous quantities of stores. At that very moment the whole staff of the victualling and transport office is engaged in the purchase, selection and shipment of provisions and stores for the navy; and the superintending lord has so much to do in the outfit and manning of the vessels of the royal navy, and is so fully occupied with various important matters immediately connected with his other duties, that it is quite impossible for him to attend to the engagement of merchant vessels, the embarkation of troops, and the shipment of military stores. Your Committee have been furnished with the clearest and most conclusive evidence on this point. 3133. 3136. 3231. 2105. 407. S. S. 554. 569. 274. 547. 596.

"The consequences are that either the victualling of the navy or the transport of troops cannot but be neglected, and, as was the case at the outbreak of the Russian war, great loss to the public service must ensue. Your Committee therefore recommend:—

"1st. The immediate separation of the Transport from the Victualling Department of the Admiralty. 275. 521. S. S. 413. S. S.

"2dly. The removal from the India Office of the transport of all troops and stores to and from our East India possessions. 2778. 2109 *et seq.* 276. 2774. 574. 801. 1247. 2109 *et seq.* 2411.

"3dly. The abolition of the Emigration Office, and consequently the transfer to the Colonial Office, to which it legitimately belongs, of all business connected with the various laws passed by the Colonial Legislatures relating to land or emigration, the consideration of land claims, the preparation of mineral leases, the framing of orders in council relating to land, and all similar duties now performed by the Commissioners of Emigration. 2906. 414. S. S. *et seq.* 574. 578. 676–682. 1050. 2945.

"Simultaneously with these important, but necessary changes, your Committee recommend the formation of a distinct and separate Transport Office, properly organized, and responsible to a department of the State, for transport of every kind required by the Government, to any part of our coast, and to all our colonies and possessions, including India. 73. 574 *et seq.* 2109. 522. S. S. 2777. 2785 *et seq.* 3152. 3252. 3135, 3136. 2906. 622. S. S. 416. S. S.

"As much business of great importance, but in many respects of a routine character, will require to be transacted at the office it should, in the opinion of your Committee, be constituted as nearly as possible on the principle of a well regulated mercantile firm, where each partner has separate duties to perform, though all consult, and are responsible as a whole. 665 *et seq.*

"Considering the nature and extent of its duties, many of which could not prudently be entrusted to gentlemen who had not a higher rating in the service than that of "clerks;" and considering that one man, however capable, while exposed to extraordinary temptations, could not perform all the various responsible duties of the consolidated office, your Committee are of opinion that there should be three Commissioners, one acting as chairman, and receiving somewhat higher remuneration for his services than the other two. 1052. 529–2329. 519. S. S.

"Under the charge of these Commissioners your Committee recommend that there should be placed the depôts at Southampton, Birkenhead, and Plymouth, and so much of the valuable and already organized machinery of the Emigration Office as may be found necessary, as also the services of the most competent agents, clerks and surveyors now attached to the India Transport and Emigration Offices who may be willing to transfer their services if required. 2185 *et seq.*

2906–2913. "When these changes are effected, every department of the Government requiring transport would apply to the Transport Office; and this office should be held responsible for the quality and soundness of all vessels engaged by it, and the manning, fitting, provisioning and ventilating of those vessels. It should also be responsible for the stowage of all cargo (with the exception of combustible munitions of war), and for due care of the health, comfort and safety of all troops and Government passengers, from the time they were embarked till landed at their port of destination. Separate and distinct accounts should, in the opinion of your Committee, be kept at the Transport Office for each department of the Government, and rendered periodically.

"For instance, if the Secretary of State for War gave an order for the transport of 1,000 troops from Woolwich to Malta, the cost should be debited to the War Office, and would appear in the Army Estimates. The certificate from the officer commanding the troops at Malta, to the effect that the work had been satisfactorily performed, would, when countersigned by the Commissioners of Transports, enable the owners of the vessels hired for the service to receive payment of the freights due to them. And in order that the Secretary of State for War might have full control over the outlay, to be passed to his debit, it would rest with him, if he thought proper to exercise the power, to fix, when he issued his order, the maximum rates at which vessels were to be engaged for the conveyance of all troops and military stores, and the number of soldiers who were to be embarked in either ships or steamers of a specified size.

"In the opinion of your Committee, all other public departments requiring transport should be debited with the cost in a similar way, and have equal power over any expenditure on their account; this arrangement, while it would check any lavish outlay, would likewise give the India Office the same control over its own finances as it now possesses.

"Objections have been raised by various witnesses to the transfer of the engagement of ships for the conveyance of emigrants, coolies, and convicts to the same office where vessels for the transport of troops are engaged. But these objections are much more specious than real. Emigrants, coolies, and convicts will, as they are now, be sent in different ships; and the desirability of putting transport of every kind under one head overrules, in the opinion of your Committee, the difficulties which have been raised, and which are applicable only to matters of detail.

"The work to be performed by the Commissioners in the chartering, outfit, and provisioning of ships for the conveyance of troops would, in most respects, be similar to that which they had to perform in the transport of emigrants or coolies. In the latter case they would receive their orders from the Colonial Minister, to whom the cost would be charged, and the special duties of one of the Commissioners would be to attend to this branch of the service.

"It would also, in the opinion of your Committee, tend to the benefit of the public service, and would relieve the Board of Trade from duties somewhat foreign in their nature, if the survey of all passenger ships, or steamers which are now inspected by the officers of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, was placed under the Transport Office. That office should also see to any evasions of the Passenger Act, such as improper clearances, insufficient crews, and so forth; the nature and stowage of cargoes, and the adoption of measures necessary for the safety of ships; the strict observance of all Government charter-parties; the adoption of new inventions for life-boats, distilling apparatuses, and such like; and the expense of receiving and forwarding troops and passengers in the case of wrecks. The Commissioners of Transports should likewise, in the opinion of your Committee, be required to report to their responsible Minister on all casualties at sea, to any ships, or to any persons or goods in ships engaged by them; and it would be advisable that one of their officers should board every vessel arriving in this country with troops or invalids, receiving, previous to disembarkation, a report from the surgeon of the sanitary condition of the vessel, and a copy of his journal on the voyage to be recorded for reference at this Office. With observations thus compiled of all occurrences on the voyage affecting the health of the troops, vast improvements might be effected, tending materially to the greater efficiency and economy of this most important branch of the public service.

2922 *et seq.* "The duties to be performed at the new transport office will demand the care of able, efficient, and experienced Commissioners, whose appointments should rest upon knowledge and merit, apart from all political considerations. Even in periods of peace their time will be fully occupied; and in the emergency of war, the organization can be so extended by the addition of temporary clerks, surveyors, and other subordinates, that they ought to be competent to conduct, with promptitude and efficiency, every demand, however great, made upon them for the conveyance of troops, munitions of war and other stores. By means of a well-organized establishment, the work ought to be done in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of the public again sustaining those losses to which the country was subjected during the early part of the war with Russia.

"The advantages to be derived from the changes your Committee venture to recommend would be:—

"1st. Direct responsibility in the event of casualties to either the troops, public passengers, or stores, from the time they were embarked till they were landed at their port

port of destination. Differences of opinion, as to who was in fault, could hardly then arise, as there would be only one department under one Minister, whose defined responsibility would commence from the time that orders were issued for the shipment of troops, stores, &c. &c., till these were exchanged for certificates of disembarkation.

"2dly. Greater efficiency and economy. Well-matured regulations would then be framed for the guidance of each department; and, inasmuch as all ships required for Government purposes would be engaged through the Transport Office, the competition between the various offices which now enhances the rates of freight would cease; and, 1050.

"3dly. The conflicting conditions now imposed by the various public departments engaging shipping, in regard to the manner in which vessels are to be fitted, ventilated, stowed and provisioned, could, by the proposed amalgamation, be brought into perfect harmony.

"Your Committee have had very important, but somewhat conflicting evidence in regard to the Minister under whose charge the Transport Office should be placed; his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, Mr. Murdoch, Chairman of the Emigration Board, Mr. C. A. Wood, and others, are of opinion that the responsible Minister should be the Secretary of State for War, and have furnished your Committee with various reasons, well worthy of consideration, in support of the opinions they have expressed. 2109 & 2111 *et seq.* 1057 *et seq.* 2337 *et seq.*

"On the other hand, his Grace the Duke of Somerset, the Earl of Dalhousie, Sir James Graham and Sir Richard Airey, as well as numerous other witnesses, all concur in the opinion that this new department should be placed under the sole control of the First Lord of the Admiralty. As the weight of authority is unquestionably in favour of this course, and as the reasons those gentlemen have given in support of their opinions are, as a whole, unanswerable, your Committee can have no hesitation in recommending it. But in recording that opinion, your Committee feel it necessary to remark that in the details of the service, especially as to the control and management of the transports in operations before an enemy, much that is deemed to be indispensable by the military authorities is objected to by the Admiralty. The difference of opinion appears to hinge upon the question whether, before an enemy, those transports should be at the disposal of the naval or military Commander in Chief, and the extent of the difference will be seen by the answers to the questions noted in the margin. Your Committee recommend this branch of the subject to the early attention of the Executive Government, as upon its decision may depend, at the most critical moment of a war, the success or failure of our military operations. 2785 *et seq.* 531. S. S. *et seq.* 427. S. S. *et seq.* 3145. Q. 2792–3–4. 2806–7–2810. 2849. 1801 *et seq.* 1826–1830. 1833 *et seq.* 427. S. S. *et seq.* 517. S. S.

"Before passing from this subject, your Committee desire to draw the attention of the House to the apparent irresponsible exercise of authority in ordering transport for the conveyance of troops. It would appear by a memorandum, dated Horse Guards, 8th January 1858, that the former constitutional practice by which all orders to the Admiralty for shipping, which necessarily proceeded from the Secretary of State, are now given by the Quartermaster General, who makes his requisition upon the Admiralty, merely sending, for the information of the Secretary of State, a duplicate of his order. It has been stated in evidence that on the orders of the Quartermaster General the Admiralty act without waiting for any approval from the Secretary of State, and that the former officer decides whether steam or sailing vessels are to be employed. If such be the case then, as the Quartermaster General acknowledges his responsibility solely to the Commander in Chief, the constitutional authority over the expenditure has by this change been entirely lost: and any such alteration would, in the opinion of your Committee, be open to grave objections. 411. S. S. *et seq.* 456. S. S. *et seq.* 538. S. S. Appendix, p. 370. 1256 *et seq.*

"If the recommendations which your Committee make to charge to the Army Estimates, and to the Indian Government, all expenses connected with the sea transport of troops be adopted, the general cost of transport will probably be considerably diminished; but nevertheless if vessels are engaged for the removal of troops without direct orders from a Secretary of State, your Committee object on constitutional grounds to any such power being exercised by a subordinate authority.

"Your Committee are further of opinion, that the double inspection of transports by the Admiralty and by the Horse Guards, especially by subordinate officers of the latter department when a ship is on the very point of departure, so strongly insisted upon by Sir Richard Airey and Colonel Gordon, ought not to be sanctioned, except under very peculiar and extraordinary circumstances. That check on Admiralty arrangements to which the Horse Guards appear to attach so much importance, destroys all individual responsibility, and may produce very serious results. In future, the Commissioners of Transports should, under the control of the First Lord of the Admiralty, be responsible for all details incidental to the service. If they are not so, the inevitable consequences, apart from matters of a more serious nature, must be an increased expense to the country, as shipowners will necessarily charge extra rates of freight for their liabilities under a system of double inspection, and the conflicting opinions of officers serving under two different departments. 2077. 1316, 1317. 2064. 460. S. S.

"As the army reliefs affect very materially the cost of transport, your Committee consider that their report would be incomplete if they did not direct the attention of our

Honourable House to the evidence they have received upon this important question. Regiments, it would appear, are often kept abroad for very long periods, and their deficiencies supplied by annual draughts. But, as the casualties by death, invaliding and discharge, to our soldiers in India, under the present system, are never less than 10 per cent. per annum, the men, according to the evidence of Colonel Gordon, are 'practically changed twice in 10 years.' It has been proposed to substitute for those annual draughts, reliefs by entire battalions every fifth year, which could be accomplished at a very considerable saving by the hire of vessels for the voyage to and from India. In fact, it has been stated to your Committee, by witnesses whose opinions on such matters ought to have great weight, that vessels could be engaged for the double voyage at 30 *l.* per man, including provisions, &c., &c., and if such be the case, your Committee recommend the proposed plan to the favourable consideration of the Government.

1877. 2224 *et seq.* 1883–4. 2220 *et seq.* 2309 *et seq.* 2419. 2737. 2981. App. 9, p. 389. App. No. 5, p. 294.

"While your Committee would hesitate to offer any opinion either on the military reasons in favour of transporting entire battalions to India or the difficulties in the way of carrying into effect so great a change in the system of Indian relief, your Committee cannot but feel that by the proposed plan a considerable saving would be effected, not merely in the cost of transport, but in various other ways. The mortality would also be thereby materially diminished, and therefore they can have no hesitation in recommending this most important subject to the immediate attention of the Executive.

"In conclusion, your Committee have not considered it necessary to offer an opinion at any length upon matters of mere detail. Such matters can be best understood by reference to the evidence, and ought to be dealt with by the Executive. But having given to the questions, involving great principles, referred to them, their most earnest and attentive consideration, they trust that your Honourable House will support the recommendations of your Committee, so that these may receive at an early period the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

Question, That the Report be now read 2°, paragraph by paragraph, put, and agreed to.

Paragraphs 1 to 6, amended, and agreed to.

Paragraph 7.—Amendment proposed, to leave out from the second word "service," line 10, to the end of the paragraph—(Mr. *H. Baillie*).—Question, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the paragraph, put.—The Committee divided:

Ayes, 3.	Noes, 5.
Mr. Longfield.	Sir M. Seymour.
Mr. Caird.	Mr. H. Baillie.
Mr. Jackson.	Admiral Duncombe.
	Mr. Baring.
	Lord Clarence Paget.

Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.

Paragraph 8, amended, and agreed to.

[Adjourned to Monday, at One o'clock.

Lunæ, 17° *die Junii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LINDSAY in the Chair.

Mr. Jackson.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Caird.	Mr. Brooks.
Admiral Duncombe.	Colonel Dickson.
Lord C. Paget.	Mr. Longfield.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	General Lindsay.

The Committee proceeded with the consideration of the Draft Report: and made several amendments.

[Adjourned to Wednesday next, at Two o'clock.

Mercurii, 19° *die Junii,* 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. LINDSAY in the Chair.

Mr. Brooks.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Longfield.	General Lindsay.
Sir Michael Seymour.	Sir Frederic Smith.
Lord Clarence Paget.	Admiral Duncombe.
Mr. T. G. Baring.	Mr. Caird.

The Committee proceeded with the Draft Report, and went through the same.

Question, That the proposed Report, as amended, be the Report of the Committee to the House—put, and agreed to.

Question, That the evidence be reported to the House—put, and agreed to.

Ordered, To Report.

EXPENSES OF WITNESS.

Name of Witness.	Profession or Condition.	From whence Summoned.	Number of Days Absent from Home, under Orders of Committee.	Expenses of Journey to London and back.	Allowance during Absence from Home.	TOTAL Expenses allowed to Witness.
				£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Robert Craigie - -	Rear Admiral - -	Torquay - - -	3	4 12 -	3 3 -	7 15 -

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MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

Martis, 19° *die Martii*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Dalglish.
Colonel Dickson.
Admiral Duncombe.
Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Lindsay.
Mr. Longfield.
Lord Clarence Paget.
Sir Michael Seymour.

WILLIAM SCHAW LINDSAY, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

John William Smith, Esq., C. B., Commissary General in Chief, called in; and Examined.

J. W. Smith, Esq., C.B.

19 March 1861.

1. *Chairman.*] YOU are Commissary General in Chief?—I am.
2. What is the nature of your duties?—I have the general management of the whole Commissariat Department, under the Secretary of State for War.
3. Do your duties consist in sending out provisions and stores for the army, and do those duties rest entirely with you?—The orders for that do; the means by which supplies are conveyed to foreign stations are provided by the Admiralty upon our requisitions.
4. Suppose that you wished to send out to a distant station clothing and food, and so forth, for the army, how do you engage the means of conveyance?—We make an indent upon the Admiralty for a certain amount of tonnage, describing the nature of the supplies to be shipped.
5. Do you specify any description of vessel, whether steaming or sailing, which you think advisable?—Only in very special cases.
6. You of course specify in your application the time when you would wish the things shipped?—Yes; if they are at all of an urgent nature.
7. Who is responsible for the safe conveyance of those stores to their destination?—The responsibility rests with the Admiralty while the supplies are afloat.
8. Then at the port where they have to be unshipped, who takes charge of them there?—The senior commissariat officer, if they be consigned to him.
9. Suppose that there is no commissariat officers there, who would, under such circumstances, take charge of the stores?—I can scarcely adduce an instance in which supplies have been sent to any place where there was not a commissariat officer; but if by accident it were so, an officer would be specially appointed for the purpose by the senior military officer on the spot.
10. When very large quantities of commissariat stores were necessarily obliged to be sent out to the army in the Crimea, was an application then made from the then Commissary General in Chief to the Admiralty in respect to the amount of tonnage which would be required to send out the commissariat stores?—It was done pretty much in the same way as it is done now. I might state that the Crimean service was very peculiar. Previously to the expedition starting, it was deemed necessary that a certain number of steamers should be hired specifically for commissariat service; they were taken up by the Admiralty, but handed over

J. W. Smith, Esq., C.B.

19 March 1861.

in toto to the commissariat, both for use and management, which I considered a defective arrangement. It rather divided the responsibility of the naval authorities at Constantinople towards the commissariat service; they looked upon it as a branch for which they were not immediately responsible; and it did not receive that amount of attention which ought otherwise to have been the case.

11. Then you think that the system in that respect could be improved?—That system existed at first, and after some practical experiments of its working, a change of a very beneficial nature took place. All the transports, including those specially attached to the Commissariat, were handed over to the Admiral Superintendent at Constantinople, Sir Frederick Grey, who managed the whole thing with perfect regularity and satisfaction. He laid down a regular system; he appointed Captain Powell to superintend the steam branch of the transports, and Captain Tudor the sailing branch; and, as far as my department was concerned, I had the greatest possible reason to be satisfied and thankful to those naval officers for the admirable efficiency with which the service was managed. They took a great amount of personal trouble to communicate with me. Sir Frederick Grey, himself, came up on many occasions from his office to consult me upon matters connected with cargoes; in short, nothing could have been better than the system then in operation.

12. Suppose that the Commissary General for the time being, during the Crimean War, desired to send out a ship-load of commissariat stores, he I understand, would apply to the Admiralty to find tonnage; but who advised the shipment of those stores?—The advices of shipment were conveyed from the War Office to the senior Commissariat officer on the spot, with regular bills of lading. In some few instances a miscarriage of the bills of lading occurred, causing a considerable amount of confusion and difficulty.

13. Were there regular invoices made out of all the stores put on board of a ship?—Yes; regular invoices, as a rule, were made out, and transmitted from the War Office to the senior Commissariat officer, either at Constantinople, or in the Crimea.

14. Then, upon the arrival of the ship at Constantinople, did the Commissariat officer then apply for the delivery of those goods?—In many instances the supplies were contracted for in England, with the understanding that the freight was to be included in the price of the supplies. In those instances, the ships were specifically consigned to the Commissariat officer, and the masters of the ships, upon arrival at Constantinople, waited upon him to report themselves, and deliver in their ships' papers precisely in the same way that they would do as to a mercantile house. A very large amount of shipping came out under those circumstances.

15. Suppose that the stores were to be landed at Constantinople, were they landed and put into the charge of the Commissariat officer?—They were, and delivered into his charge, under the responsibility of the master of the vessel.

16. Then, for example, when the Army required any of those stores, was an application made to the Commissariat officer for a supply?—Invariably.

17. When it became necessary to send a portion of those stores from Constantinople to the Crimea, who engaged a ship to convey those stores to the Crimea?—In the first part of the system they were taken up by the Commissariat, when they had to be specially engaged; but, of course, whenever available accommodation could be found in transports belonging to the Navy, that was first used, in order to save expense.

18. Then to whom did the Commissariat officer at Constantinople apply when he required tonnage to convey those particular stores to the Crimea?—He applied to the Admiral Superintendent in the first instance, and, upon receiving information from him that he could not furnish the required tonnage, it was then taken up, in some instances, I do not say in all, by the commissariat, so that there were two systems, as I mentioned at first, in operation at the commencement of the war in Turkey.

19. Then there was a Commissariat officer during the Crimean war at Constantinople?—Yes; I had charge of the Commissariat operations at Constantinople during the war.

20. Were you advised of all the shipments of stores, whether they were destined for Constantinople, or were bound direct to the Crimea?—I cannot say that it was done with perfect regularity; but it was the rule, as to the shipment of all Commissariat stores, both for Constantinople and the Crimea, that the captains

of

of ships had orders to report themselves to me in case any alteration in their destination was rendered necessary by unforeseen circumstances.

21. In point of fact, was it the case that the whole of the commissariat connected with the Crimean war was under your control and management?—Yes, it was, subordinate to the Commissary General in charge of the whole department; but my duties at Constantinople were of a very distinct character, and very extensive, as they involved all the shipping, financial, and other arrangements. Everything was referred to me that could not be exactly accomplished upon the spot.

22. Did you find any difficulty in procuring tonnage for the conveyance of the necessary supplies to the army at any time?—There was very great difficulty indeed, after the hurricane of the 14th of November. Previously to that I do not know that any very serious difficulties were experienced in that respect at Constantinople, although I am aware that transport animals could not be taken from Varna to the Crimea for want of sufficient shipping.

23. Did that arise from the scarcity of tonnage caused by the hurricane of the 14th November?—It arose from the scarcity of tonnage, and was attributable partly to an insufficient number of vessels, but more particularly to the fact, that the vessels in use were most seriously crippled by the hurricane. I can scarcely recollect one exception, or a vessel that did not require to undergo great repairs. It was during that peculiarly great crisis that the disasters referred to occurred to such an extent.

24. Did you ever hear any complaint made of the army being in want of necessary supplies?—The army were certainly in want of supplies at the front; but in all the evidence that has been adduced upon the subject, there is ample proof that there was an abundance of supplies in the harbour of Balaklava, which could not be landed and sent on to the front, live stock excepted.

25. Consequently, it would appear that there was no want of sea transport?—Not under those circumstances, excepting for horses and cattle. There was a deficiency, certainly, in this respect, particularly for live cattle, a most essential element of supply to the army, which could not be brought up for want of a sufficient number of transports.

26. With the exception of a short time after the hurricane of the 14th of November, you say that there was an ample supply of tonnage to conduct the service under your control?—I can hardly say a short time, for it took much time to repair the disasters caused by that hurricane, and to provide for the wants that arose out of it; but in six or eight months after that time, a very different state of things was established under the management of Sir Frederick Grey.

27. At that time, were the ships fully employed?—In the latter period to which I refer, they were.

28. Did any instances come under your notice in which ships were lying up for two, three, or four months' time, doing nothing?—There were certainly ships lying up, but they were mostly vessels that had cargoes on board, which could not be disposed of. I am not aware that any empty transports were kept unemployed.

29. Were they kept as store ships?—Some of them were, I believe, but I can scarcely answer for what occurred at Balaklava, as my duties were confined to Constantinople. I only formed my opinions from hearsay evidence, as to the Crimea.

30. Admiral *Duncan.*] During the war in the East, your duties were entirely confined to Constantinople?—Yes, with this extension of my responsibility, that I had to keep them supplied with everything they required at Balaklava.

31. You had no superior officer over you at Constantinople?—None.

32. You have stated, that in the first instance, when there was a divided responsibility, the Transport Service was not so well conducted?—No; and there was a very large amount of confusion caused by it.

33. Was that state of things remedied entirely after it was put under one head, Sir Frederick Grey?—It was entirely remedied, and I must say that I think the system worked as perfectly as any system possibly could.

34. In point of fact, in any future emergency, can you make any suggestion that would be an improvement upon the plan then carried out?—No; excepting as to the details of the system. Just towards the close of the war Sir Frederick Grey and I had several conferences upon the subject of clearing vessels, for a great deal of difficulty arose in settling with the owners of the vessels owing to

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the want of a full and sufficient clearance, both as to their responsibility, and as to the cargoes which might have been shipped. It was a difficult and peculiar question. We went fully into it, and proposed certain regulations, which, I think, would have had the effect of putting that system upon a sound footing, and which are still capable of being acted upon. I have not got the papers with me, but Sir Frederick Grey, who I have no doubt is in England, could produce them.

35. Was it subsequently to the Transport Service generally being put under Sir Frederick Grey at Constantinople, that the Commissariat in England took up vessels upon their own responsibility, and sent them out direct to you without any intervention at all on the part of the naval authorities?—The Commissariat did not take up the vessels; the Admiralty did so, but handed them over entirely to the Commissariat, both as to management and application. This was previously to Sir Frederick Grey's appointment.

36. Then the vessels went direct to the Commissariat authorities in the East, and they were not passed as it were through the hands of the naval authorities?—After being chartered in England, the charterparties were handed over to the authorities in England, but the management and control of those vessels rested entirely with the Commissariat in the particular cases referred to.

37. I gather from what you have stated, that in future you would recommend, in the case of transport of stores, that they should go entirely to one head, who should be responsible for their delivery, and for their being forwarded where necessary?—Yes, precisely so. I think it should always be done under the responsibility of the Admiralty, for there is no doubt that where it is made an entirely naval question, you meet with a more cordial and full co-operation of the naval authorities. I do not think that the naval Commander in Chief should have anything to do with responsibility as to details, but that the transport service should be under his general responsibility, as it was at Constantinople during the time I have spoken of; I think it should be under his general responsibility, so that all officers may know that his character would be compromised by any serious failure.

38. In point of fact, that the Transportation Service should be conducted by a naval officer, appointed specially for that purpose, so as not to burthen the Commander in Chief with any of those duties?—Yes, that was the case with regard to Sir Frederick Grey; who had the entire management of the Transport Service, with such a general responsibility towards the naval Commander in Chief as the Commissary General has towards the military Commander in Chief.

39. I believe that when interruptions to the rapid progress of the service occurred, it was at the time when the Commander in Chief had not the sole responsibility?—I can hardly say whether he had the sole responsibility or not; Admiral Boxer seemed to exercise a separate jurisdiction, being looked upon in the same light as the Admiral Superintendent of a dockyard here, not responsible to the naval Commander in Chief, but to the Admiralty direct.

40. The naval Commander in Chief, I suppose, imagined that he had other duties to perform than to attend to the transport department as well?—Yes; I am perfectly well aware that such was the feeling by which a great many naval officers were influenced.

41. Since the Crimean war, have you been employed exclusively in England?—No; I was employed at Malta for 20 months after the Russian war.

42. Are you employed in England now?—Yes; I am Commissary General in Chief at the War Office.

43. During the time you have been in that office, have you had no complaints at all of the way in which the transport service has been conducted on any occasion?—None of any consequence; none but trifling matters, that would occur in any service with the best management.

44. As a general rule, when you have sent in a demand for tonnage to the Admiralty, has the order been executed without delay, and without any interruption to the service?—Yes; it has been executed, I may say, with admirable efficiency. When the China war broke out it was necessary to make very important arrangements with regard to transport in that peculiar country, and we suggested to the Admiralty that two powerful steamers should be taken up and fitted exclusively for the conveyance of cattle; that they should be placed at the disposal of the Commissariat, but that the Admiralty should be responsible for the perfect efficiency and management of them. And I have never heard anything at all to show that that arrangement was not entirely satisfactory.

45. Colonel

45. Colonel *Dickson.*] You have stated that when you wanted to send out supplies, you made an indent for transports upon the Admiralty?—Yes.

46. How do they proceed to procure the necessary tonnage?—They charter the vessels by public advertisement, or in any other way that they may think most judicious under the existing circumstances of the case. I am not acquainted with the details. I consider it very important that a certain number of vessels should be told off for the exclusive service of the Commissariat, particularly for the conveyance of cattle. I prefer steam-vessels, because cattle require such great expedition and peculiar treatment on board ship as can only be secured with positive efficiency by steamers. I do not say that sailing vessels should not be used as auxiliary, but I would always give a preference to steamers. Although they are the dearest at first, they would be in the end very much the cheapest, for you would always get the supplies with regularity, and the saving of loss by deaths on board would more than compensate for any additional expense in the hire of those vessels.

47. You have stated that you had the entire charge at Constantinople?—Yes; the entire charge of the Commissariat arrangements.

48. Everything that was at Constantinople was in your charge?—Everything at Constantinople and in its vicinity.

49. There was a depôt of course?—There were very large depôts formed at Constantinople, and in the neighbourhood. At one time I had no less than from 50 to 60 ships thrown suddenly on my hands. They had been detained at the mouth of the Dardanelles by contrary winds. On a change of wind, after a period of about six or eight weeks, those vessels all came in, and I was extremely indebted to Sir Frederick Grey, and his staff, for the great assistance they rendered me in bringing alongside the different landing-places, and discharging the vessels that were consigned to me, even of vessels whose freights were included in the price of the supplies. Sir Frederick Grey went out of his way to oblige us, and by means of his cordial co-operation, an immense amount of difficulty and confusion was saved.

50. Of course when a vessel arrived at Constantinople with stores for the Crimea, you were aware of the contents of that vessel?—Yes, the bills of lading were transmitted to me, with some few accidental exceptions, by the earliest post; and on arrival, the masters were directed to wait upon me to receive my orders as to the disposal of the stores.

51. Was there not a story about some boots which had been taken backwards and forwards several times between Constantinople and the Crimea?—Yes; and I have no doubt it was true; but if these little failures are to be magnified, by means of "Times" correspondents, into a great crime, no one could be safe. I know this, that during the late French war in Italy, the failures that occurred there with regard to the French Transport Service exceeded many things that were very severely criticised as to our service.

52. You know nothing about the cases of the ships that were taken up as transports?—No, they were taken up under different circumstances; some by the month to be kept constantly in employment, and others by the trip.

53. Do you recollect a ship called the "Germania," that was employed, a large steamer?—No.

54. You say that great unanimity existed between the Commander in Chief and the Commissariat after the Commissariat vessels were put under the charge of the naval officers in command?—Under the Admiral Superintendent; there was very great unanimity with cordial co-operation on the part of Sir Frederick Grey and his staff.

55. Do you think that if the two services were kept entirely distinct there would be any jealousy on the part of the naval officers towards the Transport Service, if it were totally independent of them?—No, I cannot conceive that there would be any jealousy; there would be an absence of responsibility, in consequence of which probably the naval officers would not exert themselves, or put themselves so much out of the way as they would if that responsibility lay directly with the naval authorities. Instead of jealousy, they would be glad, I dare say, to get rid of the troublesome nature of the Commissariat duties.

56. Would it be, in your opinion, as safe to employ private vessels entirely for the transport of stores, as if they were carried in ships which belonged to the Admiralty; suppose, for example, one Commissariat officer delivering the goods on the one side, and another Commissariat officer who sees them on the other side,

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do you think the duty would be as efficiently performed, and that there would be the same responsibility felt?—They might, under ordinary circumstances, engage their own freights in time of peace, and the officer at the port of destination might clear the vessel and pay the freight, but that would never answer during war time. I think, even during peace, that it is far better to have one uniform system, a system managed under the Admiralty, with an individual and direct head, responsible for everything that occurs, enlarging his staff, of course, to suit peculiar emergencies.

57. *Chairman.*] Would you consider it advisable that transport of every kind should be under that one head?—All sea transport, I think, should. There is, however, a large amount of inland water transport which the Commissariat manage on all foreign stations; that does not come within the province of the Admiralty, but I think that all sea transport should, as a rule, be under the direct control of the Admiralty.

58. Sir *Michael Seymour.*] You mean both as to the Commissariat and as to troops?—Yes

59. Colonel *Dickson.*] You stated, I think, that upon one occasion you were very short of transports, particularly for cattle; at that time were there any men-of-war lying unemployed?—I can hardly bring forward any particular instance in which men-of-war were unemployed which could have carried cattle. There were but few lying in the Bosphorus when I was there; in fact they were only there occasionally, for they were generally employed off the Crimea. I cannot answer that question with any degree of precision.

60. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] Do you consider, from your experience in the Crimea, that the French managed their Commissariat department better than ourselves?—I had not any experience of French management in the Crimea, but I do not think that they did. They were better provided at the outset than we were, but we recovered ourselves ultimately, so as to place the Commissariat and every other department of the army upon a perfectly efficient footing, so that before the close of the war nothing could have been more satisfactory than the state to which things were brought. At first we were sorely cramped as to means for carrying on the war. There had been a pressure upon the country to keep down expenses connected with the army, and that pressure was seriously felt. We were not prepared to go to war on a sudden emergency; but when supplies, money, and other things became available to the full extent, everything was placed on an excellent footing, and I really cannot give the French credit for a larger amount of efficiency than we possessed.

61. With respect to cattle, was there not a different mode of proceeding in their Commissariat to what there was in ours; for example, in our case, the agreement or contract was, for the landing and delivering of the cattle on the coast, and in their case it was delivering the cattle in the camp, in a sound state; and was it not owing to the defective arrangements in our own Commissariat that the cattle delivered in the French camp were in a much more healthy and consumable state than those that were supplied to us, owing to the different mode of making the contract?—I do not think so; for I think it would have been impossible to get any man to undertake the delivery of the cattle into the camp in the Crimea at the crisis of 1854-55. I can scarcely conceive it possible, and I have never heard the idea started before, that the French were enabled to make arrangements for the delivery of cattle in a perfectly sound state in the heart of their camp, when we could not do it, for at that time no expense was spared at all events in furtherance of this particular object.

62. The difference, I believe, consisted in the contract that was made; in the one case, it was to deliver the cattle on board the ship, which was the contract, as I understand, that we made, and then to be brought to the Crimea, while, in the other case, the French contracted that the cattle should be landed at all events opposite the camp; but to be in a good state on landing?—A stipulation that

hould be delivered in good condition at the French camp was simply ble of fulfilment. There were no private means in Turkey by which indi- could have availed themselves of such a contract. I do not think that ich ever made such an arrangement. There was a great deficiency both and of sailing vessels then, while vessels of the country were very small, itable for the conveyance of cattle. I never recollect an instance in which ch beat us as to vessels, for we were always in advance of them on that point,

point, so much so, that we assisted them greatly in transporting their troops from France to the Crimea ultimately.

63. The great majority I believe were carried in the English bottoms?—Yes; and even some Admiralty transports were employed for that purpose; the "Vulcan" was one.

64. Mr. *Brooks.*] You have spoken of two systems for managing the transport service; was that system that worked so well at Constantinople established in the Crimea?—Yes; in the same way, under Admiral Freemantle; but I have no immediate cognizance of the working of it there.

65. It was not established by the Transport Board?—No; I do not think it was.

66. Have you formed any opinion as to how a Transport Board should be established, and as to who should be upon the Board?—I incline very much to the opinion, that the best way of securing efficiency is to have a well qualified individual at the head of the transport service, and, in fact, at the head of every other important service. I think that where you have direct individual responsibility you will always have efficiency with it. Boards are, I believe, to a very great extent, fallacious, and not susceptible of that direct control or responsibility which an individual is. You may enlarge an individual's staff, and give him every assistance that he requires; but I think that the responsibility should be centred in one person under the Admiralty.

67. Should that one person, in your opinion, be a civilian, or naval or military officer?—I should say, certainly, a naval man; for there are so many practical questions arising out of the transport service to be determined by the chief, that I think he ought to be a naval man.

68. Mr. *Longfield.*] Should he be a permanent officer, or only transitory?—Permanent.

69. In truth, it would require so much experience that a person who held the post only during the continuance in office of any Government would not gain the experience that was necessary to enable him to discharge its duties?—I think that permanency in the appointment would identify the individual more with the interests of the service.

70. You would have him, I suppose, subordinate to the Admiralty?—Yes.

71. Would you recommend that he should be a member of the Board so as to be co-ordinate or subordinate?—I do not know that I can give an opinion upon that point, but I think it would be a very useful arrangement that he should have access to the Board.

72. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] You have stated that you think all sea transport should be carried on under the jurisdiction and superintendence of an officer connected with the Admiralty department?—Yes.

73. But I think you said that for inland transport or river transport it was not necessary that it should be under the Admiralty?—No; it is generally confined to the local resources of the country.

74. Are you aware that Sir Hope Grant has spoken in very high terms of the assistance that he received from the navy in transporting the stores, and various matters which the troops required on their march to Pekin, up the Peiho; that the navy afforded him very considerable assistance in following the army, and furnishing them with supplies?—Yes; I am well aware that the army is highly indebted to naval officers for the great assistance and cordial co-operation which they afforded; but that is an exceptional case; you were going into an enemy's country, where you could scarcely reckon upon the means of the country being available, or the inhabitants feeling sufficiently secure in their own persons, to induce them to assist you with their boats, and such things; therefore the naval authorities undertook a great deal in that case that they would not have done in a time of peace, when the local resources of the country could be had for the hiring.

75. Are you aware that when they got beyond Nansing they were then obliged to have recourse to the country boats, and yet, still, that the officers of the navy who were appointed superintended that branch of the transport, and that it was that particular transport which Sir Hope Grant particularly alluded to?—Yes; that was the case. It has been brought under my observation in official despatches that the army were greatly indebted to the navy for the cordial co-operation and assistance afforded in places where naval officers could hardly be expected to be present.

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76. Does not that lead you to think, that wherever there is a question of water transport, whether inland or at sea, requiring naval co-operation and naval resources, it would always be advisable to have that branch of the transport placed under naval officers?—Yes; I certainly think so. Wherever naval officers can co-operate with naval resources, I think it is far better to put upon them the responsibility of providing transport for the army.

77. Sir *Michael Seymour.*] Are you aware that those boats that were worked by the navy on the Peiho River were hired by the Commissariat?—I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details, to say off-hand that they were, in the first instance, hired by the Commissariat. I think so, but I am certain that they were paid for by the Commissariat, and that they formed no portion of the naval responsibility as to expenditure. I think that one of the most laudable arrangements of Sir Hope Grant was that of providing his depôts in advance, before he made his way up the country, for he had a right to expect that the resources of the country would be entirely cut off by the enemy. It has been assumed in many quarters, that very little credit is due to the authorities for the manner in which the troops were supplied; but that is a very great mistake. The country proved, unexpectedly, bountiful in many things; but I may safely say, that the force could have gone to Pekin, even if the enemy had entirely devastated the country. There was an immense collection of supplies from neighbouring countries at the mouth of the Peiho. These were landed and formed into depôts, and as they were required, a continual stream of supply could have been kept up, even if the Tartars had cut off the resources of the country. I believe that their knowledge of our being thus provided prevented them from devastating the country, not only to our prejudice, but to the ruin of the country people. If the army had gone out there entirely dependent upon the resources of the country, and these had been cut off, it would have been just a second Crimean affair over again. It seems to be very little known, the immense labour, trouble, and arrangements that were rendered necessary for maturing the plans under which our forces went up to Pekin.

78. Mr. *Longfield.*] I will read to you an extract from the evidence of Sir Richard Airey, who was examined before this Committee last year: The first question is 1266, by Colonel Herbert: "It has been commonly said that the Commissariat broke down in the Crimea?—Yes. Would not it be more correct to say that there was no Commissariat to break down?—It was not an organized department." Is that so now?—That answer has, I think, reference to the transport service of the Commissariat, not to the general organization of the department.

79. Then is there now any organized Transport Department?—That is a duty which has been handed over to the Military Train, and it is at the present moment under consideration at the War Office, how the details of the transport service should be settled. The matter has not yet been finally settled. I have very strong opinions myself upon the subject, which I stated before Sir James Graham's Committee on Military Organization. I consider that the Commissariat should have the uncontrolled management and disposal of all the transport necessary for its own service, but under the system which has been laid down with regard to the Land Transport Corps, and subsequently to the Military Train, it transfers to a separate branch of the service the duty of conveying supplies to their destination which the Commissariat have to furnish. I think that a divided responsibility in this vital matter would be productive of immense difficulty, and probably total failure in a case of emergency.

80. Your opinion decidedly is, that the Commissariat should have the undivided control of all transport necessary for that branch of the service?—Yes, land transport.

81. Would not that entail two Transport Services?—It would; but the Commissariat Transport Service in time of war preponderates so immensely, that it would be utterly impossible, with any degree of efficiency, to delegate the power of collecting that transport, and managing it, to any other hands than the Commissary General. A small transport establishment, such as the military train now is, would be invaluable for purposes in immediate connection with the army; they could take from the commissariat depôts, to within range of the enemy's fire, the supplies that were required for immediate use, carry the sick and wounded, regimental baggage, and all those things. I contend, as I have always done,

done, in accordance with the opinions of officers of very high standing, that the Commissariat should possess entirely its own means of transport by land.

82. Referring to what you stated as to a naval officer, who you said should be the permanent head of transports, would he be the only head of the commissariat transport?—I am speaking now of land transport, not sea transport; and I stated that Sir Richard Airey must have meant land transport; a totally distinct question.

83. Is it not the fact that all transport is now extemporized by the Government, accordingly as there is a demand made for it?—No; I cannot say so, because they have a military train which costs upwards of 100,000*l.* a year, and was established as a nucleus for an extension of the arrangement in a time of war. Therefore I cannot say that they would have to extemporize arrangements required for an emergency.

84. For example, sending ten thousand troops to New Zealand, and a certain quantity of stores; is not that an extemporized arrangement?—Yes; but it would be quite impossible, in time of peace, to keep up anything like an establishment which would do for operations in New Zealand.

85. Sir Richard Airey was further asked at 1268, "No transport was organized by Her Majesty's Government for the army?—None. And it was not until the rude experience of the Crimea forced it upon their attention that Her Majesty's Government became cognizant that it was a necessary part of an army in the field?—It would appear so, certainly." Is that the fact?—It was partly so on that particular occasion, but if we go back to the Peninsular war we shall find that the Duke of Wellington, with the assistance of Sir Robert Kennedy, considered commissariat transport a most essential branch of military operations, and that he brought it to a state of high efficiency. It is no new idea to us that an efficient transport establishment is an essential part of army operations in the field; it is nothing new; but it was the absence of means for the purpose, and the reluctance to incur expense for the formation of those arrangements even after war was declared that produced an immense amount of delay and difficulty. In another part of his evidence Sir Richard Airey admits, I believe, that there were plenty of supplies in the harbour of Balaklava which could not be carried to the front for want of a road. He should have admitted amongst many other things, that the formation of that road was within the responsibility of his own department, and not unfairly have thrown the blame of failure on the commissariat. He knows, too, that the Quartermaster General could not find room for many transport arrivals which the commissariat had ready to bring from Varna to the Crimea.

86. Several witnesses have stated that it would be a great advantage to the service if some vessels, some of them said four, some five, and some said eight, of the size of the "Himalaya," were added to the navy generally to assist in transport?—That question has reference peculiarly to the conveyance of troops, a point upon which I am scarcely competent to give an opinion. It has no reference to the conveyance of commissariat supplies.

87. Colonel *Dickson.*] Do you think that the commissariat supplies you talk of would be better carried in transports belonging to the navy, or in ships taken up for that purpose?—I cannot conceive that there would be any great difference either in the one case or the other.

88. *Chairman.*] In fact it is a question of cost, is it not?—Almost entirely.

89. Mr. *Longfield.*] And that cost you have not given much attention to?—The cost we were always anxious to keep down, not only by preventing any unnecessary means being used, but in getting rid of those means that were not exactly required for the moment.

90. *Chairman.*] You stated, I think, that you thought the whole of the Transport Service ought to be under one head; do you include in that India?—We have no connexion departmentally with India; it is a separate and distinct service; but I have studied the question very much as a private individual on that particular point, and I think that one uniform system, including India, would be a great advantage to the service.

91. Do you think that that department ought to be kept distinct from all others, but to be under the control of the First Lord of the Admiralty?—I think it ought to be a distinct department, including India, and generally under the Admiralty.

92. I presume that you are aware that at present the Transport Service is conducted in connexion with the Victualling Department?—Yes, it is.

93. Do you think that they ought to be separated?—I think it is an advantage

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in peace that they should be connected, but in war, when the services would be increased to such an immense extent, it would be better, I think, to have them separate.

94. Why is it not advisable to have them separate in a time of peace?—Simply because one establishment can manage both departments, and thus save great expense.

95. If the whole of the Transport Service was placed under one head, there would be, of course, a great amount of business to be done by the Victualling Department, even in a time of peace?—There would be; but I think, with such a man as Sir Frederick Grey, Sir Houston Stewart, or Captain Eden, with a competent staff, chosen and kept in proper working order, there could be no difficulty in carrying it on.

96. When the Crimean war broke out, the Transport Service was conducted in a manner somewhat similar to that in which you recommend it should be conducted, was it not?—It was at home, I believe; but abroad, at Constantinople, and in the Crimea it was conducted somewhat differently. At first, as I said before, Admiral Boxer, who was sent out to Constantinople, was regarded more in the light of an Admiral Superintendent, and as being responsible more directly to the Admiralty than to the naval Commander in Chief on the spot.

97. You say that that did not work so well at first, upon the breaking out of the war?—As far as the commissariat service was concerned it did not, and great confusion arose.

98. Towards the latter part of the war you said that it was in better working order?—It was then as perfect as any system could be.

99. I suppose you are aware that towards the latter part of the war the system was entirely changed here from what it had been when the war broke out?—Yes; I am aware that a Transport Board was constructed at home.

100. It was under the direction of the Transport Board, was it not, that the state of efficiency which you have described was attained?—Yes. I believe that, with the experience of the first few months of the war every department connected with both army and navy was very much improved, and that it had its influence through the Transport Board, as to the Transport Service at Constantinople. I cannot speak as to the proceedings of the Transport Board at home; my observations were directed exclusively to those at Constantinople, which were of immense magnitude, and which were conducted with an admirable degree of efficiency.

101. Colonel *Dickson*.] Were you there when the Crimean war broke out?—No; I was then in the Ionian Islands, and I was sent on from there about a month previously to the war, to make preliminary arrangements for the reception of the troops on their arrival in Turkey.

102. At what date was that?—I arrived at Constantinople on the 12th of March 1854, just about a month before war was declared.

103. I suppose the fact is, that at the first commencement every department was taken rather aback; they did not expect to have had so much to do?—There was a lamentable degree of unpreparedness on the part of every department to meet an emergency of the kind. I was sent out to make the best possible arrangement I could at the end of a very severe winter, with the miserable resources of the country for my chief dependence.

104. But the moment that you had time to get into working order, everything began to improve?—Yes; everything did, after a certain time.

105. Sir *Michael Seymour*.] Did you undertake those duties without any precise instructions, and did you act upon your own judgment?—I had instructions from time to time; not very precise, I must confess; they were general instructions, and I was, subsequently, very well supported in carrying them out. I took upon myself a large amount of personal responsibility, which was not only justified, but for which I got great credit in the end.

106. Colonel *Dickson*.] How long before the army embarked for the Crimea did you think that they really meant to go there?—I cannot answer that question. I can hardly say, except this, that I was directed to make full inquiries as to the resources of the country, and to be prepared, on very short notice, to bring those resources into operation for the troops. The arrival of those instructions and the arrival of the troops were almost simultaneous; but having heard through the newspapers that the troops were expected up very shortly, I anticipated the orders, and laid in large supplies, obtained possession of the barracks at

Scutari

Scutari through the intervention of the Ambassador, and made arrangements by which the troops, when they arrived, were tolerably comfortable. *J. W. Smith, Esq., C.B.*

107. And all this entirely upon your own responsibility?—Yes; or rather I might say, with the concurrence of the ambassador. 19 March 1861.

108. But you acted merely from reports which you received, and not from any specific instructions?—Yes, just at first. As I said before, the instructions to me to provide for the troops arrived almost simultaneously with the troops themselves.

109. If you had not been prepared a little beforehand they would have been much worse off than they were?—Of course. They would have been obliged to be kept on board the ships until arrangements could have been made for them; but it would have been a dereliction of the duty I was expected to perform if I had not acted as I did.

Admiral *Robert Craigie*, called in; and Examined.

110. I BELIEVE there is some explanation which you desire to give to the Committee as to the evidence which you gave last Session?—No; not with regard to my own evidence, but with regard to a statement made by the Secretary. Admiral *R. Craigie.*

111. Sir *Michael Seymour.*] Will you state to the Committee what was the usual attendance of the Superintending Lord of the Transport Board; was it daily, or in what manner did he attend?—When the pressure became so heavy upon the Transport Service, and the department became so overworked at the end of 1854, and the beginning of 1855, Sir James Graham, then first Lord of the Admiralty, decided upon constituting a Transport Board, with a view of relieving the Comptroller of Victualling entirely of those duties, and confining those of the superintending Lord to the general supervision of the new department. When we first started Admiral Milne, the superintending Lord, visited us three or four times a week, but as we got into working order, his presence was not so often required, and he was consequently enabled to devote more time to his more legitimate duties at the Admiralty. The expression, however, of which Admiral Milne complains in Mr. Giffard's evidence is, that "the superintending Lord used not to come near the Transport Board for months; he could not, as his time was so much engaged at the Admiralty." That almost implies, that he neglected the supervision contemplated by Sir James Graham, but the fact was, that I saw Admiral Milne every day, and often twice a day, with reference to our Transport Service; his heavy duties, moreover, at the Victualling Office took him to Somerset House, on an average, four or five times a week, and on those occasions, he either came into the Transport Department, or sent a message to me to ascertain whether his presence was required.

112. *Chairman.*] In point of fact, was it not the case that the very formation of the Transport Board, necessarily relieved Admiral Milne of a very large amount of those duties?—Yes; I have had no communication with Mr. Giffard on the subject, but I am satisfied that he never meant to convey the impression which that evidence indicates, that the superintending Lord neglected the department, for no man could have more thoroughly appreciated Admiral Milne's industry and business habits than Mr. Giffard himself, nor could any man have been more sensible than Mr. Giffard of the able and energetic support that we received from Admiral Milne in every case of difficulty.

113. Was it not proverbial, when the war broke out, that the duties which devolved upon him, were such that, physically speaking, it was impossible for any man to stand them?—His fault was not that he neglected anything, but that he undertook too much.

114. Is there anything that you desire to add to your evidence of last Session, bearing upon the subject of our inquiry?—There is one little explanation with regard to a suggestion that I made as to a clause to be added in the mail contracts, which I submitted to the Duke of Somerset, and with the permission of the Committee I will read it: "With reference to the suggestion that I made in reply to Question 3187, that a clause might be added to our contracts with the great mail companies, calling upon them to furnish, when necessary, a certain amount of shipping for the transport of troops, &c., your Grace is doubtless aware that a clause with that object already exists, but the additional stipulation that the said Commissioners in the case of hiring any such vessel, shall return the same to the said Company in the same state and condition that she was in at the time of any such

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such hiring, proved one of the first difficulties that we had to encounter; the returning of the ships in the same state and condition as they were when hired, virtually operated as an insurance, which, in time of war, amounted to a very large sum, and yet we were paying the mail companies the same rate of hire charged for other vessels of the same class, without any such stipulation; we therefore took the earliest opportunity of cancelling all the engagements under which mail ships had been taken up, and formed charter parties for each ship, excluding the insurance."

115. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Have you given your consideration to the question of the transport of troops to India, now that the Indian army is merged into the Queen's army?—I cannot say that I have; it has never been called to my attention.

116. *Chairman.*] Do you think it would be advisable that the transport of all troops, whether to India or to any other place, should be under one head?—In my answer on the last occasion, I said that the Indian officials had done their work so well, that it might be hazardous to take it from them, but I see no reason why the transport of all troops should not be under one head.

117. Could the Board, of which you are the chairman, have done that business?—I think they could.

118. Without interfering in any way with their other duties?—I think so.

Jovis, 11°.*die Aprilis*, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Thomas George Baring.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Brooks.	Mr. Lindsay.
Mr. Dalglish.	Mr. Longfield.
Colonel Dickson.	Lord Clarence Paget.
Admiral Duncombe.	Sir Michael Seymour.
Mr. Jackson.	Sir Frederic Smith.

WILLIAM SCHAW LINDSAY, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

Captain *Charles Eden*, R.N., C.B., called in; and Examined.

Captain C. *Eden*, R.N., C.B.

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119. *Chairman.*] LAST Session, when you gave us evidence, you lodged a return of the comparative cost of employing private transports, and removing the troops in transports belonging to the Government?—Yes.

120. I believe you desire to correct that return in some points?—Since this Committee last met, I have ascertained that the document which I then put in as evidence was not correct. I have prepared a corrected one, and I have made it a little more complete by adding the insurance on those ships, and if you will allow me, I will now put that return in as the corrected one. (*The Witness delivered in the same.*) *Vide* Appendix.

121. You give in this return as an accurate return of the cost to the country of the "Himalaya" and the "Perseverence," belonging to the Government, and the cost to the country of the hire of the "Indiana"?—Yes; I believe that to be perfectly correct. I have taken great pains in trying to get it so.

122. The total cost, by this return, of transporting 350 men in the "Indiana" appears to be 9,450 *l.*, instead of 15,000 *l.*, as given in your former return?—Yes.

123. In this return, I see that you have also taken into consideration the question of insurance?—Yes.

124. Amounting on the "Himalaya" to 2,600 *l.* per annum?—No; it is more than 2,600 *l.* per annum; it is 2,600 *l.* on the 74 days; it is calculated, I think, at one-fifth of a year.

125. Then the insurance is calculated, not per annum, but upon this particular service?—Yes. Supposing the ship to be insured at 10 per cent., I take the proportion of that for the 74 days.

126. I see that you have also made an allowance of 3,132 *l.* for tear and wear to the ship?—Yes.

127. Mr. *Jackson.*] Are all your calculations based upon the 74 days?—Yes.

128. *Chairman.*] Have you taken into consideration casualties?—No.

129. You are aware that Her Majesty's ships, as well as all other ships, are liable to casualties at times?—Yes.

130. Have you taken into consideration in this estimate the time that the "Himalaya" is laid up?—Not in that estimate, because I cannot tell how long the "Indiana" might be laid up either.

131. How will this estimate then give a correct account of the cost to the country of transporting troops in Her Majesty's ships, as compared with transporting troops in hired ships, if you do not take into consideration the cost to the country of the "Himalaya" while she is not employed?—But I have calculated that merely to illustrate on one particular voyage the expense that it is to the country of carrying in a troop ship, and the expense to the country of carrying in a hired ship.

132. Suppose that this Committee desired to know whether it was more economical to employ private merchant ships for the transport of troops, or to have transports belonging to the Admiralty, would they from this return be able to ascertain whether it was cheaper to the country or otherwise, to employ private vessels?

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vessels?—I illustrate the expense of one voyage; I cannot tell you to what extent it might be necessary to carry the troops, how many there might be to remove.

133. Upon the broad question, are you of opinion that it is more economical to have a certain number of Government transports than to employ merchant vessels?—I cannot state as to the economy, but I am quite sure that it is absolutely necessary that there should be a certain number of Government troop ships.

134. Are you aware that upon that point Admiral Milne, who was your predecessor in office, was examined before the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy?—Yes.

135. I presume you are also aware that he has had very great experience in questions of this nature, having been for 13 years Superintending Lord of the Transport Department at the Admiralty?—Yes.

136. I ask the question, because I myself was a member of that Commission, and a witness last Session gave us an extract from the evidence of Admiral Milne, which is to be found in the Appendix to the Evidence on the Transport Service, of the relative cost to the country of hiring private vessels, and of Her Majesty's transports. In that estimate it appears that the cost of transporting a certain number of troops, which are specified, was 13,217*l.*, but that the cost to the country of transporting the same number of troops in Her Majesty's troop ship "Vulcan," would have been 27,863*l.*, so that by his calculation it appears that the cost to the country of employing Her Majesty's troop ships is double, or rather more than double, what it was in employing private vessels. He also gives another estimate, based upon actual work done, by which it appears that the cost of the transport of troops in private steam ships amounted to 14,155*l.*, and that the transport of the same troops in Her Majesty's ship the "Megæra," would have cost 28,348*l.* Can you account for the great difference between his estimate and his calculations, and those which you have just lodged?—No; I have taken great pains with those figures to see that they are accurate, and of course they are diametrically at variance with the evidence of Admiral Milne.

137. The return which you have lodged upon that particular voyage, shows that it would be more economical to employ Her Majesty's transports?—Yes.

138. How many troop ships have you at the present moment?—Six.

139. Where are they at present?—The "Himalaya" is in England, the "Megæra" is carrying troops to Gibraltar, the rest are in China.

140. So that there are only two upon the home station?—At present.

141. Have you been obliged therefore for the purposes of meeting the annual exchange of the troops to hire private vessels?—To foreign stations?

142. No; for the annual transfer of the troops; for instance, between England and Malta, between the Mediterranean and the North American station, and for the transport of troops along the coast; the exchanges which are usually taking place annually?—Along the coast we have.

143. Since you have held office, or rather since those four transports were in China, have you been compelled to employ private vessels for the transport of troops between the Mediterranean and the North American stations, or to the Mediterranean from England?—We have to New Zealand; there is one vessel going out now; that has been the principal move.

144. Have you performed those usual annual services by means of the two vessels which you have at home, or have you been obliged to hire vessels for that purpose?—We have been obliged to hire vessels for the New Zealand service, and there is one vessel now taken up, but I am not aware of any others. Mr. Willis, whom you will examine presently, will perhaps be able to answer that question. I cannot name, in fact, during the last two years, any particular vessel; I have no recollection of them.

145. When you recommend that the Government should have a certain number of troop ships, what number would you limit them to?—I think that they ought not to have less than eight powerful ones.

146. That is two more than they have at the present time?—Yes.

147. And would you substitute for those inferior vessels as they wear out, such vessels as the "Himalaya"?—Or rather smaller than the "Himalaya."

148. Would you recommend that those vessels should be kept for what we may call the home stations?—The Mediterranean, the West Indies, North America, and the Cape of Good Hope.

149. You

149. You would recommend that they should be sent as far as the Cape of Good Hope at times?—Yes.

150. But, as a general rule, would you think it desirable that those vessels should proceed to China, and New Zealand, and on those distant voyages?—No; I would rather take up merchant vessels for those voyages.

151. Would you require eight transports for the ordinary business of transport in time of peace for doing the service which you recommend should be done?—To do it efficiently, I think so.

152. You have been doing a very large amount of work apparently with only two vessels just now?—No; the troops are now in arrears in the reliefs, waiting for other vessels; some are coming back from China. It would have been a convenience to the service if we had had more vessels in the Channel at this moment to move the troops.

153. Would you have eight vessels similar to the "Himalaya," constantly employed throughout the whole year in the Mediterranean and home services?—It must depend so entirely upon the demand from the War Office for the removal of troops and warlike stores, that I can hardly answer that question.

154. Colonel *Dickson.*] You have said, I think, that you would not use those transports for China?—I think myself that it would be advisable for those very distant parts of the world to send the troops by hired vessels.

155. For the regular Indian reliefs you think that there should be hired vessels?—I think so.

156. For the regular periodical reliefs along the coast on our own shores between England, Ireland and Scotland, would you employ troop ships, or would you send the troops as passengers on board the regular vessels which are plying between those ports?—I think it would be better in every way to send them by the troop ships.

157. And more economical?—I cannot answer that question exactly, because it requires calculation. I state what I consider to be for the benefit of the service and the benefit of the troops.

158. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] You consider probably in making your calculation of the number of Government transports, that we must always allow for one or more being under repair and being useless?—Certainly; under repair, not available at the moment.

159. Mr. *Longfield.*] Can you give us any idea of the proportions between what are called the smaller and shorter distance reliefs, and the distant reliefs, such as the Indian?—I cannot, because it depends entirely upon the demands from the War Office.

160. Have you no documents which would enable you to supply the proportions between the shorter distance reliefs and the distant reliefs?—That must come from the War Office or the Horse Guards; they would be able to furnish that. I cannot.

161. Mr. *Brooks.*] In the estimate which you have put in of the expenses of the "Himalaya" you have calculated the passage exactly as a 74 days' passage?—Yes; I have taken the number of days that each ship was on the passage. There was again the advantage of the "Himalaya" performing the service in 10 days shorter time than the other.

162. Were not the men employed and victualled some days before that vessel sailed?—Yes; she is in commission.

163. Would it not have been desirable to have included in the time that she was employed the number of days between her being taken up and her sailing?—The "Himalaya" was not taken up at all, the "Himalaya" is a ship in commission, which might have been employed on some service the week before that, she is available at any moment.

164. If she was only employed for those particular 74 days, and was not employed in preparing for that particular voyage before, you would be perfectly correct; but if she was some time preparing, it would be otherwise?—But I am not aware that she was any time preparing.

165. It is usual, I believe, for ships to be some time preparing?—They some times can be ready in 48 hours to receive their troops.

166. Mr. *Longfield.*] Has the "Himalaya" ever been out of commission since the time she was purchased?—I believe never, except at this moment for a few days.

167. Mr. *Jackson.*] I have just run through the statement which you have put

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put in, and find that the price per man by the "Himalaya" amounts to about 17 *l.*; by the "Perseverance" to 20 *l.*; and by the "Indiana" 23 *l.*, the first being 74 days, the second 84 days, and the third 92 days on the route. You do not seem to have added to the calculations the cost of the outfit of the "Himalaya," except for provisions and stores?—There is the wear and tear calculated.

168. Only on the 74 days. Would it not be fairer to take from the time at which the ship was ordered to be ready, till the time when she was again ready for another operation, as the period for which she was employed on this particular service?—But I have no reason to believe that she was not ready the day after she returned; she is always ready.

169. Still a steam ship has to be overhauled on coming into dock?—Not after every voyage.

170. But you have made no allowance for the outfit?—I have only allowed for the wear and tear on the original cost.

171. At what have you taken that?—At eight per cent., and the insurance at 10 per cent.

172. Have you any idea what the "Himalaya" cost the Government?—Yes; that is in evidence, I believe; but I have it here; it was 130,000 *l.*

173. You have allowed nothing for the interest of capital upon that?—No.

174. That should be added to the 14,749 *l.*, being the gross amount of what you make the voyage for the 74 days, to have cost the public?—I have not made any calculation beyond that which I have given.

175. When you took the "Indiana," and paid this sum of money 9,450 *l.*, the Government had no risk beyond that amount; there was nothing further to pay?—There was nothing further to pay.

176. That amount discharged all obligations?—Yes, I believe so.

177. And cleared the Government of all responsibility?—I believe so.

178. Therefore, when we pay 23 *l* for each man, we know that the Government has no more to pay?—Just so.

179. But as you have not added the interest of the cost of the vessel at the rate of four per cent. upon 130,000 *l.*, from the time she was first taken up, to the time when she got back again, and started upon another operation, that would very materially increase the 14,749 *l.*?—Do you know by what?

180. About 1,200 *l.* I think, roughly speaking?—Yes.

181. Admiral *Duncombe.*] Is it not the fact that with the "Himalaya" and the other Government transports, when once fitted, they are always ready for service for the conveyance of troops?—At any moment.

182. In point of fact there is not any expense incurred on each voyage by you as there is in a taken-up vessel in preparing her?—Or in the fittings.

183. In point of fact, in vessels which are taken up for a special service, there is a great expense incurred in fitting them for that service, is there not?—Yes, in fitting them for carrying troops.

184. And of course as soon as their services are ended, and the ships are no longer required, the cost of those fittings is lost to the country?—Yes; it depends upon how the vessel is taken up, whether the owners have to fit, or whether the Government put the fittings up.

185. But I apprehend that if the owners have to fit, you pay them for it?—Of course, that is considered.

186. So that those fittings and that expense are lost to the country as soon as the vessel is done with?—Yes.

187. But in the case of a Government transport her fittings remain, and enable the vessel to be ready again for immediate service?—Yes.

188. And I believe I am right in supposing that since the "Himalaya" has been in Her Majesty's service until now, she has never been out of commission, but has been constantly employed in the conveyance of troops?—I believe constantly; and if the Committee would like to hear it, I could tell them the number of troops that the "Himalaya" has carried within what we term her last commission; she was paid off, and recommissioned immediately.

189. Mr. *Longfield.*] Does the statement from which you are about to speak include the number of miles?—It gives the number of miles also. The "Himalaya" between July 1858 and March 1861 has carried 36,757 men; she has carried 6,380 tons of stores, and she has gone over 87,581 miles.

190. With those troops and stores?—Yes.

191. Could not you institute a better comparison than the one you have to-day handed

handed in, by taking the conveyance in the same period of time of 36,000 troops by contract, and the mileage also?—No, because it depends upon what the vessels are offered at; everything is done by open tender in taking up the transports, and I cannot tell at what prices they may be offered; I cannot make that calculation.

192. Mr. *Jackson.*] Since the "Himalaya" has been in commission, has she always been at work?—I believe constantly.

193. Has she never had any delay for repairs?—Of course; but I mean to say that she has always been in commission, and ready to work.

194. And always within a few days ready to go to sea?—I believe so.

195. Has she never had great repairs upon her machinery to detain her long?—I should have to go back to the Controller's office to get a return of that; I cannot tell for the last seven years the number of days that she may have been detained in the dockyard for repairs.

196. Looking at the average working of large steamers, has she not had a great over-hauling during that time?—From what I recollect, I do not think that she has been so much in dock as other vessels.

197. Could a return be got of the number of days that she has been lying in dock undergoing repair?—It could be furnished by the Controller of the Navy.

198. In order to contrast the case of the "Himalaya" against hired steamers, I think it would be necessary to show how many days she has been laid up undergoing repair?—If the Committee would allow me to state one great advantage which I consider we have in these Government troop ships, it is this: supposing the Government wanted to move 1,000 men in a hurry, we will say to any part, even of the United Kingdom, if they were to be moved by merchant vessels, we should have to advertise for tenders; we must give seven or eight days' notice in the public papers; when the tenders come in, the vessel selected has to be surveyed, and has to be fitted for carrying these troops; the delay which would take place before we should get the troops on board probably would be three weeks. The service would have been done, and perhaps 10,000 men carried by one of the Government troop ships in the meantime. I look upon that as a very great feature.

199. No doubt it is, but that is always supposing that you have troop ships at command, and that they are not carrying troops elsewhere, or performing other duties?—Yes.

200. And what you mean is, that as one vessel went out, you would have another ready for the service in case of any emergency?—I would always have two vessels in the Channel ready in case of any emergency.

201. *Chairman.*] But for performing the ordinary service in time of peace, do you receive your orders from the War Office of vessels being required immediately, or do they not give you a fortnight or 10 days' notice?—For moving troops foreign?

202. In the ordinary service?—Of course it does not signify for any great distance; there is usually plenty of time given.

203. Sir *Michael Seymour.*] It has been proposed by the Admiralty to add two new steam transports for the Transport Service?—Yes.

204. Is that to replace tonnage?—To replace two vessels which have been lost.

205. It is probably considered right, as you have just now said, never to be without the means of moving a certain number of troops at a given moment?—Certainly.

206. And without having the delay which would otherwise arise if there were no means of moving them?—Yes.

207. Can you give any data as to the amount of transport tonnage needed by the Government. Have you any means of saying what it should be?—I cannot tell; we only answer the demand made on us by the War Office or the Horse Guards.

208. Mr. *Jackson.*] The demand is never very sudden for the Home Service, is it?—It is very sudden sometimes.

209. *Chairman.*] During peace?—Yes, it has been so within this last month on two occasions, so much so that it was necessary to move a regiment in a frigate.

210. Mr. *Jackson.*] Would it be necessary to have one of the great steamers plying between Liverpool and Dublin, or between Holyhead and Dublin, surveyed before you put troops in her?—It is the rule; no troops are embarked in a vessel until after a survey has been taken on her.

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211. Mr. *T. G. Baring.*] I suppose the recent demands which you have mentioned were for the militia to be disembodied?—Yes; they were obliged to be disembodied by a given day; it was necessary that they should return to their own country.

212. Mr. *Jackson.*] Was it not possible for the War Office to give the Admiralty notice that on a given day they were going to disembody those militia, and to ask them to be prepared with steamers, either mercantile or Government, for them?—That I cannot answer.

213. It does not belong to your department?—It does not belong to my department.

214. Mr. *Longfield.*] In a prudential point of view do you think it essential that we should have the power of quickly relieving any position?—Most certainly.

215. I will take Malta, the Ionian Islands, Gibraltar, the Cape, and the West Indies; you think it essential?—I think it absolutely necessary.

216. And you think that that is so important a thing that the element of economy should be kept rather in the back ground than otherwise?—I do.

217. The distant places cannot be either threatened suddenly, or relieved suddenly?—Under ordinary circumstances I should say that it would be better to send out the troops in hired vessels to those distant parts of the world.

218. Private competition would be sufficient in those cases, and would be more useful?—Yes.

219. But for our home possessions and the nearer parts, you think prudence outweighs every other consideration?—Yes.

220. And rapidity of relief there counterbalances first any small saving?—Certainly.

221. Considering the present circumstances, do you think that it would be sufficient merely to possess the two additional vessels of which you have spoken?—I have my doubts whether they would be enough, but I think it absolutely necessary that there should be those two.

222. Would you build or buy?—I would buy.

223. Mr. *Jackson.*] Has it ever occurred that the "Himalaya" has come in from sea one day, and returned the same day or the next?—Yes, it has; and I believe frequently.

224. Colonel *Dickson.*] I believe the "Himalaya" was not built in a Government Dock Yard?—No; she was purchased from the Peninsular and Oriental Company.

225. Mr. *Jackson.*] She was built in London?—Yes; at the Thames Iron Company's works, I think.

226. And the amount of repair upon the "Himalaya" has been upon the average less than upon other steamships?—I cannot answer that question.

227. But she has done more work?—She appears to me to have done more work, and always to have been more ready than any ship I ever knew, and the troops have always been carried with very great comfort; in fact, she is a great favourite with them as a transport.

228. Do you attribute that to her particular build, or to the meritorious conduct of the men in command?—A great deal is to be attributed to the latter; but I think the lofty decks, and the good accommodation on board, have a good deal to do with it; she has been, I may say most certainly, during the last three years, most efficiently commanded; I do not know that she has not been so before that.

229. *Chairman.*] Can you give a return of the number of days for which each of Her Majesty's troop ships was employed throughout the course of the year, for the last 10 years, exclusive of the two years of the Crimean War, and the one year of the China war; during the years of peace?—I will see if I can obtain it.

230. Mr. *Longfield.*] Would the vessels which you wish the Government to possess, be of the same class as the "Himalaya"?—Rather smaller.

231. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] To carry a battalion?—One thousand men.

232. How many men do you consider the "Himalaya" calculated to carry?—he has carried as many as 1,500, but that was a short voyage; it was from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

233. *Chairman.*] Have you any further information which you could give to the Committee with regard to the main question into which we are now inquiring?—I think none in addition to what I gave last Session.

234. You

234. You are the Superintending Lord of the Transport and Victualling Department?—Yes.

235. Do you think that it would be advisable to separate those departments?—I believe it would; it would relieve both.

236. Are you of opinion that it would be advisable to have transports of all kinds, as regards the conveyance of troops or stores, either to India or to the Mediterranean, or other places, under one department?—All the hired transports.

237. But you are of opinion that the troop ships should still be entirely under the control of the Admiralty?—Yes, entirely under the control of the Admiralty.

238. Colonel *Dickson.*] If a calculation were made, without having reference to tenders, of what would be a fair rate per mile to pay for the transport and victualling on board of troops, could not arrangements be made with private companies which would insure a superior class of vessels being always ready for that purpose?—I do not know whether they would agree to it; we might make the offer, but we do not know what the answer might be; I cannot say what they might consider fair.

239. Supposing an agreement was made of that sort, do you not think it would insure a superior class of merchant vessels being always ready to be employed on an emergency?—I cannot answer that question.

240. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] You mean that, as a matter of economy and efficiency, you are not prepared to say what would be the effect of such an arrangement?—I am not.

241. Admiral *Duncombe.*] Have you seen any reason to modify or alter your opinion as given in evidence last year as to what you conceive ought to be the method of conducting the Transport Service of the country, by having an independent Board, but under the regulations of the Admiralty?—No.

242. You still hold the same opinion as you then gave in evidence?—I do.

William Willis, Esq., called in; and Examined.

243. *Chairman.*] IN the evidence which you gave before this Committee last year, you stated that you had made various calculations as to the relative cost of hiring vessels, and employing Her Majesty's troop ships, and you lodged a paper, which appears in the Appendix to the Report of the Evidence of last Session, page 278; I see that you base your calculations, so far as Her Majesty's ships are concerned, upon the desirability of purchasing such ships, for instance, as the "Great Britain," which you named?—That calculation had reference to the transport of troops to and from India only; not to Colonial services.

244. We will take it upon the question of India. I see that in this paper you estimate that, in the transport to and from India of 12,000 officers and men, there would be a saving to the country, by employing Her Majesty's troop ships, of 150,000*l.*, or thereabouts, per annum; is that correct?—About that. I have slightly altered that statement, and request the Committee to allow me to hand in a revised statement, based on the prices of the two new vessels which are proposed to be purchased for the Government Service. (*The Witness delivered in the same.*)

Vide Appe

245. As regards Her Majesty's troop ships, have you in this estimate taken into consideration insurance?—Not in that estimate. I have prepared a separate calculation of insurance, but I have not included it in that estimate.

246. Have you allowed for tear and wear?—Fully.

247. How much?—I have taken the rates on the vessels which I propose for the Indian service at the same amount as the Comptroller of the Navy takes with regard to Her Majesty's troop ships, namely, about 8½ per cent. on the repair of hull, masts and yards, and from 10 to 12 per cent. on machinery.

248. Have you allowed anything for interest of capital invested in those ships?—Not in that calculation; but I have prepared a separate statement of it.

249. We will confine it to the paper which is now before us; as to the transport from India; you have not taken into consideration interest of capital?—Not in that return which I have just handed in.

250. Have you taken into consideration casualties to which Her Majesty's ships are liable, as well as all other ships?—I apprehend that if I provide for wear and tear, and insurance, it covers all casualties.

251. P

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251. Have you taken in consideration the time that Her Majesty's ships are laid up while under repair?—Yes; because I have considered that these vessels would be home for four months in each year unemployed.

252. In this account, have you debited the country with the cost of those vessels which are so laid up?—Yes; I have taken the full annual cost of those ships.

253. You have based your calculations upon the assumption that those vessels will be full of troops going out, and full coming home?—Quite so.

254. Then, by what you have stated, there are various charges to which those vessels would be subjected which you have not included?—I have not included them in the statement which I have put before you at this moment; but I have a separate statement of that.

255. Do you desire to lodge that other statement?—I have not yet prepared a statement in a condition to give in; but I can mention the result of it.

256. Will you do so?—Yes; the evidence which I gave before the Committee last Session principally had reference to the comparative economy of employing Her Majesty's troop ships upon colonial services, instead of hiring merchant vessels, as well as on the question of substituting a new line of Her Majesty's troop ships for the present practice of hiring merchant vessels for performing the relief services to and from India.

257. Having made out another statement, were not you satisfied with the accuracy of the statement which you gave to the Committee last Session?—I was generally satisfied with its accuracy, but I had not the same data as to the cost of private vessels as I now have from the vote taken in the Estimates of this year.

258. Are you still of opinion that there would be a saving to the country of 150,000 *l.*, or thereabouts, by employing Her Majesty's troop ships, instead of hiring vessels?—On the conveyance of troops to and from India?

259. Yes?—Yes, I am, about 165,000 *l.*; exclusive of replacement of capital, with interest, and insurance.

260. But I suppose that in making a calculation of that nature, you would take into consideration insurance, because I suppose that Her Majesty loses ships as well as private individuals?—I presume she does, and she has lost in various years five ships; but I understand that the practice of large mercantile companies is, to a great extent, not to insure; that the Peninsular and Oriental Company do not insure; that the Royal Mail Company do not insure; that the General Steam Navigation Company do not insure; that Messrs. Smith of London do not insure; that Mr. Richard Green does not insure; that Messrs. Brocklebank, Messrs. Pollock & Gilmour of Liverpool, Messrs. Smith & Sons of Glasgow, and Messrs. Davy & Co. of Menai Bridge, do not insure. There are other firm swhich I am informed only partially and occasionally insure.

261. Do you not think that those firms whom you have named, if they do not insure, keep an insurance fund?—That is quite probable; I know that the Peninsular and Oriental Company reserve 5 per cent. per annum.

262. They become their own underwriters?—Certainly, because the money remains in their coffers.

263. If one of Her Majesty's ships goes to the bottom, who loses?—A vote must be obtained from the House of Commons to replace her.

264. Then is it not as broad as it is long, if you pay 10,000 *l.* a year for insurance, and in 10 years lose 100,000 *l.*?—Certainly; and I think it is quite right that insurance should be taken into account in these comparative statements.

265. Therefore, in the estimate of the relative cost to the country of employing Her Majesty's troop ships, and hiring private vessels, you will admit that the question of insurance ought to be taken into consideration?—Certainly.

266. And further, I suppose you will admit that the question of interest of capital ought to be taken into consideration?—If it is to be viewed entirely as a mercantile matter, I certainly do.

267. But viewed as a national matter, if the Government want money, I suppose they are obliged to pay interest for it?—If a strict account is to be prepared of the actual cost of this staff of Government shipping, as compared with employing mercantile shipping for similar services, undoubtedly the redemption of the capital invested in those ships, interest on capital, and insurance, should be taken into account.

268. In what respect does the estimate before you differ from the one which you lodged in evidence last Session?—It differs first in the price of the vessels; I do not recollect what price I then gave, but I have now taken the prices at which the two vessels proposed to be bought are estimated in the votes of the present year. It differs also in one further respect, that I find in the former statement, a very large number of troops were shown as going out to China, Mauritius, and Ceylon, principally in 1857, on account of the Indian mutiny, but hardly any as coming home; I consider that that was not a fair basis on which to prepare a statement of the outward service to those stations; and had the statement been extended one year further, we should have found even larger numbers coming home. At this moment, there are on their passage from China 4,560 troops, and there are in garrison at the four northern stations to be brought home upwards of 5,000, besides 2,000 at Hong Kong, the greater portion of whom will return to this country; therefore I consider that very nearly equal numbers would be brought home from those stations in the average every year with those sent out.

269. Does the paper before you differ in any other respect from the one which you have already lodged?—I think not; I may mention one other respect with regard to the colonial services; I formerly included a slight saving of about 14,000 *l.* a year in the pay of the troops, during the shorter passages which they would make in Her Majesty's steam ships than in hired sailing vessels; but I have excluded that now, not thinking it probable that that saving would in fact be realized.

270. You have still based your calculation upon the understanding that Her Majesty's ships would be full of troops both to India and from India?—Yes.

271. And you have left out of your calculation, as I understand you, insurance and interest?—With regard to India, the saving which I have shown in the paper before you is 165,000 *l.* a year; deducting the insurance and interest from that, you would have to take away nearly 80,000 *l.* a year, leaving a saving of about 85,000 *l.* a year.

272. Then your saving, instead of being 165,000 *l.*, is only 85,000 *l.*?—It is about 85,000 *l.*

273. Presuming that the ships which took out a full complement of troops only brought home half that number, would that make any alteration in your calculations?—It would make a difference in the calculation.

274. Consequently it would reduce your reduced estimate of gain?—Yes.

275. If Her Majesty's ships were to meet with any casualties, would not that be likely to reduce the profit?—I think I mentioned that I considered we had made a full provision for casualties.

276. Have you taken into consideration in this new calculation the time when these ships are not employed?—I have assumed that the ships would perform one voyage to India, so as to arrive there in the cool season of the year; that they would return again with troops, and would remain at home unemployed for about four months, until the proper season again arrived for their regular outward voyage.

277. Have you taken into your calculation the cost to the country of those ships during these four months?—Certainly; I have taken the whole annual cost.

278. What have you allowed for the numerous current expenses connected with the ships, such as pilotage, and port charges, and various incidental expenses?—I have taken them at about 100 *l.* a voyage.

279. Do you think that 100 *l.* would cover those numerous incidental expenses?—It is a subject on which I have no information, but I apprehend that the cost which we have taken here for wear and tear is so excessive, that it would amply cover anything of that sort.

280. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] I presume you remember that the Government ships do not pay port charges; they only pay pilotage?—That is quite true.

281. *Chairman.*] Is it not as broad as it is long; do not the country lose; if Her Majesty's ships do not pay port charges, does it not fall indirectly upon the country; if Her Majesty's ships are relieved, and if by their being relieved, the harbour trustees at the different places which those vessels frequent are consequently obliged to enhance the rates to the private ships, does not it in reality fall upon the country?—I am not aware of the principle upon which the harbour commissioners act as to what revenue they wish to raise.

282. I suppose you are aware that the harbour trustees are obliged to raise sufficient revenue to maintain the harbours, and that if they do not derive it from Her Majesty's ships of war, they must derive it from other sources, from other

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vessels frequenting the harbours?—I am not at all aware of the principle upon which they act, or whether they raise barely sufficient revenue, or more than enough.

283. You are aware at all events that harbour commissioners are obliged to have sufficient funds to maintain the harbours?—I presume so; but I am not aware whether it is possible that they might raise more than sufficient.

284. We have looked at the one side of the account, we will look at the other. I see that in your calculations on the other side of the account you assume that the rate per head for sending troops to India is 14 *l.* 10 *s.*; you base your calculations upon that?—I do.

285. Where did you get that information?—It was obtained from a Return to the House of Commons, dated 24th May 1860, No. 330; the rate there is quoted at 14 *l.* 10 *s.* per head out, and 32 *l.* 8 *s.* per head home.

286. Is it stated where that information is obtained?—It was obtained, I believe, by Mr. Hammack, who prepared a statement on the mortality and statistics of the Indian army.

287. Who is Mr. Hammack?—The assistant superintendent of the statistical department in the Registrar General's Office, and he states that it was furnished to him from the India Office.

288. Since you gave us evidence we have had before this Committee the head of the Transport Department connected with India, Mr. Mason; he has given us a return which appears in the Appendix, page 319, of the cost of sending troops to India for the last ten years in private ships, Taking 1850, which is the first year that he gives, instead of the cost to the country being 14 *l.* 10 *s.* upon which you have based your calculations, I find that to Calcutta it is only 7 *l.* 5 *s.* 10 *d.*, just one half, 8 *l.* 1 *s.* to Madras, and 7 *l.* 11 *s.* 7 *d.* to Bombay?—The figures which I have adopted are said by Mr. Hammack to have been furnished to him from the India Office, and I presume therefore they are correct. I observe also that whereas the rates quoted at page 319 for 1850 are as you state, in the year 1853 I find some rates of 17 *l.* 19 *s.*, 18 *l.* 9 *s.*, 23 *l.*, 25 *l.*, and so on, and probably looking through the Returns, if they were analysed, we should find enough to bring it up to the rate here quoted.

289. It so happens that Mr. Mason has given a Return of the cost to the country during the last ten years, which will be found at page 330; the average cost to the country during the last ten years has not been 14 *l.* 10 *s.* as you have estimated, but it has been to Calcutta 11 *l.* 7 *s.* 3 *d.*, to Madras 11 *l.* 13 *s.* 2 *d.*, and to Bombay 11 *l.* 6 *s.* 6 *d.* In those ten years, as you are aware, there was in 1854 and 1855 an immense demand for ships on account of the Crimean war, and the rates were raised in those years far above the average of any previous years; there was also in 1857, as you are aware, a very large demand for ships to India on account of the unfortunate mutiny. So that even including those three years of great demand the average price is more than 3 *l.* less than you give it. Will that alter your calculations as to the relative cost of employing Her Majesty's ships and private ships?—The rates quoted at page 330 I apprehend must refer to sailing vessels only, because I find immediately below, a statement of the rates for steamers which to Calcutta were 40 *l.* 4 *s.* 8 *d.*, to Madras 35 *l.* 15 *s.*, and to Bombay 38 *l.* 8 *s.* 3 *d.* I apprehend that the India Office have given the average of the prices paid in all classes of ships, whether sailing or steam; but whether it be so or not, I simply took the results as given by the India Office. Of course I am not able to reconcile two conflicting statements emanating from the same source.

290. But you base your calculation of 14 *l.* 10 *s.* upon the price paid to private sailing ships?—To sailing vessels.

291. This return, which Mr. Mason has given to us on the part of the India Office, states, that the average rates for 10 years were not 14 *l.* 10 *s.*, but were 11 *l.* 7 *s.* 3 *d.*, and that the rates in some years were as low as 6 *l.* 17 *s.*, or thereabouts. Will that difference make any alteration in your calculations as to the desirability of employing Her Majesty's troop ships in that particular trade?—If the return now given by Mr. Mason from the India Office is considered more correct than the previous return furnished from the India Office, it certainly will make a difference; but I am not at all able to say which of the two is the correct return.

292. Would it not make a difference upon the 12,000 troops of more than 36,000 *l.*?—I have not made any calculation.

293. If you sent out 12,000 troops, and if the difference is 3 *l.* a head, it will be

be 36,000 *l.* difference?—No; because you do not alter the homeward rate, I apprehend.

294. We will go to the homeward rate afterwards; will it make a difference of 36,000 *l.*, or thereabouts?—If the difference is 3 *l.* a head, of course, on 12,000 men, it will make that difference.

295. Then it will reduce your estimate of profit of 85,000 *l.* still more by 36,000 *l.*?—Yes.

296. With regard to the homeward rate, you base your calculation, I see, on 32 *l.* 8 *s.* per head homeward?—Yes.

297. I suppose you have derived these figures from the same channel of information?—The same channel of information.

298. It so happens that Mr. Mason, on the part of the East India House, has also given a return of the actual cost of bringing troops from India for the last 10 years. Beginning with 1850, the average cost in that year (we will take the case of the men in health, because I presume it is to those that you refer in your calculations) was not 32 *l.* 8 *s.* per head, but it was 13 *l.* 8 *s.* 8 *d.* per head, being not one-half of what you gave. In the next year it was 15 *l.* 3 *s.* 4 *d.*, still not one-half. In 1853 it was 19 *l.* 8 *s.* In the next year, namely 1854, which was the year when there was a great demand for ships for the Crimean War, it rose to 35 *l.* 14 *s.* 5 *d.* In the next year, which was also the year of the Crimean War, when there was an equal demand, it was 32 *l.* 4 *s.* 2 *d.* In 1856 it was 20 *l.* 17 *s.* 6 *d.* In 1858 it was 19 *l.* In 1859 it was 18 *l.* 4 *s.*, and the average cost for the whole 10 years, including those three years when there was so great a demand for shipping, was not 32 *l.* 8 *s.*, as you give it, but it was 21 *l.* 8 *s.* 10 *d.*, so that in your calculation there is a difference of 11 *l.* per head; is that so, if these figures of Mr. Mason's are correct?—If those figures of Mr. Mason's are correct, of course it would make that difference; I was not aware of the existence of that return.

299. Will you multiply 12,000 troops to be brought home by 11 *l.*; how much will it give?—£. 132,000 *l.*

300. Therefore your profit of 85,000 *l.*, which you have made out, has already been reduced 35,000 *l.* on the outward voyage, and is brought down to a profit of 50,000 *l.*; but if you take off this 132,000 *l.*, that which you make out to be a gain to the country of 85,000 *l.*, will be a loss to the country of 82,000 *l.* by the employment of Her Majesty's troop ships?—Of course the question wholly hinges on what are the correct rates outward and homeward.

301. If Mr. Mason's figures are correct, which he, coming on the part of the East India House, gives to us, instead of your calculations showing a profit of 85,000 *l.*, provided we adopted your recommendations, there would be a loss to the country of 82,000 *l.*?—Undoubtedly, if the rates given in that Parliamentary Return from which I have taken my data are incorrect, the statement itself is altogether incorrect; but if one return furnished from the India Office differs from another, I think it is a matter to be looked into as to which of the two is the correct one, because my calculations depend wholly on the question of rate.

302. Admiral *Duncombe*.] These returns, as given in by Mr. Mason last Session, you have never seen before?—No, I have not observed them even in looking through the report.

303. And you individually have had no experience in taking up any transports for the Indian service?— None whatever.

304. It is shown in these Tables, as presented by Mr. Mason, that in one year, 1850, men in health were brought home from Calcutta at 13 *l.* 8 *s.* 8 *d.* per head, and in 1855, 32 *l.* 4 *s.* 2 *d.* There being such an immense difference, must not the profits have been very great to the parties?—I apprehend so, very great indeed.

305. In your experience in your department in managing the transport service, have you ever been subject to such a variation in the prices?—Yes; we have seen extraordinary fluctuations, even in the prices asked in one day. Sometimes they have been double, or two and a half times what they have been on another occasion.

306. In talking about the return of troops from India, of course they would not be so numerous as troops going out?—No.

307. In your department, you have had no experience upon that subject?—I have taken that into account by assuming that with the Queen's ships we

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should make provisions for only the equal, or permanent, number going out and coming home, leaving the excess number going out to be forwarded by freight as at present.

308. And I believe that there are always a great number of condemned stores and articles of that kind to bring home?—I do not know; respecting India we have no experience whatever.

The Committee-room was cleared.

After a short time, the Witness was again called in.

309. *Chairman.*] Will you have the goodness to turn to page 46 of the Evidence of last Session, at Question 823; you are there asked, by Lord Clarence Paget, if, in your opinion, it is more desirable to employ hired ships than Her Majesty's troop ships, in the transport of troops and stores to such stations as the Mediterranean and the North American stations; are you of the same opinion now as you were then upon that point?—I am of opinion that as far as regards the working expenses of Her Majesty's ships, they are not more costly than to employ freight vessels; but it is a very difficult question to answer, for we really have hardly any data on which to form a complete opinion as to the whole system. First of all, it is almost impossible to obtain identical cases of services performed by Queen's ships and hired vessels. Then again, if we take outward voyages, only Her Majesty's ships have to come home empty, and then the cost is greater than in merely employing freight out. With reference to return services statements were quoted by a previous witness before this Committee, which showed that in the cases there given the employment of freight vessels was less costly than employing Queen's ships; and even where the actual services of one of Her Majesty's ships were taken for a whole year, the statements mentioned in that report showed that the employment of freight was in certain cases cheaper than that of the Queen's ship. On the other hand, I have had a statement prepared within the last few days of the services performed by Her Majesty's ship "Himalaya" during the year 1859, and I have contrasted her working expenses, while performing those services, with the cost of performing the same services by freight vessels, and I find that, on the whole, the cost is very nearly similar; there is a slight saving by employing the "Himalaya" of about 5,000 *l.* a year; but I should hardly look upon even that case as a test of the system. Then again we have not had the services of all these eight vessels available during any part of the time that we have possessed them; four or five of these vessels were bought in 1854 and 1855; those were the years of the Crimean war. In the years 1857, 1858, or 1859, five of them were employed in China; so far therefore they have been detached from their ordinary work, namely, the colonial reliefs, so that if we obtained the record of their actual services for the year, I should still say that, with all these disturbing causes at work, we should not have satisfactory data on which to form a final opinion as to which is the cheaper system. I think, therefore, that the only way of arriving at any conclusion as to whether employing the Queen's ships is cheaper than performing the same services by hired vessels, is to take into consideration the actual movements of troops performed during a given time. In the statement which I have prepared, I have taken the average of the work done in three years, and have contrasted how that work might have been performed by Her Majesty's ships, and their cost, with the relative cost which would have been incurred had all the services been performed by freight ships at the average prices which we have positively paid for troops conveyed to those stations during those years. I find, on the whole, a slight gain in favour of the Queen's troop ships of 5,000 *l.* That is based simply on their working expenses, and does not include redemption of capital or insurance. Perhaps the Committee will allow me to hand that statement in.

310. Do you desire to lodge this Return in evidence?—Yes. (*The Witness delivered in the same.*)

Vide Appendix.

311. Turning again to your evidence of last Session, you gave in a Return, marked B., which appears at page 276 in the Appendix. Will you refer to that?—I have it.

312. Taking the particular trade, the Mediterranean trade, you make out that the cost to the country by the employment of freight ships in that trade is 51,163 *l.*; and that the cost to the country by the employment of Her Majesty's ships

ships would be 36,907 *l.*, so that there would be a saving in the Mediterranean trade of 14,256 *l.* by the employment of Her Majesty's troop ships?—Quite so. I have mentioned in my evidence that I have excluded from the statement which I am now handing in the pay of the troops upon colonial services: therefore there would be no saving in that item; it would be simply contrasting the working expenses of the ships.

313. By this amended return which you have lodged to-day, you make out that there would be a saving of 14,256 *l.* by employing troop ships?—Quite so.

314. On what basis have you formed this return?—I have based it in both cases on the number of men absolutely conveyed to Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu and home from those stations, during the three years 1857, 1858, and 1859; those were the three most recent years at the time when I prepared the statement. As regards the Queen's troop ships, I have taken into account their working expenses, *i. e.* the expenses of the maintenance of their crews, wages, and victuals; I have taken into account coals for the voyage; I have taken into account the fittings for the troops, assumed to last over a given period; bedding for the troops, the mess of the officers, and the victualling of the men; I think that I have included every expense except redemption of capital, insurance and interest.

315. What allowance have you made for pilotage?—There is no item included there for pilotage.

316. Have you made any allowance for the other contingent expenses which fall heavily?—I am not aware of others; I think that the wear and tear I have taken, which is a very high rate, amply includes any contingent expenses; I am informed by practical shipowners, that an iron vessel requires putting in dock perhaps twice a year to scrape her bottom, paint her, and put her to rights; that that operation costs about 300 *l.* or 400 *l.*, and that the wood in her interior fittings, and so forth, wastes a good deal less than in a wooden ship, owing to her giving less and straining less. On the other hand the wear and tear taken in these statements on such a vessel as the "Simoom," instead of being taken at only 300 *l.* or 400 *l.* a year, is taken at 6,940 *l.* a year, a difference which I think would amply cover any small contingent expenses.

317. If you took into consideration the cost of Her Majesty's troop ships, how much would that reduce the profit which you have estimated?—I have ascertained the original cost of the eight troop ships; I have assumed that these vessels would last 30 years; that is taken from the statement given by the Controller of the Navy in regard to wooden ships of war. I believe that the durability of iron vessels is not determined, that, in fact, it is unknown. Practical men, to use their own expression, have said that they never die if repaired periodically, but I have taken their duration as 30 years, and assumed that the capital would be redeemed in that time; I have taken interest in equal annual payments, computed at three and a quarter per cent. throughout; I find that that results in a mean annual payment of 32,000 *l.* in respect of these eight vessels.

318. Suppose that you had included in your calculation the capital invested in those troop ships employed in the Mediterranean trade, how much would it have reduced your estimated profit of 14,256 *l.*?—I have not made any calculation for each separate item of that statement, but I have simply made a general calculation for the whole of the troop ships.

319. Upon the whole of the troop ships if you take interest at 3¼ per cent., it would give 32,000 *l.*?—Yes, including the replacement of capital.

320. What do you mean by the replacement of capital?—Paying back the original capital, minus the value of the vessel at the end of the 30 years, which I have taken at one third.

321. Does that include tear and wear?—No, I have given wear and tear in the previous statement; this is simply a redemption of capital account with interest.

322. You have not included insurance upon those ships?—Not in this item of 32,000 *l.*

323. Can you say how much this 14,256 *l.* would be reduced, if you included insurance?—Not on that separate item. On the whole, I estimate insurance at about 29,000 *l.* a year.

324. At what premium have you calculated it?—I have taken it at six per cent. I believe that the average rate paid for a year on merchant vessels is eight per cent., but I think that, considering the Government ships are so well built and kept up,

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that they are well manned, and that there are no underwriters' profits to make, six per cent. is ample.

325. How many troop ships had the country six years ago?—I do not remember.

326. How many troop ships have you lost during the last six years?—Five vessels altogether have been lost.

327. Five out of ten?—Five in all. The "Birkenhead" was lost in 1852, off the Cape of Good Hope. The "Prince" was lost in the gale in November 1854, at Balaklava, when such a very large number of merchant vessels were also lost. The "Transit" was lost in 1857, in the Straits of Banca. The "Assistance" was lost in July 1860, in China, and the "Perseverance," in the latter part of 1860, off the Cape de Verde.

328. You have lost one-half of the ships?—We have been so unfortunate.

329. Do you think that if you had kept an insurance fund at the Admiralty, the same as all prudent merchants do, 6 per cent. per annum would have covered those losses?—I apprehend that if I pay a premium on my life, and die the next year, my representatives will get the whole value of my insurance; and that is the same in insurances on ships.

330. Do you think that six per cent. per annum would have covered the loss of those five ships?—I presume that if the Government insured they would do it like the merchant; and that the underwriters, who had the premium paid to them, would take the risk.

331. Do you think that it would have been a good risk for an underwriter to have taken at six per cent., considering that five vessels were lost out of ten?—I do not think that any underwriter, in taking the premium, could take into account whether he would be lucky or unlucky in the result of his risks. I know that the ordinary mercantile rate is eight per cent.

332. You state that you have lost five vessels: you state that you think that six per cent. would cover the losses; would six per cent. which you have estimated have covered these losses?—Certainly not.

333. Would 12 per cent. have covered them?—I have not stated that either 6 or 12 per cent. would have covered them; I only said that I believed that eight per cent. was the premium paid for insurance, which rate, or rather six per cent., were the Government to insure, they would have to pay.

334. Your profit of 14,000 *l.* would, of course, have been considerably reduced if you had taken into consideration the question of insurance?—Certainly.

335. If those items which you have not taken into consideration, had been calculated, would there have been any profit at all to the country by the employment of Queen's ships in the Mediterranean trade, instead of hiring ordinary merchant vessels?—I have not calculated the Mediterranean trade by itself, but I have looked at the whole question for all stations. Although I find a small saving of 5,000 *l.* a year in favour of troop ships, let us assume that there has been no saving at all, and that the cost of working Her Majesty's troop ships has simply been equal to that of hiring freight vessels; we have then to consider the question of redemption of capital, with its interest and insurance, that would cost the country about 60,000 *l.* a year. Now, I think we should look on the other side at what we get for that 60,000 *l.* a year; first, we have trained crews of about 1,400 men. Were these men simply engaged in the Royal Naval Reserve they would cost about 13 *l.* 6 *s.* a head, which would amount to 19,000 *l.* in the course of the year, leaving a balance of 40,000 *l.* as the cost of the ships. Now, I think that with regard to that 40,000 *l.* we may fairly consider that we have the money's value, because we possess the property; we have eight fine ships, and if this question is to be regarded solely as a mercantile matter, those ships would fetch their value.

336. Does that 60,000 *l.* which you have named, include pilotage, and those various contingent charges?—As I have mentioned, I have made no separate allowance for that, but I consider that the excessive rates allowed for wear and tear would amply cover all those small expenses.

337. Does it cover the time when those ships are lying up unemployed?—Yes, fully.

338. With regard to the next advantage which you say would be gained by having the men who are employed in those ships as men for a reserve, and consequently men who would be valuable to us in the emergency of war, do you think, after all, that they would be really of any value to us as a reserve?—If

you mean as a reserve at home, of course not, because they may be elsewhere; but wherever they are they will be valuable.

339. But is it not the case that when war unfortunately breaks out those transports and men are very fully employed?—Yes.

340. Consequently those men could not be removed from the transports into Her Majesty's ships of war, could they?—Yes.

341. You would require to find other men?—Certainly, hired men as you had in the "Himalaya," and other vessels, during the Crimean war.

342. Practically, they would be of no value so far as a reserve was concerned?—Not as a home reserve; but they would be available as a reserve for Her Majesty's ships on whatever station the troop ships might be.

343. But if you took them away from the troop ships into regular men-of-war, you must supply their places with other men?—Certainly. I may, perhaps, be allowed to observe, that I think the Committee, in estimating the economy of a fleet of Government vessels as compared with the cost of performing all our troop services by hired vessels, should look not only at ordinary times of peace, but at times of emergency as well. Lately, we have had five vessels employed in India or China; we had very few at home available. The "Perseverance" was employed in effecting a very large relief of troops between the coast of Africa and the different West Indian islands. She had to make several voyages, occupying a long time; she was lost just on commencing that service. We had no Queen's troop ships at home available to replace her; we therefore had to go into the market and hire a steam transport. We took up the "Avon" professedly for three months, and she will not complete her work for some little time after this month. Her hire altogether, to the end of this month, will cost 11,300*l.*, exclusive of coals. Had the "Urgent" been at home and available for the same service, she would have cost 6,926*l.*; showing, therefore, that the employment of a Queen's ship on an emergency would have saved 4,398*l.*, or 38 per cent. of the cost of the "Avon;" in addition to which there would have been saved all the cost of the "Avon's" fittings.

344. In that calculation do you include insurance?—No.

345. On depreciation?—If I included those items, it would reduce the 4,398*l.* to about 2,000*l.* odd.

346. Have you included other items, such as charges to which a ship is liable?—I think there are no other items to be included, because the large rate for wear and tear will more than cover those small expenses.

347. Have you included the replacement of capital?—Yes. I may mention another case in which the Queen's troop ships have been employed very economically indeed to the country. During the China war we have had five vessels, of an aggregate tonnage of 9,339 tons, employed in China, the "Simoom," the "Urgent," the "Vulcan," the "Assistance," and the "Adventure;" they cost the country annually 87,141*l.* We had also, in order to carry out the services in China, to hire seven merchant steam transports; they cost the country per annum 190,892*l.*, their tonnage being 10,532 tons. The relative expense of their hire for the same tonnage as that of the Queen's ships (namely, 9,339 tons), would have been per annum 169,268*l.* One of those vessels has just returned to England, but the whole of them will not be discharged before the end of this month. Taking their hire up to that period, we shall have paid for the hire of those seven vessels 252,566*l.* Had their tonnage been the same as the five Queen's ships, namely, 9,339 tons, we should have paid up to the end of this month 223,955*l.* The Queen's ships would have cost us in working expenses up to the same period 114,735*l.*; giving a gain in that time, that is, about one year and a third, of 109,220*l.*; that is to say, by employing Queen's ships, and thereby obviating the necessity of taking up a corresponding amount of merchant steam tonnage, the country will have saved 109,000*l.*

348. Were not the freights very high to China in that particular year?—No; it appears to me that the rates at which these ships are taken up are very low, averaging only 30*s.* 2*d.* per ton per month.

349. Mr. *Longfield.*] Do you include insurance?—No; but the redemption of capital and the insurance on those five ships would be only 34,581*l.*, or for a year and a third 45,531*l.* a year, whereas I show a saving on them of 109,000*l.*

350. Mr. *Jackson.*] What is the total capital of Her Majesty's ships?—£. 726,460.

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351. How much do you put down for depreciation upon that amount?—I have said that the capital would be replaced in 30 years by equal instalments, and interest of 3 ½ per cent. paid throughout.

352. Mr. *Longfield.*] Is 8 or 8½ per cent. the insurance on those voyages?—It is not that; it is not, I am informed, above four per cent. upon a China voyage, two per cent. out, and two per cent. home.

353. Mr. *Jackson.*] Have you allowed for restoration in the wear and tear?—Yes.

354. How much per cent. have you allowed?—Eight and a half per cent. per annum for wear and tear.

355. Over the 30 years?—My calculation is an annual one.

356. You estimate the capital at 717,400*l.*?—At 726,460*l.*

357. And by taking off during 30 years so much per annum, you leave the cost at the end of 30 years, 238,900 *l.*?—Yes.

358. What have you to represent 238,900 *l.*?—The ships themselves.

359. Has there been any experience to show that vessels at the end of 30 years would be worth about one-third of their original cost?—No; as I have previously mentioned, I have no experience whatever on the subject, and I believe it is quite a disputed point; I am assured by practical shipowners, to use their own expression, that these ships will last for ever if docked twice a year, properly scraped and painted, and thoroughly kept up.

360. Is it in the history of shipping that a ship ever lasted for ever, however much she may have been repaired, restored, and renewed?—I presume not; but I have formed another calculation where I have assumed the ships to be worth nothing at the end of the 30 years, and instead of the payment for the replacement of capital with interest being 32,145*l.* a year, it will come to 36,413*l.* a year, being not so very much more. It is about 4,000*l.* more.

361. *Chairman.*] How many transports do you think the Government ought to have?—I think the eight transports which they now possess are sufficient for the ordinary requirements of the relief services; but it appears to me that it would be very expedient indeed to have one, two, or possibly three, always at home available for any urgent service.

362. How many have you at home now?—Two at this moment.

363. Have you had no more than two for the last 12 months?—I think not.

364. To what extent of tonnage have you been compelled to hire from the merchant service to carry on the ordinary business?—I have not brought any return with me showing that; but to a considerable extent.

365. Those two vessels which you have had at home have been constantly employed for the last twelve months?—Yes; the "Himalaya's" work during the year 1859 was something very large indeed.

366. If those vessels which you have now in China were at home, would those vessels, with the two which are here, be sufficient to perform the ordinary reliefs?—That would make seven vessels; my calculation is that it would require eight to perform them.

367. Would those eight vessels be constantly employed on that service?—I apprehend they would. As far as I can estimate, it would leave them each about a month or six weeks in the course of the year to go into dock and repair.

368. And, with that exception, they would be always employed in moving troops or stores?—I think they would be almost always employed in moving troops, but I do not think it is economical to employ them in moving stores.

369. Why so?—You can move stores by freight so much more cheaply.

370. If you had eight vessels, in your opinion they would be fully employed in the ordinary services?—Yes. I may mention one more important fact on the question of relative cost, namely, that the eight Government steam vessels cost us for their working expenses, per annum, exclusive of coals, 151,122*l.* The average rate at which steam transports were engaged in 1854, and during the year 1855, was about 52 *s.* a ton a month, which on the same amount of tonnage as the Queen's ships, namely, 16,118 tons, would amount to 502,872 *l.* per annum; so that had Government, on the outbreak of the war in 1854, available these eight troop ships, they would have been employed in lieu of a similar tonnage of hired shipping, and an annual saving would have been effected of 351,750 *l.*, and as the value of the ships is only 726,460 *l.*, two years of such savings would have bought the ships; I think therefore that whatever the economy may

may be proved to be in ordinary times, the moment an emergency comes, Her Majesty's troop ships are not only very advantageous in regard to ensuring efficiency and dispatch, but are also highly economical.

371. In that calculation have you reckoned insurance?—No; but the total cost of insurance and redemption of capital, with interest on the eight vessels, is under 60,000 *l.* a year.

372. Then that estimate does not appear to represent the gain to the country?—The gain to the country by the employment of these vessels during the first year of the Crimean war would have been 351,750 *l.*, minus 58,933 *l.*, that is, 292,817 *l.* The working expenses are fully included here, and they leave a gain of 351,000 *l.* in a year. I have to take away from that 351,000 *l.* the replacement of capital, interest, and insurance, which together amount to 59,000 *l.*; that leaves 292,000 *l.* clear annual gain.

373. Mr. *Jackson.*] How much per cent. have you allowed for wear and tear?—Eight and a half per cent., on hulls, masts, and stores, and 10 to 12 per cent. on machinery.

374. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] Could not you furnish the Committee with an amended return with all those calculations made, so that we might see your calculations, taking the amount of depreciation and everything?—Yes. I could put in a return of the replacement of the capital, with its interest, and of the insurance.

375. Have you yet any returns of the cost of hiring ships for the last China war?—Yes. We hired in England seven steamers, at an average cost of about 30 *s.* 2 *d.* a ton a month. I can hardly give the China or India rates; six steamers were taken up there; but 123 sailing vessels were taken up of an aggregate tonnage of 110,000 tons, and their cost has ranged from 16 *s.* to 28 *s.* a ton a month.

376. No amount of home transport Government shipping could have met that emergency?—It is impossible; it would simply, *pro tanto*, have substituted the employment of merchant shipping.

377. Do you not anticipate that the more you extend the number of those ships the greater will be the cost to the country when unemployed?—Unquestionably; but I would propose only to have a limited staff, enough to perform all the ordinary services, with one or two spare vessels, which might possibly be kept out of commission, but ready for an emergency.

378. Mr. *Longfield.*] Is it not a fact that the mercantile steam navy has so far increased that you hire now at 32 *s.* a ton vessels which in the Crimean war you could only get at 52 *s.* upon the average, and would not that altogether alter the result of your calculation upon the price paid in the Crimean war, as to the advisability of employing foreign ships?—I think not. I think that another inference may be drawn from the variation of rates, namely, that there may not be now the same amount of employment. In the Crimean war we took up an immense number of transports, which alone increased the rates.

379. *Chairman.*] What the Honourable Member means is this: would it not alter your calculations as to profit if those vessels which, during the Crimean war, were engaged at 52 *s.*, could be employed at 32 *s.*, the rate which you paid in China?—Certainly.

380. If the rate had been 32 *s.*, would there not have been no profit at all upon that particular transaction?—If the rate had been reduced from 52 *s.* to 32 *s.* it would have made a great difference, and have reduced the gain to about 150,000 *l.* per annum; but I cannot imagine that to be the case; I cannot fancy that there can be such an amount of unemployed mercantile shipping as to render it possible.

381. I understand by your evidence that you do not recommend that there should be more vessels belonging to the Government than sufficient for the ordinary services in periods of peace?—I think that the existing staff, supposing them to be eight (there are now only six) would suffice for the ordinary services in time of peace. I think that for emergencies it would be well to have one or two, or possibly three reserved steamers.

382. Mr. *Longfield.*] For home service and quick reliefs, which are to be given irrespectively of cost altogether?—Yes; that is a question, I think, of expediency, and of the political advantage of possessing the vessels.

383. The question of cost cannot be put in competition there?—No; but in times of emergency these ships would make great savings. I have just given instances of vast economy.

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384. *Chairman.*] You have stated that during the last 12 months you have been doing Her Majesty's service with only two vessels, with the assistance of hired vessels. Can you give us a return of the amount of tonnage which you have been obliged to hire during the last twelvemonth, to make up for the want of those four Government vessels which have been employed in China?—Certainly.

385. I speak of tonnage employed in the ordinary reliefs of troops; I refer to vessels being engaged in the service in which you would have employed those four troop ships now in China had they been at home, and in lieu of which you have had to take up others?—Yes.

386. Will you also state what you have paid for those vessels during the last 12 months?—Yes.

387. Mr. *Jackson.*] Can you state the rates which you paid during the Crimean war?—I will instance a few; for the "Jura" we paid 55 *s.* a ton a month; for the "Argo," 55 *s.*; for the "Alps," the "Thames," and the "Trent," 50 *s.*; for the "Cambria," at one time, 55 *s.*; at another, 63 *s.*; for the "Arabia" at one time 50 *s.*; at another, 55 *s.*; for the "Etna," 55 *s.*; for the "Great Britain," 50 *s.*; for the "Calcutta," 55 *s.*; for the "Indian," 55 *s.*; for the "Hansa" and the "Germania," 60 *s.*; they were exorbitant rates.

388. Is there anything beyond 60 *s.*?—Yes; I see that we paid 62 *s.* and 63 *s.*

389. For what vessels were those?—The "Cormorant" and the "Cambria."

390. Admiral *Duncombe.*] Has your experience shown you that in cases of emergency the shipowners naturally expect, and must necessarily obtain higher freights than the ordinary course of freights?—There is no question whatever about it.

391. So that if there should be the increase of steam shipping which has been alluded to, there is no reason to suppose but that in cases of emergency the same high rates would be paid?—I think it would be wholly a question of supply and demand, and that as the demand increased, the rates would certainly rise.

392. Mr. *Jackson.*] Is there not a greater supply now than there was before?—I do not know.

393. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] Among the ships which you have mentioned as lost is the "Transit"?—Yes.

394. Was not the experience of the "Transit" that she was a source of the greatest anxiety?—I am not in a position to state, those ships are under the Admiralty, and not under the Transport Department.

Jovis, 25° die Aprilis, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Henry Baillie.	Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Brooks.	Mr. Kinnaird.
Mr. Caird.	Mr. Lindsay.
Mr. Dalglish.	Mr. Longfield.
Colonel Dickson.	Lord Clarence Paget.
Admiral Duncombe.	Sir Michael Seymour.

WILLIAM SCHAW LINDSAY, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

William Willis, Esq., called in; and further Examined,

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395. *Chairman.*] THERE are certain returns which you were asked to lodge when you were last examined; have you those returns with you?—I have both of them prepared.

396. Do you now desire to place them in evidence?—If you please (*the Witness delivered in the same*). Perhaps you will allow me to advert to two points of my previous evidence. On the last examination I was asked whether the averages of the rates to India which were quoted at page 330, of the Committee's Report of last session, would make a great difference in my calculations. I have looked at those averages; they certainly would do so if authentic; but I apprehend that they cannot be looked upon as averages; they simply seem to be a summary of the rates paid.

Vide Appendix.

397. Then do you mean to say that the returns which were given in by Mr. Mason on the part of the East India Company are not accurate?—I will instance the rates quoted for one or two of the years. In the year 1852 two ships went to Madras and two to Bombay with troops. The number of troops sent to each station, multiplied by the rate paid, would give as an actual average to Calcutta 10 *l.* 10 *s.* 4 *d.*, whereas the rate quoted at page 320 is 10 *l.* 9 *s.* To Madras it would give a true average of 9 *l.* 4 *s.* 6 *d.*, whereas the average rate quoted is 8 *l.* 17 *s.* I find that the plan adopted has been merely to add together the different rates, and to divide the result by the number of engagements, which gives fallacious results. In 1850 to Calcutta the rate is stated to be 7 *l.* 5 *s.* 10 *d.*, when only 2,900 men were despatched there. In 1859 it is shown as 12 *l.* 9 *s.* 10 *d.*, when 10,700 men went there. Those two rates added together would give a very different result than if the numbers of men were multiplied by the respective rates paid, and the true average thus ascertained. The true average of those two years to Calcutta would be 11 *l.* 8 *s.* 5 *d.*, whereas by this process it would appear to be only 9 *l.* 17 *s.* 10 *d.* To Bombay the true average is 13 *l.* 4 *s.* 9 *d.*, whereas it is made to appear to be only 11 *l.* 2 *s.* 8 *d.*

398. Have you any reason to suppose that the rates paid for each of those ships are inaccurate as given by Mr. Mason?—No; but the result given as the average is in itself inaccurate. At page 331 a summary of the whole service, of which the details are shown in the preceding pages, is given; the total numbers of men who went out, and the amount of money paid, which gives for the nine years, excluding 1858, an average rate of 13 *l.* 10 *s.* as the outward rate. In 1858 the rates rose to 14 *l.* 13 *s.*, 15 *l.* 14 *s.*, 16 *l.* 2 *s.* 6 *d.*, 17 *l.* 17 *s.*, and in one case to as high as 19 *l.* 15 *s.*, so that I have no doubt that the rate of 14 *l.* 10 *s.* given by Mr. Hammack would be about the truth. I find that in the Return from which Mr. Hammack obtained his information the detailed figures are given by the India Office, showing the numbers who went out in regiments, drafts, and recruits, and those who came homeward, and I find that his averages, which I have checked, are perfectly correct, so that I believe that the figures which I have given in, as respects the conveyance of troops to and from India, may be regarded as perfectly authentic.

399. Do you mean to say that the figures which you gave, and upon which

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you based your calculations, are more accurate than those figures which have been given to us by Mr. Mason on the part of the East India Office?—My figures are deduced from a return given by the India Office on 5 November 1859, which shows that what purports to be an average of rates, as given in the Appendix to the Committee's Report of last session, is not an actual average of rates, but a mere summary of those rates.

400. Mr. *Longfield.*] It is an average of the voyages?—Yes, it is simply the result of the engagements being added together, without reference to the number of men who went, instead of multiplying the rates by the number of men, and thus ascertaining the actual cost.

401. It is a thing patent upon the face of it?—Quite so; the real average can only be the rate actually paid per head for each man who went; it must be perfectly patent, I think, to every one.

402. They have not taken the men and divided it?—No; so that the true average is, that which is stated by Mr. Hammack, and on which I have based my calculations. I was also asked whether the saving which would have accrued from the possession by the Government of a small fleet of transports, say eight, at the commencement of the Crimean war, would not have been diminished if the rates had been only 30 *s.* 2 *d.* per month, as recently paid for seven vessels employed in China; that would have been so; but when we chartered those vessels, other vessels were offered at rates running up to 42 *s.* and 45 *s.* per ton per month, so that if we had required to charter a greater staff of ships, we must have paid much higher rates. Had the average been taken on the rates paid during the Crimean war for steam transports, and those at which transports were tendered for the China war, the saving per annum by the employment of Government transports in lieu of hired transports would have been 190,000 *l.* per annum, that is, after deducting the replacement of capital, with its interest and insurance. That appears to me a fact. You would have employed Government ships in lieu of a corresponding amount of merchant shipping, and would have saved the above sum of money, *i.e.* 190,000 *l.* per annum.

403. *Chairman.*] Are you still of the opinion which you expressed before us both last Session, and on the last occasion when we examined you, that there would be a saving to the amount which you named, by the employment of Government vessels instead of hired vessels?—Yes. I am of opinion that whenever an emergency arises, the Government vessels are not only very advantageous, but that they also effect a very great saving to the country.

404. Your calculations are based upon a period of peace; are you still of opinion that there would be the saving, which you name, to the country, by the employment of Government vessels in the relief of troops to India and elsewhere?—Certainly.

The Right Honourable Sir *James R. G. Graham*, Bart., a Member of the House: Examined.

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405. *Chairman.*] THE object of our inquiry, as you are aware, is to examine the management of those branches of the Admiralty, War Office, India Office, and Emigration Board, by which the transport of troops by means of shipping, as well as convicts and emigrants and materials of war, is now conducted; how was that business conducted when you last entered office as First Lord of the Admiralty?—When I entered office at the end of 1852, the aggregate of the business which you have mentioned was conducted by various departments; the Victualling Board of the Admiralty conducted the military branch of reliefs, and the conveyance of materials of war, as connected with the War Department; it conducted the conveyance of convicts, and it conducted all transport immediately connected with the navy. The East India Company then existed, and the Admiralty had nothing to do with the Indian reliefs. The Emigration Board was then, as now, in full operation, and the Admiralty had nothing to do with the emigration.

406. So far as the Admiralty was concerned, the transport was managed by a department known as the Transport and Victualling Office, I think?—Yes.

407. Were any changes made during the time that you held office in that particular department?—When I was first at the Admiralty in 1831, I proposed to Parliament the abolition of the Navy Board and of the Victualling Board. It

was

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was then, in time of peace, both the Victualling Board and the Transport Board. During the long French war there had been a subdivision; the Victualling Board and the Transport Board were not united. In 1831, when I proposed the change, abolishing the Navy Board and the Victualling Board, in the Act which I then introduced, the Victualling and Transport branch under a new arrangement were united, but I always intended and avowed the intention, that in the event of war the subdivision which had formerly existed between the Transport Board and the Victualling Board should be revived under the new system, and thus the Transport Department should be severed from the Victualling Department. When I returned to the Admiralty in 1852 there was peace, and I continued the arrangement in 1852, as it had existed from 1831 to 1834, when I left the Admiralty on the former occasion. I saw no reason while peace continued to effect the severance, or change the system. The Russian war broke out while I was at the Admiralty, and I soon discovered that my original view was right; that the severance was necessary. I left the Admiralty in the middle of that war, and my last act before leaving it was to effect the severance, and I created the Transport Board.

408. Then it was during your administration that the last Transport Board was organized?—It was my last act before leaving the Admiralty in the spring of 1855.

409. You are aware that that Board has since then been abolished?—On the return of peace it was abolished, and the system which had inured during peace for about 20 years was resumed, and the Transport business is conducted now by the Victualling Board as heretofore.

410. In fact the Transport Service is now conducted in the same manner as it was conducted when you entered office in 1852?—Since you intimated to me your wish that I should be examined by this Committee, I have thought it my duty to study the evidence which was presented by this Committee at the close of last Session, and I see some most important changes made in the mode of conducting the business since I left the Admiralty, as between the War Department and the Admiralty.

411. What are those changes which have been made since you left office?—The Board of Admiralty was not cognizant of any supreme military authority other than the Secretary of State for War, and all requisitions for transport for military service came when I was last at the Admiralty, and as I think, they ought to come, upon the responsibility on record of the Secretary of State for War. I see that now the requisitions come from the Horse Guards, which, as commanding the army, was not then known apart from the Minister at War. Since the change has taken place in the War Department no military authority as supreme is recognized, except the Secretary of State for War. But I see that it is in evidence that the requisitions now come direct from the Quartermaster General, nominally through the Board of Admiralty, but there is a letter marked in the corner for the Victualling Department, and the requisition passes direct from the Quartermaster General to the gentleman at the head of the Victualling.

412. Do you approve of the changes which have been made since that period to which you refer?—I, with all submission, think that it destroys responsibility, and must give rise to the greatest possible confusion.

413. With regard to the existing state of matters, do you think that it would be advisable, in time of peace, to separate the Victualling from the Transport Department?—I have read the evidence, and I think that the weight of opinion is in favour of that severance taking place now, in time of peace, in order that better preparation may be made beforehand, in the event of the calamity of war, and I incline to the opinion that, upon the whole, the severance had better now take place.

414. Are you of opinion that the transport of all troops, whether to India, or to any of our colonies and possessions, should be conducted by one department of the Government?—That opens an immense question, both of policy and of economy, and to pronounce a positive opinion as matters stand with reference to the re-organization of the Indian army, and the system of relief of the Indian army, details of which I am not cognizant, would be extremely difficult. But if I am to assume that the re-organization of the Indian army is accomplished, that a fixed force of the Queen's army, year by year, in time of peace, is to be maintained there, and that the ruling authorities come to a decision as to the frequency of the relief upon those assumptions, I should say that the whole

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transport of the Indian service ought to be transferred to the Transport Department, whatever it may be, and under whomsoever placed.

415. In regard to the shipment of stores, such as provisions for the army, and provisions also for the navy, and stores which the Stationery Office or any other department of the Government desire to send abroad, do you think that all those stores should be shipped through this one department?—I think so. I think that both order and economy would arise from that concentration.

416. Are you of opinion that that department should be responsible for the conveyance of the troops, and the stores from the time they are embarked or shipped, as the case may be, till they are landed at their destination?—Yes; I have been asked with respect to a new arrangement now existing, which I think complicates matters to a serious degree, and I may now state my opinion, perhaps not improperly, with regard to another point, which occurs in this evidence. I see with surprise that after a ship has been fitted out, we will say in the river, with the concurrence of the military authorities, and under naval responsibility, and after a charter-party has been entered into with regard to the number of men to be conveyed (and I assume that, generally, the sum to be paid is in relation to the number of troops to be conveyed), after she has left the river, the final decision of the navy and army authorities united, being in favour of the fixed arrangements as they are made in the river, that ship is to take troops on board either at Portsmouth or at Cork, and at the last moment (and Colonel Gordon says, that it is indispensable that it should be at the last moment) a military authority, either at Portsmouth, or at Cork (I believe the general commanding) has the power of entirely changing the arrangement, and of diminishing the number of men taken, we will say at Portsmouth, from 500 to 400, and at Cork, another military authority, exercising another military discretion in the same case, may reduce the number, not from 500 to 400, but by 50 instead of 100; that there is no naval concurrence required, not the Admiral Superintendent at Portsmouth, nor the naval officer commanding at Cork; that the whole arrangement is changed in 24 hours by the will of a military officer, the whole charter-party disturbed), the expense, it may be, to the public increased 20 per cent., and there is no check whatever of any superior authority. As I read the evidence, that is distinctly disclosed, and stated to be absolutely necessary.

417. You are of opinion that that is a state of things which ought not to exist?—I think it is objectionable; I think it puts an end to all check upon expenditure; I have always thought that No. 17 in the Navy Estimates, is a most unsatisfactory document; it hardly belongs to the Navy Estimates, it really is military expenditure; the check upon it, as relates to the estimate, is nil on the part of the Admiralty, because it must rest upon data drawn from the military authorities, and when it comes into account in the following year, the whole account is altogether nullified by this exercise of power affecting the charter-party, without any naval control whatever; and if there is to be this mixed authority, I think that the question which shall be supreme, either military or naval, is as nothing compared to putting an end to this apparent joint responsibility without any real responsibility in either department. In my humble judgment, rather than this should continue, it would be infinitely better to place the whole of it at once under military authority, to remove it, as in the case of the packets, from the Navy Estimates, and to add it to the Army Estimates.

418. By your evidence you appear to be of opinion that one department should undertake those various duties, and that department should be the responsible department, and you say that the cost should be taken from the Navy to the Army Estimates; you of course only mean the cost so far as regards the transport of troops and stores connected with the army?—If you will look at No. 17 in the Navy Estimates, you will see that it is almost exclusively army expenditure; and, if I may venture to express an opinion, it always has appeared to me to be most capricious. There is this year a saving effected of nearly 230,000 *l.*, it is reduced from 478,000 *l.*, which was the amount last year, to 247,000 *l.* this year; and there is the following note: "The amount provided in the above estimate for freight, &c. is irrespective of the sum which may be required on account of extraordinary services for China." If China entered largely into it I could understand the saving, but I am at a loss to collect from what data this large saving is effected on these various heads of Army Expenditure; I do not believe that the navy has any control over it whatever, it rests entirely upon the military authorities.

419. Supposing

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419. Supposing that, when this new department which you recommend was formed, the War Office sent an order for the transport of 1,000 men to Malta and 500 tons of stores, would it meet the case if that department debited the War Office with the cost, or gave an order for the payment upon the War Office, by which means it would appear in the War Estimates, and not in the Navy Estimates?—That is a new view, presented to my mind on the sudden, and I should not like to give a positive answer upon such a hypothesis. But again I say, that if the Admiralty is to conduct the service it ought not to be upon a memorandum from the Horse Guards, it ought to be based upon an official letter from the Secretary of State for War, going into all details, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and that letter should be of record. Now I find in the Appendix to the Evidence a memorandum drawn up at the Horse Guards, which is a new arrangement, made in 1858, upon which the system of requisitions now rests; it was given in by Colonel Gordon; it is at page 370; and, as I read the evidence, that is the mode in which the service has been conducted ever since 1858, resting upon a memorandum signed by the Quartermaster-general. I think that nothing can be more unsatisfactory than that basis of requisition.

420. What you would propose would be this, as I understand: that the War Office should send a requisition specifying in detail what they require, and when the service which they require to be performed is carried out, do you not think that it would meet the objections if the cost of conducting that service was posted to the debit of the War Office?—This No. 17, though borne on the Navy Estimates, does really purport to be a military expenditure, and the most unsatisfactory part of it (added to what I have already said) is, that it is a service conducted partly by vessels taken up by freight, and partly by Government ships. It is hardly possible to trace the expenditure incurred by the public in the shape of Transport Service, conducted in Government ships; you cannot trace it through the various estimates; you have the pay of the men under No. 1; you have their victuals under No. 2; you have the repairs of the ship at home, under No. 8, but never appearing upon the face of the estimates, or even of the account; and you have the repairs abroad, under No. 9; then you have, if the vessel be purchased, the purchase of the vessel under No. 10, once for all, and the interest of that original purchase not carried to the annual account; and then you have also, in No. 10, coals and materials for repairs: it is impossible to trace the real expenditure incurred, as a matter of account, by the carrying of troops in Queen's ships.

421. That arises, I presume, from the mode in which those accounts are kept; would it not meet the objection, if the Admiralty kept a separate account of the cost of all transports?—It might be done, but it never yet has been done.

422. Do you think that it would be advisable to do it?—If it remains under the Admiralty, in a separate department, it will be absolutely necessary to do so; if you are to contrast what it is of the last importance to contrast, namely, the estimate for 1861, with the cost incurred in 1861, which will appear in the annual account presented in 1862, you cannot exercise that check in any other way unless the account be so kept.

423. Do you think that it would be advisable to place under this department, emigration?—No, I do not. I concur with the opinion of the Duke of Somerset, and with the opinion of the Duke of Newcastle: emigration under Government management, as it appears to me, is about to collapse; it is reduced now to about 5,000 annually; you have one Commissioner, a man of great knowledge and experience, quite competent to conduct the work, while emigration still continues under the direction of a public office; believing that it will soon come to a close, I would not disturb it for the present; my belief is, that emigration at the public cost, and at the cost of the colony, will very soon end, and when that shall have taken place, there is a most important function resting with the Emigration Commissioners, namely, carrying into execution the Passengers Act; if I am asked for an opinion, I should say that that duty ought to be transferred to the Board of Trade, who have officers at all the out-ports, under the Merchant Shipping Act, performing functions very analogous to that which would be their duty in giving effect to the Passengers Act; and such being the state of affairs in the emigration department, I would not encumber, even for a short time, as I think, unnecessarily, the great transport department, either under the War Office or under the Admiralty, with that additional labour. I may also mention, incidentally, that the convict branch which has hitherto been conducted by the naval department, is now nearly in a similar

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state of collapse; the whole system of transportation is now reduced to a minimum; I see that the Government already contemplate abolishing transportation to Bermuda, which is one of the most important of the services, and neither with respect to emigration nor with respect to convicts, would I at present change the system

424. As emigration is happily every year becoming less and less, do you think that any use could be made of the existing machinery attached to the Emigration Office if it was transferred to this new department; I allude to the various arrangements at the out-ports, and the surveyors of ships?—I am not myself conversant with the machinery to which you refer (I believe it to be very efficient); and I do not know whether they are the permanent servants of the Government, and whether upon the abolition of the office, superannuation would be necessary, or whether the establishment might not be entirely broken up, without such transfer; but in so great an arrangement, I think that this is of minor importance; and if you establish a great transport department for the army and the navy, I should say that whoever is at the head of that department had better choose his own instruments without the transfer; of course very eligible servants turned adrift upon the abolition of a department such as the Emigration Office, ought to receive the most favourable consideration from another great department of the Government, performing similar functions, and I have no doubt they would do so; but I should be sorry to impose the transfer as a necessary part of the arrangement.

425. As emigration has been so much reduced, and it may so happen that the Government of the day may consider it necessary or desirable to abolish that Board, do you think that in such a case as that, the new department could undertake the sending out of any emigrants which the colonies might require, receiving their orders through the Colonial Office in the same way as they would receive their orders for the embarkation of troops through the War Office?—I have already stated that I am imperfectly informed as to the duties in detail of the emigration department; but I read the opinion of the Duke of Newcastle; I read the opinion of the Duke of Somerset; and I am bound to say that my opinion in the main coincides with theirs.

426. But with the exception of emigration, I understand you to say that you think it would tend to the benefit of the public service if all other transport of every kind was placed under one department?—Saving emigrants and convicts, I should advocate the concentration of the whole transport service, both of men and material of war, under one department.

427. Who, in your opinion, should be the responsible Minister for that department?—That is a most difficult question. I have read this evidence with great attention, bearing particularly upon that point. I find the opinion of the Duke of Somerset, at the head of the Admiralty, strongly in favour of continuing it under the Admiralty. I may say that though I, perhaps, may be partial, I have a very high opinion of Admiral Craigie. I placed him at the head of that transport department only from the opinion which I had formed of him in the public service in three different capacities: he had done a great deal during the Irish famine on the coast of Scotland during that unhappy period: I had employed him with regard to the naval volunteers, and he had rendered excellent service; I thought that he had given his time to civil employment against his wish, and had very much forfeited his professional prospects; and entirely on public grounds I ventured to place him at the head of that Transport Board. He possessed my entire confidence; and I think that, on the whole, in very difficult circumstances, the manner in which he performed that duty, satisfying both the naval and military authorities at a juncture of great difficulty, justified the confidence which I placed in him. Now, I have read his evidence, and I must say that I think it is extremely strong in favour of keeping the transport service under the naval department. There is a happy expression of his, which I think I can readily adopt, that while this service remains in time of war under naval direction, wherever there is a pennant flying, there is an agent of transports to be found. I believe that such is human nature, though the duty to assist would be the same, provided it were under military authority, I do not think there would be the same ready assistance given by naval officers, if it were under military authority, rather than under the authority to which they themselves are subject. I think that the assistance would not be withheld in any case, but I think that it would be given more readily and

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to a much greater extent, and with more efficiency under naval authority than it would be if the Transport Service were directly under military authority. These are opinions to which I attach weight and reasons which I think good. On the other hand, the Duke of Newcastle had some experience at the commencement of the Crimean war, adverse experience, and I do not think that general inferences can safely be drawn from that special case; but he is most decidedly of opinion, arguing from that experience, that the transfer from naval control to direct military control is indispensable. I find that Colonel Gordon, with also Crimean experience at the seat of war, gives strong evidence in the same direction. I see that Mr. Wood, who was a member of the Emigration Commission, and was at the Horse Guards under Lord Hardinge, also gives that opinion. It is a most serious decision, and it is a most difficult one. I should be sorry to cast the balance, but I repeat that in my humble judgment, either the maintenance of it under the Admiralty, or a transfer of it to the War Department immediately, is infinitely preferable to the existing state of affairs. The division as it now exists is, I think, objectionable in the extreme even in time of peace; and my belief is, that it would lead to the utmost and the most dangerous confusion in time of war.

428. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] In reference to that particular question, you have given a very strong reason why it is advantageous that the Transport Service should be under the naval authorities, because there would be more ready assistance granted wherever there was a pennant flying; but there is another point to which you have not adverted, upon which I should like to ask your opinion, namely: whether it is not absolutely necessary that the transports should be under naval authorities when you are conducting great combined movements in war time, and whether it would not be positively necessary that a fleet of transports should be under the immediate control and management of the officer commanding the fleet under which such expedition took place?—I see that by the advocates of the transfer to the War Department it is contemplated as a necessity which would be unavoidable, that there should be agents of transports, even of the rank of rear-admiral, in a great operation, but that they should be borrowed from the navy, and be immediately responsible to their employers, namely, the War Department. I did not wish to overlay the reasons of my opinion upon the balanced question; but the question put by the gallant admiral does incline the balance to the side of the Transport Service remaining under the command of the Admiralty as far as regards concentrated authority on the part of the Naval Commander in Chief on a distant expedition. I should say that even in the Crimea there would have been immense advantage in all the naval authorities, both at Balaclava and at Constantinople, being under the command of an admiral commanding—such as Lord Lyons.

429. *Chairman.*] I understand you to state, that all things considered, you think that this department ought rather to be under the First Lord of the Admiralty than under the Secretary of State for War?—That is the inclination of my judgment, but I think it a most grave decision, and I think it must be taken by the Executive Government after the most careful review of all the conflicting arguments.

430. If there were an agent for transports at any station abroad, in the emergency of war, would you have him under the orders of the Admiral commanding that station, or under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army?—I speak with diffidence in the presence of officers who are much more competent to give an opinion, who have taken their part, and a distinguished part, in joint operations; but I incline to think that the whole of the naval transport ought to be under the direction of the Naval Commander in Chief, he, of course, being in constant communication with the Military Commander in Chief, and I think you then bring it as close to concentrated authority and responsibility as is possible; but there are members of this Committee who are more competent, from practical experience, to give a sound opinion than I am.

431. In regard to the movement of troops by means of transports, you are of opinion that the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army should go through the Admiral on the station?—I think so, certainly. The only difficulty in that case is, the Admiral in command not being within easy distance of the general commanding on shore. But almost always you will find that the base of our military operations is the sea; it must be so; and if the duties of the Naval Commander in Chief should lead him to some distance from the base of the ope-

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rations, I think that the Naval Commander in Chief would make the best arrangement with the Military Commander in Chief as to the naval officer to be left in immediate communication with the Commander in Chief, and to exercise the naval authority during the absence of the Naval Commander in Chief.

432. With regard to this department, how would you have it constituted?—Almost every question propounds difficulties. I find conflicts between the Duke of Newcastle and the Duke of Somerset as to which should be the supreme authority, whether it should be naval or military, but I do find concurrence between them upon the subject of Boards. They both hold a strong opinion that Boards are not a convenient machinery for conducting great affairs, and there is considerable truth in that opinion. The Duke of Somerset illustrates it by saying, I think, that he has had himself experience of four Boards; that not one of the four worked in the same manner, and not any of them entirely to his satisfaction; that is his official experience. The Duke of Newcastle holds very much the same opinion, strongly against Boards. I am of opinion that there is great force in those objections; and yet when I was responsible during the Russian War, I did create a Transport Board, but, on the whole, I do not think that in time of peace the nucleus of a Board would require the immediate constitution of a Board. If the severance of the Victualling Department took place, I think it would be enough to appoint one separate officer, such as the officer now appointed for victualling, for the conduct of the transport business; but in time of war, I retain my opinion that, for that special service, a Board, limited in number to three, would be the best manner of conducting it, and I will assign my reason. I think that there should be mixed elements in it, to give satisfaction to the army; I think that a military officer ought to be upon that Board; I think that a naval officer, if it remains under the Admiralty, should be at the head of it; and I think that there should be an experienced civilian, a man of business, and acquainted with shipping, keeping accounts, freight, and matters of that kind.

433. Would you have the gentleman at the head of that Board connected with the Admiralty as the Superintending Lord of Transports now is?—I must say that I believe that Admiral Craigie conducted that service well during the end of the Russian war. My instructions to him were, that every morning he should go, not to the Horse Guards, because I do not recognise the Horse Guards as the head of the army, but that he should go to the Minister of War, day by day, and ascertain at the War Department what the wants of the day were; that having, himself, visited the War Department, he should pass to the Admiralty, and that, in communication with some one there as the channel of communication with the First Lord, he should make known those wants, and then proceed to his office, and, in concert with his colleagues, transact the detail of the business. That was the general instruction which I gave to Admiral Craigie: I believe that he acted on it, and I believe that upon the whole the business was well done.

434. Admiral *Duncombe*.] I think that in Admiral Craigie's own evidence before this Committee he has shown how very strictly he adhered to the judicious orders which you had given him, as he states that he was in daily communication with the War Minister, and that after communicating to the Admiralty what the wants of the War Office were, he went to the office and had them put into a channel for being carried out: that is what you think is the proper and best system to adopt in the matter?—If the transfer do not take place to the War Department, I see no other mode which would conduct it in harmony with the War Department. And I would also observe that when I constituted the Board, I consulted the Minister for War, and put upon the Board a military officer who enjoyed his confidence.

435. If the severance should take place which you have suggested, in time of peace an individual (you have just mentioned Admiral Craigie, for instance) might be put as the responsible head of that department, to be assisted in the event of war breaking out by a competent military officer, and a civilian, so forming a Board?—I would not wish to pledge myself that that officer in time of peace should be a naval officer, but I think that in time of peace it might be conducted by one person. I perhaps might incline to the opinion that that person should be a civilian in time of peace, and that the assistance which you would add in time of war would be a naval officer, and a military officer; but of course that is a detail which must rest with the judgment of the Executive.

436. Would

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436. Would it not happen that the person acting individually in time of peace would have more knowledge of the working of the department, and consequently would naturally become the Chairman of the Board when his colleagues were appointed in the event of war?—I had the advantage as the Honourable and Gallant Admiral had, of acting with a most efficient and able civilian, namely, Mr. Grant. Mr. Grant, with Mr. Laban his first clerk, did possess my confidence, and I found the business admirably done, even with all the weight of the victualling department in time of peace.

437. The charges which you mentioned as occurring, or which might possibly occur under the present regulations at the outports by the military authorities there after the vessel had been chartered and taken up in the river, could only apply to vessels taken up from the merchant service, and could not in any way, I suppose, affect the naval transports?—Yes, to this extent: the economy of conveying troops in Queen's ships will very much turn upon the numbers conveyed on each voyage, and if the Admiralty, in conjunction with the supreme authorities here, shall be of opinion that the "Himalaya" may take 800 men, and if the officer commanding at Portsmouth shall be of opinion that she can only take 700, the circumstance of the reduction in the number to be conveyed by the "Himalaya" from Portsmouth to Calcutta will materially affect the cost to the public.

438. Certainly, but do you conceive that they have that power, even with the Government transports?—I read Colonel Gordon's evidence in that sense; he says, that he will not be satisfied with any arrangements made at the port of fitting; that it is essential that there shall be a veto at the last moment, exclusively in the military authority, and that no other arrangement would be satisfactory to the Horse Guards. If that be maintained, there is no check upon expenditure, and there is no established rule.

439. Although your observation with regard to the impossibility of judging from the Navy Estimates, the cost of sending troops by the Government transports may be perfectly true as a general rule, you probably have seen in page 240 of the Appendix, a paper handed in by Captain Eden upon that subject, showing the expenses of sending men by the "Himalaya" and the "Perseverance," which were Government transports, and by the "Indiana," which was a chartered vessel?—I am grieved to perceive in this book, the greatest conflict of naval authorities upon the question of that expenditure. Captain Eden presents a most favourable estimate of the relative cost. If I turn to Appendix, pages 387 and 388, being the return of a most admirable officer of the highest experience, namely, Sir Alexander Milne, I find conclusive evidence the other way; if you will look at pages 387 and 388, you will see that the cost of conveying men by the "Imperador" from port to port, is 50 *l.* 10 *s.* 11 *d.* a man, and that the cost by the "Vulcan" is 35 *l.* 7 *s.*; now that would upon the face of it appear to be a comparison very much in favour of the Queen's ship, but the "Imperador," I believe was one of the most costly vessels that was ever engaged, and the "Vulcan" is better than many, if not most of the Queen's transports; if you compare that with a sailing ship, the cost of the Queen's ship is 35 *l.* 7 *s.*, and the cost of the sailing ship is 20 *l.* 4 *s.* 6 *d.* per man; and for these distant voyages, I observe that the opinion of the military men is, that there is very little difference in point of time; and as relates to health and comfort, the turn is very much in favour of sailing ships for such distant voyages; but then passing on to the next page 388, you will find a comparative statement put in by Sir Alexander Milne, of the cost of Her Majesty's troop ship "Vulcan" for a year, and that of engaging freight for the services performed by her in the year 1857. That is approaching to an account instead of an estimate, and is more satisfactory; you will there find that the cost of freight for the same service in a year, is 13,217 *l.*, and that the cost of employing the "Vulcan" to perform the same service, is 27,863 *l.*; and again, comparing the cost of the "Megæra" with the cost of the same service by freight, the cost by freight, per account, is 14,155 *l.*, and the cost by the "Megæra" is 28,348 *l.*, which is 100 per cent. against the Queen's ships. Now it is very difficult with such a conflict of authority to form a decided opinion, but I have great confidence in Sir Alexander Milne and his accounts, and I think that it is pretty nearly irrefragably proved that the cost of the Queen's ships is much greater than the cost of freight.

440. The Chairman suggests that I may inform you, as you may not know it, that Captain Eden has given in a corrected return since the time when he gave in that return before the Committee?—My study has been this book:

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before I came to give evidence here; I endeavoured to find in the leading points how the evidence stood, and I form my opinion upon the evidence of Captain Eden on the one hand, contrasted with this return of Sir Alexander Milne on the other.

441. May I ask you, as the Chairman has not done so, as to the benefit or otherwise to the country of a certain number of Queen's ships being retained for the uses of conveyance, irrespectively of the comparative cost?—In answer to that question, I may give my opinion very decidedly, that it is a question of degree. I should be sorry to see the navy without means of transport, and altogether dependent upon freights and the merchant service. I think it is desirable to hold freights in check by the possession, on the part of the Executive, of those means, and to a considerable extent; but I should deprecate strongly the reliance upon the exclusive possession of those means. I think that, probably, China has diverted rather inconveniently to a great distance the number of ships available; but I find in the Appendix a list of the transports available for the Queen's service; they are eight in number, and of very considerable tonnage. At the commencement of the Russian war I bought the "Himalaya," and I bought the "Prince." The one has turned out a fortunate bargain, the other a dead loss to the public. The "Prince" was lost on her first voyage. There is no insurance on the part of the public to cover the losses, and the risk is very great. I also find here, on the part of the military authorities, traces of preference for freighted ships. There is a degree of constraint and naval discipline on board the Queen's ships, which is not agreeable either to the officers or to the soldiers; there is not that perfect harmony always existing which renders a long voyage comfortable and happy; and much is to be said, especially upon long voyages, in favour of freighted ships. On the other hand, I am sure that there is great economy and efficiency for short transfers, from England to Ireland, for instance, in having steam ships at the disposal of the Government, capable of taking a regiment at once, and rapidly, in the course of 24 hours; it does not disorganize the discipline of the men; they land as fresh as when they were put on board; and there are many political and moral considerations which are in favour for short service of having transports in the Queen's service. Therefore, if I might venture to give an opinion, I would repeat that it is a question of degree, and I would not recommend that the public service should be dependent exclusively upon one or the other.

442. But you think that the public service benefits by having a certain number of troop ships available for the conveyance of troops, more especially in the short voyages, such as, say Ireland or the Channel Islands?—Yes; or even Gibraltar. I think that in short voyages there is great advantage in it. I again say, that the leaning of my opinion is, that it is more expensive; and also, as the account is now kept, you cannot institute a comparison as to the relative amount of the cost. I am quite sure that there must be another system of account with regard to the cost of these Queen's transports. From what I have already said, you can only trace it through five or six heads of the Estimates.

443. My question was without reference to the cost in this particular instance, but it had a more immediate bearing upon the political and national point of view of the Queen's service, having a certain number of troop ships available in an emergency, because evidence has been given before this Committee by Captain Eden, wherein he states that very recently troops have had to be moved in one of Her Majesty's frigates. That is probably owing to some of the troop ships being in China, there only being one, I believe, now available in this country for rapid service. Are you of opinion that it would not be advisable that that should be continued?—I have already said that this investigation proceeds at a moment of very peculiar difficulty, because the question of the reliefs to India must be dependent upon decisions not yet taken upon the questions, what is the quantum of the force permanently to be maintained there, and what shall be the duration of the stay of regiments in India. Those are two most important data, which ought to be settled before the question of Indian transport can be considered. I will assume that those questions are settled. Then there remains still a doubtful point whether for that distant voyage, health, comfort of troops, and contentment of officers and men considered, it is better that that distant voyage should be made in Queen's ships or in freighted ships; I incline to the opinion that the military men would prefer freighted ships. If that be so, I am quite confident that it will be the cheapest mode of conveyance. Then another question arises, whether the difference between the cost of steam ships

and of sailing ships is really covered, upon public considerations, by the difference of speed. It is a question which I do not think by any means settled, for a distant voyage to India or to China, whether upon the whole, health, comfort, and cost considered, sailing vessels are not preferable to steam ships. If it should be decided that sailing ships are on the whole, cost considered, preferable, you have a large number of wooden frigates all but condemned to be broken up, in ordinary; and I am by no means sure that for that special service, if sailing ships are available, it would not be good policy to have some of those frigates fitted as sailing ships for the purposes of conveyance. I only throw that out, as showing how many are the considerations to be carefully weighed at this juncture, and how many decisions may be open to the executive Government to be taken with wisdom, which as we are at present uninformed as to the data, cannot be fixed now or here.

444. Then I gather that you rather lean to this opinion, that the Indian reliefs should be sent out in freighted vessels, and probably sailing vessels, in preference to steam vessels?—Such is the inclination of my judgment; but that opens the most grave consideration possible, and it is more a political consideration than a question even of expense, namely, the question for how long regiments in the Indian service shall remain in India; that really touches the main spring of the British army; it is a military question of the greatest importance, and of course the more frequent the relief, relatively, the greater may be the expense; but as relates to the *morale* and efficiency of the British army, I am persuaded that those regimental reliefs must be frequent.

445. But leaving for the moment the Indian service out of the question, are you of opinion that a limited number of Queen's steam transports should be maintained for the use of the home reliefs?—If I am asked my opinion, I think it stands well at present. When the China war is over, as I hope it is, I think that maintaining the eight vessels which are mentioned in the evidence at about that tonnage, and that number would be a wise decision; to go on further and build more is very doubtful.

446. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Would you think it wise to replace those vessels which have been lost?—I find eight given, I think, in the first Appendix. That very loss without insurance shows the cost to the public. As a matter of opinion I should say that for the purpose of short reliefs, and as a security against being altogether dependent upon the public market for freight, about eight vessels of that tonnage would be a very reasonable arrangement.

447. Two of these vessels have been lost since the return at page 239 of the Appendix was made, namely, the "Perseverance" and the "Assistance"?—That is in itself a demonstration of the risk which the public run.

448. *Chairman.*] If it be the case that six Government transports were found sufficient for the ordinary reliefs; that is to say, for the home reliefs, the Mediterranean and the North American stations, you would not consider it advisable to have eight?—I have already endeavoured to express my opinion that for the distant reliefs, east of the Cape, it is not expedient, except in a great emergency, when it is absolutely necessary to send a full battalion east of the Cape with the greatest possible expedition, for which the "Himalaya" does present immense facilities.

449. Mr. *Jackson.*] But the six Government transports having been found during the last 12 months quite sufficient, would you have the six now increased to eight for short services?—If you would pardon me I would rather leave that to the executive to decide. I have given my opinion upon the general principle as far as I could venture to do.

450. Mr. *Henry Baillie.*] With reference to the loss of the transports, would there be any objection to their being insured by the Government?—Of course there is always a large profit in insuring, and the Government upon the whole, both with regard to buildings and stores generally, are their own insurers. I think that that is the principle, that whatever the profit upon insurance may be, they have thought it upon the whole better to be their own insurers, and to give to the public the profit of insurance.

451. But that profit can only be obtained when it is done upon a large scale?—Yes; and the Government, by abstaining from insuring anything, do it on the largest scale.

452. Not with reference to ships, because the employment of transport ships is very small by the Government?—I meant my observation to apply to all their

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stores, to all their dockyards, and to all their buildings; they do not insure any of them; certainly, with regard to these iron transports, I must express an opinion which I think experience justifies, namely, that for the conveyance of a large number of men they are very hazardous; if they touch a rock these thin iron ships go to pieces directly, their back is broken, and no chance is left; that is an argument in favour of distant voyages in sailing ships, and a strong one, I think.

453. Colonel *Dickson.*] In discussing the relative advantage or economy of sending troops long distances in sailing ships, the reliefs of troops in India for instance, do you take into consideration the increased time that England would be denuded of troops till those who were relieved returned?—Yes, that is a consideration against sailing ships; but it is a question upon which naval officers and gentlemen connected with voyages are more competent to give an opinion than I am; I am however told that fast-sailing ships for these long voyages, the time of departure being well chosen, do make the voyage in a shorter time than might be expected as compared with steamers, and the difficulty of coaling steamers is great.

454. You are decidedly of opinion that the Victualling and Transport Services ought to be divided in time of peace in order to be prepared for any emergencies which might arise in war?—My opinion inclines that way; I think that on the whole it would be wise to do it now.

455. You have said that you do not recognise the Horse Guards as the head of the army?—I do not.

456. I presume that your opinion inclines to this, that when transport is required a requisition should be made either from the War Office or from the Horse Guards direct to the Transport Board, who should be entirely responsible for the whole management of the embarkation and carriage of those troops, from the moment they embark until they disembark?—Of course, emergencies set aside rules; but I think that the general rule should be this: the Admiralty recognises the supreme authority only of Secretaries of State conveying the Queen's pleasure. If it be from the Foreign Office to send a fleet on any particular service, the Queen's pleasure is conveyed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If at this moment it should be deemed necessary to send a ship of war to New Zealand the Queen's pleasure would be conveyed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies; the Duke of Newcastle would convey the Queen's pleasure. So I think with regard to providing freight for the army, the Queen's pleasure should be notified in a formal instrument addressed to the Admiralty, signed by the Secretary of State for War or by the Under-Secretary of State. As I am advised, the State does not recognise the Horse Guards as the authority for ordering the movement of troops, to this extent, the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards cannot move a man in England without the authority of the Secretary of State, much less can the Commander-in-Chief send a man abroad without the authority of the responsible adviser of the Crown, the Secretary of State, and, therefore, both upon constitutional grounds, and with a due regard to order and regularity, I am of opinion that no provision should be made by the Admiralty for the movement of troops, except in consequence of a recorded letter from the Secretary of State.

457. Whenever a regiment or a number of regiments were required to be moved, you think that the regulations for their transport should be managed by the Transport Board on an order direct from the War Department?—When once the Admiralty has received that order from the Secretary of State to prepare for the movement of a given number of men, then the order is given from the Admiralty to the Transport Department, the Transport Department immediately puts itself in communication with the Horse Guards, the military authority, but the first moving power ought to emanate from the supreme authorities in both instances, and what they shall have finally adjusted I do not think should be varied by any military authority whatever.

458. And you would leave to the Transport Board the responsibility as to the sort of ships in which those troops should be conveyed?—In time of war, as I have said, I would have a military officer upon the Board; it is with reference to that combination, that though not favourable to Boards in general, I think for that special service a Board of a small number is necessary, but I certainly would have a military officer upon the Board in time of war. In time of peace, when the order is given to prepare for the movement of troops, whoever has the transport duty, whether it be the officer now at the head of the victualling, or, upon the severance, the officer at the head of the transports, should immediately communicate

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communicate with the Horse Guards officer as to the details, and that being once mutually fixed by naval and military authority, ought not to be superseded by military authority only.

459. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Do you believe that to any extent the alteration in the numbers on board to which Colonel Gordon alluded has taken place?—I so read Colonel Gordon's evidence.

460. It is a very important question whether, after the authorities in the river, namely, the War Office and the Admiralty authorities, have decided what number of men a transport is capable of carrying, any military officer at any of the outports should be able to reduce the number. I do not gather from Colonel Gordon that this is more than a power which he desires to have, rather than a thing which has occurred?—I will read the part of Colonel Gordon's evidence which gives rise in my opinion to the belief that in the last resort a veto on the part of the military authorities does now exist. At Question No. 2057 he is asked, "Does that apply both to peace and to the emergency of war?" (*Answer.*) "Yes, I think so; but I would leave that to the Admiralty; if they "wanted a military officer, they could always get him; I should be sorry to force a "military officer upon them, because I do not think that it would be necessary, "and it also prevents our having a complete check afterwards; we should be told "a military officer has approved of this, and, therefore, we beg that it may go on." (*Question.*) "That has happened, if I recollect rightly, during the time of the "Transport Board?" (*Answer.*) "I think so, but I do not quite recollect an "instance." (*Question.*) "(Sir *Michael Seymour.*) There is always a military "officer for every special purpose to examine with others the condition of troops?" (*Answer.*) "Yes, always, just before the embarkation, and that is the time when "we like to make our objections." (*Question.*) "That duty is the main duty to "be performed?" (*Answer.*) "Yes; but however important the other may be "it is entirely a naval question, with regard to the ship, and the sails, and the "rigging, and it is much better for the Admiralty to carry it out in their own "way; and when they hand over the ship to us, for the troops to go on board, "THEN is the time for us to make our supervision." Then you will see again, at Question 2061, a question put by the Chairman. (*Question.*) "Are not those "objections which you make, just before the troops are going to embark, often "likely to entail an extra expense upon the country, by the alterations which you "require?" (*Answer.*) "Very seldom indeed; because it is all reduced to a sys-"tem. The Admiralty know perfectly well what we want, as to the size of the ship, "and everything, and the alterations which we make are practically reduced to "not embarking the full number of men; that is what we examine the ship for; "if she is taken up for 500 men, we measure her, and see the ventilation, and "so on; we perhaps find that she is only fitted for 450, and therefore the "whole number do not go." That appears to me conclusive. Then, if there be any doubt, at Question 2064, he is asked by the Chairman, "If a military "man was in the department, who knew exactly the requirements of those "troops, and the number that the Horse Guards would allow to embark, would "not that expense be likely to be saved to the country, and would not time also "be saved?" (*Answer.*) "He is not more likely to know than the Admiralty; we "should not take his opinion; he would be under the orders of the Admiralty, and "we want a check against the Admiralty arrangements; we do not want always "to accept what they send us. Sometimes it happens that the ships are too "crowded; we have had occasion to withdraw as many as 100 men, and we do not "want to be told, 'Oh, but your own officer has approved of that.'" I will not weary you, but he gives at number 2080, an illustration of the power exercised by himself: a ship appears to have been fitted in the river with the concurrence of the naval and military authorities, it went down to Gravesend, and it was reported, I suppose, to the Horse Guards, that the distilling apparatus was defective, was that a question referred to any naval authority? Colonel Gordon goes down himself to Gravesend, inquires into the sufficiency of the apparatus, and upon his fiat that he is satisfied that the apparatus has been improved, he allows the ship to proceed. If that be possible, I think that confusion to the greatest degree must ensue.

461. I understood you to say, that the cost of the Government transports is not shown distinctly in the Navy Estimates, and that you think it would be desirable that the cost of the Government transports should be shown as appertaining to Vote 17; is that your opinion?—Not as things now are; but if the severance

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takes place from the victualling, and there is to be a separate transport establishment, whether a Board or a particular officer, I think that the accounts must be kept strictly, to show the difference of cost in the use of steam ships, and the use of freighted ships, and that can only be done by framing, with reference to the Queen's ships, a system of account which will embrace the pay of the men under No. 1, the victualling of the men under No. 2, the repair of the ship at home under No. 8, the repair of the ship abroad under No. 9, and the coals and cost of materials under No. 10; in No. 10 there is the repair of the machinery also; it must all be concentrated; and for the purpose of the public knowing the cost at which they carry troops, there must be an account kept against both the Queen's ships and the freighted ships.

462. Do you think that it would be advisable that that should be shown as connected with the transport vote?—I think that the House of Commons cannot vote No. 17, and cannot form any opinion of the cost of the reliefs, without an account so kept and duly rendered, and that it cannot be checked in any other way.

463. And you think that when the system of naval accounts is correct, it might be rendered?—I think there is no difficulty; I have no doubt that Sir Richard Bromley would give the scheme of an account in the course of 24 hours.

464. Mr. *Jackson.*] Would you include, as cost to the public, the cost of the ship, and any interest upon it, which the public might pay for the use of the money?—Certainly.

465. Also the estimated account of the depreciation in each year in the value of the ships?—It ought to be kept upon exactly the same principle as a ship-owner's account.

466. Including insurance, restitution, cost, and interest of money?—Yes; everything.

467. Colonel *Dickson.*] I think that sometimes great expense, and occasionally confusion, is caused by the constant running backwards and forwards between the two departments; do you not think that it would be a better plan that the Horse Guards should first arrange with the War Office, or the War Office with the Horse Guards, what movement of troops should take place; that then the Horse Guards should communicate direct with the Transport Board, inclosing the Secretary of State's authority, and that the Transport Board should then arrange direct with the Horse Guards, and be entirely responsible how the movement should be carried out?—I have ventured to state that the Admiralty are not cognizant of the Horse Guards as the head of the army; they only know the Secretary of State for War.

468. I am assuming that the Horse Guards, in their application, must inclose the Secretary of State's authority?—From the habit of the office, considering the position of the two offices, the one at the head of the army, and the other at the head of the navy, correspondence should be conducted directly between the two heads, both obeying the Queen's pleasure; the Queen's pleasure being conveyed to the Admiralty by the only channel through which the Queen's pleasure can be conveyed, which is the Secretary of State.

469. But the Horse Guards representing one department communicates with the Transport Board?—If you will allow me I will illustrate what I think is wrong in what is now the established usage, by some answers which I find given by the Quartermaster General, at page 75. At Question 1256, Admiral Duncombe asks him: "Under the present system since you have held the appointment you now do, your course is, if you want to send out troops to apply to the Admiralty for the means of so doing?" (*Answer.*) "Yes." (*Question.*) "Have you ever experienced any difficulty in that respect, have you ever found any remissness on their part, or that at any time when vessels have been so required by you, they have not been ready at the time specified?" (*Answer.*) "No, I cannot say that I have; there has been a little modification of late." Now that modification is an entire change of the system since I was connected with the Admiralty. "There has been a little modification of late within the last few years, inasmuch as the Quartermaster General now communicates direct with the Admiralty, and in fact direct with the operative branch of the Admiralty for his requirements" (passing by the supreme authority altogether). "I write letters addressed 'to the Secretary of the Admiralty,' but being marked 'for the Transport Service' they go direct to that department, and in many instances I have got a reply the very same day on which the letter has been written. A letter

"letter has been written in the morning, and before I have left the office I have "got a reply." That is passing by the supreme naval authority altogether, and it is a subordinate branch of the army corresponding direct with a subordinate branch of the navy, and it may be without the cognizance of either of the supreme authorities. I hold that to be incorrect in the extreme. Then Question 1258 is, "You cannot conceive anything approaching more to despatch than a system of "that sort?" (*Answer.*) "No; I have had instances in which they have written "immediately" (they mean the victualling department) "to know whether the "case was one of great urgency; whether it was absolutely necessary to take up "steam vessels, or whether freight ships would do, and it would depend upon "circumstances which would be adopted." Now that is a correspondence immediately affecting to the extent of 50 or 60 per cent. the cost of transfer between two subordinate departments, one of the navy, and the other of the army, and as far as I can see without any control by the ministers who are really at the head of both, and who ought to be responsible.

470. Surely neither of those subordinates could by any possibility act without the entire concurrence of the heads of their departments?—I find this on the authority of the Quartermaster General, and I read it with amazement.

471. If the adjutant of a regiment sends an order, he does it in the Colonel's name, surely it could not by any possibility occur that the Quartermaster General would make an application of that sort, except with the entire concurrence of the heads of the departments?—I know not; I should like to have the certainty of seeing the order under under the hand of Lord Herbert, or the Under Secretary of State.

472. Even if getting that order would cause a delay of three or four days in the answer to the communication?—That depends upon the organization of the departments within themselves; if the organization of the War Office be good, no such delay would occur.

473. Might not a case happen of the Secretary of State for War being officially absent, or it being impossible to get his signature, or to get to him?—The Under Secretary of State would then direct the letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, which would be quite official, and would be of record. I have not quite finished my quotation from the evidence. Answer 1259, is in itself alarming; the question is, "So in the same way, if what are called man-of-war transports are avail-"able, the Admiralty informs you" (that is the Quartermaster General at the Horse Guards) "of that circumstance, that they are ready if suited to the service for "which they are required?" (*Answer.*) "The Admiralty notify" to whom? To the Secretary of State? To the Commander-in-Chief? No. "The Admiralty notify "to me," that is the Quartermaster General, "that they have a man-of-war either at "Portsmouth or Sheerness, or wherever it may be, and that it will be ready, some-"times they may say in a month. If that suit the military requirements, we reply "accordingly," that is the Horse Guards; "but if we say 'No, we cannot wait a "month,' they then go into the market and take up tonnage." Now, the notification of being unable to wait a month, ought not to come from the Horse Guards, but ought to come from the Secretary of State for War; inasmuch as the Horse Guards cannot move a man either at home or abroad without the order of the Secretary of State; it is no authority whatever if the Quartermaster General says, "We cannot wait a month;" that should come from the supreme military authority. Then I perhaps may go on to state another thing: I read with surprise that a perfect scheme for the transfer of troops was prepared by the Transport Board in the year 1855; you will find that stated by Mr. Giffard, in answer to question 570: "When you came into office did you draw "up any set of regulations for the guidance of the service?" (*Answer.*) "Not at "the commencement; before we quitted office we improved the code that was in "force." (*Question.*) "Have you a copy of these regulations?" he says, "I have "not;" but they have now been given in; they are to be found in the Appendix;" "they were produced by Captain Eden; they have never been adopted, I believe; "they hung fire, I understand, at the Horse Guards; this is a book which stated "the 'regulations to be observed for the tendering, surveying, &c., of ships, to be "employed by the Admiralty as transports.'" (*Question.*) "Are those the regula-"tions you referred to?" (*Answer.*) "Yes." (*Question.*) "Do you think that "if any one Board was to be originated it would be necessary to lay down some "such regulations as those which are contained in this book?" The answer is, "Certainly;" with his experience as Secretary to the Transport Board. If you will look again to No. 592, you will find the following evidence: "Though "this

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"this book of regulations was compiled in 1855, you say that they have never been "adopted because they are hanging fire at the Horse Guards?" (*Answer.*) "So I "understand." (*Question.*) "If that hanging fire at the Horse Guards should "cease, you think that the adoption of those regulations would make the "Transport Service efficient, and that they should be adopted if the Transport "Board were re-established?" (*Answer.*) "Yes." Then Admiral Duncombe said, "They had to go."—Where? "To the Horse Guards for approval?" (*Answer.*) "Yes." Now, from that day to this (and that is now six years ago), this complete scheme, which is now in your Appendix, No. 13, framed by the Transport Board, of which a military officer was a member, sent by the Secretary, and sent, as I think, wrongly, to the Horse Guards, and not to the Minister of War, has, as Mr. Giffard expresses it, "hung fire" for six years at the Horse Guards, and there is at this moment no scheme whatever in force under adequate sanction, regulating the conveyance of troops.

474. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Have you studied those proposed regulations?—No, I have not. I take them as bearing the highest sanction, because they were framed by the Transport Board, composed as it was of a naval officer, a military officer, and a gentleman conversant with shipping; and I also believe that they were drawn by Mr. Giffard, a gentleman in whose abilities I have very great confidence; and whatever their merit or demerit may be, they lie dead; no objection has been taken to them by the military authorities, but no sanction has been given.

475. Colonel *Dickson.*] I understand you to think that the transport service ought to be entirely conducted by the Admiralty, and that the Horse Guards should have no veto at all respecting it; that when, as you say, the Minister of War has made his application to the Transport Board, they should regulate the means of transport, without consulting the Horse Guards at all?—I think far otherwise; I think that in time of war there should be a military officer, a member of the Board, virtually nominated by the Minister of War, and possessing his full confidence, and that in working the detail at the port of outfit there should be concurrently with a naval officer, a military officer, superintending and reporting to the Board the fittings; but when once those fittings are complete with the concurrent exertions of a naval and of a military officer, and those fittings are approved by a Board containing the three elements, naval, military and shipping experience, no power, and certainly no military power exclusively, should be able to alter his arrangement in the least without the intervention of any naval authority.

476. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] For the due and continual working of the service in its detail, bearing in mind the important principle that the Secretary of State for War is the responsible head, do you mean that the Admiralty should exact for every small requisition for stores, or for the movement of a few troops in small detachments, that there should be no communication between the Admiralty and the Quartermaster General's department, except with the signature of the Secretary or Under Secretary of State?—That is pushing it to the extreme; but I should say that the question of moving regiments, or large detachments, anything like what Colonel Gordon contemplates, where a reduction can be made of 100 men in one ship, or 50 men in another ship, or anything approaching to that scale, is not a matter of detail, but involves great expense, and involves principles of command which ought not to be violated.

477. But as regards detail, I understand you that there must be constant communications between the two departments, and that it would not be advantageous to the public service that they should go through the formal routine of the signature of the Secretary or the Under Secretary of State?—That touches the great question of the command of the army. Until the recent arrangement was made consolidating the Ordnance, the Horse Guards, and all military departments under the sole control of the Secretary of State for War, matters stood upon another footing, and there was no objection, comparatively, to communications upon matters of detail between the Admiralty and the Horse Guards. But now, since it has been admitted that the command of the army is vested in the Secretary of State for War, and that the Commander in Chief and the Horse Guards are subordinate to the Secretary of State for War, I think there is no safety in any instructions to the Admiralty, incurring expense of any magnitude, unless they have a recognized authority in a formal instrument from the War Office. I do not think that you will fix responsibility for military expenditure satisfactorily in any other way; and I think that the mode which is described in

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the evidence leads to immense expenditure without check, especially in the present state of the Vote No 17, which is borne upon the Navy Estimates, though really, in a great measure, an army expenditure, and the very principle which led to the transfer to the Post Office of the Post Office expenditure, and removing it from the Navy Estimates would certainly lead, considered only as a matter of account and responsibility, to a similar transfer of this vote to the Army Estimates.

478. You are aware that Vote No. 17 is prepared by the Admiralty after having received an estimate from the War Office of their probable want during the coming year?—I am aware of that; and it appears to me that nothing can possibly be more loose than that estimate must be upon the very face of the estimate for this year. There is a reduction effected in 1861–62 as compared with 1860–61, amounting to nearly 250,000 *l.*; and there is a note which says that extraordinary services for China are not included. Now, saving China, it does not occur to me upon what principle of closely framed estimates there can be a difference of 250,000 *l.* between 1861 and 1860.

479. You are aware that the sum of 120,000 *l.* "for the freight of ships on monthly pay, or for the purchase of the same," and 85,000 *l.* for "coals for steam transports," making in the whole the sum of 205,000 *l.*, was taken last year as an estimate for China, without any knowledge by the Government necessarily of what the expenditure would amount to, which was going on at the other end of the world. But irrespectively of that sum, and comparing the Vote 17 for this year with the year before it, is there any such great discrepancy as leads you to supppose that the vote has not been duly considered?—I cannot say that it has not been duly considered, but there is a note appended that "the amount provided in the above estimate for freight, &c., is irrespective of the sum which may be required on account of extraordinary services for China," therefore I put China out of view, and China being out of view, no circumstances upon the face of public affairs would appear to justify a diminution of 250,000 *l.* for freight, on account of the Army Department in the year 1861–62, as compared with the year 1860–61.

480. But is it not the case that it arises solely from the fact that this year no sum has been taken for China, whereas last year the sum of 205,000 *l.* was taken for extraordinary service in China?—I really cannot answer as to the precise cause of the omission of that 120,000 *l.*, but I see that the very last item "for provisions and medical comforts for troops embarked on board ships of war, troop ships, monthly transports, and freight ships," is 27,500 *l.* in 1861–62, and in 1860–61 it was 50,000 *l.* I will put China aside, that item is reduced nearly 100 per cent., it is reduced from 50,000 *l.* to 27,500 *l.* What the cause of that reduction is is open to explanation, but on the face of it I do not understand it.

481. Mr. *Dalglish.*] With reference to the management of transports, supposing that you had two vessels of 2,000 tons, one under the management of a private firm and the other under the management of the Admiralty, which of those two vessels do you suppose would do the greatest amount of transport service in the year, and be conducted at the cheapest cost?—I do not believe that any vessel of the size and tonnage of the "Himalaya" has done more work than the "Himalaya."

482. Do you not suppose that the Peninsular and Oriental Company's boats have done more work?—That is, in running passages?

483. Yes.—I do not think that the comparison is fair between passages across the Atlantic, with every possible facility for repairs both at the port of arrival, and at the port of departure, and the passages made by a vessel like the "Himalaya," running to all parts of the world, making very long voyages, and being very often at the Cape or at Hong Kong, with no possibility of a large and effectual repair; a vessel running from Liverpool to New York, with facility of repair at both ports, affords no analogy, I think.

484. But in steam vessels there can be a comparison between the number of miles run and the amount of cost of repair?—Certainly, between the miles run. The cost of repair is another ingredient, and it is very difficult to estimate the cost of repair of the "Himalaya," because she may run for a year with almost no repair, and yet at the end of the year the repairs may be very heavy, and that must be carried to account. But I have already said, that I am not an advocate for conducting reliefs by Government ships exclusively; I repeat that I believe it to be a question of degree; and I believe that it will be found better and cheaper

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for short transports, particularly between England, Ireland, and Scotland, and perhaps Gibraltar or Malta, not much further than that; and there are other considerations which make it desirable that the Government should not be exclusively dependent upon freight and the merchant service; but for economy in ordinary circumstances, I have no doubt that freight is considerably cheaper.

485. You think that transport would be cheaper by a private firm than by the Admiralty?—I have no doubt of it; my belief is, that individual private interest prompts greater care and greater economy than you will ever find possible in a public department; self-interest is a strong motive to saving; it must always be wanting in a public department.

486. *Chairman.*] Do you think that the service in short voyages would be conducted at less expense by means of Government vessels than by private vessels?—I am not quite sure of that; but in the case of a regiment conveyed at once from Portsmouth to Cork in 24 hours, with so little interruption to its discipline, it is as good as when it embarked; beating about in the Channel in sailing vessels would be very different.

487. If you turn for a moment to the account rendered by Admiral Milne, to which you have already referred, and which is at page 388 of the Appendix, you will find that in the first account which he gives there the transport was principally for short voyages along the coast?—The first is to the Cape, then there is Quebec.

488. But it is principally along the coast?—Yes, it is so.

489. This is not an estimate, but it is the actual account of cost?—It is.

490. He shows there that the service performed in hired vessels cost the country 13,217 *l.* 14 *s.* 9 *d.*, whereas, if Her Majesty's ships had been employed, it would have cost the country more than double that amount, namely, 27,863 *l.* 11 *s.* 4 *d.*?—I have already cited that as conclusive evidence that it is more costly to employ Queen's transports than merchant vessels; and if expense alone is to be considered, there can be no question of it.

491. Are you of opinion that that is also applicable to short as well as to distant voyages?—Of course; the merit of this account is, that it is very different from an estimate; it is undeniable, and upon the whole it demonstrates, upon a mixture of voyages, some long and some short, that the statement of account is very much in favour of freight; but there are the other considerations, partly military and partly political, to which I have adverted, which still lead me to think that the Queen's troop ships should not altogether be discontinued, though I admit that they are more costly.

492. Mr. *Caird.*] Has the Secretary of State for War the same absolute control over the movement of the naval force as you say he has over the land force?—Quite; every Secretary of State has co-ordinate and co-equal power, and any Secretary of State conveying to the Admiralty the Queen's pleasure must be obeyed by the Admiralty; the Admiralty is subordinate to all the Secretaries of State when they convey the Queen's pleasure.

493. Quite as much as the Horse Guards?—The Horse Guards and the Admiralty stand exactly in the same position; they are subordinate to the Queen's pleasure, notified by a Secretary of State.

494. Colonel *Dickson.*] Is that pleasure notified by the Secretary of State in every case of relieving ships, or removing the naval force?—No, there is this difference; the Admiralty, excepting under special instructions under their patent, have the power of movement; the Horse Guards have no patent, and not a man can be moved by them. The Duke of Wellington, when I was at the Home Office, never moved a corporal's guard from London to Windsor without notice of the movement to the Home Secretary; the Duke of Wellington never moved a company for Colonial relief without notifying it to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, and obtaining his sanction. The Horse Guards are subordinate; they do not hold by patent; the Admiralty hold by patent, and they have the power of movement, and the notification of the Queen's pleasure with them is the exception; with the Horse Guards it is the rule.

495. That brings us back to the great question, the Duke of Wellington never moved a company of a regiment without notifying it to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, but did he ask the permission of that Secretary of State for moving them?—He could not move them as it then stood without a civil officer giving his sanction; the Secretary at War gave the route, and that route was a check upon the movement; a civil authority directly present at the

Horse Guards exercised the check. Since the abolition of the office of Secretary at War, that is now confided to the Secretary of State for War; all those checks which were exercised by the Secretary of War are under patent now to be exercised by the Secretary of State for War, and there is the great distinction that the Horse Guards do not hold by patent, but are subordinate; the Admiralty have power delegated under their patent, saving cases of exception where the Queen's pleasure is notified by a Secretary of State.

496. The Commander in Chief having received the authority of the Secretary of State, would it not expedite the movement if his subordinates could communicate direct with the Admiralty, instead of going through the Secretary of State for the details?—The Admiralty recognise no subordinate authority; the Admiralty recognise nothing independent of their patent, which they hold direct from the Crown, except the Queen's pleasure, notified by a Secretary of State.

497. Sir *Michael Seymour*.] With reference to whether the transport service is to be carried on under the First Lord of the Admiralty, or through the military authorities under the War Minister, who is to undertake that supervision which in all parts of the world, wherever a naval flag or pennant is flying, is now of instant application whenever a transport arrives, for seeing to her sea condition, her supplies of provisions, or coals, or water, and for repairs; if the change took place, how would that important supervision be exercised, as it is advantageously, I conceive, now done, and at the moment when it is required?—As I understand, the advocates for the transfer from the Naval Department to the War Department contend that it would be equally well done in this way, that the War Department, in the event of war, should borrow for the special service from the Navy, naval officers. That in a great expedition, even a rear admiral should be at the head of the Transport Department of the War Office, and that that officer should be in communication with the naval authorities in the conjoint operation. I have already said, that my belief is, that though there would be respect for the public service, and what was due to the public service on the part of the Navy, under those circumstances the assistance rendered to the transport service by the naval service generally would not be so cordial and prompt under that arrangement, or so efficient as it is now.

498. Looking back to the period of the Peninsular war, where the late Duke of Wellington had large duties performed in respect to the transport of troops by hired transports, under the immediate control of naval authority, were not those services efficiently and fully performed to his satisfaction as a military Commander in Chief?—They were most admirably performed; that brings to my recollection a circumstance which I well know; Admiral Malcolm was an intimate private friend of mine, and it was his good fortune to take the Duke of Wellington from the Cape to Bombay, when he went with his regiment to join the Indian army before his great exploits at Assaye, and it also was his good fortune to take the Duke of Wellington from Cork to Mondego Bay, before the battle of Vimeira, at the commencement of the Peninsular war. When the Duke went to command the army immediately before the battle of Waterloo, he applied to the Admiralty, and made it a personal request that Admiral Malcolm should hoist his flag at Ostend, and, at the request of the Duke, Admiral Malcolm had the whole arrangement of the Transport Service, possessing the unbounded confidence of the Duke of Wellington, being selected by the Duke, and his flag was flying at Ostend when the battle of Waterloo was fought.

499. *Chairman*.] Have you any further suggestions to offer?—No; I have only too largely, I am afraid, stated opinions; I could not contribute facts, as my experience is not recent; but when you did me the favour of saying that you wished to see me, I endeavoured to make myself master of the evidence which was laid before the House last year; I have compared it with my past experience, and I have ventured to lay before you what I think is the imperfection of the present state of arrangements, and I have nothing more to say except to thank you for having heard me, and begging you to pardon me if I have expressed too much of opinion and have given you too little of fact.

Charles Richards, Esq., called in; and Examined.

C. Richards, Esq. 25 April 1861.

500. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] WITH regard to the return which Mr. Willis was asked for, can you state whether it can be furnished?—The information for which Mr. Willis was asked, was what proportion of the troop service done in 1860 would have been performed by four vessels which were not available had they been available for the service, and my representation to the Admiralty was, that it would be impossible to state what particular portion of the troop services done in 1860 would have been performed by any particular vessels, and that to make out a return of the whole of the troop services performed in 1860 would be really so serious a hinderance to the current business of the office that I deemed it my duty to bring it under the notice of the Lords of the Admiralty for their directions before undertaking it. That is the sum and substance of my report to the Board on that subject.

501. Could you give, instead of this return, the amount of private tonnage engaged during the year 1860 in the reliefs on the Home, Mediterranean and West India stations; the number of troops conveyed, the time occupied, and the cost?—I can give it, but it will occupy some considerable time; it must be abstracted from various documents. For instance, the outward services would not occupy much time, but the services from one island to another and the homeward services would be a very long job, and just now we are so overwhelmed with the claims and work consequent on the close of the China war, that it would be a very serious hinderance to business; I must apply to the Board for more assistance if I have to furnish these returns.

502. *Chairman.*] Can you give the number of troops conveyed in hired vessels during 1860?—Do you mean the number of troops conveyed from England to foreign stations?

503. The number of troops conveyed in the course of the ordinary reliefs, including the Mediterranean, the North American, and West India stations, and the home stations, and the cost to the country?—Yes, that we can give.

504. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] With regard to the loss of the "Perseverance," will you state what course it was necessary to pursue in consequence of the loss of the "Perseverance"?—It was necessary to hire a steam transport to carry out the service on which the "Perseverance" was employed at the time of her loss, and the "Avon," a vessel belonging, I think, to the Royal Mail Company, was taken up.

505. With regard to the loss of the "Assistance," that has only very lately happened, and no steps have been taken in consequence of her loss?—Not that I am aware of; I do not know what steps the Commander in Chief, in China, where she was lost, may have found it necessary to take, but nothing is known in England of what has been done.

506. In fact, we have not had time to feel the effect of her permanent loss to the public?—No, I should think not.

507. The services of that vessel can hardly be said yet to be able to be appreciated?—No, we can hardly appreciate the loss of them.

508. *Chairman.*] You have two Government vessels now at home?—Yes; the only two vessels that I know of at home now, are the "Himalaya" and the "Megæra" I cannot at this moment remember any more; but it must be borne in mind that I have very little to do with the Queen's transports at all; I happen to know that the "Himalaya" is in England, because I saw her a short time ago, and the "Megæra," I believe, is carrying out reliefs between England and Gibraltar.

509. And you have the "Avon" besides those two?—She is now performing the service which the "Perseverance" would have done, had she not been lost.

Rowley Richardson, Esq., called in; and Examined.

510. *Chairman.*] THERE is a paper bearing upon the document which you lodged last Session, which you desire to lodge now, as it is explanatory of the plan which you have for conducting the Transport Service?—It is entirely with regard to the transport of troops to and from India; I have limited my remarks to India, and to the conveyance of the ordinary reliefs; since the Committee published the statement which I furnished last year, I have received so many communications,

munications, especially from naval men, on the subject, that I felt it my duty to go further into the question; that paper which I now hand in does not contain those opinions, because they are very lengthy, but I should be glad to place them before the Committee. I cannot mention the names of all of the officers, as I have not their permission to do so, and some of them are abroad. I have also considerable information, which I should be glad to give in a very short form, with regard to steamers as contrasted with sailing ships. My remarks are limited entirely to sailing ships. I look upon the Admiralty in this case as in the position of a merchant who has a very large capital, which he not only does not employ, but which he pays his banker for keeping, because a great many of these ships which I allude to are now doing nothing, and of course they are maintained, some say at a considerable expense; as far as I can ascertain the expense of merely maintaining them is not very considerable, but still it is something.

511. You are of opinion that those old ships of war could be fitted for transports, and thus a considerable saving be effected?—I think so, because it would not be like purchasing ships; they are now lying idle, rotting, and doing nothing.

512. And that is the object which you have in view in lodging this further paper?—Yes, to show that it can be done at a very reduced rate, compared with what it now is, and with great advantage to the State in every respect.

Jovis, 2° die Maii, 1861.

MEMBERS PRESENT.

Mr. Henry Baillie.	Mr. Lindsay.
Mr. Brooks.	Mr. Longfield.
Mr. Dalglish.	Lord Clarence Paget.
Admiral Duncombe.	Sir Michael Seymour.
Mr. Jackson.	Sir Frederic Smith.
Mr. Kinnaird.	

WILLIAM SCHAW LINDSAY, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

The Right Honourable the Earl of *Dalhousie* (attending by permission of the House of Lords), Examined.

Right Hon. the Earl of *Dalhousie*.

2 May 1861.

513. *Chairman.*] WHEN was your Lordship Secretary of State for War?—From February 1855 till 1858, when the Government broke up.

514. How was the transport service conducted when you entered office?—When I entered office, the transport service was placed by Sir James Graham, who was then at the Admiralty, upon a new footing, by the establishment of a Transport Board, of which Admiral Craigie, then Captain Craigie, was the head, and Major Robertson represented the military branch; and there was a civilian, I forget his name, representing the civil department.

515. Did you approve of the change which was made by Sir James Graham?—I had not any experience of the mode in which transport was conducted before that, because when I was Secretary at War, the Secretary at War had nothing to do with that question; but I entirely approved of the change, and concurred in the change which Sir James Graham made.

516. Was the business of transport efficiently conducted during the time that your Lordship held office?—With some exceptions now and then, which are to be expected in bringing a new department to work smoothly, I should say that it was most efficiently conducted; at all events it was conducted to my satisfaction.

517. Do you recollect what those exceptions were?—One of the exceptions was, that the Admiralty seemed to me to retain a power which in the transmission of stores of all kinds from this country to the basis of war at Balaklava, which was upon some occasions attended with very great inconvenience; whether that power was a right power or not, it is not for me to say, but the power was to this effect, that when I sent a transport full of my stores to Balaklava, the Admiral at the Bosphorus took upon himself the right of appropriating that vessel as soon as it came within his command, of unloading all my stores, and of reshipping them in other vessels, and sending them on to the seat of war in those vessels. This occasioned such very great inconvenience at one time, that the storekeeper at Balaklava made representations to the War Office of the manner in which his stores arrived, that they came in the greatest possible confusion; some of them not arriving at all on account of their transhipment, and I sent out a peremptory order to Balaklava that that was not to happen again. The Admiral on the station, I suppose, took some umbrage at this, as questioning his authority, and he immediately appealed, as he naturally would do, to his Commander in Chief, Lord Lyons, to know whether such an order was to be obeyed. Lord Lyons, after consulting with the Commander in Chief of the Army, gave instructions that that order was to be obeyed. After that things went direct from the port of dispatch here to the port of delivery at Balaklava, and I had no further reason to find any fault, or, at all events, if any fault was to be found, the responsibility rested entirely with myself and my own department.

518. Is your Lordship aware how the Transport Service is conducted at the present moment?—No, I am not; a change, I believe, has taken place since I left

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I left office; I believe that the War Transport Board has been abolished, and, except from hearsay, I do not know how the transport is conducted.

519. Then I may state, for the information of your Lordship, that the Transport Service is now conducted by a department known as the Transport and Victualling Department, in somewhat the same manner as it was before the Board to which you allude was constituted. Do you think, looking to the contingency of war, that it would be advisable, during a period of peace, to make any change in the present mode of conducting the Transport Service?—If it is conducted by the Admiralty under one individual, and as part of another department, I think that that is a mistake. My view of the conduct of sea transport is, that it undoubtedly should be under the charge of the Admiralty. I have no hesitation in giving that opinion. If it were placed under the War Department, the War Department could not do it; they would be obliged to consult the Admiralty, and to take matters at second hand from the Admiralty; in fact, they would be the agents of the Admiralty; to carry it out, therefore, it is much better that the thing should be in the hands of those who I think are the fittest parties to conduct it; but I am also clearly of opinion that, for the satisfaction of both services, both the navy and the army at all times, not only in war, but in peace, the Transport Service should be conducted by a Board, with a naval officer at its head, and with a military officer as a component part of that Board. I apprehend that a civilian would also form an essential part of the Board.

520. Do you refer to a period of peace as well as a period of war?—I do; in peace it would not be necessary to have so many clerks, or so many functionaries carrying out the work of the Board, as it would in war; but even in peace it is necessary, if you do not want after interferences, that you should have a naval officer and a military officer in communication, and the one will inform the other what the service can supply and what is required.

521. From what your Lordship has just stated, it appears to be your opinion, that it would tend to the benefit of the public service if the Victualling Department was separated from the Transport Department?—Certainly. I think that the Transport Department should be a service by itself.

522. You are also clearly of opinion that this new Transport Department to be formed should conduct the whole of the Transport Service?—I think that it should conduct the whole of the Transport Service, with one very trifling exception, which is the transport of ordnance stores coastwise, from port to port, in England. I except only the transport of ordnance stores, from port to port, in England, which could be done by means of the small vessels which are at present under the control of the Ordnance Department.

523. Then would you not place those vessels under the control of this new department?—I think that it would be more convenient for the public service if they were to remain under the control of the Storekeeper General.

524. Do you mean so far as regards the engaging of those vessels, or so far as regards the stowage?—They are not engaged at all; they are vessels in the distinct pay of the Government, and in the Army Estimates you see a regular estimate made for them.

525. With that exception, you think that transport of every sort should be placed under the control of this new department?—Military transport. I do not speak of the transport of emigrants or of convicts; of that I know nothing; but military transport of every sort should be under the conduct of that Board.

526. Would you make that Board responsible for the proper fitting out of the ships, and the ventilation of the ships, and responsible for the stowage of the cargo; in a word, responsible from the time of embarkation until the troops or stores were landed at their destination?—With regard to the fitting up, if there was a Board constituted as I proposed, namely, with a military officer upon it, that military officer ought to be enabled, either by himself or by his substitutes, to give directions for the fitting of every transport which might be taken up. First of all, the naval officer at the head of the Board would see that the vessel taken up was a proper vessel, seaworthy, and fit to do the duties which were required of her, in every way. The military officer would see that she was capable of being fitted for the military purposes for which she was required, whether it was to carry troops, or whether it was to carry stores. Then, with regard to the stowage, there is only one description of stores which I think there would be any difficulty in any parties stowing, except those who are

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immediately responsible for them, and that is stores of a combustible description. I thought at one time that there were more stores of that description conveyed from this country abroad than there really turns out to be; I thought that shells and explosive weapons of war of that description, if I may so call them, were sent from this country filled; I find that that is not so; that there are no live shells embarked in any ships in this country, except Her Majesty's ships in the navy; that when these shells are sent out to the seat of war, they are filled when they arrive at the seat of war by the Ordnance there; that there are certain combustibles of war which go out in vessels of the nature of cartridges for small arms, and also, when war is going on, rockets, which cannot be prepared at the seat of war; and these stores, whenever a ship is taken up, are all obliged to be put in a magazine which is fitted by the Ordnance on board that ship for that purpose, and I think that the fitting of the magazine should rest with the Ordnance; they ought to be responsible for the magazine being properly fitted, of course under the control and superintendence of the Admiralty; and they ought to be responsible for the placing in that magazine of all the combustible stores which are to be embarked, and those ought never to be interfered with until they arrive at the port of destination, excepting in some emergency over which nobody has any control.

527. Then, with that exception, you would make this Board, and the parties connected with the new department, responsible for the stowage of all descriptions of cargo?—I think so.

528. Various objections have been made by witnesses to a Board; it has been termed a cumbrous machine. From your experience, have you found it to be so, generally?—Some Boards are cumbrous; some Boards are not cumbrous. Where Boards work well together, I do not think they are cumbrous; where they are determined not to work well together, and jealousies exist, of course they do become cumbrous.

529. Does your Lordship recommend a Board, because you are of opinion that one gentleman would not be competent to conduct the whole of the duties required?—I recommend a Board, because I think that you require, in the first instance, that different interests should be represented. For instance, if only one individual existed at the head of the Transport Department in the Admiralty, upon receiving orders to take up shipping for a certain number of troops, he would naturally be disposed to do it in, perhaps, the most economical way for the public service. The party who hires the ship to this head of the department is, of course, anxious to make as much as he can by carrying as many troops as possible, so that there is a combination between these two gentlemen to make the ship go, if I may use the expression, as far as it can go. But on the other hand, when it arrives at the port of embarkation of the troops, then comes the party who is responsible for the health and comfort of the troops; and after that vessel has been hired and sent there he finds fault; and although the vessel is held by the head of the department, and by the party letting it to the head of the department, to be fitted for, say 500 men, he must have the right of saying, "I cannot put 500 men on board, I can only put 400;" whereas, if you have a military officer engaged from the first in taking up that ship, he ought to know and to be able to say how many troops are competent to go into that ship; and on arriving at the port, the troops have nothing to do but to march on board.

530. Upon the constitution of this Board, do you think that a naval gentleman, or a military gentleman, or a civilian, ought to be at the head of it?—A naval gentleman, beyond all doubt. We found, during the war, when a similar Board existed, it was perfectly well conducted by Admiral Craigie, to the entire satisfaction, not only of myself, but of all the departments with which I was concerned.

531. I also understand your Lordship to say that the responsible minister for that Board, in your opinion, ought to be the First Lord of the Admiralty?—The responsible minister ought to be the First Lord of the Admiralty.

532. Admiral *Duncombe.*] I gather from your Lordship's evidence, that in the formation of any Transport Board, if it should be thought desirable to have one, you very much agree with the evidence of Sir James Graham upon that subject, namely, that a Transport Board should be formed in some measure distinct from the Admiralty, but at the same time entirely under the Admiralty, and that that Board should consist of a naval officer, a military officer, and a civilian?—Yes, I entirely

I entirely agree with that; it is the way in which Sir James Graham (who I think is one of the best departmental administrators that I have ever known) formed the Transport Board in 1855, and I have seen no improvement which could be made upon that mode of formation in a new Board.

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533. It has appeared in evidence before us; I think in the evidence of Colonel Gordon; that, whether rightly or wrongly, the Horse Guards now exercise the power of making any alterations at the last moment at any of the ports at which a vessel may call, with regard to the number of men who may be sent out in that vessel. For instance, a vessel has been taken up for the conveyance of a certain number of troops with the concurrence of the Admiralty and the War Department; but at the last moment the Horse Guards exercise a veto in diminishing the number of men to be sent out in that vessel. Do you consider that that is beneficial to the service, and should be continued or not?—It is difficult to answer that question, because I cannot say that it is not beneficial to the service; but at the same time there is no doubt that it is an anomaly, and that anomaly arises in my opinion entirely from the fact that a military officer is not concerned in the first instance in the taking up of that ship. I think that if a military officer were upon his responsibility to be concerned in the first engagement of the ship, he knowing for what number of men it was necessary to provide passage, it would be quite unnecessary, and indeed there could be no occasion for the Horse Guards at the last moment interfering either to increase or to diminish the number of men. But at the present moment, under the mode in which I understand that matters are now conducted, I think it is necessary, for the comfort as well as for the lives of the Queen's troops, that there should be a power somewhere (and the Quartermaster General, in fact, represents in that matter the War Department) to prevent a vessel being overcrowded.

534. Supposing the vessel to have been taken up by a Board containing the three elements which have been mentioned, naval, military, and a gentleman of shipping experience, are you of opinion that the military authorities should have that power at the last moment of excluding from the vessel a certain number of men for which she has been prepared and fitted up under the concurrent exertions of that Board?—No; I think that they ought not to have that power; but if anything occurs to them to lead them to the supposition that when the men are embarking, or about to be embarked, the vessel is insufficiently taken up for the purposes required, an immediate report of that ought to be made to the War Department, and the military officer upon that Board should be held responsible for having overlooked that point, and having sent a vessel to take 500 men which was not capable of taking more than say, 450.

535. In fact such an occurrence could hardly take place if it was a Board containing the three elements to which we have alluded?—I do not say that it could not occur, but it certainly ought not to occur.

536. Mr. *Jackson*.] With regard to the taking of troops locally, say from England to Ireland, or from Ireland to Scotland, or to the Mediterranean or to Gibraltar, would you have the management of that under this Board, or would you place it exclusively in the hands of the Admiralty?—I think that that question rather points to the present practice of the Government keeping at their disposal a certain number of transport ships attached entirely to the navy. I think that that is a matter of considerable advantage to the public; it may possibly be a little more expensive in the year, but I think that it is a great advantage to the public that you should have certain large troop ships at the immediate command of the Admiralty, so that they may not rely entirely on such transports as have been described, but that they may be ready to ship a regiment, and carry it to any part of the world.

537. Supposing we have eight ships like the "Himalaya," quite equal to any emergency which might arise, would you place those eight ships under the absolute control of the Admiralty, or would you place them under this combined Board?—I hold this combined Board to be under the control of the Admiralty. This combined Board can do nothing without being moved by the Admiralty, and the Admiralty can do nothing without being moved by the Secretary of State.

538. Would you have the Horse Guards send to the Admiralty, and that the Admiralty Board should give orders for these ships, or would you have the Admiralty send the requisition of the Horse Guards to this Board to carry it out?—I would have the Admiralty receive no requisitions from the Horse

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Guards alone; the Admiralty must receive its orders from one person, and from one person only, and that is from a Secretary of State. The First Lord of the Admiralty takes no orders from anybody except a person competent to convey the Queen's pleasure.

539. Under whose control would you have these eight ships kept?—Those must be entirely in the same hands as all the Queen's men-of-war are.

540. And a requisition would come from this Board for one of those ships?—Supposing an emergency occurs to require that a regiment should be sent out in the course of a day's notice to any particular point, you are perhaps aware that a regiment is always held liable to be removed at 24 hours' notice, and all the officers and men should be always in a state that they can quit the country for however distant a part of the world at least at 24 hours' notice. The Secretary of State for War signifies to the Admiralty the Queen's pleasure that a regiment should be sent to such and such a place, for such and such a purpose, at the shortest possible notice; I apprehend that the Admiralty would have its vessel in as good a state of preparation as the regiment itself would be in, and in 48 hours the vessel would be away, whereas by contract many days would elapse.

541. Would you have it placed in the hands of the Transport Board, or of the Admiralty?—It must go to the First Lord of the Admiralty in the first instance, and he must then move the Transport Board. When I was in office, we carried on matters what I call in a business like manner, because before any official order was given, the head of the Transport Board communicated with me every day, to know what my orders or what my wants were likely to be, and I privately informed him what those orders were likely to be; he, of course, informed his superiors, and then when the thing was to be done, it was done through the heads of the department, and the Admiralty were the parties who set the Transport Board in motion.

542. *Chairman.*] Are you also of opinion that it would be advisable to place under this new department the transport of all troops to and from India?—Certainly, to and from India.

543. Objections have been raised upon the grounds that India is not a colony, but has its own Government?—India is a territory to which we are now sending the Queen's troops by regular rotation, and sometimes unfortunately upon emergencies. But all reliefs there are simply matters of a greater distance than the reliefs to our near colonies, and they should be conducted altogether upon the same principle.

544. You think that no difficulties would be likely to arise on account of India being to a certain extent still under its own Government?—None whatever. I do not see why the Transport Board, if it was established, should not conduct all the military transport to India, as well as to any other part of the world.

545. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] And from the fact of the revenues of India bearing the expense, that is a mere matter of detail which would not hinder the arrangement?—That is a mere matter of pecuniary arrangement, which, of course, would be settled between the financial departments of the India Office and of the War Office. I believe that the revenues of India bear the expense of transit one way, and that the revenues of England bear the expense of it the other way. The matter of account would probably be very much the same if one regiment was relieving another.

546. *Chairman.*] Are there any other suggestions which you desire to offer bearing upon the subject of the present inquiry?—No; there are no other suggestions which I should feel either disposed or able to offer, which your questions have not brought out. I think that you have touched almost upon every point, and I have given you my opinion as I have formed it from my experience.

John Charles Mason, Esq., called in; and Examined.

547. *Chairman.*] Mr. Willis, a gentleman from the Transport Department of the Admiralty, has laid before us certain comparative returns of the cost of conveying troops in Her Majesty's ships to and from India, and the cost of conveying the same number of troops in private vessels; he has based those calculations upon certain rates, which are different from the rates which you, on the part of the East India Office, gave us last Session. Have you any reason to doubt the accuracy of those figures which you then laid before the Committee?—I have not the slightest want of faith in the figures, because they are positive facts; no inferences

inferences are drawn. I have given to the Committee for ten years, from 1850 to 1859, both inclusive, from the 1st of January to the 31st of December in each year, ranged under the different Presidencies, the name of the ship, the tonnage, the number of officers, the number of men, and the rate per head, according to the articles of agreement to be paid for those men; those are incontrovertible facts; there is no calculation upon them. I have proceeded by the directions of the Committee in that Account to give them the average in each year of those prices as applicable to each Presidency, which I have put at the bottom of each of the returns, and I have wound up the account of the ten years with a general average of the prices.

548. In what manner have you made up the averages?—Say that in a particular year there were ten ships to Calcutta. I have added up those ten prices, and divided it by ten, so as to arrive at the average price.

549. In all cases?—In all cases throughout.

550. Do you know where Mr. Willis got the figures on which he has based his returns?—My attention had been drawn to them by a Member of this Committee, and likewise by yourself, and I then cast about to look for the possible data, and I find that in a Parliamentary Paper which contains a Report by Mr. Hammack, there is a statement founded, as stated by Mr. Hammack therein, upon an India office return which he, Mr. Hammack, says gives the actual "aggregate expense" of the transport of regiments to and from India in the years 1852–53, and for the other four years, in the same way, 1853–54, and so forth, giving a total sum, and which makes an "average rate," as Mr. Hammack says, of 14 *l.* 10 *s.* per head.

551. Who is Mr. Hammack?—Mr. Hammack is an actuary, and he is a member, I believe, of the Government Statistical Department, and Mr. Hammack was employed, whether as a Member of the Committee or not I cannot exactly say, but he was employed to prepare the report in which these statements are made, for a Committee which was sitting, as to the amalgamation of the Queen's army and what was called the East India Company's local army.

552. Do you know from whom Mr. Hammack got his figures?—I have had some trouble to find that out; being an India office return, the notion would be, generally speaking, that it was prepared by myself, I being the head of that particular department, or by the Military Secretary, or possibly by the Accountant General, from the general books; and I have found out that this return, or statement, was made out by the Accountant General, from the general books, in order to meet a particular requirement; to show what was the total expense under every denomination incurred in the operation of transport. It will be seen upon reference to Mr. Hammack's report that he gives, in the years 1852–53 a gross number of soldiers costing a total sum; he goes on in the same way in every year; he gives no particulars, and no items. I have ascertained that the component parts or items of that gross expenditure consist of more things than the actual transport, or what I should call the passage of the men, inasmuch as it contains the value of the cots and hammocks for each man, which are always put on board separate and distinct from the contract of the ship. It contains, likewise, the value of the medical comforts per man, which are always supplied; there are a few stores always put into the hands of the doctor in case any of the men should be sick, and require something extraordinary. It likewise contains every expense which could apply to the operation of transporting the people. Perhaps I can illustrate it better by putting a case: A ship might have been desired to take 300 men, and an arrangement might have been made with the owners for such taking, but 50 men short might possibly embark, for which there would be a forfeiture of one-third of their passage-money. That I find comes into this account which Mr. Hammack has made, as well as demurrage, and other contingent charges.

553. Then, in fact, that return is not an accurate return of the rate of hire?—I think it is not; it is a very proper return for the purposes for which it was made, but it is not a return made upon the same principle, and with the same object, as that upon which this Committee desired me to make my Return.

554. Admiral *Duncombe.*] In either one or other of these cases we do not for a moment assume that the account presented was cooked, but two accounts appear to me to vary, inasmuch as you formed your accounts upon a different basis. Mr. Hammack, as I understand from your statement, was employed by the Government to present a Return for the use of Parliament?—No, a report for the India Office.

555. You alluded to some Committee?—It was a Committee which was ap-

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pointed by the Secretary of State for India, with reference to the settling of the principle for the amalgamation of the two armies, and it was necessary that the Committee, which was engaged upon that amalgamation, should know the exact expenditure and cost of relieving the Queen's army, and of recruiting the East India Company's army; therefore, Mr. Hammack, in order to make out his statements of the expenditure required from the India Office a statement containing those particulars, which appear in an appendix to Mr. Hammack's report, as being the data upon which he arrives at 14 *l.* 10 *s.* as the average rate per head.

556. Still I do not see but that I was correct in saying that Mr. Hammack, for the time being, was employed by the Government, and, consequently, was for the time being a servant of the Government, and under the Secretary of State for India, as I understand from you he prepared this return, which return was presented to Parliament: is not that so?—No, it is not so; it comes before Parliament in this way: an address was moved, that the report, with regard to the amalgamation of the armies, should be laid before the House, and therefore all these papers appear in that report. That report, with that statement of Mr. Hammack's, was made without reference to the purposes of this Committee, and therefore it does not contain the information which should govern this Committee in any of their decisions; it consists of different materials.

557. *Chairman.*] In fact, the 14 *l.* 10 *s.*, from what you say, includes certain items, besides the cost of freight?—Precisely; which, of course, would have the effect of swelling the expense per man when you divide "the aggregate expense."

558. Admiral *Duncombe.*] That return was prepared under a department of the Government, and eventually found its way before Parliament, although it was previous to the assembling of this Committee?—Yes.

559. Is it not the case that that return differs from yours, or from any body else's, inasmuch as it goes more into detail?—It does not go into detail at all, and mine does. There is not the least detail in Mr. Hammack's account, and there is the difficulty.

560. I understood you to say that his return comprised a proportion of the charge for hammocks and cots, and medical comforts?—Yes; because, as I explained to the Chairman of the Committee, my attention being drawn to his report, I set about to find out whence the statement originated, and what were the component items making those large totals, and I found it out only yesterday afternoon and this morning.

561. You will quite understand that I am not doubting the accuracy of either your return or the other; I am only endeavouring to arrive at what is the cause of their varying one from the other?—Well; that is how I understand that Mr. Willis has assumed in his account that 14 *l.* 10 *s.* is the rate of freight.

562. *Chairman.*] Does your return contain simply the freight?—Simply the freight, and the passage money of the officers.

563. Suppose your figure to be 10 *l.*, and that beyond that 10 *l.* in Mr. Hammack's return, there are hammocks which may cost for instance 1 *l.* per head, bedding which may cost 1 *l.* 10 *s.*, and medical comforts which may cost 2 *l.*, it would thus bring the 10 *l.* which you give in up to 14 *l.* 10 *s.*?—By possibility it might; but the real expense of the hammocks and bedding is but 15 *s.* 6 *d.*, and 5 *s.* for the medical comforts; it is only about 1 *l.* 0 *s.* 6 *d.* But then there are various other things in that account which would have the effect of swelling up the expense, though they are not really and truly the passage money. It is put so because the requirement was for the total expense incurred, which of course is a very large and comprehensive expression.

564. Admiral *Duncombe.*] Does your return account for the case which you instanced just now of a vessel being taken up for so many men, and at the last moment, 50 men being withdrawn from that number?—Not at all.

565. There would of course be an allowance to the shipowner for those 50 men so withdrawn?—Truly; but my account does not include that. My account is for the number of men on board, the number of men actually sent; I would take the liberty of referring to another account of mine which is numbered "2," where the gross expense is calculated, but it is upon the principle of a non-detailed account, simply multiplying the freight; that gives the actual expense in gross for the whole 10 years for freight of men and officers also.

566. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Do you, or do you not, dispute the correctness of the

the account from which Mr. Willis has drawn his information of the actual expense, including cots, hammocks, medical comforts, and the reduction in numbers embarked, and the consequent forfeiture to the shipowners?—I do not dispute that; I have gone into it, and I see that there is an error in simple arithmetic; 14*l.* 10*s.* is not the price which is shown by Mr. Hammack's report; I make it come to 14*l.* 10*s.* 2¾*d.*, or something like that, to be accurate; but that is a trifle in itself.

567. In fact, Mr. Hammack's report would make it rather more?—It would make it rather more; I am not at all responsible for it, and do not know anything of it further than that I have ascertained from the person who made out the statement for another purpose, what various items that statement did contain.

568. Do you not think that in making these returns, for the information either of the department itself, or for a Committee of the House of Commons, who are anxious to ascertain what really is the cost to the country of sending out an average number of men per annum, all these costs should be included?—I certainly do, if that be the object of a Committee. If the requirement of this Committee had come to me to make out a statement of the entire expense involved in the operation of transport, of course I should have put a column for these contingencies; but I may say upon that, that I differ very much as to the admission of the cots and hammocks in the account, inasmuch as it is a contingent expense; that is, like a part of the establishment; they are put on board the vessel for the accommodation of the men, but they are the property of the State, and at the arrival of the vessel at the termination of the voyage they are given into store and used up for other purposes. That is also the case with the medical comforts; they are put in the hands of the doctor for use on the passage, and if it happened that there was no sickness, they would not be expended, but would be delivered into store at the end of the voyage.

569. Subject, of course, to a per-centage of deterioration and loss?—Yes. Most of those medical comforts are hermetically sealed; they are soup and bouilli, and other things of that sort which are not likely to deteriorate.

570. *Chairman.*] In fact, in a comparative return of the cost in Her Majesty's ships and in hired vessels, hammocks, beds, and comforts, ought not to be included any more than the clothing and the accoutrements of the soldiers?—That is quite my opinion; it is not a part of the actual expenditure for transport, rather it is what a merchant would call stock in trade.

571. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Then are we to understand that, supposing those men were not embarked, the public would equally have to pay those sums?—According to our agreements, if the owners of the ship have been desired to provide for 300 men, and we only put 250 on board, we are bound by the terms of our agreement to forfeit to the owners one-third of the passage money for every man not embarked.

572. My question is this: you state that these expenses contingent upon the passage of troops ought not in fairness to be shown as a part of the expenditure consequent upon their transport by sea?—I did not mean you to infer that; I stated it in answer to your Lordship's question, which was about the total expense involved; then I say that they certainly ought to come into account. But in the way that my accounts were prepared by direction of the Committee, it was meant that they should show what ship was engaged at a particular time, what description of ship she was, how many officers she took, how many men she actually took, and what was the price per man.

573. I clearly understand that; but you admit that the average cost per man was 14*l.* 10*s.* 2¾*d.* for those five years?—Yes, including all contingencies.

574. Have you any reason to suppose that it has considerably decreased since those five years?—No, I should not think so at this moment; but immediately after those five years came the two mutiny years, when we were obliged to pay enormously, and we used steam vessels, which were most expensive; after that, say, for the latter part of the year 1859, and in 1860, the expense was about the same as before the mutiny.

575. About 14*l.* 10*s.* 2¾*d.*?—I think that the total cost might be put at about that, including similar contingencies of expenditure.

576. Have you looked carefully over Mr. Willis's statement?—I cannot say that I have; I have looked cursorily at it.

577. Can you inform the Committee whether in that statement he provides for

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for these contingencies to which we have been alluding, making up the additional cost per man to 14 *l.* 10 *s.*?—I do not think that he does, because he assumes that the rate is 14 *l.* 10 *s.* per man, which sum, as I have already explained to the Committee, includes these very contingencies.

578. But in making his comparison with that, in his proposal for transporting the troops in other ways, does he make any allowance for medical comforts, for the expense of hammocks and cots, and for other contingencies?—No, I did not see that he did. He proceeds upon the principle that the vessels are yours; therefore that would be all in the stock of the vessel.

579. Doubtless; but still the cots and hammocks must equally be provided, whether the troops go in men-of-war or in merchant ships?—Certainly.

580. You are not aware whether in his statement he made any allowance for those cots and hammocks?—I do not think that he did; but I confess that I have not looked at it with a critical eye; I have merely cast my eye over it.

581. Mr. *Brooks.*] Is it a frequent occurrence that the men embark short of the number for which the ship is chartered?—It is not a very frequent occurrence; but it has happened sometimes.

582. I understand from you that the owners of the vessel charge one-third of the passage money for the men who do not embark?—Yes.

583. Do you think that that is a fair charge upon the rest who do embark?—Certainly it is in a statement of the total cost incurred for transport.

584. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Could you give us a statement showing what is the average reduction in the number of men taken under those who have been engaged for?—I could give you the actual default in each ship for those 10 years. It would, of course, take a little time, because it would be necessary to look to the accounts of each ship in order to ascertain it; it does not occur to me that it would be of much service if such a statement were prepared.

585. Mr. *Dalglish.*] What is the cause of the decrease in the number embarked?—Sometimes it happens that a man who is told off for a particular ship deserts; sometimes he may be sick, and they do not choose to put him on board, so they keep him in the depôt, and send him next time; and there are various cases of that sort. Instances have occurred where the public service here has prevented the sending of the men to the full extent.

586. *Chairman.*] Then it is still your opinion that, considering the object which this Committee have in view, the figures which you gave last Session are correct?—They are.

587. And you think that if the cost of hammocks, beds, and medical comforts, and so forth, was included on the one side of the account, it ought also to be included on the other side of the account?—Yes; and that cost is 1 *l.* 0 *s.* 6 *d.* per man for the two together; that is for the bedding, cots and hammocks, and the medical comforts alone.

588. Your average according to the best of my recollection in those years to which you have referred is somewhere about 10 *l.* 10 *s.* How do you make up the difference between the 10 *l.* 10 *s.* and the 14 *l.* 10 *s.*?—In taking averages of prices of ships you cannot arrive at the same figures for such average price, and for the actual price or cost per man, unless it so happens, that in every individual ship which is taken in the average there are the same numbers of people transported. If you will kindly turn to my Statement, No. 2, you will see that I have calculated it out for every year from 1850 to 1859. Unfortunately that statement which I made, by the desire of the Committee, contains the passage money of officers, which Mr. Hammack's statement does not. So they cannot be compared together. Then there is another point of difference which you will permit me to explain, between the two accounts, and that is, that the statements in Mr. Hammack's account are made in this way, for the year 1852–53, and 1853–54, which means that they are taken from the official year, from the 1st May in the one year to the 30th April in the next; whereas my statements are made according to the calendar year, from the 1st January to the 31st of December. So that there would be different numbers and different ships brought in, and different prices; they would cross each other. That would account in a great degree for their not tallying.

589. Take one of those years, namely, 1855. I see that you gave the average price per man for the year 1855, as 9 *l.* 10 *s.* 3 *d.* to Calcutta, 9 *l.* 11 *s.* 8 *d.* to Madras, and 9 *l.* 17 *s.* 3 *d.* to Bombay?—Yes, and 10 *l.* 15 *s.* 6 *d.* to Kurrachee.

590. Of course there could be no difference in the actual rate which you paid; if the cost of those items which you have named is only 1 *l.* 0 *s.* 6 *d.*, how do you make up the difference between the figures which I have just stated, and the 14 *l.* 10 *s.* 6 *d.*?—Those are the average prices which are given there; but if you will cast your eye down, you will find in the detail of the ships some which are higher than that average, and some which are lower than that average, of course. *J. C. Mason, Esq.* 2 May 1861.

591. The prices paid to Calcutta are 10 *l.* 10 *s.*, 9 *l.* 17 *s.*, 9 *l.* 7 *s.*, 9 *l.* 8 *s.*, and 8 *l.* 9 *s.* 6 *d.*, which gives, as I have said, and as you show, an average of 9 *l.* 10 *s.* 3 *d.* Now, there is a great difference between that and 14 *l.* 10 *s.*?—But Mr. Hammack takes all the five years, and then he draws the average upon the "aggregate expense incurred" for the whole five years in a lump.

592. Do those five years include the years of the Indian mutiny?—No, they stop immediately short of that period.

593. Mr. *Jackson.*] Do you know what the rule is with the Peninsular and Oriental Company in the event of a passenger not going; do they demand one-third or one-half of the passage money?—I believe it is one-half, and that is generally the understanding in the merchant trade; but ours is a matter of positive contract.

594. By which you forfeit one-third?—Yes.

595. Then the Government is better dealt with than private individuals?—Yes.

596. *Chairman.*] The rates which you have given to us are the actual rates which were paid by the East India Company?—Yes.

597. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] We understand from you that Mr. Hammack's statement of the average as 14 *l.* 10 *s.* 2 *d.* excludes the cost of officers?—I understand that it does.

598. If officers were included, which they were in Mr. Willis's statement, would not that increase the per-centage?—But in Mr. Willis's statement, as I saw it, he charges for officers separate and distinct; he takes them at a mean of 103 *l.*

599. Then his statement excludes officers likewise?—Yes.

Charles Alexander Wood, Esq., called in; and Examined.

600. *Chairman.*] IN your evidence before us last Session, in answer to Questions 2191 and 2199, and in answer to other questions, you gave the cost, in your opinion, of the transport of troops to and from India. We have had before us Mr. Willis, a gentleman connected with the Transport Board, who has given to us certain returns of the comparative cost of employing Government ships and hiring private vessels. Those calculations which he has laid before us entirely differ from the calculations which you gave to us, and, with the permission of the Committee, I have handed to you those returns to consider; have you considered them?—I have. *C. A. Wood, Esq.*

601. Are those returns, in your opinion, based upon sound data as to the actual cost to the country of transporting troops in Her Majesty's ships of war, as compared with the transport of those troops in private vessels?—The returns which I received from the Chairman are three in number; they are No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3, and appear to have been put in on the 11th of April last. They appear to me to admit of observation, and not to contradict the opinion which Sir Alexander Milne gave upon some previous returns, and which I handed in to the Committee in answer to the question as to the comparative cost of the two modes of carrying on the Transport Service. I think that these three returns, if closely examined, would really be found to support the returns which were appended to Sir Alexander Milne's former evidence.

602. Have you made any calculations in regard to the comparative cost of employing Her Majesty's vessels and hiring private ships?—Having received hese returns from the Chairman, I felt that it was impossible to do justice to the subject in a *vivâ voce* examination, and therefore I wrote my observations upon these returns, and if it be the pleasure of the Committee to receive what I have committed to paper upon them, I will hand it in.

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Vide Appendix.

603. You now desire to lodge that memorandum?—If you please. (*The Witness delivered in the same.*)

604. In the return which you gave in last Session, it appeared that the cost of transporting troops in Her Majesty's ships, as stated by Sir Alexander Milne, was 100 per cent. more than the cost would have been had those same troops been transported in private ships?—It was so.

605. In that return which Sir Alexander Milne gave in, were insurance, depreciation, and interest on capital included?—They were not.

606. Consequently, the cost of transporting troops in Her Majesty's ships, would be a great deal more even than what Sir Alexander Milne stated?—Yes.

607. Mr. Willis gave it as his opinion that there would be a saving to the country by the employment of Her Majesty's ships in the transporting of troops to and from India of no less than 218,272 *l.*; you, in this return which you have just given in, show that instead of there being a gain to the country of that large amount, there would be an actual loss of 343,186 *l.*?—Yes.

608. Do you, in this paper which you have lodged, point out how this vast difference arises between those two calculations?—I have endeavoured to do so; and if the Committee will permit me to explain, I will show where I think that a great difference has arisen. In the first place there is no addition made for interest upon the original cost of the 13 Government vessels, redemption of capital, or insurance. Now in a calculation as to the comparative cost between two modes of transport, which is to be defrayed by the revenues of the East India Company, and not by Imperial revenues, I look upon it as indispensable that those charges should be added. I have, therefore, added interest at 3½ per cent. on the total estimated cost of each Government vessel, which is given at 122,000 *l.* I have also added redemption of capital at 7½ per cent., and insurance at 6 per cent.: that upon each vessel would make an annual difference of 20,435 *l.* That is the principal difference on one side of the account. Then, upon the other side, the returns which were put into my hand, take the passage in freight ships at half Mr. Hammack's calculation, which is 23 *l.* 9 *s.* each way, or for the double voyage 46 *l.* 18 *s.* I have taken it according to the report made by Mr. Walcott to Sir Alexander Tulloch, which is at a price of 30 *l.* per man for the double voyage. The whole is an estimated service, a prospective service, and consequently a matter of calculation; and seeing the care with which that report was framed by Mr. Walcott, and which will be found at page 294 in the Transport Blue Book, I have thought it right to assume that the sum of 30 *l.* per man is one which may be taken as safe. That sum is considerably more than Mr. Walcott gives his average at. I think his average is 25 *l.* and a trifle. I have taken it at 30 *l.* per man, in order to make it a safe calculation. That 30 *l.* per man assumes that the ship would be taken up for the double voyage out and home. It will be an entirely new service, and no doubt a larger number of vessels will be brought into the trade; and that in itself will affect the prices. But it is very interesting to look at what Mr. Mason's averages have been for ships taken up for a series of years: outwards, at home; and homewards, in India. Now those two averages together, I think, come to about 32 *l.* 10 *s.* And there is also a very remarkable and interesting fact connected with Mr. Mason's observations, which bears very much upon evidence given to the Committee in the early part of its sittings, as to what was the cost of bringing men home from India. I think evidence was given to the Committee to show, that it was much more expensive to bring home invalids. Some witnesses were asked what was the cause of the additional cost of taking up the homeward freights, and the answer was, that it was in consequence of the invalids. But it does turn out, in looking over Mr. Mason's averages, that it is really more expensive to bring home men in health than it is to bring home invalids. In the 10 years the average cost per man for bringing home invalids from India is 21 *l.* 13 *s.* 4 *d.*, and for bringing home men in health, 22 *l.* 8 *s.* 6 *d.* (Transport Blue Book, page 341). Taking that 22 *l.* 8 *s.* 6 *d.*, or rather taking perhaps as the general average homewards, 22 *l.*, and estimating what has been the average outwards for a series of ordinary years, because in the last 10 years the averages were very high, in consequence of the gold discoveries of Australia, the Russian war, and the Indian mutiny, three circumstances which enormously enhanced the cost of all freights from the United Kingdom; but, taking an average of ordinary years, my opinion is, upon the best information which I can gather from brokers and persons connected with the India trade, the freight outwards to India may

may be done for ten guineas per man, and those returns of Mr. Mason's, in ordinary years, I think, entirely bear out that view. There are some years when passages were considerably under that amount.

Sir *Samuel Morton Peto*, Bart., a Member of the House; Examined.

609. *Chairman.*] YOU are aware of the object of this inquiry?—I am.

610. Do you know how the Transport Service is at present conducted?—Only by general report.

611. You are aware that a department of the Admiralty, known as the Victualling and Transport Department, sends out all the troops belonging to the War Department, and the whole of its own stores as well, and that the East India Office sends out all the troops and stores to India?—I am aware of that.

612. And that this Transport and Victualling Department also sends out the stores from other departments?—Yes.

613. From your experience do you think it would be advisable that those various departments should be thrown into one?—My own impression is that the Government would get their business done very much better in regard to their transports, if they were to concentrate the business as much as possible, and give as much direct responsibility as possible to the department undertaking it.

614. Do you think, first upon the ground of economy, that that would be an advantage?—Undoubtedly; it would be better managed altogether.

615. Assuming that this deparment was formed, do you think, with regard to the amount of work which it would have to do, that the work would be more than one department could well manage?—Certainly not. There are many private firms in this country that have enormous works going on, who have a great deal to do in the way of transport; I can speak from what I have known of the operations of our own firm, and I should say that a very limited establishment indeed would be sufficient.

616. Will you favour the Committee with an idea of the amount of the operations of your own firm?—Mr. Betts has had a great many abstracts formed; I will give the Committee the best information I can. I find that in the years 1853, 1854, and 1855, which he has abstracted, the total amount of shipment in tonnage of our firm was 118,194 tons; of which 84,721 tons were sent to Canada, and 33,473 to Denmark and other countries in the north of Europe, in which we were carrying on public works.

617. Mr. *Jackson.*] Was that during the Crimean war?—It has no connexion with the Crimean war.

618. That has no reference to the amount of tonnage which you sent out to the Crimea?—Not at all.

619. Was it during the period when the Crimean war was going on?—It was in the years 1853, 1854, and 1855.

620. *Chairman.*] How do you engage your tonnage?—We have a clerk in London who gives a very limited portion of his time to it, and we have our agents at the ports where we engage our ships. Of course what we require does not in any way transpire; we make all our engagements as quietly as we possibly can, but we do it through an agent who has our confidence, in Liverpool, in London, and at the other ports where we may choose to ship.

621. Mr. *Jackson.*] Your rule is not to review the operation, but you give the absolute power to your agent for him to fix upon the ship?—Certainly; a reference to us even by telegraph would spoil the operation; it is necessary to do it instantly, and it is impossible to carry on this class of operations unless you give your confidence to persons who are directly responsible to you, and then your own judgment is exercised as to what they do when you have the result of it before you. I can just give the Committee what we paid during the years which I have mentioned. To Canada in 1853, the average of all our tonnage cost us 18*s.*; in 1854, 21*s.*; in the latter part of 1854, 25*s.*; during the whole of 1855, we got it out at 15*s.* The shipments to Denmark average during the whole time in vessels direct, 11*s.* 6*d.*; in coasting vessels doing business here, we got it done at 9*s.*

622. The distance to Canada is about the same as the distance to the Crimea?—About the same.

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623. You found that in consequence of the Crimean war, you had to pay a higher rate of freight?—The freights got up from 18*s.* to 25*s.*, mainly in consequence of the large demand.

624. But you were never detained in your operations by the want of shipping?—Never a day.

625. You always found that as fast as your demand arose, there came a supply?—Always; there was no difficulty whatever in getting any extent of shipping.

626. I understand that you have only one person in your establishment to superintend the whole of that business?—We have a very active, intelligent person, to whose care this sort of thing is committed, and it certainly does not occupy one-fourth of his time; he has immense duties besides those.

627. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] For what species of goods do you usually take up tonnage?—A great variety; a good many iron rails and chairs; a good many wheels for carriages, locomotives in parts. We sent out to Canada about nine miles of tubular bridges, all in sections; it is almost impossible to tell you what we send out.

628. I presume you insure your goods?—Not always.

629. But usually?—Sometimes we do not, sometimes we do; we have no particular rule.

630. Therefore, if a ship was lost, in most cases it would involve great inconvenience to you, but no pecuniary loss?—It is a great pecuniary loss, because we must replace the materials. I have a case in point. It so happened that in the erection of the large bridge over the St. Lawrence, we were very anxious about one particular opening; the ship containing it foundered, and we lost it; we heard of it at Liverpool; we had to make another opening at our works at Birkenhead, working night and day, and to ship it within nine days.

631. In the event of a vessel being lost, you would not be answerable to the public; you would not be called upon to state the reasons which induced you to put your goods on board a bad ship?—I should say that the best possible guarantee with reference to that is, the enormous inconvenience and loss to us if our ships miscarry. In the case which I have mentioned, the loss to us was, certainly, 5,000*l.* Therefore, we are very particular in the ships which we take up.

632. Mr. *Jackson.*] You take some of a bad quality?—No; because our loss is not to be measured by the value of the things which we send; all the things fit together like a piece of machinery, and if you take out one piece, the inconvenience and loss is immense, from the consequent delay and other things.

633. If you are your own underwriters in the case of any particular ship, it is because she is of a better class, and there is less risk?—Yes; we sometimes insure, and sometimes we do not.

634. Your contracts in Canada were time contracts?—Yes; we insured in that case.

635. You are subject to a very heavy penalty of six per cent. interest if you did not finish by the time stated?—Yes.

636. Therefore, the loss of any particular part of a bridge, which prevented the whole railway being opened, would be to you a most serious matter?—Yes; and so it always is; it is impossible for Honourable Members to measure the loss to us by the mere intrinsic value of the thing so lost, its collateral issues are so great. We are excessively particular in our class of vessels.

637. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Do you ever send large bodies of men which we could compare to the transport of troops?—No, I cannot say that we do; we send generally a staff of persons to carry on our contracts; but we endeavour, as far as possible, to use the people of the country.

638. You have no other public department who claim a certain amount of cubic space per man, and certain comforts and conveniences; it is all within your own control entirely, and therefore can hardly be compared with the proceedings of a public department who have the management of a system of transport?—The only point at issue, I apprehend, would be, whether the making up of a cargo, which is generally an important matter of consideration, is, in regard to the public or the Government, more onerous than it is with us. If our people were to go and put heavy railway machinery on the top of things which might be crushed, and all that sort of thing, we should suffer very serious loss. We are obliged to pay great attention to the packing of our cargoes, the same as

the Government would. We are responsible simply to ourselves, and, of course, to the public, inasmuch as we have pledges which are very onerous as to time.

639. Mr. *Jackson.*] You would have found no difficulty in sending four times the amount which you did send?—Certainly no difficulty.

640. Without any increased staff?—Without any increased staff.

641. If the amount of your shipments had come up to 400,000 tons instead of 100,000, your staff would have been quite sufficient?—It would have taken the whole of the time of the person to whom this matter is committed, instead of a portion of his time, that is all.

642. You have never found, during your experience, whether in shipping to the Crimea, to Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, or the British provinces in North America, any difficulty in obtaining a supply of tonnage equal to your demand?—Certainly not. The great thing is to have people who thoroughly understand it. I need not say to Honourable Members that a person who does not understand that particular class of business would be very considerably imposed upon; it requires a good deal of judgment, and a good deal of care; and hence, I say that the most important thing is to have a person who is directly responsible.

643. You have a man who is responsible to you?—Yes, and his accounts are reviewed by us every month; our custom in business is to have returns of every contract, which we have at the end of every month, and the freightages are one of the things reviewed by the partners in the month. There is a classified cost, and if it struck us that we were paying more than we ought to do, we should summon the person directly responsible to us, and he would have to account why he had gone in excess.

644. You wanted to send out to the Crimea labourers, mechanics, and engineers, and even including missionaries; did you find any difficulty in getting proper accommodation?—Not at all. If it is of any interest to the Committee, I will state to them exactly what we sent out.

645. Can you give the period of time when you sent them out?—Yes; I can give all the particulars. The time occupied in shipment to the Crimea was a portion of December 1854 and January 1855; the greater part was sent then, but we continued to send on from February till the next November, as the railway was extended. The staff which we sent out consisted of a chief engineer, three assistant-engineers, one cashier, three assistant-cashiers, one marine superintendent, six surgeons, one superintendent horsekeeper, two storekeepers, one draftsman, two assistant-surveyors, five timekeepers, two missionaries, and four nurses, making a total of 32 persons. Then the various class of mechanics and others I need not read, but they made a total of 536, making together 568; of the 32 forming the staff one died; of the corps of 536 we lost 37, making 38; of the corps of carpenters, 24 were sent to Scutari to do some hospital work for the Government, and one died.

646. How many horses did you send?—We sent 130 horses, of which we lost 15 during the time. I may state that the staff employed by us in London upon the Crimean Railway were four clerks and one messenger, in addition to an occasional agent looking up materials in the country. The staff employed in London by Captain Andrews were three clerks, in addition to the extra assistance of two clerks upon the despatch of ships from Victoria Docks. The dietary in the Crimea, which I presume also included the voyage, was, fresh meat, 1 lb. each on one day in the week, during February, March and April 1855; 7,748 lbs. was the total purchased; beer, a pint every other day during February and March 1855; salt meat, 1¼ lb. per day each; bread, ditto; soap supplied at 6 *d.* per lb.; rum, 1 gill per day all the time; coffee, 1 oz. each day, or 1 oz. every other day, and tea 2 oz. every other day; sugar, 1¾ oz. each day; rice, 2 oz. each day; peas, 2 oz. each day; potatoes, lemon juice, &c. &c., occasionally.

647. *Chairman.*] Who attended to the fitting out of the ships in which you sent those men; was it the gentlemen in your office to whom you have alluded?—Yes, a gentleman in our office attended to it principally.

648. Mr. *Jackson.*] That was in addition to the ordinary business?—It had nothing to do with our ordinary business; it was a specific duty, and we put altogether a separate staff on for it. The whole thing was so important, and at the same time we did not wish to mix up our business affairs with it, that it was all done separately and distinctly.

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649. But you did not find any difficulty in getting any of the parties?—No; and I trust that it was done to the satisfaction of the Government.

650. Sir *Frederic Smith.*] From where did you make your shipments?—From London, generally.

651. Mr. *Jackson.*] If there was any detention at all, did it arise from the Government, or from your own men?—I do not know that we had any detention to complain of at all; I do not recollect any.

652. Admiral *Duncombe.*] What was the nature of your engagement with the Government; did you take a contract in this country to execute that work in the Crimea, and to be answerable for every thing from the time when you loaded your ships here until they were unloaded at Balaklava?—We had no contract with the Government; it was one of the cases in which all things were to be put aside. The Duke of Newcastle sent for me, and asked, whether in the emergency in which the country was placed we would throw ourselves, and all our resources, into that emergency, and I believe that we did so to the best of our ability.

653. Had you any Government supervision?—No.

654. You were simply responsible to the Government for the work which they required?—Yes; we would not have undertaken it on any other terms.

655. Did you look to, or require, or receive any assistance from the authorities, either naval or military, at Balaklava?—No assistance beyond their mere countenance and aid, so far as it was necessary to get facilities.

656. But, in regulating your vessels and transporting your goods, you did it entirely yourselves?—Yes.

657. Mr. *Jackson.*] You made it a condition that Government officials were not to interfere?—We did, decidedly.

658. *Chairman.*] In making those large shipments, had you any one to see to the proper stowage of those goods?—Yes; it was of great consequence.

659. Full bills of lading and manifests, I presume, were made out?—Yes.

660. And you had an agent at the port to which these stores were destined?—Yes.

661. And you sent copies of those bills of lading and manifests to that agent, I presume?—Yes.

662. You have given it as your opinion that it would tend to the benefit of the public service if all the transport departments were thrown into one; how, in your opinion, ought that new department to be constituted?—The best way, in my judgment, would be to make it as simple as possible; certainly not to divide the responsibility, and to make that responsibility as apparent as possible, by the very accurate way in which the accounts were kept, so that each transaction upon the face of it might bear its own impress, and be capable of examination.

663. Would you make this department responsible from the time that the troops were embarked, or the stores shipped, till they were landed at their destination?—Certainly. I would not have any division of responsibility at all.

664. Who do you think ought to be the responsible minister for that department. Should he, in your opinion, be the Secretary of State for War, or the First Lord of the Admiralty?—I would rather not give an opinion to the Committee upon that point.

665. Do you think that at the head of this department it would be better to have a military or a naval gentleman, or a civilian?—I would rather take a civilian, undoubtedly, if it was a transport department; it would be quite right, and the Government no doubt would see it their duty, if that took place, that there should be some person in connexion with this department who should be charged with certain duties, but the mere mercantile affair should be left with commercial men; if you once get out of that, I am perfectly sure that you are landed in irresponsibility; it cannot be otherwise.

666. Why do you think that a civilian would be better at the head of this department than a naval man?—Because I do not believe that in the general working out of matters of a commercial character, anything else but a commercial mind is likely to be fully applied and brought to bear in a question of a mercantile character.

667. Mr. *Jackson.*] Suppose that you had had to send 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, or 4,000 navvies out of Canada, would you have doubted your ability to do it?—We should have had no difficulty at all.

668. No matter what number of men you had had to send forward, you could have

have insured them the same amount of comfort?—Yes; and I am quite sure that if Honourable Members knew the difficulties which we had in a country like Canada, in carrying out enormous works, with a body of something like 40,000 or 50,000 men, for three years, where we had as extensive a commissariat as they ever had in the Crimea, and all that sort of thing, they would see that we have large resources at our disposal.

669. You had to send most of these materials in sleighs, over the snow, and to provide supplies for the men in the summer season, there being no access to the provisions in the winter season?—Yes.

670. You had to take these things through dense forests, and there was no more difficulty than there would have been in transporting 100,000 tons of materials in the Crimea?—I should say so, decidedly.

671. You had to do it by the river in the summer, and through the snow in the winter, and you had to transport at least half of the 100,000 tons of material in sleighs, in order to arrive at its destination?—No doubt we had.

672. And the forest had to be felled in order that you might make a road?—Yes, in great lengths; in some places as much as 40 or 50 miles, one continuous forest.

673. And a roadway had to be made in the autumn by the felling of the trees, so that a path might be made in the snow to take the materials and provisions in order to enable the works to go on?—Yes.

674. Mr. *Dalglish.*] With all this immense demand, did you ever have transports of your own?—No.

675. Was it your opinion that you could do your business cheaper by employing the shipping trade than by having transports of your own?—Far more so; there is no doubt of it.

676. And is it your opinion that the Government would find it cheaper to adopt the same course?—I am perfectly certain that if the Government attempted to keep up a large body of transports to carry on their business, it would cost them immensely more than if they simply depended upon the resources of the country.

677. *Chairman.*] Then are you of opinion that the Government should have no transports of their own?—Certainly; England ought not to have them. It is different with France, because they have not a mercantile navy to fall back upon; but in England you can always buy your transport and freight far cheaper than by keeping up a staff. If you have to keep up a staff and vessels for this kind of thing you cannot always insure their employment, and the moment they are idle, interest of money is going away, depreciation is proceeding, and a thousand avenues of expense are open. It is not the mere matter of what you pay for the ship while she is making the voyage, it is what she is costing in half a hundred other ways when not at work.

678. Mr. *Jackson.*] It is something the same as with a block ship at the mouth of a river?—Yes.

679. Mr. *Brooks.*] Have you occasionally to take up steam ships?—Yes, occasionally. In the case of things which are required in great haste, of course we have to avail ourselves of that mode of transit; we do not do it more than we can help.

680. During the Russian war had you occasion to take up steam transports?—We had to take up steam transports entirely for the Crimea.

681. Did you find any difficulty at that period?—Yes, in common with the Government. I suppose that it was on account of the suddenness of the demand.

682. Mr. *Jackson.*] I think you recommended the Government in many instances rather than pay this high price to purchase the steam ships, and sell them again?—We did.

683. Do you believe that that was a profitable operation for the Government?—Yes.

684. And you would do the same yourselves if you found a difficulty in hiring a steam-boat?—Yes, if placed in the same position as the Government were then placed in. It must be recollected that what we did for the Crimean railway hardly applies to the ordinary practice.

685. Placing that aside, I put the question to you generally whether, if you found a difficulty in procuring freight, and freights were very high, and there was a combination in order to keep them so, you would unhesitatingly purchase

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vessels, instead of hiring them, and sell them when done with, the difference being the freight?—Yes.

686. *Chairman.*] You have stated your opinion that the Government ought not to hold any transports?—The honourable Member has been presenting to me a difficulty which I have never found to exist, and he has been supposing the Government to be placed in a position of great difficulty by a combination amongst steam owners, and he has asked me what I would do under those circumstances? I say that I would buy some vessels and use them, and sell them again to keep down the general amount of freight; but that is a mere matter of business at the time; in our own business we have found no difficulty at all with regard to ships. As I have stated, if our quantity of goods to Canada had been quadrupled, we could have obtained the shipping without any difficulty, or any large increase of freight.

687. Mr. *Jackson.*] And that was during the time when the Crimean war was proceeding?—Yes.

688. Sir *Frederic Smith.*] Do you think that there is any probability of a combination amongst shipowners?—The resources of the country are too numerous for it; if you proceed about your business in a judicious manner, I cannot conceive anything of the kind.

689. Mr. *Kinnaird.*] We have had it in evidence this morning that if there is an emergency, and it is of importance to send off, for instance, a regiment immediately to any of our colonies, it can be done in 48 hours if you have your own ship. How long would it take to adapt a transport for carrying 1,000 or 1,200 men?—I feel myself hardly able to give the Committee an answer to that question; I have not been placed in a position to know.

690. Do you see no difficulty in the Government being totally denuded of transports of its own?—I do not say that the Government should not have a single transport; I simply give my evidence as to what is best upon the general result of the thing, and I beg the Committee to accept my evidence in that sense.

691. Mr. *Jackson.*] This country having passed through the Indian mutiny and the Crimean war, and you having during those periods had to export large amounts of tonnage, with the increased demand from the Government acting against you, you have never yet found any difficulty in meeting with a sufficient amount of tonnage to carry on your operations?—Certainly never; and I believe that the Government can hire transports now a great deal cheaper than by using their own vessels. At Glasgow the other day, one of their war steamers which had been sent down with a large amount of machinery for Mr. Napier, for one of the Government's own ships, the same vessel had to take back machinery for their own ship in London. I could not understand why it would not have been much better for Mr. Napier to have made the machinery for his own ship, and for the person who had Mr. Napier's machinery for the other ship to have done the same thing. I am not able to explain it.

692. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Are you aware that in the case of the machinery for the "Black Prince," it was thought desirable on the part of the Controller of the Navy that the "Black Prince" and the "Warrior" should have precisely similar machinery?—No, I am not at all aware of that.

693. With the view of acting in concert abroad, so that in the event of any one part of the machinery of one of the two ships being damaged by shot or other casualty, the other ship should be enabled to supply such parts if it was wanted. Are you aware that that was the reason?—I am not aware of the circumstances at all.

694. Mr. *Jackson.*] Supposing your firm, or the firm of Napier, or any other firm who were building half a dozen of these vessels, were desired to construct all this wrought-iron work from a model or drawing, do you not think that you could construct it accurately enough without having it made by one manufacturer?—Certainly. I wish to state my impression, why the Government cannot by possibility do these things, if they have the extensive machinery of a Board, so well as individuals can. In the particular case which I have mentioned, the machinery was directed to Glasgow, and the whole of the machinery was put out upon the pier at Glasgow itself. The ship, from not having depth of water enough up at Glasgow, was sent down to Greenock to be fitted, and all this machinery had to be put on board a lighter, and taken down to the vessel. The persons on board the ship which brought the machinery, as I was given to understand (I speak subject to correction), because it was ordered

to Glasgow, would take it to Glasgow, and the Government had to bear the expense of that, and of its being taken down to Greenock. In an individual firm I have no doubt we get a great advantage, because the parties are anxiously looking out, and know the responsibility under which they are employed; we get, I have no doubt, a better class of service than you would get from any Board, or anything of that kind. One or two persons are much more responsible for what they do. and you would get a much better result from them than from any extensive Committee or Board.

695. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] I should wish to revert to the question which we have rather departed from, as to the propriety or non-propriety of the Government having transports. I understand from you that, as a general rule, you think that it is more advisable in this country, where we have an unlimited command of tonnage, that we should employ merchant ships to transport our troops? —Certainly.

696. But I think you stated that there are reasons why the Government should keep a certain amount of tonnage of their own?—I said that I thought that the Government should have a certain amount of tonnage of their own, to be ready at any instant; that I think is quite right, but, as a general rule, I think the less they have the better, for the reasons which I have given to the Committee.

697. I will take the case of the reliefs to the Channel Islands, and the reliefs to Gibraltar, and will extend it even so far as Malta, to the Mediterranean; would it not be desirable that whenever we wanted to send a body of troops, we will say from Portsmouth to the Channel Islands, or from the Channel Islands to Dublin, or I will even say from England to Gibraltar, we should transport those troops in a vessel which was already fitted rather than that we should go to the expense of hiring a troop ship, which would require fitments which would cost a considerable sum, and which fitments, at the end of this short voyage, would be a comparative loss to the country?—The circumstances which I have mentioned would apply specially to such cases and to emergencies; there is no doubt that for very short voyages and for pretty regular service, if you can keep it up constantly, it would be the interest and the duty of the Government to have a certain amount of strength.

698. You may have seen a return showing the employment of the Government transports, showing that they have been, in fact, in continuous employment; that they have not been lying idle. If the Government transports which we now have have been in continuous employment, and principally for those ordinary reliefs, would it be wise that we should reduce the number which we at present maintain?—I am not able to answer that question without knowing more than I do of the subject. I should be sorry to give the Committee an opinion unless I was thoroughly able to base it on something like practice of my own; but I may fairly say to the Committee, that if the Government are called upon for any particular service, involving any large extent of transport, in my judgment they will do it cheaper and better by resting on the commercial marine of the country than by resting on any particular branch of their own service.

699. Mr. *Jackson.*] Taking the transport of troops between England and Ireland, do you suppose that with the numerous mercantile steamers, including the mail steamers from Holyhead, there would be any difficulty in getting in 24 hours a sufficient amount of power to transport any number of troops?—You could get any amount you pleased; there is no doubt of it. We have the Chester and Holyhead Railway, which is a proof of what has been done.

700. From your experience as Chairman of the Chester and Holyhead Railway Company, and having a part connexion with boats across the channel, if the Horse Guards telegraphed that they wished to take 1,000 men across the channel, they could do so without further notice?—No doubt of it.

701. The same observation would apply to Liverpool; there would be no difficulty in 24 hours, or as soon as the troops could be brought down by rail, in transporting them across?—There is no doubt about it. But I understood the noble Lord's question to apply to such points as the Scilly Islands, and those parts where you have no regular communication; but, as regards Liverpool and the connexion with Ireland, there is no doubt about it.

702. I will take Jersey and Guernsey; there is a regular steam packet service every day in summer, and twice a week in winter; would there be any difficulty in transport there?—Not at all. There is a regular service from Weymouth, and another, I believe, from Southampton; there is no difficulty at all.

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703. *Chairman.*] The whole matter amounts to a question of cost with you?—I should say that you would do it much cheaper by hiring transport.

704. Sir *Frederic Smith.*] You think that the number of Government transports ought to be very limited?—Very limited.

705. Mr. *Jackson.*] Would the same answer apply to Scotland, where there is an immense steam communication between Glasgow and Liverpool. There would be no difficulty in getting any amount of troops by sea there or by rail?—Just so; I may observe that I am shipping now a large amount of materials to Algeria, and I find no difficulty at all.

706. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] Do the vessels which you have freighted to Algeria require peculiar fitments at great cost?—Certainly not.

707. In Government transports for taking troops, is it not necessary that there should be fitments for their hammocks, their mess tables, and their comforts of every description?—Certainly; but with regard to Ireland and places to which there are steamers, you would have no difficulty in sending off the troops. I have been very often on board a French vessel when 500 or 600 men have been on board, and there is no difficulty at all.

708. But do the French take the care of their troops which we do?—No; I am bound to admit that they certainly do not.

709. Mr. *Jackson.*] You apprehend that no fittings would be required in a journey from Holyhead to Dublin, or from Liverpool to Dublin?—No, nor to Algeria; they take quite sufficient care of the troops, and they are very happy.

710. Sir *Frederic Smith.*] In the removal of cavalry regiments, do you not see any difficulty in trusting to the commercial supply of transports?—I do not see any difficulty at all.

711. *Chairman.*] In fact, if time was allowed, merchant shipowners could fit up their vessels in any way which the Government might require?—No doubt about it.

712. And you think that the number of Government transports ought to be limited to perhaps two or three, to be at hand in case of sudden emergency?—My impression is, that the Government should have a small number, so as to be ready for any sudden emergency; that is the only thing which I think they should do.

713. Lord *Clarence Paget.*] But you are not quite prepared to say exactly the number?—I am not; I hesitate to give an opinion as to the exact number, because I have not studied that matter.

714. *Chairman.*] Is it your opinion that the ordinary reliefs which take place every year along the coast to the North American station and to the Mediterranean, as well as the transport of troops who are sent to India and more distant stations, ought to be effected in hired vessels?—Certainly.

APPENDIX.

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Appendix, No. 1.

PAPER delivered in by Captain *Charles Eden*, R.N., C.B, 11 April 1861.

COST of moving TROOPS from *England* to the *Mediterranean*, thence to the *West Indies*, thence to *England*, in Her Majesty's Troop Ships "Himalaya" and "Perseverance" and hired Troop Ship "Indiana." Appendix, No. 1.

	HIMALAYA, 850 men. To Malta, thence to Barbadoes, thence to Demerara, thence to England. 74 days.	PERSEVERANCE, 550 men. To Corfu, thence to Jamaica, thence to England. 92 days.	INDIANA, 350 men. To Corfu, thence to Trinidad, thence to St. Lucia, thence to England. 84 days.
	£.	£.	£.
Cost of wages and victuals of crew -	2,566	2,559	
Cost of victualling troops - -	2,691	2,164	
Cost of coals (estimated) - - -	3,760	2,160	Total Cost, 9,450
Wear and tear - - - - -	3,132	2,139	
Insurance at 10 per cent. on original cost, if paid.	2,600 ⅓ of a year.	2,165 ¼ of a year.	
TOTAL - - - £.	14,749	11,187	9,450

Admiralty,
11 April 1861.

Appendix, No. 2.

PAPERS delivered in by *William Willis*, Esq., 11 April 1861.

(F.)

Appendix, No. 2.

ESTIMATED COST of performing the Average Annual TROOP SERVICES between *Great Britain* and the Colonies, based on the Numbers Conveyed in the Years 1857, 1858, and 1859.

(Substituted for Statement B, enclosed in Paper dated 19 June 1860.)

STATION.	Officers and Troops Conveyed.		Estimated Cost of Conveyance in		Balance in favour of	
	Outwards.	Homewards.	Freight Ships.	Her Majesty's Troop Ships.	Freight Ships.	Her Majesty's Troop Ships.
Mediterranean - -	4,875	3,287	44,957	30,701	- -	14,256
Canada and Nova Scotia	980	1,340	16,017	9,787	- -	6,230
West Indies - - -	415	725	10,547	9,275	- -	1,272
China - - - -	3,140	12 *3,128	97,174 *39,877	105,405 *10,632	- -	21,014
Mauritius - - -	780	52 *728	7,205 *6,306	16,160 *1,676	4,325	—
Cape, St. Helena and Ascension.	987	676	16,810	22,260	5,450	—
Algoa Bay - - -	615	240	8,583	13,091	4,508	—
Australia and New Zealand.	442	800	16,528	30,828	14,300	—
Ceylon - - -	470	32 *438	5,226 *4,579	17,407 *1,223	8,825	—
		7,164 *4,294	223,047 *50,762	254,914 *13,531		
					37,408	42,772
	12,704	11,458	273,809	268,445	—	—
				273,809	- -	37,408
				5,364	- -	5,364

* Assumed, to equalise Outward Services.

Note.—The estimated cost of Her Majesty's troop ships does not include insurance, interest, or redemption of capital.

11 April 1861. *Wm. Willis.*

(G.)

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT of the ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENSE of Conveying 12,000 Officers and Men, with their Families, to India, and bringing similar Numbers Home.

Appendix, No. 2

(To be substituted for Statement A, in Paper of 19 July 1860.)

GOVERNMENT STEAM TROOP SHIPS.		ANNUAL EXPENSE. 1 Steamer.		13 Steamers.
		£.	£.	£.
Wear and Tear.	Hull 3,200 tons, at 25*l.* per ton - £. 80,000			
	Machinery 500 horse-power, 60*l.* per horse-power - - - - - 30,000			
	110,000			
	Masts, yards, rigging, sails, anchors, and stores, say - - - - - 12,000			
	Total cost - - - 122,000			
	Hull 80,000*l.*, $\frac{1}{15}$ per annum - - -	5,333		
	Masts, &c. 12,000*l.*, $\frac{1}{5}$ per annum - - -	2,400		
	Machinery, 500 horse-power 6*l.* per horse-power - - - - - - - -	3,000		
			10,733	139,529
Wages and Victuals of Crews.	200 men, say the same amount as Her Majesty's Ship Himalaya (204 men), wages -	8,890		
	victuals	3,770		
	Total crews 2,600 men (200 x 13).		12,660	164,580
Mess and Victualling of Troops.	924 { 36 officers for 80 days, at 6*s.* 6*d.* (10 *s.*—3 *s.* 6 *d.*)	936		
	924 { 888 men - 80 days, at 5 *d.* (11 *d.*—6 *d.*)	1,480		
	186 { 106 women for 80 days, at 7 *d.*, 115 -	251	6,186	80,418
	186 { 160 children - 80 days, at 8 *d.* - -	426		
	1,110 adults in each ship, each making two voyages (one out and one home, per annum).	3,093		
Fittings - -		*s.* *d.*		
	36 Officers - - - - - at 16 6	30		
	888 Men - - - - - „ 6 11	307		
	106 Women - - - - } „ 12 10	119		
	80 Children = adults - - }			
		456		
	Estimated to last, say four years - - -	114		
	Add for repairs, 10 per cent. of first cost -	45		
			159	2,067
Bedding - -	Provided by Indian authorities, and not included in expenses of sailing freight ships.	—	—	—
Coals - -	Actual consumption of "Great Britain" on voyage to Bombay in 1857 (71 days) 1,487 tons, being at the rate of 4 $\frac{18}{100}$ tons per 100 horse-power per day.			
	Say 5 tons per horse power per day = for 500 horse-power, 25 tons per day, or, for 80 days, 2,000 tons per voyage.			
	Each steamer makes two voyages per annum (one out and one home),=4,000 tons per annum, say, at 2*l.* 5*s.* per ton. - - - - - - - - - -		9,000	117,000
Pilotage and incidental expenses	Say 100 *l.* per voyage - - - - - - -		200	2,600
		£.	38,938	506,194

Appendix, No. 2.

	Each Steamer.		13 Steamers. Out.	13 Steamers. Home.
Number of Troops conveyed per annum.	Officers - - - 36	924 × 13 =	12,012	and 12,012
	Men - - - 888			
	Women - - - 106	186 × 13 =	2,418	and 2,418
	Children (adults) - 80			
		1,110	14,430	and 14,430

SAILING FREIGHT SHIPS.		Annual Expense. £.	£.
Cost of Conveyance (Rates actually paid).	Officers:		
	936 (36×26) at 103 *l.* - - - - - -	96,408	
	Mess Contributions:		
	936 officers for 108 days, at 3/6 a day - -	17,690	78,718
	Men, Women, and Children (Adults):		
	1074 (888×186) × 26=27,924 at 23*l.* 9*s.** -	654,818	
	Ration Stoppages:		
	(23088) 888 × 26 for 108 days at 6*d.* - -	62,337	592,481
		£.	671,199

Rates of Freight actually Paid.	£. s. d.
* Outward rate (average of five years), 1852-53 to 1856-57	14 10 –
* Homeward rate (average of five years), 1852-53 to 1856-57	32 8 –
Average - - -	£. 23 9 –

Pay of the Troops.	
Steamers: 24,024 officers and men for 80 days, at 1*s.* 7·005*d.* per day - - -	152,192
Sailing Freight Ships: 24,024 officers and men for 108 days, at 1*s.* 7·005*d.* per day	205,459
Annual saving - - - - - - - £.	53,267

ABSTRACT.

	Conveyance, Fittings, Coals, Mess, Victualling &c.	Pay of Military Officers and Troops while at Sea.	Total Charge.
	£.	£.	£.
Present system: sailing freight ships - - -	671,199	205,459	876,658
Proposed system: Government steam troop-ships -	506,194	152,192	658,386
Annual saving, by employment of steam troop-ships -	165,005	53,267	218,272

11 April 1861.

Wm. Willis.

Appendix, No. 3.

PAPER delivered in by *William Willis*, Esq.

(H.)

STATEMENT of the Cost of the Services performed by H. M. S. "HIMALAYA," in the Year 1859, as compared with the EXPENSE by FREIGHT SHIPS.

Services performed by "HIMALAYA."					Cost of performing the Services by FREIGHT SHIPS.		
From	To	Officers.	Men.	Women.	Children.		Amount.
						£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Portsmouth - -	Malta - - -	31	547	29	27	620 at £. 6 6 8 - -	3,926 13 4	
Malta - - -	Portsmouth - -							
Portsmouth - -	Cape of Good Hope -	63	1,587	82	115	1,790 at 11 14 2 - -	20,957 18 4	
Cape - - -	Portsmouth - -							
Portsmouth - -	Quebec - - -	3	13	7	17	66 at 7 15 2 - -	512 1 -	
Quebec - - -	Portsmouth - -	-	13	4	9			
Bermuda - - -	Portsmouth - -	32	816	69	189	1,106 at 10 5 3 - -	11,350 6 6	
TOTAL Out and Home - -		129	2,976	191	352			36,746 19 2
Simons Town - -	Algoa Bay - -	5	1	-	-			
Cape of Good Hope.								
Algoa Bay - -	Port Natal - -	16	385	23	34			
Ditto - - -	Simons Town - -	7	94	8	21			
Quebec - - -	Bermuda - -	32	795	81	96			
Intercolonial - - - -		60	1,275	112	151	At rates paid under local contracts - -		4,677 12 -
Gravesend - -	Plymouth - -	27	634	45	42			
Plymouth - - -	Gravesend - -	9	396	15	25			
Portsmouth - -	Plymouth - -	33	833	69	67			
Plymouth - - -	Liverpool - -	24	646	58	62			
Liverpool - - -	Dublin - - -	35	834	73	57		£. s. d.	
Dublin - - -	Portsmouth - -	28	850	75	97	230 officers, at 30 *s.* - -	345 - -	
Gravesend - -	Yarmouth - -	15	285	35	68	7,971 adults, at 15 *s.* - -	5,978 - -	
Yarmouth - -	Hull - - -	1	72	7	5		6,323 - -	
Ditto - - -	Newcastle - -	11	262	29	51			
Gravesend - -	Portsmouth - -	9	513	21	34			
Portsmouth - -	Dublin - - -	32	816	69	189	Victualling, at contract rates -	1,088 - -	
Dublin - - -	Portsmouth - -	6	853	74	100			7,411 - -
Coastwise - - - -		230	6,994	570	797			
TOTAL conveyed - - - -		419	11,245	873	1,300	Cost by Freight - - £.		48,835 11 2

Cost of H. M. S. "Himalaya" for the Year 1859:	£. s. d.	
Average annual cost for wear and tear of hull, masts, machinery, &c.; and cost of wages and victuals for crew - - - - - - - - - - - -	28,110 - -	
Mess of military officers in the year 1859 - - - - - - - - - -	863 - -	
Victuals of men, women, and children - - - - - - - - - - -	5,223 14 7	
Bedding for use of troops - - - - - - - - - - - - -	489 6 8	
Coals, actually consumed, 7,104 tons, on the above voyages - - - - - - -	8,964 13 2	
Cost of H. M. S. "Himalaya" - - £.	43,650 14 5	43,650 14 5
Less than Freight - - - - - £.		5,184 16 9

Note.—The cost of H. M. S. "Himalaya" does not include insurance, interest, or redemption of capital.

11 April 1860.

William Willis.

Appendix, No. 4.

Append x, No. 4. PAPERS delivered in by *William Willis*, Esq., 25 April 1861.

(I.)

COLONIAL SERVICE.

GOVERNMENT TROOP SHIPS.—(Capital and Insurance Account.)

	Assuming the Steamers to be worth one-third of their Original Value	Assuming the Steamers to be worth nothing
	At the end of Thirty Years.	
	£.	£.
The redemption of the capital invested in the eight Government steam troop-ships, in the period of 30 years, with interest at 3¼ per cent. per annum, would amount (as shown in the annexed tables) to - - - - - - - - - - -	32,145	36,413
Insurance on the eight steamers, at their mean value (in 15½ years), viz. (492,660 *l.* + 475,960 *l.* = 968,620 *l.* ÷ 2 =) 484,310 *l.*, at 6 per cent. per annum (for all voyages), or on (387,450 *l.* + 363,235 *l.* = 750,685 *l.* ÷ 2 =) 375,342 *l.*	29,058	22,520
Total charge for redemption of capital, with interest, and insurance - - - - £.	61,203	or 58,933
The crews of these ships (1,423 men), if regarded as a "Naval Reserve," would cost, at the rate in the Navy Estimates for 1861-62, viz., 13 *l.* 5 *s.* 10 *d.* per man per annum - - - - - - - - - - - -		18,914
Final cost to the country of the possession of eight steamers of the aggregate burden of 16,118 tons - - - - £.		40,019

15 April 1861. *William Willis.*

Ships assumed to be worth One-third of their Original Value at the end of the 30th Year.

1. Year.	2. Unredeemed Value of Eight Government Steamers decreasing by 16,700 *l.* per annum, until worth one-third of their Original Value. (726,460*l.* ÷ 3 = 242,153*l.* 484,307*l.* ÷ 29 = 16,700 *l.*)	3. Redemption of Capital. 726,460 − 242,153 = 484,307*l.* ÷ 30 = 16,143*l.*	4. Amount bearing Interest each Year (reduced annually by Amount in Column 3), (16,143*l.*)	5. Interest at 3½ per Cent. per Annum on Amount in Column 4.	6. Total Charge for Redemption of Capital and Interest (Columns 3 and 5).
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1	726,460	16,143	726,460	23,609	39,752
2	709,760	16,143	710,317	23,085	39,228
3	693,060	16,143	694,174	22,560	38,703
4	676,360	16,143	678,031	22,036	38,179
5	659,660	16,143	661,888	21,511	37,654
6	642,960	16,143	645,745	20,986	37,129
7	626,260	16,143	629,602	20,462	36,605
8	609,560	16,143	613,459	19,937	36,080
9	592,860	16,143	597,316	19,412	35,555
10	576,160	16,143	581,173	18,888	35,031
11	559,460	16,143	565,030	18,363	34,506
12	542,760	16,143	548,887	17,838	33,981
13	526,060	16,143	532,744	17,314	33,457
14	509,360	16,143	516,601	16,789	32,932
15	492,660	16,143	500,458	16,264	32,407
16	475,960	16,143	484,315	15,740	31,883
17	459,260	16,143	468,172	15,215	31,358
18	442,560	16,143	452,029	14,690	30,833
19	425,860	16,143	435,886	14,166	30,309
20	409,160	16,143	419,743	13,641	29,784
21	392,460	16,143	403,600	13,117	29,260
22	375,760	16,143	387,457	12,592	28,735
23	359,060	16,143	371,314	12,067	28,210
24	342,360	16,143	355,171	11,543	27,686
25	325,660	16,143	339,028	11,018	27,161
26	308,960	16,143	322,885	10,493	26,636
27	292,260	16,143	306,742	9,969	26,112
28	275,560	16,143	290,599	9,444	25,587
29	258,860	16,143	274,456	8,919	25,062
30	242,160	16,153	258,313	8,395	24,548
		484,300			30)964,363
		242,160			
	£	726,460		£.	32,145

Ships assumed to be worth nothing at the end of the 30 Years.

1. Year.	2. Unredeemed Value of the Eight Government Steamers (Column 2—Column 4).	3. Interest at 3½ per Cent. per Annum on Amount in Column 2.	4. Redemption of Capital. 726,460*l.* ÷ 30 = 24,215 *l.*	5. TOTAL CHARGE for Redemption of Capital and Interest (Columns 3 and 4).
	£.	£.	£.	£.
1	726,460	23,609	24,215	47,824
2	702,245	22,823	24,215	47,038
3	678,030	22,035	24,215	46,250
4	653,815	21,249	24,215	45,464
5	629,600	20,462	24,215	44,677
6	605,385	19,675	24,215	43,890
7	581,170	18,888	24,215	43,103
8	556,955	18,101	24,215	42,316
9	532,740	17,314	24,215	41,529
10	508,525	16,527	24,215	40,742
11	484,310	15,739	24,215	39 954
12	460,095	14,953	24,215	39,168
13	435,880	14,166	24,215	38,381
14	411,665	13,379	24,215	37,594
15	387,450	12,592	24,215	36,807
16	363,235	11,845	24,215	36,020
17	339,020	11,018	24,215	35,233
18	314,805	10,231	24,215	34,446
19	290,590	9,444	24,215	33,659
20	266,375	8,657	24,215	32,872
21	242,160	7,869	24,215	32,084
22	217,945	7,083	24,215	31,298
23	193,730	6,296	24,215	30,511
24	169,515	5,509	24,215	29,724
25	145,300	4,723	24,215	28,937
26	121,085	3,935	24,215	28,150
27	96,870	3,148	24,215	27,363
28	72,655	2,361	24,215	26,576
29	48,440	1,574	24,215	25,789
30	24,225	787	24,225	25,012
		£.	726,460	30)1,092,411
				36,413

(K.)

INDIA.

GOVERNMENT STEAM TRANSPORTS.—(Capital and Insurance Account.)

	£.
If the 13 steamers by which the conveyance of troops to and from India is proposed to be effected were assumed to be worth nothing in the 30th year of service, the redemption of the capital invested in their purchase, in the period of 30 years, with interest at 3½ per cent. per annum, would amount (as shown in the annexed table) to - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	79,497
Insurance on those steamers, at their mean value (in 15½ years; viz. £. 845,876 + 793,010 = 1,638,886 ÷ 2) = £. 819,443, at 4 per cent., for one voyage to and from India, per annum, would be - - - -	32,777
Total charge for redemption of capital, with interest and insurance - - - - - -	112,274
The crews of these ships, 2,600 men (13 ships of 200 men each), if regarded as a "Naval Reserve," would cost, at the rate in the Navy Estimates for 1861-62; viz., 13 *l.* 5*s.* 10*d.* per man per annum - -	34,558
Final cost to the country of the possession of 13 steamers of 3,200 tons each - - £.	77,716

15 April 1861. *Wm. Willis.*

INDIAN SERVICE.

Ships assumed to be worth nothing at the end of the Thirtieth Year.

REDEMPTION OF CAPITAL.					REDEMPTION OF CAPITAL.				
1. Year.	2. Unredeemed Capital (Column 2— Column 4).	3. Interest at 3½ per Cent. per Annum.	4. Annual Redemption for 30 Years (1,586,000 ÷ 30 = 52,866).	5. Total Charge (Column 3+ Column 4.)	1. Year.	2. Unredeemed Capital (Column 2— Column 4.)	3. Interest at 3½ per Cent. per Annum.	4. Annual Redemption for 30 Years (1,586,000 ÷ 30 = 52,866).	5. Total Charge (Column 3+ Column 4).
	£.	£.	£.	£.		£.	£.	£.	£.
1	1,586,000	51,545	52,866	104,411	19	634,412	20,618	52,866	73,484
2	1,533,134	49,826	52,866	102,692	20	581,546	18,900	52,866	71,766
3	1,480,268	48,108	52,866	100,974	21	528,680	17,182	52,866	70,048
4	1,427,402	46,390	52,866	99,256	22	475,814	15,464	52,866	68,330
5	1,374,536	44,672	52,866	97,538	23	422,948	13,745	52,866	66,611
6	1,321,670	42,954	52,866	95,820	24	370,082	12,027	52,866	64,893
7	1,268,804	41,236	52,866	94,102	25	317,216	10,309	52,866	63,175
8	1,215,938	39,518	52,866	92,384	26	264,350	8,591	52,866	61,457
9	1,163,072	37,799	52,866	90,665	27	211,484	6,873	52,866	59,739
10	1,110,206	36,081	52,866	88,947	28	158,618	5,155	52,866	58,021
11	1,057,340	34,363	52,866	87,229	29	105,752	3,437	52,866	56,303
12	1,004,474	32,645	52,866	85,511	30	52,886	1,718	52,866	54,584
13	951,608	30,927	52,866	83,793					
14	898,742	29,209	52,866	82,075				TOTAL - - £.	2,384,925
15	845,876	27,491	52,866	80,357					
16	793,010	25,772	52,866	78,638				30 Years' annual average - - -	79,497
17	740,144	24,054	52,866	76,920					
18	687,278	22,336	52,866	75,202					

Appendix, No. 5.

PAPER delivered in by Mr. *Rowley Richardson*, 25 April 1861.

Appendix, No. 5.

Employment of Sailing Men-of-war as East India Troop Ships.

Having during the recess read the various Parliamentary Papers which have within the last two years been published on the subject of the Transport of Troops to India, and finding that the opinions expressed therein by high military and civil authorities bear most favourably on the plan laid by me before the Committee last Session, I beg to offer the following additional remarks on the question:—

Numbers to be conveyed.

The Royal Commissioners on the organization of the Indian Army, report that the European force to be kept in India should be 80,000 men, and from calculations made by Sir A. Tulloch (of the War Office), Colonel Baker (of the India Office), and Mr. Hammack (of the Statistical branch of the Registrar General's Department), it appears that to maintain this force, the following number of passages will be required annually, viz:—

	OUT.	HOME.
Men of relieving regiments	8,000	—
Men of relieved „	- -	3,200
Recruits to replace deaths	5,040	—
Time-expired men coming home	- -	1,800
Invalids „	- -	4,000
Recruits going out to replace time expired-men and invalids	5,800	—
Making a Total of	18,840	9,000

Organized transport service.

Major-Generals Sir J. R. Vivian and Sir A. Tulloch appear to be of opinion that an organized transport service for India would be desirable, and Sir G. Clerk considers that a system of periodical reliefs might be matured in such a way that the service might be performed with facility and a great deal of expense thereby obviated.

Cape route.

According to the testimony of Sir Harry Smith, Sir W. Cotton, Sir A. Wilson, Mr. Willoughby, and other persons specially conversant with the subject, the best and most economical mode of effecting the conveyance of the troops, is by sailing ships *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope: and in addition to the opinions already laid before the Committee against steamers being used as East India troop ships (except on urgent occasions), those of Colonel the Hon. A. Gordon, Colonel Brownrigg, Mr. Willoughby, and Mr. Allan, managing director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company, may be quoted. The following facts may be considered sufficient to show the advantages of employing sailing in preference to steam ships on this service:—

Opinions against steamers.

	PER CENT.
The rate of passage money paid during the mutiny in steamers exceeded that paid for sailing ships, by	172
While the time gained by steamers was only	31
The rate per ton per month paid for hired steam vessels employed in China since 1859, exceeds that paid for sailing transports by	200
The time gained on the voyage by the steam transports sent to China in the beginning of 1860, over the sailing ships despatched at the same time, was only	8
The cost to the Crown of a steamer engaged in conveying stores on her way to Hong Kong in 1860, exceeded the sum which would have been paid had the stores been taken in hired sailing ships by	125
While the time gained on the voyage was only	7

Time gained in steamers not commensurate with increased expense.

Appendix, No. 5.

Steamers have on several occassions been tried by merchants in the Indian trade, but after a few voyages they have been withdrawn.

Tried by merchants.

Time of arrival in India.

Troops must be landed at only one period of the year.

To secure the financial success of any plan for the conveyance of troops to India in steam vessels, it is necessary that the ships should be constantly employed; a course which will involve the landing of fresh regiments and recruits at all seasons of the year not excepting those which experience has proved to be inimical to the health of Europeans newly arrived in a tropical climate. According to Sir James Outram, Major General Hancock, Sir J. R. Martin, and Dr. Renny, troops should leave England so as to reach India about November, and embark in India so as to arrive home about May, and Mr. Willoughby remarks, that "it is melancholy to reflect upon the calamitous losses which have occurred in regiments on their first arrival in India from a neglect of this precaution." The deliberately and repeatedly expressed opinions of such distiguished men are sufficient to show that the practice which prevails of despatching the annual reliefs, &c., in the summer months is not likely to be departed from, except in cases of emergency, and consequently that the financial requirements of continual employment for steam vessels will not be met.

resent plan.

ates for officers.

tates for troops.

At present the troops are conveyed in merchant vessels. The passages of officers are paid for at "regulation prices," which are very high, and it was stated in evidence before the Royal Commissioners, that the officers alone of a regiment cost, in the transit to and from India, no less a sum than 10,000 *l.* An instance has also been adduced of the enormous sum of 430 *l.* having been paid in less than seven months on account of the passage money of one subaltern officer brought home from India and sent out to that country. The rates paid for the troops vary considerably: the average price paid for each soldier outward, during the five years preceding the mutiny, was 14 *l.* 10 *s.*, while that charged for the homeward passage was as much as 32 *l.* 8 *s.* In the estimates of the expense of local and European troops furnished by Colonel Baker, the sum of 14 *l.* was charged for each man outward, and 25 *l.* was taken for each man homewards.

ndian finances.

Reduction in expenditure desirable.

These charges are borne by the revenues of India; and in the present state of those revenues (in which there has been a deficit, during four years, of 37,000,000 *l.* sterling, and respecting which the Governor General has recently stated, that even every sentry dispensed with would be a "desirable reduction") it is evidently most necessary that every retrenchment which will not interfere with the efficiency of the service should be effected. Any plan, therefore, whereby a considerable reduction may be made in the cost of the transport of troops to and from India, especially if the comfort and convenience of the men may at the same time be increased, would appear to demand the consideration of the Indian Government, and to be further worthy of that of the Home Government, if by it the calls on the Imperial Exchequer would be lessened and the naval service benefited.

Proposed plan.

My scheme shows how these objects can be attained; and I submit, that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty possess the means for their attainment, for there are at the home ports at least 13 line-of-battle ships and 27 frigates (comprising about 65,000 tons) not likely to be required as men-of-war, which are equal in all respects and superior in many to merchant troop ships, in which the soldiers could be conveyed better and at much less expense than they now are in trading vessels, and by the use of which employment would be given to a number of naval officers, and a valuable addition would be made to the naval reserve.

Condition of men-of-war.

By the official reports of the last surveys held upon these ships, it appears that many of them are "dry, sound, and in good condition," and that most of them are in good order.

Opinions in favour of men-of-war troop ships.

Naval opinions.

Military opinions.

That the employment of men-of-war as troop ships generally is considered by high naval authorities to be advantageous to both branches of the service may be proved by reference to the evidence given by Rear-Admirals Lord Clarence Paget and George Elliot before the Royal Commission on manning the Navy, and also to the Report of the Manning Committee of 1852. It may also be safely asserted that high military authorities are not opposed to soldiers being conveyed in ships bearing the pendant; for all who spoke on the subject before the Committee last Session expressed themselves very much in favour of the Himalaya.

As East India troop ships.

Naval opinions.

Military opinions.

As regards the employment of sailing men-of-war as East India troop ships, I beg to state that I have received communications from a large number of officers of all ranks, admirals, captains of flag and other ships, commanders, secretaries, lieutenants, masters, and warrant officers, the opinions expressed in which are all most favourable to my plan; and I would call special attention to the opinions of General Sir W. Cotton, who speaks of the fine fleet of seventy-fours lying in Hamoaze and Portsmouth harbour, and suggests their being so used; of Major-General Sir A. Tulloch, who recommends the employment of six ships; and of Major-General Pratt, who proposes that "the Royal Navy should equip a sufficient number of troop ships regularly fitted up for the express purpose of transporting troops and military stores of all kinds; whereby the charge for the conveyance of troops would be very greatly diminished, whilst the comfort of the soldiery would be much increased, and without doubt their discipline and efficiency better preserved."

India to be the starting point.

As on the one hand the number of troops proceeding to India is double that of those coming

coming home, and, on the other hand, the rates in merchant vessels paid for men returning to England are much higher than those paid on the outward voyage, it follows that the tonnage of the men-of-war to be employed on this service should be regulated by the number of troops coming home. I propose, therefore, to use as many liners and frigates as may be requisite for the performance of the homeward voyage, letting them return to India with full freights, and allowing the remainder of the soldiers to go out in merchant vessels, as at present.

Money advantage to Indian Government.

By this arrangement the double voyage might be performed for 18 *l.* 16 *s.* per head, including officers; and, as will be seen by the annexed Statement, a saving would be effected in favour of the Indian Government to the extent of 79,492 *l.* a year. This sum is arrived at after charging (at the rate of 4 *l.* 2 *s.* per ton) the whole expense of equipping and fitting the ships, allowing for wear and tear 3 *l.* per ton, or double the sum usually inserted: giving 10 men for every 100 tons, or more than twice the complement required in transports hired by Government, calculating full pay for the officers, with very high ratings, and continuous service wages for all the crews, and at the same time taking the estimate formed at the India office for the passage-money in merchant vessels. If the average of the rates actually paid for five years be taken as those which will have to be paid in future, the saving every year will amount to 144,644 *l.*

Money advantage to Admiralty.

Taking the less favourable estimate, not only would the Indian Exchequer be relieved to the extent of 80,000 *l.* per annum, but the Navy Estimates would be benefited by upwards, annually, of 37,000 *l.*; employment would be given to about 240 officers; and more than 1,700 petty officers and seamen, trained in gunnery and used to the discipline of men-of-war, would be added to the reserve. If, however, an increase to the Naval Reserve should be considered more desirable than a reduction in Indian expenditure, the whole of the troops both ways could be conveyed in men-of-war; and even then, although the ships would not be full on the homeward voyage, the service would be performed at about the same cost to the Indian Exchequer as that which will probably be incurred for the use of merchant vessels. In this case the money advantage to the Admiralty would be about 70,000 *l.* a year, and the reserves would be increased to the extent of about 3,400 men.

I would here observe:—

Ships to be comfortably fitted.

1. That the ships could be fitted with every convenience for the troops; that they could be "floating barracks, in which the soldiers could enjoy and maintain a state of comfort, health, and efficiency inferior only by a few degrees to what they would enjoy in garrison on shore."

Troops to be drilled on voyage.

2. That the troops would be enabled to be drilled and disciplined on board the men-of-war in the manner pointed out by Sir James Outram in his minute of 11 February 1860, printed at pages 134 to 156 of Parliamentary Paper, No. 330; advantages which they could not possibly enjoy in merchant ships.

Ships might call at several ports.

3. That if occasionally the number of soldiers or invalids ready for embarkation at one port in India should not be sufficient to fill a ship, she might call at other ports, such as Madras, Ceylon, or the Mauritius, to fill up.

Convalescent station at Cape.

4. That some of the troops might be left at the Cape, if that were made an intermediate station for invalids, as proposed by several Indian officers, without additional cost.

Delay in India not add to cost.

5. That although the time required for the performance of the "double voyage," including a month's stay in India, would only be three-fourths of the year, the estimated expense of men-of-war has been taken for 12 months, so that a delay in India, of even two or three months, would not increase the cost of the men-of-war; whereas in the case of merchant vessels, detained under similar circumstances, a charge for demurrage, which is described by Mr. Willoughby as being frequently very heavy, would be incurred.

Stores might be taken.

6. That the men-of-war might take considerable portions of the large quantities of stores sent out annually to India; the freight now payable on which would be thereby saved.

Effect on market.

7. That the employment of Her Majesty's ships for the transport of so large a number of the troops would tend to reduce the rate which would have to be paid for those remaining to be sent out in merchant vessels.

Ordinary guard ships might be reduced.

8. That the removal of so many ships from the sailing ordinary would be advantageous, as making room for other ships at the several ports, and with the numbers so reduced it might be practicable, by confining the remainder to one or two of the ports, to do away with the guard-ships of sailing ordinary at the others.

Employment of officers of Indian Navy.

9. That the establishment of an organised transport service for India might give an opening for the employment of some of the officers of the Indian Navy, who may otherwise be pensioned and placed on half-pay, and might also be the means of inducing many of the seamen unengaged in the East India passenger ships to enter the Royal Navy.

Conclusion.

Seeing, then, that this proposal contains advantages for the naval, military, and Indian services, and that its adoption would considerably relieve the present demands on the Imperial and Indian treasuries, I confidently submit it for favourable consideration, and I trust that

Appendix, No. 5.

that even if it should not be deemed prudent to immediately carry out the scheme as a whole, the facts and opinions now brought forward may be sufficient to induce the Government to allow a trial to be made forthwith by the employment of at least three of the men-of-war which may be considered suitable for the conveyance of troops.

Transport Branch,
Admiralty, Somerset House,
April 1861.

Rowley Richardson.

COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE of the Expense of carrying 9,840 Officers and Troops to India, and of bringing 9,000 Officers and Troops (including 4,000 Invalids) from India to England.

		Including full Charge for Messing and Victualling Troops.		After deducting Mess Contribution and Ration Stoppage.	
		Total.	Rate per Head.	Total.	Rate per Head.
		£.	£. s. d.	£.	£. s. d.
At the rates actually paid between 1852 and 1857	Merchant vessels: passage-money of officers and troops.	498,046	26 9 10	428,125	22 15 5
	Men-of-war: fitting and equipping, wear and tear, pay and wages, provisions, &c.	353,402	18 16 -	283,481	15 1 7
	Difference - - - £.	144,644	7 13 10	144,644	7 13 10
At the rates estimated by Colonel Baker, of India Office	Merchant vessels: passage-money of officers and troops.	432,894	23 - 6	362,973	19 6 1
	Men-of-war, as above	353,402	18 16 -	283,481	15 1 7
	Difference - - - £.	79,492	4 4 6	79,492	4 4 6

If insurance be charged on men-of-war, the annual premium would amount to about 8 *s.* 6 *d.* per head.

Annual money advantage to the Admiralty if 17 men-of-war be employed as East India troop ships:

	£.
Half-pay, &c. of naval officers to be employed	18,795
Money value of services of seamen to be added to the reserve	16,169
Wages and provisions of men employed on board the ships while in ordinary	1,441
Expense of maintaining the ships in ordinary	1,020
£.	37,425

THE preceding is the substance of a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated the 19th February 1861, and which was forwarded to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by the Comptroller of Transport Services on the 25th of that month, with a Memorandum of which the following is a copy, viz.:—

"In forwarding to their Lordships the accompanying papers, which are brought forward by Mr. Richardson in accordance with the sanction conveyed in their order of the 27th July last, I feel assured they will appreciate the ability that has been displayed and the pains that have been taken by that gentleman in the compilation of his scheme, which is, I think, well adapted for the performance under ordinary circumstances of a portion, at least, of the assumed annual troop services between this country and India, provided, of course, that the sailing ships, to which Mr. Richardson adverts, are available and found suitable for the purpose. Experience has shown that when there is a return service suited to the capacity of the vessel, it is, as a measure of economy, more advantageous to employ Queen's ships than to hire freight, especially when the troops are to be conveyed to or brought from a distant station. As regards discipline and its natural results, health, efficiency, and comfort, there can scarcely be a doubt of the superiority of the one over the other. I do not, however, think much benefit will be derived in the conveyance of stores by such ships, for when the provisions and water for the crew and troops, with the baggage of the latter, are on board, there will be little available space, if any, for cargo. I do not think it necessary to make any observations on the expediency of the measure as a means of creating a reserve of seamen.

Charles Richards,
Comptroller of Transport Services.

Appendix, No. 6.

PAPER delivered in by *Charles Alexander Wood*, Esq., 2 May 1861.

MEMORANDUM.

HAVING received from the Chairman of the Transport Committee three Papers, marked No. 1, 2, and 3, delivered in on the 11th instant, No. 1 by Captain Charles Eden, R.N., C.B., Nos. 2 and 3 by William Willis, Esq., on the comparative cost of conveying troops in Government and hired ships; and having been requested to consider whether, in consequence of these returns, I wish to modify the opinion I have expressed to the Committee on that question; and referring to my answers to Questions 2191, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, and also 2215, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:

1st. As regards Paper No. 1.

I fear this return, in its present form, will not furnish the information necessary for a correct comparison of the two systems. It will be observed that Government ships are charged with wages and victuals of crew only for the number of days actually on the voyage. But these have also to be paid while the ships are in England; and I submit that the proper form of the return would be one showing what these vessels cost, and what they earn per annum, crediting the account with the services which they actually perform, and debiting it with the rates at which the same services could be performed by hired ships. It will be seen that, in answer to Question 2191, as to the comparative cost of the two systems, I gave in an extract from the evidence of Sir Alexander Milne, before the Manning Commission, that this able and experienced officer was not favourable to an exclusive use, for sea transport, of Government vessels; and that he supported his opinion by returns printed in the Appendix of the Transport Blue Book, at pages 387–8. These returns are in a better form, and will be found to show that in 1857 the cost of transport was quite 100 per cent. higher in Government than hired vessels. But even these returns do not include any charges for interest on the original cost, insurance, or redemption of capital, or the deadweight of the country, on account of half-pay and pensions. To arrive at an accurate comparison, the latter should be charged; and there should also be added interest at say 3 ½ per cent. on the original cost, and redemption of capital at 7 ½ per cent., and also insurance, which is low at six per cent. It is not, I am aware, the practice to insure Queen's ships; but in the present calculation, insurance must be charged, since it is in evidence that five out of ten of the Government owned transports have been lost. If to the sums already debited to Government vessels in the returns furnished by Sir Alexander Milne, these further charges be added, the balance in favour of hired transports would then be much larger than 100 per cent.

2ndly. As regards Paper No. 2.

Return (F) is not the actual, but only an "estimated" comparative cost of performing certain voyages, out and home, in Government and freight ships. The basis of calculation is not given; but since the return omits interest, redemption of capital, and insurance, it does not give the information necessary to enable the Committee to compare the two systems. It is, however, open to remark, that while in three cases mentioned in the margin, of short voyages, the balance is in favour of Government ships, in three others, also mentioned in the margin, of long voyages, where the cost of actual and not "assumed" services is given, there is a balance of more than 50 per cent. in favour of hired ships.

1. Mediterranean.
2. Canada and Nova Scotia.
3. West Indies.

1. Cape, St. Helena and Ascension.
2. Algoa Bay.
3. Australia and New Zealand.

Return (G).—This return gives a comparative statement of conveying to and from India 12,000 officers and their families, in Government steamers and sailing freight ships, and shows an annual saving in favour of the former of no less than 218,272 *l.*; but the statement is open to much observation, and instead of the balance being as stated, it will be shown to be very largely in favour of hired vessels.

Appendix, No. 6.

On the one hand, as in the former Table, the Government ships have not been debited with interest, redemption of capital, and insurance. These items, therefore, have to be added to the annual expense of each steamer. That charge would then stand as follows:—

	£.	£.
Annual cost, as estimated		38,938
Interest on 122,000 *l.*, at 3½ per cent.	£. 3,965	
Redemption of capital, at 7½ per cent.	9,150	
Insurance, at 6 per cent.	7,320	
		20,435
	£.	59,373

But from that sum must be deducted the cost of messing and victualling one-fourth of the number sent out, for whom, as absorbed in India, no return passages will be required, say 542 *l.* for each ship; thus making the charge per ship 58,831 *l.*, and the gross charge for 13 Government ships, 764,803 *l.*

On the other hand, the cost of the freight sailing ships is taken not only at far too high a rate, but also for a larger number than will actually have to be brought home.

First, as to the cost of passage. The estimated rate is 23 *l.* 9 *s.* per man each way, or one-half of 46 *l.* 18 *s.*, being the average cost actually incurred by the East India Company for all transport to and from India during five years, namely, 1852–3 to 1856–7. The actual average price per man, outwards to all the Presidencies, for a period of ten years,* was 11 *l.* 17 *s.* 6 *d.* (*vide* Transport Blue Book, p. 330), and for the present calculation passages outwards and homewards may be estimated for, at the rate specified in Mr. Walcott's Report of the 27th March 1860, addressed to Sir Alexander Tulloch (*vide* same Report, page 294). It is there shown, that sailing ships may be chartered, for the double voyage, out and home, at rates not exceeding 30 *l.* per man. On that basis the cost then would be as follows:

	£.	£.
10,472 outwards and homewards, at 30 *l.*	£. 314,160	
Less stoppages at 6 *d.* for 216 days	56,548	
		257,612
3,490 outwards, at 11 *l.* 17 *s.* 6 *d.* (being one-fourth of the whole number)	41,443	
Less stoppages at 6 *d.* for 108 days	9,423	
		32,020
	£.	289,632

To this sum may be added 53,267 *l.*, the estimated loss of service by the additional length of the voyage in sailing ships (but which charge is open to observation), making together with 78,718 *l.* charged for officers (a charge also admitting of reduction), a gross sum of 421,617 *l.*

The result of the foregoing calculations will be shown more clearly by the following abstract:

Government Steam Transports.		Hired Sailing Ships.	
	£.		£.
Annual cost according to Return (G.) of each vessel	38,938	Passages outwards and homewards for 10,472 adults, at 30 *l.* the double voyage, less the usual stoppages	257,612
Deduct for messing and victualing men not carried homewards	542	Passages outwards only, for 3,490 adults (being one-fourth of the whole number), at 11 *l.* 17 *s.* 6 *d.*, less the usual stoppages	32,020
	38,396		
Add for interest, redemption of capital, and insurance	20,435	Officers as estimated	† 78,718
	58,831	Loss of services as estimated	‡ 53,267
Or for 13 Vessels £.	764,803	£.	421,617

Balance

* This period included (1) Australian Gold Discoveries; (2) Russian War; and (3) Indian Mutiny. In ordinary times the average outwards has not much exceeded 10 guineas.

† This sum admits of reduction, as many officers return overland, and some die or remain in India.

‡ If troops be moved in entire battalions and not drafts, the item may be wholly struck out. It may also be observed, that if Indian service be reduced to five years, a further large saving on the cost of Indian reliefs, viz., for soldiers' families, may be effected, and greatly to their comfort.

Balance in favour of hired sailing ships, 343,186 *l.*; and being a difference, as compared with the abstract given in Paper (G.), of 561,458 *l.*, or upwards of half a million sterling on only one year's Indian reliefs. Appendix, No. 6.

3dly. As regards Paper No. 3.

This return gives a statement of the cost of the "Himalaya" for the year 1859, and of the sum that would have been payable for freight, if the services she performed within the year had been carried on in hired ships. In this case a balance is shown in favour of the Government ship of 5,184 *l.* 16 *s.* 9 *d.* But taking the original cost of the ship to have been say 130,000 *l.*, if there be added for interest (3½ per cent.) 4,225 *l.*, redemption of capital (7½ per cent.) 9,750 *l.*, and insurance (6 per cent.) 7,800 *l.*, together making 21,775 *l.*, the gross cost of the ship would be 65,425 *l.* 14 *s.* 5 *d.*, and the balance then would be in favour of hired freight, to the extent of 16,590 *l.* 3 *s.* 3 *d.*

Such then being the result of an analytical examination, as to cost, of the returns placed in my hands, I should wish to be permitted to recapitulate some facts, which I believe to be indisputable, bearing on the question before the Committee:—

1. Steam ships cannot, on long voyages, be navigated as cheaply as sailing vessels.
2. Hired ships are paid for only when actually wanted.
3. First class vessels suitable for carrying men, can always be obtained from the Merchant Service; and as to speed, safety, and accommodation, are not to be surpassed by any Government transports that have as yet been commissioned.
4. Merchant ships carrying on the outward and homeward voyages, a quantity of cargo on freight, frequently amounting, after deducting their victualing, to one half the sum paid for the troops, have an advantage which Government troop ships cannot possess, and of course can carry troops cheaper, because the cost of the whole voyage is not based on their conveyance exclusively. In illustration of this it may be seen, on reference to the prices paid in 1850, 51 and 56 (*vide* Transport Blue Book, pp. 319, 320, and 324), when outward freights were probably very low, troops have been conveyed to India at almost nominal rates, and below 40 *s.* per man, exclusive of victualling.
5. When out and home work cannot be relied on (and sometimes political or other events will disturb the military arrangements), Government vessels, at heavy cost, must either return without earning a back freight, or be kept idle on the foreign station. But in the case of merchant vessels, they either cease to be in Government pay on the completion of their outward voyage, or, if engaged for a double voyage, that engagement may be cancelled for a moderate compensation, which ought to be fixed by the charter, and the ships would then fall back on the freight market, and bring produce to England instead of troops, an advantage which no Government ship can command. It may possibly be urged, that Government ships would carry, besides troops, public stores. To some extent, such shipments might be safely made. But, as a general rule, ordnance stores forming the bulk of those for which Government conveyance has to be provided, ought not to be largely shipped in vessels carrying troops. To effect quick and also safe passages, troop ships ought not to be heavily burthened with stores of this description; and for Indian reliefs, when competing against hired ships, Government vessels would get little help from Government stores, as these are chiefly an outward cargo; while ships trading to India look more to their homeward cargo, and at double or treble the rate of outward freight, an advantage on which a Government ship could not calculate.
6. But though, for ordinary reliefs, and more especially the Indian reliefs, hired ships are preferable to Government transports, and for the latter service the disuse of steamers has recently been recommended by a Committee of the House of Commons (Par. Pap. on East India Transport, No. 382, of 1858), I am, nevertheless, of opinion, as stated in my answer to Question 2189, that for Imperial interests, it is advantageous to Government to possess "a few troop ships of very superior class." I showed that, except the "Himalaya," the present transports make slow voyages, and consequently are not such as ought to be retained in the Troop Transport Service. I avail myself of this opportunity to add, that though for transporting men on long voyages, steamers are far more expensive than sailing vessels, and, for ordinary reliefs, cannot be recommended, still, for the transport of horses, I am by no means sure that it may not be found expedient to use steam on nearly every occasion. My impression is, that for the latter service, taking into account the condition and value of the horse, and the importance of its being relieved as soon as possible from the confinement of a ship, the advantages derivable from steam are so great, that its employment, though a very expensive agency, is, in this case, justifiable.

In conclusion, I would submit that any new vessels which Government may seek to acquire for the transport service should be constructed expressly, and with reference to the conveyance of horses; as, in the event of any sudden emergency for this service, suitable vessels, with the requisite fittings, might not be procurable from the merchant service.

30 April 1861. *C. Alexander Wood.*

Appendix, No. 7.

STATEMENT showing the Numbers of OFFICERS, MEN, &c., conveyed in HIRED STEAM VESSELS, Coastwise, during *West Indies*, during

FROM	TO	REGIMENT.	NUMBERS CONVEYED.								NAME OF VESSEL.
			Officers.	Ladies.	Officers' Children.	Servants.	Men.	Women.	Soldiers' Children.	Horses.	
Liverpool	Dublin	14th Dragoons	7	–	–	–	187	12	10	7	Trafalgar
Portsmouth	Cork	Lanark Militia	9	–	–	–	394	21	33	2	Preussischer Adler
Ditto	ditto	ditto	12	1	4	–	301	25	44	2	Dodo
Troon	ditto	North Cork Rifles	9	–	–	–	307	29	42	3	Temora
Ditto	ditto	ditto	6	–	–	–	262	29	29	–	ditto
Dublin	Liverpool	5th Lancers	7	–	–	–	180	13	23	123	Windsor
Ditto	ditto	ditto	5	1	–	–	98	–	–	106	Trafalgar
Ditto	ditto	ditto	6	2	6	–	199	27	33	118	Windsor
Ditto	ditto	ditto	7	1	–	–	112	–	–	119	ditto
Plymouth	Dublin	Dublin City Militia	8	1	2	–	367	28	59	2	Foyle
Ditto	ditto	ditto	7	1	–	–	214	13	25	2	Lady Eglinton
Fleetwood	Belfast	Antrim Rifles	24	2	7	–	566	7	6	4	Royal Consort
Portsmouth	Waterford	Waterford Artillery	16	2	5	–	267	37	68	1	Malvina
Sheerness	Montrose	Forfar Artillery	12	1	2	–	378	34	50	1	London
Ditto	ditto	ditto	12	–	–	–	184	13	21	–	Queen
Belfast	Liverpool	62d	6	–	–	–	109	–	–	–	Waterloo
Ditto	ditto	63d									
Leith	Thames	Sussex Militia	5	–	–	–	104	14	16	1	Express
Ditto	ditto	ditto	10	–	–	–	192	9	8	2	Caledonia
Thames	Leith	2d Lanark Militia	5	–	–	–	118	12	27	–	Express
Ditto	Granton	ditto	8	–	–	–	140	12	20	2	Clarence
Ditto	Leith	ditto	7	–	–	–	140	14	31	–	Princess Royal
Ditto	ditto	ditto	5	–	–	–	140	15	20	–	Ossian
Leith	Thames	Sussex Militia	5	–	–	–	120	11	7	2	ditto
Granton	ditto	ditto	8	–	–	–	110	7	12	3	Princess Royal
Dublin	Portsmouth	55th Foot	19	2	3	–	405	39	51	2	Foyle
Ditto	ditto	ditto	15	–	–	–	383	35	69	3	Iberia
Liverpool	Cork	Northumberland Militia	12	4	6	–	269	38	36	1	Falcon
Cork	Liverpool	Lancashire Artillery	7	–	–	–	185	9	15	–	ditto
Ditto	ditto	ditto	12	3	1	–	208	18	29	5	Cormorant
Liverpool	Dublin	96th Foot	36	–	–	–	766	71	69	6	Windsor
Ditto	ditto										Trafalgar

Appendix, No. 7.

the Year 1860, together with the Expense thereof; also, of those conveyed to the *Mediterranean, North America,* and the same Year.

RATES OF PASSAGE.																					Amount Paid for Passage and Victualling.	REMARKS.
Officers.			Ladies.			Officers' Children.			Servants.			Men.			Women.			Soldiers' Children.			Horses.				
£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.	d.	£. s. d.	
1	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	–	–	10	–	–	5	–	1	10	–	132 5 5	This amount includes 1 day's rations and 1 day's foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	15	6	–	15	6	–	7	9	2	12	6	455 13 3	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates
1	5	–	1	5	–	–	12	6	–	–		–	15	6	–	15	6	–	7	9	2	12	6	356 9 3	This amount includes 3 days' rations and 3 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	10	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	18	6	–	18	6	–	9	6	4	4	–	399 16 10	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	10	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	18	6	–	18	6	–	9	6	–	–		364 14 –	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	–	–	10	–	–	5	–	1	10	–	1,134 1 1	This amount includes 1 day's rations and 1 day's foraging, at the usual rates.
1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	10	–	–	–		–	–		1	10	–		
1	–	–	1	–	–	–	10	–	–	–		–	10	–	–	10	–	–	5	–	1	10	–		
1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	10	–	–	–		–	–		1	10	–		
1	7	6	1	7	6	–	13	9	–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	2	2	–	342 2 11	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1	7	6	1	7	6	–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	2	2	–	169 16 3	This amount includes 2 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1	1	–	1	1	–	–	10	6	–	–		–	8	6	–	8	6	–	4	3	1	1	–	315 7 –	This amount includes 1 day's rations for the men only, and no foraging.
1	5	–	1	5	–	–	12	6	–	–		–	17	6	–	17	6	–	9	–	4	4	–	385 11 9	This amount includes 3 days' rations and 3 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
–	–		–	–		–	17	–	per head for all			–			–	–		–	–		–	–		461 14 –	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
–	–		–	–		–	17	–	per head for all			–			–	–		–	–		–	–		220 9 2	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	12	6	–	–		–	–		–	–		74 2 6	
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	3	–	–	90 7 8	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	3	–	–	157 17 1	This amount includes 2½ days' rations and 2½ days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	–	–		98 9 3	This amount includes 2 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	3	–	–	120 13 8	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	–	–		117 13 11	This amount includes 2 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	–	–		112 9 2	This amount includes 2 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	3	–	–	99 17 5	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
1	5	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	6	–	10	6	–	5	3	3	–	–	98 17 2	This amount includes 2 days' rations and 2 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
2	–	–	2	–	–	1	–	–	–	–		–	15	–	–	15	–	–	8	–	4	4	–	491 5 –	This amount includes 3 days' rations and 3 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
2	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	15	–	–	15	–	–	8	–	4	4	–	464 17 6	This amount includes 3 days' rations and 3 days' foraging, at the usual rates.
–	17	6	–	17	6	–	10	–	–	–		–	14	–	–	14	–	–	7	–	2	2	–	303 7 9	This amount includes 3 days' rations and 3 days' foraging, at the usual rates (calculated for 269 men, 31 women, and 36 children).
–	17	6	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	14	–	–	14	–	–	7	–	–	–		385 – 1	This amount includes 2½ days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
–	17	6	–	17	6	–	10	–	–	–		–	14	–	–	14	–	–	7	–	2	2	–		This amount includes 1 day's ration and 1 day's foraging, at the usual rates.
1	–	–	–	–		–	–		–	–		–	10	–	–	10	–	–	5	–	1	10	–	480 15 –	

STATEMENT showing the Numbers of Officers, Men, &c., conveyed in Hired Steam Vessels,

FROM	TO	REGIMENT.	NUMBERS CONVEYED.								NAME OF VESSEL.
			Officers.	Ladies.	Officers' Children.	Servants.	Men.	Women.	Soldiers' Children.	Horses.	
Dublin - -	Jersey - -	30th Foot - - -	15	1	2	–	416	45	55	4	Iberia - - -
Ditto - -	ditto - -	- ditto - - -	2	–	–	–	71	7	5	–	Foyle - - -
Ditto - -	Alderney -	- ditto - - -	11	–	–	–	313	27	37	1	ditto - - -
Jersey - -	Dublin - -	15th Foot - - -	22	2	3	–	415	41	54	4	ditto - - -
Alderney - -	ditto - -	- ditto - - -	8	1	–	–	285	20	27	1	Iberia - - -
Jersey - -	ditto - -	- ditto - - -	5	–	–	–	111	10	16	–	ditto - - -
Liverpool - -	ditto - -	14th Dragoons - -	3	–	–	–	91	2	2	–	Windsor - -
Ditto - -	ditto - -	4th Light Dragoons -	27	1	3	–	587	32	49	460	Windsor and Trafalgar
Ditto - -	ditto - -	Fermanagh Militia -	21	2	3	–	471	45	35	5	Windsor - -
Dublin - -	Liverpool -	North Lincoln Militia -	27	2	–	–	859	54	48	5	Windsor and Trafalgar
Liverpool - -	Dublin - -	Donegal Militia - -	25	6	10	–	471	95	17	4	Windsor - -
Dublin - -	Liverpool	2d Stafford Militia -	27	2	1	–	835	68	85	6	Windsor and Trafalgar
Liverpool - -	Dublin - -	Grenadier Guards -	15	–	–	–	662	55	50	4	Prince and Windsor
Dublin - -	Liverpool -	- - ditto - -	17	–	–	–	719	64	57	3	Trafalgar and Princess
Portsmouth -	Warren Point (Newry).	86th - - - -	21	2	1	–	443	45	29	5	Foyle - - -
Ditto - -	Ditto - -	ditto - - - -	8	1	1	–	350	30	37	1	Zephyr - - -
Plymouth - -	Glasgow -	Fife Militia - -	14	4	4	–	357	36	55	1	Foyle - - -
		TOTAL - - -	575	45	64	–	14,861	1,268	1,511	1,021	

MEDITERRANEAN, NORTH AMERICAN,

MEDITERRANEAN:											
England - -	Gibraltar -	- - - - - -	1	–	–	–	52	2	–	–	Indiana (steamer) -
Ditto - -	Corfu - -	- - - - - -	11	3	3	2	314	20	29	1	- - ditto - -
Ditto - -	Malta - -	- - - - - -	1	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	Mail steamer of 4th Feb.
Ditto - -	ditto - -	- - - - - -	1	–	–	–	25	–	–	–	- ditto - - 20th do.
Ditto - -	ditto - -	- - - - - -	1	–	–	–	25	–	–	–	- ditto - - 27th do.
Ditto - -	ditto - -	- - - - - -	1	–	–	–	25	–	–	–	- ditto - - 12th Mar
Ditto - -	ditto - -	- - - - - -	28	1	–	–	581	65	67	5	Olympus (steamer)
NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES:											
England - -	Halifax -	- - - - - -	7	1	1	–	173	4	4	–	Arabian (sailing) -
Ditto - -	Quebec -	- - - - - -	5	1	2	–	122	2	2	1	- - ditto - -
Ditto - -	Halifax -	- - - - - -	4	1	–	–	59	4	6	–	Arabia (steamer) -
Ditto - -	Jamaica -	- - - - - -	5	–	–	–	64	11	14	–	William Hammond (saili
Ditto - -	Barbados -	- - - - - -	6	2	–	–	74	13	5	–	- - ditto - -
		TOTAL - - -	71	9	7	3	1,517	121	127	6	

18 May 1861.

Coastwise, during the Year 1860, together with the Expense thereof, &c.—*continued.*

RATES OF PASSAGE.								Amount Paid for Passage and Victualling.	REMARKS.
Officers.	Ladies.	Officers' Children.	Servants.	Men.	Women.	Soldiers' Children.	Horses.		
£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	
1 10 –	1 10 –	– 15 –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	4 4 –	403 – –	This amount includes 4 days' rations and 4 days' foraging, at the usual rates (calculated for 416 men, 40 women, 55 children.)
1 10 –	– –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	– –	62 11 8	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 10 –	– –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	4 4 –	264 6 6	This amount includes 3 days' rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 10 –	1 10 –	– 15 –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	4 4 –	382 17 3	This amount includes 3 days' rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 10 –	1 10 –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	4 4 –	215 7 4	This amount includes 2 days' rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 10 –	– –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	– –	95 1 3	This amount includes 3 days' rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 – –	– –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	– –	55 16 3	This amount includes 1 day's rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 – –	1 – –	– 10 –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	1,114 15 10	This amount includes 1 day's rations and 1 day's foraging, at the usual rates.
1 – –	1 – –	– 10 –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	330 15 10	This amount includes 1 day's rations and no forage, at the usual rates.
1 – –	1 – –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	505 – –	
1 – –	1 – –	– 10 –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	363 – –	This amount includes 1 day's rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
1 – –	1 – –	– 10 –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	511 5 –	
1 – –	– –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	437 – 2	This amount includes 1 day's rations and 1 day's foraging, at the usual rates.
1 – –	– –	– –	– –	– 10 –	– 10 –	– 5 –	1 10 –	427 5 –	
2 – –	2 – –	1 – –	– –	– 17 6	– 17 6	– 9 –	4 4 –	630 15 7	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates; and rations for 33 men for 1 day extra.
2 – –	2 – –	1 – –	– –	– 17 6	– 17 6	– 9 –	4 4 –	465 17 5	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no foraging, less 2 *l.* 1 *s* 3 *d.*
1 15 –	1 15 –	– 18 –	– –	– 16 –	– 16 –	– 9 –	4 4 –	478 5 8	This amount includes 4 days' rations and no foraging, at the usual rates.
							£.	14,576 15 8	*N.B.*—The rations are cast at the usual daily rates, viz, 1 *s.* 3 *d* per man, 10 *d.* per woman, 5 *d* per child, and the foraging at the usual rate of 1 *s.* 6 *d.* per day.

AND WEST INDIAN SERVICE.

10 – –	– –	– –	– –	7 10 –	6 10 –	– –	– –	413 – –
15 5 –	10 5 –	2 at 3 16 3; 1 at 5 1 8	6 12 6	7 19 6	6 12 6	2 15 –	30 – –	2,970 17 2
13 – –	– –	– –	– –	4 6 8	– –	– –	– –	26 – –
13 – –	– –	– –	– –	10 – –	– –	– –	– –	263 – –
13 – –	– –	– –	– –	10 – –	– –	– –	– –	263 – –
13 – –	– –	– –	– –	10 – –	– –	– –	– –	263 – –
12 – –	12 – –	– –	– –	6 – –	6 – –	3 – –	20 – –	4,525 – –
15 – –	15 – –	3 15 –	– –	6 18 3	6 18 3	3 9 1	– –	1,364 10 8
15 – –	15 – –	3 15 –	6 18 3	6 18 3	6 18 3	3 9 1	– –	972 4 5
19 – –	19 – –	– –	– –	8 – –	8 – –	4 – –	– –	623 – –
25 – –	– –	– –	– –	10 – –	10 – –	5 – –	– –	965 – –
25 – –	25 – –	– –	– –	10 – –	10 – –	5 – –	– –	1,095 – –
							£.	13,743 12 3

Chas. Richards, Comptroller of Transports.

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